

# **'CAR-CHASE TV': THE LEGITIMISATION OF POLICE WORK?**

**By**

**James Deane**


A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire.

July 2016

# STUDENT DECLARATION FORM

## **Concurrent registration for two or more academic awards**


I declare that while registered as a candidate for the research degree, I have not been a registered candidate or enrolled student for another award of the University or other academic or professional institution.



James Deane

## **Material submitted for another award**

I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for an academic award and is solely my own work



James Deane

## **Abstract**

'Car chase TV' has become a staple of U.K. television schedules over the past two decades. Conveyed in a plethora of observational documentaries (ob-docs), mediated images of police vehicular pursuits (PVPs) are packaged as entertainment products. However, the rise of PVPs as a ubiquitous entertainment spectacle has taken place against a backdrop of concern around a steep rise in the human cost of PVPs emanating from police oversight bodies and widely reported in the national press.

This research investigates whether car chase TV tends to legitimise the police, their work, and specifically the problematic practice of PVP. Historical analysis is used to map the developing concern around PVPs from 1900 through to 2011. The thesis then presents the findings of a thematic analysis carried out on an archive of ob-doc 'car-chase TV' programmes broadcast in the UK between 1993 and 2011.

This analysis indicated that such programmes do tend to legitimise the police, police work and PVPs in particular. It also showed that the challenge to the legitimacy of PVPs expressed in official reports, the print media and elsewhere largely failed to permeate the mediated construction of PVPs in the 'car-chase TV' programmes broadcast on the commercial television networks, but did produce a limited response in the programmes broadcast on the BBC television network, a response which tended to (re)legitimise PVPs in the face of these concerns.

The research found that there has been an historical decline in the visibility of PVPs presented in the television programmes contained in the archive, due to various possible factors.

This research is significant in that it examines a hitherto under-developed area of criminal justice research and contributes a unique historical perspective on the issue of PVP. It makes a novel contribution to the literature on the legitimisation of the police in the mediated sphere of television.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page Number</u>
List of Tables and Figures	7
Acknowledgements	9
Abbreviations and Glossary	10
INTRODUCTION	11
Relationship to Other Work	16
Novel findings and propositions	19
CHAPTER 1. BIOGRAPHIES OF SERIES TITLES	20
Introduction	20
Police Stop VHS. 1999 – 1994	20
Police Camera Action (POCA). ITV. 1994 – 2010	23
XCars. BBC One. 1996	25
Car Wars. BBC One. 1999 – 2007	27
Road Wars. Sky One. 2003 – 2009	27
Traffic Cops. BBC One. 2003 – Present	29
Motorway Cops. BBC One. 2003 – Present	30
Police Interceptors. Channel 5. 2008 – Present	30
Closing Remarks	32

CHAPTER 2. LEGITIMACY	34
Legitimacy and Policing by Consent	34
TV Programmes and Legitimacy	39
PVPs and Legitimacy	43
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY	50
Introduction	50
Newspaper Analysis	50
Thematic Analysis (TA) - Sampling of the Video Material	56
The Time-Lag	59
How the Episodes Were Sampled	61
Data Preparation	66
Thematic Analysis – An Explanation	67
The Thematic Analysis of the Data.	69
Research Interview	73
CHAPTER 4. CHRONOLOGY OF CONCERN	77
Introduction	77
1900-1984: Nothing to See Here	78
1985-1998: The Gathering Storm	86
1999-2011: Overtaken by Events	122

CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS	174
Introduction	174
Thematic Analysis Findings	175
Analysis of Findings	190
PVP Causes Danger	190
PVP Minimises Danger	201
The Danger Themes	204
Training	210
Management	220
Adherence to Policy	225
Excitement Cops	226
The Research Questions Answered	232
 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION	 241
List of References	247
 Appendices	 
Appendix 1 – Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material	A1
Appendix 2 – List of 51 Episodes Selected as the Sample	A14
Appendix 3 – Interview Schedule	A17

## List of Tables and Illustrative Material

Figure 1.1. Police Stop 1 VHS Cover	21
Figure 1.2. Police Stop 2 VHS Cover	22
Table 3.1. Number of News Reports Containing Keywords 1980–2011	54
Table 3.2. Episodes Sampled for Research Questions	63
Table 3.3. Strata Sampled and Percentages 1993-2011	65
Table 3.4. Phases of a Thematic Analysis	68
Figure 4.1. Daily Mirror. 7 <sup>th</sup> May 1925. Pg 1	79
Table 4.2. Metropolitan Police PVAs Statistics 1970 – 1984	90
Table 4.3. INQUEST PVP-Related Fatality Statistics 1990 – 1999	101
Figure 4.4. PCA PVP-Related Fatality Statistics 1997/98 – 2000/01	136
Figure 4.5. Daily Star. 25 <sup>th</sup> August 2001. Pg 6	137
Figure 4.6. Daily Express. 25 <sup>th</sup> June 2002. Pg 10	141
Figure 4.7. PCA PVP-Related Fatality Statistics 1997/98 – 2001/02	145
Figure 4.8. Daily Express. 27 <sup>th</sup> January 2005. Pg 1	154
Figure 4.9. The Times. 19 <sup>th</sup> September 2007. Pg 21	162
Figure 4.10. Daily Star 18 <sup>th</sup> September 2007. Pg 15	163

## List of Tables and Illustrative Material (Continued)

Figure 4.11. PCA / IPCC PVP-Related Fatalities 1997/98 - 2011/12	172
Table 5.1. Police Stop. TA Findings. VHS Video (1993 – 1994)	175
Table 5.2. Police Camera Action (POCA). TA Findings. ITV (1995-2008)	177-8
Table 5.3. Instances of Public in Danger Theme in <i>POCA</i> (1995 - 2008)	178
Table 5.4. Instances of PVP Causes Danger Theme in <i>POCA</i> (1995-2008)	178
Table 5.5. X-Cars. TA Findings . BBC One (1996)	180
Table 5.6. Car Wars. TA Findings. BBC One (1999 - 2006)	181
Table 5.7. Traffic Cops. TA Findings. BBC One (2003 – 2011)	182
Table 5.8. Road Wars. TA Findings. Sky One (2003 – 2009)	183-4
Table 5.9. Motorway Cops. TA Findings. BBC One (2009)	185
Table 5.10. Police Interceptors. TA Findings. Channel 5 (2008 - 2011)	186
Table 5.11. Amalgamated TA Findings (All Results)	187
Table 5.12. Amalgamated TA Findings (All results and Percentages)	189
Table 5. 13. POCA. Vignette Recorded & Broadcast Years (2006-2008)	206

## Acknowledgements

The process of researching and writing this PhD thesis has benefitted from the help and support of a number of people on both an academic and personal level. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude here.

In the early stages of the project, the late Barbara Hudson was a source of considerable encouragement, as was Dr David Scott and Graham Gooch.

The exemplary supervision of Michael Cavadino and Martin O'Brien helped me immeasurably and ensured that the thesis was completed; providing inspiration, guidance and encouragement in exactly the right quantities, precisely when they were required. The work was challenging at times, but always conducted within a supervision framework of good humour and support. It would not have been completed without them. Special thanks are also due to Dr Rob Mawby and Dr Tim Owen who examined the thesis in a professional and good-natured manner for which I am grateful. Staff at the National Police College Library and Greater Manchester Police Museum could not have been more helpful and I'd like to acknowledge the help of John Lockett and UCLan research staff; Bogusia and Margaret. I'd also like to acknowledge the contribution of my interview respondent who was very generous with his time and insights into the world of television production.

On a more personal level, my twin brother Martin Deane has provided support in a variety of ways, not least financial. His encouragement has been invaluable. Fellow research students Esther, Munira, Helen and Lola (perhaps unwittingly) provided pastoral support whilst sharing office space. I'd also like to thank my work colleagues, especially Howie for being so flexible with my (often inconvenient) working patterns and likewise the Essentials family. Tom Smith and Dave Orr also merit a mention for their encouragement and support. Finally, I'd like to acknowledge my partner Kim who has been at my side at every step of the way through this journey. It has been tough at times, but her unconditional support and patience has assisted me in more ways than I can possibly ever recount here – thank you so much for everything.

## Abbreviations and Glossary

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
GoPro	A Small Wearable Camera
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary
IDR	Incident Data Recorder or 'Black Box'
IPCC	Independent Police Complaints Commission
Jump-Cut	A Quick Editing Technique
NPIA	National Police Improvement Agency
Ob-Doc	Observational Documentary (Film-making Style)
PCA	Police Complaints Authority
PMI	Pursuit Management Inspector
POCA	Police Camera Action (TV Series)
PVA	Police Vehicle Accident
PVP	Police Vehicular Pursuit
RAC	Royal Automobile Club
Ride-Along	Camera Operator Rides with the Police
Series Title	A Television Series – e.g. Road Wars
TA	Thematic Analysis
T-PAC	Boxing in A Suspect's Vehicle Using Several Police Cars

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents a sociological study of Police Vehicular Pursuits (PVP) and their depiction in observational documentary (ob-doc) television programmes. In addition this thesis also traces the historical development of concern around the issue of PVPs using a variety of sources.

The concept of vehicular 'pursuit and capture' in law-enforcement is certainly not a new one and can be traced back to the introduction of the motor vehicle (Laybourn & Taylor: 2011). This simple narrative can be seen in both fictional and 'factual' images of policing across a variety of media products. Always popular in a fictional setting (Sparks: 1992; Bignell: 2005), this simple 'pursuit and capture' narrative has steadily made inroads into 'factual' programming (Doyle: 2003). In the modern mass-mediated world, '[T]elevision circulates the cultural images through which we understand aspects of our social world ranging from our own identities to our concepts of right and wrong' (Cavender & Deutsch: 2007. 68). Modern crime-related television programming spans an ever-widening array of formats and hybrid genres (O'Sullivan: 2005).

Conveyed by these television formats PVPs, initially in the form of video clips and later as part of programmes employing the ob doc format, series titles such as *Police Camera Action (POCA)*, *Police Interceptors*, *Road Wars*, *Traffic Cops*, *XCars*, *Motorway Cops* and *Car Wars* have become familiar staples of the U.K.'s television landscape.

The format originated in North America during the late 1980s, with the popular and long-running series *COPS*, which is widely cited as the first television programme to utilise the 'ride-along' production style with the police, offering viewers the opportunity to '...engage in some vicarious slum travel' (Valverde: 2006. 107). This type of ob doc programming is an attractive proposition for television companies in that the content is relatively cheap to produce (Fishman: 1998), easy to syndicate worldwide (Palmer: 1998), and is deliberately non time-specific which facilitates repeat airings for maximum flexibility within television schedules.

This highly successful format has been imitated and widely adopted internationally (Doyle: 2003; Surette: 2011).

These images of PVP are significant because it can be argued that they complete a 'half formed picture' (Hurd: 1981. 57; Mawby: 2003) of PVPs to the viewers of these 'car-chase TV' products, as they are unlikely to have any direct first-hand experience of the phenomena themselves. Furthermore, images of PVPs are conveyed against a backdrop of significant numbers of serious and fatal injuries caused by PVPs in the world outside the sanitised mediated construction of PVPs contained in 'car-chase TV' products (IPCC: 2007).

As the final stages of this thesis were being prepared, PVPs were once again propelled to the top of the news agenda after a tragedy unfolded in Liverpool. PC Dave Phillips was killed on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October whilst deploying a 'stop-stick' tyre deflation device in an attempt to stop a fleeing Mitsubishi four-by-four. The incident and subsequent investigation were extensively reported across a variety of news platforms (BBC: 2015; Thomas & Siddle: 2015; Hopkins: 2015) and the subsequent funeral was televised live by the BBC News and Sky TV channels.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of October Jeremy Vine's BBC Radio 2 show devoted over ten minutes to the death of PC Phillips and questions were raised about the danger presented by deploying officers on foot to attempt to stop vehicles, often driving erratically and at high-speed, using tyre-deflation devices. The tragedy also featured prominently in the flagship evening news programmes broadcast on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October by the BBC, ITV and Channel 4.

In addition, Channel 4 News also broadcast an investigation into the Metropolitan Police's 'Operation Venice' which was aiming to tackle a 144% rise in crimes committed by young moped riders, including muggings and smash-and-grab raids on jewellery shops. This news report – and a subsequent follow-up story broadcast on the 7<sup>th</sup> October - suggested that those involved in this scooter-based criminal subculture were well aware of a police directive not to pursue motorcyclists without helmets.

Therefore, it was claimed that when pursued by police vehicles, the suspects would simply jettison their helmets and force the police to abandon the pursuit. This report has clear parallels with the work of Laybourn & Taylor (2011: 187) who examined the development of fears around 'mobile criminality' during the early years of mass motorised transport; fuelled by an increase in street robberies and smash-and-grab raids carried out across the U.K. during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Similarly, the Channel 4 news reports also contained echoes of the fear around the mobile criminality of the mods and rockers during the 1960s (Cohen: 2002).

The death of PC Dave Phillips was the most recent example of the danger posed to police officers by the attempted deployment of a 'stinger' or 'stop-stick' tyre deflation devices. Previous cases have occurred in 1999 (Morris: 1999c) and 2003 (Twomey: 2003), with the latter resulting in the deaths of two police officers in a single incident.

As we shall see in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), news-media interest in PVPs tends to fluctuate and is stimulated by dramatic, unusual or sensational cases. However, in the entertainment sphere, PVPs are a seemingly ubiquitous component in popular films, television dramas, video games and 'car-chase TV' programmes. This disconnect between the varying levels of attention given to potentially deadly PVPs by these different media platforms is an interesting topic for analysis.

There is a paucity of U.K. based literature relating to PVPs in a mass-mediated setting, despite the ubiquity of 'car-chase TV' programmes on U.K. television. As will be examined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern') PVPs are responsible for a sizeable number of fatalities each year, which renders this lack of criminological attention somewhat puzzling. There exists a disconnect between the mass-mediated images of PVPs conveyed by 'car-chase TV' and the news reports detailing the fatalities and serious injuries caused by PVPs in the national press. This thesis therefore addresses an under-researched policy area.

The research questions which form the basis of this research are the following:

1. Do PVP-based TV programmes legitimise the police and police work? If so, how do they do this?
2. Did PVP-based programmes alter in response to public and official concern about PVPs expressed during the period 2001-2005? If so, how?
3. Has the visibility of PVPs conveyed in the TV programmes been subject to a decline over time? If so, why might this be the case?

Research Question One was formulated in order to examine how the police, police work generally and PVPs - a controversial crime-fighting tactic – are conveyed in a mass-mediated setting. Using Thematic Analysis (TA) a sample of ‘car-chase’ TV programmes was examined in order to identify potentially legitimising and delegitimising content.

The chronological component of Research Question Two was calibrated to include both the peaks in official concern and the subsequent spikes in print-media news reporting which occurred during 2001 – 2005. As will be examined in Chapter 4 (‘Chronology of Concern’) it was theorised that these periods of heightened concern might have produced a demonstrable alteration in the ‘car-chase TV’ programmes. As with Research Question One, TA was utilised on the relevant sample to examine this question.

Research Question Three addresses a relatively simple question and was prompted by the perception of the researcher during the compilation of the research archive of video material from which the research data was sampled. PVPs appeared to be increasingly absent from the more contemporaneous archive material. Using a basic quantitative approach, the frequency and duration of PVP-related events in the video sample data would be quantified in order to test the hypothesis underpinning this research question. If correct, then the altogether more complex issue of providing potential explanations for this decline would also be necessary.

This thesis comprises six chapters. In the first of these, (‘Biographies of Series Titles’) the eight ‘car-chase TV’ programmes that comprise the data sample used during the TA exercise in Chapter 5 (‘Findings and Analysis’) will be examined.

Details relating to the broadcast periods, presentational style and other salient factors will be outlined.

Chapter 2 ('Legitimacy') addresses the theoretical issue of legitimacy in terms of its definition and application to PVPs both generally and in the specific context of its potential relevance to 'car-chase TV' programmes.

Chapter 3 ('Methodology') introduces the various methodologies which were utilised to produce the thesis. These include an explanation of the approach used to produce the historical analysis in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern') and the TA exercise conducted in Chapter 5 ('Findings and Analysis') before concluding with a discussion of the methodology underpinning the research interview which fed into various parts of the thesis. This chapter also discusses the formulation of the research questions, their rationale and their relation to the methods utilised to examine them.

Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern') draws upon material gathered using an extensive national newspaper archive search alongside a variety of official reports, policy documents and other literature to synthesise a unique historical analysis of the development of concern around the issue of PVPs from 1900 to 2011. The peaks in this concern, prompted by large spikes in the number of PVP-related fatalities are also identified along with details of the responses of the U.K.'s police oversight bodies.

Chapter 5 ('Findings and Analysis') contains a discussion of the findings produced by the TA conducted on a stratified random sample of video material contained in a large purpose-built archive of 'car-chase TV' programmes. These findings are presented in two sections. The first of these contains the quantitative results of the TA in table-form, with the potentially relevant themes being identified within the data sample. These findings are then briefly discussed in order to explore any patterns, trends or other interesting features contained within the data which relate to the research questions.

In the second section of Chapter 5 ('Results and Analysis') a more detailed discussion of the findings is undertaken, which involves a comprehensive analysis of relevant case-studies which draw on illustrative examples which are relevant to the research questions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings in relation to the research questions which are then answered.

Chapter 6 ('Conclusion') considers the findings and the answers to the research questions.

## **Relationship to Other Work**

The majority of existing literature relating to PVPs takes the form of officially produced material which includes annual reports, management guidelines and other publications emanating from the U.K.'s various police oversight bodies and from within the criminal justice system (See for example Lind: 1998; ACPO: 2004, 2009; Best & Eves: 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Docking et al: 2007). Much of this work has been stimulated by an unprecedented rise in the number of PVP-related civilian fatalities which occurred at the turn of the millennium and peaked in 2001-02 and again in 2005-06. Whilst this material is directly relevant to the issue of PVPs in practical or policy terms, it does not address the ways that PVPs are depicted on television or in the national print media. These documents will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern').

There also exists a small amount of broadly similar, official PVP-related material produced in Australia (Hoffmann & Mazerolle: 2005; Brewer & McGrath: 1990; Lyneham & Hewitt-Rau: 2013; Palmer: 2003; Hoffmann: 2003), but this is dwarfed by the sheer volume of North American literature which comprises several hundred journal articles and policy documents (see Alpert & Lum: 2014 for an overview). The majority of this research has limited utility due to geographical, social and legal considerations.

A second type of relevant literature analyses the presentation of police and police work in different mass media. For example, there is a wealth of existing literature focussing on the long-running North American police 'ride-along' style ob-doc

series, *COPS* which has garnered a great deal of academic attention (Doyle: 1998, 2003; Fishman: 1998, 1999; Cotter et al: 2008; Valverde: 2006; Hallett & Powell: 1995; Kooistra et al: 1998; Monk-Turner et al: 2007; Grant: 1992). However, this is again limited to North America and rarely involves PVPs.

In a U.K. setting, the long-running television series *Crimewatch* has been the focus of previous police-media research (Jermyn: 2003, 2007; Emerson-Dobash et al: 1998; Schlesinger & Tumber: 1994. Chapter 9; Jewkes: 2015. Chapter 6), however this programme does not feature PVPs. Similarly, there exists a significant amount of prior research into the fictional portrayal of policing and police work on television and popular film (Sidney-Smith: 2002; Hurd 1979; Laing: 1991; Clarke: 1992; O'Sullivan: 2005; Reiner: 2000b; Rafter 2006).

Of greater relevance to this thesis are a number of research studies which relate to media representations of policing in a 'reality' television, news media or other 'factual' settings. Among these, Lee & McGovern (2014) have produced ground breaking research into police communication strategies in Australia which examines the rapidly increasing police engagement with 'reality' television and social media. Similarly, Leishman and Mason (2003: Chapter 7), Mason (2003) and Palmer (1998) have examined the development of police-based 'reality' television programmes and the blurring of the boundaries between 'factual' and fictional images of the police and police-work. Reiner (1994, 2000, 2008) has also written extensively in the area of police-media relations with a particular focus on tracing the development of both pro and anti-police television documentaries, which he argues has taken place against a backdrop of a general increase in the visibility of the police in both fictional and 'factual' mass-mediated settings.

Parallels also exist between this thesis and other research which has sought to examine the manner in which crime news is produced and reported in an increasingly politicised and mass-mediated setting.

Among these, work examining the construction of crime stories in the news media was produced by Chibnall (1977) and this research was developed with a sharper focus on the relationship between the police and journalists in two classic works by Ericson et al (1989, 1991).

Broadly similar research was published by Schlesinger & Tumber (1994: Chapter 7), which outlined the approach utilised by the police institution when attempting to bolster their legitimacy when faced with potentially scandalous practices, pressure groups or a variety of other threats in a mass-mediated setting.

Also closely related to this thesis is research which seeks to explore the 'behind the scenes' processes which underpin the production of televisual images of the police. Among these the work of Colbran (2014) is noteworthy, taking as its focus the interplay between media professionals and the police in the making of the long-running television programme *The Bill*. Perlmutter (2000) conducted ethnographic research into the effect that mass-mediated images of the police in a reality TV setting had on 'real' officers working in North America.

Research conducted by Mawby is also relevant to the thesis (2002: 143-148), as his research into police 'image work' examines the development of police – media cooperation in the context of increasingly organised public relations initiatives by the police with the aim of securing positive images of their organisation.

These media analyses have all informed the thesis that follows, but none of them address the issue of PVPs directly.

Therefore, despite a wealth of literature in both of the categories outlined above, there is a paucity of research which examines the convergence between these two research strands. Specifically, there is a large body of official literature directly related to PVP, but not in a mediatised setting and there is a wealth of literature relating to police-media relations – including some which addresses police ob-docs - but very little which relates to PVP. This thesis bridges this gap in criminological knowledge by examining PVPs in two contrasting U.K. media settings; both in national newspapers and situated within ob-doc television programmes.

## **Novel Findings and Propositions**

This research has found that 'car-chase TV' programming tends overall to legitimise the police, their work and their undertaking of PVPs. This can be seen in terms of a 'mixed economy of legitimisation' which tends to legitimise PVPs in different ways according to the public service or commercial broadcast models. The commercially broadcast 'car-chase TV' programmes in the data sample did not demonstrate any alterations in their content to reflect the concern expressed around the issue of PVPs in the 'real world'; however, the BBC- broadcast programmes did. The research also found that even though the public service (BBC) broadcast material appears to contain challenges to the legitimacy of PVPs, these challenges are subsequently trumped by a tendency to focus on re-legitimising themes. The thesis concludes with the finding that PVPs have been subject to a decline in their visibility over the chronological duration of the data sample, a number of possible reasons for which are discussed during the 'Conclusion' chapter of this thesis.

## CHAPTER 1. BIOGRAPHIES OF SERIES TITLES

### Introduction

This chapter contains a short biography of each of the eight series titles which contributed to the data sample, the details of which are contained in Chapter 3 ('Methodology'). The aim is to familiarise the reader with the different traits, tendencies and approaches adopted by each of these series titles. Although this kind of 'car-chase TV' programming can appear at first glance to be a generic television format, upon further inspection it becomes apparent that they differ in a variety of ways. Alongside an examination drawing out these differences, the development of 'car-chase TV' programming will also be discussed.

### **Police Stop VHS. 1993-1994.**

This was a highly successful VHS video series featuring footage provided by the police using their nascent mobile-video recording technology. An independent television production company discovered that the police had approximately 50 hours of raw video material featuring a variety of traffic incidents ranging from the bizarre and amusing to the more conventional, which included high-speed PVPs and spectacular accidents. Inspector David Rowland, who was part of the traffic division within the Metropolitan Police assisted in the negotiations which resulted in the raw footage being released to Labyrinth Media. This media company had previously produced a variety of commercial VHS titles on a diverse range of topics which included *UFOs*, *Tai Chi*, *Visitors from Space* and the *Old Wild West*.

Inspector Rowland was subsequently employed by Labyrinth Media both as a consultant and co-presenter of the *Police Stop* series, which comprised five VHS videos released between 1993 and 1995. The majority of the footage featured in *Police Stop 1 & 2* was filmed by the Metropolitan Police, with *Police Stop 3* and *4* being mainly comprised of international material.

The format was narrated by the well-known actor Graham Cole who played PC Tony Stamp in the long-running television series, *The Bill*, with Inspector Rowland providing the opening introduction in full police uniform; adding the official 'police voice' and burnishing the production with a veneer of institutional authenticity.




Figure 1.1. Police Stop 1 VHS Cover.

The VHS cover for *Police Stop 1* (Figure 1.1.) states that:

*'Police Stop is a high-speed, white knuckle ride through the often dangerous...world of the country's traffic cops. No actors, no stuntmen, no script – but every minute as exciting as the movies at their best – this is real-life action, as it happens, captured on camera by the police to put you behind the wheel on some of their hairiest pursuits...so join the force for 50 minutes of non-stop action.'*

This statement represents a ‘call to action’, enlisting the viewer to vicariously join in the pursuits featured in the video. In an era when mobile video recording technology was still relatively expensive and inaccessible, the *Police Stop* series took advantage of both the novelty and availability of police-authored video material to bring a brand of, ‘...constructed police reality’ (Mason: 2003. 4) directly into the homes of the public who were then able to view the work of the police on their domestic VCR machines.




Figure 1. 2. Police Stop 2 VHS Cover.

A photograph of Rowland was featured on the front cover of the VHS cassette case for *Police Stop 2* (Figure 1.2.) alongside the Metropolitan Police logo. The inclusion of this logo in such a prominent position confers a degree of authenticity to the product contained within, which itself is an early example of a partnership between the police and private media companies. Many of the U.K. PVPs featured in this series involved the attempted capture of armed robbers and other ‘serious’ criminals. Perhaps unsurprisingly given its age, the footage featured in *Police Stop* is of very poor quality.

Clearly a product of its time, the overall presentation is one which harks back to the early days of the format. Filmed mainly by amateur camera operators and featuring a large proportion of single-camera derived CCTV footage, *Police Stop* lacked the sophisticated production values seen in subsequent examples of the genre which were to follow soon after.

Despite reaching the number one position in the VHS sell-through chart with sales running into the hundreds of thousands (Daily Mail: 1994b), Labyrinth Media went into receivership. In spite of this setback, *Police Stop* continued for a short period on the Sky television platform and retained the participation of Graham Cole and Inspector Rowland. Heavily re-edited versions of the *Police Stop* video series are still occasionally re-aired on Sky television. *Police Stop* spans only 2 years in the sample, but it is worth including as a baseline for the way in which PVPs were conveyed during this early period of the genre.

### **Police Camera Action (POCA). ITV. 1994 - 2010.**

*Police Stop* can be clearly seen as the progenitor to the ITV series, *Police Camera Action* (hereafter *POCA*), which broadcast a total of 95 episodes from the tail-end of 1994 through to 2010, albeit with a four year hiatus between 2002 and 2006.

*POCA* was one of the earliest examples of the clip-based format broadcast on British television and was created after television producers learnt that Kings Lynn Police Authority were selling video clips of various crimes 'caught on camera' to the general public (Palmer: 1998).

*POCA* utilised a very similar format to *Police Stop* and the series also employed the services of Inspector Rowland as a consultant. Additionally, there was a significant degree of overlap in the content featured across both series, with *POCA* and *Police Stop* regularly featuring identical material. However, *POCA* significantly developed the format through the introduction of both studio-based and location-shot segments delivered by Alistair Stewart.

These sections of the programme were of a reasonably high production standard and contrasted sharply with the majority of the footage featured in *POCA* which was produced using low-resolution fixed cameras mounted in the pursuing police vehicles, with the addition of occasional material shot by officers in police helicopters or light-aircraft. Particularly evident in the earlier episodes, this material either tended to be black and white, grainy, shaky and occasionally a combination of all three.

Far from being an impediment to the overall product, this 'low-tech', sub-broadcast quality video material can be seen to serve as an indicator of the honesty of both the material on display and the manner of its production (West: 2005. 83). This faux-reality is maintained using extremely skilful production techniques which can mask the highly-polished production of the programme by leaving enough 'raw-edges' on display to preserve an overall sense of authenticity and realism (Cotter et al: 2008. 280).

Compounding this appearance of authenticity further, events were often conveyed through the use of a single camera and this lack of multiple viewpoints produces an extremely basic perspective of the unfolding events for the viewer. However, throughout its production run, a steady improvement in the quality of the footage was clearly visible.

The programme usually featured a running commentary provided by Alistair Stewart and as Bignell observes (2005: 137), '...the programme gains some of its connotations of public service by his association with the values of objectivity, seriousness and reliability which derive from news programmes.' His deadpan, cliché-ridden and somewhat lumpen commentary points out the obvious mistakes of motorists, poor driving and the clear dangers presented by high-speed pursuits

Following Alistair Stewart's second conviction for drunk-driving in 2003 (Payne: 2003), the programme was suspended and broadcast only a handful of episodes during late 2006 before resuming properly in 2007 with Alistair Stewart relegated to a studio-only role which saw him 'book-ending' the programme.

The on-location sequences were handed over to other presenters including Adrian Simpson, a journalist who had previously presented television motoring shows before becoming a newsreader in 2010. Despite this setback, *POCA* was an extremely popular television programme and garnered large audience shares throughout its run (Hill: 2005a). A spin-off book was published in 1996 and its author claimed that the programme was regularly watched by audiences in excess of sixteen million viewers (Gilbey: 1996. 9).

In 1999, *POCA* was nominated for *Lew Grade Award* (Mason: 2003. 1) and was also famously parodied by surrealist comedians Vic Reeves and Bob Mortimer, who restyled it as *Police Camera Accident*. The executive producer, Steve Warr, went on to co-found Raw Cut TV, the company which went on to produce both *Road Wars* and *Police Interceptors*.

### **XCars. BBC One. 1996.**

This short-lived BBC-produced ob doc television series only broadcast a total of 6 episodes during 1996 but is particularly interesting due to its status as an early example of the 'ride-along' style of television in which cameras accompanied Greater Manchester specialist car-crime 'X-Unit'. The programme was narrated by actor John Nettles who is perhaps best-known for playing the lead roles in UK detective dramas *Midsomer Murders* and *Bergerac*. Although the majority of the video material featured in *XCars* was captured in the 'ride-along' style by a camera operator seated in the rear of the police vehicle alongside some helicopter and car-mounted camera footage, it also included video material shot outside of these confines.

As a result of this increased camera mobility, *XCars* contained some truly extraordinary raw footage of PVPs. An example of this can be seen in PVP 5.4, when the officers being filmed are able to get in front of an approaching pursuit before deploying a 'stinger' device into the path of the fleeing vehicle. Thus the viewer is able to witness the extraordinary spectacle of a fleeing vehicle, closely followed by a convoy of traffic cars complete with a blur of disorientating blue lights and a cacophony of deafening sirens, passing a few feet from the camera at ground-level.

This extraordinary footage presents the viewer with a hitherto unseen and therefore highly unusual perspective on a PVP taking place, in which the face of the fleeing driver is clearly visible. Furthermore, the camera also catches the arrest of the suspect at close quarters, providing the viewer with vicarious sensation of being up-close and personal with the action taking place on screen.

*XCars* is also noteworthy for the numerous opportunities it provided for the viewer to see the officers 'backstage'.

Inter-PVP vignettes offered a glimpse behind the curtain and what can be seen is a blend of the desperate and the genuinely amusing. The officers proffer their apparently unguarded opinion that they are effectively fighting a losing battle against an epidemic of car crime and joyriding in and around the city of Manchester. However, they appear to have accepted the overall futility of their response to the situation and instead stoically undertake numerous operational initiatives to try and stem the tide of criminality that is so clearly threatening to overwhelm them.

Against this backdrop of adversity, the Inspector in charge of their unit provides the antidote to the bleak outlook fostered by the programme; offering the viewer dry-humour, genuine wit and repartee which appears to galvanise the camaraderie of the traffic officers under his command. This early example of the 'ride-along' style effectively managed to convey a real sense of immediacy to the proceedings being conveyed.

The commentary was paired down and rarely present during the PVPs featured. Jerky 'jump-cuts' were used to punctuate the programme and the format afforded the traffic officers ample opportunity to express their opinions on a wide variety of topics including food, sport and of course PVPs. Overall, *XCars* documents the low-level warfare that was clearly taking place between the 'X-Unit' and the large number of car-criminals, joyriders and ram-raiders in and around the city of Manchester during the mid-1990s.

### **Car Wars. BBC One. 1999 – 2007.**

The first series of *Car Wars* was broadcast on BBC One in 1999, with further series being aired in 2004, 2006 and 2007 alongside a small number of special episodes which were broadcast in 2001 and 2003. *Car Wars* was produced by a subdivision of *Mentorn Media*, one of the largest commercial television production companies in the U.K., which later went on to produce both *Traffic Cops* and *Motorway Cops* for BBC One.

The majority of *Car Wars* episodes were narrated by Jamie Theakston, who was also employed in the same capacity for both *Traffic Cops* and *Motorway Cops*. *Car Wars* introduced a number of innovations to 'car-chase TV' programming, most notably the addition of musical accompaniment to the PVPs and numerous cut-away shots featuring interviews with police officers discussing the events as they unfolded were interspersed with footage of the PVPs themselves. It also introduced a higher standard of production values than had hitherto been seen in the genre; the production was certainly far more polished than the content seen in its predecessors.

*Car Wars* shared a number of similarities with *XCars*, in that it utilised the same ob doc and ride-along format whilst following the same police division throughout its run, the TVCU. In some cases, the same officers featured in both programmes and *Car Wars* is unusual in that, notwithstanding the special episodes, the programme always followed the same police unit despite its sporadic run between 1999 and 2007. In terms of the production methods utilised, *Car Wars* can be seen as a typical ob doc, the blueprint of which has been extremely influential both during and after its run.

### **Road Wars. Sky One. 2003 - 2009**

The television series *Road Wars* aired 88 episodes on Sky One between 2003 and 2009 and was a creative collaboration for the newly formed Raw Cut production company involving the production teams behind *Police Stop* and *POCA*.

Unusually the first six series of *Road Wars*, spanning 2003 to 2008 were filmed with the same force; Thames Valley Police. Embedded with their proactive roads policing team, using unmarked high-performance vehicles, *Road Wars* predominantly comprised 'ride-along', in-car mounted camera and helicopter footage produced in the ob doc format. This series title largely pre-dated the introduction of affordable, broadcast-quality body-worn cameras, such as the now ubiquitous *GoPro* and was therefore limited to filming officers within fairly narrow confines. For example, if two officers ran off in different directions, the camera operator had to decide which one to follow and film.

This gathered footage was often interspersed with video archive content produced by a variety of other U.K. police forces alongside international material, largely sourced from North America. For the 7th series of *Road Wars*, the production team moved on to work with the Road Crime Unit (RCU) of Devon and Cornwall Police after senior officers from Thames Valley Police decided to cease their collaboration with Raw Cut media (Davies: 2008).

The first 80 episodes of *Road Wars* were narrated by Lee Boardman who is perhaps best-known for playing the villain Jez Quigley in the ITV soap-opera, *Coronation Street*. Boardman's somewhat idiosyncratic commentary style employed a wide variety of slang, sarcasm and humour, delivered in an enunciated Mancunian accent. He was replaced in 2009 for the final 8 episodes by Claire Goose, an English actress perhaps best-known for her role as a WPC in the ITV drama, *the Bill*.

*Road Wars* offered a unique hybrid format, which combined the clip-based approach seen in previous shows such as *POCA*, with the 'ride-along' style of video production seen in programmes such as *XCars*. According to the interview respondent, who had knowledge of the editorial decisions taken by the producers of *Road Wars*, this combination was deliberately tailored to enable the producers to 'spice-up' the programme. PVPs and other exciting events were strategically interspersed between the 'ride-along' sections of the programme. The producers could not guarantee that there would be enough PVPs or other exciting events captured by their embedded film crews.

Therefore they had the fall-back option of a library of predominantly North American material which could be used to add exciting material to any episode of *Road Wars*. Two special episodes of the programme, entitled *Road Wars USA* were broadcast in December 2006 with the stated aim of conducting a cross-cultural experiment to demonstrate the differing styles of policing that exist between the U.K. and the U.S.A.

### **Traffic Cops. BBC One. 2003 – Present**

*Traffic Cops* is a flagship BBC series produced by Mentorn subsidiary, Folio Productions, which has broadcast more than 100 episodes over its 13-series run to date. Billed as a documentary series on the BBC website (BBC 2015), the programme has chronicled the work of traffic units in a variety of police jurisdictions including West Yorkshire, Sussex, Cheshire, Humberside and South Wales. Narrated by Jamie Theakston, each episode is a loosely themed collection of clips collated under a sub-title, examples of which include, *Playing the Game*, *Losing Control and Picking up the Pieces*.

*Traffic Cops* is produced in the classic ob doc style with very high production values which mark it out from the competition. *Traffic Cops* tends to feature a smaller number of vignettes than competing offerings, enabling the issues covered to be examined with a level of detail that is not commonly seen in 'car-chase TV' more generally. Alongside a focus on light-hearted, amusing and unusual events, *Traffic Cops* also covers significant and serious issues, such as PVPs and fatal RTAs, although it has yet to feature a fatality caused by a PVP. Also noteworthy, is the use of cut-away interviews with traffic officers, their superiors and support staff which are interspersed with 'ride-along', body-worn and in-car mounted camera and helicopter footage.

Furthermore, *Traffic Cops* is unusual in that it doesn't broadcast internationally sourced clips or material recorded with any police force other than the one with which they are embedded. At the time of writing, new episodes of this series are still being broadcast, albeit at a much slower rate than was seen during the late 2000s.

## **Motorway Cops. BBC One. 2003 – Present**

*Motorway Cops* shares an identical format, production team and broadcast channel with its sister series title, *Traffic Cops*. As the name suggests, the main focus is on the work of the motorway divisions of various U.K. police forces.

Originally starting as a spin-off series of special episodes derived from *Traffic Cops*, approximately 35 episodes of *Motorway Cops* have been broadcast and similarly, these episodes tend to feature themed collections of footage encompassing a wide-variety of subject matter ranging from animals loose on the carriageway to treacherous weather conditions and the occasional PVP.

## **Police Interceptors. Channel 5. 2008 – Present**

*Police Interceptors* is produced by Raw Cut, the same company behind *Road Wars* and there have been almost 100 episodes broadcast during its eight series run to date, although some of these have been compilation episodes. *Police Interceptors* features 'ride-along', body-worn and in-car mounted camera and helicopter footage filmed with various U.K. forces including South Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Cumbria and Lincolnshire Police.

Series one to three were filmed with Essex Police, however each subsequent series has tended to relocate to a different force, adding variety both through the subsequent change in the police personnel featured and through changes in the geographic backdrop from urban to rural and sometimes back again. *Police Interceptors* is narrated by Christopher Fox, an actor best known for his roles as Detective Sergeant Max Carter in ITV's *The Bill* and Corporal Louis Hoffman in the SAS drama *Ultimate Force*.

*Police Interceptors* differs somewhat from rival productions in a number of key areas. Firstly, the units featured are, strictly speaking, not traffic units. Rather they are introduced as a hand-picked proactive policing team equipped with high-performance vehicles and trained to be, 'one of the fastest high-speed pursuit teams in the world.' As such, the officers are rarely seen carrying out typical roads-policing duties, such as issuing speeding tickets.

Instead they are billed as elite officers and the opening credits prime the viewer to expect high-octane action in the form of high-speed PVPs, violence and serious offences taking place. Whether they achieve these stated aims and deliver on their hyperbolic claims is debatable.

Secondly, *Police Interceptors* adopts a very distinctive approach to both the police vehicles and the officers driving them. The specifications of the vehicles; their nought to sixty acceleration times, horsepower and number of torques are frequently included into the commentary, including while PVPs are taking place. Furthermore, plentiful car-centred cut-away shots are used alongside jaunty camera angles and pumped-up music, resulting in something akin to a cross between a car advert and an outtake from the popular BBC show, *Top Gear*. The high-performance cars and force helicopter are introduced and profiled utilising faux computer screen graphics, detailing their performance and other specifications.

The officers featured are also subjected to this inter-vignette profiling, which tends to list their nickname, years of police service and favourite food, book or film. Often these predilections are designed to amuse; for example one officer says his least favourite food is tomatoes, but his favourite food is tomato sauce. Whilst not being entirely unprecedented, this approach which focusses on both the personalities of the officers and the characteristics of their vehicles is a particularly prominent feature in *Police Interceptors* that is unusual within the conventions of the ob doc genre.

The third key difference displayed by *Police Interceptors* is its focus on the backstage area of policing and the associated 'banter' and practical jokes that tend to take place around mealtimes in the police station. The inclusion of these and other amusing vignettes is rarely seen in similar offerings such as *POCA*, *Traffic Cops* or *Car Wars*, although there was a small amount of broadly comparable material included in the series title *XCars*.

These three facets combine to produce a highly distinctive presentational style which is imbued with a sense of urgency that is further accentuated by the contrast with the more light-hearted vignettes. Although typically containing no more than two or three PVPs per episode, when married with the dramatic commentary, on screen graphics and booming soundtrack, *Police Interceptors* clearly presents PVPs at the entertainment end of the television ob doc spectrum.

Despite a slow-down in the frequency of new *Police Interceptors* episodes during 2015, a number spin-off series titles have been launched during this period, including *Police Interceptors Unleashed* and *Police Interceptors Takedown* starring ex-footballer Vinnie Jones, who rides along with the officers serving the role of narrator. Historically, material from episodes already broadcast is also occasionally recycled into a series of 'best-of' specials, which tend to be shown between new series of the main *Police Interceptors* series title.

### **Closing remarks**

Through the chronology of the series titles outlined above, the genesis and development of 'car-chase TV' is clearly visible. From the earliest clip-based shows to the specially filmed ob-doc format, the genre has adapted very successfully to the rapid progress in technological possibilities which has in-turn led to the increased visibility of PVPs. However, technological advances only partly explain the rapid growth in 'car-chase TV', as perhaps the most significant factor in its development has been an increase in the willingness of the police to cooperate with the producers of such programmes to achieve their aim of generating favourable images of their organisation (Lee & McGovern: 2014. 142). In recent years, the police organisation has been forced to become increasingly media-savvy and has adopted a proactive role in the construction and maintenance of legitimacy through the management of their image in a hyper-mediated society (Mawby: 2002. 36).

The central, chase and capture narrative structure which underpins much of 'car-chase TV' programming can be seen as one which is mediated and augmented through the editing process, which serves to distort time-frames by removing

superfluous content and context in order to deliver ‘...uncomplicated ‘bite-sized’ justice for the MTV generation’ (Mason: 2003. 2). PVP as a mediated spectacle can therefore be seen as a highly selective representation of police activity which is carefully re-constructed and formatted in such a way that it can, ‘...grossly misrepresent police work and still manage to come across as reality programming’ (Surette: 2011. 94).

Additionally, Palmer (1998: 9) observes that, ‘...these programs serve the needs of police, who are seen doing their job very well, and of broadcasters, who are seen fulfilling television’s public service function and garnering high ratings.’

Each of the series titles examined above has formulated an approach to the presentation of PVPs and they are conveyed according to their respective conventions. These conventions are themselves influenced by a variety of stakeholders; television executives, media professionals, advertisers, television production staff, senior police officers and others, all with varying degrees of influence over the ‘end product’.

Audience demographics are also potentially significant factors shaping the presentation of PVPs and other police activities conveyed in ‘car-chase TV’ programmes. OFCOM statistics produced in 2012 indicate that television channels have clear target demographics (OFCEM: 2012). For example, the main BBC channels tend to appeal to an older audience, while Sky One viewers were more likely to be male. Therefore, it is logical to suggest that the producers of ‘car-chase TV’ programmes tailor their offering to reach and appeal to these target demographic populations, especially given that television is increasingly being abandoned as an entertainment medium amongst those aged 15 to 35 (Burrell: 2014).

‘Car-chase TV’ must therefore compete with other media offerings such as computer games and adapt to the changing television landscape in order to survive.

## CHAPTER 2. LEGITIMACY.

### Legitimacy and Policing by Consent

The concept of political legitimacy has been the subject of discussion for many years (see Fabienne: 2014), not least because, as Tsushima & Hamai observe (2015: 214), 'the concept of legitimacy is highly abstract and complex.' Not only have these debates centred upon the theoretical and practical aspects of the concept, but also on the definition of legitimacy itself. Bradford & Jackson (2010: 3) state that, '...a precise, durable definition of legitimacy remains elusive.'

A detailed examination of the multiple competing definitions of legitimacy and their contrasting theoretical positions is beyond the scope of the research being undertaken here. What is required is a functional definition which will be employed to undertake the data analysis and examine the research questions.

Tyler and Huo (2002: xiv) define legitimacy as a socially prevalent, '...belief that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed and that the individual ought to defer to their judgements'. This is a fairly narrow definition restricted to 'legal' authorities. An alternative definition is provided by Hurd (2015: 1), who states that, '[L]egitimacy is commonly defined in political science or sociology as the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern'. These three kinds of 'authority' are closely-related to the concepts adopted by Max Weber who posited an extremely influential typology which is often taken as a starting point for sociological deliberations around the issue of legitimacy (Tenkebe & Liebling: 2013. 1).

In this classic work, contained in chapter three of the collection *Economy and Society* under the title, *The Types of Legitimate Domination*, originally published in 1922 (Weber: 1978), Weber outlines three *pure* or *ideal* types of authority upon which valid and legitimate domination can be based; which were classified as *Rational Legal*, *Traditional* and *Charismatic* (Weber: 1978. 215).

According to Weber, rational legal authority rests:

‘... on the belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. In the case of legal authority obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office’ (Weber: 1978. 215 - 216).

Traditional authority is centred on, ‘...an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them’ (Weber: 1978. 215). Weber’s final type of legitimacy, charismatic authority, is based upon, ‘...devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him’ (Weber: 1978. 215).

These three ideal types are rarely found in their pure form and should therefore be used as tools with which to examine legitimacy in the real world (Allen: 2004. 100). Streich (2005: 182) points out that in application, the pure forms of Weber’s three-fold typology often coexist and overlap. Furthermore, Best, S (2002: 12) argues that, ‘[T]he ideal type is a list of characteristics that the researcher considers the most significant. What is most significant is based upon the informed personal opinion of the researcher, a basis which Weber terms ‘value relevance.’”

Weber’s typology has, ‘...broad applicability as an analytical tool’ and is therefore valuable when undertaking, ‘...comparative analysis of various socio-political phenomena’ (Sternberger: 1968, in Tankebe & Liebling: 2013. 1). However, this typology has been critiqued by Beetham (1991), who argues that, ‘those granting legitimacy always do so on the basis that it is an expression of common shared values’ (Jackson et al: 2013. 152). According to Fabienne (2014. 2) the essential difference is due to Weber’s typology being a descriptive one, which contrasts with the work of theorists such as Beetham who combines elements of both descriptive and normative typologies.

As Tankebe & Liebling recently observed (2013: 1):

‘In the past 20 years, criminologists have become more interested in normative compliance with the law, and especially the concept of legitimacy: that is to say, citizens’ recognition of the rightness of the authority of criminal justice officials, and the consequences of this recognition for behaviour. Legitimacy is now an established concept in criminological analysis.’

Be that as it may, a detailed examination of normative versus descriptive legitimacy lies outside the scope of this thesis and in order to achieve the stated goals of the research project, Weber’s typology, which ‘...has been largely accepted’ (Bensman: 2014. 10) will be adopted.

As Bradford et al (2013: 81) state:

‘theorists from Weber onwards have viewed legitimacy as a vital component of social institutions, both in the long run for their very survival, and also on a day-to-day basis since people will defer to and assist institutions they feel to be legitimate’.

This assistance is particularly useful for both criminal justice agencies and the agents who operate within their frameworks. Mawby (2002: 57) observes that historically, ‘...those in authority, including the British police, have valued the importance of legitimating their power, in the sense of being accepted, of being considered rightful.’

In a practical context, legitimacy can be seen as a potentially vital component in assisting the police with their operational duties (Myhill & Quinton: 2011 2). As Mazerolle et al (2014: 3) point out, the potential benefits of being seen as legitimate include the increased likelihood that compliance with police instructions will be achieved without recourse to more coercive physical measures and increased public cooperation with the police during investigations, intelligence gathering and a wide array of other day-to-day operational tasks.

Legitimacy is a vital constituent in the principle of 'policing by consent' (Reiner: 2010. 70; Smith: 2007. 276; Morgan: 1989. 217). 'Policing by consent' was embedded into the foundations of the British police as a necessary component of their eventual acceptance by the general public (Pike: 1985. 180), based upon the notion that consent is preferential to coercion, specifically the use of force to secure public compliance (Oxford: 1984. 114). Elaborating on this principle further, Loader (1995: 38) states that, 'the police - from the time of Peel onwards - have been officially represented as 'citizens in uniform' operating within, and circumscribed by, the contours of public approval', as opposed to a body divorced from the population, its culture and values, ruling by coercion imposed from above.

The principle of 'policing by consent' has been the subject of much debate (Loader: 1995. 41; Morgan: 1989. 217; Oxford: 1984. 114; Reiner: 2010. 70). This debate has been particularly acute in circumstances where it can be argued that the police have deviated from this principle and used inappropriate or disproportionate coercive force in order to achieve their objectives (Wilson et al: 2001. 30). Where this occurs, it can be seen in Weberian terms as domination without legitimacy.

Instances such as these can damage both the credibility of the 'policing by consent' doctrine and the legitimacy of the police. As Waddington & Wright (2008: 487) observe, 'The police must be credible in being able to subdue resistance to their lawful authority, whilst not abusing that authority.'

As a 'use of force' issue (Alpert & Fridell: 1992), PVPs may present a risk to the legitimacy of the police if they are carried out in a manner that is deemed excessive. Discussing the use of coercive force, Waddington & Wright argue (2008: 487) that there are a number of possible situational variations worth considering. In some cases, there is simply an excessive or disproportionate response to the threat posed. However, a more sophisticated version of this argument is based upon the appropriateness of the police response to a given situation. Citing Binder & Scharf: (1980) & Klockars (1996), Waddington & Wright argue (2008: 488) that:

‘Since force is often used to terminate a series of exchanges between the police and others (however brief), questions might arise regarding the competent management of that interaction by the police...whilst the use of force may have been proportionate at the point of use, could it have been avoided by more skilful prior management?’

This observation is highly applicable to PVPs as the critiques examined in Chapter 4 (‘Chronology of Concern’) are often based upon perceived management or tactical failures (Horner: 1995; Best & Eves: 2004b; Docking et al: 2007) and issues around the proportionality of PVP events undertaken for relatively trivial offences which may not warrant this potentially dangerous police response (Crickmer: 2001; Daily Star: 2001; PCA: 2002).

A more radical critique of PVPs might even question the whole policy of carrying out any PVPs at all, on the grounds that PVPs are always or generally likely to create danger to the public which outweighs any benefits to law enforcement that might accrue from chasing suspects in vehicles. Such a critique, were it to gain wide acceptance, would be a serious threat to the legitimacy of both the practice of PVPs and to the police who carry out and sanction them.

In an article which poses the question, are PVPs ever worth the risk to human life in response to a fleeing motorist; Waddington argues that legitimacy is a crucial factor in the public acceptance of PVPs, observing that:

‘I would view the issue of whether police should pursue non-compliant vehicles...*not in terms of its outcomes* at all but in terms of its inherent *legitimacy*... For there is more to policing than simply outcomes; it is now widely recognised that much police activity...is of symbolic value. The public judges the police not by what they achieve as outputs (criminal convictions and the like), but *how* it is achieved’ (Waddington: 2010. 121 emphasis in the original)

## TV Programmes and Legitimacy

According to Reiner (2008: 314), 'Policing, especially in Britain, has always been a matter of symbolism as much as substance'. This well-known quote has relevance to a wide-range of issues around the importance of fostering a positive police image in the media and the potentially detrimental effect that negative news reports and critical media constructions can have on the legitimacy of the police organisation. In response to an increasingly media-saturated world, there has been a growing awareness in police circles of the potential benefits that can be fostered by developing positive working relationships with media organisations (Lee & McGovern: 2014. 141). Leishman and Mason (2003: 27), argue that Reiner's quote is particularly applicable to police legitimacy, citing Mawby's research into police 'image work'. Mawby states that:

'Image work has arguably become one mechanism by which the police seek to foster and maintain legitimacy...The police service has to address the issue of actively seeking legitimacy and being seen to be conducting police work in a manner regarded as legitimate' (2002: 54 - 57).

Mawby outlined the formalisation of police communication strategies and explored the development of relationships between the police and the media with a particular focus on the ways in which these relationships could serve to legitimise policing, whilst also having the potential effect of obscuring police legitimacy problems. Mawby (2002. 53), observed that:

'[T]he legitimacy of the public police is potentially held up for scrutiny when any policing activity is engaged in. Each event which brings into question police integrity and competence...communicates particular images and threatens to undermine police legitimacy.'

Therefore it is important that police activities are presented by the media in a favourable light so that their legitimacy is enhanced rather than diminished. The police institution is well aware of this requirement and in a report published by the

College of Policing entitled, *Guidance on Relationships with the Media* (College of Policing: 2013. 4), the following 'Key Principles' are laid-out,

2.1. Legitimacy is an essential aspect of the British policing model, based on consent. The press and other forms of media play an important part in assuring police legitimacy and protecting the public interest.

2.2. Police interaction with the media should be guided by a legitimate policing purpose, which is one related to the core values and standards of policing.

These guidelines clearly acknowledge the potential benefits that can be gained through fostering good police – media relations, with the caveat that this must be undertaken within a framework of a legitimate policing purpose. In the context of 'car-chase TV', quite what this 'legitimate policing purpose' is remains unclear. The video material which is broadcast communicates footage of PVPs being undertaken and these media products are able to convey the work of the police to a potentially large audience who have very little direct experience of PVPs. It is reasonable to suggest that a significant amount of the public's knowledge of PVPs is formed as a direct result of viewing 'car-chase TV' programmes. Therefore, these televised images matter, as Reiner (2010: 178) observes:

'The media-constructed image of policing is thus vital for the attainment of consent. It is a refraction of the reality, constructed in accordance with the organisational imperatives of the media industries, the ideological frames of creative personnel and audiences, and the changing balance of political and economic forces affecting both the reality and the image of policing.'

As well as being vital for the attainment of consent, it could also be argued that the media image of policing is similarly crucial in achieving its legitimacy. The close cooperation between the police and media companies which produces this kind of material could be seen as an example of the proactive 'image work' examined by Mawby (2002).

The overall impact generated by mass-mediated images of policing is subject to competing theorisations and Reiner outlines the existence of two distinct and opposing perspectives which exist within the literature concerned with police – media relations. According to these differing viewpoints, the effect of media representations of policing and crime are seen as being either ‘subversive’ or ‘hegemonic’ (Reiner: 2008. 316).

The first of these theorisations takes the view that the media produce material which is potentially criminogenic, can increase the fear of crime and subverts the authority of the police and criminal justice system by conveying images which either trivialise, ridicule or otherwise call into question, ‘the integrity and fairness, or the efficiency and effectiveness of the police’ (Reiner & Greer: 2012. 258). This position tends to be influenced by small-c conservatism and concerns about declining morality, which argues that mass-mediated images of crime and policing, ‘undermine internalised controls, by regularly presenting sympathetic or glamorous images of offending’ (Reiner & Greer: 2012. 258).

On the other hand there exists, ‘an academically influential critical perspective’ (Leishman & Mason: 2003. 9), which subscribes to a ‘hegemonic’ theorisation of mass-mediated images of crime and policing. According to this standpoint, media images can lead to negative ‘real-world’ consequences such as a tendency to legitimate

‘undemocratic and authoritarian forms of policing and criminal justice, including vigilantism. Media demonization of offenders diverts public anxiety away from other sources of insecurity, and solutions to the crime problem are portrayed in terms of strengthening the forces of order rather than reform the social system’ (Reiner: 2008: 316).

In this way, the ‘hegemonic’ perspective argues that crime-waves, moral panics and manipulation of the fear of crime are utilised in the service of maintaining the ‘status quo’ which ultimately favours the interests of powerful groups within society such as the police organisation or those who have control over the mass-media.

However, as Reiner (2010: 179) rather persuasively argues,

‘both the ‘subversive’ and ‘hegemonic’ view of the role of media images of law and order are too simple. In an unequal and hierarchical society, competition in presenting ideas is as structurally loaded as all conflicts. Very broadly, the weight of images portrayed by the mass media will be supportive of the existing social order in any relatively stable society. But the demands of credibility and comprehension produce a reflection in media presentations of changing patterns of conflict. Images across a range of media may be contradictory, or even present a consensus for reform at particular times’.

History does indeed suggest that policing images are mixed or contradictory in nature. The relationship between the police and the media has not always been a happy one and there are certainly examples of both critical and embarrassing television programmes made with and without police cooperation.

These include the 2003 Panorama ‘undercover’ special, *The Secret Policeman* broadcast in 2003, the infamous Roger Graef ob-doc, *Police* broadcast in 1982 and the highly embarrassing *Meet the Police Commissioner*, another ob-doc which focussed on Kent’s Police and Crime Commissioner Ann Barnes which aired in 2014.

During 2008, Thames Valley Police pulled their cooperation with television company *Raw Cut* during the filming of *Police Interceptors* (Davies: 2008), following criticism from a local councillor who suggested that the programme made Kent Police look ‘weak’. Chief Constable Sara Thornton conceded that, ‘some clips do not depict the force in a good light’, but she denied that this was the main reason for their decision to cease filming with the television company (Davies: 2008. 1).

Nevertheless, these controversies and skirmishes between media producers and the police are rare as, generally speaking – as Reiner contends - the media tend to present the police in a favourable light, albeit within the framework of an occasionally volatile relationship which can be antagonised by scandals or high-profile mistakes, errors or failures (Reiner: 2010. 185).

Ensuing chapters of this thesis will further bear out this general 'hegemonic' tendency, as well as illustrating some minor countervailing 'subversive' ripples, very much as Reiner's analysis suggests.

A detailed examination of why this general tendency might exist is ultimately outside the scope of this research, which merely seeks to establish what tendency, if any, 'car-chase TV' has regarding the legitimacy of PVPs and the police. Nevertheless, there are a number of competing theorisations which attempt to explain why the mass media might have a general tendency to support the legitimacy of powerful established authorities such as the police. One such explanation – with little credibility - would be the crude 'conspiracy theory' which argues that all the powerful elites within a given society colludes to support each other and protect their collective interests. Altogether more respectable is the functionalist theoretical framework, which tends to view any social phenomenon as functioning to maintain and reproduce existing social relations. A radical twist on this is the 'Marxist functionalism' arguably represented by the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG: 1982) which sees the workings of powerful institutions within capitalism as functioning to maintain an unjust capitalist system.

Or – and perhaps most plausibly - it might more simply be that, in any society or social context, power tends to beget power. By virtue of the fact that the police are a powerful social institution (having, for example, resources that can be granted or withheld from programme makers), they have the power to ensure that – broadly speaking (as Reiner suggests and as discussed earlier in this section) - they are presented favourably in television programmes and can thus legitimise themselves via the media.

### **PVPs and Legitimacy**

This raises the interesting question of whether (and if so, how) the portrayal of the events in programmes portraying PVPs may have contributed to the legitimisation or delegitimisation of PVPs and of police work in general.

Ensuing chapters of this thesis will be seen to bear out that, in 'car chase TV' as elsewhere, the general 'hegemonic' tendency to legitimate the police and police work suggested by Reiner is indeed in operation – but so are some occasional minor-key potentially 'subversive' effects.

In terms of potential delegitimation, it is possible that the increasing visibility of PVPs may have led to greater scrutiny and the raising of questions about the legitimacy of this high-risk activity. North American research has suggested that public support for PVP is contingent upon the seriousness of the pursuit-triggering offence, with a marked decline also being observed when the public have statistical knowledge of the risks associated with PVP (MacDonald & Alpert: 1998).

Moreover, PVPs in general present the police with a number of interrelated difficulties. Initially there is the general image problem associated with police drivers, which prompts Hattenstone (2000: 4) to ask, 'why do people trust ambulances and fire engines when they are speeding but are suspicious of police officers?' This suspicion may be grounded in the impression which many people may have that the police tend to enjoy high-speed driving and relish the opportunity to undertake PVPs.

Such impressions are backed up by ethnographic research (Loftus: 2010: 7). Using covert participant observational methods during the mid-1970s, Holdaway (1983: 135-136) made the following observation:

'When a patrol car reports over the personal or force radio that it is chasing a stolen vehicle, it is quite usual for other drivers to join in, even though they are formally prohibited from doing so and will probably make what is already a fairly dangerous situation even more precarious. At one time the problem became so serious - the accidents that occurred during chases and the long processions of police cars with lights flashing and horns sounding become embarrassing – that the force published an official order in an attempt to control things. The order was read to the PCs on parade. Reactions varied:

[Sergeant]. 'All this parading around in rows of cars is stupid. All you need is one or two cars chasing.'

[PC]. 'Yes but some drivers won't go after them, will they?'

[Inspector]. 'It's not right that you should be chasing people around just to get the thrill.'

[PC]. 'Yes, but it's fun isn't it?'

Holdaway goes on to describe the resistance experienced by police managers when attempting to proscribe unwanted behaviours among officers at 'street-level.'

Broadly similar observations were made in the work of Gray, whilst he was undertaking ethnographic research with the Metropolitan Police during the early 1980s (Smith & Gray 1983: 53-54). During his fieldwork, Gray became involved in a PVP as a passenger during a 'ride-along' with police officers, causing him to reflect that:

'Car chases offer the kind of excitement that police officers particularly hanker after...As dawn came up, four area cars had joined the chase, which became more and more hair-raising, the cars reaching speeds of 90 mph and over in fairly narrow suburban streets. The driver eventually came to a halt in a dead-end by a recreation ground... By this time the whole recreation ground was surrounded by police vehicles... it illustrated the magnetic attraction of a chase like this one.

Everyone who had taken part in the chase found it intensely satisfying. They stood around in the charge room...swapping exaggerated and self-congratulatory accounts of what had happened for some time afterwards.'

Clearly the idea that the police enjoy PVPs is one that could potentially delegitimise them by creating (or fuelling the existing) suspicion that undertaking PVPs may be merely motivated by thrill seeking. The stated reasons for undertaking PVPs are usually couched in terms of public protection, crime prevention and public service.

Thrill-seeking motivations do not accord with the image of the police portrayed by 'car-chase TV' programmes; highly trained police drivers that embody the professional attitude required to exercise sound judgement in order to protect the public from criminals and *their* dangerous driving.

Any notion that these laudable aims are not the *real* reasons why the police decide to risk the lives of others and themselves by undertaking a highly unpredictable PVP purely for their own gratification risks damaging their legitimacy. In this, we see that the motivations for undertaking PVPs are a crucial component in the construction of their legitimacy.

There is an obvious contradiction here, insofar as the PVPs are presented as an entertainment spectacle to the viewer of 'car-chase TV' programming, whilst the police drivers conducting them are themselves rarely permitted to acknowledge the entertainment value of PVP events. However, it could well be that, despite such contradictions, the general depiction of PVPs in these programmes overall serves to legitimise pursuits and the police undertaking them.

The relationship between Weber's (1978) typologies of legitimisation in relation to 'car-chase TV' will now be examined. Initially, it must be noted that 'car-chase TV' does have the potential to legitimise the police and PVPs in a variety of interrelated ways. In Weber's terms, this portrayal contains elements of both charismatic and legal rational authority. The charismatic authority initially stems from the general character of the elite police drivers featured in the programmes and the regular viewer will attain a degree of familiarity with their working personalities.

The 'ride-along' style of filming enables the viewer to vicariously share the PVP experience with the police drivers. Not every vignette featured in these programmes contains a PVP and in some cases the viewer is afforded a glimpse of the 'backstage' (Goffman: 1959) areas of the police station, canteen, offices and car garage where officers indulge in 'banter' and 'horseplay' with each other. These scenarios create the impression that the police are 'normal' people with a good sense of humour. These vignettes serve as a counter-balance to the more serious incidents that the police have to deal with.

The difficulties of police work are also conveyed, including scenarios in which the police are forced to confront and subdue violent and abusive members of the public whilst demonstrating extraordinary levels of restraint whilst using minimal levels of force.

In other vignettes heart-warming levels of patience, consideration and humanity are emphasised, especially in cases where a vulnerable victim or offender becomes the subject of police attention. Officers are also seen to utilise 'common-sense' and their discretionary judgement when dealing with particularly trivial offences or in cases where there are mitigating circumstances which illicit a more lenient response. Crucially, when faced with any type of crisis, the officers always appear to know what type of remedy is required and demonstrate their mastery of the craft-skills required to resolve the situation and restore order.

Legal rational legitimacy is also a crucial element in the presentation of PVPs in 'car-crash TV' products. Adherence to pursuit policy and clear demonstrations of concern for the safety of the public create a reassuring impression of the police driver as a trustworthy professional equipped with the necessary training to carry out their duties competently within the framework of rules and regulations governing police conduct. This adherence to policy, backed up by specialist training within a hierarchy of supervision implicitly provides a basis for legal rational authority and legitimacy as outlined by Weber (Allen: 2004. 111-112).

Questions around the legal rational legitimacy of PVPs led to a focus on themes relating to *Training, Management* and *Adherence to Policy* as these were deemed to be the most appropriate to measures indicating the presence of legal rational legitimacy whilst undertaking the TA examined in Chapter 5 ('Findings').

Traditional authority is somewhat harder to identify within the context of 'car-chase TV'. As was discussed above, the notion of 'policing by consent' could be seen as a long-standing, if somewhat problematic tradition (Loader: 1995; Wilson et al: 2001) and it could be argued that this represents a kind of traditional authority.

Perhaps the greatest contribution to police legitimacy is a negative one, comprising content not actually included in 'car-chase TV' programming. There is clearly no way of knowing what material is deemed unsuitable for broadcast and left on the cutting room floor. What is certain however is that this type of ob-doc programming very rarely shows the negative outcomes of PVPs. As such the content of 'car-chase TV' can be seen as 'one-way traffic' regarding its potential impact on the legitimacy of PVPs and consequently, the police; potentially delegitimising material is rarely shown. This raises questions around the effect that these broadcasts, which often show dangerous and controversial PVPs, have on the legitimacy of both the PVPs themselves and the police more generally. How is this danger to the public, the police and the suspects represented and explained and what is the potential impact on legitimacy? This question fed into Research Questions One and Two and assisted in identifying a number of related themes that might be salient during the TA process.

A failure to achieve or secure legitimacy tends to invoke a specific set of reactions. Tankebe and Liebling (2013: 1) observe that:

'...political authorities (including criminal justice authorities) virtually always claim to be legitimate authorities... [but] if citizens identify legitimacy deficits, authorities often adjust their practice (in effect making a revised claim).'

It could be argued that this can be applied to deficits in the legal rational authority of PVPs, evidenced by the delegitimising claims around the issue of sub-standard driver training and ineffective management of PVPs examined further in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern').

Reiner makes a similar point, suggesting that challenges to the legitimacy of policing tend to be addressed using a narrative of 'scandal and reform' (Reiner: 2010. 181). Using this narrative, the response to a potentially delegitimising scandal is to negate the criticism through the use of an argument suggesting that the particular issue has led to a reform in the working practices which caused the scandal in the first instance.

Again, this can be applied to PVPs insofar as the peaks in concern expressed in the print media and elsewhere fuelled by the rapid rise in fatalities caused by PVPs (examined in Chapter 4 – ‘Chronology of Concern’) did produce a revised claim made by those with the relevant authority, which was clearly based upon reforms to the training of police drivers and more restrictive management oversight and control of PVPs. This re-legitimising claim did make an appearance in some of the programmes sampled and analysed (see the discussion of PVP vignette 28.3 in the ‘Training’ section of Chapter 5 (‘Findings and Analysis’)).

We shall therefore return to the issue of legitimacy and its relation to PVPs and the research questions in Chapter 5 (‘Findings and Analysis’).

## **CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY.**

### **Introduction**

This chapter outlines the methodological approaches and the methods used during the research process. These methods were a newspaper archive search and historical analysis of the content, a thematic analysis conducted using a sample of video data from relevant TV documentary programmes and a semi-structured interview. The research therefore employed a mixed-methods approach to examine the research questions.

### **Newspaper Analysis**

In order to trace the historical development of the concern around PVPs, the use of the print media was selected as the most practical medium to achieve this aim. Comprehensive web-based newspaper archives are readily accessible and these sources were searched in the manner detailed below, yielding both quantitative and qualitative data (as will be apparent both below and in the account in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern')).

Owing to the sheer number of regional newspaper titles and the relative inaccessibility of much of this material in digital archives, it was decided that national newspaper titles would form the bulk of the archive search. This would also facilitate the production of a national picture, rather than focusing on a tightly defined geographic area. It should be noted, however, that a small number of local print-media sources were sourced and used in the chronology of concern chapter; for instance if the source was germane to the particular event being covered or if more detail about a particular case was required.

Keywords were used to search web-based newspaper archives. Rather than search for the keywords in the headline of news reports, the keyword search was applied to both the headline *and* text within the report.

As there is no unified or complete web archive of all the national newspapers currently in print in the U.K., numerous searches using various archival databases were undertaken.

Boolean searching allows the use of certain 'operators' which are words such as 'and', 'not' and 'or' which accompany the keywords when searching in order to narrow the results. The databases also enabled the filtering of results by year and the parameters were set to include newspaper stories published between 1900 and 2011. Some news titles, such as *The Independent* and *Telegraph* were not included in the archive search, as there was no practical way to remotely search their archive of content online.

Each of the various newspaper archives (listed below) was searched using the keyword *Police* with the addition of a different word each time (searches 1-3) to reflect the variations in terminology likely to be found across a variety of newspapers (Sapsford: 2006. 126). Following this, the process was repeated with the separate keywords, Joyride, Joy-ride and Joyrider (searches 4-6). This search, using several likely spelling variations, was undertaken for comparison, in order to examine the effect that the media interest around joyriding had on the frequency of news reports relating to PVPs. The final search for the keyword, 'Sheena', was conducted to source stories concerning the collision involving a police van and the journalist Sheena McDonald in 1999 (7), more about which is contained in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'). Therefore the following searches were undertaken:

1. Police + Chase.
2. Police + Pursuit.
3. Police + Crash.
4. Joyride.
5. Joy-ride.
6. Joyrider.
7. Sheena.

These searches were carried out using the following web-based newspaper archives.

1. Pro-Quest Historical Newspapers: *The Guardian* and *Observer*. (1791-2003).
2. *Daily Mail* Historical Archive. (1896-2004). (Excluding *Mail on Sunday*).
3. The *Times* Digital Archive. (1785-2008). (Excluding *Sunday Times*).
4. UK Press Online – a meta archive search covering the following titles:
  - i. *Daily Mirror*. (1903-1980).
  - ii. *Daily Express*. (1900 – Present).
  - iii. *Sunday Express*. (2000-Present).
  - iv. *Daily Star*. (2000-Present).
  - v. *Daily Star Sunday*. (2002- Present).

These archive searches had a number of chronological limitations. Due to licensing restrictions, *Daily Mirror* reports from 1980 onwards, *Daily Mail* reports from 2004 onwards, *Times* reports from 2009 onwards and *Guardian* reports from 2003 onwards were not available using this method. Therefore, follow up searches using the keyword combinations explained above were undertaken by visiting the websites of the individual newspaper titles, in order to circumvent these chronological limitations.

The search engine provided on the *Guardian* and *Observer* website did not enable advanced searching. However, newspaper reports from these two newspapers published between 2004 and 2011 were available through a simple Google search; using the keyword combinations discussed above alongside the relevant year of publication. The *Daily Mail* website provided access to news reports from the missing years, 2005 to 2011, through an advanced search option. *The Times* newspaper introduced a pay-wall in July 2010. However, as the news reports published in *The Times* between 1900 and 2008 had already been gathered and frequency of PVP stories generally was in a state of decline towards the end of the 2000s – this made a subscription to access the archive somewhat unnecessary.

The *Daily Mirror* website appeared to offer an advanced search option, but in practice no results were produced when the search terms and chronological parameters were entered. Therefore the researcher was left to conclude that the *Daily Mirror* website archive is incomplete.

Both the *Sunday Express* and *Daily Star* news archive results for the years 2000-2011 had already been gathered. However, there was no method of accessing newspaper reports from the period prior to 2000, as both the *Sunday Express* and *Daily Star* website archives went back only as far as 2006. However, as there were spikes in print-media's interest in PVPs in both 2001 and 2006, the news stories produced by the initial archive search for both of these news titles spanning 2000 to 2011 was deemed sufficient for the purpose of examining the concern around the issue of PVPs.

Whilst it was clearly not possible to assemble a complete newspaper record for every national newspaper title for the period 1900 to 2011, the various newspaper archive searches produced over 500 separate news reports which were downloaded and read. False positives and duplicates were filtered out and the reports or opinion pieces which mentioned either a vehicular 'police chase' or 'police pursuit', totalling 350, were printed and filed in chronological order. Stories printed over several pages were counted only once and 'international' reports were not included.

In addition to this news-based data, material produced by the IPCC, PCA, HMIC and ACPO, along with variety of other pertinent sources, formed the basis of the Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), a hitherto unwritten historical account of the fluctuating level of concern around the issue of PVPs between 1900 and 2011.

Year of Publication.	Number of News Reports Containing the Keywords, Police + Pursuit, Police + Chase or Police + Crash.	Number of News Reports Containing the Keywords, Joyride, Joy-Ride or Joyrider.
1980	2	2
1981	0	0
1982	0	1
1983	1	0
1984	3	0
1985	4	1
1986	9	1
1987	3	1
1988	3	4
1989	14	5
1990	3	8
1991	20	50
1992	11	30
1993	27	42
1994	23	37
1995	11	24
1996	12	7
1997	14	16
1998	6	7
1999	12	10
2000	10	3
2001	21	6
2002	15	7
2003	15	6
2004	12	8
2005	23	4
2006	5	4
2007	9	1
2008	9	4
2009	8	2
2010	3	1
2011	3	1

**Table 3.1. Number of News Reports Containing Keywords. 1980 – 2011.**

Referring to Table 3.1 (above), 1980 was selected as a suitable start year as the frequency of news reports related to PVPs was relatively small and sporadic prior to this date. There is the possibility of duplication; multiple newspapers covering the same incident, especially if the case was particularly newsworthy due to unusual circumstances or some other novelty factor. Some events produce numerous follow-up reports emanating from the same case, for example if an injured passenger dies in the days following a PVP-related crash or if a court case involving a suspect is reported.

The statistics produced in Table 3.1 (above) are intended only to provide a basic overview of the trends in news reporting that were taking place and the spikes in the results of the keyword searches associated with PVPs (Police + Pursuit, Chase or Crash) can be seen occurring between 1991 and 1993, during 2001 and in 2005.

There does appear to be a possible correlation between reductions in the frequency of reports containing the keywords 'joyrider / joy-ride / joyrider' and an increase in the frequency of news reports featuring the PVP-related keywords 'police + chase, pursuit or crash' between 2000 and 2005. The possible reasons for this will be examined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'). However, these numbers do not tell us anything about the *content* of the various news reports; for example, whether they are critical of PVPs or broadly supportive.

It was intended that these news reports would form the basis of an historical analysis examining the depiction and discussion of PVPs in the print media and elsewhere with a focus on the rising concern produced by an increase in the fatalities associated with PVPs. This was undertaken as planned and the results can be seen in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'). When organised and catalogued in chronological order, the frequency of these news reports revealed the presence of two spikes in the frequency of news reports expressing concern around PVPs; one in 2001 and the second in 2005 (see Table 3.1). It also became apparent that the news media's presentation of PVPs contrasted sharply with the video material contained in the archive.

This disconnect between the differing portrayals of PVP that were somehow produced and existed during this period became the focus of Research Question Two, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

### **Thematic Analysis - Sampling of the Video Material.**

A large database of electronically stored television programmes was used to examine the research questions. This database contains approximately 400 individual episodes of police-orientated factual television programmes, VHS video 'rips' and observational documentaries or ob-docs, spanning the years 1993 to 2015. The majority of the material in the database comprises television series that were produced and broadcast in the United Kingdom. However, the database also contains two straight-to-video VHS 'rips' alongside approximately 150 police-orientated ob-docs produced and broadcast in Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and North America.

This represents all such programmes which were likely to feature PVPs that the researcher could acquire spanning the years 1993 to 2015. The amount of this particular type of television programming has increased markedly since the early 2000s and this growth is reflected in the archive. The vast majority of this material was sourced using web-based peer-to-peer networks. Sourcing large amounts of data in this manner presented a number of challenges. Knowing where to find the material and then adhering to the strict rules and behavioural protocols which govern the conduct of users on the various host sites requires both organisation and patience.

Once downloaded, it was often difficult to catalogue and archive the material correctly. Although the required information, such as the broadcast date, channel and episode number are occasionally embedded into an accompanying metadata file, careful cross-referencing was often required to ascertain and verify these details in order to maintain the chronological integrity and general accuracy of the database.

Similar issues were also encountered when using specialist software to source material uploaded to video sharing sites such as *You Tube* and 'streaming' television archives such as *Box of Broadcasts*, both of which were used to fill gaps in the database. Once captured and catalogued, this material was then added to the database. In addition, repeat broadcasts of relevant material missing from the database were also captured using television recording equipment and added to the archive in accordance with the original air date.

When all of these various data sources were exhausted for the period 1993 to 2011, the available material was archived into folders following the convention of *Original Broadcast Year, Series Title and Series Number* (if applicable). For example, folders were named:

[1996] XCars S01.

[2006] Traffic Cops S04.

[2010] Police Interceptors S03.

These folders corresponded to the strata of data items used to produce stratified random samples, as is explained below. In one case, two *series* of *Police Interceptors* were broadcast in the same year; series one was broadcast in the summer of 2008, and the first half of series two (six episodes) was broadcast later in 2008 with the remainder of series two (six episodes) being broadcast in early 2009. This required a solution which retained the chronological integrity of the database. Therefore, all the episodes of *Police Interceptors* that were broadcast during 2008 were placed in the *[2008] Police Interceptors S01* folder, even though six episodes were part of *Series Two* that was shown in 2008.

Initially, all non-U.K. based material was removed from the main database, in order to maintain the focus on the U.K. situation which is chronologically mapped to the rise in concern around PVPs that will be examined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern').

The 'best-of' compilation episodes were also removed from the database as these could potentially distort the research findings.

Maintaining the same folder structure as outlined above, the remaining U.K. material broadcast between 1993 and 2011 was divided into two subsets; those which tended to regularly feature PVPs and those which did not, with the latter subset being quarantined. This division took place at the series title level, not at the individual episode level and the ACPO definition was utilised to determine the presence (or otherwise) of PVPs in the series titles, which defines a PVP as being underway when:

'A driver indicates by their actions or continuance of their manner of driving that they have no intention of stopping for police and the police driver believes that the driver of the subject vehicle is aware of the requirement to stop and decides to continue behind the subject vehicle with a view to either reporting its progress or stopping it. Pursuit may be spontaneous or pre-planned' (ACPO: 2008. 7).

The series titles that were disregarded as a result of this process included, among others, *Cops with Cameras*, *Brit Cops*, *Send in the Dogs*, *You're Nicked and Car Crime U.K.* Whilst occasionally featuring PVPs, the focus of these series titles, which includes the work of police dog units, door entry teams and crowd control specialists was not deemed to be sufficiently relevant to the subject area of PVPs. Moreover, the database contains a wealth of data that is highly relevant to the research questions, making the inclusion of video material that was likely to be only tangentially relevant unnecessary.

The eight series titles which remained in the database were *Police Stop*, *POCA*, *XCars*, *Car Wars*, *Road Wars*, *Traffic Cops*, *Motorway Cops* and *Police Interceptors*. A brief biography of each of these series titles is contained in Chapter 1 ('Biographies of Series Titles').

Following these stratification processes, the remaining material in the database, a full inventory of which can be seen in Appendix 1, comprised a large amount of highly relevant U.K.-based video material which regularly featured PVP-based content according to the ACPO definition above (ACPO: 2008. 7).

As can be seen in Table 3.3 there is significant variation in the number of episodes available for sampling from within each stratum. There are two factors which are responsible for this variation. The first is that some series consisted of more episodes than others. The second is that some episodes were simply not available through the data collection methods outlined above. Therefore, although not a complete collection of all the potentially relevant material which has been broadcast, the database is nonetheless a reasonably representative collection of PVP-related television documentary programmes, including significant numbers of the most well-known and successful series. The database is therefore a suitable tool with which to answer the specific research questions.

### **The Time Lag**

In order to select a suitable sample of episodes for analysis, it is essential to consider the time-lag between the filming of PVPs and their eventual broadcast on television, or publication on VHS in the case of the *Police Stop* video series. All video material requires editing and other post-production work before broadcast or publication can take place. Captions, music and commentary are added in the post-production stages and potentially troublesome legal issues must be addressed. The seasonal organisation of television schedules also has a bearing on the eventual broadcast date and when combined, these considerations introduce a time-lag that varies and is therefore extremely difficult to gauge accurately.

However, in early clip-based examples of the genre it was not uncommon to see a date-stamp displayed on the screen during PVPs.

This information was presumably embedded by police on-board camera systems in real-time and would perhaps be useful when using the video footage as evidence in legal proceedings. Perhaps, as Gillespie (2000: 19) suggests this kind of information may have been deliberately left in the final edit of the material as an indicator of its authenticity. However, for the purposes of this study, this information can be useful in signposting the actual age of the footage being shown. Using this identification method, it can be seen that early episodes of *POCA* and the *Police Stop* video series were heavily reliant on PVP material that was often recorded two or three years prior to publication or broadcast. This time-lag can perhaps be attributed to a paucity of suitable material for broadcast during the nascent period of the genre during the mid-1990s.

The increased adoption and expansion of police in-car video and CCTV technology has inevitably produced more material suitable for broadcast and closed this time-lag significantly and subsequently reduced the reliance on older material. Therefore, clip-based examples of the genre, such as episodes of *POCA* broadcast at the turn of the millennium tended to feature material which had typically been recorded between twelve and eighteen months prior to broadcast although older material was still featured occasionally. This embedded date-stamp and vehicle speed information is less common in more contemporary programmes, especially those filmed in the 'ride-along' style using broadcast-quality mobile recording equipment, dash-cams and 'GoPro' cameras mounted inside police vehicles and sometimes attached to the officers themselves.

These contemporary 'ride-along' style programmes tend to favour captions added in post-production which refer to the time of the incident being shown, but without indicating the year or month, presumably to assist with the syndication of the footage to other television networks internationally by adding a timeless quality to the material. Clearly this lack of an identifiable recording date is unhelpful in attempting to ascertain the time-lag between filming and broadcast.

Although by no means an exact science, a best-estimate for this time-lag is approximately 12 months and this will be factored into the chronological calculations which underpin the examination of the research questions. This estimate is broadly supported by the interview respondent who took the view that from the start of filming to the end of the broadcasting would usually take just under one year. Allowing for this time-lag will allow the concerns around the issue of PVPs in the print media and elsewhere to feed-through and potentially be evident in the data.

### **How the Episodes were Sampled**

Having screened out the irrelevant material from the database, there remained a total of 244 separate data items, each comprising a single episode of a series title broadcast between 1993 and 2011 along with two VHS videorips produced in 1993 and 1994 (See Appendix 1). The next task was to select stratified random samples of this data for the TA, guided by the parameters of each of the research questions.

#### 1. Do PVP-based TV programmes legitimise the police and police work? If so, how do they do this?

This broad question was investigated using the widest possible chronological spread of the episodes in the database, which included the earliest data available from 1993 through to the more contemporary material broadcast in 2011. This enabled an historical examination of the potential legitimisation of the police and their work over an 18 year period. 2011 was selected as the cut-off point as PVP-related fatalities had returned to their pre-concern levels seen in the late 1990s. In addition, 2011 was also the year in which the ACPO guidelines (ACPO 2008) were codified into law (IPCC: 2011), which underlines 2011 as a suitable point to cut-off the research. As will be examined in detail below, the video material which comprised the research data was thematically analysed in order to answer this research question.

2. Did PVP-based programmes alter in response to public and official concern about PVPs expressed during the period 2001-2005? If so, how?

As will be examined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), PVP-related fatalities rose during each of the financial years 1998/99, 1999/00 and 2000/01 rising to a peak during the period 2001/02 (PCA: 2002) and spiking again to a lesser extent during 2005/06. Similarly, concern expressed in the print media also peaked twice, during both 2001 and 2005 before subsiding markedly during 2006. Therefore, allowing approximately one year to accommodate the estimated time-lag between filming, production and airing of the PVP-related television programmes, it would be reasonable to expect that any response to this concern would be discernible during television programmes broadcast between 2002 and 2006. Therefore, the relevant strata when addressing this research question were identified in the database as being those episodes broadcast between 2002 and 2006. As will be outlined below, the presence of, or increase in the particular themes identified during the thematic analysis process might indicate that the concern expressed around the issue of PVPs was being manifested in the television programmes.

3. Has the visibility of PVPs conveyed in the TV programmes been subject to a decline over time? If so, why might this be the case?

During the preliminary stages of conducting the thematic analysis of the data sample, a third question arose, concerning the frequency of PVPs that were visible chronologically across the data set. There appeared to be a downward trajectory in the visibility of PVPs, both in terms of the number of PVPs conveyed and in the percentage of each episode that was dedicated to vignettes featuring PVPs. This led to the formulation of the third research question, which required the use of quantitative methods to examine the long term visibility of PVPs conveyed in the episodes sampled. The rationale and method utilised to conduct the timing of PVP events in the data is examined further below in the 'data preparation' section of this chapter.

Year of Broadcast	<u>Question 1.</u> Do PVP-based television programmes legitimise the police and police work? If so, How do they do this?	<u>Question 2.</u> Did PVP-based television programmes alter in response to public and official concern about PVPs expressed during the period 2002 - 2006? **	<u>Question 3.</u> Has the visibility of PVPs conveyed in these TV programmes been subject to a decline over time? If so, why might this be the case?	Number of episodes sampled for each year.
1993				1*
1994				1*
1995				2
1996				2
1997	No Data	No Data	No Data	No Data.
1998				2
1999				1*
2000				2
2001				2
2002				2
2003				4
2004				4
2005				4
2006				4
2007				4
2008				4
2009				4
2010				4
2011				4
Totals	51	18	51	51

**Table 3.2 - Episodes Sampled for Research Questions.**

\* Only one episode available in the database for these years.

\*\* Allowing for one year time lag.

As can be seen in Table 3.2 there is a significant overlap between the samples utilised to examine the three research questions. A total of 51 episodes were selected as the complete sample. A conscious decision was made to include material from each of the available strata. As outlined above, the stratification was based on the variables of *Original Broadcast Year*, *Series Title* and *Series Number*, resulting in the creation of 'folders' (corresponding to strata), each of which contains all the episodes of a particular *Series Title*, broadcast during a specific *year* or as part of a single *series number* spanning a given year. Each stratum contains a varying number of episodes, the contents of which were randomly sampled to produce the data applicable to the three research questions.

The results of this random sampling can be seen in Table 3.3(below). The sample size for the period between 1993 and 2003 was subject to some general limitation in the availability of material. Two episodes for each year up to 2003 were sampled, except for the years 1993, 1994 and 1999 where only a single episode was available in the database. There were no data available in the archive for 1997. The analysis relevant to answering Research Question One employed the largest possible sample, comprising 51 episodes, as episodes from each year were of potential relevance to this question.

To answer Question Two the smallest sample was employed, with 18 episodes. However the sample size was doubled to four episodes for each of the years relevant to this question where the data was available. Therefore four episodes were sampled for the years spanning 2003 to 2006, allowing for a one-year lag and two episodes were sampled for 2002 as there were only two episodes from 2002 available in the archive.

Question Three spans the period 1993 to 2011, and the sample used to examine this question was all 51 episodes (the same as for Question One).

Year.	Series Titles Being Broadcast Which Are Present in the Database.	Number of Episodes of Each Series Title Sampled for that year.	Number of Episodes in Total Available in Each Stratum	Sampling Percentage for Each Strata
1993	Police Stop [VHS]	1*	1	100%
1994	Police Stop [VHS]	1*	1	100%
1995	POCA	2	3	66.67%
1996	X-Cars	2	6	33.33%
1997	No Data Available	---	---	---
1998	POCA	2	2	100%
1999	Car Wars	1*	1	100%
2000	POCA	2	6	33.33%
2001	POCA	2	2	100%
2002	POCA	1	1	100%
	Car Wars	1	1	100%
2003	Road Wars	2	6	33.33%
	Traffic Cops	2	9	22.22%
2004	Road Wars	2	6	33%
	Traffic Cops	2	3	66%
2005	Road Wars	2	5	40%
	Traffic Cops	2	8	25%
2006	Road Wars	1	7	14.29%
	Traffic Cops	1	10	10%
	POCA	1	6	16.67%
	Car Wars	1	2	50%
2007	Road Wars	1	18	5.56%
	Traffic Cops	1	9	11.11%
	POCA	1	3	33.33%
	Car Wars	1	4	25%
2008	Road Wars	1	19	5.26%
	Traffic Cops	1	11	9.09%
	POCA	1	12	8.33%
	Police Interceptors	1	12	8.33%
2009	Road Wars	1	18	5.56%
	Traffic Cops	1	5	20%
	Police Interceptors	1	7	14.29%
	Motorway Cops	1	1	100%
2010	Traffic Cops	2	9	22.22%
	Police Interceptors	2	15	13.33%
2011	Traffic Cops	2	7	28.57%
	Police Interceptors	2	8	25%
Totals		51 Episodes	244 Episodes	Total sampled 20.09%

**Table 3.3. - Strata Sampled and Percentages 1993-2011.**

The sampling of the episodes was carried out randomly within each stratum (defined by Broadcast Year and *Series Title*), with at least one episode being selected from each stratum. Sampling fractions varied between different strata (see Table 3.3).

### **Data Preparation.**

Having selected the 51 episodes that comprised the full sample, a number of preparatory steps were required in order to process the data prior to the TA process. The relevant episodes in the sample were organised into a digital folder and each was organised chronologically (by year) and given a sequential number between 1 and 51, with number one representing the first episode from 1993 (*Police Stop*) and number 51 representing the last of the episodes in the sample from 2011 (*Police Interceptors*).

A spreadsheet was then populated with basic information detailing the year of broadcast, *series title*, episode number or name, series number and broadcast channel of each of the episodes contained in the sample (See Appendix 2).

Utilising the ACPO definition of a PVP, (ACPO: 2008. 7) the first viewing was undertaken in order to ascertain the number and duration of the PVPs contained in each of the 51 sample episodes. The number of PVPs in each episode was therefore logged along with the start time. This process also doubled as an opportunity to begin the task of data familiarisation.

In order to accurately and consistently record these details, the whole vignette containing the PVP was timed from the start of the vignette to the end. This was a fairly straightforward exercise, as the programmes clearly demarcate both the beginning and end of each vignette using a form of televisual punctuation mark, usually consisting of a short and oft-repeated closing shot, musical motif or video montage sequence that functions as a full stop signalling the end of the vignette. PVPs that were contained in the opening or closing credits or as part of the 'preview' sections designed to inform the viewer of the upcoming content featured in the episode were not included in these calculations.

These timings were produced in order to address Research Question three, which examines the hypothesis that there has been an overall decline in the visibility of PVPs in the various *series titles* contained in the sample. Each PVP-related vignette was allocated a unique two part identification number. The first, between 1 and 51 related to the episode number and the second was derived from the PVP-related vignette number. For example data number 32.2 corresponds to the second PVP contained within episode 32 of the sample. Having completed these basic organisational and auditing procedures, the data was ready to be thematically analysed. However, prior to detailing how this was undertaken, we must first outline what thematic analysis is, examine what it entails and address its suitability as a tool for analysing the video data.

### **Thematic Analysis – An Explanation.**

A variety of potentially suitable qualitative methods were considered. As Silverman & Marvasti argue (2008: 8), this consideration of methods should be based entirely upon their potential suitability for the research task, in this case, that of analysing a video-based data sample. Following a small exploratory pilot analysis, T.A. was selected as a particularly suitable method applicable to the study of video material, able to cope with pictures, music and other potentially relevant presentational variables. TA is also extremely flexible at a theoretical level, as it benefits from not being allied to any single epistemological position (Clarke et al: 2008). This circumvents the requirement to slavishly follow strictly proscribed theoretical frameworks, such as those associated with conversation analysis (Braun & Clarke: 2006). At the most basic level, Hayes (2000: 173) summarises TA as a method of, 'qualitative analysis which involves sorting information into themes. Themes, in this context, are recurring ideas or topics which can be detected in the material analysed.' TA is an analytical procedure which, according to Guest et al (2012: 11) is 'the most commonly used method of analysis in qualitative research.'

Despite this ubiquity, TA is rarely acknowledged in the research literature (Howitt & Cramer: 2011. 328): as Boyatzis (1998: vi) states, ‘thematic analysis is a process that many have used in the past without articulating the specific technique. [It is] to be used to assist the researcher in the search for insight [as] a process for encoding qualitative information.’

TA has been adapted to suit a variety of research aims across a broad range of subjects and disciplines and applied to a wide variety of different data types, including food advertising posters (Robertson & Pettigrew: 2006), interview data from sales teams and their managers (Zorn & Ruccio: 1998) and video material analysed in order to examine the relationship between the police and science in the television programme *CSI* (Cavender & Deutsch: 2007). Because it can be used for a wide variety of data types (including video data) it was particularly suitable for this research, unlike (for example) content analysis which can only be used for data in textual form.

Braun and Clarke (2006: 87) offer a clear and practical guide to the steps required to carry out a thematic analysis and their guidelines on the method of TA are contained in Figure 3.4 (below).

Phase	Description of the process
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data:	Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.
2. Generating initial codes:	Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.
3. Searching for themes:	Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.
4. Reviewing themes:	Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis.
5. Defining and naming themes:	Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme.
6. Producing the report:	The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.

**Figure 3.4 – Phases of TA - Taken From Braun and Clarke (2006: 87).**

With the exception of the ‘thematic map’ mentioned in stage 4 (above), these guidelines were adopted and specific details of how the TA was applied to the video data will now be examined below.

### **The Thematic Analysis of the Data.**

Having performed the basic organisational tasks necessary to prepare the video data, the TA was then undertaken. The entire video data set was viewed for a second time and extensive and detailed notes were produced. Using a bespoke survey instrument that was designed, tested and refined during the pilot analysis, these notes included a synopsis of each vignette and general observations related to potentially interesting features in the data. The exploratory pilot TA examined twelve additional episodes in order to test the research method and instrument of data analysis. The findings produced by this preliminary pilot study have not been used in the main analysis.

As per the method outlined by Braun and Clarke (see Figure 3.4) a full transcript of the on-scene dialogue and added commentary contained in every vignette in the sampled episodes was produced regardless of whether it contained a PVP or not. The opening titles were also scrutinised in the same manner. During this early stage in the TA, the first research question concerning the legitimisation of the police and police work began to be formulated. Contrasts in the way that the police and their work were being conveyed in different series titles were beginning to become apparent. The commentary styles, explanations and rationales that were associated with a variety of police work, including PVPs in the various series titles differed markedly. This prompted the formulation of a research question which would examine these differences.

The video data set was then viewed in its entirety for a third time in order to verify the accuracy of the transcripts, synopses, timings and allocated identity numbers given to each of the PVP vignettes in the sample.

Alongside this verification process, the initial codes relating to the PVP-based vignettes were also generated (Stage 3 in Figure 3.4). Work then began on condensing and amalgamating the large number of codes that had been generated during this third viewing of the data. (Stage 3 in Figure 3.4). This coding process, 'forces the researcher to make judgements' (Ryan and Bernard: 2000. 780).

Having verified that the extensive notes were, as far as was possible, a verbatim account of the data set, the analysis then switched to using these notes as the main focus of the continuing TA, although the video material was consulted for the purpose of verification if required. The TA process involved the identification of relevant words and phrases contained in both the commentary and on-scene dialogue featured in all vignettes, including the non PVP-related ones. Non-verbal coding also took place as scenarios and events present in the data were also identified and summarised into code form. For example there were numerous codes associated with 'public in danger' which were expressed in a variety of different ways; sometimes verbal, but also conveyed through the use of non-verbal cues such as slow-motion replays of near misses in which the apparent danger to the public was flagged-up and emphasised without being explicitly verbalised.

The code list was gradually condensed and consolidated into a list of potential themes based upon the unity of the theme's ability to summarise the multiple signifying codes. The identification of themes is a process which is driven through careful, reflexive and sometimes pragmatic coding of the data. Codes are therefore amalgamated; subsumed and re-defined to produce overarching themes. The process itself is not entirely linear as refinement and re-assessment are an integral part of the method (Ryan & Bernard: 2000). These themes were then carefully verified through a process of cross-referencing them with similar instances of the theme from other vignettes in order to corroborate their accuracy, coherence and stability in relation to the data.

This 'reviewing' (Stage 4 in Figure 3.4) was a particularly lengthy process as a number of these themes were more difficult to identify than others. What became the *Teamwork* theme for example, was very well represented in the data set and identification of the codes signifying it were relatively simple to identify in the majority of cases. Other themes, such as what became *Excitement Cops* were often more subtly conveyed and subsequently required a greater level of verification to ensure their presence.

In the final phases of the TA (Stage 5 in Figure 3.4) the themes that had been produced thus far were checked to ensure they were sufficiently distinct from each other and alternative names and phrases were considered in order to achieve the best fit between the descriptor and the phenomenon it represented. Some of these amendments necessitated a return to the data set and occasionally, a re-viewing of the relevant video material. Some vignettes produced multiple codes and themes. A number of the PVP-related vignettes contained in the data sample were very short in duration and therefore contained very little that could be analysed.

The entire data set was then viewed for the fourth and final time to check that the themes were present and accurately reflected what was being conveyed in the PVP-related vignettes. Having exhausted the coding process, evident as a result of no new codes being generated, the final hard-copy notes now contained a list of themes that were present in each PVP-related vignettes. 35 of these PVP-vignettes were subsequently removed from the analysis due to them not being filmed in the U.K.(see Appendix 2). Of these 35 'international' PVPs, three were Canadian, one was Australian and 31 were filmed in the U.S.A. It was therefore decided that these 35 PVP-related vignettes were not directly relevant to Research Questions Two and Three and only tangentially relevant to Question One. This left 150 U.K.-based PVPs in the sample and these varied greatly in length, from 8 to 840 seconds in duration. Having completed the T.A. the results were presented in table form.

These results, along with more detailed qualitative, 'extract examples' (Stage 6 in Figure 3.4) of the themes within the data and their relevance to the research questions will be discussed in Chapter 5 ('Findings and Analysis'). As Valverde (2006: 34) observes:

'[O]ne can count how many men in uniform appear every night on a particular television network, and in that work, each representation of a uniform is a datum: but for an analysis of the social meanings of uniforms, we need tools beyond counting.'

The findings represent, 'one possible reading' based upon the researcher's 'reflexive interpretation' of the data based upon the 'observer's frame of reference, according to explicit criteria', which in this case is predicated upon the issue of legitimacy (Reiner & Greer: 2012. 246). Below is a list of themes that were identified during the T.A. process.

- PVP Causes Danger.
- PVP Minimises Danger.
- Public in Danger.
- Cops in Danger.
- Suspects (& their occupants) in Danger.
- Danger of Suspect Escaping.
- Police Protect the Public.
- Management.
- Adherence to Policy.
- Training.
- Teamwork.
- Skills.
- Excitement Cops.
- Excitement Suspects.
- Arrest Inevitable.

These themes were deemed to be the most relevant ones available to address the issue of legitimacy that forms the basis of Research Question One whilst being useful indicators of any potential alterations in the way that PVPs were conveyed during the period specified by Research Question Two. This list of themes therefore represents a variety of features present in the research data that may be linked to legitimacy, both in positive and negative terms. For example, it was theorised that the *Excitement Cops*, *PVP Causes Danger* and *Public in Danger* themes might delegitimise PVPs whilst *PVP Minimises Danger*, *Training* and *Management* might potentially serve to legitimise them.

## **Research Interview**

During the early stages of the research design, it was decided that conducting interviews with a small number of the media professionals responsible for the production of some of the series titles represented in the sample data would be beneficial. The overall aim of conducting these interviews was to develop a better understanding of the processes of production from ‘behind the camera.’ It was therefore hoped that the interviews would provide hitherto unknown insights into a vast array of pertinent areas such as the production process, audience considerations, partnership working, legal compliance and the attitudes of television professionals to the PVPs that feature in their work as media producers. Therefore, a wish-list of potentially useful respondents was researched and formulated, concentrating on the senior-level executives such as the producers and directors of popular ‘cat-chase TV’ series titles. It was hoped that as a result of approaching these senior individuals, the interviews might ‘snowball’ down to the lower ranks within their respective media organisations, providing more respondents.

As gaining access to media professionals as interview respondents was by no means guaranteed, it was envisaged that any data produced by these interviews would be used in a supplementary role to the research as a whole. As such, the ideal maximum number of respondents suitable was deemed to be ten.

However, the quality of these respondents was envisaged as being more important than the actual number interviewed. Various interview methods were considered including structured, semi-structured and open-ended approaches. A semi-structured interview method was deemed to be the most appropriate technique as not all the relevant questions could be anticipated in advance, and the semi-structuring should be conducive to a reasonably free-flowing interview (as indeed proved to be the case).

Following numerous redrafts and modifications an interview schedule was produced; containing 15 questions organised into five sections. Designed to be as open-ended as possible, these questions could then be followed up with further subsidiary questions at the interviewer's discretion to enable the interviewer to, '...seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given, [in order to] record qualitative information about the topic' (May: 2011. 134). The interview schedule can be found in Appendix 3. Careful consideration was given to the ordering of the questions, not simply with the aim of assisting the flow of the interview, but also with a view to putting the respondent at ease with the first section of themed questions. The more challenging questions were left until late in the interview, when hopefully the respondent and interviewer would have built a level of rapport conducive with discussing the potentially more difficult or controversial questions.

The next requirement was to seek the approval of the University Ethics Committee. Once ethical approval had been granted, initial approach emails were sent to three television production companies. Of these three, the first one of these did not respond to either the initial, or a series of subsequent emails. Therefore, it was not possible to initialise contact with anyone working within this organisation. The second company eventually responded after numerous repeated email approaches and a process began whereby the initial approach email was forwarded back-and-forth between various individuals, both senior and junior within the organisation. Tiring of this, I decided to telephone the television production company and was informed that they were unwilling to participate in the interview process.

There was clearly an issue of mistrust at work and the conversation, though polite, was imbued with a degree of wariness and suspicion.

The third production company was altogether more cooperative. The initial approach email was responded to within 24 hours and there followed two brief telephone exchanges with one of the directors of a leading television production company. As a result of these conversations, a meeting was scheduled to take place at the *Doc-Fest* event in Sheffield on the 9<sup>th</sup> of June 2014 with a respondent who had been involved in the production of three of the series titles that were included in the thematic analysis data sample.

The subsequent interview, which took place over almost two hours, was digitally recorded and transcribed. The respondent offered a possible explanation for the reluctance of other television production companies to participate in research interviews. He explained that there had been major repercussions in the television production industry resulting from the broadcast of the highly embarrassing Channel 4 documentary, *Meet the Police Commissioner* in May 2014. In the wake of this broadcast, a very senior government official (widely thought to be the Home Secretary, Teresa May) had subsequently written to every police Chief Constable advising them to carefully consider their working relationships with media companies in order to avoid any further embarrassment.

The interview respondent was concerned that this high-level political intervention had resulted in increased suspicion between the police and media production companies and this may lead to problems gaining the necessary access to police officers for the purpose of filming them. In addition, the respondent believed that, as access became more problematic, this would lead to an increase in the competition for police access among the various privately owned television production companies. The respondent believed this was a likely cause of the unwillingness to participate in the research interviews shown by the other production companies.

Indeed, before carrying out the successful interview, the respondent requested proof of identity and credentials from the researcher, initially fearing that he was being set up by a journalist. Similarly, a member of staff working for the second of the three television production companies that were initially approached for potential interviews was also suspicious of the researcher's motives. This was most likely the reason for their refusal to participate in the research being undertaken here.

Due to these access problems, only one research interview was undertaken. Although the interviews were never envisaged as a crucial part of the thesis, the process of securing that one interview was extremely time-consuming. However, sharing the perspective and insights of a (gratifyingly forthcoming) long-standing producer of PVP-based television programmes – perhaps the most valuable interviewee I could have acquired - was extremely enlightening. The interview produced some interesting contextual material which has been incorporated into the report of the findings and discussion contained in this thesis where appropriate.

## CHAPTER 4 – CHRONOLOGY OF CONCERN

### Introduction.

This chapter will chronologically examine the birth and development of concern around the issue of PVPs. As will be explored below, this concern emanated from numerous official sources which include the various police oversight and management bodies operating in the U.K. In addition, this concern was also expressed in the national news-media, by pressure groups, members of the public, politicians and by the police themselves.

In examining this concern, this chapter will trace how and why the issue of PVP has developed from a position of near-invisibility, into one that was seen as increasingly problematic. There have been fluctuations in both the media interest and the level of concern expressed around the issue of PVP, which has at times been temporarily subsumed into other, more prominent debates, such as those concerned with joyriding in the early years of the 1990s and the cause celebre of Sheena McDonald who became synonymous with dangerous police driving during 1999 and 2000.

As we shall see, during the first half of the 2000s, there was a confluence of factors which threatened the legitimacy of PVP as an acceptable law enforcement activity. The first of these factors was a very large statistical increase in the number of PVP-related fatalities towards the end of the 1990s and into the early 2000s (PCA: 2002). This produced a spike in media interest, as evidenced by the publication of numerous high-profile national newspaper articles and opinion pieces that were highly critical of PVPs.

The second factor, similarly motivated by a rapid rise in PVP-related fatalities, was a flurry of 'official' interest in PVP, manifested primarily in the publication of critical reports by the various bodies concerned with the regulation, management and oversight of the police. However, alongside this official concern, the early part of the new millennium also saw the exponential growth of PVP images as a central component of popular television ob-doc programming, which served to raise the visibility of PVPs.

The following chronological analysis is broken-down into three sections. The first of these, 1900-1984 can be seen as the pre-concern period. The second, spanning 1985 - 1998 – covers the birth of concern and the first challenges to the legitimacy of PVP. The third, 1999 - 2011 covers the peak of concern which saw the most significant threats to the legitimacy of PVPs; a period which culminated in the introduction of legally-binding rules to regulate PVPs (IPCC: 2011).

### **1900 – 1984: Nothing to See Here**

Initially opposed by self-interested politicians attempting to protect their sizeable investments in the railway network, the motor car steadily became an increasingly common sight during the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Setright: 2000). Ensuring the smooth flow of traffic had long been a major component of police work, however, managing the rapid expansion of motorised transport in more rural areas, alongside the huge growth of motor vehicle ownership in the large towns and cities placed an enormous manpower burden on the police force (Weinberger: 1995).

Manpower issues aside, the early part of the century saw the development of a class-element to police encounters with motorists as officers increasingly found themselves dealing with drivers of a higher social status than themselves (O’Connell: 1998). These encounters tended to produce friction, hostility and resentment (Plowden: 1973). In some cases, motorists would provide false details or refuse to stop their vehicles for police (Emsley: 1993). The inter-war years saw a rapid expansion in automobile production and ownership (Daunton: 2007). This invariably meant that mobility was increasingly available for potentially nefarious purposes.

PVP is not a particularly modern phenomenon; rather like so-called ‘joyriding’, it is an activity that can be traced to the earliest days of motoring (O’Connell: 2006. 455). There are numerous documented cases of PVP from the 1920’s (Daily Mail: 1924a; 1924b; 1925; Laybourn & Taylor: 2011. 181), and the 1930’s (Daily Mail: 1930; 1931; 1935).

These newspaper reports tended to be very short in length and devoid of any criticism of the police role in the PVP. As Figure 4.1 shows, alongside a large photograph of the wrecked getaway vehicle, Superintendent Lane and Inspector Hallett pose heroically for a photograph following their involvement in a PVP. This is the earliest example of a front-page 'splash' involving a PVP that was produced by the newspaper archive search detailed in Chapter 3 ('Methodology'). It is unusual in that PVP-related national newspaper reports during this period tended to be comprised of a few lines of text and photographic accompaniments were rare.



Figure 4.1 – Daily Mirror. 7<sup>th</sup> May 1925. Pg 1. (Daily Mirror: 1925).

During the inter-war period, relations between motorists and the police worsened significantly, perhaps due to spiralling numbers of driving-related prosecutions being undertaken by the police which reached 114, 541 during the second six months of 1928 (O'Connell: 1998. 126). This situation represented a potentially serious threat to the concept of 'policing by consent', and such was the concern that senior officers suggested, in evidence to the Royal Commission on the Police in 1929, that they would prefer to cede their traffic-management duties to one of the motoring bodies such as the Automobile Association (Plowden: 1973).

This suggestion was rejected. However, according to most accounts, the ever-expanding numbers of motorised vehicles necessitated an increase in motorised police patrols (Emsley: 1996; Laybourn & Taylor: 2011; Weinberger; 1995). However, Taylor (1999) challenges this 'demand-led' explanation and instead argues that the 'modernisation' seen during the 1930s was largely driven by police-generated 'supply-side' statistics constructed to bolster the position of the police in rapidly changing times (see also Taylor 1998).

What is beyond doubt is that the police became increasingly motorised throughout the century, but the introduction of dedicated traffic police was not a development welcomed by all officers and there was some resentment towards those occupying this role within the force. Subscribing to the well-worn argument that a focus on motorists was ignoring 'real' crime, Weinberger (1995: 67) outlines the opinion held by some beat officers, that traffic officers were not doing 'real' police work, typified by the quote of a police Inspector who stated:

'There's a terrific divide...The traffic PC, he liked to sit down all the time, they were tired men, very tired, they were not PCs, never have been...We were the practical men on the job, these fellows...well these fellows were never PCs... You were either a working man or you weren't in those days, these were traffic men see. 'Oh no, we don't do this, we're specialists, we don't accept charges' was their attitude'.

Both crime rates and traffic levels had doubled towards the end of the 1950s and as part of their response, the police increasingly turned to motorised transport and radios to maximise their operational efficiency (Critchley: 1978). However, it has been argued that this shift towards technology and mobility was instrumental in detaching the police from the communities they served, which had a detrimental impact on this important relationship (McConville & Shepherd: 1992. 1; Reiner: 2010. 79).

There appears to have been a dearth of PVP-related stories printed in the national press during the 1940s and throughout most of the 1950s. Perhaps this can be partly attributed to the outbreak of World War Two and its aftermath. As Setright observes (2002.85), motoring essentials such as tyres and petrol were scarce commodities during this period. Perhaps the lack of PVP-related stories was a result of fewer incidents or perhaps newspaper editors and journalists were pre-occupied with more pressing war-journalism.

As affluence increased in the post-war period, the wartime shortages were reversed and there was a spectacular increase in the uptake of motorised transport throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Judt: 2005. 339). This expansion was met with the gradual introduction of specialist police traffic divisions to meet the demand for road-policing (Emsley: 2009. 249). PVP-related stories resurfaced sporadically in national newspapers during the late 1950s (Daily Mail: 1957; The Times: 1958). No PVP-related news-reports were discovered for the period between 1959 and 1963, however PVP-related news reports did resurface sporadically during the mid-1960s (Daily Mirror: 1964; 1964b; 1966; Times; 1967). Again, it is unclear what underpins these fluctuations in reporting. What is clear, however, is that the officers involved in these events tended to be presented in heroic terms and the legitimacy of PVPs as a crime-fighting tactic was therefore not challenged. This is most-likely due to the serious nature of the criminality that was being 'fought' by the police officers involved in the PVPs; with armed robbery being particularly well represented in stories from this period.

Whilst these stories promulgated the image of brave, action-oriented police heroes, there was a darker side to the police that was being gradually uncovered. The 1960s and 1970s saw serious threats to police legitimacy as high-profile corruption and malpractice scandals were discovered, raising fundamental questions about the integrity and honesty of the police (Newburn: 2008. 93; Reiner: 2010. 81).

Journalist Peter Laurie conducted observational research with the Metropolitan Police for an eight month period during the late 1960s, and noted that, 'The traditional spice of area car work used to be the chase, but London is now so crowded with cars that tearing about after villains in the old style is officially discouraged' (Laurie: 1970. 93). This observation concedes that the practice of 'tearing around' was officially deemed undesirable, perhaps even a little old-fashioned, by senior officers. Nevertheless, this nostalgic lament demonstrates that PVPs were a popular activity among some officers.

Newspaper reports during the 1970s tended to either adhere to the heroic, 'cops and robbers' narrative (Cooke: 1978), while others simply report the facts of the case in a straight-down-the-line manner without criticism of the police (Times: 1973; 1974; Cunningham: 1978; 1979). However, towards the end of the decade, three PVP cases were reported over two separate articles in relatively quick succession and, for the first time, criticism of the police and a hint of doubt around their tactical approach to terminating PVPs were contained in these news reports.

The first of these cases was reported in the *Daily Express* on the 27<sup>th</sup> May 1978 under the headline, *Barricade of Death* (Daily Express: 1978). Police were involved in the pursuit of two 16 year old boys. In an attempt to terminate the escalating pursuit involving ten police vehicles, the police Inspector in charge, Gordon Keen, decided to commandeer four heavy goods vehicles (HGV) to block the entire motorway. Amazingly, at least one of the HGV drivers was still in his cab as the bandit car approached, as the police believed that the fleeing driver would stop when he saw the lorries up ahead.

However, the vehicle smashed into the improvised road-block, killing the driver and seriously injuring the passenger. Speaking after the crash, Inspector Daff of Thames Valley police stated that:

‘...it had become too dangerous to let this car go on. It might be possible with hindsight to suggest other means of stopping it. But the man on the spot had to do what he thought was right and these youths had been given every chance to stop in safety’ (Daily Express: 1978. 5).

This statement implies that there may have been some undisclosed criticism of the method used by the police to terminate the pursuit. Use of the ‘hindsight’ argument also suggests that alternative PVP termination methods may have been a better option, which in turn infers that the method used may have been misguided. The improvised response to the PVP also suggests the lack of an agreed pursuit termination policy. These inferences aside, it was highly-unusual for a newspaper report from this period to include police statements justifying their choice of PVP termination tactics, especially in the context of what was a fairly brief news article.

The second case, reported in the *Daily Express* on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 1978 under the headline *The Deadly Chase*, involved a trio of 16-year old boys who were involved in a crash which killed the boy driving the borrowed car and left his two young passengers unconscious in hospital. As the newspaper reported, (Pratt & Couzens: 1978. 3):

‘Later yesterday, Hampshire police said emphatically: ‘At no time was this a chase. The patrol car was following to check their speed. There was no siren or blue light flashing.’ But [the victim’s father] said bitterly: ‘If that’s the case why was the car doing 70 miles per hour? Police at the hospital told me they started following at 30 mph.’’ The row over what action police should take in such circumstances escalated last night. But the verdict in most cases was in favour of the police.’

What is interesting and unusual about this case, is that the father of the deceased driver expressed his scepticism regarding the police version of events and the newspaper published this criticism.

More telling perhaps, is the final paragraph which, in referring to 'the row' around 'such circumstances', speaks to the existence of a contrary view to that held by the police and their supporters. This report is significant in that it represents the first open criticism of PVP and as such, can perhaps be seen as the opening salvo in the battle to be fought over the legitimacy of PVP. The fact that two 16 year old boys were killed and three were seriously injured, coupled with their status as petty criminals may have contributed to the controversy around these particular cases. Tactically, the use of civilian vehicles in a roadblock could also be seen as questionable, as could the lack of warning equipment - lights and sirens - being utilised during in a 70mph 'follow'.

These cases suggest that the legitimacy of PVP as a law-enforcement tactic was not guaranteed and could not be taken for granted in all cases. It could be argued that this criticism reflected the general decline in deference towards authority that was seen to develop during the late 1970s (Reiner: 2010. 82). Towards the end of the 1970s, the police were also being seen in increasingly political terms (Morgan: 1989. 217) and disquiet was coalescing around the related issues of police complaints and accountability which were widely seen as requiring urgent reform (Scraton: 1985. 40; Box: 1983. 83).

The 1980s witnessed further seismic shocks to police legitimacy (Graef: 1989. 24), as the Brixton Riots erupted in 1981, closely followed by publication of the Scarman Report and the Miner's Strike of 1984. This decline in police legitimacy argues Smith (2007: 279), was due to a corrosion of the very mechanisms which had sustained it in the post-war era, he states:

'...corruption scandals contradicted the message that the police were a disciplined organisation with clear standards; miscarriages of justice....highlighted abuse of powers; rising crime and plummeting clear-up rates showed the police were less and less effective...a militarised response to growing industrial and political disorder shook the foundations of the strategy of minimum force.'

The first half of the 1980s was a particularly turbulent period for the police and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 'public opinion polls were expressing considerable reservations about the police; and quality newspapers on both ends of the political spectrum accepted such findings' (Emsley: 1992. 132). Alongside this normalisation of public criticism of the police generally, the reporting of PVP incidents continued, during the first-half of the 1980s (Daily Mirror: 1980; Daily Mail: 1983; 1984; The Times: 1984). These stories adopted a fatalistic attitude to the resulting deaths and injuries, but the tactics, actions and strategies adopted by the police were never questioned or discussed. It is therefore somewhat peculiar, given the general increase in criticism of the police during this period, that the issue of PVP was not identified as a more controversial issue at this time. Perhaps this can be attributed to the relatively poor visibility of PVPs, compounded by a lack of reliable data and a criminological focus on other, more visible and controversial police-related fatalities, such as deaths in custody, police shootings or public-order related incidents, due to the prevailing social and critical research currents of the time.

In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, there was an explosion in policing research, with a great deal of material being produced with practical and policy-oriented objectives (Newburn & Reiner: 2007). Policing was increasingly being seen in political terms and this had a significant impact on both criminological and public discourses (Loader: 1994), in particular with those adopting critical and left-leaning approaches (Reiner 2000. 212). Subsequently, much of the academic material produced during this period was concerned with political issues, including police accountability (Scraton: 1985), militarisation of the police and the control of public disorder (Manwaring-White: 1983, McCabe & Wallington 1988; Ackroyd et al 1980; Waddington 1987; Jefferson 1987), controversial police-related deaths (Scraton: 1987, Rollo: 1980; Ward: 1986), police corruption (Box: 1983) and police-race relations (Jefferson & Grimshaw:1982; Hall et al: 1978).

Alongside this criticism, research-based scrutiny of the police underwent a huge expansion at the end of the 1970's, which mushroomed further during the 1980's (Reiner: 1992. 437).

This material emanated from a variety of sources including academic institutions, think-tanks, pressure-groups and some journalists, as well as from a range of 'official' bodies and police research organisations including the police themselves (Reiner: 2000. 209).

Broadly representative of this kind of research, 1983 saw the publication of a research study by the *Police Foundation* entitled, *Road Users and the Police* (Dix & Layzell: 1983). Though fairly comprehensive and wide-ranging in the scope of its enquiry into traffic policing, this document did not contain a single reference to accidents involving police vehicles or PVPs. It could be argued that this omission was indicative of the lack of official concern around the topic, although it is difficult to establish whether concern around PVPs was being expressed internally within the relevant bodies and organisations.

### **1985 – 1998: The Gathering Storm**

Up until the mid-1980s, the general issue of police-related road traffic incidents, and the more specific topic of PVPs, had avoided both academic and official scrutiny. However, this situation began to change on the 18<sup>th</sup> of March 1985 with the publication of a report in the *Daily Mail* (1985: 8) under the headline *Innocent Driver Killed in Police Crash*. The case involved the pursuit of a vehicle which crashed into a car, killing the driver and seriously injuring his wife and son who were passengers in the vehicle. In a particularly critical tone, the newspaper reported that following the fatal collision, 'People who ran to help complained last night that the pursuing police ignored the injured...and concentrated on capturing the...driver'. Members of the public were forced to release the casualties by cutting through their seat-belts and the report concluded by stating that, 'A member of the West Midlands police committee said the chief constable would be asked for a full report on the incident, 'We want clarification on the police policy for high-speed chases' (*Daily Mail*: 1985. 8).

This statement was unusual in that it referenced an intention to conduct enquiries into the incidents and five weeks later, the *Times* ran a story on the 23<sup>rd</sup> April under the headline, *Police Review on Car Chases* (Evans: 1985). It catalogued two contemporaneous PVP cases involving multiple fatalities in addition to reporting on two inquests verdicts following fatal PVP incidents. The article stated:

‘There have been a number of incidents involving police car chases and the Association of Chief Police Officers is at present looking into the policy of police forces on following and stopping vehicles. Scotland Yard’s policy is to follow any stolen car even if it goes off at high speed...until it runs out of petrol or another car manages to get in front and stop it’ (Evans: 1985. 2).

The article then produced Metropolitan Police sourced statistics on PVAs for the period between 1981-84, before pointing out that police drivers are four-times more accident prone than other drivers in the city. Clearly some of this disparity may be due to the fact that police drivers are more likely to engage in high-speed driving than the general public and the statistics themselves are very difficult to verify. However, there are obvious questions here relating to the policy statement referring to stolen vehicles. What if the vehicle is not stolen? Do they still chase fleeing motorists if they are driving a legally-owned vehicle? Should they pursue if they are unsure whether the target vehicle is stolen? In short, this policy is very unclear in its application. This is not the only pursuit policy consideration raised in the report, as waiting for the target vehicle to run out of petrol seems like a very ‘primitive’, not to say, speculative tactic for bringing a pursuit to a safe conclusion. It demonstrates the lack of safe pursuit termination options that were available during this period. Tactical options such as the use of ‘stinger’ tyre-deflation devices and helicopters were not available to the police during this time.

The language used in this early challenge to the legitimacy of PVP is also interesting. The word ‘chase’ or ‘chased’ is used seven times within the news report. However, the language utilised to quote police policy uses the words ‘follow’ or ‘followed instead (Evans: 1985.2). Linguistic considerations aside, the report stated that a review of pursuit policy was apparently underway.

This did not prevent further incidents from taking place, although there were no further PVP-related incidents reported until October 1986, when one officer died and another had his leg severed during a crash whilst pursuing a suspected stolen vehicle (Times: 1986; Daily Mail: 1986a).

Later the same year, an article was published in the *Times* under the headline *Inquiry into Police Car Chase Deaths* (Tendler: 1986). It was reported that the PCA was now overseeing the investigating of three PVP cases which were being examined by Scotland Yard's complaints investigation bureau. The report stated, 'The complaints authority has become involved in the cases at a time when accidents involving the police have become the centre of controversy' (Tendler: 1986. 3).

This interest in the issue of police driving had been fuelled by the founding of 'Victim', a pressure group established by Mrs Josie Taylor in May 1986 following the death of three young people, including her 20 year-old daughter during a PVP involving eight patrol cars in late 1984 (Mason: 1989. 320). Appearing on the *Reporting London* television programme in January 1987, Mrs Taylor was critical of the apparent rise in fatalities and serious injuries involving police vehicles and made it clear that she and the other members of her pressure group would not be, 'fobbed-off', with the usual, 'blandishments about the normally high standard of police driving' (Brain: 2010. 147). She had written to the Home Office asking for clarification on the rate of fatal and serious injury PVAs and the number of prosecutions against officers involved in these incidents. She was puzzled by the response, stating that:

'On the number of incidents involving police cars I was given some weird statistics that do not make sense...and it has been impossible to find out how many officers have been prosecuted for reckless driving. No information exists as far as I know' (Mason: 1987. 320).

In December 1986, the *Guardian* newspaper published an article with the headline *Follow That Car* (Azlz: 1986).

It reported that the pressure group 'Victim' was in correspondence with 48 families who had been bereaved as a result of PVAs, including pursuits. Furthermore, it lambasted the, 'poorly documented' statistics relating to PVA produced by the Metropolitan police, while expressing concern that similar statistics for other police regions were simply not available.

In response, the Association of Chief Police Officers secretary John Over was quoted as saying, 'A police driver doesn't know what he has got when he sees a car speed off like a bat out of hell. It could be a kidnapping, robbery with violence. What does he do, let the criminal disappear?' (Azlz: 1986. 10). However, this argument is somewhat undermined by the details of a PVP case from a few months earlier, in which a police driver chased a 24-year old man, who was killed in the resulting crash, on the grounds that he was not wearing his seat belt (Daily Mail: 1986). This surely does not rank with the crimes outlined by John Over, who was clearly offering a 'worst-case scenario' in his attempt to defend the legitimacy of PVP in the face of serious concerns being expressed around the safety, or otherwise, of police driving practice and policy.

The high-profile and persistent campaigning of Mrs Taylor therefore represented a formidable challenge to the legitimacy of PVP. Media exposure of her grievances, along with a continuation of damaging PVP-related news stories in the national press served to maintain the pressure on the police to respond to this criticism.

In their capacity as authors for the charity group INQUEST Benn & Worpole (1986) published *'Death in the City: An Examination of Police Related Deaths in London'* which featured chapters on a variety of controversial topics including police use of firearms, deaths in custody and crucially, a chapter examining police road-traffic incidents. In Table 4.2 (below), they sourced PVA data drawn from the Metropolitan Police force's annual reports which were published by the Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis. The accidents recorded therein are said to be those, according to the annual reports, in which the police driver was, '...entirely or partly to blame' (Benn & Worpole: 1986. 66).

<u>Year</u>	<u>No of Accidents.</u>	<u>Accidents / Mileage</u>	<u>Police Deaths</u>	<u>Civilian Deaths</u>
1970	3,014	18,524	0	No Stats.
1971	2,819	19,090	2	No Stats.
1972	2,432	22,253	2	No Stats.
1973	2,439	20,585	1	No Stats.
1974	2,259	20,787	1	No Stats.
1975	2,458	19,754	0	No Stats.
1976	2,243	20,735	0	No Stats.
1977	3,312	14,107	3	No Stats.
1978	3,371	12,964	2	No Stats.
1979	3,777	11,193	1	No Stats.
1980	3,889	10,856	1	No Stats.
1981	4,142	10,434	1	2
1982	4,949	8,457	1	4
1983	5,051	8,581	3	8
1984	4,381	No Stats.	2	7*

**Table 4.2. Metropolitan Police PVA Statistics 1970-1984**

Sourced from Benn and Worpole (1986: 66).

\* Figures cover January – October.

There is clearly not enough detail here to enable either specific claims or broad generalisations. There are also a number of methodological questions, the answers to which are unclear. For example, was PVP a factor in any of these accidents or were they the result of incidents resulting from emergency response driving? How can the statistics be verified or cross-referenced? How many incidents were not included in the statistics because they fell outside of the criterion for inclusion? What was the statistical picture in other force areas over the same period and how did they compare?

Did the 1984 Road Traffic Regulation Act, which provided certain traffic-rule exemptions for drivers working for the emergency services, have any impact on the statistics following its introduction? (Farrell: 1992).

These questions raise wider issues around the validity of statistical data more generally and the problems associated with the uncritical use of such materials are well documented (see for example O'Connell-Davidson & Layder 1994; Coleman & Moynihan 1996; Maguire 2007; Hammersley: 1993). As a social construction, all statistical data must be treated with a degree of caution. Despite the ostensible solidity of this quantitative data, it has been constructed through a series of interpretations, which can lead to unreliable results for a variety of reasons (Bottomley & Pease: 1986). This noted, statistical information may still be useful in examining trends and priorities and can therefore provide an approximate historical overview of a given period; illuminating a 'bigger picture' of events and circumstances. In this case it would appear that their very existence and publication is perhaps more pertinent than their reliability. The fact that these statistics were collated and became the focus of an INQUEST investigation at this particular moment is indicative of the growing attention being paid to the problematic issues of PVA and PVP.

Regardless of the statistical validity contained in the work of Benn and Worpole (1986), the inclusion of a chapter on 'problematic police driving' can be seen to represent a 'maturing' of this topic, evidenced by virtue of its inclusion as an issue in *Death in the City* amongst more-well established controversial criminal-justice related issues, such as police shootings, police racism and deaths in custody.

Inspecting the INQUEST compiled statistics (Benn & Worpole: 1986), it becomes apparent that there are very small variations in the annual number of police fatalities reported, making a detailed analysis of these fairly insignificant differences pointless. However the authors observed that at least two civilian fatalities were omitted from the figure for 1972, but the two officers killed during that year were included.

Another source of concern to the authors was the marked decrease in the safety ratio per police-mile driven, which they argued was the result of, '...a qualitative change in the nature of policing in London and the increasing reliance on high-speed driving in the capital' (Benn & Worpole: 1986. 67).

Alongside this statistical information, the authors also outlined ten case studies, half of which were related to emergency response incidents, with the other half being PVP-related, which they argued, pointed to a lack of accountability following police-related road traffic fatalities. Officers were subject to internal disciplinary procedures which excluded the families of the victims. In a number of the case studies outlined, coroner's inquests were saturated with police witnesses, whose testimony, evidence or opinions were rarely challenged, giving primacy to the police version of events and ensuring that attempts to de-legitimise or question police activities were thwarted. Families complained that the police had attempted to blame the victim for their own demise (Benn & Worpole: 1986. 74). This observation has clear parallels with work of Scraton & Chadwick (1987: 212) who characterise the inquest process and the general institutional response to controversial police-related deaths, as one in which a 'negative reputation' of the victim is constructed.

Alongside the statistical data, the case-studies documented here therefore represent a particularly powerful, detailed and highly emotive challenge to PVPs as a legitimate law-enforcement tactic. The authors pointed out that there was a great deal of controversy generated in the localised areas where the incidents took place and this caused a great deal of anti-police resentment and bitterness towards the criminal justice system within the families, friends and communities of those affected (Benn & Worpole: 1986. 69). Although the case studies in their work would have been seen by a much smaller audience than the cases featured in large-circulation national newspapers, Benn & Worpole (1986) were able to cover the case-studies using a level of harrowing detail far beyond the average newspaper article. Similarly, they were able to tell 'the whole story', which included the lack of post-incident accountability and the long-term implications for the affected families.

The authors subscribed to the view, citing previous ethnographic research (Holdaway: 1983. 135; Smith & Gray: 1983.53; Fassin: 2013. 81), that PVPs were internally valued by police officers 'on the ground' as a high-status activity because they offer an exciting, dangerous and combative antidote to the mundane drudgery of day-to-day police work (Benn & Worpole: 1986. 65). A similar comment was made by Reiner (2010: 120) in his discussion of 'cop cultures', who observed that, 'the main substance to which the police are addicted is adrenalin.'

More inquests involving PVP-related fatalities were reported in the national press towards the end of the year (Daily Express: 1986a), with one recounting the details of a particularly unusual case, in which a female police driver was killed whilst undertaking a PVP (Times: 1986b). A verdict of accidental death was reached in this instance and graphic details, including how the WPC, '...spun screaming to her death' (Daily Express: 1986b. 7), added a macabre twist to the news report.

Perhaps as a response to the increased visibility of PVP-related news reports, a section on police accidents was included in the annual report of the Chief Inspector of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in 1987 (Brain: 2010. 147). Douglas Hogg, the Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office ordered all police forces to provide information on fatal-PVAs from the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1987 onwards (Mason: 1987. 321). For the previous year, 1986, only nine forces had this information available. Interestingly, information on serious injury PVAs was not requested.

In February 1987, Police Review published an article entitled, *The Police Pursuit Dilemma* (Mason: 1987), which provided a potted-history of recent PVP-related fatalities, including summaries of incidents involving both civilian and police victims. The article quoted a retired grade-one police driver who opined that the advanced drivers operating within the Metropolitan Police, of which he was one, were the best in the world, before arguing that it was the non-pursuit trained patrol car drivers who had difficulty undertaking pursuits. Furthermore, the article went on to suggest that senior Metropolitan Police officers had previously attempted to:

‘...discourage keen patrol car drivers from taking matters into their own hands. But it is very difficult to curb an officer’s natural instinct to make an arrest. Patrol car drivers may know that if they were to stop chasing a vehicle until a pursuit car was in the area, the suspect would escape. (Mason: 1987. 321).

This reasoning offers an explanation as to why, in spite of the dangers, it remains difficult to discourage officers from undertaking PVPs. Police officers clearly have no wish for the suspect to evade them. However, this temptation to take risks in order to secure an arrest may lead to additional problems if officers are insufficiently trained in the skills required to undertake high-speed or pursuit driving. The policy of allowing untrained ‘patrol’ drivers to begin a pursuit, on the understanding that they must cede the PVP to a more qualified driver when he or she becomes available to take over, coupled with the fact that PVPs tend to be very short in duration, may perhaps be a contributory factor in a significant number of negative PVP outcomes.

Perhaps in response to these potential shortcomings, the Association of Chief Police Officers established a working party in November 1987 to examine aspects of police driver training and pursuit management and their report was published in 1989 (ACPO: 1989). This development signalled the beginning of ACPO’s repeated intervention into various aspects of PVP management, policy and training over the coming decades (see for example Horner: 1995; Lind: 1998; Brunstrom: 2004; Giannasi: 2008, 2009).

However, it must be noted that due to its lack of official constitutional status (Emsley: 1996. 185), the guidance and recommendations issued by ACPO have no legal or statutory basis. In reality this means that the acceptance and practical implementation of their recommendations by the various police forces is a purely voluntary exercise. Indeed, as will be examined further below, the implementation of their recommendations around the issue of PVP has been, historically speaking, patchy despite numerous attempts by ACPO to standardise a variety of training and regulatory issues around PVPs.

1987 saw a noticeable reduction in the publication rate of PVP-related national newspaper reports compared with the rate of similar stories during 1986. In February the Daily Express reported a high-speed PVP that concluded with the suspect committing suicide after firing a shotgun at two WPCs (Daily Express: 1987). This dramatic and highly unusual story was the only PVP-related report from the year 1987 that was discovered during the newspaper archive searches detailed in Chapter Three ('Methodology').

This trend continued throughout 1988 and despite a further 24 PVP-related fatalities during that year (Gorman: 1989), the archive searches yielded only one PVP-related news story which retold how a Porsche driver had been able to avoid capture by his police pursuers who were unable to match the 130mph top-speed of his high-performance car (Daily Mail: 1988).

It is unclear why there were so few PVP-related news reports during 1987 and 1988, however the frequency of PVP-related news stories took a dramatic turn during the first half of 1989. In March the Daily Mail (1989a) reported a PVP which resulted in three deaths and two serious injuries. Two days later, under the headline *The Deadly Pursuits*, the Daily Mail (Hampshire: 1989) published a report which referenced two recent PVP-related incidents which had led to fatalities. Interestingly, the report also began with statements from ACPO, which is at odds with previous reports in which police statements tend to be presented in the final paragraphs. Peter Joslin, the secretary of ACPO's traffic committee, was quoted in the report (Hampshire: 1989. 12), stating that,

'[W]e are not complacent in any way and one death is one too many. But the alternative to chasing criminals is to do nothing. If that happened the terrorists, the criminals and the car thieves would be able to move about at will. A police officer in pursuit doesn't know whether he is chasing an IRA terrorist or a 15-year-old joyrider.'

The report made it abundantly clear that, in spite of the recent PVP-related fatalities, police managers would not be issuing police drivers with any new instructions regarding PVP.

However, a witness to one of the PVP-related incidents outlined by the report contradicted the police version of events. The police and witness accounts differed in their estimates of the distance between the target vehicle and the pursuing police cars. The report concluded with a reference to the imminent publication of the ACPO report, observing the existence of, ‘...mounting public concern’, alongside a (rather weak) assertion that Scotland Yard’s guidelines justify PVP only, ‘...if it is absolutely essential to secure an arrest. (Hampshire: 1989. 12).

As with previous justifications for PVP (Daily Mail: 1986; Azlz: 1986), the police response to criticism of PVP during this period appears to be based upon offering a worst-case scenario. In this case, (Hampshire: 1989), the ACPO spokesman, Peter Joslin, invoked the spectre of the IRA terrorist on the one hand and a 15-year-old joyrider on the other. Whilst these two offenders differ greatly in terms of their potential seriousness, the argument is surely one based upon questions around their identification. Furthermore, his binary distinction between pursuing a suspect or simply ‘letting them escape’ is a false choice. Previous cases have demonstrated that not all pursuits involve stolen vehicles and not all pursuits are initiated following serious crimes (for example see Daily Mail: 1986). Having scoured the newspaper archives, no reports of PVPs involving IRA members have surfaced. Perhaps symptomatic of a less technologically sophisticated time, these justifications would be a far more difficult to maintain in the modern era of ANPR cameras, police helicopters and inter-linked police databases which can be used to facilitate safer alternative PVP outcomes or forego the need to conduct PVPs. Whether they were effective in assuaging public concern is unclear. It could be argued that the legitimacy of PVP was still relatively intact at this stage. However, over the coming decades, more serious and sustained challenges were developing.

In the final days of March 1989, two more reports were circulated by national newspapers. The first of these, published in the *Daily Express* under the headline, *999 Chases Facing Curbs as the Eighth Victim Dies* (Johnson: 1989), contained a potted-history of recent developments around the issue of PVPs. In it, the author states that a ‘crackdown’ on police chases looks likely ‘as public concern mounts over the issue’.

However, this news report produced no evidence of public concern to verify the claims made. In what looks suspiciously like a leak, the report goes on to outline, with remarkable accuracy, the main recommendations of the yet-to-be-published ACPO (1989) *Police Driving Report*, almost 12 weeks before its publication. It was also reported that John Burrow, the Chief Constable of Essex police, had, ‘...issued new guidelines on car chases to his men. He said they had been instructed to back off if there was a danger to the public’ (Johnson: 1989. 30). This general instruction issued by John Burrow contrasts with the assertion made by Peter Joslin the same month, that ACPO would not be producing any new instructions relating to pursuits (Daily Mail: 1989).

The second report, published four days later in the Daily Mail under the headline, *Car Chase Police Set for Shake-up* (Kemp: 1989. 9) also referenced the upcoming ACPO (1989) *Police Driving Report* and again, was remarkably accurate in its predictions of the recommendations the ‘confidential’ report was likely to contain. The main thrust of the Daily Mail (Kemp: 1989) report centred upon comments made by a driving expert who claimed that police driver training was out of date, based as it was on a handbook published in the 1930’s. He argued that modern developments in automotive technology were no longer compatible with old training methods and driving techniques taught to the police.

May 1989 saw the publication of four further PVP-related news articles, the first of which was a fairly typical accident report which featured in the *Daily Express* (1989) following two fatalities after a fleeing motorist drove the wrong-way down a dual carriageway and crashed head-on into another vehicle. The second report, published during May 1989 demonstrates the introduction of a political element into the concern around PVP. Laid out on the front-page of the *Times* newspaper (Gorman: 1989. 1), the report pointed-out that there had already been 11 PVP-related fatalities in 1989, before outlining a call for a Home Office inquiry into the issue of PVP from Mr Anthony Beaumont-Dark, the Conservative MP for Selly-Oak. Furthermore, the MP observed that many recent fatal PVPs had been initiated for petty offences and argued that, ‘guidelines issued by Chief Constables were obviously not working.

We keep on being told that lessons are being learnt, but the truth is that people keep on dying and I don't think the lessons have been learnt' (Gorman: 1989. 1).

The third report was published in the Times during May 1989 (Seton: 1989), under the headline, *Police Decision to Chase Car Defended* and detailed another fatal PVP incident, this time involving the death of a 15-year old youth who was driving a stolen vehicle near Birmingham. The deputy chief constable of West Midlands police, Mr Paul Leopold was quoted as saying, (Seton: 1989.3), '[I]f we failed to catch criminals, we would be criticized. Now that we have tried to do the job we are supposed to do, we are also been criticized'. His statement represents the classic, 'damned if they do, damned if they don't' argument. Perhaps the obvious question here is - would it not be better to choose the latter option as the lesser of two evils if both are equally undesirable? This news report also contained a strenuous denial of culpability from the police force involved in the incident, as it was claimed that there was a distance of approx. 100 yards between the fleeing motorist and the pursuing police vehicle, which was using its emergency equipment (lights and sirens) during the pursuit.

The fourth report, published in the Daily Mail (Ward: 1989), closely preceded the publication of the ACPO (1989) *Police Driving Report* and detailed a three-car pile-up which left one victim in a critical condition. In this case, a spokesman from Scotland Yard stated, (Ward: 1989. 5), 'The police driver hardly had time to give chase. He was on the radio when the car took off over the bridge.' Be that as it may, but the prevailing climate around PVPs during this period meant that regardless of the actual level of police involvement, the incident was quite likely to be labelled as a 'police chase', as evidenced by the use of the headline in this case, which read, *Police Car Chase Ends in Pile-up* (Ward: 1989).

The long-awaited ACPO, *Police Driving Report* was published on the 15<sup>th</sup> of June 1989 (ACPO: 1989. 3) and its 29 recommendations were aimed at, 'providing proper management of pursuits, viewing them as a team rather than an individual endeavour; reducing the frequency with which they occur and providing guidance for all those involved.'

A detailed examination of these recommendations reveals a raft of sensible and practical measures which are remarkable only in the sense that they were not already in place at the time. The report recommended the introduction of periodic eyesight tests and suggested that psychological testing should be undertaken to ensure that pursuit trained officers were able to deal with the stress of PVPs. In the specific area of PVP, the report stated that:

‘The Working Party is aware of and understands the view of both society and the service that the pursuit of vehicles is often hazardous. It rejects any suggestion that pursuits should no longer be undertaken, but recommends effective training for and management of such incidents to minimise risk’ (ACPO: 1989. 3).

These PVP-specific recommendations suggested that non-trained drivers should not undertake PVPs (Recommendation 21), control room supervisors should take control of incidents as soon as possible (Recommendation 14), police drivers should be subject to alcohol breath-tests following incidents (Recommendation 26) and that no more than two police vehicles should be involved in a PVP, except in cases where ‘mobile containment’ of the fleeing vehicle was being attempted (Recommendation 17).

Reactions varied following the publication of the ACPO (1989) *Police Driving Report*. The Guardian newspaper (Carvel: 1989) printed a report entitled, *Police Issue Tougher Car Chase Code* which reproduced the main recommendations of the ACPO (1989) report, concentrating primarily on those regulating PVPs. The news report suggested, through reference to remarks made by John Over, the chairman of the ACPO traffic committee, that:

‘the police had not been pushed to draw up the new code by public or press, ‘nor by the silly remarks of politicians who talk about joy-riding to describe the theft of cars.’ However, he conceded that he had been influenced by Mrs Josie Taylor...who organises the pressure group *Victim*’. (Carvel: 1989. 8).

Mr Over's defiant tone, in the face of press and public concern around PVPs is somewhat puzzling. He acknowledged the influence of the pressure group *Victim* but was keen to delegitimise any potential influence being brought to bear on the ACPO (1989) report by the public, politicians or the press. In a *Police Review* article entitled *Touching the Brake on Pursuits* (Peard: 1989), printed the day after publication of the ACPO (1989) report, Mr Over was quoted as saying that:

'[O]ne of the strongest complaints following such accidents is a lack of care, a lack of compassion by police. Bobbies are sometimes too off-hand about accidents in which a completely innocent bystander has been killed. We should be able to say 'sorry' without admitting liability' (Peard: 1989. 1211).

Mr Over's assertion that PVPs would continue, albeit with a more proscriptive framework of regulation, appears to have been successful in temporarily assuaging media interest in PVPs. The ACPO (1989) report had perhaps achieved the desired effect of relegitimising PVPs and shifting the media focus onto the safer terrain of police driver training. *Police Review* printed an article on the 30<sup>th</sup> June entitled, *Training Gap in Police Driving* (Gallagher's Beat: 1989) which pointed-out the deficiencies and inconsistencies of police driver training, both in the U.K. and the U.S.A. The *Daily Express* printed an article containing similar criticisms in early 1990 under the headline, *In Hot Pursuit of 'Suspect' Police Driving* (Benson: 1989).

Revisiting the main argument seen in an article from the previous year (Kemp: 1989), a driving expert criticised police driver training methods as being too reliant on the 50-year old *Roadcraft* handbook which, he argued, rendered many of the techniques old-fashioned and out of date. In response, a police spokesman complained that, 'Last time we tried to revise *Roadcraft*, the furore about police pursuits blew up and there was no point in going ahead then' (Benson: 1990. 33). Quite why this officer thought that the controversy over PVPs was grounds for not updating the *Roadcraft* manual is unclear.

At the turn of the 1990s, the rate of PVP-related stories in the print media declined markedly.

This situation can perhaps be attributed to a significant reduction in the number of PVP-related fatalities recorded nationally during the first half of this decade (See Table 4.3 below). Again, the previously outlined caveats regarding the validity and reliability of these statistics must be reiterated. They were the only figures that were available for the period between 1990 and 1997. There are some variance between the INQUEST statistics and those produced by the PCA from 1997 onwards. Numerous attempts have been made to contact INQUEST in order to clarify the methodology used to produce their PVP-related fatality statistics, with no success. Therefore, the INQUEST statistics are used here in the broadest possible terms, simply to provide a context for the discussion around the prevailing trends of the period.

Year	PVP-Related Deaths
1990	0
1991	1
1992	0
1993	2
1994	1
1995	2
1996	9
1997	17
1998	10
1999	8

**Table 4.3. INQUEST PVP-Related Fatality Statistics 1990 – 1999. (INQUEST 2014).**

If taken at face value, these statistics appear to demonstrate that the first half of the 1990s was characterised by a relatively stable rate of recorded PVP-related fatalities and this perhaps explains the lack of PVP-related newspaper reports seen throughout 1990. A similar lack of concern was evident in official research produced during the early part of the 1990s.

In 1991 the Home Office produced a research study entitled *Traffic Policing in Changing Times* (Southgate & Mirrlees-Black: 1991), which examined various issues around the efficiency and organisational approaches employed in the management of traffic policing at the start of the decade. There were no references to PVP contained anywhere in this report, an oversight that was perhaps indicative of a lack of official concern around the issue of PVP during this period. However, this report did recommend the use of unmarked 'video-cars' for gathering evidence of 'bad' driving for use in court proceedings or simply as a tool at the road-side to show motorists the error of their ways. Despite featuring sporadically in news reports during the 1980s, often in the context of Northern Ireland (Rodwell: 1980; Guardian: 1980, 1982; Joyce: 1985), the phenomenon of joyriding became increasingly prominent in newspaper reports during the late 1980s and early 1990s (see for example Raphael: 1988; Guardian 1989; Ahmed: 1990; Pilkington: 1990).

Joyriding quickly became a significant component in the prevailing media and social preoccupation with a variety of youth crimes that marked the start of the decade (Muncie: 2004. 5; Scraton: 1997. Vii). It must be noted that, in its normally accepted use, the term joyrider refers to a quite specific expressive, stylised and ritualised act of criminality, usually in a stolen vehicle, conducted for the pleasure of the participant and their audience (Campbell: 1993. 255). The term was widely adopted during the early 1990s, not always accurately, as short-hand for a variety of car-based criminality and remains in use, albeit sporadically, across a variety of differing media types including PVP- based television programmes (O'Connell: 2005. 455). It is debatable whether the media furore and subsequent response to joyriding represented a 'moral panic' in the classic sociological sense of the term (Brown: 2005. 58; Cohen: 2002. viii).

If not a fully-fledged moral panic, then the joyrider was certainly cast as a serious threat to other road-users that, according to certain sections of the print media, was not being tackled effectively by either the courts or the police (Parkin: 1991; McKerron: 1991; Daily Express: 1991; Gardner: 1991; Qualtrough: 1991; Levy: 1991).

This created contradictory discourses in the print-media, who published highly critical PVP-related headlines such as, *Police Chase Scandal: 1,200 Crashes in a Year* (Langston: 1991), whilst simultaneously lambasting the apparently weak criminal justice response to joyriding.

However the rise of the joyrider had a profound impact on PVP-related news stories during the 1990s. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the frequency of news reports containing the terms, *Joyride*, *Joy-Ride* or *Joyrider* spiked during 1991. It could be argued that this increase in media interest in joyriding might have bought the police some 'breathing space', switching the media-focus away from PVPs and onto the problem of joyriding. In January 1991, the *Daily Express* published a report under the headline, *Mothers Killed as Police Chase 130mph Joyrider* (Hornby & McDonald: 1991). The incident claimed three lives and, in a reversal of the situation seen in the previous decade, the police cited adherence to the new pursuit guidelines (ACPO: 1989) as justification for their decision not to try and stop the stolen vehicle earlier. This event was also reported in the *Daily Mail* (Daily Mail: 1991a) under the headline, *Joyrider Death Smash*.

In February 1991, the *Daily Express* published another news story under the headline, *Joyrider's Trail of Death*, which reported details of a particularly horrific PVP-related incident which resulted in the deaths of two pedestrians as they crossed the road (Cook: 1991). This incident was also reported in the *Daily Mail* under the banner, *Joyrider Kills Two in Police Chase* (Daily Mail: 1991b).

What is remarkable about these news reports, which were all clearly documenting PVPs, is that the seven fatalities resulting from these PVP events were not represented in the INQUEST statistics outlined above (Table 2.2.), raising questions around both the validity of the statistics and their methodological underpinnings.

Also interesting, is that these reports demonstrate the development of a shift in emphasis around who was deemed responsible for the resulting PVP-related fatalities, with joyriders being apportioned various degrees of culpability for these deaths in a number of cases.

Another potentially significant development seen during this period was the publication of news reports documenting that pursuits were being terminated by the police, in line with the ACPO guidelines (ACPO: 1989) due to concerns around public safety (Times: 1991; Rose: 1992).

In September 1991, two youths from the Meadow Well estate in Tyne and Wear were killed during a PVP when the Renault 5 GTI they were travelling in hit a lamp-post at 125 mph and burst into flames (Observer: 1991; Merritt: 1991; Scott: 1991). In the immediate aftermath of the incident, rumours circulated around the estate that the pursuing police vehicles had rammed the Renault off the road (Daily Mail: 1991c; Wainwright: 1991), despite police assertions to the contrary (Campbell: 1993. 56). Following the deaths of the two youths, four days of rioting erupted on the Meadow Well estate (Cook & Hetherington: 1991), which later spread to the nearby Scotswood estate (Hetherington: 1991a). These events were widely reported and generated significant political comment, which saw condemnation from right-leaning newspapers (Scott & Woodcock: 1991; Daniels: 1991; Lee-Potter: 1991), and a more sympathetic tone being adopted by the more liberal elements of the press (Wainwright: 1991; Kennedy: 1991; Guardian: 1991; Hetherington: 1991b).

Although the PVP-related aspect of the case was quickly subsumed into the prevailing media narratives, it became apparent that some of the estate's residents and some of the dead boy's family members believed that they were not joyriders, but professional thieves, a distinction made on the basis that ram-raiding was akin to earning, whereas joyriding was seen as being a leisure activity (Daily Mail: 1991d; Campbell: 1993. 55).

1991 represented a peak in the media focus on joyriders and PVP-related fatalities continued to be reported during the first few years of the 1990s (Cunningham: 1991; Woodcock: 1992a; Chalmers: 1993; Independent: 1993).

The introduction of the joyrider into the media narrative may have served to ameliorate the negative public image of PVP.

This, it could be argued, may have served to re-legitimise PVP, albeit partially and temporarily, through the addition of the joyrider as a supplementary and blameworthy causal explanation for some PVP events.

Furthermore, a number of newspaper stories posited the notion of the police as *victims* of joyriding under such headlines as, *Joyriders Trying to Ram Police Cars on 'Zoo' Estate* (Guardian: 1993), *Police Vehicles Wrecked in Motorway 'Dodgems'* (Daily Mail: 1993), and *Terror as Police Are 'Hunted Down' by Rammers* (Williams: 1993). Individual officers who had been injured whilst attempting to arrest joyriders were also featured in various sympathetic newspaper reports (Woodcock: 1992b, 1993; Observer: 1994; Daily Mail: 1994a).

In these reports, the problem of joyriding was presented as a threat to the safety of both the general public *and* the police, who were ostensibly reacting to events outside of their control; a youth crime-wave. Moreover, reports of successful pursuit terminations in the face of unacceptable risks to public safety served to contrast the reckless attitude of the joyrider with the conscientious approach of the police driver and their managers. As an alternative to abandoning PVPs or other tactical measures, the police had a new weapon in their arsenal. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of January 1993, they had successfully deployed a 'stinger' device for the first time, comprising a strip of hollow spikes which was laid before the fleeing vehicle to puncture its tyres, bringing the 90-minute pursuit to a safe conclusion (Scott: 1994).

Following the recommendation contained in, *Traffic Policing in Changing Times* (Southgate & Mirrlees-Black: 1991), video cars were gradually introduced by a number of forces and the material produced by this technological innovation is highly likely to have featured in the first generation of 'car-chase TV' video and television programmes. The first of these was the VHS sell-through title, *Police Stop*, which was released in 1993 and was the cause of some controversy.

As reported in the *Daily Mail* (Daily Mail: 1994b), the video documented a collision between an innocent motorist and a suspected armed robber following a protracted, high-speed PVP.

The innocent driver had been attempting to obtain a copy of the incident footage recorded by the police helicopter with the view to mounting a prosecution of the police for their role in the event. Despite repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain a copy of the footage from the police, he later discovered that this video material had been included in the material on the *Police Stop* video release, which had gone on to sell 200,000 copies since its release in 1993 (Daily Mail: 1994).

It is noteworthy that the *Police Stop* video series emerged at this time. Clearly enabled by the advances in mobile video recording systems available to the police, the offering of PVP as the main component in a commercial entertainment package was very much at odds with the grim reality of PVP for its victims, their families and friends. In an interview with one of those responsible for the creation of the *Police Stop* series, the respondent recounted how they had learned of the existence of approximately 50-hours of video material filmed by in-car police video recording systems. After numerous meetings with senior police officers and a lengthy process of persuasion had been embarked upon, the video material was handed over to the production company for editing, packaging and retail sale. This implies a degree of nervousness on the part of the police to release the footage and therefore calls into question the notion that the footage was released in order to legitimise pursuits. However, that the material was handed over suggests that senior police had calculated that the dissemination of the footage would be beneficial to them in some way and at this particular time.

1994 represented a significant year in the concern around the issue of PVP, which saw the publication of a number of unusual and shocking PVP cases. In January, the *Daily Mail* reported the case of a 13 year-old joyrider leading police on a 130mph chase (Rose: 1994). In April, a major PVP incident involving up to 30 police vehicles unfolded over a distance of over 100 miles, resulting in the police closing a number of roads and putting-up roadblocks in a bid to stop a youth in a stolen Capri. (Grylls: 1994). In June 1994, two innocent motorists were killed during a PVP involving a police motorcyclist (Daily Mail: 1994c). In August 1994, the Times reported on a PVP in Southampton involving 15 police vehicles (Times: 1994).

Soon after, the *Daily Mail* published a report documenting the case of a 13 year-old female joyrider, who had been pursued at over 100mph in a stolen vehicle and was only stopped after all four car tyres were punctured by a 'stinger' (Daily Mail: 1994d). In September 1994, the *Daily Mail* reported details of a particularly harrowing case. A joyrider was burnt alive after becoming trapped in the wreckage of a vehicle following a very short pursuit. Police officers were unable to save the driver after he had made-off at high speed upon sighting their police vehicle, before crashing the stolen Seat which then caught fire (Daily Mail: 1994e).

September 1994 also saw the airing of the pilot for the television programme, *Police Camera Action*, series one of which comprised 14 programmes which were shown sporadically up to January 1997. The format featured international, in-car and helicopter footage of a variety of driving activities, some of which involved PVPs.

In December, the *Daily Mail* reported perhaps the most shocking case of the year, this time involving a Boxing Day pursuit of joyriders with a seven year old boy as a passenger, in which numerous police cars were rammed before the pursuit was ended, thankfully without any injuries being sustained by those involved (Burden: 1994). In late December, the final PVP case of 1994 was reported, this time concerning a 13 year-old boy who seriously damaged three police vehicles using a stolen Jaguar XJS before finally being stopped and arrested (Riley: 1994).

It is worth noting that in a number of cases there are reports of PVPs being undertaken by large numbers of police vehicles (Grylls: 1994; Times: 1994), which is clearly not in accordance with the pursuit guidelines produced by ACPO (ACPO: 1989). Official interest in issues around police driving and the associated accidents was gaining momentum and the Police Research Group (PRG) began work on a large-scale, three year study in 1994. 1995 saw the Association of Chief Police Officers Traffic Committee produce their revised pursuit guidelines (Horner: 1995). This report outlined a range of best-practice technical instructions for undertaking PVPs, addressing issues around tactics, training, technology and standardised definitions of terms such as 'pursuit', 'follow' and 'tactical contact' (Horner: 1995).

The report asserted that modifications to their previous policy were necessary in the light of 'current operational experiences', to combat developments in the way that criminals were using vehicles and also because the previous codes of practice, '...did not provide positive practical help or guidance to police drivers, controllers or managers for the pursuit to be tactically terminated and the offenders arrested' (Horner: 1995. 1.5).

This report aimed to develop a standardised set of tactical solutions to bring pursuits to a safe conclusion, utilising hollow-spike tyre deflation devices such as 'stop-stick' or 'stinger' or deploying a number of police vehicles around the fleeing motorist in a 'tactical pursuit and containment' (TPAC) formation to force the fleeing driver into a controlled stop. It also introduced the concept of a 'Ground Commander' taking charge of these localised tactical elements, working alongside a 'Control Room Supervisor'. Horner (1995) also observed that the majority of police forces did not have suitable insurance in place to cover themselves in cases where officers had caused damage to their own vehicles or had been injured during a PVP. The use of video-cars for evidence gathering was again recommended, as was the ability of Control Room Supervisors to terminate a PVP at their discretion.

The report represents a further intervention by ACPO to address the problematic issue of PVP and although there were many similar reports produced later, the work of Horner (1995), writing as the head of the ACPO traffic committee, is interesting due to its focus on tactics to bring about the safe conclusion of PVPs. Pursuit policy is not mentioned in the report and it could be argued that there is an element of 'catch-up' running through many of its recommendations. In particular, those which relate to overall control of PVPs, tactical solutions to safely terminate PVPs and the provision of suitable insurance for this dangerous activity were arguably long overdue. The inevitable question is why were these recommendations not made earlier and why were they produced at the time they were?

PVP cases continued to be reported throughout 1995, (Times: 1995a, 1995b; Daily Mail: 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Daily Express: 1995). Judy Hood, a nurse was killed in June when a police vehicle taking part in a PVP training exercise smashed into her car at between 90 and 116mph while she was waiting in a stationary traffic queue (McGowan: 1996). The police driver, who was trained to an advanced level (Daily Mail: 1996a), was later cleared of causing death by dangerous driving, but was instead convicted of careless driving, fined £750 and banned from driving for six months (Daily Mail: 1996b).

But perhaps the most noteworthy case from 1995 involved PC Lezlie Collins, a West Midlands Police driver who became the subject of a great deal of controversy, due to prolonged media scrutiny of the circumstances following his involvement in a fatal incident in December 1995. PC Collins was the driver in a double crewed police vehicle undertaking the pursuit of a stolen Ford Escort, when he went through a junction at an estimated 95 mph and smashed into the Vauxhall Nova being driven by Neil Homer. Both Mr Homer and the police passenger, PC Robert Dallow were killed, while PC Collins escaped with minor injuries (Independent: 1995). Subsequent news stories relating to this case will be examined as they occur in the on-going chronological timeline below.

Following this event, December 1995 saw an article published in the *Daily Express* under the headline, *Hot Pursuit Police Chases to be Probed* (Grey: 1995). The report announced the intention of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), the oversight body with responsibility for investigating police activity in the U.K., to undertake an overview of the issue, taking- in their current investigative workload of 27 PVP-related deaths throughout 1995. Furthermore, the report contained an excoriating critique of PVP policy by Neil Homer's father, Dennis, who argued that, (Grey: 1995. 22):

‘If the crooks want a car they can have it. Had this not occurred my son would be alive. I blame the police for this accident. I know they have got to catch these offenders but why take the risk of killing innocent people?’

The report went on to outline the concerns of Tessa Jowell MP, which centred upon her assertion that there was a lack of suitable training delivered to police drivers due to spending cuts. Defending PVP policy, a police spokesman argued that officers usually adopted a strategy of, 'tailing' rather than, 'hounding' fleeing suspects, stating that, '...these cars being chased are more often than not stolen vehicles driven by criminals and it would be wrong for police to give up any attempt to arrest these people' (Grey: 1995. 22). This argument was clearly prioritising the law enforcement side of the policing role at the expense of the order maintenance requirement. As Skolnick (1975: 6) has argued:

'The police in democratic society are required to maintain order and to do so under the rule of law. As functionaries charged with maintaining order, they are part of the bureaucracy. The ideology of democratic bureaucracy emphasizes initiative rather than disciplined adherence to rules and regulations. By contrast, the rule of law emphasises the rights of individual citizens and constrains upon the initiative of legal officials. This tension between the operational consequences of ideas of order, efficiency and initiative, on the one hand, and legality, on the other constitutes the principle problem of police as a democratic legal organization.'

Skolnick's term 'initiative' can be seen as a functionally similar to idea of 'discretion' and his argument neatly summarises the thorny issue of PVPs insofar as it speaks to the issue of reconciling the competing demands of maintaining order whilst adhering to and upholding the law.

PVPs therefore represent a classic manifestation of this dichotomy, insofar as the practice of pursuing a suspect in order to apprehend them epitomises an element of the police role, function and mandate of upholding the law whilst simultaneously offering the potential for creating *disorder* on the roads. In some cases, PVPs can lead to the death of the suspect and it is only due to the legally-based driving exemptions conferred on the police that they are able to conduct PVPs in the first instance.

1995 concluded with the official concern over PVP reaching new heights, which would invariably increase discussions around its legitimacy. The first few months of 1996 were, relatively speaking, fairly quiet in terms of PVP-related newspaper reports. In March there was a PVP-related fatality when a fleeing vehicle containing two prisoners on day-release crashed at high-speed into another car, killing an elderly passenger and injuring four others. (Daily Mail: 1996c).

The trial of the police officer charged with the death of the nurse Judy Hood, killed during a PVP training exercise from the previous year received extensive newspaper coverage after he was found guilty of careless driving and ordered to pay £750 (McGowan: 1996; Daily Mail: 1996a; Daily Mail: 1996b). The *Times* report on the case quoted the brother of the victim, who stated that:

‘[T]his tragedy has devastated our family and our lives will never be the same again without Judy. We are disgusted and deeply upset by the verdict. There is no doubt that [the police driver] is completely responsible for Judy’s death. There were no extenuating circumstances’ (Young: 1996. 3).

There were a number of follow-up articles, prompted by the intervention of the Police Complaints Authority who demanded an urgent review of police PVP training, labelling the high-speeds reached in the training exercise as, ‘indefensible’ (Times: 1996. 2). Another, more detailed *Daily Mail* article observed that the convicted police driver would not be facing any internal disciplinary action (Rose: 1996a). The article concluded by quoting Police Complaints Authority member Caroline Mitchell, who argued that:

‘Such a dreadful accident must not be allowed to happen again Lessons must be learned. Pursuit training can surely be conducted at lower speeds on public roads and relevant driving skills taught off road’ (Rose: 1996a. 13).

1996 also saw the airing of the BBC, ‘fly-on-the-wheel’ documentary television series, *X Cars* (Guardian: 1996. a48).

Although only six episodes were televised, they offered viewers a raw insight into the work being undertaken by Greater Manchester Police's Tactical Vehicle Crime Unit, which consisted primarily of high-speed driving in pursuit of car thieves, joyriders and other mobile criminals. This portrayal of PVP from the police point of view, punctuated by officer's explanations and opinions on the reasons and remedies for the problem of joyriding proved to be extremely popular, garnering viewing figures of 12.3 million, which equated to a 51% share of the audience (Hill: 2005b. 28).

Away from this highly-visible portrayal of PVP on television, there appears to be a dearth of news reports relating to PVP incidents published in the national press during 1996. Aside from the court cases resulting from incidents which occurred during 1995 (McGowan: 1996; Daily Mail: 1996a; Daily Mail: 1996b; Rose: 1996a), the archive search produced only two cases, with one fatality in total, that had occurred in 1996, (Rose: 1996b; Swift: 1996). This is peculiar, given that the INQUEST statistics (Table 4.3.), indicated a large rise in PVP-related fatalities from 9 to 17 between 1995 and 1996. This raises questions about whether editorial decisions, in particular those around what is deemed news-worthy, may have been a factor in this apparent lack of PVP-related newspaper coverage (Wykes: 2001. 22). The first PVP-related newspaper report of 1997 was published in the *Daily Mail* under the headline, *Joyrider Killed by a Lamp Post* and recounted how a fleeing driver survived the initial impact of a crash while being pursued, only to be killed when a damaged lamp post collapsed onto him after he was thrown from the vehicle (Daily Mail: 1997a).

Following this, the *Daily Mail* reported that a large compensation claim had been awarded to a police driver in legal proceedings against the driver of a fleeing vehicle (Golden: 1997). The decision to award the sum of £250, 000 to the officer, who had been injured whilst undertaking a pursuit, was the subject of an appeal by the Motor Insurance Bureau, as in their view, '...when the pursuit got too fast, [the officer] should have stopped... the crash was caused by his own error' (Golden: 1997a. 35).

In February 1997, the *Guardian* produced a sobering news report, detailing the extent of the joyriding problem, which quoted interviews with detectives and painted a grim statistical picture of a situation that was apparently spiralling out of the control of the criminal justice system (Hetherington: 1997a). A week later, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February, the *Guardian* reported that a PVP in Sunderland has resulted in the death of a teenage joyrider and left his passenger critically injured, when their vehicle had come to rest in a river (Hetherington: 1997b).

Later in February 1997, there were further developments in the Neil Homer & PC Robert Dallow PVP-related fatality case when police driver PC Lezlie Collins was found guilty of causing 2 deaths by dangerous driving and sentenced to three months in prison (Daily Mail: 1997b). More negative headlines relating to this case quickly followed, when in April 1997, PC Collins was released from prison after serving six weeks of his sentence and resumed his employment with West Midlands police (Times: 1997). Reporting the same story, the *Daily Mail* was unambiguous in its condemnation of the developments in the case. Under the headline, *Anger as Killer PC Gets His Job Back*, the report quoted Dennis Homer, the father of Neil Homer as stating, 'It is an absolute disgrace. If this officer had stolen £10 from the petty cash he would not have been allowed to continue [being a police officer] but this man has killed my son' (Golden: 1997b. 26). The report also contained details from the trial, outlining that there had been an attempt by a control room traffic supervisor to call off the pursuit, an instruction which had been disregarded by PC Collins.

Furthermore, to demonstrate the division of opinion in this case – a petition signed by over 1,000 people was produced in support of PC Collins. The solicitor acting for PC Collins welcomed the decision to allow him to return to work and stated that 'it is important he returns to duty. We believe the law should be changed. If a person fulfilling a public duty is sent to prison, it sends the wrong message to the drivers of emergency vehicles' (Golden: 1997. 26). This statement fails to acknowledge both the damning circumstances of the case and the human cost of unregulated high-speed encounters between the police and fleeing motorists.

In a ten-day period spanning the end of April 1997 and the beginning of May, two PVP incidents cost the lives of 8 people (Campbell: 1997). These incidents were not widely reported. However, Dennis Homer continued to persist with his demands for a full enquiry into the PVP that killed his son alongside a more wide-ranging examination into the manner in which PVPs were being conducted (Campbell: 1997). Another PVP-related court case followed in May, which saw a joyrider sentenced to 3 years and 9 months in prison for killing a pedestrian in central London whilst attempting to evade a pursuing police vehicle (Daily Express: 1997).

Later that same month, news of another court case was published in the *Daily Mail*, under the headline, *PC's Pile-up at 132 MPH* (Daily Mail: 1997c) The report detailed how the police vehicle being driven by PC Simon Talbot span-out and flipped over several times on the motorway during a heavy rainstorm whilst he was attempting to catch-up with another vehicle, the driver of which had allegedly driven off without paying for petrol. PC Talbot escaped unharmed but his passenger, PC Woolway suffered serious injuries to his arm and shoulder. Quoted in the news report, PC Woolway stated:

‘The conditions were atrocious but PC Talbot kept accelerating...we were doing 132mph. I shouted at him but he continued at the same speed. I have never been so petrified in my life. I have told PC Talbot on numerous occasions before to slow down, but he takes no notice’ (Daily Mail: 1997c. 33).

PC Talbot was fined and his driving licence was endorsed with nine points, as the magistrate had decided that a disqualification from driving would not be a suitable punishment, as he was on ‘official duty’ when the incident took place (Daily Mail: 1997c. 33). Although not strictly a PVP, this case reflected an emerging trend of reporting, with a focus not only on the PVP incidents themselves, but rather on the subsequent trials of joyriders and police officers instead. These trail-based news reports were perhaps easier to produce due to the courts being more accessible to journalists than the scenes of, and details surrounding PVAs and PVPs.

When combined, these reports may well have promulgated a less-than-favourable image of the police driver as a motorised menace, hell-bent on securing an arrest at any cost and for any alleged offence, even if that meant risking their own safety as well as that of their colleagues and the general public.

Acting as a potential counterweight to this negative image, 1997 saw the screening of the Carlton Television series, *Motorway* an ob-doc focusing on the tasks undertaken by the West Midlands based, Central Motorway Patrol Group. Despite airing three hours of footage documenting a variety of traffic-related incidents which had taken place on one of the busiest motorways in the country, PVPs were not featured in the programme. However, the second series of *POCA* began being sporadically broadcasted in April 1997 and this did feature PVPs as part of a mixture of domestic and international video content, mainly garnered from police cameras situated in video-cars, helicopters or at the roadside. The airing of this second series concluded in January 1999.

Reports of PVPs were noticeably absent in the national press from June 1997 onwards, with the exception of a case, published on the front page of the *Daily Express*, involving the death of a 17 year-old, middle-class student who crashed into the gates of his college during a PVP, and was subsequently killed in the subsequent fireball when he was trapped inside the burning vehicle (Reynolds: 1997). This story was very much against-type, insofar as it involved the novelty of a young man who was described as 'gifted' and had a promising future, no criminal record and came from a respectable family. At no point in the report was the term, joyrider used to describe the victim, who was later found to have been over the drink-drive limit (Daily Mail: 1997d).

1997 also saw the publication of a report by the Home Office Police Research Group, entitled, *A Study of Deaths and Serious Injuries Resulting from Police Vehicle Accidents* (Rix et al: 1997). The authors outline their reasoning for undertaking the project with the following statement:

‘Police vehicle accidents (PVAs) are a source of considerable concern to both the general public and the police service alike. They can cause pain and suffering to those involved, consume large amounts of public resources and potentially put the police in conflict with the public. There has been a great deal of speculation about the likely causes of PVAs and these have highlighted by the media in a number of cases. There has, however, been very little systematic research into factors associated with such accidents and even detailed information on the number of incidents which occur can be difficult to obtain’ (Rix et al: 1997. 1).

Utilising police-authored accident reports, the study aimed to examine trends in the number of PVAs over the four year period between 1991 and 1995, with the secondary aim of exploring a variety of circumstances surrounding accidents between 1990 and 1993. However, the researchers reported significant difficulty in obtaining the basic statistical information necessary to undertake the study. 7 of the 43 police forces operating in England and Wales at the time were unable to supply the requested information for the year 1991 and 13 forces did not have the statistics for the year 1990. As a result of this, the researchers had to abandon the incomplete data set for 1990 and revise the parameters under examination to include 1991 to 1995. Despite this, the figures used in the study were claimed to represent between 41% and 44% of the PVAs for the period selected and were therefore deemed sufficient by the authors to provide an analysis of the prevailing PVA trends. The authors also encountered problems accessing police-authored PVA accident reports, as a number of these had been destroyed to comply with the data-retention policies of the forces holding them.

Turning to the statistical analysis conducted by Rix et al (1997) for the Home Office Police Research Group, the authors observed that of the 770 serious injuries or fatalities included in the study, 38% of them were attributable to either ‘follows’ or PVPs, which accounted for 45% of the fatalities and 39% of the serious injuries in their sample.

Serious injury cases were classified as those involving at least one bone fracture, internal injury, laceration, concussion, crushing or severe shock to one or more parties involved. According to their analysis, police drivers were blameworthy in 7% of the cases featured in the research.

The study utilised the 'catch-all' term PVA throughout the document and defined it as, '...a road traffic accident involving at least one police vehicle of any description' (Rix et al: 1997. 40). The authors suggested that the employment of this broad category may have produced an 'over estimate' of the number of PVAs. Examples were provided of such events which met the criteria for inclusion as a PVA but were not accidental, such as cases involving a 'controlled collision' to end a PVP or where a police vehicle had been struck while attempting to protect the scene of an earlier accident. The research utilised the terms 'pursued' and 'followed' interchangeably and this lack of specificity is problematic, as without the application of a clear demarcation between the two categories, PVP events may have been classified as 'follows' and not counted as pursuits. In an attempt to clarify this, Rix et al (1997: 40) provide a glossary which defines a pursuit in the following terms:

'[The] ACPO Traffic Committee define this as being when an appropriately trained officer, in a suitable vehicle pursues a fleeing vehicle with the intention of safely causing it to stop. For the purposes of this research, pursuits involving untrained officers have also been included.'

Contrast this description with the definition of a 'follow',

'This is when a police officer safely monitors the progress of a vehicle, with the objective of appropriately trained officers undertaking a pursuit.'

Clearly, the researchers were forced to modify these definitions based on their own assessments of the case studies in order to conduct their research, which meant using their own judgement as to whether events should be classified as PVPs, even if they did not meet all the requirements in the ACPO definition, such as the training level of the driver or the suitability of the police vehicle.

This demonstrates the existence of a grey-area around the correct classification of PVP events. Often it can be difficult to ascertain whether an event is a pursuit or a follow. Indeed, the authors maintained that they had little choice but to classify many of the 'follows' in their study as pursuits, as they concluded that 15% of the pursuits that resulted in either fatalities or serious injuries were being undertaken by police drivers trained only to a 'basic' classification level.

The report did not include any case studies to enable further clarification of how these terms and classifications were arrived at, however it does contain a wealth of data spread-out over 30 plus tables and charts, creating the illusion of a methodical and ostensibly thorough piece of research. Unfortunately, it is entirely reliant on an uncritical acceptance of the police version of events, which in this case, was manifested in police-authored accident reports. The police, if not always at an individual level, are often able to construct the 'official' version of the events in which they are themselves involved (Alpert & Fridell: 1992). Moreover, there is the common problem of gaining access to information when conducting police-based research, as the police themselves are usually the primary gatekeepers of access to information relating to their own activities (Reiner: 2000b.215).

The work of Rix et al (1997) represents an early reflection of the concerns that would become central to much of the subsequent PVP-centred research produced over the following years. Specifically, this include issues around police driver training, PVP regulation and management, compulsory use of emergency equipment such as lights and sirens during all high-speed driving, PVPs been undertaken by unqualified drivers, the mandatory breath-testing of police drivers following incidents, improvements in incident data collection and retention, greater scrutiny of police driver's accident histories and the formulation of a standardised definition of what constitutes a PVA or PVP. Although this report did not make recommendations, it is perhaps surprising that Rix et al (1997) found themselves in the position of having to point out these fairly basic, common-sense measures that would assist in delivering much-needed improvements in the safety of PVPs.

The first half of 1998 continued in much the same way as the previous year; with few PVP-related news reports being published. The first news report of 1998 was published in June, following a fatality when by a fleeing motorist in a stolen vehicle colliding with an innocent bystander's car (Daily Mail: 1998a). The following month, details of a particularly horrific incident, involving the pursuit of a Nissan Micra containing nine members of the same family, were reported in both the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express* (Daily Mail: 1998b; Blacklock: 1998). A two year-old girl travelling in the Micra was killed, while several others were left injured and trapped inside the vehicle following the ten minute pursuit which was ended when the vehicle crashed into a tree. In view of the fact that the Micra is a particularly small vehicle and that on this occasion it contained seven children and two adults, it could be argued that the pursuit of this vehicle by police was reckless given the obvious risk of injury in the event of a crash.

In September 1998, the *Guardian* newspaper produced two investigative pieces which offered different perspectives on the issues of joyriding and PVP. The first of these reports, entitled *Road Junkies*, examined recent psychological research which appeared to suggest that joyriding should be understood as an extremely addictive, possibly even compulsive activity which required similar treatment to that made available for drug addicts (Spinney: 1998). The second report, entitled *Speed Kills*, was based upon participant observation in a PVP training exercise by a journalist (Hall: 1998), which juxtaposed details of the advanced training undertaken by police drivers with the recent developments, controversial cases and negative outcomes associated with PVAs and PVPs.

September 1998 also saw publication of the *Report of the Working Group of the Association of Chief Police Officers (Personnel and Training) Committee into Pursuit Driver Training*, more commonly known as the *Lind Report*, due to the name of the lead author, (Lind: 1998)

In the foreword, (Lind: 1998. 1), the author states that:

‘There is an expectation from the public that its Police Service will demonstrate the highest of standards when its Officers discharge their duties. No clearer example of this can there be than the use of police vehicles to detect and apprehend offenders. The police vehicle is a very important tool for use by Officers to fulfil their duty and inevitably there are occasions when these vehicles must be driven at high speeds...The most emotive of such occasions is pursuit...It is crucial that members of the Police Service accept the importance being placed on improving their driving skills and attitudes and I hope this will also serve to reassure the public of the commitment by the Police Service to maintaining the highest driving standards on our roads.’

This statement tacitly acknowledges the existence of public concern around the issue of PVP and offers public reassurances based upon proposed improvements in the driving skills and attitudes of police drivers. The report represents a significant attempt to tighten-up the control around various aspects of PVP with an underlying focus on reducing the number of inappropriate pursuits, whilst reasserting the need for national implementation of the recommendations made in the previous report (Horner: 1995) and the adoption of the prior observations of Rix et al (1997).

Centring upon four key categories; training, operational, technology and administration, the report contains 33 recommendations, which included the introduction of, ‘Attitudinal Training’ and more rigorous assessment and monitoring of police driver training. Lind (1998: 5) also recommended the development of harmonised, ‘national core competencies’ for all three levels of police drivers; basic, standard and advanced. Furthermore, the report recommended the completion of risk assessments around PVP and was concerned with improving pursuit management training of both police drivers and control room staff. Lind states that (1998: 19):

‘Pursuits should be subject of vigorous control and only undertaken by trained personnel. Individuals should only engage in pursuits in suitably equipped vehicles and must continually consider the consequences of the pursuit.’

However, subsequent research clearly demonstrates the uneven and patchy implementation of Lind's recommendations (PCA: 2002), which saw approximately one-third of the police forces in England and Wales adopting the new driving standards contained in the report (Hopkins: 2000a).

Subsequent research demonstrates that PVPs continued to be undertaken by unqualified drivers (PCA: 2001. 31) or in unsuitable vehicles (PCA: 2002). Nevertheless, the Lind Report (1998) can be seen as representing an early attempt to address the mounting problem of PVP, manifested both in terms of the rising number of fatalities (PCA: 2000) and the negative publicity it was generating. With the issue of police driver training now beginning to take centre-stage in the official discourse around PVP, it was reported in December 1998 that during a Thematic Inspection of , the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Colin Smith had unearthed serious deficiencies in the way that PVPs were being undertaken by some police forces (BBC: 1998). In section 5.6 of the report (HMIC: 1998. 26) it was stated that:

‘...the communications room had difficulty co-ordinating the radio channels of all the officers involved in a pursuit within the very short time an incident affords. This carries the risk of offending vehicles being pursued for too long, by inadequately trained, local police drivers in inappropriate vehicles’

On the issue of police driver training, the report discovered some potentially serious organisational and training issues around the provision of suitably qualified drivers to participate in PVPs. Section 7.4 of the report (HMIC: 1998. 31-32) states:

‘...due to shortages in personnel, untrained officers are being deployed beyond the limits of their skill. In one force, of the motorway patrol officers driving high powered cars only 60% had completed an advanced driving course and motorway policing course...In another force, traffic sergeants who were not advanced drivers were using high performance vehicles in an operational capacity beyond the limits of their skill, albeit in an attempt to ‘get the job done. In addition to the safety implications, Her Majesty’s Inspector is concerned for the reputation of police drivers as public exemplars of safe driving, particularly at high speed’

The findings of this report were not reported in the national print-media, but were published on the BBC News Online website (BBC: 1998). This report can be seen as evidence of official concern around the issue of PVPs and their potential to damage the 'reputation' of police drivers if the situation around training was not resolved.

1998 concluded with an incident reported in the *Times*, under the headline *Police Car In Chase Runs Over Boy of 10*, in which a patrol car knocked-down a 10 year-old boy on its way to an emergency (Joseph: 1998). Although this event was mislabelled by the newspaper as a 'chase' although it was clearly an 'emergency response' incident and it brought the number of injuries and fatalities caused by police vehicular activity to twelve during 1998 (Joseph: 1998). Although not strictly PVP-related, it could be argued that this type of incident feeds into the narrative of 'gung-ho' police drivers, tearing around without the proper training and putting the safety of themselves and others at risk. A conflation of emergency response and PVP events, alongside a celebrity victim was to prove the catalyst for a sustained campaign by the national press against police driving in general and this will be examined in the next section.

### **1999 – 2011: Overtaken By Events**

Close to midnight on the 26<sup>th</sup> of February 1999, broadcaster Sheena McDonald was hit by a police van on an emergency response call in North London, leaving her unconscious in intensive care with severe head injuries (Harvey: 1999). Although this incident was not PVP-related, it played into the prevailing media narrative based upon concern around all aspects of police driving which had developed towards the end of 1990s. Metaphorically speaking, the Sheena McDonald case opened the floodgates for a torrent of news reports which directly challenged the competence of police drivers. In the immediate aftermath of the incident, the *Daily Mail* published a report entitled, *Terrible Toll of Police in a Hurry* (Maguire & Timms: 1999), which catalogued six recent emergency response incidents alongside one PVP, all of which had resulted in either a fatality or serious injury being caused to a member of the public.

The *Daily Mail* was particularly interested in the McDonald case and contributed significantly to the numerous published reports related to the case during 1999 and 2000. These tended to take the form of progress reports on the recovery of Miss McDonald (Riddell: 1999; Beaven: 1999; Levin: 1999; Daily Mail: 1999a), or developments in the case, such as the revelations that the police van was travelling on the wrong side of the road and had numerous mechanical defects (Wright & Boshoff: 1999). Other stories related to the subsequent trial of the police van driver in January 2000 (Joseph: 1999; Dodd: 1999; Carter: 2000; Rawstorne: 2000a). The lengthy recovery of Miss McDonald and the subsequent trial served to keep the issue of police driving in the news for a sustained period of time.

Alongside this flow of news reports, momentum towards a response was beginning to build. It became apparent that 'open-season' had been declared on police drivers who were about to be subjected to a very thorough examination under the media microscope. A 'perfect storm' was developing around the issue of police driving, which comprised of a celebrity victim coupled with a surge in the rate of both PVPs and more general PVAs, manifested in the relevant statistics. A very similar case, which took place in March 1997 and resulted in the death of a pedestrian, was barely covered in the national press, perhaps because the victim was not a celebrity (Hurry: 1999).

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 1999, the headline on the front page of the *Daily Mail* boldly proclaimed, *Police Car Crashes Injure Six People Every Day* (Rayner: 1999). Labour MP Gordon Prentice, who had uncovered the statistical evidence upon which the headline was based, had written to the Home Secretary, Jack Straw asking for clarification around the levels of training received by those officers involved in accidents, arguing that the individual forces with the worst accident records should be, '...named and shamed' (Rayner: 1999. 6). These statistics were not entirely pursuit-specific but instead were amalgamated from incidents resulting from a variety of police driving activities. Nevertheless, the presentation of these bald statistics on the front page was presumably intended to shock their readers.

The involvement of numerous politicians in the story also indicated political interest in the issue and this in turn signalled to their readers that the problem was being addressed.

The following day, the *Daily Mail* continued its theme with an article headlined, *Speeding Police Kill Four in Eight Weeks*, which detailed that the issue of PVAs was to be, '...discussed in the House of Lords' (Williams: 1999. 40). On the 30<sup>th</sup> of March the *Daily Mail* continued to apply pressure on the police by publishing a piece entitled, *Dossier of Death* which detailed eight recent fatalities caused by police drivers, 2 of which were PVP-related (Williams & Morris: 1999). In an accompanying *Daily Mail Comment* piece, the newspaper was scathing in its criticism of the police. Beginning with comments based upon the recent PVA statistics, it stated:

'Those shocking statistics led us to suggest that an attitude of macho recklessness had taken hold in the force. No fewer than 2,123 people were injured last year by police vehicles responding to 999 calls or pursuing suspects...fifteen died, simply because they had been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Chief Constables must note the depth of the anger provoked by this wholly unacceptable toll, for it helps to explain – in part at least – the steady fall in respect for the police' (Daily Mail: 1999c. 10).

Clearly, the newspaper was trying to make a link between declining deference to police authority and the growing number of fatalities and injuries caused by a high-speed, macho driving culture which the *Comment* piece argued was now being increasingly manifested within the police force. The statistics, particularly those relating to injuries, were both shocking and embarrassing and represented a potentially serious threat to the legitimacy of police drivers. In early April, there was a further development in the Neil Homer case. Under the headline, *Parent's Anger over Payout for PC Driver Who Killed Their Son*, it was reported that PC Lezlie Collins was set to receive a police pension following his early retirement from West Midlands Police on the grounds of ill-health (Wright: 1999).

Defending the pension award, the chairman of the West Midlands Police Federation stated that, 'It is hardly a meal ticket for life. He is entitled to that pension because he has paid for it. When discredited MPs stop receiving their pensions we might reconsider our view' (Wright: 1999. 17). Having received an undisclosed amount of compensation from West Midlands police in an out-of-court settlement, Dennis Homer was scathing in his criticism of the rapidly increasing number of fatalities and injuries involving police drivers, stating that:

'What really concerns me is that the lessons of Neil's and other people's deaths have not been learned. More and more people are getting injured and killed through the sheer madness of some police drivers' (Wright: 1999. 17).

April 1999 saw the *Daily Mail* publish two further articles on the general issue of PVAs. The first of these, entitled, *End the Death Chases*, contained extracts from an internal police memo which read, 'The police are killing the public. This is a possible front page headline that we do not want. However it is increasingly likely with the numbers of fatal police accidents' (Morris: 1999a. 7). In response, an unnamed safety campaigner stated that the memo amounted to, 'a staggering admission of responsibility' by the police (Morris: 1999a. 7). The report went on to quote a senior police officer who was said to be aiming for a ten-percent reduction in PVAs over the coming year before concluding with comments from Gordon Prentice MP and various safety campaigners announcing plans to fit all Metropolitan Police cars with Incident Data Recorders (IDR), popularly known as a 'black-box', in an attempt to reduce accidents. IDRs were fitted to some Metropolitan Police emergency response vehicles in 1999 (Guardian: 1999), however it remains unclear if this policy was adopted by other forces.

The second *Daily Mail* article, published two days later on the 12<sup>th</sup> of April under the headline, *Anger at Huge Rise in Police Accident Deaths*, was billed as an 'exclusive' owing to the newspaper having secured the latest PVA accident statistics from the PCA Annual Report two months prior to their official release (Morris: 1999b).

The report outlined a 50% rise in the number of PVA-related fatalities over the previous year, with the number of PVP-related fatalities also having doubled to 17 from the previous year.

Approached by the newspaper for a response, the Home Office refused to comment on the statistics and insisted that, '...responsibility rested with individual forces' (Morris: 1999b. 12). However, a spokesman from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents argued that national guidance, rather than reform at an individual police force level was required as a matter of urgency. In an accompanying *Daily Mail* comment piece headed, *Clamping Down on Speeding Police*, it was suggested that the statistical increase in PVAs, '...bears out a suspicion that a culture of recklessness has taken hold among many police drivers' (Daily Mail: 1999b. 10). Although there is a tendency in these articles to conflate the various policing driving activities that can lead to PVAs, the potentially detrimental impact that these negative news reports may produce and the likely consequences of not addressing this problem quickly were also mentioned in the editorial, which went on to warn that:

'...it is important to remember that safety is not the sole issue here. Attitudes towards the police are another important factor. Effective policing depends crucially on the trust and respect of the public. The feeling that officers are prepared to be careless about public safety, or disregard laws and regulations that ordinary road users must obey...will inevitably undermine that trust' (Daily Mail: 1999b. 10).

Again, this argument makes a link between the potential damage that a specific activity, PVPs could inflict upon public trust in the police and the subsequent damage to police legitimacy that this may cause. At the same time as this warning was being issued, May 1999 saw the first airing of the television programme *Car Wars* on BBC One, which contained an overt public-safety message that was at odds somewhat with the image of police drivers being routinely conveyed in national print-media news reports.

In an interview carried out during 2002, a spokesman for the production company responsible for *Car Wars* stressed the 'instructive' nature of their programme, going on to infer that, 'they'd rather audiences didn't view their programme's use of real-life car chase sequences in the same thrill-hungry light as *Police, Camera, Action*' (Belcher: 2002.1).

In response to the worsening situation, June 1999 saw the publication of a news report, stemming from a leaked internal policy review, which claimed that senior officers from Avon and Somerset police were considering a plan to introduce slower, diesel powered patrol cars to replace their current high-performance response car fleet in an effort to reduce the number of PVAs (Woodward: 1999). This plan, although not applicable to motorway traffic cars, was welcomed by campaign group, the *Pedestrians Association*, but was reported to have caused predictable, '...outrage' among other officers in the Avon and Somerset force, prompting an unnamed officer to state that, '[T]his will send a clear message to car thieves and burglars, the police will be unable to catch you in the act, go and do what you like' (Woodward: 1999. 6).

This plan represented a fairly drastic, perhaps even desperate approach to dealing with the rising number of PVA and PVP-related incidents. It could be argued that the restriction of high-performance vehicles implies a failure of management in preventing officers from undertaking high-speed driving safely by other means. Clearly, the plan suggested by Avon and Somerset police tips the balance between high-speed response and road safety firmly in favour of the latter and as such, it represented a significant curtailment of police driver discretion. Similarly, West Midlands police were also attempting to introduce safer methods of addressing the problem of PVP, as evidenced by report in the *Guardian* (Hopkins: 1999. 11), which stated that:

‘The West Midlands force has issued its officers with new guidelines which should drastically cut the number of high-speed pursuits by using helicopters for overhead tracking, and has introduced the ‘stinger’ device, which deflates tyres when cars run over them. The force has been under intense scrutiny since the death of Neil Homer, 21 in December 1995.’

These policy initiatives, along with the use of technological solutions such as fitting IDRs to immediate response vehicles used by the Metropolitan Police (Guardian: 1999) and the increasing use of helicopters, were aimed at addressing the growing concern around PVPs at an individual force level. Although newspaper reports on joyriding were still occasionally being published (Price: 1999), their frequency was in noticeable decline towards the end of the 1990s when compared to the peak in news reports seen during the early 1990s (see Table 3.1). However, PCA statistics demonstrate that the annual rate of PVP-related fatalities continued to increase as the new millennium approached (See Table 4.4).

It emerged that the police were seen as being defensive and against the independent investigation of PVP events by the PCA (Hopkins: 1999) who alleged in their Annual Report for 1998-99 that some forces were still reluctant to refer fatal and near fatal PVAs and PVPs to the PCA for independent investigation or independent supervision (PCA: 1999).

Immediately prior to the turn of the new millennium, the *Daily Mail* reported that a joyrider had been sentenced to four years for killing a traffic officer as he attempted to deploy a ‘stinger’ during a high-speed PVP incident in May of 1999 (Morris: 1999c). PC Stephen Jones was the first police officer to be killed whilst attempting to terminate a pursuit using this method, underlining the inherent dangerousness of this approach. In December 1999, the *Daily Mail* reported that a pedestrian had been killed by a police vehicle answering an emergency call to attend a public house after the burglar alarm there had been activated (Keeley: 1999). These cases represented a tragic farewell to the 1990s and the new decade began with the trial resulting from the Sheena McDonald case which had become something of a cause celebre in the previous year.

The trial received a considerable amount of news coverage and concluded with the police driver being found not guilty of careless driving (Carter: 2000; Rawstorne: 2000a).

However, Miss McDonald, who was reported to be outraged by the acquittal of the police driver immediately announced her intention to mount a private prosecution against the Metropolitan Police (Wells: 2000). The *Daily Mail* reported the not guilty verdict on its front page and in a comment piece published the day after the trial, it stated:

‘though the court has given its verdict...the case leaves a deeply unpleasant aftertaste...the episode will do nothing to ease the deep public concern over the hundreds of accidents when bystanders have been injured or even killed by police cars....and then we come to the most unedifying aspect – the attempt to smear Miss McDonald’ (Rawstorne: 2000b. 1).

This smear took the form of allegations made by the police defence team during the criminal trial which suggested that Ms McDonald had been drunk at the time of the accident (Levin: 2000; Rawstorne: 2000). The news report concluded with a round-up of recent fatal PVA cases which had resulted in the prosecution of police drivers, all of which had been subject to relatively lenient punishments (Rawstorne: 2000b). More criticism was to follow later in January 2000, in the form of an extensive interview with Miss McDonald which featured a quote from it as the headline which read, *I Had Always Believed the Police Were on the Side of the Good Guys, Not Any More. I have Lost my Faith in British Justice* (Levin: 2000). This was followed up with an appearance on the BBC Scotland programme, *Frontline* where it was revealed that there were no training courses available for either emergency response or pursuit driving in the whole of Scotland (BBC: 2000b). Whilst this lack of training does not necessarily equate to an increase in accidents, as Scottish police drivers were obviously able to travel to other areas to receive appropriate training, it could be argued that this revelation demonstrated that Scottish police forces were not taking seriously the growing concern around the issue of PVAs.

Senior officers appearing on the *Frontline* programme were at pains to reassure the public that safety was the paramount concern and that driver training was being improved and was currently the subject of a high-level and comprehensive review by senior ACPO officers (BBC: 2000c).

January 2000 also saw a third series of *Police Camera Action*, comprising 19 episodes, begin airing on ITV. Twelve of the episodes aired in 2000, five in 2001 and two in 2002. The reasons for the sporadic, clustering broadcast schedule of this series are unclear. However, due to its reliance on pre-shot footage, rather than footage filmed by use of the 'ride-along' method, perhaps the programme was hampered by a shortage of suitable material.

March 2000 saw the publication of a comprehensive investigative article in the *Guardian* entitled, *A Dangerous Pursuit* (Hattenstone: 2000) which used case-studies and interviews to examine the aftermath of a number of high-profile PVA and PVP events, with the Lezlie Collins / Neil Homer case being particularly well covered. Following the death of his son, Neil Homer during a PVP in December 1995, Dennis Homer had become a vociferous campaigner for reform of PVP policy and had been investigating the circumstances around his son's death. A chance encounter while appealing for witnesses on a local radio station had led to a meeting with two boys who had heard the whole incident unfold on an illegal police radio scanner. The information he gathered from this meeting, along with his persistent media campaigning eventually led to West Midlands police implementing changes to their PVP guidelines.

However, despite this positive development, Dennis Homer had faced stiff resistance to his campaign and Hattenstone (2000. 21) also reported that David Twigg, a member of the legal team representing the Police Federation had written an article in the Birmingham Post which contended that:

'The activities of criminals and, more rarely, the actions of police officers who seek to protect the public will inevitably create risks. It is inevitable, on occasion; innocent bystanders will be killed or injured.'

This 'collateral damage' argument belies the details of the PC Leslie Collins case, which exemplified the worst elements of PVP. On a more personal level, the twin sister of Neil Homer recounted how she was ostracised from her role as a volunteer special constable following the death of her brother.

She recalled how, a month after his death, she returned to duty but was told by another officer, '[Y]ou're not one of us anymore, you're not welcome at this station' (Hattenstone: 2000. 21). The report also detailed how the Police Federation regularly threaten to sue the victims of PVAs and PVPs, usually on the premise that the accused officer has endured a 'loss of earnings' and observes that the Police Federation tended to hire the very best defence barristers, while the prosecution was usually reliant on Crown Prosecution Service barristers who were not incentivised to try and win the case. This, alongside the tendency of juries to show a degree of reluctance in finding officers guilty (BBC: 2000c), and judges disinclination to jail them for incidents which occurred while they were on duty (Hopkins: 1999) makes achieving justice extremely difficult.

However, media pressure was beginning to produce a response and the *Daily Mail* was leading the charge in full campaigning mode. In a self-congratulatory tone, the front page splash published on the 30<sup>th</sup> of March 2000 proclaimed, *18,000 Police to Face Driving Tests*, with a secondary headline on page two which read, *Yard Clampdown on Police Danger Drivers after Mail Campaign* (Wright: 2000). The new driving regulations outlined in the news report were applicable only to the Metropolitan Police but did represent a significant tightening up of all aspects of police driving. After claiming that a reduction in accidents coincided with the launch of their police driving campaign in March 1999, the article went on to mention that the Channel 4 documentary series, *Dispatches*, would be broadcast that evening and it would be focussing on national police driving standards (Wright: 2000).

The programme featured interviews with Sheena McDonald and others who had been bereaved following PVAs and examined their perceived lack of post-incident accountability (Shooter: 2000).

In addition the programme featured CCTV footage of unsafe police driving and, directly quoting from an extract of a leaked Association of Chief Police Officers report, it was claimed that:

‘The main problem with regard to pursuits and emergency response driving is not that officers have not been initially adequately trained for their particular role, it is that they exceed their level of authority’ (Wright: 2000.2).

The *Dispatches* television programme also made potentially embarrassing claims about the poor roadworthiness of police vehicles, claiming that they were not required to pass a standard MOT test, instead being repaired, serviced and maintained by specialist police vehicle-only garages (Shooter: 2000). This may explain the widely reported defects including under-inflated tyres, faulty speedometer and under-performing emergency lights that were seen on the police van that hit Sheena McDonald.

The *Dispatches* programme raised a number of interesting questions. In particular, if the leaked ACPO document was correct in arguing that a lack of discipline and not a lack of training was the primary cause of both PVAs and PVPs, then a training-based solution can surely offer only a partial remedy to the problem of rapidly increasing fatal and serious injury PVPs and PVAs. Perhaps framing the problem as a training issue was easier to explain and ‘solve’ than the altogether thornier option of acknowledging that ill-discipline and poor judgement among police drivers was a potentially significant factor fuelling both PVAs and PVPs.

Closely following the broadcast of the *Dispatches* programme the *Daily Mail* published a report under the headline, *Met’s 999 Cars are Pulled off the Road*, which detailed how, after testing by independent mechanics, at least a quarter of the emergency response vehicles being used by the Metropolitan Police were immediately taken out of service due to a variety of mechanical faults (Rose: 2000). Furthermore, 60 of these vehicles had such serious faults that they were classified as being, ‘...dangerous to drive’ (Rose: 2000. 32).

The news report claimed that concerns about the roadworthiness of vehicles was raised by Metropolitan Police officers, however, a spokesman for the private company which ran the maintenance contract, *Venson*, pointed-out that it had received no evidence to suggest that poor maintenance was a factor in any of the 1,200 PVAs it was aware of.

Be that as it may, the revelation that so many of the Metropolitan Police's emergency response vehicles were in such a poor state of repair was embarrassing, especially considering that the force was trumpeting its new 'safer driver' policy and IDRs in an attempt to reduce the number of PVAs (Guardian: 1999; Wright: 2000a).

On April 13<sup>th</sup>, an older PVA case resurfaced, perhaps due to the rising profile of the victim, as Heather Mills was reported to have received £200,000 in damages from Scotland Yard following the loss of her leg after a collision with a police motorcycle in 1993 (Reynolds: 2000). Although the case was barely covered by the media at the time of the incident, her status as the new partner of Sir Paul McCartney and the contemporary nature of the story had apparently rendered it newsworthy. In rounding up the case, the news report stated that Scotland Yard had not admitted liability and the damages were awarded in an out-of-court settlement. Heather Mills maintained she had been forced to sue Scotland Yard after PC Osbourne, the police motorcycle driver, had been cleared of dangerous driving and then filed a damages suit against her for loss of earnings and psychological trauma. PC Osbourne was reported to be, 'angry' about the damages awarded to Heather Mills, branding the award, '...a waste of taxpayers' money', which he believed was unjustified following his acquittal (BBC: 2000d).

Despite the press focus on PVAs, PVPs were increasingly being seen as a problematic issue in their own right, not least due to publication in November 2000 of the latest Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority. This report stated, '[T]here is worrying evidence that the skill and judgement of some police drivers are open to question and criticism (PCA: 2000. 30).'

Although the report was keen to stress that 16 of the 44 regional police forces had fully implemented the Lind Report's (1998) recommendation, it was clear that the adoption of these recommendations was extremely patchy across the U.K. (PCA: 2000. 31). Moreover, the report revealed that PVP-related fatalities had risen substantially over the previous year, from 17 in 1998-1999 to 22 in 1999-2000 (PCA: 2000).

As 2000 drew to a close, the publication of the latest Police Complaints Authority statistics outlining a significant increase in the number in PVP-related fatalities were widely reported in the national press under headlines which included, *Alarm as Number of Deaths in Police Car Chases Soars* (Wright: 2000b), *Police Chase Toll Soars* (Clarke: 2000), *Police Chase Deaths have Doubled in Two Years* (Bennetto: 2000) and *Police Car Pursuits Deaths up 50%* (Hopkins: 2000b).

In a BBC news report, it was noted that, '...the number of deaths during police chases has risen by 300% from six last year to 24', a rise which was reported to be a cause of, '...obvious concern' to Home Officer Minister Charles Clarke (BBC: 2000e. 1). Similar political concern was also being expressed in the House of Lords. During a debate on *Police Response Vehicles: Fatal Accidents*, Lord Ashley of Stoke described the number of fatalities and accidents caused by PVAs and PVPs as, 'shocking and unacceptable', before stating that, '[T]he police may have guidelines, but they are clearly not keeping to them. Although we admire the work of the police and support them in every possible way, their attitudes to driving must be changed' (HL Deb 12<sup>th</sup> December 2000, cc 214-6).

The debate ended with assurances that the Lind Report (1998) guidelines were being adopted nationally and this would in turn lead to a reduction in fatalities and serious injuries caused by police vehicles. However, less than a month prior to these assurances being made in the House of Lords, the results from an internal, self-report survey completed by each of the U.K.'s police forces yielded evidence that the recommendations laid out in the Lind Report (1998) were not being universally adopted across the police service (Cullen: 2000).

The survey discovered that only one quarter of forces had implemented a mandatory attitudinal training component or regular re-testing of all police drivers into their training programmes. Moreover, the survey revealed that night-time driver training was only being delivered to all police drivers in two-thirds of police forces, with two forces not offering their drivers any night-time driving training at all (Cullen: 2000). The findings of this survey which was produced using self-report questionnaires were not able to be independently verified.

However, the PCA Annual report (PCA: 2000) had made a broadly similar point, observing that only 16 of the (then) 44 police forces in England and Wales had implemented the training guidelines contained in the Lind Report (1998).


The media concern around PVPs continued into 2001. In February another safety scare emerged in the *Sunday Express*, which reported that contaminated brake fluid had been discovered in some emergency response vehicles used by the Metropolitan Police (Gillard & Connett: 2001). Having obtained figures The *Daily Mail* continued its campaign to '...crackdown on poor police driving', with the publication of a report entitled, *24 Civilians Die in Police Car Chases in Just One Year* (Taylor & Wright: 2001. 19). The article pointed out that outside the Metropolitan force, IDRs had not yet been fitted to vehicles across two-thirds of other forces.

In July 2001, the *Police Complaints Authority Annual Report 2000/01* was published and in the *Chairman's Foreword*, Alistair Graham wrote:

'There has been a 178 per cent increase in fatalities involving pursuits over four years, which is totally unacceptable. Police forces must take urgent steps to meet the rising tide of public concern' (PCA: 2001. 3).

In a section dedicated to *Road Traffic Incidents*, the report produced statistics detailing the rise in PVP-related fatalities (Table 4.4 - below) and went on to state that, 'It is worrying to note that there are still reports of officers participating in pursuits or responding to emergency calls, with inadequate training and using inappropriate vehicles' (PCA: 2001. 31).

These PVP fatality statistics were disputed by the Association of Chief Police Officers, who, citing HMIC statistics, argued that the real figure for the period 2000-2001 was actually 11 (Baird: 2001). However, despite these protestations, the PCA figures were widely reported in the national print media (John: 2001; Raynor: 2001; Hopkins: 2001; Steele: 2001). PVP-related fatalities continued to be reported during the second half of 2001.



**Table 4.4. PCA PVP-Related Fatalities 1997/98 – 2000/01.** (PCA: 2001. 30).

On the 20<sup>th</sup> August, the death of 16 year-old girl killed when a fleeing vehicle crashed was reported in both the *Daily Mail* and *The Times* (Daily Mail: 2001; Times: 2001). Five days later, on the 25 of August, another altogether more horrific case, involving the deaths of four people during a PVP received extensive coverage.

Under headlines including *Fireball Hell* (Booker: 2001 – See Figure 4.5) and *Police Chase Horror* (Daily Mail 2001a), it was reported that three smash-and-grab suspects and an entirely innocent motorist had been killed in a head-on collision when the fleeing vehicle hit another car at 100mph whilst travelling on the wrong side of road (Judge: 2001).

Although the four victims were killed instantly in the crash, witnesses recounted the gruesome spectacle of the police impotently watching the cars burn for 15 minutes until the fire brigade arrived, by which time the bodies inside were charred beyond recognition (Mitchell: 2001). Announcing a PCA-supervised investigation of the incident, police spokesman Mr Baker-McCardle made clear his view on where blame for the incident should lie, in stating that, 'The driver of that vehicle drove in such a way as to bring about the accident. Any suggestion that the accident was caused by the police pursuit is speculative and premature' (Allison: 2001).

6 DAILY STAR, Saturday, August 25, 2001

**HORROR: The mangled wreckage of the gang's Carlton and, below, the flattened Vectra**



## FIREBALL HELL

### Four wiped out as police chase robbers at 100mph

by MICHAEL BOOKER

**THREE** thieves making a 100mph getaway from a smash-and-grab raid were burned alive when their car exploded in a head-on crash with another vehicle.

The raiders, who were being chased by a police car up the wrong way of a dual carriageway in Swanley, Kent, died after ploughing into an on-coming Vauxhall Vectra early yesterday morning.

The driver of the Vectra was also killed instantly. Police say the raiders, whose black Vauxhall Carlton had been chased across two counties following the raid on a Boots store in Chislehurst, will have to be identified from dental records after their bodies were destroyed in the inferno fireball.

**Killed**

Deaths in police chases have risen dramatically, leading to calls for officers to back off during pursuits.

People killed in police chases rose from nine in 1997-98 to 25 last year.

Nine of the dead were bystanders who were not involved in the pursuits. And 16 people were seriously injured.

The Police Complaints Authority has called for restrictions on high-speed driving by officers if there is no fall in the death rate. The Kent

smash is being investigated by the Police Complaints Authority and is certain to lead to calls for stricter monitoring of police chases.

Detectives leading the investigation described the scene as one of "carriage, anguish and tragedy".

The driver of the Vectra is believed to be a man in his 40s from Kent.

Two cars from Surrey police had been chasing the vehicle after the

break-in, in which perfume and electrical goods were taken.

Five men wearing balaclavas and hoods smashed into the store using two vehicles at around 2.15am on Friday.

The Vauxhall Carlton headed towards Sevenoaks in Kent on the A25 and then turned the wrong way on in the A20 where the crash happened.

Police are now trying to trace a silver Cavalier which is believed to have contained other members of the gang.

Eye-witnesses Jenny and Graham Withers described how they heard a horrific bang and then saw the Carlton on fire.

They said: "There was nothing police could have done."

"The flames were eight feet high and the heat so intense. It was horrible to see."

**DAILY STAR**  
says

### Beware of his backers

TORY activist Edgar Griffin was thrown out of the Conservative party yesterday because of his links to the evil British National Party.

His son Nick runs the hateful outfit and his wife Jean actually stood for the BNP at the last election.

Embarrassed by these revelations about Mr Griffin, an Iain Duncan Smith supporter, the Tories took action.

Mr Griffin has been in the party for 53 years - and has probably barely changed his politics in that time.

This incident says much about a party which isn't even sure who its 300,000 members are.

And about some of the people who think Duncan Smith is the man to lead the Conservatives to glory.

There are plenty of right-wing old duflers like Mr Griffin in the Tory party. And they're probably all voting for Duncan Smith.

So take note if the balding ex-Army man wins the leadership.

Just remember who some of his backers are.

### Cops' quick road to ruin

A HIGH-SPEED police chase ended yesterday in four deaths, as we report on this page.

Cops were chasing thieves in a Vauxhall Carlton doing 100mph the wrong way along the A20.

They'd stolen perfume and electrical goods from a chemist shop.

Is that really worth two police cars going in hot pursuit?

And when the chase ends with bodies too charred to identify in a burned-out pile-up, can any of us really say we are surprised?

We've said it before and we'll say it again.

The police must weigh a quick collar against the risk to themselves, the victims and - more importantly - the innocent public.

Not too often it's like yesterday.

Not worth it.

### Richardheads

IT'S A sad day when Tesco feels it has to re-name Spotted Dick.

Fainthearted shoppers, upset at the name, will now buy Spotted Richard instead.

We hope this trend doesn't go too far.

Or next thing you know we'll have James Bond movies without Pussy Galore.

Figure 4.5. Daily Star 25<sup>th</sup> August 2001. (Booker: 2001: 6).

However, newspaper editorials published in the aftermath were clear in their condemnation of police action. The first of these, published in the *Daily Star*, opined:

‘Cops were chasing thieves [who had] stolen perfume and electrical goods from a chemists shop. Is that really worth two police cars going in hot pursuit? The police must weigh a quick collar against the risk to themselves, the villains and – more importantly – the innocent public. All too often it’s like yesterday. Not worth it.’ (Daily Star: 2001: 6).

The second editorial, published in the *Sunday Express*, observed that there had been a large number of PVPs in recent times before arguing that:

‘You could regard this as a statistical blip but the evidence appears otherwise... The police say car chases are rare. By that they mean pursuits carried out by specially-qualified police drivers but most recent accidents have not been of this nature. They are cases where the police followed behind a suspect at a distance with sirens sounding. This appears to have been sufficient to make the suspect drive recklessly and cause an accident. It is clearly time for a radical rethink of police pursuit policy’ (Sunday Express: 2001. 38).

The Daily Star editorial made a simple point, that the decision to undertake a PVP must not be taken lightly for relatively petty offences. The *Sunday Express* editorial, on the other hand, was a little more sophisticated due to its recognition of the potential for a pursuing police vehicle to increasingly escalate the risks taken by the fleeing driver (Best: 2002) through the application of ‘psychological pressure’ (Alpert & Fridell: 1992. 123). Accompanying the *Sunday Express* editorial was a two-page article headlined, *Dangerous Dilemma Facing Police Driver in the Deadly Pursuit of Justice on Roads* (Calvert: 2001), which contained details of recent fatal PVP cases alongside extensive quotes both from victim’s families and from the chairman of the national police driving school, Commander Richard Cullen. Speaking in defence of PVP, Mr Cullen argued that,

‘Pursuits play a vital role in protecting the public. The public want us to catch criminals and in my experience nobody drives away from a police car unless they have done something wrong. Drunken drivers and boy racers will kill people regardless of whether police are chasing them. The fatalities are higher than we’d want but they are a small percentage of the accidents caused by these people’ (Calvert: 2001. 21).

Mr Cullen did not offer any explanation for the large rise in PVP-related fatalities, but instead stressed the safety protocols governing who was allowed to undertake PVPs and under what environmental conditions.

However, conspicuously absent from his statements, was the question of *why*, or rather *for what level of offence* should the risky activity of PVP be permitted. His assertion that fleeing motorists are guilty of some offence may be true in his experience. However, it makes no concession to the proportionality between apprehending offenders for relatively minor offences versus the risk of undertaking a pursuit of that offender with a possibility of a negative outcome. It could also be argued that his suggestion that PVPs are vital in terms of public protection fails to accommodate the rising number of PVP-related fatalities endured by members of the public, be those innocent bystanders, fleeing drivers or their passengers or occasionally police officers themselves.

On the 8<sup>th</sup> of November 2001, the *Daily Mail* published an article which reported that there had been 26 PVP-related fatalities in the previous 7 months (Willey: 2001). Announcing their intention to commence a major research project into PVPs, a spokesman from the PCA stated, ‘[W]e are very worried by these figures and we believe that, at the moment, the increase in the number of pursuit deaths is the most worrying problem we are dealing with’ (Willey: 2001. 27). This article was followed, three days later, by a double-page feature in the *Sunday Express* which posed the question, *As 999 Chase Deaths Continue to Soar, Why Has No Police Driver Faced Prosecution?*, which briefly outlined details of each of the 26 PVP related deaths that had occurred over the previous seven months, before stating that, ‘...so far no prosecution or even disciplinary action has been taken against any

officers involved in the 26 deaths' (Crickmer: 2001. 10). The article went on to quote Mr Kevin Delaney, formerly the head of the Metropolitan Police's traffic division, who opined:

'Very often situations that are relatively minor become far more serious because the police drivers decide to pursue a suspect. It is a lack of judgement in some cases. There is a real problem here...but it will take a very brave Chief Constable to take the decision to tell his officers to slow down' (Crickmer: 2001. 10).

The report concluded by quoting the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman, Simon Hughes, head of the PCA, Sir Alistair Graham, individuals from various road-safety groups and an unnamed spokeswoman from the Home Office who all expressed growing concern at the rise in PVP-related fatalities.

2002 began with a lull in news reports of PVPs, with the first one being reported in April of that year (Lawton: 2002), closely followed by a second, emergency response-related fatality which was reported later that same month (Hudson: 2002). Quoted in the second of these reports, Sir Alistair Graham once again expressed his growing concern over the rapidly rising PVA and PVP-related fatality figures, stating that:

'If there is no early improvement [in these figures] I recommend that the Home Office should seriously consider reviewing the law to ensure that police officers can break the road traffic law only if they are undertaking pursuits for a serious offence' (Hudson: 2002. 15).

In contrast with these negative constructions of traffic policing, April 3<sup>rd</sup> 2002 also saw the return of the BBC television programme *Car Wars*, the first six episodes of which had been broadcasted in 1999. Following this hiatus, a new one-off episode entitled, *Fast & Furious* which documented the traffic-work of four Scottish police forces was aired in order to publicise *National No-Speeding Day* on April 10<sup>th</sup> 2002.

Explaining the partnership between his media company and the police, the executive producer was keen to stress the public safety and educational messages conveyed by the programme and the potential benefits for public safety that publicising both bad driving and the work of the traffic police may deliver (Belcher: 2002.1). *Fast & Furious* contained a number of PVPs alongside interviews with the police drivers while they retrospectively viewed and commented on the footage of the pursuits that they were involved in. The programme was a precursor, in terms of the style, content and overall tone of the PVP-based programming broadcasted on the BBC over the coming years. This is perhaps unsurprising, due to the fact that subsidiaries of the same production company responsible for *Car Wars*, Mentorn Media, was later to produce both *Traffic Cops* and *Motorway Cops* for the BBC.

In sharp contrast to the images of PVP conveyed in *Car Wars*, news stories in the national print media continued to report fatalities caused by police drivers.

10 Tuesday June 25 2002 Daily Express

**Young woman is latest police pursuit victim in death toll that's tripled in four years**



SUNG: TV's Sheena McDonald



By John Twomey

A WOMAN was hit and killed by a police car racing to a 999 call early yesterday - the latest in a fast-growing toll of innocent lives lost in high-speed pursuits.

Police and paramedics tried to save the 29-year-old victim but she died at the scene.

Last night, an inquiry was launched into how the woman was knocked down by the marked Vauxhall Astra police car as she crossed the road.

The crash comes at a time of rising concern about the number of people killed and injured in police chases or as officers answer 999 calls. Latest figures show that the death toll has tripled in four years.

The car, carrying two officers, had its blue lights flashing as it raced to the scene of a burglary call in Shooters Hill, south London.

The driver had not turned on the Astra's sirens because it was so late at night and the roads were relatively quiet.

The Police Complaints Authority said the Metropolitan Police had voluntarily referred the crash to them.

"I will ensure a thorough inquiry is conducted into this tragic incident," said PCA member Marcus Williams, who will supervise the inquiry.

"I will be meeting with the investigating team and a copy of the investigation will be sent to HM Coroner for the public inquest.

The two officers involved in the crash were said to be "extremely shaken". Both have been placed on

# Another 999 chase ...another innocent passer-by is killed



**WITNESS APPEAL:** The road where the victim was hit by a police car

## Where the lives are lost

**THE** number of people killed in high-speed police pursuits has almost tripled in four years.

Police Complaints Authority figures show there were 25 deaths during police pursuits in 2000-2001, compared with nine between 1997 and 1998.

But a spokesman stressed: "These figures are national and in most cases police vehicles were not directly involved in crashes. Of the 25 deaths, 18

were passengers in cars being followed by police which either lost control or hit another car."

PCA chairman Sir Alistair Graham said when the figures were released: "Both the public and police officers themselves are at risk during such pursuits. We must find an answer."

On Thursday, the PCA will reveal the findings of research into deaths and injuries resulting from police pursuits.

sick leave. Scotland Yard refused to reveal how fast the car was travelling when the woman was knocked down.

The vehicle is fitted with a data recorder which will reveal the speed and other details about the moments before the crash.

Public worries over the increasing toll have led police chiefs to introduce a tougher training regime for their drivers.

The most high-profile of recent cases involved Channel 4 newsreader Sheena McDonald. She is suing the Metropolitan Police for £500,000 for injuries received when she was hit by a police van in February, 1999.

The vehicle, carrying two officers, was going to the aid of fellow constables trying to break up a pub fight when it hit the broadcaster as she crossed a busy road in Islington, north London.

Ms McDonald, a former girlfriend of Chancellor Gordon Brown, was in a coma for 72 hours. She suffered serious head injuries and had a titanium staple inserted into her skull.

The police van driver was cleared at a magistrates court in January, 2000, of driving without due care and attention.

Ms McDonald, 47, is suing on the grounds that the driver was negligent. She is also claiming damages from the Met due to a catalogue of alleged defects to the vehicle.

OPINION: PAGE 12

Figure 4.6. Daily Express. 25<sup>th</sup> June 2002. (Twomey: 2002. 10).

Another pedestrian was killed during an emergency response incident on the 24<sup>th</sup> of June 2002 (Taylor: 2002). However, the event was labelled erroneously as a 'chase' in the *Daily Express* which also printed a portrait photograph of Sheena McDonald who was now apparently synonymous with both PVPs and PVAs (Twomey: 2002). As can be seen in Figure 4.6, the issue was deemed sufficiently serious to be worthy of 'Express Special Investigation' status.

June 27<sup>th</sup> 2002, saw the publication of a landmark report by the PCA, entitled, *Investigation of Road Traffic Incidents (RTI's) Involving Police Vehicles (1998-2001): Identifying Common Factors and the Lessons to be Learned*, otherwise known as by its subtitle, *Fatal Pursuit* (Best: 2002).

The study sampled 85 cases referred to the PCA following a death of serious injury resulting from either PVAs or PVPs between 1998 and 2001. The report reproduced details of five case-studies, followed by a *Learning the Lesson* analysis, which examined the possible reasons for the negative PVP outcome in each of the five cases, which in turn informed the key findings of the report.

The pursuit commentaries and general communications between control room supervisors and police personnel engaging in PVPs were found to be inadequate in the majority of cases and non-existent in others (Best: 2002. 19). This, argued the report, undermined the dynamic risk assessment procedure and, '...resulted in risky decisions [being] taken by police drivers rather than by their control room supervisors' (Best: 2002. i). In the case studies analysed by the report, collisions involving police vehicles were very rare but the converse was found to be true for the fleeing vehicles, which often crashed either into street furniture, trees, pedestrians or other vehicles. The report (Best: 2000) concluded that police drivers are generally sufficiently trained to avoid collisions during PVPs and this has obvious implications when considering PVP risk assessments. Best argues that:

'...it is the lower skill level, that of the pursued driver, that should be accounted for in assessing risk, not the skills of the police driver.

In contrast, for the vast majority of the non-pursuit / follow cases...the referral results from a collision involving police vehicles' (Best: 2002. iii).

This assertion, it could be argued, represents a significant challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy of the period. If correct, this argument suggests that improvements in the training of police drivers may not reduce the number of PVP-related fatalities but could perhaps facilitate a reduction in the number of PVA's resulting from emergency response and routine police driving activities. Stolen vehicles were the subject of pursuits or follows in only 29 of the 64 PVP incidents studied in the report (Best: 2002. iv) and it was reported that the number of fatalities resulting from PVAs had been relatively stable over the previous four years.

This led to the conclusion that, '...the rise in pursuit deaths cannot be regarded as reflecting an overall increase in police road use or general reporting of traffic incident to the PCA' (Best 2002: 1). The report also argued that pursuits should not be undertaken without a clear strategic plan to bring the pursuit to a safe conclusion. The key conclusion of the study was that:

'...the police continue to engage in too many pursuits/follows that endanger public safety and that the most effective way to reduce this is by increasing management control on the evolution of pursuits and reducing officer discretion about both initiating and continuing with pursuits' (Best: 2002. i).

This conclusion was widely quoted in the subsequent news reports detailing the findings of the PCA report (Telegraph: 2002; BBC: 2002a; Guardian: 2002; Steele: 2002; Baird: 2002; McJannet: 2002). In response to the publication of the PCA report, Bill Brereton, the ACPO spokesman on police driving was said to be, 'perplexed' by the large rise in PVP-related fatalities which had occurred against a backdrop of, 'heavy investments in training and equipment in recent years', while a spokeswoman for the Police Federation pointed to the failure of some forces to fully adopt national driver training standards (Hopkins: 2002. 1).

An opinion piece in the magazine, *Police Review*, argued that calling off pursuits would not make the streets safer, but instead would undermine the professionalism of experienced police drivers and may result in control room supervisors taking the blame in the event of a negative PVP outcome (Marchant: 2002). The following week, *Police Review* published a critique of the PCA report (Best: 2002) by regular columnist Peter 'Tank' Waddington who argued that:

'[A] gaping hole in the report is the lack of evidence regarding the frequency with which police engage in pursuits without adverse consequences. Without this data the three-fold increase in deaths arising from pursuits proves little. For all we know, police pursuits in general have increased ten-fold in the period and the proportion of those ending in tragedy has declined significantly' (Waddington: 2002. 14).


This hypothetical argument, which does not address the statistical increase in PVP-related fatalities, fails to acknowledge that historically it is the police themselves who have failed to provide this contextualising data, a point observed by the PCA who stated that, '[W]e have identified a general mood of defensiveness and evasion in the police service in response to attempts to demystify and quantify the frequency of and risk associated with pursuits' (PCA: 2002. 35).

Furthermore, Waddington (2002. 14) goes on to argue that, '...the PCA has aroused public anxieties on the basis of slender and inadequate information.' This argument, which is clearly aimed at discrediting the work of Best (2002), fails to acknowledge that the PCA is simply fulfilling its oversight function in the face of an extremely significant rise in the number of PVP-related fatalities in which police drivers are implicated. There is no evidence to suggest the existence of public anxiety, but there is certainly evidence of growing political concern and an increase in the number of victims, bereaved families and associated newspaper reports. The 2002 Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority was published on the 10<sup>th</sup> July and despite using the general heading of 'Road Traffic Incidents', it contained a substantial section on the rising number of PVP-related incidents that had been referred to the PCA for investigation (PCA: 2002).

In purely statistical terms, the report outlined a very large increase in the number of fatalities caused by PVPs, which had risen from 25 during 2000 – 01, to 44 for the period 2001 – 02 (See Table 4.7). The report argued that:

‘The police service has a fundamental responsibility to explain this increase. We can only conclude that, in spite of the warnings we issued in last year’s Annual Report, forces are still not doing enough to address this issue’ (PCA: 2002. 33).

When placed in context, the report pointed out that, statistically speaking, the police were currently responsible for 1% of annual road accidents occurring across the U.K.



**Figure 4.7. PCA PVP-Related Fatality Statistics 1997/98–2001/02.** (PCA: 2002. 32).

The report challenged the police view that curtailing PVPs would lead to an increase in the number of vehicles fleeing from the police, arguing that, ‘If the police do not accept this assertion, the onus is on them to produce the empirical evidence to disprove it’ (PCA: 2002. 35).

Finally, utilising four detailed PVP case-studies, the report analysed the various factors which lead to fatalities in an attempt to draw-out the lessons, which it argued could be learned from each of them. Prominent among these factors, was the escalation of risk in pursuits initiated for relatively minor traffic infringements. Referring to one case, in which a vehicle was initially followed, ‘...for no particular reason’, before hitting and killing a pedestrian, the report argued that:

‘[I]t was not known at that stage that the vehicle was stolen or that the driver was disqualified. The fact that the driver was subsequently convicted is no justification for the officers’ actions - they were materially involved in a series of high-risk activities in a busy town centre. Their escalation of a series of follows and pursuits led to increased risk-taking by the suspect’ (PCA: 2002. 38).

This assertion raises a number of interesting arguments, primarily, the view that retrospective knowledge should not be used to justify a PVP after the fact and that proportionality, in terms of having a sufficient reason to initiate a pursuit or follow, should be exercised by police drivers. The following month, in August 2002, two police officers were killed by a fleeing van whilst attempting to terminate the PVP using a ‘stinger’ device, a tragic event that was widely and sympathetically reported in the national media (BBC: 2002b; Branigan: 2002; Moriarty: 2002; Parker: 2002). Two more fatal PVP events, which resulted in three fatalities were reported at the end of August (Wright: 2002) and in September the *Telegraph* printed a detailed round-up of recent development in the areas of regulation, research and opinion around PVPs (Luckhurst: 2002). 2002 concluded with publication of a report in *The Times*, which detailed how Los Angeles police chiefs were considering banning the majority of pursuits following a 30% rise in PVPs over the previous year, resulting in huge sums of compensation being paid out to the victims (Ayres: 2002).

2002 can be characterised as a pivotal year in the history of concern around PVPs. Statistically, the number of PVP-related fatalities peaked at 44 for the period covered by the PCA Annual Report for 2001 to 2002 (PCA: 2002).

This rapid increase in PVP-related fatalities referred to the PCA obviously led them to issue strident criticism of the police and also had the effect of increasing the research activity carried out by the PCA and its successor the IPCC, evidenced by a series of reports and other research which will be examined below. The publication of data outlining the rise in PVP-related fatalities, along with the official criticism this generated, fuelled a continuation in negative national news reports centring on the activities of police drivers, with PVPs in particular being singled-out for criticism.

Although there were (statistically speaking) more PVA and PVP related news stories printed in the previous year (2001), the news reports from 2002 maintained the pressure on the police to respond, against the backdrop of the very significant rise in the number of PVP-related fatalities during the financial year 2001/02.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2003 saw the *Sunday Express* publish a double-page report under the headline, *Stop Police Car Carnage*, alongside a large photograph of 12 year-old schoolgirl Rachel Sumner who had been killed in an emergency response related incident (Perry: 2003). The article went on to quote Rachel's mother who complained that she still had not received any explanation of the events from the police, who were reluctant to provide information to the newspaper due to the ongoing PCA explanation (Perry: 2003). In the same edition, the *Sunday Express comment* section announced the launch of its campaign, '...to stop innocent people being mown down by police officers in pursuit of criminals' (Daily Express: 2003. 20). Claiming support from John Stalker, ex-Chief Constable of Great Manchester Police, the piece questioned the validity of undertaking risky PVPs to catch criminals when other options to secure an arrest, such as increasing the use of helicopters, would be safer and more effective. Concluding, the comment piece argued that, '[T]he police have been slated time after time for the death and injury they cause with their cars. The time has come for a radical rethink of pursuit by police cars' (Sunday Express: 2003. 20).

Against the backdrop of these critical newspaper reports, televised images of PVP began to proliferate on television during 2003. March 18<sup>th</sup> 2003 saw the launch of the weekly prime-time BBC One ob-doc series title, *Traffic Cops* and a further thirteen episodes of this programme were aired sporadically between March and December 2003. Closely mirroring this development, Sky One began broadcasting *Road Wars* on the 26<sup>th</sup> July 2003 and aired a further five episodes between July and August 2003. Although significant differences exist between the content-type, style and overall tone of the programmes, both *Traffic Cops* and *Road Wars* tended to feature PVPs as a significant proportion of their broadcast material.

As these two TV programmes settled into the television schedules, the court case resulting from the deaths of two officers in August 2002 whilst they attempted to deploy a 'stinger' was reported in May 2003 (Twomey: 2003; Guardian: 2003). In June, another court case was reported in which an officer was given a six-month suspended sentence following an emergency response collision incident that left a mother of three in a coma (Mintowt-Czyz: 2003).

In autumn of 2003, the journal *Policing and Society* published a *Research Note* entitled, *Fatal Pursuit: An Analysis of Police Chases Resulting in Loss of Life or Serious Injury* (Best & Eves: 2003). Due to its publication in a specialist academic journal, this article was not likely to be read by the large readership that could be reasonably expected of an article in the national print media. However, it is worthy of inclusion here because it offers an insight into the potential factors fuelling the rise in PVP-related fatalities. Moreover, the article forms part of the *Fatal Pursuit* research papers series which would be published by the same authors in their capacity as employees of the PCA (Best & Eves: 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005).

Best and Eves (2003) studied 64 PVP events which resulted in 71 fatalities or serious injuries. In the cases studied, none of those injured or killed were police officers. They concluded that almost half of the incidents lasted less than two minutes and noted that post-incident disciplinary action was almost entirely absent from the cases studied, despite many of the incidents contravening ACPO and individual force PVP policies. The authors stated that:

‘The data on the nature of collisions would suggest that the technical training of police drivers is not a significant problem but training and policy around the judicious use of pursuits, and the restriction of circumstances under which they can be undertaken, is imperative in addressing this issue’ (Best & Eves: 2003. 313).

The authors also contended that there was clear evidence of risk-escalation in the driving of the fleeing vehicle, which they argued was caused by the pursuing police vehicle. This assertion challenged the argument that police drivers bear no responsibility for negative pursuit outcomes by virtue of the fact that police vehicles were rarely involved in the resulting collisions (Best & Eves: 2003. 313).

September 15<sup>th</sup> saw the publication of the PCA Annual Report for 2002-03 which contained the latest PVP-related fatality figures. It reported a 27% reduction in the number of PVP-related fatalities when compared to the previous year (2001 – 2002); down from 44 to 31.

However, despite these figures being described as, ‘a welcome fall’, the report also acknowledged that this reduction in PVP-related fatalities had taken place against a backdrop of, ‘considerable public concern about the steep rise in the number of deaths resulting from pursuits by police vehicles (PCA: 2003. 59). The publication of the latest PCA Annual Report and PVP-related fatality figures was not reported in the national print media, although it was reported on the BBC News website the following day (BBC: 2003). In November 2003 the *Daily Mail* reported, under the headline *Brave Police Force Puts Ban on Car Chases*, that Humberside Police were had introduced a, ‘...blanket ban’ on PVPs, opting instead to use their helicopter and ‘stingers’ to safely terminate pursuits, a development that was welcomed by both the PCA and the RAC Foundation (Brooke: 2003.31). There were no reports of other police forces adopting similar policies.

The second series of *Traffic Cops* began airing on BBC One during January of 2004, the six episodes that comprised the second season were broadcast throughout the year, two in April, one in May, one in June and the final episode in December of 2004.

March 2004 saw publication of the updated *Guidelines for the Management of Police Pursuits 2004* (ACPO: 2004) by ACPO, a document that was produced in collaboration with the PCA and superseded the previous guidelines (Lind: 1998). In the foreword the report acknowledges the large rise in PVP-related fatalities and suggests that, '...there may be instances where it may be better to discontinue a pursuit on the grounds of public safety' (ACPO: 2004. 4). This statement sets the overall tone of the guidelines, which ostensibly represented a serious challenge to the discretion available to police drivers.

However, despite containing statements appearing to proscribe particular behaviours or activities, such as establishing solid road-blocks (ACPO: 2004. 13), or using more than two police vehicles in a pursuit (ACPO: 2004. 27), these directives were then significantly undermined by vague caveats referring to 'exceptional circumstances' which are inserted into the guidelines. Nevertheless, the new guidelines did attempt to introduce a more solid tactical element and significantly tighten-up the management of PVPs, introducing the concept of a ground commander (ACPO: 2004. 13) and cautioning officers involved in pursuits or their management that they may have to justify their decision making and tactical rationale in the event of a negative PVP outcome (ACPO: 2004. 9).

February 2004 saw the return of news reports concerned with the negative consequences of emergency response incidents (Stote: 2004; Walker: 2004). These events generating critical headlines which included, *How Police Cause Carnage on our Roads*, with the subsequent report quoting concerned Home Office ministers and other politicians (Mason: 2004).

In March 2004, the PCA was superseded by the IPCC. This handover of responsibility for police complaints delayed the publication of the final *Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority 2003 – 2004* until July 2005. Immediately prior to its dissolution, the PCA simultaneously published two reports, *Following Fatal Pursuit* and *Police Pursuits in Wales*, both of which were to seriously challenge the legitimacy of PVP.

The first of these, entitled *Following Fatal Pursuit* (Best & Eves: 2004a) was an extensive examination of 86 fatal or serious injury incidents which had occurred since the publication of the previous *Fatal Pursuit* report (Best: 2002), involving a variety of police driving activities, including 64 PVPs. The aims of the research were to compare the differences in pursuit policy across the 43 police regions, to examine variations in the quality of post-incident accident reports produced by the police and to look for evidence that lessons had been learned. The findings in these three key areas were highly critical. The report described significant inconsistencies in the pursuit policies across the police regions studied, observing that some of the policies, ‘...appear to have been written in such a way that no police driving behaviour is proscribed in all circumstances’ (Best & Eves: 2004a. 9).

Similar variations were found to exist in the quality of post-incident reports, particular when addressing factors pertaining to the police driver involved in the incidents. The authors argued that:

‘...the provision of information in final reports on the characteristics of police drivers, far less passengers and control room staff, remains so inconsistent and unreliable that attempts at meaningful analysis of risk factors relating to the officers involved are once again not possible’ (Best & Eves: 2004a. 9).

These inconsistencies in pursuit policy and the variability in the quality of post-incident investigations led the authors to conclude that the police would have great difficulty in drawing-out useful institutional lessons from previous incidents (Best & Eves: 2004a. 11). Moreover, their analysis of the case studies discovered that only one third of the vehicles pursued by police drivers were actually stolen, prompting the authors to challenge the police to justify their decision to pursue based upon the often mistaken suspicion that the target vehicle was stolen (Best & Eves: 2004a. 8). The report recommended that a national database of post-incident recommendations should be established, against which the police could be inspected by HMIC (Best & Eves: 2004a. 11).

In addition, the report recommended the codification of the ACPO pursuit guidelines, a new draft of which was currently being formulated, which it was

argued would, ‘...assist in ensuring that the level of standardisation between forces in increased’ (Best & Eves: 2004a. 58).

The second PCA report, *Police Pursuits in Wales: The Results from a One-Year monitoring Exercise in the Four Welsh Police Forces, 2002-2003*, utilised a self-report survey method, this research aimed to demystify PVPs through the production and analysis of data on the frequency and outcomes of all PVPs conducted over a twelve month period across Wales. (Best & Eves: 2004b).

Notwithstanding the obvious methodological limitations of the survey method, which the authors observed was liable to be susceptible to ‘self-presentational bias’ (Best & Eves: 2004b. 28) and potential under-reporting of incidents, the findings of the research proved illuminating. A total of 344 incident summary forms were returned during the study and it was discovered that 21 of the PVP incidents reported were conducted by police drivers trained only to ‘basic or ‘standard’ level. In 55 per cent of cases, there was no tactical consideration made regarding the safe termination of the pursuit, which the authors suggested may be due to the short duration of these events (Best & Eves: 2004b. 6).

Just over 40 percent of the pursuits resulted in an arrest, either at the scene or subsequently. Although the findings of the research were described by the authors as ‘tentative’, the report observed that:

‘The most common outcomes reported were either that the vehicle was abandoned or that the target vehicle managed to escape...there were no reported cases of pursuits terminating because the pursued vehicle ran out of petrol. This further challenges the effectiveness of pursuits as a successful tactic as more than twice the number of incidents were brought to an end by a collision than by the effective use of tactics’ (Best & Eves: 2004b. 7).

The two PCA research studies (Best & Eves: 2004a, 2004b) and the new ACPO pursuit guidelines were not extensively reported in the national print media, although the BBC did produce a short report based on the PCA press conference which launched the research studies (BBC: 2004).

The *Guardian* published a similar article on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March which referenced the PCA reports and detailed how the PCA researchers has approached numerous police forces for information, but none of them had been able to accurately quantify the success of pursuits carried out in their force area (Cowan: 2004).

The second series of Sky One's *Road Wars* was broadcast between June and August 2004, featuring PVP footage as a key component of the programme. In view of calls for improvements in police driver training made by a number of newspapers, there was a certain irony in the way that a pursuit-training accident was reported in the *Daily Express* during September 2004. Under the headlines, *Police Training Stunt Ends in M-way Chaos* (Brooks: 2004a) and *What Happens When Rookie Police Practice on the M-Way* (Brooks: 2004b) the newspaper mockingly reported that the resulting five car pile-up had causes serious damage to three police vehicles and physical injuries to five police officers. Again, it could be argued that this was another case of mixed messages coming from the newspapers. On the one hand they were critical of the lack of police driver training, on the other they were also keen to report instances where training exercises had resulted in injuries to those undertaking them.

2004 represented another difficult year for police drivers. Not only were they under intense media scrutiny which questioned their competence and professionalism, they had also been the focus of critical PCA research which had raised fundamental questions about the justification for pursuits and their approach to reducing the PVP- fatality rate. (Best & Eves: 2004a; 2004b). In 2005 the BBC One flagship ob-doc, *Traffic Cops* began airing its third series on January 17th.



Figure 4.8 – Daily Express. 27<sup>th</sup> January 2005. (Whitehead: 2005a. 1)

The same month, the *Daily Express* ramped-up its campaign against police drivers (see Figure 4.8 above) with the publication on the 27th of January, of a front page headline which read, *Police Drivers Kill Thirty People a Year* (Whitehead: 2005a). Citing figures of uncertain origin, which it was claimed were unearthed by their own special investigation, the report amalgamated fatalities caused by a variety of police driving activities, including PVPs, and observed that, '[T]he police service, the country's foremost campaigner for road safety, is now under increasing pressure to act' (Whitehead: 2005a. 1,6).

Expanding the story onto the inside pages, the report produced a digest of recent cases and presented ‘...damning statistics’ which chronicled the recent rise in fatalities caused by police drivers under the headline, *When Police Cars are Lethal Weapons* (Whitehead: 2005a. 6-7).

The following day, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of January, the Daily Express front page lead again attacked the police under the headline, *Stop Police Car Deaths* (Whitehead & Walker: 2005). The story detailed how Liberal Democrat politician, Paul Tyler had raised the issue in the Commons after seeing the Daily Express front page from the previous day. Praising the newspaper, Mr Tyler stated that:

‘Every bereaved family and every potential victim owes a debt of gratitude to the Daily Express team. No one underestimates the importance of catching criminals but it cannot be at the expense of innocent drivers’ and pedestrians’ lives’ (Whitehead & Walker: 2005. 1).

David Davies, the shadow Home Secretary was also said to be concerned about the fatality rate and the Home Office were said to be considering a plan to issue revised guidelines to police drivers in light of the revelations uncovered by the *Daily Express* special investigation. Again, the story was expanded further on the inside pages, featuring the banner headline, *No Police Chase is Worth Price of a Life* (Whitehead & Walker: 2005. 8-9). In February 2005 the journal, *Criminal Justice* published an article by the former PCA researchers Best and Eves, which posed the question, *Why Are There no Lessons Learned from Road Traffic Incidents Involving the Police?* (Best & Eves: 2005).

Although not likely to have the same circulation, reach or potential impact as a newspaper article, this research utilised case studies to examine the apparent lack of post-incident disciplinary action taken against officers and the subsequent failure to learn lessons from both PVAs and PVAAs. The research concluded that the current system of regulating, managing and learning from previous events was ineffective and therefore not likely to yield a reduction in the frequency of these incidents.

The third series of *Road Wars* began airing on the 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2005 on Sky One. In contrast, the BBC's *Inside Out* documentary series screened a programme entitled *Police Crashes* on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March which focussed on West Midlands Police and featured interviews with those affected by PVAs and PVPs, including Dennis Homer (BBC: 2005). Nick Hardwick, the chairman of the newly established IPCC wasted little time in entering the discussion around PVAs and PVPs, suggesting that a debate was required around public expectations of police emergency response times (Lee: 2005) and calling for the tightening-up of PVP management (Perry & Tominey: 2005). However, in spite of a 500% increase in police PVAs over the previous decade, the Home Office denied any plans to launch a public enquiry and referred journalists to ACPO, who promptly referred journalists back to the Home Office, resulted in accusations of 'passing the buck' between the two bodies (Perry & Tominey: 2005).

In May 2005 Jan Berry, the chairman of the Police Federation, called for all pursuit vehicles to be fitted with IDRs and pointed to wide variations in the training given to officers (Whitehead: 2005b). Ms Berry argued that, '[T]he consequences of sending out police drivers on pursuits when they have not been given the proper training and equipment to do so safely are incredibly serious. A car becomes a weapon when it is put into the hands of someone who has not been given the skills and ability they need' (Whitehead: 2005b. 17). More critical news reports followed, including another double-page attack in the *Sunday Express* on the 22<sup>nd</sup> May, headlined *I Could Have Died in Police Crash So Why Are 999 Men above the Law?*, in which the newspaper called on the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, '...to sort out this mess before there are more deaths on the road' (Tominey & Perry: 2005. 6).

The *Sunday Express* maintained the pressure by running a phone-poll with the question, 'Should the Home Office issue tougher guidelines for police driver training?' This highly unscientific survey, perhaps inevitably, returned a verdict of 97% in favour (*Sunday Express*: 2005. 73).

Owing to the handover from the PCA to the IPCC, the publication of the PCA Annual Report for the period 2003-2004 had been subject to a delay.

This had also obviously interrupted the publication of the latest PVA and PVP statistics which were usually contained in the PCA Annual Report. However, the figures for 2003-2004 were eventually published in June 2005 by the police minister Hazel Blears in response to a parliamentary question (Guardian: 2005). The data showed that:

‘The number of people killed or injured in police car-chase and emergency call collisions rose by 60% last year...there were 2,015 casualties in 2003-04, up from 1,259 the previous year. Among these, 31 people were killed and 138 were seriously injured, up from 22 and 106 respectively’ (Steele: 2005. 1).

Unfortunately, these figures failed to disaggregate fatalities caused by PVPs from those caused by other police driving activities. However, the substantial rise in the number of recorded injuries over the period 2003-04 may be partly attributable to the introduction of the Police Reform Act 2002, which placed, ‘...a statutory duty on police forces to refer to the IPCC incidents in which there is reason to believe that police contact may have caused or contributed to a death of serious injury’ (Docking et al: 2007).

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of July 2005, an IPCC press release announced their intention, with the full support of ACPO and the Home Office, to conduct an 18-month long, ‘...major study on fatal police driving accidents’ (IPCC: 2005b. 1). The *Sunday Express* quoted an IPCC Commissioner who stated that:

‘We are not going to pull any punches on this. When we find fault we will highlight it. We are not looking for scalps and we are not saying the police are entirely at fault. We want to take on board their views too’ (Perry: 2005. 16).

When the delayed *PCA Annual Report* for 2003-2004 was finally published on the 21<sup>st</sup> of July 2005, it revealed that 29 PVP-related fatalities had been recorded for the period covered, along with 9 emergency response fatalities and 1 death resulting from a standard driving incident (PCA: 2005). Clearly there is a significant variance between the figures presented by the PCA and those published by the police minister in June.

This may be due to differences in recording methodologies, timescales covered or other unknown factors. Broadly speaking, the PCA figures are potentially more useful due to the disaggregation of PVP fatalities from the other possible types; however, there is no practicable means of ascertaining the validity of either data set. Notwithstanding these statistical anomalies, these figures were quickly superseded by the publication of the first IPCC Annual Report in November 2005, which contained data for the period 2004-2005 (IPCC: 2005a). The report stated:

‘[I]n 2004-05, there were 44 road traffic fatalities resulting from 43 police-related road traffic incidents. 23 of the 44 road traffic fatalities involved a vehicle which was being pursued, or had recently been pursued by police. Six of the fatalities involved a police vehicle responding to an emergency call. *The remaining 15 resulted from other police activity, such as a collision following an individual failing to stop when requested to do so by officers*’ (IPCC: 2005a. 33. Emphasis added).

The classification of these 15 fatalities is somewhat confusing as it is unclear if these incidents would have been included in the PVP-related category under the old PCA classification process. Perhaps the IPCC did not include these fatalities in the PVP-related category because there was no attempted pursuit involved. Certainly, more detail regarding the categorisation method and rationale used to classify these 15 fatalities would be helpful here. In keeping with the practice of the PCA Annual Reports, the IPCC figures did not present statistics relating to the number of injuries caused by police vehicles. In January 2006 the *Daily Express* published an article criticising the apparent increase in the use of high-performance vehicles by the police (Whitehead: 2006).

PVP-related fatalities continued to be reported throughout the first half of the year (Ward: 2006; BBC: 2006; Perry: 2006; Armstrong: 2006). January 2006 also saw the airing of series four of the ITV programme *POCA* albeit in a truncated form; featuring only seven episodes as opposed to the nineteen shown in the previous series, all of which were aired in January and February 2006.

However, the third series of *Car Wars* (BBC One), the fourth series of both *Traffic Cops* (BBC One) and *Road Wars* (Sky One) ensured that PVPs were a common sight on both U.K. terrestrial and satellite television throughout 2006.

The IPCC Annual Report for the period 2005-06 was published on the 24<sup>th</sup> July. Statistically, it reported that, despite a reduction in the overall number of PVP incidents, a number of these had led to multiple fatalities. Therefore, there were 32 PVP-fatalities reported for the period 2005-06 (IPCC: 2006. 22). With one exception (Daily Mail: 2006), the second half of 2006 was characterised by a marked reduction in the frequency of PVP-related news reports. The criticism of police drivers appeared to widen-out, taking in a variety of motoring-related issues. These included criticism of a police driver who escaped punishment after he was caught travelling at 159mph while apparently testing the handling of a new police vehicle (Parker: 2006; Morris: 2006) and another officer who was similarly let-off after speeding to collect a Chinese takeaway (Brooke: 2006).

2007 began with criticism of a different kind for the police. Pursuing motorcycles had become increasingly undesirable; the obvious vulnerability of the rider increased the risk of injury in the case of a collision and had been noted in various PVP-management and regulatory reports (Best & Eves: 2004a.25; ACPO: 2004. 27; Docking et al: 2007.31). Therefore, when presented with suspects riding motorcycles, police drivers were naturally reticent to pursue, especially if the riders were not wearing helmets. This 'non-pursuit' led to criticism in several news reports during 2007, prompting headlines such as, *Police Blasted on Chase Policy* (BBC: 2007) and, *Cops: Don't Chase Bike Yobs – They Might Fall!* (Neil: 2007).

This was far from a new development, a similar report from 2006 asked, *Is This Country Going Mad?* (Evans: 2006) and in 2005, the Sunday Express published a story stating, *Mini-bikes 'Too Dangerous for Police to Chase': Youngsters Could Hurt Themselves Trying to Get Away, Force Tells Its Officers.* (Buchanan: 2005).

These stories illustrate the difficulty in satisfying the competing and often contradictory demands placed on the police.

Newspapers often publish reports critical of the increase in PVP-related fatalities, only to condemn police drivers later for not pursuing particularly vulnerable suspects on motorcycles. This concession to the safety and well-being of those being pursued was somewhat at-odds with the images of PVP proliferating on television. On the BBC, the 4<sup>th</sup> series of the *Car Wars* aired six episodes between April and May 2007, while *Traffic Cops* series five aired 8 episodes starting in June and series two of the BBC's *Sky Cops* broadcasted 11 episodes between July and October. However, Sky One's flagship police ob-doc, *Road Wars* had been significantly expanded, with series 5 now comprising twenty episodes which were shown from May 2007 onwards. ITV's offering, *POCA* aired its 5<sup>th</sup> series, totalling 28 episodes between September 2007 and December 2008.

Away from these mass-mediated images of motorised policing, condemnation and criticism of PVP was manifested in negative news reports which continued during 2007. A taxi driver and young female were killed in April 2006 when a pursued vehicle hit them (Gill: 2007a). In May, the *Daily Express* reported that after a five-year legal battle, a £3 million pound compensation award was finally granted to a woman crippled by a police vehicle during an emergency response incident in 2002 (Blacklock: 2007). Also in May, the *Daily Mail* reported details of a highly unusual case in which an ex-WPC led traffic officers on a 130mph pursuit before ramming police vehicles, assaulting two police officers and refusing a breath test (Brooke: 2007). The newspaper was highly critical of, what they argued was a lenient punishment, despite the judge described her driving during the incident as, '...just about the worst...I can remember dealing with' (Brooke: 2007. 1).

The IPCC *Annual Report* for 2006-07 was published on the 23<sup>rd</sup> July (IPCC: 2007) and unusually did not contain any data relating to PVAs or PVPs for the period covered by the report. This omission was only partially addressed by the publication on September 18<sup>th</sup>, of the IPCC research report entitled, *Police Road Traffic Incidents: A Study of Cases Involving Serious and Fatal Injuries* (Docking et al: 2007) which contained partially complete PVP-related fatality statistics for the period 2006/07 (Docking et al: 2007. 64).

In the introduction, the report acknowledged that:

‘Road traffic incidents (RTIs) involving the police are a source of much concern for both the general public and the police service...these incidents undermine public confidence in the police, cause suffering and pain for those involved and take up significant amounts of public resources’ (Docking et al: 2007. 2).

Comprising eight distinct chapters, this detailed research aimed to examine a wide-range of factors around both PVAs and PVA, including data trends, environmental factors, management, data collection and retention, driver training, post-incident investigation reports and criminal justice outcomes.

The report analysed 275 RTI case-studies which resulted in serious or fatal injuries, sourced from referrals to the IPCC between April 2005 and September 2006, of which 192 cases were pursuit-related. It discovered that, only half of the police drivers involved in these serious or fatal injury cases were trained to an advanced level (Docking et al: 2007. 19) and the report also found evidence suggesting that inappropriate police vehicles were being used to conduct PVPs (Docking et al: 2007. 20). Moreover, the report discovered that tactical options for safely terminating PVPs were not considered in 64% of the cases in their study (Docking et al: 2007. 31). Echoing the recommendations made in previous research (Best and Eves: 2004a. 58), Docking et al (2007. 57) asserted the desirability of updating and codifying the ACPO Pursuit Guidelines (2004) to bring the issue of police RTIs up to parity with other types of deaths following police contact, such as firearm incidents or deaths in custody.

Concluding, the research observed that:

‘There is evidence from our study of unnecessary risk taking where there may have been alternative resolutions. Examples of this include inappropriate police vehicles conducting the pursuit, and pursuits of disqualified drivers who might be arrested at a later date’ (Docking et al: 2007. 56).

This contention, that the report had uncovered evidence of unnecessary risk-taking during PVPs, was extensively reported in the national print-media (Siddique: 2007; Verkaik: 2007; Macfarlane: 2007; Gill: 2007b; Dodd: 2007). However, in addition to the findings around the issue of risk-taking by officers, the report was also highly critical of the lack of training provision given to officers engaging in pursuits. In a *Times* newspaper article published on the 19<sup>th</sup> September (see figure 4.9 below) this lack of training was singled-out, with the clear inference that training failures may be responsible for fatalities during PVPs. (O'Neill & Goode: 2007).

## Half police drivers whose chases end in death are not fully trained

► Officers are taking 'unnecessary risks'  
► Watchdog calls for tighter restrictions

**Sean O'Neill, Mark Goode**

Only half of police drivers involved in high-speed chases that ended in death or serious injury were fully trained in pursuit, an official watchdog reported yesterday.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission said that police officers took "unnecessary risks" when chasing suspects. "There is a fine balance to be struck in controlling crime by dealing with someone who is driving recklessly, and increasing the risk to public safety by engaging in dangerous high-speed pursuit," the IPCC's report concluded.

"If an officer decides to pursue someone there is the risk that the person will drive more recklessly to escape and therefore present greater danger to themselves and others on the road."

The commission called for a mandatory code of practice for officers involved in pursuits in an effort to cut a rising toll of deaths and injuries.

Its report was published 24 hours after five people died in a head-on collision on the M4 in South Wales, apparently caused when a car drove in the wrong direction along the motorway to escape a police pursuit. The police did not follow it.

Three young men in the car died, as did the occupants of the vehicle they hit, James and Bridget Stafford, both 70, who were returning to Surrey from a holiday in Ireland.

About 40 people die each year in road accidents involving police vehicles. The report studied 275 incidents, resulting in 115 deaths, which were referred to the IPCC between April 2004 and September 2006. Although the number of chases in which someone dies is small compared with the thousands of times that vehicles are pursued each year, road accidents are the largest single cause of deaths involving the police.

The IPCC report painted a picture of young men in their twenties – often under the influence of drink and drugs – being chased by male police officers, half of whom had not had advanced driver training. Those being chased were often suspected of motor-

ing offences. In one incident highlighted in the report, a Kent police officer chased a motorcycle because its rider and pillion passenger were not wearing crash helmets. The incident ended with the police car hitting the motorcycle, whose 15-year-old rider was taken to hospital with a fractured collarbone.

The report said: "The most common way for the pursuit to end was for the pursued vehicle to collide either with a wall or tree, an unrelated vehicle, or street furniture."

The IPCC recommended that all police vehicles be fitted with data recorders and that some types of police vehicle, including vans and 4x4s, should not be used for chasing suspects because of their limited handling capabilities.

The report also recommended that police should not pursue people on motorcycles or mini-motorcycles, except where a serious crime had been committed.

However, figures in the report show that 28 per cent of the vehicles pursued by police had been stolen. It also said that 60 per cent of drivers stopped after high-speed chases were

riders is much more vulnerable than a driver or occupant of a car." He said that pursuit was a necessary police tactic but a high-risk one which had to be used carefully.

Mr Hardwick added: "Many of the police pursuits we deal with are of short duration and involve split-second decisions by officers. This emphasises the need for strong and clear regulation of this area of policing."

Andy Holt, Assistant Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, said the report had led to the Association of Chief Police Officers initiating a review of its guidelines on pursuits.

Tony McNulty, the Police Minister, said: "The ability to pursue is a useful and possibly vital tactic for the police. To lose that ability to pursue would be very damaging. However, the IPCC's work shows that pursuits must be conducted as safely as possible."



**24**  
The average age of driver of a car pursued by police  
Source: IPCC

The scene of Monday's crash at junction 25 of the M4, near Newport, South Wales, where five people were killed

Figure 4.9. The *Times*. 19<sup>th</sup> September 2007. (O'Neill & Goode: 2007: 21).

On the same day as the IPCC published their latest research (Docking et al: 2007), a particularly horrific PVP incident was also being reported in the national print-media (see Figure 4.10 below). Police chased a vehicle for five miles, having initially attempted to stop it on the grounds of 'suspicious activity' (Twomey: 2007. 27). When the fleeing vehicle entered the wrong side of the M4 motorway, the pursuit was called off (Linge: 2007a).

However, after travelling at high speed for approximately one and a half miles down the wrong carriageway, the fleeing car hit another vehicle head-on, resulting in the deaths of five people and very serious injuries being sustained by a sixth. (Morris: 2007).

**Star NEWS** DAILY STAR, Tuesday, September 18, 2007 15

## Youths drove wrong way down motorway

Picture: MIUW EVANS

MANGLED: A couple in the Volvo died instantly in the head-on smash



# FIVE DIE IN HIGH-SPEED COP CHASE

by NADINE LINGE

**FIVE people died in a head-on crash when a suspected stolen car fleeing police was driven the wrong way down a motorway early yesterday.**

A Ford Mondeo with four youths inside smashed into a Volvo, killing the couple inside it. The Mondeo driver had managed to dodge oncoming traffic for a mile and a half before crashing at more than 70mph.

**Horrified**

Traffic officers in a marked patrol car had been tailing the car for five miles after they tried to stop it. But they held back when the car sped on to the M4 at Newport, south Wales, and radioed for help. The lad at the wheel drove down the slip road to join the eastbound carriageway, then veered west into oncoming traffic. Detectives were

last night waiting to question an 18-year-old survivor who has fractures. One horrified witness said: "The cars were just mangled. It is amazing one person managed to survive." The youths, including two brothers aged 18 and 20, had allegedly

been in trouble for car crime. A pal said: "They'd drive circuits around south late at night." The two off-duty officers will be quizzed by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

**WRECK:** The horrific scene on the M4 yesterday

It's the biggest ever

NatWest Mortgage Challenge

## Lower new mortgage repayments or £1000!



If we can't lower your monthly mortgage repayments with our two year Base Rate Tracker mortgage we'll give you £1,000. For Halifax, Abbey, Lloyds TSB, CeRG, Barclays and Woolwich customers whose deal is ending or who are free to move their mortgage from these lenders without incurring an Early Repayment Charge. Conditions apply. Details in branch.

**You can't lose!**

Figure 4.10. Daily Star 18<sup>th</sup> September. (Linge 2007: 15).

This period, mid-September 2007, can be seen as one characterised by a peak in official concern around the issue of PVPs due to the combined impact of the particularly egregious Newport PVP incident and the publication of the IPCC report (Docking et al :2007).

Both events produced a large number of news reports which were highly critical of PVPs and against this backdrop of media-interest, ACPO announced its intention to review the Pursuit Guidelines it had produced in 2004 (ACPO: 2004). Curiously, there was a lull in PVP-related newspaper stories published during the remainder of 2007 with only an emergency response fatality reported in November (Riches: 2007). 2008 began with the publication of the ACPO authored document, *the Management of Police Pursuits Guidance* (ACPO: 2008). The foreword stated that:

‘The number of people killed and injured in police pursuits still remains unacceptably high...[P]olice pursuits are still subject to intense scrutiny by both the IPCC and the media, and rightly so. This revised guidance has been drafted to take account of the recently published IPCC report on Police Road Traffic Incidents and incorporates all the recommendations contained in that report...forces that do not implement this guidance will find it more difficult to defend the actions of their officers in the event of death or injury following a pursuit. (ACPO: 2008. 4).

PVP-related news reports were scarce in the first months of 2008. In January a news report detailed how a young car thief had been trapped under a police vehicle as he tried to escape following a pursuit (Daily Mail: 2008). However, a cluster of three more serious incidents were about to reignite the concern over PVPs. The first of these cases was reported in March following the death of a woman when her car was hit by a fleeing 4x4 vehicle being pursued by an unmarked police car (Hills: 2008). The incident left a two year-old boy fighting for his life (Moult: 2008) and seriously injured three others (Fagge: 2008). The gruesome images of the wrecked vehicles contained in the news reports were a disturbing testament to the chaos described by the eye-witnesses.

The second incident took place in April when police became involved in the pursuit of a £120,000 Bentley Continental (Daily Mail: 2008b). The PVP resulted in the Bentley being destroyed along with three police vehicles and three teenage passengers and five police officers were injured in the subsequent pile-up (Neil: 2008).

The third case centred upon the death of schoolgirl Hayley Adamson in May 2008. Although not actually a PVP, the incident and its aftermath were a public relations disaster for Northumbria Police. PC John Dougal was driving a marked patrol car when a vehicle travelling in the opposite direction triggered his Automatic Number Plate Recognition system (ANPR), at which point he turned the patrol car around and accelerated to a very high-speed in an attempt to catch-up with the vehicle (IPCC: 2008). As she was attempting to cross the road, Hayley Adamson was killed instantly by the patrol car, which was estimated to have been travelling at between 74 and 94mph in a 30mph zone without its lights or siren activated (IPCC: 2009a). At the scene of the collision, Hayley's boyfriend, who was hysterically shouting at PC Dougal and other officers in attendance, was shot with a Tazer weapon and the situation turned ugly with locals throwing missiles at the police vehicles and threatening to start a riot (Humphreys: 2008). The case produced damaging headlines, including *100mph Cops Wipe Out Girl...then Shoot Boyfriend* (Lawton: 2008a).

In the aftermath of the incident, two WPCs were disciplined, one for referring to Ms Adamson as a 'scumbag' (Armstrong: 2010), and the other for inappropriate behaviour at the subsequent court case of PC Dougal (Daily Mail: 2010a). These damaging revelations were aired on the BBC's regional news and current affairs programme, *Inside Out* (BBC: 2010a). In the subsequent independent IPCC investigation, it was revealed that the IDR fitted to PC Dougal's patrol car had failed to record data verifying the use of emergency equipment and the speed of the vehicle at the time of the collision (Daily Mail: 2010a). It also transpired that the ANPR database had been incorrect in flagging-up the suspect vehicle that PC Dougal, an advanced driver, was attempting to catch-up (Wainwright: 2009).

PC Dougal was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving in April 2009 and sentenced to three years imprisonment (BBC: 2009a). During the trial pictures captured from PC Dougal's in-car video recorded system showing the final seconds before impact were reproduced in the national print-media (Byrne: 2009; Perrie: 2009).

In a final twist, Northumbria Police successfully nominated themselves for a Chartered Institute of Public Relations *Pride Award* in 2009 for their handling of the Hayley Adamson incident and its aftermath, a development which was criticised as highly insensitive by the Adamson family (Telegraph: 2010) and some newspapers (Daily Mail: 2010b; Metro: 2010). Although not PVP-related, this case and its aftermath generated a huge amount of negative publicity around the issue of police driver competence. It also brought into sharp focus, the limitations of the technology used by the police, notably the ANPR system and IDRs which both failed in their primary tasks.

In July, the latest PVP-fatality data was released as part of the IPCC *Annual Report 2007-08* (IPCC: 2008). The data showed that 17 people had been killed in PVP-related events for the period covered, a small decrease on the number for the previous financial year (2006-07), which stood at 19. However, evidence was emerging which suggested that the ACPO guidance on PVPs (ACPO: 2008) was still not being nationally implemented or understood.

In August, eight police officers were suspended from carrying out driving duties after eight police vehicles and a force helicopter were involved in a 50-mile PVP of a motorcyclist who died in a subsequent collision (Daily Mail: 2008c). Following the incident the IPCC concluded that misconduct charges should be brought against 7 officers; four for failing to heed a control-room order to terminate the pursuit and three for failing, ‘...to adhere to the rules of engagement by being in a convoy behind the motorcycle’ (IPCC:2010. 1). As a result, one officer appeared in court charged with dangerous driving, but the case collapsed and he was cleared of the charge (Manchester Evening News: 2010). Furthermore, the IPCC had little choice but to reverse its misconduct charges. Elaborating on the reasoning behind this decision, the IPCC stated, that:

‘...the force’s own internal review of a series of pursuits and the evidence given by police officers at the inquest showed complete confusion about the application and understanding of the pursuit policy.

In particular it has become clear that the Greater Manchester Pursuit policy with regard to gaining authorisation for pursuits may well have been unworkable. A widespread practice would appear to have developed and been accepted by senior officers of presumed authorisation to conduct a pursuit, rather than the requirement to gain authorisation from the control room supervisor. Therefore misconduct decisions with regard to a failure to gain authorisation could no longer be substantiated' (IPCC: 2010a. 2).

This case shared some similarities with another PVP-fatality inquest resulting from the pursuit of a motorcyclist in July 2007 by two officers who were trained only to the basic level. Despite clearly breaching their force policy, which the officers claimed they were unaware of at the time of the incident, the coroner ruled that the breach was not a contributory factor in the death of the motorcyclist but was said to be 'dismayed' at their lack of knowledge regarding the rules around pursuits (Daily Mail: 2008d). In October, two police officers were cleared of causing death by dangerous driving following the death of a pensioner during a police training exercise in November 2006 (Tozer: 2008). Having found one of the drivers guilty of the lesser charge of dangerous driving, the jury passed a note to the trial judge accusing Lancashire Police of 'institutional complacency', in view of their poor management of the training exercise (Carter: 2008. 1).

Over the course of two-hours in November, four people died in two separate PVPs in Greater Manchester (Broster: 2008; Wainwright: 2008) and four more died in December when their car crashed into a takeaway during a PVP in Bradford (Weaver: 2008; Lawton: 2008). In spite of these horrific incidents and the negative publicity surrounding police drivers in the news-media, 2008 saw a glut of television programmes featuring PVPs as a component of their content being aired. Established programmes such as *Road Wars* and *Traffic Cops* were both now into their 6<sup>th</sup> series.

As was the case in 2007, *Road Wars* (Sky One) aired 20 new episodes in 2008 and *Traffic Cops* (BBC One) almost doubled its episode count in 2008 to 15. *POCA* (ITV) also increased its episode count in 2008 to 28.

In addition, 2008 saw the launch of a new series title on Channel 5, *Police Interceptors* which aired 14 episodes during 2008. The first PVP-related news report of 2009 was published in February and concerned a possible technological solution to the problem of PVP, involving the use of satellite technology to remotely disable the engine of a fleeing vehicle (Groves: 2009). The report went on to state that Kent and Gloucestershire police had invested in large anti-vehicle nets that could be fired at fleeing vehicle to disable them. However, despite the satellite immobilisation system being described by Liberal Democrat transport spokesman Norman Baker as, ‘...an idea with great potential’, there is no evidence that either of these technologies have ever been utilised.

In March, the Metropolitan Police Forces’ PVP policy was subject to excoriating criticism during a coroner’s inquest into the death of motorcyclist Lexy Williams killed during a pursuit in January 2007 which reached speeds of 124mph on one of London’s busiest roads (Taylor: 2009). Giving evidence, some officers were critical of the PVP guidance they were expected to follow, describing it as, ‘...cumbersome and confusing’ (Taylor: 2009). There was no evidence of wrong-doing prior to the pursuit being initiated, but officers suspected that Mr Lexy was riding a stolen motorbike simply because they thought that its number plates looked too new (Lowe: 2009). The coroner was critical of the high-speeds reached during the pursuit and the fact that it was continued in spite of a lack of helicopter support and the cordoning-off of the incident scene which blocked entry to an ambulance and the delivery of medical treatment for 20 minutes (Suthenthiran: 2009. 1).

Delivering a narrative verdict, the coroner concluded that:

‘What comes out of this inquest is that the [PVP] regulations are complex, contradictory and unworkable and must be discarded in favour of a new version that sets out a threshold test. I think this will save many lives’ (Taylor: 2009. 1).

In a follow-up article in a local newspaper, the critical comments made by the coroner were both reproduced and echoed by the mother of Lexy Williams, before the article concluded by stating that the IPCC were persisting with their aim of having the ACPO Pursuit Guidelines (ACPO: 2008) codified into law (Lowe: 2009).

In response, ‘...the Home Secretary commissioned the National Police Improvement Agency to produce a [draft] Code of Practice on the management of Police Pursuits’ (Wired.gov: 2010).

The IPCC *Annual Report* was published in July 2009 and perhaps unsurprisingly due to the number of multiple-fatality incidents towards the end of 2009, the data for 2008-09 contained in the report showed that there were 22 PVP-related deaths during this period (IPCC: 2009b), an increase of 5 over the previous year. Speaking after the release of the report (IPCC: 2009b), the IPCC chairman:

‘...contrasted progress on deaths in police custody with the deteriorating figures for police pursuit fatalities...in the case of deaths in custody, there was a strict procedure to assess what had gone wrong following every death, and individuals were held to account if necessary [but] such stringent procedures had yet to be introduced in the area of police pursuits’ (BBC: 2009b. 1).

The first half of 2009 was characterised by a marked absence of PVP-related news reports in the print-media, with the notable exception of a case from April in which a teenager was killed during a PVP after he stole his father’s high-powered Mercedes sports car which was widely reported (Narain: 2009; Mahoney: 2009; Roberts: 2009; Ashford: 2009; BBC: 2009c). During August, two pedestrians were killed when a vehicle mounted a pavement in Bradford during a PVP lasting 75 seconds (Daily Express: 2009a; Tozer & Brooke: 2009), two women were killed when a fleeing vehicle collided with their car during a 60-second PVP near Leeds (Lawton: 2009), and the body of a missing girl was found on the back-seat of vehicle following a PVP in Wales (Daily Express: 2009b; Fallon: 2009; Wall: 2009). Another pedestrian was killed during a PVP when a fleeing vehicle mounted the curb in October (Daily Mail: 2009).

In November 2009, the *Daily Express* published an article under the headline, *Police Car Smashes Cost us £22,000 a Day*, which pointed out that PVAs and PVPs had resulted in the writing-off of 500 police vehicles between 2008-09 (Ingham: 2009).

As was the case in 2008, police drivers conducting PVPs continued to occupy a highly-visible role in the television schedules during 2009. *Road Wars* (Sky One) series seven and eight straddled 2009, airing 15 episodes and *Traffic Cops* (BBC One) broadcast 6 episodes. *Police Interceptors* (Channel 5) also returned for a second series comprising six episodes and a 'best of' compilation programme.

January 2010 saw the publication of two news reports, one detailing the death of a teenage pedestrian during a PVP (Daily Express: 2010), and the other recounting the macabre case of a couple who were burnt to death when their vehicle was struck by the fleeing car during a PVP (Dawar: 2010). In March, the National Police Improvement Agency produced a *Consultation Draft of the Codes of Practice on the Management of Police Pursuits* (NPIA: 2010). The draft codes, which were based on the guidelines produced by ACPO in 2008 (ACPO: 2008), were laid out in document implicitly addressed towards Chief Constables with the aim of spelling out their responsibilities regarding the training and management of pursuit resources, PVP data collection, inter-force cooperation, the development of PVP tactics and post-incident transparency and accountability (NPIA: 2010).

The IPCC *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts* for 2009/10 was published in July and in the foreword, the chairman Nick Hardwick spoke of his continued desire to see the codification of the ACPO Pursuit Guidelines (ACPO: 2008) in spite of a changeover in government following the U.K. general election of 2010 (IPCC: 2010b. 7). The report did not contain any data regarding the number of PVP-related fatalities, but this information was later published as part of the *Deaths During or Following Police Contact* statistics in December 2010 which showed that there were 19 PVP-related deaths during the financial year 2009/10 (Grace: 2010). Addressing the Superintendents Association during September 2010, before the improving fatality data was released, Supt Alan Greene expressed concern at the number of civilian casualties caused by police drivers.

He was also extremely critical of what he argued was a generally poor standard of police driver training, attributable in his view to ACPO not appointing a lead on driver standards (Daily Mail: 2010; Bloxham: 2010).

More criticism surfaced in August, in the form of news reports which highlighted the refusal of some police drivers to pursue motorbike riders, a situation prompted by the theft of three motorcycles from a showroom in Greater Manchester by helmetless thieves who were allowed to escape (Tozer: 2010; BBC: 2010b).

2010 was another pivotal year in the history of concern around PVPs. Work had begun on codifying the *ACPO Pursuit Guidelines* (ACPO: 2008) and the PVP-related fatality figures were beginning to show a steady and persistent decline.


Furthermore, 2010 had also been characterised by a significant reduction in the frequency of negative PVP-centred reports in the national print-media (see table 3.1). In contrast to this reduction in visibility, more positive images of PVPs continued to proliferate on television during 2010, albeit at a lower rate than was seen in the previous two years. *POCA* (ITV) aired its final four episodes and *Traffic Cops* along with its sister programme, *Motorway Cops* (BBC One) broadcast eleven episodes and *Police Interceptors* (Channel 5) returned with 15 episodes during 2010.

Despite fatal PVP-related incidents being reported in January (BBC: 2011), February (Daily Mail: 2011) and April (Carter: 2011), 2011 was characterised by a continuation of the low-rate in the frequency of PVP-related news reports.

Approximately seven years after it was first suggested by Best & Eves (2004a), on the 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2011, the codification of the *Codes of Practice on the Management of Police Pursuits* (NPIA: 2010) was announced by Policing Minister Nick Herbert, a development that was welcomed by Tom Davies, the IPCC specialist Commissioner on PVPs (IPCC: 2011). Based upon the draft produced by the NPIA in 2010 (NPIA: 2010), the now statutory *Code of Practice on the Management of Police Pursuits* placed Chief Constables under a legal obligation to adhere to the *ACPO Pursuit Guidelines* (ACPO: 2008). This development is a suitable point at which to conclude this historical analysis of the 'Chronology of Concern'.

However, it is perhaps noteworthy that in spite of the input of both the IPCC and NPIA, the new statutory rules of engagement on PVPs were predominantly influenced by the guidelines produced by ACPO; a body which floats free of the normal mechanisms of police accountability or democratic oversight (Rowe: 2004. 125) and lacks the necessary legal or constitutional basis to enforce its recommendations (Emsley: 1986. 185).

The IPCC Annual Report 2010/11 was published in July 2011 and alongside various case studies outlining their work holding officers to account in post-PVP proceedings, the report sketched-out its involvement in the process leading to codification of the ACPO Guidance (ACPO 2008). The latest, *Deaths During or Following Police Contact* data was also released in July 2011 and it showed that 13 people were killed during PVPs over the financial year 2010/11 (Grace: 2011), falling by one to 12 for the following year 2011/12 (IPCC: 2015). The PVP-fatality figures produced by the PCA and the IPCC between 1997 /98 and 2011 / 12 are reproduced in Figure 4.11.



**Figure 4.11. PCA / IPCC PVP-Related Fatalities 1997/98 - 2011/21.**

(Data Sourced from PCA: 2001; PCA: 2002; Docking et al: 2007; IPCC 2015).

The downward trajectory of PVP-related fatalities is clearly visible, as are the peaks in 2001/02 and 2005/05. These peaks correspond with the media interest in PVPs and in a less-linear fashion, the concern expressed by the various police oversight bodies (they are 'slower moving' than the print media, generally taking longer to produce reports or otherwise react).

In the following chapter, we shall look for evidence that this concern has been manifested in a sample of 'car-chase TV' products.

## CHAPTER 5 – FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS.

### Introduction

As was detailed in Chapter 3 ('Methodology'), a (TA) exercise was conducted in order to identify the presence or otherwise of themes which would be best suited to answering the research questions. In the following section, 'Findings', I present a series of tables which show the results of the TA along with some brief observations around their frequency, chronological spread and comparison between the different *series titles*.

The next section 'Analysis of Findings' will examine a number of more detailed examples of the themes as they are manifested in the data with the aim of drawing out issues of relevance to the research questions.

As was examined in Chapter 3 ('Methodology'), the following themes were deemed to be the most appropriate in relation to the research questions:

- PVP Causes Danger.
- PVP Minimises Danger.
- Public in Danger.
- Cops in Danger.
- Suspects (& their occupants) in Danger.
- Danger of Suspect Escaping.
- Police Protect the Public.
- Management.
- Adherence to Policy.
- Training.
- Teamwork.
- Skills.
- Enjoyment Cops.
- Excitement Suspects.
- Arrest Inevitable.

## Thematic Analysis - Findings

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect	Police Protect the	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
1993	1.1			X				X				X				
	1.2											X				X
	1.3															
	1.4															
	1.5															
	1.6	X		X	X								X			
	1.7											X				X
	1.8															
1994	2.1															
	2.2															
	2.4															
	2.5											X				X
	2.6															
Total	13 PVPs	1	--	2	1	--	---	1	--	--	--	4	1	--	--	3

**Table 5.1. Police Stop. TA Findings. VHS Video (1993 – 1994).**

Many of the themes found later in the data set were not well represented or are completely absent from the material featured in *Police Stop* (see table 5.1). Of the 13 PVP vignettes represented in the sample, only 5 had discernible themes according to the analysis method used. *Public in Danger* was identified twice while *Cops in Danger*, *PVP Causes Danger* and *Police Protect the Public* were all identified only once. This absence of themes can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, the commentary and inter-police dialogue present in *Police Stop* is extremely sparse and as a consequence of this situation, there is very little to analyse.

The video material is therefore left to 'speak for itself'. Secondly, due to the period in which the material was filmed, it is perhaps unsurprising that the themes, *Management* and *Adherence to Policy* are absent from the material. As was examined in a previous chapter, the introduction of more stringent PVP management through the implementation of increasingly restrictive PVP policies did not begin until the late 1990s. Thirdly, the *Police Stop* format did not give voice to either the police or the suspects involved in PVPs, notwithstanding the occasional incidental audio from police communication systems. Therefore the format effectively silences the 'police voice', rendering it impossible to ascertain their motives for undertaking PVPs or if any of the parties involved in the chase derived enjoyment from it (*Excitement Cops / Excitement Suspects*). *Skills* were not well-represented in *Police Stop*, however there was a relatively strong showing for the *Teamwork* theme, which featured in four vignettes and the *Arrest Inevitable* theme which was present in three vignettes. In spite the lack of identifiable themes, *Police Stop* provides a baseline example of how the PVP-based genre has become increasingly sophisticated in its presentation of PVPs during the period sampled.

*POCA* (see Table 5.2 below) began broadcasting in 1995 and the early episodes contained a relatively small number of PVPs. The episodes of *POCA* in the sample data span a lengthy period and are therefore particularly interesting because they offer a long-term view of how PVPs have been conveyed. While the analysis provides a numerical indication of the frequency with which each theme was present in the PVP-based vignettes from a given *series title*, the frequency of particular themes during particular time-frames is also occasionally noteworthy and will be examined where relevant below. The *Teamwork* theme was identified in almost 42% of the PVP vignettes featured in *POCA*. Examples of this include numerous references to traffic officers being coordinated by helicopter support (4.1, 7.2, 39.3), an emphasis on good inter-police communication (11.1, 15.5 and 15.9), and the undertaking of complex rolling roadblock, or so-called T-PAC manoeuvres (15.7 and 15.9).

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects In Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
1995	3.1								X			X				
	3.2	X	X	X												
	4.1			X								X				X
1998	7.1															
	7.2	X	X	X								X				
	7.3			X	X			X			X					
	8.1															
	8.2										X					
	8.3				X	X										
	8.4		X	X		X		X								
2000	10.2	X			X	X					X					
	10.4															
	10.5	X					X					X	X			
	10.6															
	10.7															X
	11.1	X		X	X	X		X				X	X			
	11.2				X							X	X			
	11.3											X	X			X
	11.6											X	X			X
	11.7															X
2001	12.1			X							X	X		X		X
	12.2			X							X		X			X
	13.1				X						X					
	13.2															
	13.3				X	X										
	13.6															
	13.8											X				
2002	15.1															
	15.2															
	15.4					X										
	15.5	X		X							X	X	X			X
	15.6	X			X							X				X
	15.7											X	X			
	15.8											X				
	15.9	X		X		X						X	X			
2006	31.1	X		X	X							X	X			
	31.2			X												
	31.3	X		X	X							X	X			
	31.4	X		X		X										
	31.5	X		X		X										
	31.6	X		X									X			
	31.7															
2007	35.1	X	X	X				X								
	35.2	X		X	X	X							X			
	35.3	X		X	X	X										
2008	39.1	X	X	X				X		X		X				

	39.3	X	X	X				X				X				
	39.4	X	X	X	X					X		X				
Total	48 PVPs	19	7	22	13	11	1	6	1	2	7	20	13	1	1	9

**Table 5.2. Police Camera Action (POCA). TA Findings. ITV (1995-2008).**

Whilst the theme *Public in Danger* was present before and during the spike in the concern around PVPs seen in the print media during 2001 (2002 allowing for a one-year lag), there was a marked increase in the presence of this theme in episodes broadcast between 2006 and 2008 (See Table 5.3 below).

Period	Number of Episodes in the Sample	Number of PVP Vignettes Featured in the Sample	Number of Times 'Public in Danger' was Identified	Percentage of Vignettes Containing 'Public In Danger' Theme.
1995 - 2002	9	35	10	28.57 %
2006 - 2008	3	13	12	92.30 %

**Table 5.3. Instances of Public in Danger Theme in POCA (1995 – 2008).**

39% of the PVP vignettes featured in the POCA-derived data contained the *PVP Causes Danger* theme and these instances were heavily concentrated in the latter part of the sample (See Table 5.4 below).

Period	Number of Episodes in the Sample	Number of PVP Vignettes Featured in the Sample	Number of Times 'PVP Causes Danger' was Identified	Percentage of Vignettes Containing 'Public In Danger' Theme.
1995 - 2002	9	35	8	22.85%
2006 - 2008	3	13	11	84.61%

**Table 5.4. Instances of PVP Causes Danger Theme in POCA (1995 - 2008)**

The *PVP Minimises Danger* theme was detected in 7 of the vignettes contained in the *POCA* data, which amounted to 15%. The *Cops in Danger* theme was present in 13 of the 48 PVP-related vignettes and was fairly evenly spread among the sample, as was the related theme of *Suspects in Danger* which was present in 11 vignettes. The theme, *Police Protect the Public* was identified only 6 times during the 48 vignettes. However, it is perhaps significant that this theme was not present during the episodes broadcast during 2001 or 2002.

The *Skill* theme was not detected until the year 2000 and was present in 13 of the *POCA* vignettes in the sample. A number of themes were clearly absent from the *POCA* vignettes featured in the sample. In particular, themes relating to the *Management* of PVPs by senior officers and at police headquarters were present in only one vignette from 1995 (3.2). Similarly, the theme *Adherence to Policy* was identified in only two vignettes from 2008 (39.1 and 39.4). The *Excitement Suspects* theme was entirely absent from the *POCA* sample, and only one instance of both the *Excitement Cops* and *Danger of Suspect Escaping* themes were identified.

The theme, *Arrest Inevitable* was present in 9 of the PVPs featured, with a noticeable peak during 2000/2001, prior to it disappearing entirely, before re-appearing in 2008. This usual trigger for the identification of this theme was linked to the commentary, typically framed in terms of a futile attempt by suspects to escape the long-arm of the law. This theme was particularly well represented in the *POCA* data, but not detected to anything like the same extent in other *series titles* represented in the data.

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
1996	5.1		X		X									X		
	5.2	X		X												
	5.3														X	
	5.4	X	X	X	X	X						X		X		
	6.1				X											
	6.2			X												
Total	6 PVPs	2	2	3	3	1	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	2	1	--

**Table 5.5. X-Cars. TA Findings . BBC One (1996).**

The two *XCars* episodes contained in the sample yielded only six PVPs. However, the results (see Table 5.5 above) demonstrated a clear inclination towards themes associated with danger, which were identified in five of the six PVP-based vignettes in the sample. The *Public in Danger* theme was detected in three (or half) of the vignettes, as was the *Cops in Danger* theme, as was *PVP Causes Danger*, while *Suspects in Danger* was present in only one. The *Teamwork* theme was not manifested to the same degree and was identified only once.

Absent from these vignettes were a number of themes, specifically *Danger of Suspects Escaping*, *Police Protect the Public*, *Training* and *Arrest Inevitable*. *Management* and *Adherence to Policy* were also not represented in the sample vignettes, however, as was the case with *Police Stop*, this is perhaps to be expected given that the material contained in *XCars* predates the introduction of more formal management and oversight of PVPs, which increased significantly during 1998 and beyond (see for example Lind: 1998). Finally, the themes *Excitement Cops* and *PVP Minimises Danger* were identified twice each and *Excitement Suspects* was present once.

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
1999	9.1				X		X			X		X				
2002	14.1	X		X								X				
	14.2	X		X				X								
	14.3	X		X	X			X				X	X			
	14.4				X					X		X				
	14.5			X		X		X								
	14.6					X										
	14.7				X			X				X				
2006	28.1	X		X												
	28.2	X		X												
	28.3	X		X				X			X					
	28.4	X		X		X										
	28.5				X				X	X		X		X		
	32.1															
	32.2									X		X				
Total	15 PVPs	7	--	8	5	3	1	5	1	4	1	7	1	1	--	--

**Table 5.6. Car Wars. TA Findings. BBC One (1999 - 2006).**

Overall, themes associated with danger were well-represented in *Car Wars* (see Table 5.6 above), being present in thirteen of the fifteen, or over 86 per cent of the PVP-based vignettes featured. Specifically, *Public in Danger* was present in eight vignettes; whilst *PVP Causes Danger* was identified in seven and *Cops in Danger* was identified in five. The *Suspects in Danger* theme was identified in only three of the 15 PVPs featured. Perhaps significantly, there were no instances of the *PVP Minimises Danger* theme identified in any of the vignettes. *Adherence to Policy* occurred in four vignettes and the *Teamwork* theme was present in seven, or almost half of the *Car Wars* PVP-related vignettes.

The themes, *Danger of Suspect Escaping*, *Management*, *Training*, *Skills* and *Excitement Cops* were present in one vignette each. The theme, *Police Protect the Public* was present in five, or one third of the PVPs featured and *Danger of Suspect Escaping* was identified in only one vignette. Also absent from the *Car Wars* PVP-related vignettes were the themes, *Excitement Suspects* and *Arrest Inevitable*.

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
2003	18.1	X		X			X	X			X					
	18.2		X					X	X			X				
	18.3	X		X			X	X			X	X				X
	19.1	X			X	X									X	
	19.2				X								X			
2004	22.1				X	X									X	
	22.2							X					X			
2005	26.1											X	X	X		
	27.1	X		X		X		X			X	X				
2006	30.1						X									
2007	34.1				X	X						X	X	X	X	X
2008	38.1	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X	X	
2009	40.1	X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	
2010	45.1		X	X	X			X	X	X		X	X			
2011	48.1	X		X	X			X		X	X	X		X		
	49.1							X		X		X	X	X		
Total	16 PVPs	7	4	7	7	6	4	10	3	5	4	10	6	6	5	2

**Table 5.7. Traffic Cops. TA Findings. BBC One (2003 – 2011).**

The 12 episodes of *Traffic Cops* contained in the sample yielded 16 PVP-related vignettes (see Table 5.7 above). The danger themes were well represented, occurring in thirteen, or just over 81% of the vignettes; *PVP Causes Danger*, *Public in Danger* and *Cops in Danger* were identified seven times each. The theme *Suspects in Danger* was identified six times and there were four occurrences of *PVP Minimises Danger*, three-quarters of which appeared in the final three vignettes featured in the sample. The *Skills* theme was identified six times and *Adherence to Policy* and *Excitement Suspects* were both identified in five PVP-related vignettes. Incidents of the *Excitement Cops* theme, detected in six of the 16 vignettes, were concentrated in 5 of the six vignettes broadcast between 2007 and 2011.

Less prominent were the themes, *Danger of Suspects Escaping* and *Training* that were both identified four times each and instances of the *Management* theme were present in three vignettes. The least conspicuous theme was *Arrest Inevitable* which was identified in only two vignettes.

At the opposite end of the scale, *Traffic Cops* scored very highly for the themes *Police Protect the Public* and *Teamwork*, which were both identified in ten of the vignettes featured. As can be seen in the results (Table 5.7), the *PVP Minimises Danger* and *Excitement Cops* themes were increasingly apparent in the sample from 2006 and 2007 respectively. The *Adherence to Policy* theme did not appear until 2008, after which it was then identified in all of the five remaining vignettes contained within this section of the sample.

Similarly, the *Teamwork* theme was identified in every PVP vignette contained in the sample from 2007 to 2011 and the theme *Police Protect the Public* was present in every one of the five vignettes featured during 2008 – 2011.

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
2003	16.1	X		X												
	16.2	X			X							X				
	16.3									X		X	X			
	16.5	X						X			X	X	X			
	16.6	X			X							X	X	X		
	16.7	X		X		X									X	
	17.1				X							X				
	17.2	X		X		X										
	17.3		X	X	X	X						X	X			
	17.4															
	17.5			X	X								X			
	17.6											X				
	17.8			X				X	X			X				
2004	20.1					X										
	20.2	X		X	X								X			

	20.3			X									X			
	21.1		X	X		X		X								
	21.2	X		X								X	X			
	21.3					X										
	21.4	X		X		X				X						
	21.5	X		X				X				X	X			
2005	24.2		X		X	X		X				X	X			
	24.3	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X			
	24.6															
	24.7	X		X								X				X
	24.8	X		X												
	25.1									X	X	X	X			
	25.2		X	X	X			X				X				
	25.5				X							X				
	25.7															X
	25.8	X		X				X	X			X				
2006	29.2	X		X												
	29.3		X										X			
	29.4		X	X								X	X			
	29.6															
2007	33.1						X					X	X	X		
	33.8		X													
	33.9		X													
2008	37.1	X		X								X	X			
	37.3		X													
	37.4	X	X	X	X			X				X				
2009	41.1							X				X				
	41.3			X		X		X				X				
Total	43 PVPs	17	11	21	11	10	1	11	3	4	3	22	16	2	1	2

**Table 5.8. Road Wars. TA Findings. Sky One (2003 – 2009).**

The 10 episodes of *Road Wars* included in the sample contained 43 PVP-related vignettes (see Table 5.8 above). The *Excitement Suspects & Danger of Suspect Escaping* themes were identified in one vignette each, whilst the *Arrest Inevitable* and *Excitement Cops* themes were both identified in two vignettes. *Management & Training* were similarly represented in the sample, featuring three times each. However, it should be noted that the issue of police training is highly prominent during the opening credits of *Road Wars*, during which the status of the protagonists as ‘highly trained pursuit specialist’ is emphasised.

The *Adherence to Policy* theme was present in four of the vignettes, although it was absent from the episodes in the sample during its last three years of broadcast, 2006-2009.

The *Suspects in Danger* theme was observed in ten, or just under a quarter of the vignettes, and the *Cops in Danger*, *Police Protect the Public* and *PVP Minimises Danger* themes were present in eleven, although again, the *Cops in Danger* theme was markedly absent from the episodes broadcast during 2006-2009. *Skills* were emphasised in sixteen, or over a third of the vignettes and the skill of the police was heavily emphasised during the opening credits of each episode of the programme. The *PVP Causes Danger* theme was identified fairly evenly in 17 of the *Road Wars* PVP vignettes in the sample and *Public in Danger* was identified in twenty-one, or just under half of the vignettes, with a noticeable peak in the occurrence of this theme during 2004. The most prominent theme identified in the PVPs presented by *Road Wars* was *Teamwork* which was fairly consistently present in twenty-two, or almost one-half of the vignettes containing a PVP.

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
2009	42.1	X		X				X				X	X	X		
Total	1 PVP	1	--	1	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	1	1	1	--	--

**Table 5.9. Motorway Cops. TA Findings. BBC One (2009).**

*Motorway Cops* contributed only one episode and one PVP to the sample (see Table 5.9 above). Clearly, this very small sample size should be taken into account when discussing the findings produced by this section of the analysis. The findings from the analysis of *Motorway Cops* appear to closely match the results of its sister programme, *Traffic Cops*. In particular, the presence of the themes, *Public in*

*Danger, Police Protect the Public, Teamwork, Skills, PVP Causes Danger and Excitement Cops* appears to mirror the commonly identified themes present in *Traffic Cops*.

Year	PVP #	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills [Practical]	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
2008	36.1	X			X		X			X	X	X	X			
	36.2		X	X		X		X				X				
	36.3		X	X											X	
2009	43.1	X		X								X				
	46.1		X	X	X	X		X	X			X			X	
2010	47.1			X		X				X		X				
2011	50.1	X	X	X				X		X	X	X	X			
	51.1	X	X					X		X		X	X			
Total	8 PVPs	4	5	6	2	3	1	4	1	4	2	7	3	--	2	--

**Table 5.10. Police Interceptors. TA Findings. Channel 5 (2008 - 2011).**

The *Police Interceptors* derived segment of the sample spans the relatively short four-year period between 2008 and 2011 (see Table 5.10 above). Alongside the two 2011 episodes of *Traffic Cops*, the *Police Interceptors* derived data is therefore the most contemporary material featured in the analysis. The six episodes that were selected for analysis contained eight PVP vignettes and in common with other series titles broadcast during the same period, such as *Traffic Cops*, *Road Wars* and *Motorway Cops*, *Police Interceptors* does not feature a large number of PVPs; rather the tendency is for these *series titles* to broadcast longer PVP-based vignettes. The themes, *Excitement Cops*, and *Arrest Inevitable* were not present in the material analysed and *Danger of Suspect Escaping* and *Management* were present only once each.

Similarly, *Cops in Danger* and *Excitement Suspects* were identified in two of the vignettes, as was the *Training* theme, which is perhaps a consequence of the strong emphasis on training that is hammered-home during the commentary which accompanies the opening credits of *Police Interceptors*. The *Skills* and *Suspects in Danger* themes were both present in three vignettes each and *Police Protect the Public*, *PVP Causes Danger* and *Adherence to Policy* were identified in four, or half of the vignettes, with 75% of the instances of this latter theme occurring in the final three PVP-vignettes. *PVP Minimises Danger* was present in five of the vignettes, which amounted to over 62%. The second most common theme in the sample of *Police Interceptors* was *Public in Danger*, which was present in six, or 75% of the eight vignettes featured. As was the case with *Road Wars*, *Teamwork* was the most commonly identified theme; identified in seven of the eight vignettes, representing a very high rate of 87.5%.

Series Title.	# of PVPs	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Danger Suspects	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills [Practical]	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
Police Stop	13	1	--	2	1	--	--	1	--	--	--	4	1	--	--	3
POCA	48	19	7	22	13	11	1	6	1	2	7	20	13	1	1	9
XCars.	6	2	2	3	3	1	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	2	1	--
Car Wars.	15	7	--	8	5	3	1	5	1	4	1	7	1	1	--	--
Traffic Cops.	16	7	4	7	7	6	4	10	3	5	4	10	6	6	5	2
Road Wars.	43	17	11	21	11	10	1	11	3	4	3	22	16	2	1	2
M-way Cops.	1	1	--	1	--	--	1	1	--	--	--	1	1	1	--	--
Police Interceptors	8	4	5	6	2	3	1	4	1	4	2	7	3	--	2	--
Total	150	58	29	70	42	34	8	38	10	19	17	71	41	13	10	16
Percentage (Rounded)		39	19	47	28	23	5	25	7	13	11	48	27	8	7	11

**Table 5.11. Amalgamated TA Findings (All Results).**

Referring to the Table 5.11 (above), the results for the TA of each *series title* have been amalgamated and it is clear that the *Teamwork* and *Public in Danger* themes are the most prominent overall, identified in 48 and 47 per cent of the vignettes respectively. In Table 5.12 (below) the figures have been partnered with the percentages for each theme in each *series title*.

<b>Series Title.</b>	<b># of PVPs</b>	PVP Causes Danger	PVP Minimises Danger	Public in Danger	Cops in Danger	Suspects in Danger	Danger of Suspect Escaping	Police Protect the Public	Management	Adherence to Policy	Training	Teamwork	Skills [Practical]	Excitement Cops	Excitement Suspects	Arrest Inevitable
<b>Police Stop</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	--	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	--	--	<b>1</b>	--	--	--	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	--	--	<b>3</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>8</b>	--	<b>15</b>	<b>8</b>	--	--	<b>8</b>	--	--	--	<b>31</b>	<b>8</b>	--	--	<b>23</b>
<b>POCA</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>39</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>XCars.</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	--	--	--	--	--	<b>1</b>	--	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	--
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>17</b>	--	--	--	--	--	<b>17</b>	--	<b>33</b>	<b>17</b>	--
<b>Car Wars.</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>	--	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	--	--
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>47</b>	--	<b>53</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	--	--
<b>Traffic Cops.</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>44</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Road Wars.</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>39</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>M-way Cops.</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	--	<b>1</b>	--	--	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	--	--	--	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	--	--
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>100</b>	--	<b>100</b>	--	--	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	--	--	--	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	--	--
<b>P. Interceptors.</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	--	<b>2</b>	--
<b>Percentage</b>	--	<b>50</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>37</b>	--	<b>25</b>	--
<b>Total No of Theme Present</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Percentage (Rounded)</b>		<b>39</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>

**Table 5.12. Amalgamated TA Findings (All results + Percentages)**

## **Analysis of Findings**

There now follows a more detailed discussion of the findings based upon what were identified as the most important themes and the manner in which they were manifested in each series title incorporating some discussion points around the potential of these programmes to either legitimise or delegitimise PVPs. Those themes which were deemed to be the most salient to the research questions formed the basis of the discussion. Those examined below are *PVP Causes Danger*, *PVP Minimises Danger*, *The Danger Themes*, *Training*, *Management*, *Adherence to Policy* and *Excitement Cops*. The relevance of each of these themes to the research questions will be discussed individually prior to the discussion around their manifestation in the research data. The examination of each theme will conclude with a brief discussion summarising their contribution to addressing the research questions.

### **PVP Causes Danger**

This theme is one which may potentially delegitimise PVPs through the expression of the idea that the initiation of a PVP by the police giving chase is the direct cause of danger to others. Whilst it may be argued that all PVPs represent a dangerous situation, the ostensible link between the two is not always present in the vignettes contained in the data. Therefore, a clear declaration was required for the theme to be identified as present. This could take the form of a verbal statement by the commentator or officers *in situ*. To a lesser extent, this theme was also identified by reference to the behaviour or actions of those in situ.

This theme was present in 39 percent of the PVP-based vignettes featured in the sample. However, there were significant differences in the frequency of this theme identified in the data samples provided by individual series titles. *Police Stop* only provided one example of this theme, detected during vignette 1.6, which documents the pursuit of an armed robber lasting almost eight minutes.

Taking place at high-speed on a motorway, this PVP creates a highly dangerous situation, exacerbated by a chaotic police response. Although this vignette eschews any added commentary, the radio exchange between the pursuing units can be clearly heard, during which an officer orders the two motorcycle officers leading the pursuit to 'get out of this chase! It's too dangerous for bikes' (1.6). The motorcycle riding police officers appear to ignore this instruction and continue the pursuit, often very closely behind or alongside the suspect vehicle. The danger inherent in the unfolding situation can clearly be seen and the PVP features an unusually high number of near-misses between the vehicle being driven by the suspect and those driven by members of the public. Each of these near-collisions is greeted with exasperated gasps and wincing from the police helicopter crew who are filming and coordinating the operation below. The PVP ends with a head-on crash between the suspect car and another vehicle, after which the viewer is reassured that no one involved in the collision was *seriously* injured.

The *PVP Causes Danger* theme was identified in 19, or 39% of the PVP-based *POCA* vignettes, a percentage which exactly matched the mean across the data set as a whole. However, instances of this theme were concentrated in the latter part of the sample which spanned the period between 2006 and 2008. The manifestation of this theme was primarily identified in the commentary which accompanied the PVP vignettes. For example, the following extracts from the *POCA* derived data illustrate how the theme, *PVP Causes Danger* was presented:

31.3. [Commentator]. '...pedestrians are at risk... [the suspect] is fearless as he overtakes in the face of oncoming traffic...he narrowly avoids hitting an oncoming vehicle.'

31.5. [Commentator]. '[The suspect] dangerously squeezes between two cars at high speed...he narrowly avoids a collision with the white van...his driving could be a real hazard to the public.'

31.6. [Commentator]. [S]till refusing to stop [the suspect] almost collides with another car'

35.2. [Commentator]. '[D]riving like this is intentionally putting the public's lives at risk...He crosses once more onto the wrong side of the road and nearly collides with an ambulance.'

Deploying a straight-bat presentational style, *POCA* tends to emphasise and repeat a very similar refrain around the issue of the danger caused by PVPs which focusses on the dangerous actions of the fleeing suspect, rather than the danger created by the pursuing police vehicles. The question of whether these PVPs are legitimate in terms of a risk / reward calculation is never raised. As the following examples demonstrate, *POCA* simply conveys the 'common-sense' assumption that when faced with a vehicle failing to stop, the police have no option but to undertake a PVP;

(31.6). [Commentator]. 'Police suspect that he may have stolen the Astra...but when he won't stop, the police are forced to go in pursuit'.

(35.1). [Commentator]. 'This driver thought it was ok to ignore a Lincolnshire Police officer who told him to stop...the police are forced to pursue him'.

(35.2). [Commentator]. 'Driving like this is intentionally putting...lives at risk...police officers must pursue the car at high speeds'.

As these examples demonstrate, *POCA* tends to present PVPs within a 'taken for granted' framework, within which, it is presupposed that PVPs are entirely legitimate and there are no potentially troubling questions surrounding them. Similarly absent from the *POCA* vignettes, is any acknowledgment around the question of whether the suspects are driving in a dangerous fashion *as a result of being pursued* by the police. Perhaps these questions would spoil the simple 'chase and capture' narrative arc so beloved of this kind of entertainment programming (Doyle: 2003). Be that as it may, *POCA* appears willing to underscore the *potential* danger of the PVPs featured in the programme, presumably to make the content of the programme more exciting for the viewer, arguably to the point of hyperbole and exaggeration in a number of cases. There were no instances of a PVP being terminated in *POCA* due to safety concerns.

This is perhaps unsurprising, given that police-supplied video material of a PVP being terminated would first need to pass through this initial police filtering before being considered for broadcast by the production team. It is difficult to imagine a terminated pursuit fitting into the simple narrative structure of *POCA*.

The *X-Cars* derived sample material produced only two instances of the theme *PVP Causes Danger*, both of which were identified in the aftermath of a PVP. The first of these was based upon the comments made by an officer surveying the wreckage following a particularly nasty road-traffic accident between the suspect vehicle and another car which ended the high-speed PVP being featured;

(5.2). [Traffic Officer]. 'There could be six dead bodies now couldn't there?

Devastation, this is how the vast majority of these pursuits can and do end.

That could have been you, me or anybody in that Fiesta going home'.

This quote illustrates how luck and fatalism are utilised to explain the lack of serious or fatal injuries caused by the PVP. The observation that 'it could be you' involved in the worse-case scenario painted by the officer underlines the entirely random element and also the dangerousness of PVPs. The officer is suggesting that PVPs tend to end in 'devastation' implying that he knows this must serve to delegitimise PVPs. Similarly, in the second occurrence of the *PVP Causes Danger* theme in *XCars*, the same traffic officer states that during another PVP, the suspect driver was,

(5.4). [Traffic Officer]. '...doing speeds of 60, 70, 80 through the town centre [where there are] party-goers, drunks making their way home... I suppose really, it is good luck rather than good judgement that he hasn't killed somebody'.

Again, luck is cited as a key factor in the PVP not causing a fatality to random members of the public. However, the traffic-officer quickly follows up this statement by proposing that, in his opinion, the suspects that he pursues drive in a highly dangerous manner at all times, regardless of police involvement;

(5.4). 'But the plain truth is that [the suspects] drive like that when they are not being pursued. It's a misconception to say well they wouldn't be driving like that had the police not been chasing them'.

Here, the traffic officer is clearly attempting to dispel any notion of police culpability for the negative outcomes associated with PVPs. This statement therefore legitimises PVPs as being a necessary response to the perpetually dangerous driving of the suspects which the officers must pursue in the name of public safety.

The post-PVP conversation continues,

(5.4). [Officer Two]. 'This has ended very well, nothing is damaged, nobody's hurt and he's in custody. He certainly can't kill anybody in the back of the [police] van which is where he is now and that's the best place for him'.

In the post-PVP reckoning, Officer Two outlines why he believes the PVP has been a success; an arrest without injury or damage being caused. This is deemed to be a 'good result' and chimes with what he believes is the police function, real or imagined, as a crime-fighter carrying out 'real police work', utilising his impressive driving skills to successfully overcome the potential dangers of the chase to arrest the suspect safely. Despite the risk to public safety presented by the PVP itself, Officer Two is arguing, retrospectively and from the vantage point of knowing all has ended well, that he has actually protected the public by apprehending the suspect and taking him off the streets. This is an example of how the *PVP Causes Danger* and *PVP Minimises Danger* themes were coded for and can both be present in the same vignette. This conjunction between ostensibly oppositional themes is discussed further in the following section on *PVPs Minimise Danger*.

Although the delivery of this assessment appears to deviate in tone somewhat from the bravado-laden summary provided by Officer One, both statements are constructed upon variations of the same central tenets; job satisfaction, adrenalin and enjoyment.

This vignette legitimises PVPs by inviting the viewer to appreciate the spectacle of a job well done. The incident (as most are) was filmed from a police point of view and the viewer is able to vicariously enjoy the obvious post-PVP satisfaction of the officers at the scene. The chase was thrilling, the bad-guy is locked up, and everyone is safe; the 'asphalt cowboys' (Skolnick: 1975. 246) have got their man and can now finish their kebabs before rolling onto their next job.

This vignette, as well as others to follow, demonstrate that for both police drivers and the suspects they pursue, there is prestige attached to their driving prowess and ability to apprehend the suspect, or escape the police respectively. Bragging rights are available to either party if they deem their efforts to have been successful. It is therefore reasonable to argue that adrenalin plays a significant role in the motivation to flee or pursue and this proposition will be examined in the 'Excitement Cops' section below in more detail later.

However, the overall thrust of vignette 5.4 is arguably legitimising the PVP by presenting it - especially with the message we are left with at the end of the vignette - as an event carried out by skilful officers with good consequences which is undertaken with a view to minimising the danger faced by the public.

*Car Wars* contained seven instances of the *PVP Causes Danger* theme. The majority of these were straightforward observations where the commentator described near-misses with members of the public;

(14.1). [Commentator]. 'It's 8:30 in the morning and the estate's children are on their way to school. The joyrider swerves past cars, mounts pavements and barrels around corners...[A]s the pickup rounds a corner, it only narrowly misses a child on a bike.'

(14.2). [Commentator]. '[The suspect] makes a wild manoeuvre...he very narrowly misses striking the road works and the [road-worker] chap steps back and [the suspect] nearly hit him'.

(28.1). [Commentator] '[The suspect's] driving is now causing concern for those pursuing'. [Officer] 'You just know that it's going to end in tears really'.

As was the case with the vignettes in both *XCars* and *POCA*, the *Car Wars* data demonstrated a similar fatalistic reliance on luck as an explanation for the lack of catastrophic incidents caused by the dangerous driving of the suspect and predictably, the risk posed by the pursuing police vehicles is never mentioned. The pursuing officers are said to be concerned about the manner of the suspect's driving and take the view that it will 'end in tears'. However, this concern does not appear sufficiently acute, even with the apparent inevitability of a collision, to force the officers to consider terminating the pursuit.

The theme *PVP Causes Danger* was identified seven times in the BBC *series* title, *Traffic Cops*. In 2003, *Traffic Cops* broadcast a vignette (18.1) in which one of the U.K.'s most highly qualified and experienced pursuit drivers, PC Tim Scouthern discusses PVPs. In a cut-away interview segment, which is interspersed with footage of the PVP, he states that, '...obviously things do happen in pursuits, they are an extremely dangerous situation to be in'. This somewhat euphemistic turn of phrase acknowledges that this elite police driver is well aware that the situation he is involved in is both hazardous and unpredictable. Later in the same vignette (18.1), the commentator reiterates the potential danger, stating:

'At these speeds the chances of a serious accident are great. It's too late to let the gang simply drive away and there's no time to think of the consequences'.

This statement presents the continuation of the PVP as the only course of action under the circumstances. Furthermore, the commentary makes it clear that despite the high probability of serious consequences, there is simply *no time* to consider the risks associated with the PVP. In a later *Traffic Cops* vignette broadcast in 2003 (19.1), PC Scouthern is said to be undertaking a 'dangerous journey' whilst pursuing joyriders during a PVP in Sheffield (19.1). In another *Traffic Cops* vignette from 2005 (27.1), a traffic officer pursues a Subaru that has been driven away from a motorway service station without paying for petrol; a so-called 'bilking' offence.

The pursuit reaches speeds of over 100 MPH and the fleeing Subaru side-swipes a Honda on a roundabout before the driver decides to pull over and surrender to the pursuing officers. It transpires that the now damaged Honda had an 18 week-old baby on board and the officer reports that he has given the Subaru driver a verbal dressing-down over the risks his driving posed to the baby and other members of the public. The officer takes obvious satisfaction from the reaction of the Subaru driver, who apparently 'turned white' when he was informed of the baby in the car he had collided with, compounded by the fact that the stolen petrol bill amounted to a measly £23.

However, the officer who was chasing the suspect appear oblivious to the fact that he was also involved in the pursuit and was therefore also potentially blameworthy for any potential collision. In an alternative reading of this vignette, it could be seen to delegitimise the PVP, as there was such an obvious disparity between the severity of the crime committed and the risk to an archetypal innocent victim (the baby) in this particular case. However, the officer's apparent 'disgust' at the behaviour of the suspect would presumably be shared by many viewers who might well conclude that he, and not the officer, was entirely to blame for this potentially dangerous situation. This shifting of the blame, in what is essentially an activity involving two parties (the police and the suspect), may serve to relegitimise the PVP conveyed here, despite the lingering inference that some police drivers will risk the lives of the public to chase relatively petty offenders and it is only through good fortune that these incidents do not result in fatal or serious injuries.

A comparable scenario was conveyed by an episode of *Road Wars* from 2008 (37.1). Upon stopping the fleeing vehicle after a high-speed PVP, the officers discovered an unwilling passenger inside, prompting one police driver to state to the camera operator (and therefore the audience), that:

‘...the disgusting thing is that there is a young male in the vehicle as well who is severely disabled and the driver didn’t give any consideration to that...he just drove in a dangerous manner. Had we known that [the disabled passenger] had been in there then we would have called the pursuit off for his safety if nobody else’s.’

This retrospective concern for the safety of an archetypal potential victim (a severely disabled passenger), coupled with the police’s apparent disgust at the situation that the fleeing driver put his passenger in, along with the assertion that they would have terminated the pursuit had they know of the passenger may serve to relegitimise the PVP. A less favourable summary of this vignette would be to suggest that the police were actually flummoxed by the presence of the disabled passenger in a situation where they were actually expected to find a car thief instead, forced them to quickly switch from pursuers to carers. However, the overall impression conveyed by the PVP in this case (37.1) was that the lack of a negative outcome was purely a case of good luck. This reliance on luck as an explanation for the lack of serious post-PVP consequences is a fairly common component across the data sample.

In another *Traffic Cops* vignette (40.1), the commentator wraps-up proceedings following the pursuit and arrest of a suspected joyrider by observing that, ‘luckily it hasn’t ended in tragedy tonight’. In common with the vignettes examined above from other series titles, *Traffic Cops* acknowledges the danger caused by PVPs but utilises a mixture of references to luck and fatalism, maintaining the line that PVPs do take place, are dangerous, but ultimately the lack of serious and fatal injuries is down to luck, at least as far as the suspect’s driving is concerned. *Motorway Cops*, sister programme to *Traffic Cops*, contributed only one vignette to the sample and the theme *PVP Causes Danger* was identified within it (42.1). Broadcast in 2009, officers are pursuing a stolen mini-van, the rear doors of which open during the start of the pursuit to reveal a youth unsecured in the back of the van.

Although the pursuing officers are aware of the unrestrained youth being thrown around inside the rear of the fleeing van under sharp braking and hard cornering and in spite of the obvious danger posed by the insecurity of the van doors – the youth could at any moment be ejected from the rear of the van into the path of the pursuing vehicles – the officers continue to pursue through the heavy rush-hour traffic, dodging the numerous pedestrians who are said by the commentator to be, ‘...getting in the way’. The danger caused by the PVP is all too apparent in this vignette (42.1), however, far from delegitimising the PVP, the commentator observes that, ‘...for PC Smith, this is what being a motorway cop is all about’. Interspersed with footage of this PVP, a cut-away section features PC Smith, who elaborates that his motivation for joining the police was, ‘...basically to catch the bad guys.’ [42.1].

The message presented by this vignette is clear; the job of the police is to catch the bad guys, this is their role, purpose and motivation for joining the force. Seen in this context, PVPs fit into this narrative as something that the police should be doing to fulfil this crime-fighter role.

The *Road Wars* derived data produced 17 instances of the *PVP Causes Danger* theme, many of which were straightforward acknowledgements of the risk involved in PVPs. Examples include,

(16.1). [Commentator]. ‘How no-one was smashed into was incredible.’

(16.5). [Commentator]. ‘Pursuits at high-speed have always been dangerous to bring to an end.’

(21.2). [Commentator]. ‘I bet that cyclist thought she was a goner...Blasting through a junction, he narrowly misses several cars.’

(21.5). [Commentator]. ‘At another roundabout, he narrowly avoids hitting other cars.’

(24.7). [Commentator]. ‘[The suspect] narrowly misses an old man at the bus-stop’.

(24.8). [Commentator]. ‘[The suspect’s] driving gets more and more dangerous, forcing a woman pushing a pram to run for her life.’

What is noteworthy about these examples is that they are all derived from the commentary that commonly accompanies the PVPs in the ob-doc genre. In *Road Wars*, as in *POCA* and *Police Stop*, this commentary has effectively supplanted the 'police voice', especially around the issue of PVPs. In examples 24.7 and 24.8 we see more archetypal potential victims of the PVPs; the old man sitting at the bus stop and the woman pushing a pram respectively. In the other examples, third-party vehicles, rather than the people inside them are cast as the potential victim of the PVP (21.2, 21.5). Note also, the flippant comment about the cyclist and her near-death experience (21.2). As was also seen in the *POCA* data, there is a tendency to exaggerate the dangerousness of the PVPs in the *Road Wars* vignettes; near-misses are often replayed several times in slow-motion for dramatic effect. The *Police Interceptors* data contained four instances of the theme *PVP Causes Danger*. These followed a similar pattern to those seen in *Road Wars* insofar as they tended to explicitly acknowledge the inherent danger associated with PVPs. For example,

(43.1). [Commentator]. 'Police are wary of high-speed pursuits on country roads.'

(50.1). [Commentator]. '[The pursuing officer] knows that the longer a pursuit persists, the likelihood of a serious accident increases.'

These quotes were coded as instances of the theme, *PVPs Cause Danger*. Again in these *series titles*, the police voice is eschewed in favour of the scripted commentary. This is perhaps unsurprising given that *Police Interceptors* and *Road Wars* are both produced by the same company, Raw Cut. Conversely, it appears that the *series titles* broadcast on the BBC are far more likely to discuss the issue of PVPs because they afford the 'police voice' space within the programme. This difference is at its most pronounced, for example, when the BBC *Series Titles Traffic Cops* and *Motorway Cops* are compared with the ITV *series title POCA*. The 'police voice' rarely (if ever) features in *POCA* except in a very literal (and limited) sense; 'operational' police voices can be heard on the radios being used by the officers, but *POCA* instead prioritises the commentary provided by the presenter.

In contrast to this, *Motorway Cops* and *Traffic Cops* feature relatively lengthy cut-away and road-side interviews with police officers, allowing their opinions, viewpoints and explanations around the issue of PVPs to be interspersed with the footage of the PVPs. These BBC programmes are produced in a more ob-doc style, which in common with its more contemporary commercial rivals, is comprised of footage specifically shot for the programme rather than using third-party, police supplied and produced video clips, a format utilised by *POCA* for many years. The reliance on the police to make available the material used in *POCA* effectively means that this footage as already been subjected to a police filter before it is considered for broadcast.

Whilst this would presumably be much cheaper in terms of production costs when compared with the expense of on-location filming, this format does potentially raise questions about the impartiality of series titles such as *POCA* that are so heavily reliant on the police for material. Obviously all of the ob-doc series titles under scrutiny here are, to some degree reliant on the cooperation of the police. However, it is hard to imagine how the *POCA* format would accommodate critical voices and remain a viable commercial proposition. The financial imperative underpinning the commercial broadcast model means that the producers of *POCA* would be unlikely to jeopardise the commercial opportunities afforded by a popular series title which is presumably cheap to produce and commercially successful.

### **PVP Minimises Danger**

This theme, identified in 19 percent of the PVP-related vignettes in the sample overall, has the potential to legitimise PVPs, as it obviously presents them as being undertaken by the police in an attempt to protect the public from the hazardous driving of the offender. There were no instances of this theme detected in the sample data derived from the *series titles*, *Police Stop*, *Car Wars*, *Motorway Cops* or *Car Wars* and it was identified only once in the six vignettes derived from *XCars* (5.1), which featured the pursuit and capture of a drunk driver.

Similarly, the pursuit of drunk, drugged or mentally unstable drivers made up the majority of the instances of this theme in *Road Wars* (17.3, 22.4, 29.3, 33.9, 33.8, 37.3), and in a smaller proportion of the data from *Police Interceptors* (46.1). These PVPs are arguably conducted for the 'right' reasons and can therefore be seen as necessary to minimise danger for the general public and the suspect, as those being pursued demonstrably represent a potential safety hazard regardless of, and prior to, police involvement in the situation. These vignettes may therefore serve to legitimise PVPs by demonstrating the clear and unambiguous necessity of the police response. However, other examples of this theme were altogether more ambiguous and there were 13 instances of the *PVP Minimises Danger* theme which were identified in the same vignette as the *PVP Cause Danger* theme. 69% of the vignettes containing both the *PVP Causes Danger* and *PVP Minimises Danger* themes occurred between 2008 and 2011 and are spread across *the Series Titles* that populate the sample during this period.

Although the presence of these two themes in the same vignette may appear counter-intuitive, there is a clear pattern underlying the pairing of these two apparently contradictory themes within 13 of the vignettes in the sample. For example,

(3.2). [POCA]. [Commentator]. 'His dangerous driving is becoming a threat to others...*the police priority is to stop the car ASAP*'.

(7.2). [POCA]. [Commentator]. 'Officers are increasingly concerned about the safety of the general public...*they know they must take drastic action to end this pursuit*'.

(21.4). [Road Wars]. [Commentator]. 'The cops are concerned about pursuing the youths who have no helmets on, *but when they whip down the pavement, causing residents to jump out of their way, the cops decide they have to put a stop to their little game*'.

(35.1). [POCA]. [Commentator]. [The suspect has] '...[C]reated a dangerous incident... *fortunately for everyone he's off the road*'.

- (37.4). [*Road Wars*]. [Commentator]. 'The pursuit is getting dangerous...*so the police box him in and deploy their stinger*'.
- (39.1). [*POCA*]. [Commentator]. 'He's not slowing down despite the risk to others...*officers know they have to end this pursuit as quickly as possible*'.
- (40.1). [*Traffic Cops*]. [Commentator]. 'The driver is getting more and more reckless and dangerous... [Officer] '*...you have to catch these people or they'll be out doing it again tomorrow*'.
- (48.1). [*Traffic Cops*]. [Officer]. 'We've got to stop that vehicle and we've got to stop him. He carries on driving – *at some stage his odds are going to end and he's going to hit something.*'
- (49.1). [*Traffic Cops*]. [Officer]. 'We don't want to be chasing [the suspect] for ever because the longer the chase goes on for, *the more likelihood of someone getting injured, car crashing or something going wrong.*'
- (50.1). [*Police Interceptors*]. [Commentator]. 'This is a highly dangerous pursuit...*the roads are going to be a lot safer with this fella off the streets*'.

These examples illustrate how a *PVP Causes Danger* theme can be trumped by an instance of the *PVP Minimises Danger*' theme (italicised), which tends to appear towards the end of the vignette. Therefore, these examples demonstrate how a potentially PVP-delegitimising vignette can, in the final analysis, be turned into a re-legitimising one. This phenomenon fits into the simplistic narrative structure of, 'police turn chaos into order', which tends to ignore the police's role in either creating or sustaining the chaos, but credits them with resolving the situation, restoring order and protecting the public. This 'thin-blue-line' argument is typified in a vignette from the *Traffic Cops* data (30.1) broadcast in 2006, in which a traffic officer states,

'People say, well you know, should the police actually be pursuing vehicles? But if the criminal was to know, well all-right then I'll drive at 40 in a 30 zone and the police won't bother trying to stop me – you know it's going to be bedlam'.

## The Danger Themes.

A number of other *Danger* related themes were also analysed in order to ascertain which specific groups were said to be at risk from the PVP; the public, the police or the suspects themselves. Typically, this theme was identified when PVP-related danger was mentioned as part of the commentary or referenced by those *in situ* either during or after the pursuit. Overall, the *Public in Danger* theme was present in 47% of the 150 vignettes in the sample. However, the *Public in Danger* theme was only present in two the 13 *Police Stop* vignettes, which at just under fifteen percent, represented a far lower proportion than was generally seen across the data sample. For example, it was present in 46% of the *POCA* vignettes, 50% of *XCars*, 53% of *Car Wars*, 44% of *Traffic Cops* and 49% of the *Road Wars* data. These figures, at least in terms of their total percentages, were broadly consistent across the *series titles*.

There are numerous possible reasons for the absence of the *Public in Danger* theme in the *Police Stop* vignettes. Perhaps the most significant factor was the lack of commentary which hampered the analysis process more generally when compared with later *series titles*. However, it must be noted that although the commentary was a significant component, it was not the only indicator used in the analysis process. Another potential factor in explaining the lack of danger codes more generally is the fact that the video material used in *Police Stop* was supplied by the police themselves. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that prior to release, the material would have been filtered to remove anything potentially damaging to the police, providing the television producers with only the material that conveys a favourable image of the police and police work. If correct, this may also explain why PVP-legitimising codes such as *Teamwork* and *Arrest Inevitable* were more commonly identified than the various danger themes as these could potentially legitimise the police through an emphasis on these more positive elements of police work.

Similarly, the video material presented in *POCA* is also supplied by the police. However, unlike *Police Stop*, *POCA* features a commentary by Alistair Stewart and this assists with the research analysis by adding a descriptive element to the material being shown. This commentary tends to construct an interpretation of events that is skewed in favour of the police and highly complementary of their actions, alongside an emphasis on the dangerousness of the PVP which leans towards exaggeration at times.

A good example of this is contained in vignette 39.3, in which the police are pursuing a cannabis dealer in icy conditions. Alistair Stewart makes numerous references to near-misses between the suspect vehicle and pedestrians in addition to repeatedly drawing attention to the perilous black-ice that, '...could cause the [suspect's] car skid out of control at any moment, sending it careering into the path of other road users'. However, in reality the PVP is actually taking place at a fairly slow speed and the danger to pedestrians is therefore minimal. Furthermore, Stewart makes no mention of the potential effect that the black ice could have on the police vehicles in pursuit, which apparently are unaffected by the ostensibly treacherous road conditions. This kind of selective omission, coupled with an emphasis on the possibility of imminent disaster, creates a narrative that thrives on the *potential* danger while locating these apparent risks squarely with the actions of the suspect and as far away from the police as possible.

The frequency with which the *Public in Danger* and *PVP Causes Danger* themes were identified in the *POCA* data was subject to a significant increase during the period between 2006-2008 following its return after a three year hiatus spanning 2003-2005 (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The reasons for this rise are unclear; however it is plausible to suggest that the proliferation of these themes during this period is linked to two factors. The first of these is that approximately half of the PVPs broadcast by the *series title POCA* during the period 2006-2008 were typically much older than the actual broadcast date. Utilising the date-stamp displayed in the bottom corner of the screen (where available), Table 5.13 illustrates the point;

Year of Broadcast	Vignette Number	Year PVP Recorded [If Known]	'PVP Causes Danger' Theme Present?	'Public in Danger Theme' Present?
2006	31.1	<b>2002</b>	Yes	Yes
2006	31.2	<b>2002</b>	No	Yes
2006	31.3	<b>2001</b>	No	Yes
2006	31.4	<b>2001</b>	Yes	Yes
2006	31.5	<b>Unknown</b>	Yes	Yes
2006	31.6	<b>2002</b>	Yes	Yes
2006	31.7	<b>Unknown</b>	No	No
2007	35.1	<b>2000</b>	Yes	Yes
2007	35.2	<b>2006</b>	Yes	Yes
2007	35.3	<b>2005</b>	Yes	Yes
2008	39.1	<b>Unknown</b>	Yes	Yes
2008	39.3	<b>Unknown</b>	Yes	Yes
2008	39.4	<b>Unknown</b>	Yes	Yes

**Table 5. 13. POCA – Vignette Recorded & Broadcast Years (2006-2008)**

When *POCA* resumed broadcasting in 2006 after its three-year hiatus, it appears that the episodes shown were either complete episodes that had been ‘canned’ during that three-year period that were then broadcast in their original form during 2006, or that the programmes were re-edited to include some fairly dated material, or perhaps there was a shortage of available material – forcing the producers to rely on older material they had initially rejected. However regardless of these potential explanations, the inclusion of material filmed in 2000-2002 may explain the increasing presence of the danger themes.

This is because, as was outlined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), this immediate post-millennial period saw a very significant rise in the number of PVP-related fatalities and a spike in the concern around the regulation and management of PVPs expressed by the various police oversight bodies among others. Therefore, it could be argued that the PVPs filmed during the nadir in the regulation and oversight of PVPs, prior to the introduction of more stringent management controls, may capture an historical snapshot containing images of a particularly hazardous time, making identification of the danger themes during analysis more likely. The second potential explanation, which may be particularly applicable to the material broadcast between 2007 to 2008 is that, simply stated, the increased frequency of the danger themes could be a result of changes in the way that the commentary was scripted - perhaps in order to increase the perceived level of jeopardy through the inclusion of more references to danger with the aim of intensifying the on-screen excitement?

A similarly high level of the *Public in Danger* theme was identified in the *Police Interceptors* derived portion of the sample; which was present in six of the eight, or 75% of the PVP-based vignettes featured. This figure illustrates the prominence given in *Police Interceptors* to ideas around the potential danger that pursuits represent to public safety. The series titles *POCA*, *Road Wars* and *Police Interceptors* are prone to exaggerate the *potential* for an imminent catastrophe and tend to feature numerous slow-motion replays of near misses along with commentaries that emphasise and sensationalise the more dramatic elements of the events being shown.

Interestingly, these *series titles* are all broadcast on commercial TV platforms: ITV, Sky One and Channel 5 respectively. These editorial strategies are not commonly seen in the BBC broadcast *series titles* *XCars*, *Traffic Cops*, *Motorway Cops* and *Car Wars* which tend to present PVPs in a more ob-doc style, eschewing both hyperbole and over-dramatization.

This is a crucial difference in the overall presentational tone between the two broadcasting models, commercial and public service orientated which also has a bearing on how they present PVPs and potentially legitimise them. Whilst the presence of the themes *PVP Causes Danger* and *Public in Danger* across the data set is clearly evidence of an acknowledgement that PVPs are potentially dangerous, this does not necessarily delegitimise PVPs because in the mediated world of ‘car-chase TV’, the consequences of this apparent danger are never fully realised. This is because the television producers are unlikely to include footage of a PVP-related fatality in their carefully crafted entertainment products. Powerful commercial imperatives drive the private media companies who produce these ‘car-chase TV’ programmes and the inclusion of this kind of potentially horrific material would be a very poor commercial decision as it could conceivably jeopardise future contracts with programme commissioners.

Furthermore, this would be likely to have a detrimental effect on future access to the police institution for the purposes of filming their activities. According to the interview respondent, the relationship between the media production companies and the police is primarily built on trust. Therefore, having previous experience of media work with the police allows Chief Constables to vouch for the producers when they decide to approach a different force with a view to filming with them. Trust is therefore a vital commodity in this process and this means that the reputation of the production team as a ‘safe pair of hands’ is highly-prized and therefore to be protected at all costs. As an entirely voluntary undertaking, access to the police is therefore granted only to those that the police trust and feel comfortable working with.

Faced with these restrictions, ‘car-chase TV’ instead revels in and titillates its audience with the thrill of the narrowly averted catastrophe, skilfully utilising the near-miss as a valuable currency of authenticity. Our attention is drawn to the danger and the terrible events that *could* have happened and the viewer is asked to imagine the worst case-scenario in the name of entertainment.

The tacit agreement between the producers, the police, broadcasters, advertisers and viewers is clear: nothing too distressing or gruesome will be shown.

The *potentially* horrific consequences of a PVP gone wrong will never appear in these programmes; the viewer is effectively shielded from PVP-related fatalities and serious injuries. If there is any doubt in the wake of a (rare) road traffic collision resulting from a PVP, events which are almost exclusively sourced from North America or other non-U.K. jurisdictions, the viewer is assured that everyone survived the incident and made a full recovery. Therefore we see that 'car-chase TV' conforms to Hollywood-style conventions, in which the apparent peril is acknowledged, mined for thrills then ameliorated in the form of a safe and happy conclusion brought about by the police.

Thus, the narrative of chase and capture is maintained and the happy ending, in which the chaos is averted and normality is restored by the police, is an integral and essential part of the narrative-arc that is followed by the producers of 'car-chase TV'. When disaster is averted - as it invariably is - the concept of the 'lucky escape' is deployed to explain the lack of serious or fatal injuries caused by PVP and the viewer is invited to observe and presumably condemn the dangerous driving of the fleeing suspect repeated in slow-motion replays along with condemnatory utterances from the police, commentators or both. Despite the concession to potential danger contained in 'car-chase TV' programming, the overall presentation is one which valorises PVPs as an entertainment commodity and validates the police response to fleeing suspects as a 'taken for granted' notion which is rarely questioned.

If a PVP-related fatality was to feature in one of these programmes, this would surely serve to delegitimise PVPs; however for the reasons examined above, this is unlikely to transpire. In relating the themes, *PVP Causes Danger* and *Public in Danger* to the research questions, there is no clear evidence in the data to suggest that the spike in concern around PVPs seen in the print-media and elsewhere between 2001 and 2005 impacted on the frequency of these particular themes during 2002 – 2006 (allowing for the one-year lag).

However, towards the end this timeframe in 2006, the beginnings of a notable intensification was identified in the frequency of both of these themes in the *POCA* data (see tables 5.3 and 5.4 above). However, the reasons for this substantial increase are unclear. There was also an increase in the number of instances of the *PVP Causes Danger* and *PVP Minimises Danger* themes both being detected in the same vignettes from 2008 to 2011 across the various *series titles* represented in the data sample broadcast during this period. It could be argued that instances of the *PVP Causes Danger* and *Public in Danger* themes have the potential to delegitimise PVPs. However, when placed in the context of ‘car-chase TV’, these manifestations of mediated danger are constructed through a lens which frames the police as heroic saviours with the means to resolve any dangerous situations and ameliorate the *potential* danger.

This is particularly evident in the later commercial *series titles*, such as *Police Interceptors*, in which the danger themes were very well represented alongside a strong showing for the legitimising theme, *PVP Minimises Danger*. Despite this nod in the direction of danger, the modus operandi of ‘car-chase TV’ is one which tends to crowd-out and overpower these potentially delegitimising themes through a skewed emphasis on more positive legitimising themes such as *Skill*, *Teamwork* and *Management*. This can be seen operating particularly clearly in the BBC-derived series titles, *Traffic Cops* and *Car Wars* and will be examined further below in the section on the *Training* theme.

## **Training**

*Training* is a potentially legitimising theme insofar as it confers a degree of control to the police officers undertaking seemingly unpredictable PVPs. It also signifies preparation and coordination as well as indicating that the police have been equipped with the necessary tools to carry-out PVPs in a safe and organised manner.

As such, training can be seen to furnish the undertaking of PVPs with a sense of organisational legitimacy; conveying the message that the police take PVPs seriously enough to make plans for their successful and safe conclusion, and that they are undertaken by a well-regulated and benevolent institution which will ensure this. The *Training* theme can therefore be seen as a potentially useful component in answering Research Question One, which is concerned with the legitimisation of the police and police work. In addition, this theme may also be able to contribute to Research Question Two - focussing on the programmes' possible response to external concern about PVPs - as a lack of sufficient training formed a potent criticism of PVPs in various newspaper and official reports outlined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern').

No instances of the *Training* theme were detected in the data set for the series titles *Police Stop*, *XCars* and *Motorway Cops*; chronologically this theme was first identified in a *POCA* vignette broadcast in 1998, which referred to the police drivers as 'highly trained pursuit officers' (7.3). A second reference, identified as a *Training* theme was made in the following *POCA* episode also from 1998, during which Alistair Stewart stated that, 'every police driver is highly trained and only allowed behind the wheel of a powerful traffic car after a series of tough courses and stringent examinations' (8.2). A reassuring and potentially legitimising statement, however, according to a Thematic Inspection Report published by HMIC in 1998, police driver training was a cause for serious concern, particularly around the issue of inadequate or non-existent police training prior to involvement in PVPs (HMIC: 1998. 32).

The *Training* theme was not particularly well represented in the *POCA* data; being present in only 15% of the vignettes. Similarly, only one example of the *Training* theme was identified in the *Car Wars* derived data sample, amounting to 7%, the same percentage as was identified in *Road Wars*. However, a much higher frequency of the *Training* theme was detected in two of the other *series titles*, *Police Interceptors* and *Traffic Cops*, in which it was identified in 25% of the vignettes featured.

In the case of *Traffic Cops*, this 25% total amounted to four instances of the *Training* theme and vignette number 18.1, broadcast in 2003 is particularly interesting. It begins with PC Scouthern involved in pursuit of burglars in a stolen vehicle through a housing estate late at night. Interspersed with audio from the PVP itself, the commentator states, 'Chases like this raise questions about who is in control, the traffic cops or the criminals?' (18.1). In a cut-away interview segment, PC Scouthern addresses this question by stating that, 'The thing that we mainly say is that we [the police] are in charge of the pursuit and if the pursuit gets dangerous then we are trained to call it off'. (18.1). Here we have a clear challenge to the legitimacy of PVPs, raising the issue of control and acknowledging the presence of potentially difficult questions around the balance of power during PVPs.

In comparison to the trenchant and persistent criticism of PVPs that was seen in the print media during the same period (examined in Chapter 4 'Chronology of Concern', the question raised in *Traffic Cops* appears relatively innocuous. However, it should be noted that any critique of PVPs emanating from within the world of 'car-chase TV' is an extremely rare phenomenon. This claim is supported with reference to the data sample, throughout which this kind of challenge to the legitimacy of PVP is only seen occasionally in series titles broadcast on the public-sector platform (the BBC) and are entirely absent from those broadcast on the commercial television platforms such as Sky, ITV and Channel 5.

Scouthern's response to this question around the control of PVPs is based firmly upon his training. The viewer is assured that his training has equipped Scouthern, an elite police driver, with the foresight to anticipate any potential harm caused by PVPs that he is undertaking. Therefore, he should be trusted to terminate the pursuit before any harm can occur, based upon his professional judgement of the situation. This is a clear use of *Training* as a riposte to the suggestion that there is an alternative view, contrary to the police-centric position adopted by the vast majority of 'car-chase TV' programmes.

That this question was raised at a time of heightened concern around the issue of PVPs, is evidence that this concern had, in a small but significant way, been acknowledged and included in the material broadcast in *Traffic Cops*.

During another vignette (18.3) featured in the same episode of *Traffic Cops*, a different traffic officer, PC Houghton makes a very similar training-based assessment of the dangers of PVP and his own level of training, stating:

‘If I ever thought that I was putting my own life in danger then I’d stop and I wouldn’t pursue it. I’m confident in my abilities and the ability this force has trained me in to be at an advanced [driving] level. Where the point comes that I think my life is in danger or other people’s lives are in danger, pedestrians, other road users then that’s when I’ll stop.’

Despite these claims of a detached and professional approach made by PC Houghton, the commentator observes that PC Houghton and PC Scouthern are, ‘being sucked-in’ to the PVP they are undertaking, the end result of which is a minor collision between Houghton’s patrol car and the suspect’s vehicle. All ends well and the PVP is potentially relegitimised due to the arrest of the burglary suspects and the apparent rarity, pointed out by the officers themselves, of collisions involving police vehicles during PVPs. There was only one instance of the *Training* theme detected in the *Car Wars* data, however it is perhaps one of the most interesting examples. Broadcast in March 2006 (28.3), the vignette begins with a montage of four short video clips, each showing a car crash resulting from a PVP. The accompanying commentary states that, ‘in recent years concern has been growing over the numbers killed and injured in police car crashes.’ Following this statement, the vignette cuts away to a short studio-based interview with Aimee Bowen, a spokeswoman from the road safety charity Brake, who points out:

‘In the year 2003 to 2004 we saw 31 people killed and over 2000 seriously injured in crashes involving police vehicles that were responding to either emergencies or in high-speed pursuits. Now that is an increase of about 65% on the previous year.’

As this montage of PVP-related car crashes continues the commentary states:

‘[A]ccidents like this are all too common. Last year in Manchester four people died as a result of police pursuits – the worst fatality record of any police force outside London.’

This was clearly an instance of the *PVP Causes Danger* theme as was coded as such. Addressing these potentially delegitimising statistics and the direct criticism aimed at Greater Manchester Police (which was perhaps a response to the rising national concern around the recent sharp increases in PVP-related fatalities), Mike Todd, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police responded, ‘I would agree that one death is one death too many and that’s why we are concentrating on driver training. That’s also why we have the Tactical Vehicle Crime Unit.’

The vignette then cuts away to ‘ride-along’ footage of PC Fletcher, an advanced driver with Manchester Police’s TCVU, undertaking a periodical assessment of his driving capabilities with a police driving instructor as a passenger. The commentator explains that this training exercise is taking place on a country road and then states that, ‘[T]he TCVU’s elite drivers are tested on their skill every three years, it’s pass or fail. This is PC Fletcher’s three year test, ahead of him is a car driven by another police officer whose job it is to make this pursuit as difficult as possible...Fletcher’s job is at stake if he fails...Fletcher must decide if it’s safe to overtake.’

At this point in the vignette, PC Fletcher initiates a dangerous overtaking manoeuvre and this is not well received by the instructor, who admonishes PC Fletcher and observes that had been ‘latched-on’ to the pursuit and as a result, had made some poor decisions during the training exercise. PC Fletcher then apologises to the instructor and there follows a cut-away interview scene in which PC Fletcher explains his reasoning for carrying out the overtake, describing the manoeuvre as ‘a bit cheeky.’

In spite of this potentially serious error, and to his obvious relief, PC Fletcher is declared to have passed the driving assessment, as the instructor believes that his driving has, 'come up to the required standard.' The vignette then returns to Aimee Bowen from Brake, who argues that:

'Police officers are very highly trained individuals, particularly the traffic officers, however by definition every single high-speed car-chase involves two vehicles. One is being driven by a highly trained professional; the other is being driven by a scared criminal whose only objective is to get away from the policeman following them.'

The vignette concludes with Mike Todd who is given the last word, responding with the argument that:

'We cannot have a situation where as soon as someone jumps into a car, having just been involved in a robbery, ram-raid or abduction...they can just drive off and the police aren't going to follow them. Our responsibility is to make sure those pursuits are as safe as they possibly can be.'

This vignette represents the most direct critique of PVPs contained across the data set as the inclusion of two short sections from the Brake spokeswoman clearly represent a direct challenge to the legitimacy of PVPs. As was the case with the previous vignette, the re-legitimising response was based on arguments around the issue of training. If the intention of the training section involving PC Fletcher was to reassure viewers that the training of police drivers is conducted to a very high standard, then it could be argued that this vignette was unlikely to have entirely achieved its aim. The highly dangerous overtaking manoeuvre on a public road which narrowly avoided a serious collision, coupled with the assessment that PC Fletcher had reached the required standard expected of advanced police drivers may not have reassured the more inquisitive, critical or sceptical viewer.

The training vignette certainly raised questions around PC Fletcher's decision making skills and his ability to avoid becoming 'latched-on' during a high-speed PVP. Aimee Bowen's brief comments were separated by this much longer training section but her assertion that police driver training was not the issue, rather the priority should be a more cautious approach to the fleeing suspect was interesting and reflected the argument made by Best (2002: iii) outlined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'). These arguments flatly contradicted Mike Todd's position which was based upon training as a panacea to the danger associated with PVPs. Moreover, Mike Todd's assertion that the PVPs are necessary to address the dangers associated with very serious crimes, such as abduction or robbery completely overlooks the fact, borne out by official reports (PCA: 2002. 38) and other sources (Crickmer: 2001. 10; Calvert: 2001. 21), that many PVPs are undertaken for relatively minor or unknown offences.

These arguments aside, it is interesting that Aimee Bowen from *Brake* and her critique of PVPs was included in this vignette (28.3). It would be difficult to imagine her comments being aired in any of the series titles broadcast on the commercial platforms such as *Police Interceptors*, *Road Wars* or *POCA*. This raises the question, why was Aimee Bowen included in this instance? It is plausible to suggest that her appearance in this BBC programme in 2006 was a manifestation of the concern being expressed in other parts of the media and elsewhere. As was previously examined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), the print-media and police oversight bodies were expressing their concern around the issue of PVPs, with a spike in news reports occurring during 2005. Allowing for the one-year lag in broadcasting, this particular vignette (28.3) would have been produced at roughly the same time. This vignette may therefore present some evidence that, in relation to Research Question Two, the *series title Car Wars* did fleetingly alter its format to allow criticism of PVPs to be included, albeit within a general framework which ultimately continued to legitimise PVPs through an imbalanced weighting towards the pro-police PVP arguments within the same episode.

The presence of critical voices in the vignette raises another question; why was this critique included in the BBC derived portion of the data sample and not in the material broadcast by the commercial operators? A potential answer to this question lies in the differing restrictions and obligations under which the television broadcasters operate. In the mixed economy of the U.K.'s television landscape, the BBC as a public service broadcaster must adhere to a specific set of Editorial Guidelines. In section four, the Guidelines state (BBC: 2015. 23):

‘The Agreement accompanying the BBC Charter requires us to do all we can to ensure controversial subjects are treated with due impartiality in our news and other output dealing with matters of public policy or political or industrial controversy [1]. But we go further than that, applying due impartiality to all subjects. However, its requirements will vary.’

[1] Paragraph 44 (1), Broadcasting: An Agreement Between Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the British Broadcasting Corporation, July 2006.

The guidelines go on to state that:

4.4.7. When dealing with ‘controversial subjects’, we must ensure a wide range of significant views and perspectives are given due weight and prominence, particularly when the controversy is active. Opinion should be clearly distinguished from fact.

These extracts from the BBC Charter dictate that the BBC must treat controversial issues with a degree of impartiality or balance. In practice this means that as well as allowing Chief Constable Mike Todd the right of reply in regard to the number of fatalities that have occurred in his force area due to PVPs, they must also allow space for the counter argument, presented by Aimee Bowen in this case, to be aired.

However, in purely chronological terms, it could be argued that the 'due weight and prominence' given to the arguments made by Aimee Bowen were outweighed by the time allowed for pro-PVP arguments made within the same episode.

This gives the impression of a token response to the controversy surrounding PVPs, introduced in order to satisfy the demands of the Editorial Guidelines. Allowing space for this critique of PVPs to be aired is certainly unusual, however, it is a long way from, for example allowing the bereaved family members of those killed by PVPs onto the airwaves. In the vignette immediately following this one, another seldom-seen event was shown (28.4). A suspect vehicle flees from traffic officer PC Bruce for no apparent reason and is involved in a serious collision with another car, causing the occupants of both vehicles to become trapped inside the severely mangled wreckage of their vehicles. What is unusual about this vignette is that the cameras are able to film the car thief injured and crying whilst trapped inside the wreckage of the stolen car. Demonstrating commendable professionalism, PC Bruce quickly switched roles from pursuer to life-saver while the innocent motorist and suspect are both eventually freed from the wreckage of the two vehicles and taken to hospital.

Whilst the event was technically a PVP, insofar as the suspect was knowingly fleeing from a police officer who was attempting to pursue him, the very large distance between the two vehicles and the very short duration of the PVP rendered the officer's involvement in events marginal at best. Other officers arrive on the scene and view the footage of the incident at the scene using the on-board video recording equipment. A consensus is quickly reached among the half-dozen officers viewing the footage on the small video monitor at the scene of the crash and the verdict is that that PC Bruce is in the clear, as according to another traffic officer, '[You're] well off him aren't you there – not an issue with it at all is there?' (28.4).

In the aftermath of the collision, PC Bruce states that (28.4):

‘The main concern is the people in the vehicles; to make sure that nobody is too seriously injured. It’s very, very frustrating... all this could have been avoided if the lad in the Volvo had just pulled over and stopped – this would never have occurred.

You still feel upset...but you have to remind yourself that the accident has happened totally because of one person and that’s the driver of the [fleeing] Volvo.’

This choice of this vignette to follow the previously critical one (28.3) could be seen to re-legitimise PVPs through an emphasis on the life-saving role of police drivers, undertaken diligently even when the injured party is a dangerous car thief who was clearly to blame for the injuries caused both to himself and the innocent motorist he collided with. Furthermore, in this vignette the police driver was unequivocally not at fault, demonstrating that police drivers are not always responsible for accidents and injuries resulting from PVPs.

These two vignettes (28.3, 28.4) aired in 2006, raise questions about how this particular BBC series title balanced its obligation to the Editorial Guidelines (BBC: 2015) with its obvious reliance on access to the police as a source of material. Allowing the critique of PVPs to be heard, but then following it up immediately with a PVP vignette which was highly sympathetic to the police point of view arguably demonstrates a tendency to favour the police view on the causes, culpability and solutions associated with the controversial issue of PVPs. Despite this example of a tendency to legitimise PVPs, albeit with the inclusion of a small number of critical voices, vignette 28.3 can arguably be seen as a response to the controversy surrounding PVPs that was examined in a previous chapter. Although this televised critique represents only an isolated example of potential delegitimation, similar critiques were not detected in any of the data broadcast on the commercial platforms.

The commercial operators would be far less likely to include critiques of PVP as there is no obligation for them to do so. Moreover, critical opinions would be likely to contradict the overall message that high-speed PVPs are entertaining and not impacted by real world problems and issues. In the simplistic television fantasy-world created by these out-and-out entertainment products, there would be no benefit to introducing health and safety spoilers into the format.

However, in the vignettes examined above, broadcast on both commercial and public service television platforms, it can be seen that *Training* is a theme which, although only present in just over 11 percent of the vignettes contained in the sample, nevertheless has the potential, when it occurs to relegitimise PVPs in response to criticism.

## **Management**

The *Management* theme is highly relevant to Research Questions One and Two for a number of interlinked reasons. The management of PVPs can be seen as closely aligned to Weber's concept of Rational Legal legitimacy (Weber: 1978. 215). This is because both the rules of engagement around PVPs and ultimately their legitimacy are both based on legal authority. As was examined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), these rules of engagement became increasingly stringent and proscriptive, before their voluntary basis was eventually overturned and codified in 2011 (IPCC: 2011). Prior to this, a great deal of the criticism levelled at PVPs was based upon their poor management (ACPO: 1989. 3; Rix et al: 1997; Best: 2002. i; ACPO: 2004). This oversight is therefore a critical factor in the legitimisation of PVPs and is represented here by the *Management* theme, which in turn is related to the concept of bureaucracy so vital within the Weberian framework.

The Legal Rational legitimacy of PVPs is therefore rooted in visible and accountable adherence to the rules of engagement which itself has a Legal Rational basis.

In specific terms related to Research Questions One and Two, identifiable instances of PVP oversight and intervention are potentially useful indicators that the concerns expressed both by the print-media and other sources outlined in Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern') were being manifested in the research data and then neutralised by reference to the purported antidote of effective and rational management.

The *Management* theme was not identified in the data for the series *titles, Police Stop, XCars or Motorway Cops*.

It was present in only one vignette from *Car Wars, POCA and Police Interceptors* and was identified three times each in both *Road Wars* and *Traffic Cops*. Despite this relatively meagre showing for the *Management* theme in the data, it is worth examining a number of examples in which this theme was identified. Firstly, it must be noted that this theme was barely present in the data between 1994 and 2003. This absence is hardly surprising in view of the lack of effective regulation during the 1990s and into the early part of the new millennium, as was examined in a Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'). Referring to the data, two instances of the *Management* theme were detected in the material broadcast in 2003.

The first of these was contained in a vignette from *Road Wars* in which an individual at police headquarters orders pursuing police vehicles to back off from the pursuit when a helicopter arrives to take over the management of the PVP (17.8).

The second instance of the *Management* theme from the material broadcast in 2003 is from the *Traffic Cops* data. In this vignette (18.2), footage of a PVP being undertaken by PC Scouthern is interspersed with cut-away shots of the control room at police headquarters whilst the commentator states that:

'[P]olice pursuits are no longer solely in the hands of the traffic cops behind the wheel. The real power sits at headquarters in the control room; watching and listening is a specially trained Pursuit Management Inspector (PMI).'

The vignette then cuts to an interview with PMI Craig Pratchett, who states, '[M]y training has helped me in pursuit management. It's not essential but it allows me to have a perspective of the experience which the pursuing driver is engaged in.' However it quickly becomes apparent that PC Scouthern is having significant communication difficulties with his control room. It takes several attempts before the PMI realises that Scouthern is telling him that he is undertaking a PVP and there are clear signs that PC Scouthern is frustrated by this obvious breakdown in communication.

In another *Traffic Cops* vignette broadcast in 2010 (45.1), two patrol cars are involved in the pursuit of an overloaded van.

The officers are granted authorisation to use 'tactical contact' in an attempt to stop the vehicle and one of the officers manages to stop the van by shunting it from the side as it entered a roundabout. In the aftermath of the safe conclusion of the PVP and the arrest of the suspect the police driver states:

'I've never done [a tactical contact] before. I was surprised we were given the authorisation to use that manoeuvre...I was unaware at that stage that the Inspector was completely unaware that it was a fully laden, long wheel base hi-top Mercedes Sprinter van that weighed so much more than our (patrol) BMWs' (45.1).

This vignette brings into sharp relief, the apparent disconnect between the officers 'on the ground' and the PMI back at HQ, who was unable to grasp details relating to the type of vehicle that the officers were attempting to stop. This communication breakdown could have resulted in very serious consequences for the officers 'on the ground'. However, far from delegitimising the PVP at the centre of this vignette, the bravery and tenacity of the traffic officers, coupled with a good result; the arrest of a suspect with only minor damage to one patrol car, served to mitigate the potential delegitimation caused by this obvious communication breakdown.

In a later *Traffic Cops* vignette broadcast in 2008 (38.1) the management of PVPs takes centre stage. A teenager in a stolen Jaguar is being pursued by several police vehicles, through a busy town-centre. The pursuing officers are instructed by the control room to back off to avoid putting pressure on the teenager and the helicopter takes over the pursuit and commentary. While the teenager is being apprehended, the commentator interjects with the explanation that, 'these days, chasing kids in cars is not approved of, even though stolen vehicles...driven by youngsters are all too common.' Later in the same episode, during a vignette not containing footage of an actual PVP (38), officers are on patrol and looking out for a stolen car when a motorbike speeds past their marked police vehicle, overtaking them at high speed.

The officers don't attempt to pursue the motorbike and the commentator explains that, 'like under-aged kids in cars, motorbike riders who don't want to stop are also off limits to pursuing traffic cops.' The vignette (38) continues with the police driver stating that:

[W]e are really knackered on the pursuit policy...for no...once a motorbike fails to stop...we are supposed to stop, pull-over and pass it out as observations. A pursuit and nobody at the end of it – rankles. It's something you've just got to live with. If you let it rankle too much, you wouldn't be doing this job for too long.'

The vignette (38) continues and the two officers pull over and stop as details come in over the radio of a PVP taking place some distance away from their current position. They listen intently to the police radio and a male voice, presumably that of a PMI, clearly states, 'Tango-one-zero. Due to the age of the driver of the car, being very, very young, the pursuit is not, the pursuit is not authorised, the pursuit is not authorised.' This message elicits an unfavourable reaction from the two officers sitting in their car listening to the radio messages, who sigh loudly, roll their eyes and drop their heads before one opines that:

‘...it’s very disappointing, it’s difficult to say why the consent of the supervisor was aborted at that point, the age of the driver is without doubt an aggravating factor... myself if I was behind the vehicle and anything was looking dangerous, I’d abort it. The offenders will come another day’ (38).

The officers filmed here were clearly very disappointed that they were not permitted to pursue; both the potential excitement of the chase and the consequent satisfaction of arresting the suspect were denied to them by more senior ranks. They appeared to disagree with the decision made by the control room staff and point out their own competence to terminate the PVP should it become too dangerous.

There are clear parallels here with the historical research literature which suggests the existence of conflict and friction between the officers ‘on the ground’ and senior management who seek to control their behaviour (Reuss-Ianni: 1982; Reiner: 2010. 116; Fassin: 2013. 26; Newburn and Reiner: 2012. 812). This particular vignette could be seen as legitimising PVPs as it conveys the message that police managers are the cool-headed and sensible arbiters of whether a pursuit should take place, based on strict risk-assessments. This promotes the image of a professional police force which is in charge of PVP events and can therefore reign in officers who might want to put the public at risk by undertaking dangerous PVP without good cause to do so.

Conversely, it could be argued that these restrictions on the discretion of officers on the ground to pursue a suspect if they feel it appropriate may lead to a different kind of criticism that of a weak and ineffective police force unwilling to pursue criminals due to health and safety concerns. These kinds of criticism are never far away and resurface periodically (Buchanan: 2005; Evans: 2006; BBC: 2007; Neil: 2007; Tozer: 2010; Docherty: 2015). It is hard to imagine the commercial operators including such material in their broadcasts.

Doing so would reduce the excitement and impact of their programming, potentially have a detrimental impact on their viewing figures and complicate the simple narrative structure of chase and capture that underpins much of their content.

As with the previously discussed themes, there appears to be differences in the way that the public service and commercial broadcasters convey the *Management* theme. The BBC-derived *series titles* tend to include a much greater level of explanation relating to the management and oversight of PVPs than is typically conveyed in the output of the commercial broadcasters. In particular the BBC series title *Traffic Cops* conveyed in detail both the implementation of more a more proscriptive pursuit police and the effect that these management restrictions had on the officers which were subject to them.

### **Adherence to Policy**

The *Adherence to Policy* theme differs from the *Management* theme in one key respect; it was identified only when traffic officers 'on the ground' were seen to be voluntarily following PVP guidelines without any direct or overt Management input, guidance or instruction. Although not commonly seen in the research data; being detected primarily in the material between 2008 and 2011 in the *series titles* *Traffic Cops*, and *Police Interceptors*. Examples of this theme in the sample usually took the form of short statements made by traffic officers to their control rooms, such as:

(40.1). [Traffic Cops]. [Officer]. 'I am pursuit-management trained, authorised vehicle, low-risk; no other vehicles.'

(47.1). [Police Interceptors]. [Officer]. 'Pursuit trained from Rayleigh.'

*Adherence to Policy* is a potent legitimising theme because it demonstrates that police drivers engaging in PVPs are professional, following the correct rules and exercising their discretion in a responsible manner.

This has obvious positive connotations and can be seen to refute potential allegations that police are simply a bunch of gung-ho, unregulated and uncontrollable 'asphalt cowboys' (Skolnick: 1975. 246). As with the *Management* theme discussed above, it could be argued that the *Adherence to Policy* theme confers (in Weber's terms) Legal Rational legitimacy to PVPs, as when detected this theme demonstrates that the police are simultaneously bound by *and* following the rules governing their conduct (Weber: 1978. 215).

### **Excitement Cops**

The *Excitement Cops* theme refers to statements or suggestions that the police derive excitement as a result of taking part in PVPs. It is relevant to both Research Questions One and Two as it has the potential to delegitimise PVPs. This potential delegitimation is based on the suggestion that rather than undertake PVPs in order to protect the public from dangerous criminals, they are instead undertaken to generate excitement or thrills and seen as a 'personal challenge' by the police officers in pursuit. As will be examined in more detail below, it can be argued that explanations for the phenomenon of joyriding share a number of motivational factors with the police drivers who pursue them. In this regard, the legitimacy of PVPs can be challenged in circumstances where the motivations of the police and the fleeing suspect converge.

Clarity around the motivation for police drivers to engage in PVPs is therefore a crucial component in their legitimacy and any suggestion that they are undertaken for 'sport' is likely to be a potent delegitimising factor. The presence or otherwise of this theme is a potentially useful indicator of the stated motivations for undertaking PVPs that are conveyed in the data. Occurrences of this theme can therefore be seen as directly relevant to Research Questions One and Two. The frequency of this theme in the data was, perhaps unsurprisingly, very low but there were very marked differences between the rates in specific series titles.

There were no instances of the theme *Excitement Cops* identified in the data from *Police Stop* or *Police Interceptors* and occurrences of this theme were negligible in the data from *POCA* (2%), *Car Wars* (7%) and *Road Wars* (5%).

However, the theme *Excitement Cops* was identified in one-third of the vignettes in the BBC series title *XCars*, in 37 percent of the vignettes in the BBC series *Traffic Cops* and was also identified in the single vignette from the BBC series title *Motorway Cops*. The BBC-derived series titles in the data therefore accounted for almost 77 percent of the instances of the *Excitement Cops* theme, with almost half of these instances being contained in *Traffic Cops*.

There was little evidence of the *Excitement Cops* theme in much of the research data sourced from the commercial broadcasters.

In an *XCars* vignette, (5.1) a specialist traffic officer from Manchester Police's Tactical Vehicle Crime Unit (TCVU) offers an explanation of why PVPs take place through recourse to the familiar notion of the joyrider who steals cars for thrills and the entertainment of both himself and others in his peer-group. The officer argues that these car thieves view being chased by the police as both a personal challenge and an opportunity for additional thrills, beyond simply stealing the car. The officer goes on to posit that being chased by the police is regarded as a high-status activity among the (predominantly) young males within particular social groupings. Therefore, following the chase, the young males are able to claim 'bragging rights' amongst their peers, through a demonstration of their driving prowess, evidenced by their ability to escape from their police pursuers.

Ironically too, this explanation shares a number of similarities with the motivations of traffic officers for undertaking PVPs. There is considerable research literature to suggest that PVPs are both enjoyed and feted as a high-status activity by the police officers on the ground for very similar reasons (see for example Holdaway: 1983. 135; Smith & Gray: 1983. 53; Benn & Worpole: 1986. 65; Fassin: 2013. 81; Loftus: 2010. 7).

In a later vignette from *Traffic Cops* broadcast in 2003 (19.2), a traffic officer explains that young males steal cars because, 'they want to show how good they are at driving and getting away from a police car is one way that they can show that.'

It could be argued that whilst attempting to explain the factors motivating the suspects they are pursuing, the officer is also inadvertently provided some insight into the motivations for the pursuing police drivers; the personal challenge of matching their skills against the fleeing youths. In addition, there is similar corroborating evidence present in the research data. For example, during another XCars vignette, two traffic officers, abandon their half-eaten kebab supper to pursue and successfully apprehend a suspected car thief.

(5.4). [Officer One]. '[the PVP has been]...all worthwhile...my kebab is up there [points to throat]. He's like that 'come on!' [all officers present laugh] and I'm thinking my foot is to the floor in the RS [Cosworth]'

Officer One is making light of the detrimental effect that the PVP-induced adrenalin-rush has had on the digestion of his kebab and recounting the moment his police colleague, the passenger in his high-powered RS Cosworth Sierra, was imploring him to drive faster, despite him having his 'foot to the floor'. The sound of laughter among his colleagues as he recounts his 'war story' signals the obvious approval of the group, his peers and fellow officers. This vignette demonstrates that traffic officers derive enjoyment and excitement from PVPs and that they confer status on those who participate in them. Scenes like this can therefore potentially delegitimising PVP by creating the impression that police drivers may engage in PVPs for their own gratification rather than to serve and protect the public and are prepared to take these risks in order to satisfy their selfish desire for excitement.

In another, more clear-cut example from the BBC series title, *Motorway Cops*, traffic officer PC Smith candidly states that, '[A] pursuit does get the adrenalin going and it makes for the excitement of the job – it's one of the reasons why you do it (42.1). Other examples include a later vignette from *Car Wars* during which a traffic officer reports that during a PVP, '...the adrenalin buzz is quite strong' (28.4). The examples above were coded as instances of the *Excitement Cops* theme.

There was also evidence in the research data (19.2) indicating the magnetic appeal of PVPs to traffic officers who will go to extraordinary lengths to try and get 'in on the action.' In an example from a non-PVP vignette from *Traffic Cops* (38), the officers featured are trying to catch-up with a pursuit that is underway a few miles from their current position. Driving in a frantic manner, the officer burns out the clutch on his patrol car, but he is not deterred by this significant mechanical challenge.

Instead, he suggests that, as he lives just around the corner from where the patrol car has broken down, he could quickly run home and get his own car in order to continue their attempt to catch up with the PVP. This is quickly deemed to be a bad idea and the officers instead continue at an amusingly low-speed in their crippled patrol car. There is also evidence in the data (32.2) that inter-force and more localised inter-unit rivalries may also be a strong motivational factor for involvement in PVPs, specifically the aim of ensuring bragging-rights associated with being first on the scene to make the arrest. The Thames Valley Police units featured in the series title *Road Wars* were given the call-sign *Tango Vulture*, a play on their real call-sign, *Tango Victor*, by other units on their division owing to their tendency to arrive on the scene of an incident and steal the arrest from other officers (Davies: 2008. 1).

In a *Traffic Cops* vignette broadcast in 2011 (49.1), a traffic officer is able to beat his more experienced colleagues to the arrest following a PVP. The commentary exclaims that, 'being on a pursuit so soon [into his traffic career] is a real bonus.', before the officer explains that, 'it's my first follow in five years – so... that's the best time I've ever had in a traffic car.'

This quote underlines the pleasure that this particular police officer derived from the PVP and subsequent arrest, made ahead of his colleagues. This was coded as an example of the *Excitement Cops* theme. As was outlined earlier, this theme has the potential to delegitimise PVPs, by conveying the impression that the police may be undertaking pursuits motivated by the potential thrills of the chase, rather than by their role as public protectors. The introduction of the potential for inter-force and inter-unit competition is also potentially delegitimising. It is perhaps worth restating that the instances of the *Excitement Cops* theme were predominantly identified in the series titles broadcast by the BBC and that they appeared to increase in frequency from 2007 onwards

Conversely the very low frequency of the *Excitement Cops* theme in the output broadcast by the commercial operators is also significant. In a *Police Stop* vignette from 1994, the commentator states during footage of a high-speed PVP that, '[P]olice do not like having to follow vehicles driving like this, but are obliged to do so' (2.1).

This, it could be argued, represents the legitimisation of the police actions being conveyed on-screen by dispelling any notion that the officers featured in the vignette may be enjoying the PVP, instead intoning (rather clumsily) that PVPs are simply a job which police drivers are reluctantly forced to undertake.

These potentially legitimising messages are not confined to the material broadcast by the commercial operators. A similar message was conveyed by an episode of *Traffic Cops* broadcast in 2004 (27. Intro). Although not containing a PVP, a cut-away interview section forming part of the introduction to the episode contained an interview with a traffic officer, who states that:

'When you're in a pursuit you can't wait for it to stop, you're just trying to stop them killing themselves, killing somebody else and when things go wrong you do have that question mark in your head; is there anything I could have done differently' (27. Intro).

This statement, a result of the 'police voice' being allowed the space to be heard, conveys the notion that not all police drivers enjoy PVPs. Furthermore, it suggests that PVPs are undertaken to protect both the public and the fleeing suspect, whilst speaking to the psychological trauma and potential regrets in the aftermath of a PVP gone wrong. Although not contained in a PVP-related vignette, this statement represents a rare example of explicit doubt being expressed around the issue of PVP by a police driver, a sentiment not expressed in the commercially broadcast sample data. In another vignette (14.2) with a broadly similar theme broadcast by the *series title Car Wars* in 2002 against the backdrop of a spike in concern around PVPs, an interview with a traffic officer is interspersed with footage of him undertaking a PVP.

During the PVP, which took place during the rush hour, the officer pursued the suspect through a busy petrol station. Reflecting on his decision making during the interview, the officer states:

'I can look at every single incident and I can relate to how I was feeling at the time, what should I have possibly done, what I shouldn't have done. I tend to look at that video and still see things that I could have done better. Hitting a petrol pump and knocking it off its mountings would have been horrendous...if I find myself involved in a situation where I should have to be involved in a pursuit and it heads towards a petrol station then that would be the first thing that would come into my mind...I am not following this guy through a (petrol station) forecourt regardless' (14.2).

These two vignettes (27, 14.2), conveying reluctance to pursue and post-PVP regrets respectively, demonstrate the mixed messages that are present in the data round the theme of *Excitement Cops*. Perhaps this is simply a reflection of different opinions held by some traffic officers who genuinely do not relish the prospect of undertaking a highly dangerous and unpredictable PVP. It would therefore probably be a mistake to suggest that *all* traffic officers derive pleasure from PVPs. If this is correct, then allowing the police voice to be heard would invariably produce a variety of opinions to be expressed around the issue of PVPs.

However, there are clearly some key differences in the way that PVPs are conveyed by the BBC, a public service broadcaster, and those following a commercial broadcast model. Whilst the BBC derived series titles were more likely to broadcast material which conveyed the excitement of PVPs for the police conducting them, the same cannot be said of the commercial operators, who appear far more reticent to broadcast this kind of meaning within their output.

The absence of the *Excitement Cops* theme in the majority of the material broadcast by the commercial operators appears to be a case of ‘the dog that didn’t bark.’ This absence may serve to legitimise PVPs through a tendency to avoid the message that PVPs are fun for those undertaking them, despite these programmes clearly emphasising their entertainment value for the viewers of PVP as a commercial entertainment spectacle.

## **The Research Questions Answered**

### 1. Do PVP-based TV programmes legitimise the police and police work? If so, how do they do this?

As has been examined in the discussion above, the tendency of the ob-doc *series titles* under examination here is to legitimise both the police and the work that they undertake. However, there are noticeable differences in the way that this is done by BBC and commercial broadcasters. Officers are valorised in various ways. For example, *Teamwork* as a theme was detected in almost half of the vignettes in the sample and this can be seen as crucial in presenting a unified image of the police in both the public sector (BBC) and commercially broadcast material.

Another commonly identified theme, *Public in Danger* which was detected in almost 45 percent of the sampled episodes can be seen as the presentation of peril; dangerous situations which only the police are able to resolve – regardless of their responsibility for helping to create or sustain the danger presented by PVPs.

However, this is peril very much constructed on the television producers' terms. The programmes also serve to legitimise PVPs by omitting to represent their potentially delegitimising features. Choosing to ignore the concern around PVPs is perhaps both an understandable and sensible decision on the part of the commercial programmes, as including critical material could potentially threaten future police cooperation with the production companies and jeopardise the financial and logistical viability of their entertainment products.

But whatever the cause of this omission, it does have the effect of tacitly legitimising, or at least, not delegitimising PVPs. As a public service broadcaster, the BBC has an obligation to provide a balanced approach when engaging with controversial issues. But what the data show is a small and largely token effort to critique what is potentially the most controversial of subjects addressed in these programmes, the PVP. Following this perfunctory critique, PVPs and those conducting them are re-legitimised using one or more techniques which can include a focus on the high-quality of police driver *Training, Management (oversight) of PVPs, Adherence to (PVP) Policy*, the *Practical Skills* of the police in action or simply a reassuring statement from a senior police officer.

The working arrangements around access to the police for the purpose of filming are significant drivers shaping the overall presentation of the police in this type of programming. Both the public service and commercial broadcasters rely on the cooperation of the police in order to produce their content. When standard filming techniques, such as the 'ride-along', are employed, these ensure that the events are almost always depicted from the police point of view. The camera (or viewer) is protected by the thin blue line, in both a cinematographic and literal sense. The police officer and narrator act as guides to make sense of the proceedings being conveyed.

The interview respondent was keen to stress the importance of getting the 'right kind of officers' to regularly feature on camera as this was deemed crucial in encouraged viewers to empathise with the officers, 'doing a tough job in difficult circumstances.'

Thus the police are presented as ‘good guys’, as ‘citizens in uniform’ carrying out the policing by consent which is the traditional basis for police legitimacy in Britain. Indeed, the consent of the viewer to the policing depicted is effectively, if usually tacitly, solicited by these programmes. The likeability and appeal of the police officers featured may therefore be about much more than maintaining empathy and viewing figure and it could perhaps be argued that this is linked to Weber’s concept of Charismatic authority – authority linked to the positive personal qualities of those with power.

There were numerous examples of Humour being present in the 51 episodes that comprised the sample, although rarely was this included in the PVP-related vignettes. The series titles, *Police Interceptors* and *Traffic Cops* in particular were prone to the inclusion of humour, usually consisting of horseplay, jocular ‘banter’ between officers and amusing encounters with the public which are interspersed between the more serious PVP-related action sequences. Again, this assists in constructing the police officers featured as being charismatic and likeable but still somehow ordinary decent people – citizens in uniform.

In contrast, the television programmes tend to favour commentary that uses derogatory terminology to delegitimise the suspects featured in their output. *POCA* tended to favour terms such as ‘thief’ (7.2, 15.5), ‘criminal’ (7.3, 8.1, 11.3, 13.3, 18.5), ‘fugitive’ (13.2) and occasionally terms such as ‘mad motorcyclist’ (11.7) and ‘caravan criminals’ (10.2). Similar labels and phrases were used in *Road Wars* but with the addition of some jocular slang epithets such as, ‘total head-banger’ (17.3), ‘muppet’ (20.2), ‘dohnut’ (20.3) and ‘numpty’ (20.2, 41.3). *Police Interceptors* used terms such as ‘boy-racer’ (36.1), ‘maniac’ (36.3), ‘nutter’ (21.3) and ‘dohnut’ (37.1).

The BBC-derived material did occasionally use this type of colourful language to describe the suspects featured in their programmes; however they tended to primarily favour more straightforward terms in preference to street-slang. *Car Wars* opted for descriptions including ‘joyriding thief’ (14.1), ‘thief’ (14.2, 14.7, 14.6, 28.2) and ‘car thief’ (14.2.).

*Traffic Cops* used descriptors such as ‘ruthless burglars’ (18.1), ‘muggers’ (18.2), ‘car thief’ (22.2), ‘criminal’ (26.1), ‘maniac’ (27.1, 43.1) and ‘kamikaze driver’ (48.1).

It can be seen that there is a clear difference between the descriptors utilised by the commercially broadcast and public service transmitted material. The commercially broadcast material tended to use more derogatory and humorous slang to describe the suspects in their material.

There were no instances of humour contained in the PVP—related vignettes from the *series title* *POCA*. However, the majority of *POCA* episodes featured a ‘humorous’ and often quite cruel ending, usually comprising of an unusual or bizarre scenario set against a musical backdrop. Examples of this include a half-dressed, intoxicated or mentally ill man attempting to direct a busy stream of traffic to the strains of The Bee Gee’s, *Staying Alive* and a heavily intoxicated woman falling over whilst failing a ‘field sobriety test’ being administered by an American traffic officer to the musical accompaniment of Run DMC and Aerosmith’s, *Walk this Way*. These vignettes are presumably included to end the programme on a lighter note whilst conveying the message that despite all the dangerous situations that we have just voyeuristically enjoyed, nobody has been (seriously) hurt and we can all take a ‘feel-good’ moment to chuckle at the antics of someone less fortunate, drunk or mentally ill.

Whilst this type of comedy vignette was clearly considered to be an important component in the overall package of material included in the majority of the episodes of *POCA*, there appears to have been a concerted effort to compartmentalise this humour well away from PVPs, which are conveyed in an altogether more serious fashion.

The clear implication of this editorial decision is that PVPs are no laughing matter and should be conveyed in a manner befitting the seriousness of the situation. Humour could be seen as a potentially delegitimising factor if used ‘incorrectly’, for example in conjunction with a potentially dangerous PVP, as this may convey the message that the police do not take PVPs seriously.

The omission of humour from the vast majority of PVP-related vignettes can be seen as potentially legitimising them, by contrasting the humourlessness with which PVPs are conveyed with the humour present elsewhere in the programmes. As a final point here, the manner in which the commentator feeds the synopsis and other pertinent information to the viewer is also worthy of consideration with regard to the legitimacy of PVPs. In a phenomenon I have labelled, 'the benefit of oversight', it is often the case that the viewer has more information than the officer 'on the ground'.

This is because the commentary is added in post-production and the producer therefore has a certain amount of discretion regarding what and crucially, *when* key pieces of information are given to the viewer.

Consider a PVP where the officer has no idea why the suspect is fleeing. What we essentially see is the traffic officer chasing the suspect for no known reason. This could potentially delegitimise the PVP being undertaken as it could be argued that the officer has no reason, other than the fact that the suspect is fleeing, to give chase. However, through the commentary, the viewer will often be told the reason why the suspect is fleeing before the arrest is made. This is the 'benefit of oversight' in action, subtly impacting upon (or even manipulating) the viewer's perception of the events being conveyed and providing 'post-hoc legitimisation.'

## 2. Did PVP-based television programmes alter in response to public and official concern about PVPs expressed during the period 2001 – 2006? If so, how?

The commercial broadcasters appeared to largely ignore the concern around PVPs that was expressed elsewhere during 2001-2006, with the possible exception of the series title *Police Interceptors* which - perhaps due to its contemporaneous nature - did present the theme *Adherence to Policy* in 50 percent of the vignettes it contributed to the data sample during the time period 2008-2011. However, a number of these were fleeting occurrences of this theme; used as a device to ramp up the excitement.

In any event, the *Police Interceptors* data falls outside the chronological remit of the question, beginning its broadcast run in 2008.

Similarly, *POCA* was not regularly broadcast between 2003 and 2006, rendering an assessment in relation to Research Question Two somewhat problematic. However, as was examined above, there was a significant increase in the *PVP Causes Danger* and *Public in Danger* themes detected in the *POCA* data from 2005 to 2008 (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The reasons for this remain unclear.

The *Road Wars* data did not demonstrate any alterations in response to the public and official concern around PVPs between 2001 and 2006. However, this concern did elicit a response in the BBC *series title*, *Traffic Cops*. Presumably as part of their obligation to deal with controversial issues in a balanced manner, there were instances where the concern around PVPs was clearly manifested in the data.

Broadcast in 2003, *Traffic Cops* vignette 18.3 contained a lengthy section posing the question, who is in control of PVPs? This question was quickly buried under an avalanche of re-legitimising interviews with police drivers and their PMI. In a later *Cars Wars* episode broadcast in 2006 (28.3), a spokeswoman from the road safety charity, Brake was given a platform to raise concerns arising from large increase in the number of police-related road traffic fatalities and serious injuries during the period 2003 to 2004. Again, these criticisms were squeezed-out by a skewed focus on the 'police voices' which unsurprisingly drowned out these potentially delegitimising concerns with opinions which tend to legitimise PVPs.

There was also evidence that the BBC-broadcast episodes were more likely to show the effect of increasingly stringent restrictions on PVPs.

Although broadcast in 2008 and therefore outside the timescale specified for Research Question Two, a *Traffic Cops* episode broadcast in 2008 (38) left no doubt that the restrictions were not welcomed by all traffic officers.

To summarise the answer to Research Question Two, the commercial broadcasters did not respond clearly in terms of alterations to their formats, in response to the concern expressed around the issue of PVP during the period 2001 to 2006. However, there was some limited evidence that the BBC-derived data responded to these concerns, although ultimately these concerns were ultimately negated with potentially re-legitimising themes.

3. Has the visibility of PVPs conveyed in the PVP-related TV programmes been subject to a decline over time? If so, why might this be the case?

Referring to Appendix 2, it quickly becomes apparent that there has been an historical decline in the number of PVPs contained in the 51 episodes spanning 1993 to 2011 that were contained in the sample. Not only has the number of PVPs declined, but so has the percentage of PVP-related content in the 51 episodes that comprise the sample. This decline is not particularly smooth in terms of the number or percentage. However, according to the criteria for identifying PVPs in the data outlined in Chapter 3 ('Methodology'), there is a clear downward trend.

For example, the first ten episodes in the data sample (1-10, spanning 1993 to 2000) contain 40 PVPs whereas the final ten episodes in the sample (42-51, spanning 2009 - 2011) contain 9 PVPs. In terms of percentages, the first ten episodes in the data sample contain a mean percentage of 32.5% PVP-related content, whereas the final ten episodes contain a mean percentage of 11.6. There are a number of possible explanations for this decline in the visibility of PVPs. The most obvious of these is that there are fewer pursuits taking place and the decline in visibility of PVPs on television is simply a reflection of this.

Data relating to the actual number of PVPs taking place is very difficult to obtain. However, there is anecdotal evidence in the data to suggest that PVPs have become increasingly rare over the previous ten to fifteen years, a point which one traffic officer also makes in an episode of *Traffic Cops* (49.1). This may be due to the introduction of more stringent restrictions on the discretion of traffic officers.

However, there have also been a great many car security improvements over the timespan covered by the data sample and as a result, cars are now simply much more difficult to steal or take for the purpose of joyriding than was the case in the 1990s.

Purely in terms of their visibility in 'car-chase TV' products, it must be considered that the particular regional force that the production company is embedded with will have a bearing on the type of material that is produced. As the interview respondent made clear, filming with a small or predominantly rural force will tend to produce less PVP material than working with a large urban force. Therefore, producers tend to 'cherry-pick' the forces that they want to work with based upon the variety and type of material they need and expect to film. As the producers work their way through their preferred force options, they invariably end up filming with their third or fourth preference force and endure the predicted lack of high-octane PVP-related action sequences. A lack of exciting PVP vignettes could potentially have the knock-on effect of a slump in ratings and the eventual withering of the format, resulting in the series title failing to be recommissioned by the executives who decide what is shown on television.

The television landscape is constantly changing in an attempt to counteract the potential boredom of the viewing public and generally speaking, there are now fewer police ob-doc series titles being produced in the U.K. than was the case in the 2000s. Obviously there are repeat broadcasts of some series titles, but the PVP-based ob-doc format appears to be in decline. The relationship between the police and the media is not always harmonious and mutually beneficial. In evidence given to the Leveson inquiry, the Chief Constable of South Wales, Peter Vaughan thought that with hindsight:

'he regrets allowing officers to be filmed for the BBC One programme *Traffic Cops* [because] the televised behaviour of some officers was not representative of the South Wales Police [and was] damaging to the force's reputation' (Hacked Off: 2012. 1).

Mr Vaughan went on to tell the inquiry that the broadcasts of *Traffic Cops* featuring his officers were now used as a training tool to assist with their media training.

These concerns around the representation of the police in an ob-doc setting are similar to those expressed in 2008 by the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, Sara Thornton (Davies: 2008. 1) who thought that the series title *Road Wars* made her officers appear 'weak'. Although these concerns are expressed only sporadically, they do indicate the existence of unease amongst senior officers in some forces relating to the presentation of their officers and the potentially detrimental effect that this may have on perceptions of their force as a whole.

Finally, there exists the possibility that, as the concern around PVPs has reduced over recent years, the decline in the visibility of PVPs is perhaps a symptom of this? Although it is impossible to be certain that there is a link between the two factors, the waning of media attention, reduction in fatalities and the decline in concern means that PVPs no longer require the 'repair-work' of legitimisation to be undertaken by 'car-chase TV' programming.

## CONCLUSION

Thus it can be seen that 'car-chase TV' programming tends to legitimise the police, police work and PVPs. The analysis also demonstrated a varied response to the concern around PVPs expressed in other areas of the media and in official circles. The BBC-derived material tended to pay lip-service to this concern, whilst the commercially broadcast material exhibited no manifestation of this concern, even during large spikes in the number of PVP-related fatalities in the 'real world'. In the chronological data sample analysed, PVPs have been subject to a clear decline in visibility for a variety of potential reasons. In the research findings also pointed to interesting and unexpected differences that exist in the ways that the public sector and commercial broadcasters tend to legitimise PVPs. With the exception of *XCars* which was made in-house by the BBC, it must be noted that all the *series titles* contained in the data were produced by commercial media production companies. However, what the analysis has shown is the existence of a 'mixed economy of legitimisation', based upon the obligations and commercial imperatives of the differing broadcast models which convey images of PVPs in the U.K.

The commercial broadcasters tend to omit references to the excitement experienced and potentially sought by the police undertaking PVPs, whilst emphasising the dangerous, dramatic and sensational elements of the PVPs featured in their series titles, thus legitimising PVPs by celebrating them as entertaining 'cops and robbers' adventures. Furthermore, the commercially broadcast series titles also demonstrated very little interest in the 'police voice' and prefer scripted commentary, which either by accident or design, leaves little space to discuss, or even acknowledge the concern around the issue of PVPs which was manifested in the print-media and official sources during the period between 2001 and 2006.

Therefore, whilst the commercial broadcasters appear keen to utilise the concept of danger to 'spice-up' their offering to viewers, they are apparently reluctant to acknowledge the potential real-world dangers and concerns associated with PVPs. This reluctance manifests itself, for example in a general disinclination to include references to the management of PVPs and adherence to PVP policy in series titles such as *POCA* and *Road Wars*, despite an increase in the frequency of this theme seen throughout the chronological span of the sample.

Consequently there is little evidence in the commercially broadcast series titles of the concern around PVP that was expressed in the print media and amongst the various police oversight bodies during the period 2001 to 2006.

The commercial broadcasters are not required to adhere to the principles of balance and impartiality contained in the BBC Charter (BBC: 2015) when dealing with controversial issues such as PVPs and there is some evidence in the BBC derived data which appears to demonstrate an attempt to fulfil these obligations. For example in *Traffic Cops*, there was a much higher incidence of the potentially delegitimising *Excitement Cops* theme than was typically seen across the data more generally and this was accompanied by a great deal more discussion of the potential influence of adrenalin and excitement as motivational factors for undertaking PVPs. In addition, direct challenges to the legitimacy of PVPs, such as that argued by Aimee Bowen from the road safety charity Brake in *Car Wars* (28.3), were only identified in the BBC-derived data.

However, despite this, the BBC-derived material demonstrated a more complex approach to the legitimisation of PVPs. This is based upon an initial acknowledgement of the potential problems and concerns associated with PVPs, something which the commercial broadcasters hardly ever do. This potential delegitimation is then overridden with countervailing themes such as *Training & Management* which receive greater prominence and emphasis.

Both the public service and commercial broadcasters tend to legitimise PVPs however, in the 'mixed economy of legitimisation', the BBC-derived series titles are obliged to occasionally include what amounts to token critiques of PVPs. Therefore, the legitimisation of PVPs in the BBC-derived material is presented in a more complex manner; with recourse to the inclusion of more favourable (legitimising) themes and messages than negative (delegitimising) ones.

It may be argued that the BBC fulfils its remit of impartiality in other forums, such as in its investigative journalism strands. As was discussed in a Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern'), the controversial issue of PVPs has been featured in the BBC's *Inside Out - Birmingham* during 2005 (BBC: 2005) and also in ITV's *London Tonight* in 1987. However, this coverage is sporadic and usually only broadcast on the BBC's regional programmes and as a result, this televisual concern around PVPs is unlikely to reach a national audience and will likely remain a localised issue. In something of a tribute to the work of C Wright-Mills (1959), Lawrence (2000: 7) argues that personal tragedies may be crises for the persons involved, but if managed successfully by officials, they will not be treated by the media as public issues.

However, some incidents, such as the Sheena MacDonald case (see Chapter 4 ('Chronology of Concern')) can become the centrepieces of struggles to designate and define public problems. This legitimisation of PVPs identified in both the public service and private sector 'car-chase TV' programmes is clearly not entirely consistent and the programmes studied also contain material which could potentially delegitimise both the police and PVPs. Nevertheless, legitimisation is the general tendency, and delegitimising material is normally counteracted by re-legitimising techniques.

Although any potential explanations for this are outside the scope of this thesis, these legitimising processes do not appear to be the result of some grand conspiracy.

Rather they most likely reflect the reality of producing entertainment media out of 'real-life' recordings of police work in society as it is, with its institutions (including the police and broadcasting companies) and the prevailing images of policing in popular culture. The tendency to legitimise the police and police work is likely to be a result of the dependency of the media companies on the cooperation of the police that they film; a mutually beneficial relationship where all the parties involved are well-served by the current arrangements.

The interview respondent admitted that a certain degree of 'self-censorship' permeated all aspects of the production process and as an explanation for this, he proffered the argument that, 'making the police look bad' was not part of his remit and would ultimately be counter-productive in terms of access to the police for the purpose of filming. This might suggest, conversely, that making the police look good – i.e. legitimising them – might in fact be something that the programme producers would do as a matter of routine as it would be in their interests to do so.

The interview respondent explained that the usual procedure prior to airing the material is that a rough version of the programme is initially viewed and:

'...signed off with the [police] commissioner then you take it up to a viewing with the coppers and they will watch it – not that they have any control because you are not allowed to give them that – in the old [broadcasting] codes – they are watching it to make sure that we aren't saying the wrong things, procedures, that we have got the right names for the coppers, everyone's behaving.'

However, this apparent lack of police control over the contents of the programmes does not necessarily mean that the police are powerless, as they always have the 'nuclear option' of withdrawing consent and access to the film-makers and their staff. The interview respondent recounted an instance of this taking place, stating that:

‘You know there’s been the famous story last year where the BBC wouldn’t let the police change something, it wasn’t really a big ask but someone in the BBC was obviously, took it upon themselves and they... refused to change this thing – which was really quite a stupid thing – but that’s the BBC for you and so the next day all the crews, because they were still filming and editing at the same time as one does – often the process is on-going and so all the camera crews got dumped out of the police cars at the side of road – off you go, bang! It made us laugh somewhat.’

This breakdown in relations between the police and the production companies serves as a reminder, if one were needed, that even in the modern mixed economy of public and private television production companies, the police still have a great deal of latent power to shape the ‘official definition’ of social problems that can serve to legitimise their activities, even when – in the case of PVPs – they are seen as highly controversial in other areas of society.

Whatever the explanation for this tendency to legitimise the police work and PVPs in particular, it could be argued that the cosy arrangement between the police and media should be a cause of greater social concern.

It appears that the televisual media under scrutiny here are exercising a conservative and legitimising function around the issue of PVPs, a practice carried out by a powerful public body which appears on any objective analysis to be open to serious concern and questioning in the way that it creates danger to the life and limb of the very citizens whom the police exist to protect. As Reiner observes:

‘The media, even while reproducing perspectives fundamentally legitimating the police role, nonetheless criticize and question many particular police actions and individual officers. So long as that is not carried too far, the existence of the media as apparently independent, impartial and ever-vigilant watchdogs over state agencies on behalf of the public interest is conducive to the legitimation of these apparatuses (but not all individuals working within them).

The process of legitimation could never be effective if the media were seen as mere propaganda factories' (Reiner: 2010. 178).

Within the framework of a 'mixed economy of legitimisation', Reiner's assertion is particularly appropriate to the BBC-derived data in the sample. Whilst this material creates the impression that the legitimacy of PVPs is being challenged, this is merely a mirage which quickly evaporates under the weight of re-legitimising themes and supporting arguments. The rare challenges to the legitimacy of PVPs can therefore actually be seen as part of the perpetual (re)legitimation of this activity.

## **List of References**

- Ackroyd, C., Rosenhead, J. & Shallice, T. (1980). The Technology of Political Control. London. Pluto Press.
- ACPO. (1989). Police Driving Report. The Association of Chief Police Officers. Manchester. Greater Manchester Police Printing and Reprographics Unit.
- ACPO. (2004). Guidelines for the Management of Police Pursuits 2004. London. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland.
- ACPO. (2008). The Management of Police Pursuits Guidance. London. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland.
- Ahmed, S. (1990). Fatal Joyrider Chase Denied. The Guardian. 18<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 6.
- Allen, K. (2004). Max Weber: A Critical Introduction. London. Pluto Press.
- Allison, R. (2001). Four Die in Fireball after High Speed Chase. The Guardian. 25<sup>th</sup> August.
- Alpert, G. & Lum, C. (2014). Police Pursuit Driving: Policy and Research. New York. Springer.
- Alpert, G. P. & Fridell, L.A. (1992). Police Vehicles and Firearms: Instruments of Deadly Force. Prospect Heights, Illinois. Waveland Press.
- Armstrong, J. (2006). Carjack Killing. Daily Mirror. 12<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 1.
- Armstrong, J. (2010). Policeman Called Death Crash Teen Hayley Adamson a 'Scumbag'. Daily Mirror. 9<sup>th</sup> November.
- Ayres, C. (2002). LA Police Prepare to Give Up the Chase. The Times. 18<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 16.
- Aziz, C. (1986). Follow That Car. The Guardian. 9<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 10.
- Baird, R. (2001). Brake the Speed Cops. Daily Express. 11<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 6.
- Baird, R. (2002). Police Told to Reduce Car Chases. Daily Express. 28<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 32.

- Bamber, D. (2001). Police 'Have 1,000 Crashes a Month' Despite Curbs. Daily Telegraph. 25<sup>th</sup> February.
- BBC. (1998). Chief Inspector Attacks Roads Policing. BBC News Online. Accessed Oct 2005 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/235631.stm>
- BBC. (2000a). TV Presenter to Sue after Acquittal. BBC News Online. Accessed Nov 2005 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/600206.stm>
- BBC. (2000b). Broadcaster Condemns Police Training. BBC News Online. Accessed Nov 2005 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/677067.stm>
- BBC. (2000c). Transcript: In Pursuit. BBC News Online. Accessed October 2005 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/676094.stm>
- BBC. (2000d). Model Damages 'Waste of Money'. BBC News Online. Accessed October 2005 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/711402.stm>
- BBC. (2000e). Sharp Rise in Police Chase Deaths. BBC News Online. Accessed November 2005 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1072354.stm>
- BBC. (2002a). 'A Police Car Killed My Son'. BBC News Online. Accessed July 2007 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2068036.stm>
- BBC. (2002b). Two Police Die After Van Pursuit. BBC News Online. Accessed June 2006 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2194909.stm>
- BBC. (2003). Police Crash Deaths 'Far Too High.' BBC News Online. Accessed July 2007 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3113252.stm>
- BBC. (2004). Car Chase Deaths 'Unacceptable'. BBC News Online. Accessed June 2006 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3524471.stm>
- BBC. (2005). Inside Out Website. Accessed March 2007 at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/westmidlands/series7/police\\_crashes.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/westmidlands/series7/police_crashes.shtml)
- BBC. (2006). Inquiry after Police Chase Death. BBC News Online. Accessed June 2008 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/somerset/4640676.stm>

- BBC. (2007). Police Blasted on Chase Policy. BBC News Online. Accessed June 2008 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/6305129.stm>
- BBC. (2009a). PC Jailed over Girl's Crash Death. BBC News Online. Accessed August 2009 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/tyne/8028666.stm>
- BBC. (2009b). Police Chase Deaths 'Need Action'. BBC News Online. Accessed August 2009 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8154865.stm>
- BBC. (2009c). Teenager Dies in Police Pursuit. BBC News Online. Accessed August 2009 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/8001472.stm>
- BBC. (2010a). PC Said Girl Killed by Speeding Officer was 'Scumbag'. BBC News Online. Accessed November 2010 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-11711949>
- BBC. (2010b). Safety Fears Stop Police Pursuit of Altringham Thieves. BBC News Online. Accessed January 2011 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-10984311>
- BBC. (2011). Man Dies as Car Crashes in Keighley Pursuit. BBC News Online. Accessed January 2011 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bradford-west-yorkshire-12262546>
- BBC. (2015). BBC Traffic Cops Mini Site. Accessed September 2015 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006zygp>
- BBC. (2015). Editorial Guidelines Document. Accessed June 2015 at [http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/pdfs/Editorial\\_Guidelines\\_in\\_full.pdf](http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/pdfs/Editorial_Guidelines_in_full.pdf)
- BBC. (2015). PC Dave Phillips Murder: Man 'Accepts' His Driving Caused Death. BBC News Online. Accessed October 2015 at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-34488744>
- Beaven, A. (1999). I Can't Remember Me. Daily Mail. 4<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 28.
- Beetham, D. (1991). The Legitimation of Power. Basingstoke. MacMillan.

- Belcher, D. (2002). Steering Clear of Cheap Thrills: TV Car Wars Will Mark National No-Speeding Day with a One-Off Special on the Roads of Scotland. Herald Scotland. Accessed November 2005 at <http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/steering-clear-of-cheap-thrills-tv-car-wars-will-mark-national-no-speeding-day-with-a-one-off-special-on-the-roads-of-scotland-1.154384>
- Benn, M. & Worpole, K. (1986). Death in the City. London. Canary Press.
- Bennetto, J. (2000). Police Chase Deaths have Doubled in Two Years. The Independent. 11<sup>th</sup> November.
- Bensman, J. (2014). Max Weber's Concept of Legitimacy. In Jackall, R. & Graham, D. (eds). From Joseph Bensman: Essays on Modern Society. Knoxville, TN. Newfound Press.
- Benson, D. (1990). In Hot Pursuit of 'Suspect' Police Driving. Daily Express. 23<sup>rd</sup> March. Pg 33.
- Best, D. & Eves, K. (2003). Fatal Pursuit: An Analysis of Police Chases Resulting in Loss of Life or Serious Injury. Policing & Society. Vol 13, No 3.
- Best, D. & Eves, K. (2004a). Following Fatal Pursuit: An Investigation of Serious Road Traffic Accidents (RTIs) Involving the Police, 2001 – 2002. Police Complaints Authority. London. Police Complaints Authority.
- Best, D. & Eves, K. (2004b). Police Pursuit in Wales: The Results from a One-Year Monitoring Exercise in the Four Welsh Police Forces, 2002 – 2003. Police Complaints Authority. London. Police Complaints Authority.
- Best, D. & Eves, K. (2005). Why are there No Lessons Learned from Road Traffic Incidents Involving the Police? Criminal Justice. Vol 5 (1). Pp 37-53.
- Best, D. (2002). Fatal Pursuit: Investigation of Road Traffic Accidents (RTIs) Involving Police Vehicles, 1998 – 2001: Identifying Common Factors and the Lessons to be Learned. Police Complaints Authority. London. Police Complaints Authority.

- Best, S. (2002). Introduction to Politics and Society. London. Sage.
- Bignell, J. (2005). Big Brother: Reality TV in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Basingstoke, Hampshire. Palgrave.
- Blacklock, M. (1998). Girl Dies as Police Chase 9-in-Car Family. Daily Express. 15<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 25.
- Blacklock, M. (2007). £3 Million for Mother Crippled by Police Car. Daily Express. 15<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 21.
- Bloxham, A. (2010). Police Pursuits 'Kill 40 People a Year' Senior Officer Says. Telegraph. 21<sup>st</sup> September.
- Booker, M. (2001). Fireball Hell. Daily Star. 25<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 8.
- Bottomley, K. & Pease, K. (1986). Crime and Punishment: Interpreting the Data. Milton Keynes. Oxford University Press.
- Box, S. (1983). Power, Crime and Mystification. London. Tavistock.
- Boyatzis, R.E. (1998). Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development. California. Sage.
- Bradford, B. & Jackson, J. (2010). Cooperating with the Police: Social Control and the Reproduction of Police Legitimacy. Paper presented at the ASC Annual Meeting, San Francisco Marriott, San Francisco, California, November 17th, 2010.
- Bradford, B., Jackson, J. & Hough, M. (2013). Police Futures and Legitimacy: Redefining 'Good Policing.' In Brown, J.M. (ed). The Future of Policing. Abingdon, Oxon. Routledge.
- Brain, T. (2010). A History of Policing in England and Wales from 1974: A Turbulent Journey. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Branigan, T. (2002). Two Police Die as Car Chase Ends in Crash. The Guardian. 16<sup>th</sup> August.

- Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology. Vol 3. Pp 77 – 101.
- Brewer, N. & McGrath, G.M. (1990). Progress Report on Urgent Duty High Speed Pursuits: Offender and Pursuit Characteristics. Australian Centre for Policing Research. Report Series No 89. Adelaide.
- Brooke, C. (2003). 'Brave' Police Force Puts Ban on Car Chases. Daily Mail. 17<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 31.
- Brooke, C. (2006). Justice Chinese Style. Daily Mail. 24<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 7.
- Brooks, T. (2004a). Police Training Stunt Ends in M-Way Chaos. Daily Express. 23<sup>rd</sup> September. Pg 21.
- Brooks, T. (2004b). What Happens When Rookie Police Practice on the M-Way. Daily Express. 24<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 41.
- Broster, P. (2008). Four Die in Police Car Chase Horrors. Daily Express. 17<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 22.
- Brown, S. (2005). Understanding Youth and Crime. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Maidenhead, Berkshire. Oxford University Press.
- Brunstrom, R. (2004). Guidelines for the Management of Police Pursuits 2004. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland. London. ACPO.
- Burden, P. (1994f). Seven-Year-Old Boy in Joyriders Chase. Daily Mail. 27<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 19.
- Burrell, I. (2014). BBC and Channel 4 Battle to Keep Younger Viewers. The Independent. June 6<sup>th</sup>. Accessed June 2014 at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/tv-radio/bbc-and-c4-battle-to-keep-younger-viewers-9501266.html>
- Byrne, P. (2009). 1 Sec from Death. Daily Mirror. 9<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 4-5.

- Calvert, J. (2001). Dangerous Dilemma Facing Police Drivers in the Deadly Pursuit of Justice on Roads. Sunday Express. 9<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 20-21.
- Campbell, B. Goliath. 1993. London. Methuen.
- Campbell, D. (1997). Father Demands Inquiry Over Son Killed As Police Chased Joyriders. The Guardian. 6<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 6.
- Carter, H. (2000). Police Van Which Hit Newsreader Had Siren On. The Guardian. 12<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 6.
- Carter, H. (2008). Police Complacency Led to Crash, Says Jury. The Guardian. 8<sup>th</sup> October.
- Carter, H. (2011). Man Dies in Crash after Police Car Chase. The Guardian. 26<sup>th</sup> April.
- Carvel, J. (1989). Police Issue Tougher Car Chase Code. The Guardian. 16<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 8.
- Casciani, D. (2007). 'Needless Risks' in Police Chases. BBC News Online. Accessed May 2008 at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7000318.stm>
- Cavender, G. & Deutsch, S.K. (2007). CSI and Moral Authority: The Police and Science. Crime Media Culture. Vol 3. (1). Pp 67-81.
- Chalmers, A. (1993). Girl Joyrider, 14 Dies In 70mph Police Chase. Daily Mail. 16<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 5.
- Chibnall, S. (1977). Law and Order News. London. Tavistock.
- Clarke, A. (1992). You're Nicked! Television Police Series and the Fictional Representations of Law and Order.' In Strinati, D. & Wagg, S. (eds). Come on Down? Popular Media Culture in Post War Britain. London. Routledge.
- Clarke, M. (2000). Police Chase Toll Soars. Daily Mail. 11<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 39.
- Clarke, V., Burns, M. & Burgoyne, C. (2008). Who Would Take Whose Name? Accounts of Naming Practices in Same-sex Relationships. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology. Vol 18. Pp 420 – 439.

- Cohen, S. (2002). Folk Devils and Moral Panics. (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed). London. Routledge.
- Colbran, M. (2014). Media Representations of Police and Crime. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Coleman, C. & Moynihan, J. (1996). Understanding Crime Data: Haunted By the Dark Figure. Buckingham. Oxford University Press.
- College of Policing. (2013). Guidelines on Relationships with the Media. Accessed July 2014 at <http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/reports/2013/201305-cop-media-rels.pdf>
- Cooke, H. (1978). Gunpoint Heroes. Daily Express. 28<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 1-3.
- Cooke, H. (1991). Joyrider's Trail of Death. Daily Express. 22<sup>nd</sup> February. Pg 13.
- Cooke, S. & Hetherington, P. (1991). Riots Erupt for a Fourth Night. The Guardian. 13<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 1.
- Cotter, R., De Lint, W. & O'Conner, D. (2008). Ordered Images: Cooking Reality in Cops. Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture. 15 (3). Pp 277-290.
- Cowan, R. (2004). Police Pursuit Death Toll Rises. The Guardian. 3<sup>rd</sup> March.
- Crickmer, G. (2001). As 999 Chase Deaths Continue to Soar, Why Has No Police Driver Faced Prosecution? Sunday Express. 11<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 10-11.
- Critchley, T.A. (1978). A History of Police in England and Wales. (Revised Ed). London. Constable.
- Cullen, R. (2000). Results of Survey on Police Pursuit Driver Training. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland. London. ACPO.
- Cunningham, D. (1978). Inferno Horror: Three Die After Car Chase. Daily Express. 8<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 19.
- Cunningham, D. (1979). Teeny-Racer Floors Police. Daily Express. 12<sup>th</sup> October. 1979. Pg 23.

Cunningham, D. (1991). Mother Is Killed By Police Car. Daily Express. 10<sup>th</sup> October.  
Pg 15.

Daily Express. (1978). Barricade of Death. 27<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 5.

Daily Express. (1986a). Tragedy of Chase Death. 12<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 12.

Daily Express. (1986b). Car Chase Tragedy. 23<sup>rd</sup> December. Pg 7.

Daily Express. (1987). Bandit Fires at WPCs Then Kills Himself. 13<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 10.

Daily Express. (1989). Two Killed in Smash as Truck Dodges the Police. 2<sup>nd</sup> May. Pg 7.

Daily Express. (1991). Joyrider Let Off Lightly By 'Powerless' Judge. 21<sup>st</sup> September.  
Pg 21.

Daily Express. (1995). Driver Hunted as Girl is Left to Die in Porsche. 14<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 5.

Daily Express. (1997). Joyride Killer is Jailed. 20<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 23.

Daily Express. (2009a). 2 Killed in Police Chase. 28<sup>th</sup> August.

Daily Express. (2010). Teenage Girl Killed in Police Car Chase. 19<sup>th</sup> January.

Daily Mail. (1924a). Car Chased In Crowded Road: Police Pursuit at 55 MPH. 18<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 7.

Daily Mail. (1924b). Taxicab Pursuit: Police Overtake Injured Suspect. November 10<sup>th</sup>. Pg 7.

Daily Mail. (1925). Dash from Custody: Holiday-Makers Join in Police Chase. 5<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 10.

Daily Mail. (1930). 3 a.m. Bandit Chase: Three Robberies during Police Pursuit. 3<sup>rd</sup> November. Pg 11.

Daily Mail. (1931). Bandits Drive Into Overtaking Police Tender. 29<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 9.

Daily Mail. (1935). Man Killed in 60 MPH Police Pursuit. 28<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 9.

Daily Mail. (1957). Escaping Soldier Dies In Crash. 19<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 7.

Daily Mail. (1983). Car Chase Ends In Crossing Death. 19<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 2.

Daily Mail. (1984). Heiress Dies In Crash As Police Chase Stolen Car. 13<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 5.

Daily Mail. (1985). Innocent Driver Killed in Police Crash. 18<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 8.

Daily Mail. (1986a). PC Killed in High Speed Chase. 24<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 5.

Daily Mail. (1986b). No Seat-Belt Man Dies In Police Chase. 22<sup>nd</sup> August. Pg 2.

Daily Mail. (1988). The M5 Maniac Gives Police the Slip at 130 MPH. 20<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 21.

Daily Mail. (1989). Three Killed as Police Chase Car. 2<sup>nd</sup> March. Pg 2.

Daily Mail. (1991). Joyrider Death Smash. 28<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 19.

Daily Mail. (1991b). Joyrider Kills Two in Police Chase. 22<sup>nd</sup> February. Pg 2.

Daily Mail. (1991c). Family 'Pride' in the Car Thieves who Died. 11<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 2.

Daily Mail. (1993). Police Vehicles Wrecked in Motorway 'Dodgems'. 3<sup>rd</sup> August. Pg 15.

Daily Mail. (1994a). The Moving Target. 14<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 23.

Daily Mail. (1994b). Secret Crash Film Turns Up In Shops. 21<sup>st</sup> March. Pg 23.

Daily Mail. (1994c). Two Killed as Police Chase Car. 27<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 2.

Daily Mail. (1994d). The Getaway Girl. 2<sup>nd</sup> September. Pg 21.

Daily Mail. (1994e). Stolen Car Fireball. 16<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 27.

Daily Mail. (1995a). Policewoman in Car Chase Crash Fights For Life. 9<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 24.

Daily Mail. (1995b). Tragedy of Man Killed in Stolen Car Police Chase. 17<sup>th</sup> August.  
Pg 26.

Daily Mail. (1995c). Boy of 13 Dies in Joyride Car Chase. 23<sup>rd</sup> November. Pg 23.

Daily Mail. (1996a). Nurse Dies 'as Police Practice at 100 MPH'. 24<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 27.

Daily Mail. (1996b). 100 MPH Death Drive PC is Cleared. 30<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 14.

Daily Mail. (1996c). Granny Killed as 100 MPH Convict Hits Car. 6<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 28.

Daily Mail. (1997a). Joyrider Killed by a Lamp Post. 2<sup>nd</sup> January. Pg 31.

Daily Mail. (1997b). Jail for PC in Double Death Crash. 20<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 19.

Daily Mail. (1997c). PC's Pile-up at 132 MPH. 22<sup>nd</sup> May. Pg 33.

Daily Mail. (1997d). Pupil Killed in Crash Was Over Drink Limit. 25<sup>th</sup>  
October. Pg 27.

Daily Mail. (1998a). Police Chase Ends in Death of Student. 24<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 24.

Daily Mail. (1998b). Tragedy of Couple and 7 Children in a Micra. 15<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 32.

Daily Mail. (1999a). Sheena Shines on First Night Back in Lights. 19<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 11.

Daily Mail. (1999b). Clamping Down on Speeding Police: Comment. 12<sup>th</sup> April. Pg  
10.

Daily Mail. (1999c). Comment: A Speeding Menace to Public Safety. 30<sup>th</sup> March. Pg  
10.

Daily Mail. (2001a). Girl of 16 is Killed in Police Car Chase. 20<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 15.

Daily Mail. (2001b). Police Chase Horror. 25<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 31.

Daily Mail. (2006). Driver In Police Chase Dies After Ploughing Into Ex-Lovers Home.  
29<sup>th</sup> August.

Daily Mail. (2008a). Teenager Trapped Under Police Car During Chase of Stolen  
Vehicle. 14<sup>th</sup> January.

- Daily Mail (2008b). The Bent Bentley: £120,000 Stolen Car Wrecked after Chase Leaves Five Police Hurt and Three Panda Cars Pranged. 16<sup>th</sup> April.
- Daily Mail. (2008c). Police Suspended after Motorcyclist is Killed During Hour-Long 'Blues Brothers' Car Chase. 7<sup>th</sup> August.
- Daily Mail. (2008d). Motorcyclist Died in Police Chase Pursuit after Officers 'Broke the Rules', Inquest Hears. 1<sup>st</sup> August.
- Daily Mail. (2009). Elderly Woman Killed by Stolen Car in Police Chase Hit-and Run. 29<sup>th</sup> October.
- Daily Mail. (2010). Traffic Police Chief Calls for More Scrutiny of Officers' Driving after FORTY People are Killed in Pursuits in a Year. 20<sup>th</sup> September.
- Daily Mail. (2010a). Policewoman Is Disciplined After Calling Girl, 16, Hit and Killed by a Patrol Car a 'Scumbag'. 8<sup>th</sup> November.
- Daily Mail. (2010b). 'Sick' Police Force Win PR Award for the Way they Handled Death of Schoolgirl... Killed by Patrol Car. 25<sup>th</sup> March.
- Daily Mail. (2011). Teenager Killed and Three Injured after Stolen Car Being Chased by Police Crashes into Wall. 2<sup>nd</sup> February.
- Daily Mirror. (1925). Fatal Motor Crash Ends Midnight Bandit Chase. 7<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 1.
- Daily Mirror. (1964). Z-Car Man in Shots Drama Gets Medal. 4<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 23.
- Daily Mirror. (1964b). Police Ambush Starts 80 MPH Chase. 8<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 5.
- Daily Mirror. (1980). Wrong-lane Smash Kills Boy. 17<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 13.
- Daily Star. (2001). Daily Star Says: Cops' Quick Road to Ruin. 25<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 6.
- Daniels, A. (1991). Sick Envy that Fires These Riots. 13<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 6.
- Daunton, M. (2007). Wealth and Welfare: An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1851-1951. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

- Davies, C. (2008). Thames Valley Police Pull Out of Road Wars. The Guardian. 19<sup>th</sup> October.
- Dawar, A. (2010b). Man and Wife Burn to Death as Car is Hit in a Police Chase. Daily Express. 29<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 35.
- Dix, M.C. & Layzell, A.D. (1983). Road Users and the Police. Beckingham, Kent. The Police Foundation / Croom Helm.
- Docherty, S. (2015). Force Accused of Avoiding Pursuits Clarifies Policy. Police Oracle. 26<sup>th</sup> October.
- Docking, M., Bucke, T., Grace, K. & Dady, H. (2007). Police Road Traffic Accidents: A Study of Cases Involving Serious and Fatal Injuries. London. Independent Police Complaints Commission. Research and Statistics Series: Paper 7. London. Independent Police Complaints Commission.
- Dodd, V. (1999). PC Charged Over Newsreader Crash. The Guardian. 16<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 7.
- Dodd, V. (2007). Police Act Recklessly in Pursuits, Says Watchdog. The Guardian. 19<sup>th</sup> September.
- Doyle, A. (1998). Cops: Television Policing as Policing Reality. In Fishman, M. & Cavender, G. (eds). Entertaining Crime: Television Reality Programmes. New York. Aldine De Gruyter.
- Doyle, A. (2003). Arresting Images: Crime and Policing in Front of the Camera. Toronto. University of Toronto Press.
- Emerson-Dobash, R., Schlesinger, P., Dobash, R. & Weaver, C.K. (1998). Crimewatch UK: Women's Interpretation of Televised Violence. In Fishman, M. & Cavender, G. (eds) Entertaining Crime: Television Reality Programmes. New York. Aldine De Gruyter.
- Emsley, C. (1992). The English Bobby: An Indulgent Tradition. In Porter, R. (ed). Myths of the English. Cambridge. Polity Press.

- Emsley, C. (1993). Mother, What Did Policeman Do When There Weren't Any Motors? The Law, the Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 1900-1939. The Historical Journal. 36. 2. Pp. 357-391.
- Emsley, C. (1996). The English Police. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Harlow, Essex. Longman.
- Emsley, C. (2009). The Great British Bobby. London. Quercus.
- Ericson, R. V., Baranek, P.M. & Chan, J.B.L. (1989). Negotiating Control. Milton Keynes. Open University Press.
- Ericson, R. V., Baranek, P.M. & Chan, J.B.L. (1991). Representing Order. Toronto. University of Toronto Press.
- Evans, M. (2006). Police: We Can't Chase Motorbike Thieves, They May Hurt Themselves. Daily Express. 30<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 9.
- Evans, P. (1985). Police Review on Car Chases. The Times. 23<sup>rd</sup> April. Pg 2.
- Fabienne, P. (2014). Political Legitimacy. In Zalta, W.N. (ed). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed 2014 at [plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy)
- Fagge, N. (2008). Woman Killed as Police Chase 4x4. Daily Express. 31<sup>st</sup> March. Pg 15.
- Fallon, A. (2009). Missing Girl's Body Found in Car Boot after Police Chase. Daily Express. 4<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 9.
- Farrell, A. (1992). Class Crime & Corruption. London. Bookmarks.
- Fassin, D. (2013). Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing. Polity Press.
- Fishman, J.M. (1998). Ratings and Reality: The Persistence of the Reality Crime Genre. In Fishman, M. & Cavender, G. (eds). Entertaining Crime: Television Reality Programmes. New York. Aldine DeGruyter.
- Fishman, J.M. (1999). The Populace and the Police: Models of Social Control in Reality-Based Crime Television. Critical Studies in Mass Communication. Vol 16. No 3. Pp 268-288.

- Gallagher's Beat. (1989). Training Gap In Police Driving. Police Review. 30<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 1326- 1327.
- Gardner, D. (1991). A Triple Taunt from the Man in the Mask. Daily Mail. 5<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 9.
- Giannasi, M. (2008). The Management of Police Pursuits Guidance. The Association of Chief Police Officer of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
- Giannasi, M. (2009). The Management of Police Pursuits Guidance. The Association of Chief Police Officer of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
- Gilbey, P. (1996). Police Camera Action. London. Ebury Press.
- Gill, C. (2007a). Girl Lawyer Dies as Police Chase Ends in Horror. Daily Mail. 30<sup>th</sup> April.
- Gill, C. (2007b). High-Speed Risks That 'Police Drivers Don't Need To Take'. Daily Mail. 19<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 17.
- Gillard, M. & Connett, D. (2001). Police Cars Safety Scare. Sunday Express. 18<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 13.
- Gillespie, T. (2000). Narrative Control and Visual Polysemy: FOX Surveillance Specials and the Limits of Legitimation. Velvet Trap: A Critical Journal of Film and Television. Issue 45. Spring. Pp 36-49.
- Goffman, I. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York. Doubleday.
- Golden, J. (1997a). Car Crash PC Wins £1/4 Million From Joyrider. Daily Mail. 16<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 35.
- Golden, J. (1997b). Anger as Killer PC Gets His Job Back. Daily Mail. 18<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 26.
- Gorman, E. (1989). Deaths of Two More Drivers in Police Car Chase. The Times. 2<sup>nd</sup> May. Pg 1.

- Grace, K. (2010). Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Statistics for England and Wales 2009/10. London. Independent Police Complaints Commission.
- Grace, K. (2011). Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Statistics for England and Wales 2010/11. London. Independent Police Complaints Commission.
- Graef, R. (1989). Talking Blues. London. Fontana.
- Grant, J. (1992). Prime Time Crime: Television Portrayals of Law Enforcement. Journal of American Culture. Vol 15. No 1. March. Pp 57-68.
- Grey, S. (1995). Hot Pursuit Police Chases to be Probed. Daily Express. 19<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 22.
- Groves, J. (2009). How Police Could Call a Halt to Car Chases. Sunday Express. 8<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 15.
- Grylls, J. (1994). Midnight Mayhem. Daily Mail. 5<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 20.
- Guardian. (1980). Joyrider Shot. 27<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 24.
- Guardian. (1982). Joyrider Dies. 8<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 22.
- Guardian. (1989). Joyriders Who Plunged into Avon Gorge' Died Accidently'. 25<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 7.
- Guardian. (1991). The Riot Challenge in the Round. 11<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 18.
- Guardian. (1993). Joyriders Trying to Ram Police Cars on 'Zoo' Estate. 9<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 3.
- Guardian. (1996). Television Listings. 9<sup>th</sup> September. Pg a48.
- Guardian. (1999). Met Fits Black Box in Cars to Cut Road Crashes. 5<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 4.
- Guardian. (2002). Police Pursuits Deaths Rise. 27<sup>th</sup> June.
- Guardian. (2003). Death Crash Driver 'Rammed Police Car'. 2<sup>nd</sup> May.
- Guardian. (2005). More People Killed In Police Car Crashes. 24<sup>th</sup> June.

- Guest, G.S., MacQueen, K.M. & Namey, E.E. (2012). Applied Thematic Analysis. London. Sage.
- GUMG. (1982). Really Bad News. London. Writers and Readers.
- Hacked-Off. (2012). South Wales Police Chief Constable Regrets Allowing BBC to Film His Officers. Accessed June 2013 at <http://hackinginquiry.org/leveson-inquiry/south-wales-police-chief-constable-regrets-allowing-bbc-to-film-his-officers/>
- Hall, S. (1998). Speed Kills. The Guardian. 28<sup>th</sup> September. Pg B14.
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. & Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the Crisis. Basingstoke, Hampshire. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hallett, M. & Powell, D. (1995). Backstage with Cops: The Dramaturgical Reification of Police Subculture in American Crime 'Info-tainment'. American Journal of Police. Vol XIV, No1. Pp 101 – 129.
- Hammersley, M. (1993). How Official Statistics Are Produced: A View From the Inside. In Hammersley, M. (ed). Social Research. London. Sage.
- Hampshire, J. (1989). The Deadly Pursuits. Daily Mail. 4<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 12.
- Harvey, M. (1999). TV Presenter Hit By Police Van Lies Critically Ill. The Times. 1<sup>st</sup> March. Pg 6.
- Hattenstone, S. (2000). A Dangerous Pursuit. The Guardian. 25<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 21-22.
- Hayes, N. (2000). Doing Psychological Research. Maidenhead, Berks. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Hetherington, P. (1991a). Flames of Meadow Well Riot Spread Around the Tyne. The Guardian. 12<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 3.
- Hetherington, P. (1991b). Children of the Giro Economy. The Guardian. 18<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 23.

- Hetherington, P. (1997a). Death Risks Raise Joyriding Stakes. The Guardian. 10<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 7.
- Hetherington, P. (1997b). Police Issue Joyrider Warning After Boy Dies in Crash. The Guardian. 17<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 5.
- Hill, A. (2005a). Reality TV: Audiences and Popular Factual Television. Abingdon, Oxon. Routledge.
- Hill, A. (2005b). Reality TV: Performance, Authenticity and Television Audiences. In Wasko, J. (ed). A Companion to Television. Oxford. Blackwell.
- Hills, S. (2008). Woman Dies in Pursuit by Police. Metro. 31<sup>st</sup> March. Pg 26.
- HL Deb 12<sup>th</sup> December 2000. Vol. 620. cc 214-6.
- HMIC. (1998). Road Policing and Traffic. HMIC Thematic Inspection Report. London. Home Office.
- Hoffmann, G. & Mazerolle, P. (2005). Police Pursuits in Queensland: Research, Review and Reform. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. Vol 28. No 3. Pp 530-545.
- Hoffmann, G. (2003). Police Pursuits: A Law Enforcement and Public Safety Issue for Queensland. Crime and Conduct Commission Queensland.
- Holdaway, S. (1983). Inside the British Police: A Force at Work. Oxford. Blackwell.
- Hopkins, N. (1999). Stop-Police. The Guardian. 12<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 10.
- Hopkins, N. (2000a). Police Car Pursuit Deaths Up by 50%. The Guardian. November 11th. Pg 6.
- Hopkins, N. (2001). PCA Seeks Curbs on Police Car Chases. The Guardian. 11<sup>th</sup> July.
- Hopkins, N. (2002). Deaths in Police Chases Triple. The Guardian. 28<sup>th</sup> June.
- Hopkins, S. (2015). PC Dave Phillips: Hundreds Pay Respects at Liverpool Funeral for Policeman Killed in Hit-and-Run. Huffington Post. 2<sup>nd</sup> November.

- Hornby, D. & McDonald, T. (1991). Mothers Killed as Police Chase 130 MPH Joyrider. Daily Express. 28<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 15.
- Horner, J.B. (1995). Pursuits. Association of Chief Police Officers Working Group. The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland.
- Howitt, D. & Cramer, D. (2011). Introduction to Research Methods in Psychology. (3rd Ed). Harlow, Essex. Prentice Hall.
- Hudson, D. (2002). 999 Crash Victim Probe. Sunday Express. 14<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 15.
- Humphreys, O. (2008). Tributes in Pink to Hayley. Daily Express. 7<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 15.
- Hurd, G. (1979). 'The Television Presentation of the Police.' In Holdaway, S. (ed). The British Police. London. Arnold.
- Hurd, G. (1981). The Television Presentation of the Police. In Bennett, T. (ed). Popular Television and Film: a Reader. London. British Film Institute.
- Hurd, I. (2015). Legitimacy. In the Encyclopedia Princetoniensis. Accessed June 2015 at <http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/255>
- Hurry, K. (1999). PC in 999 Call Death Crash Sobs as He is Found Guilty. Daily Mail. 13<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 24.
- Independent. (1993). Girl, 14, Dies In Car Crash During Police Chase. The Independent. 16<sup>th</sup> March. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/girl-14-dies-in-car-crash-during-police-chase-1497905.html>
- Independent. (1995). PC and Motorist Die in Car Chase. The Independent. 18<sup>th</sup> Dec.
- Ingham, J. (2009). Police Car Smashes Cost Us £22,000 a Day. Daily Express. 30<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 11.
- IPCC. (2005a). Annual Report and Accounts, 2004/05. Independent Police Complaints Commission. London. The Stationary Office.

- IPCC. (2005b). Press Release: Independent Police Complaints Commission Launches Major Study on Fatal Police Driving Incidents. Independent Police Complaints Commission. [http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/pr170705\\_rtireport.htm](http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/pr170705_rtireport.htm)
- IPCC. (2006). Annual Report and Summary of Accounts 2005/06. Independent Police Complaints Commission. London. The Stationary Office.
- IPCC. (2007). Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 2006/07. Independent Police Complaints Commission. London. The Stationary Office.
- IPCC. (2008). Press Release: IPCC to Independently Investigate Newcastle RTI. 20<sup>th</sup> May. Independent Police Complaints Commission. <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-independently-investigate-newcastle-rti>
- IPCC. (2009a). Press Release: Northumbria Police Officer Sentenced to Three Years Imprisonment. 1<sup>st</sup> May. Independent Police Complaints Commission. <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/northumbria-police-officer-sentenced-three-years-imprisonment>
- IPCC. (2009b). IPCC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 2008-09. Independent Police Complaints Commission. London. The Stationary Office.
- IPCC. (2010a). Press Release: IPCC Publishes Findings from Investigation into Circumstances Surrounding Death of Alan Long. Independent Police Complaints Commission. <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-publishes-findings-investigation-circumstances-surrounding-death-alan-long>
- IPCC. (2010b). Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 2009/10. Independent Police Complaints Commission. London. The Stationary Office.
- IPCC. (2011). IPCC Welcomes Force of Law Given to Police Pursuits Guidelines. Independent Police Complaints Commission. <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/ipcc-welcomes-force-law-given-police-pursuit-guidelines>

- IPCC. (2011a). IPCC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 2010/11. Independent Police Complaints Authority. London. The Stationary Office.
- IPCC. (2015). IPCC Road Traffic Incidents Webpage. Independent Police Complaints Commission. <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/road-traffic-incidents>
- Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Stanko, B. & Hohl, K. (2013). Just Authority: Trust in the Police in England and Wales. Abingdon, Oxon. Routledge.
- Jefferson, T. & Grimshaw, R. (1982). Law, Democracy and Justice: The Question of Police Accountability. In Cowell, D., Jones, T. & Young, J. (eds). Policing the Riots. London. Junction Books.
- Jefferson, T. (1987). Beyond Paramilitarism. British Journal of Criminology. Vol. 27. No. 1. Pp 47-53.
- Jermyn, D (2003). Photo Stories and Family Albums: Imaging Criminals and Victims on Crimewatch UK. In Mason, P. (ed). Criminal Visions: Media Representations of Crime and Justice. Cullompton. Willan.
- Jermyn, D. (2007). Crime Watching. London. I.B. Tauris.
- Jewkes, Y. (2015). Media and Crime. (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed). London. Sage.
- John, M. (2001). Chiefs Put the Skids on Death-Race Cops. Daily Star. 11<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 6.
- Joseph, C. (1998). Police Car In Chase Runs Over Boy of 10. The Times. 26<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 3.
- Joseph, C. (1999). Police Van Driver on Sheena Crash Charge. Daily Mail. 16<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 38.
- Joyce, J. (1985). Ireland's Alcatraz Awaits Joyriders. The Guardian. 18<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 4.
- Judge, E. (2001). Four Killed as Raid Car Flees Police. The Times. 25<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 9.
- Judt, T. (2005). Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. London. Penguin Press.
- Kemp, M. (1989). Car Chase Police Set for Shake-up. Daily Mail. 29<sup>th</sup> March, Pg 9.

- Kennedy, M. (1991). Carey Says Riots Linked to Poverty. The Guardian. 20<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 1.
- Kooistra, P.G., Mahoney, J.S. & Westervelt, S.D. (1998). The World of Crime According to Cops. In Fishman, M. & Cavender, G. (eds) Entertaining Crime: Television Reality Programmes. New York. Aldine De Gruyter.
- Laing, S. (1991). Banging in Some Reality: The Original 'Z-Cars'. In Corner, J. (ed). Popular Television in Britain. London. British Film Institute Publishing.
- Langston, J. (1991). Police Chase Scandal. The Express. 20<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 41.
- Laurie, P. (1970). Scotland Yard: A Study of the Metropolitan Police. London. Penguin.
- Lawrence, R.G. (2000). The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality. London. University of California Press.
- Lawton, J. (2002). Car Thief, 15, Dies in Police Copter Chase. Daily Star. 13<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 31.
- Lawton, J. (2008a). 100 MPH Cops Wipe Out Girl...Then Shoot Boyfriend. Daily Star. 21<sup>st</sup> May. Pg 20.
- Lawton, J. (2008b). 4 Die as Cop Chase Car Hits Chippy. Daily Star. 12<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 17.
- Lawton, J. (2009). Best Pals Killed in Stolen Car Horror. Daily Star. 28<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 22.
- Laybourn, K. & Taylor, D. (2011). Policing in England and Wales, 1918-39: The Fed, Flying Squads and Forensics. Basingstoke. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Lee, A. (2005). Stop Killer Car Chases, Watchdog Tells Police. Daily Express. 4<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 20.
- Lee, M. & McGovern, A. (2014). Policing and Media: Public Relations, Simulations and Communications. Abingdon, Oxfordshire. Routledge.

- Lee-Potter, L. (1991). The Sport of Hooligans. Daily Mail. 18<sup>th</sup> September. Pg. 7.
- Leishman, F. & Mason, P. (2003). Policing and the Media: Facts, Fictions and Factions. Cullompton. Willan.
- Levin, A. (1999). The Crash Erased My Memory – I Didn't Even Know That Dianna Had Died. Daily Mail. 8<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 42-43.
- Levin, A. (2000). I Had Always Believed the Police Were on the Side of the Good Guys, Not Any More. I have lost my Faith in British Justice. Daily Mail. 15<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 26-27.
- Levy, G. (1991). We Will Win Against The Joyride Thugs, Vows Police Chief. Daily Mail. 5<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 9.
- Lind, R. (1998). Report of the Working Group of the Association of Chief Police Officers (Personnel and Training) Committee into Pursuit Driver Training. The Association of Chief Police Officers.
- Linge, N. (2007). Five Die in High-Speed Cop Chase. Daily Star. 18<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 15.
- Loader, I. (1994). Democracy, Justice and the Limits of Policing: Rethinking Police Accountability. Social and Legal Studies. Vol. 3. Pp 521-544.
- Loader, I. (1995). Youth, Policing and Democracy. London. MacMillan Press.
- Loftus, B. (2010). Police Occupational Culture: Classic Themes, Altered Times. Policing & Society. Vol 20. No 1. Pp 1-20.
- Lowe, R. (2009). New Police Pursuit Guidelines are Inadequate, Says Chase Victim's Mother. The Times. Accessed May 2011 at [http://www.times-series.co.uk/news/4499778.New\\_police\\_pursuit\\_guidelines\\_inadequate\\_says\\_chase\\_victim\\_s\\_mother/](http://www.times-series.co.uk/news/4499778.New_police_pursuit_guidelines_inadequate_says_chase_victim_s_mother/)
- Luckhurst, J. (2002). Cut to the Chase – Hot Pursuit Kills. Telegraph. 21<sup>st</sup> September.
- Lyneham, M. & Hewitt-Rau, A. (2013). Motor Vehicle Pursuit-Related Fatalities in

- Australia, 2000-11. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice. No 452. June. Australian Institute of Criminology.
- MacDonald, J.M. & Alpert, G.P. (1998). Public Attitudes towards Police Pursuit Driving. The Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol 26. No 3. Pp 185-194.
- Macfarlane, J. (2007). Curb on Police Car Chases as Death Toll Rises. Daily Express. 19<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 7.
- Maguire, C. & Timms, J. (1999). Terrible Toll of Police in a Hurry. Daily Mail. 1<sup>st</sup> March. Pg 15.
- Maguire, M. (2007). Crime Data and Statistics. In Maguire, M., Morgan, R. & Reiner, R. (Eds).The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. (4<sup>th</sup> Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Mahoney, J. (2009). Cop Chase Lad, 16, Dies Joyriding Dad's Mercedes. Daily Star. 17<sup>th</sup> April.
- Manchester Evening News. (2010). Daughter of Biker Alan Long 'Disgusted' Over Police Case. Manchester Evening News Website. Accessed August 2010 at <http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/daughter-of-biker-alan-long-disgusted-891768>
- Manwaring-White, S. (1983). The Policing Revolution. Brighton. Harvester Press.
- Marchant, C. (2002). In Pursuit of Safety. Police Review. 28<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 5.
- Mason, G. (1987). The Police Pursuit Dilemma. Police Review. 13<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 320-321.
- Mason, P. (2003). The Thin Blurred Line: Reality Television and Policing. British Society of Criminology Selected Proceeding. Volume 5. August.
- Mawby, R. C. (2002). Policing Images: Policing, Communication and Legitimacy. Cullompton. Willan.

- Mawby, R.C. (2003). Completing the Half Formed Picture?: Media Images of Policing. In Mason, P. (Ed). Criminal Visions. Cullompton. Willan.
- May, T. (2011). Social Research: Issues, Methods and Processes. (4<sup>th</sup> Ed). Maidenhead. Oxford University Press.
- Mazerolle, L., Sargeant, E., Cherney, A., Bennett, S., Murphy, K., Antrobus, E. & Martin, P. (2014). Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Policing. London. Springer.
- McCabe, S. & Wallington, P. (1988). The Police, Public Order and Civil Liberties. London. Routledge.
- McConville, M. & Shepherd, D. (1992). Watching Police, Watching Communities. London. Routledge.
- McGowan, B. (1996). Nurse Died in Police Car Chase. The Express. 24<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 17.
- McJannet, J. (2002). Cops Blamed for Chase Death Toll. Daily Star. 28<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 2.
- McKerron, I. (1991). Plea for Law Change to Stop Motor Thefts. The Express. 18<sup>th</sup> Sept. Pg 7.
- Merritt, J. (1991). Joyriders Killed in Crash Explosion. The Observer. 8<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 9.
- Metro. (2010). MP Slams Police Over Crash PR Award. Metro. Accessed June 2011 at <http://metro.co.uk/2010/03/25/mp-slams-police-over-crash-pr-award-192310/>
- Mintowt-Czyz, L. (2003). Patrol Car Victim Still In a Coma. Daily Mail. 5<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 19.
- Mitchell, A. (2001). Four Dead as Police Car Chases Robbers. Daily Express. 25<sup>th</sup> August. Pg. 10.
- Monk-Turner, E., Martinez, H., Holbrook, J. & Harvey, N. (2007). Are Reality TV Crime Shows Continuing to Perpetuate Crime Myths? Internet Journal of Criminology.com

- Morgan, R. (1989). Policing By Consent: Legitimizing the Doctrine. In Morgan, R. & Smith, D.J. (Eds). Coming to Terms with Policing. London. Routledge.
- Moriarty, R. (2002). Car-Chase Murder Quiz as 2 Police Die. Daily Express. 16<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 29.
- Morris, L. (1999a). End the Death Chases. Daily Mail. 10<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 7.
- Morris, L. (1999b). Anger at Huge Rise in Police Accident Deaths. Daily Mail. 12<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 14.
- Morris, L. (1999c). Joyrider Gets Four Years for Killing PC After 115 MPH Chase. Daily Mail. 2<sup>nd</sup> December. Pg17.
- Morris, S. (2006). Judge Gives Discharge to 159 MPH PC. The Guardian. 26<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 4.
- Morris, S. (2007). Five Killed in Motorway Smash After Police Chase. The Guardian. 18<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 14.
- Moult, J. (2008). Woman Killed and Boy, 2 Fights for Life as Police Chase Ends in Tragedy. Daily Mail.
- Muncie, J. (2004). Youth and Crime. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). London. Sage.
- Myhill, A. & Quinton, P. (2011). It's a Fair Cop? Police Legitimacy, Public Cooperation and Crime Reduction. National Policing Improvement Agency.
- Narain, J. (2009). Joyrider, 16, Who Stole his Father's Mercedes Killed in Car Crash after 100 MPH Police Chase. Daily Mail. 16<sup>th</sup> April.
- Neil, L. (2007). Cops: Don't Chase Bike Yobs...They Might Fall! Daily Star. 26<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 17.
- Neil, L. (2008). You Copped It! Daily Star. 16<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 25.
- Newburn, T. (2008). Policing Since 1945. In Newburn, T. (ed). Handbook of Policing (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Cullompton. Willan.

- Newburn, T. & Reiner, R. (2007). Police and Policing. In Maguire, M., Morgan, R. & Reiner, R. (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. (4<sup>th</sup> Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Newburn, T. & Reiner, R. (2012). Policing and the Police. In Maguire, M. Morgan, R. & Reiner, R. (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. (5<sup>th</sup> Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- NPIA. (2010). Code of Practice on the Management of Police Pursuits: Consultation Draft (Version 4.1). March 2010. National Police Improvement Agency.
- O'Connell, S. (1998). The Car in British Society: Class, Gender and Motoring, 1896-1939. Manchester. Manchester University Press.
- O'Connell, S. (2006). From Toad of Toad Hall to the 'Death Drivers' of Belfast: An Exploratory History of 'Joyriding'. British Journal of Criminology. 46. Pg 455-469.
- O'Connell-Davidson, J. & Layder, D. (1994). Methods, Sex and Madness. London. Routledge.
- O'Neill, S. & Goode, M. (2007). Half Police Drivers Whose Chases End in Death Are Not Fully Trained. The Times. 19<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 21.
- O'Sullivan, S. (2005). UK Policing and its Television Portrayal: 'Law and Order' Ideology or Modernising Agenda? The Howard Journal. Vol 44. No 5. Dec. Pp 504-526.
- Observer. (1991). Joyriders Die. The Observer. 8<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 1.
- Observer. (1994). Fleeing Joyrider 'Drove Over' WPC. The Observer. 2<sup>nd</sup> January. Pg 4.
- OFCOM. (2012). Channel Demographics Webpage. Accessed January 2014 at <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-market-reports/cmr13/tv-audio-visual/uk-2.78>

- Oxford, K. (1984). Policing By Consent. In Benyon, J. (Ed). Scarman and After.  
Oxford. Pergamon.
- Palmer, D. (2003). 'Hot Pursuit': Law Enforcement Practice and the Public Interest.  
Alternative Law Journal. Vol 28. No 1. Pp 32-036.
- Palmer, G. (1998). Police Shows on British Television: New Police Blues. In Jump  
Cut: A Review of Contemporary Media. Dec 42. Pp 12-18.
- Parker, A. (2006). Laughing Policeman. The Sun. 26<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 9.
- Parker, S. (2002). Two Cops Mown Down Trying to Stop Chase Van. Daily Star. 16<sup>th</sup>  
August. Pg 7.
- Parkin, K. (1991). Jail the Joyriders Now! Daily Express. 5<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 4-5.
- Payne, S. (2003). Alistair Stewart Gets Drink-Driving Ban. Telegraph. 2nd July.
- PCA. (1999). Annual Report and Accounts of the Police Complaints Authority 1998 –  
1999. Police Complaints Authority. London. HMSO.
- PCA. (2000). Annual Report and Accounts of the independent Police Complaints  
Authority 1999 – 2000. Police Complaints Authority. London. HMSO.
- PCA. (2001). Annual Report and Accounts of the independent Police Complaints  
Authority 2000 – 2001. Police Complaints Authority. London. HMSO.
- PCA. (2002). Annual Report and Accounts of the independent Police Complaints  
Authority 2001 – 2002. Police Complaints Authority. London. HMSO.
- PCA. (2003). Annual Report and Accounts of the Police Complaints Authority 2002 –  
2003. Police Complaints Authority, London. HMSO.
- PCA. (2005). Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority 2003 - 2004. Police  
Complaints Authority. London. HMSO.
- Pead, D. (1989). Touching the Brake on Pursuits. Police Review. 19<sup>th</sup> June. Pg  
1210-1211.

- Perlmutter, D, D. (2000). Policing the Media: Street Cops and Public Perceptions of Law Enforcement. California. Sage
- Perry, A. & Tominey, C. (2005). Police Crash Toll Soars. Sunday Express. 10<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 44.
- Perry, A. (2005). Crashes Probe Puts Police Driving Under the Spotlight. Sunday Express. 17<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 16.
- Perry, A. (2006). Car in Police Chase Kills Boy on Pavement. Sunday Express. 11<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 15.
- Perry, K. (2003). Stop Police Car Carnage. Sunday Express. 2<sup>nd</sup> March. Pg 18-19.
- Perry, R. (2009). 94 MPH Killer Cop. The Sun. 9<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 29.
- Pike, M.S. (1985). The Principles of Policing. London. MacMillan Press.
- Pilkington, E. (1990). The Joyriders Who Come to Grief. The Guardian. 8<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 16.
- Plowden, W. (1973). The Motor Car and Politics in Britain. Harmondsworth, Middlesex. Pelican.
- Pratt, C. & Couzens, C. (1978). The Deadly Chase: Party Boy, Killed in 70 MPH Drive. Daily Express. 3<sup>rd</sup> June. Pg 3.
- Price, R. (1999). Boy's Joyride to Death. Daily Mail. 20<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 6.
- Qualtrough, A. (1991). Joyrider 'Freed to Kill'. Daily Express. 22<sup>nd</sup> November. Pg 3
- Raphael, A. (1988). New Drive to Hit Britain's £1bn Joyriders. 27<sup>th</sup> November. The Observer. Pg 11.
- Rawstorne, T. (2000a). Sheena PC Driver 'Did Not Take Care'. Daily Mail. 12<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 21.
- Rawstorne, T. (2000b). TV Star: I'll Sue Police. Daily Mail. 13<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 1.

- Raynor, G. (1999). Police Car Crashes Injure Six People Every Day. Daily Mail. 19<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 1, 6.
- Raynor, G. (2001). Number of Police Chase Deaths Soars. Daily Mail. 11<sup>th</sup> July.
- Reiner, R. (1992). Police Research in the United Kingdom: A Critical Review. Crime & Justice. Vol 15. No. 2. Pg 435-508.
- Reiner, R. (1994). The Dialectics of Dixon: The Changing Image of the TV Cop. In Stephens, M. & Becker, S. (eds). Police Force, Police Service. London. MacMillan.
- Reiner, R. (2000). Police Research. In King, R.D. & Wincup, E. (eds). Doing Research on Crime and Justice. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Reiner, R. (2000b). Romantic Realism: Policing and the Media. In Leishman, F., Loveday, B. & Savage, S. (eds). Core Issues in Policing. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Harlow, Essex. Pearson.
- Reiner, R. (2007). Media Made Criminality. In Maguire, M., Morgan, R. & Reiner (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. (4<sup>th</sup> Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Reiner, R. (2008). Policing and the Media. In Newburn, T. (ed). Handbook of Policing. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Cullompton. Willan.
- Reiner, R. (2010). The Politics of the Police. (4th Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Reiner, R. & Greer, C. (2012). Mediated Mayhem: Media, Crime Criminal Justice. In Maguire, M. Morgan, R. & Reiner, R. (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. (5<sup>th</sup> Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Reuss-Ianni, E. (1982). Two Cultures of Policing. New Brunswick, NJ. Transaction Publishers.
- Reynolds, L. (1997). Golden Boy, 17 Dies in Chase. The Express. 20<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 1. 4, 5.

- Reynolds, M. (2000). McCartney Girl Wins £200,000 For Lost Leg. Daily Mail. 13<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 19.
- Riches, C. (2007). Driver Died After Police Van 'Sped Past Red Light'. Daily Express. 13<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 12.
- Riddell, P. (1999). A Smile as Sheena Goes Home. Daily Mail. 7<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 15.
- Riley, A. (1994). Boy, 13, Rams Police Cars in Jaguar Joyride. Daily Mail. 30<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 29.
- Rix, B., Walker D. & Brown, R. (1997). A Study of Deaths and Serious Injuries Resulting from Police Vehicle Accidents. Police Research Group.
- Roberts, B. (2009). Joyrider Rambo Dies in Car he Stole from Dad. Daily Mirror. 17<sup>th</sup> April.
- Robertson, M. & Pettigrew, S. (2006). A Thematic Content Analysis of Children's Food Advertising. International Journal of Advertising. Vol 26 (3). Pp 357-367.
- Rodwell, B. (1980). Belfast Plan for Joyriders. The Observer. 13<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 2.
- Rowe, M. (2004). Policing, Race and Racism. Cullompton. Willan.
- Rollo, J. (1980). The Special Patrol Group. In Hain, P. (ed). Policing the Police. Volume 2. London. John Calder.
- Rose, P. (1992). Teenage Road Terror. Daily Mail. 25<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 18.
- Rose, P. (1994). Driver, 13, in 130 MPH Chase. Daily Mail. 19<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 17.
- Rose, P. (1996a). Police Shame over Deadly Chase Game. Daily Mail. 8<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 13.
- Rose, P. (1996b). Granny Killed as 100 MPH Convicts Hit Car. Daily Mail. 6<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 28.
- Rose, P. (2000). Met's 999 Cars Are Pulled Off the Road. Daily Mail. 10<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 32.

- Ryan, G.W. & Bernard, R. H. (2000). Data Management and Analysis Methods. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (eds). Handbook of Qualitative Research. (2nd Ed). California. Sage.
- Sapsford, R. (2006). Research and Information on the Net. In Sapsford, R. & Jupp, V. (eds). Data Collection and Analysis. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). London. Sage.
- Scott, R. & Woodcock, J. (1991). Precision Planned Rampage. Daily Mail. 11<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 1-2
- Scott, R. (1991). The Car-Crazy Friends who found a Terrible Way to Die. Daily Mail. 9<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 14.
- Scott, R. (1994). Police Nail Their Suspect. Daily Mail. 2<sup>nd</sup> February. Pg 20.
- Scraton, P. (1985). The State of the Police. London. Pluto Press.
- Scraton, P. (1987). 'Speaking Ill of the Dead': Institutional Responses to Deaths in Custody. In Scraton, P. (ed). Law, Order and the Authoritarian State. Milton Keynes. Open University Press.
- Scraton, P. (1997). (ed). Childhood in Crisis? London. UCL Press.
- Seton, C. (1989). Police Decision to Chase Car Defended. The Times. 18<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 3.
- Setright, L.J.K. (2002). Drive On! A Social History of the Motor Car. London. Granta.
- Shooter, H. (2000). Police Have a License to Kill. Socialist Worker. 1<sup>st</sup> April. Issue 1690.
- Sidney-Smith, S. (2002). Beyond Dixon of Dock Green. London. IB Tauris.
- Silverman, D. & Marvasti, I. (2008). Doing Qualitative Research. California. Sage.
- Siqqique, H. (2007). Watchdog Criticises 'Risky' Police Chases. The Guardian. 18<sup>th</sup> September.
- Skolnick, J. (1975). Justice without Trial. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). New York. John Wiley & Sons.

- Smith, D.J. & Gray, J. (1983). Police and People in London, vol. IV: The Police in Action. London. Policy Studies Institute.
- Smith, D.J. (2007). New Challenges to Police Legitimacy. In Henry, A. & Smith, D.J. (eds). Transformations of Policing. Hampshire. Ashgate Publishing.
- Southgate, P. & Mirrlees-Black, C. (1991). Traffic Policing in Changing Times. HORS 124. London. HMSO.
- Sparks, R. (1992). Television and the Drama of Crime. Buckingham. Oxford University Press.
- Spinney, L. (1998). Road Junkies. The Guardian. 14<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 14.
- Steele, J. (2001). Deaths On Police Car Chases Treble in Four Years. Telegraph. 11<sup>th</sup> July.
- Steele, J. (2002). Police Car Chases Kill 30 In Nine Months. Telegraph. 28<sup>th</sup> June.
- Steele, J. (2005). 2,000 People Killed or Hurt in Police Crashed Last Year. Telegraph. 25<sup>th</sup> June.
- Stote, M. (2004). Sadie, 11 Loses Her Leg in 999 Cop Car Crash. Daily Express. 18<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 11.
- Streich, G.W. (2005). Authority. In Horowitz, M.C. (ed). New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Michigan. Thomson Gale.
- Sunday Express. (2001). Sunday Express Opinion: Rethink Police Pursuit. 9<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 38.
- Sunday Express. (2003). Comment: Put the Brakes on Pursuits. 2<sup>nd</sup> March. Pg 20.
- Sunday Express. (2005). Express Debate: Should The Home Office Issue Tougher Guidelines for Police Driver Training? 29<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 73.
- Surette, R. (2011). Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images, Realities and Policies. (4th International Ed). California. Wadsworth.

- Suthenthiran, L. (2009). Met To Review Motorcycle Chases after 124 MPH Death. London Evening Standard. 27<sup>th</sup> April.
- Swift, G. (1996). Fairway Driver Who Left the Police in His Divots. Daily Mail. 23<sup>rd</sup> August. Pg 11.
- Tankebe, J. & Liebling, A. (2013). Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An Introduction. In Tankebe, J. & Liebling, A. (Eds). Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, B. & Wright, S. (2001). 24 Civilians Die in Police Car Chases in Just One Year. Daily Mail. 9<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 19.
- Taylor, B. (2002). Police Car on 999 Call Kills Pedestrian. Daily Mail. 25<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 5.
- Taylor, D. (2009). 124 MPH Death Prompts Call for New Rules on Police Chases. The Guardian. 28<sup>th</sup> March.
- Taylor, H. (1998). The Politics of the Rising Crime Statistics of England and Wales, 1914-1960. Crime, History and Societies. No. 1. Vol. 2. Pg 5-28.
- Taylor, H. (1999). Forging the Job. British Journal of Criminology. Vol.39. No.1. Pp 133-135.
- Telegraph. (2002). Police Attacked Over Car Chase Deaths. 27<sup>th</sup> June.
- Telegraph. (2009). Teen Joyrider Killed after Crashing his Father's Mercedes During Police Chase. 16<sup>th</sup> April 2009.
- Telegraph. (2010). Police Force Nominated Itself for Award Over Case of Schoolgirl Killed by Officer. 24<sup>th</sup> March.
- Tendler, S. (1986). Inquiry into Police Car Chase Deaths. The Times. 22nd September. Pg 3.
- Thomas, J. & Siddle, J. (2015). Policeman Killed in Wallasey Hit-and-Run Named as Dad of Two PC Dave Phillips. Liverpool Echo. 5<sup>th</sup> October.
- Times. (1958). Chase Ends In Fatal Crash. 1<sup>st</sup> December. Pg 6.

- Times. (1973). Girl of 16 Dies after Crash in Police Chase. 26<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 4.
- Times. (1974). Court Hears of Car Chase in Chicago Style. 12<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 3.
- Times. (1984). PCs Die In Car Chase Crash. 31<sup>st</sup> December. Pg 2.
- Times. (1986). Police Death in Car Chase. 24<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 2.
- Times. (1986b). Inquest is Told How WPC Died in Chase. 23<sup>rd</sup> December. Pg 3.
- Times. (1991). Police Abandon Car Chase. 14<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 7.
- Times. (1994). 15 Police Cars in Chase. 24<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 2.
- Times. (1995a). Thieves in Car Chase Throw Out a Lowry. 25<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 5.
- Times. (1995b). Car-Chase Shot. 24<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 6.
- Times. (1996). Report Urges Police Chase Review. 8<sup>th</sup> October. Pg 2.
- Times. (1997). PC Who Caused Two Deaths Keeps Job. 17<sup>th</sup> April. Pg 2.
- Times. (2001). Girl 16, Killed as Police Chase Car. 20<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 4.
- Tominey, C. & Perry, A. (2005). I Could Have Died in Police Crash So Why Are 999 Men above the Law? Sunday Express. 22<sup>nd</sup> May. Pg 6-7.
- Tozer, J. & Brooke, C. (2009). 100 MPH Joyriders Kill Mothers: Friends on Their Way Home From a Meal Die as Stolen Car Crashes in Police Chase. Daily Mail. 27<sup>th</sup> August.
- Tozer, J. (2008). Police Accused of 'Institutional Complacency' after Pensioner is Killed in High-Speed Training Exercise. Daily Mail. 7<sup>th</sup> October.
- Tozer, J. (2010). Motorbike Robbers Allowed to Escape...in Case They Get Hurt. Daily Mail. 17<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 11.
- Tsushima, M. & Hamai, K. (2015). Public Cooperation with the Police in Japan: Testing the Legitimacy Model. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. Vol 31 (2). 212-228.

- Twomey, J. (2002). Another 999 Chase...Another Innocent Passer-by is Killed. Daily Express. 25<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 10.
- Twomey, J. (2003). Motorist Killed 2 PCs 'Because He'd Been Jilted'. Daily Express. 2<sup>nd</sup> May. Pg 7.
- Twomey, J. (2007). 5 Die as Chase Car Drives On Wrong Side of M-Way. Daily Express. 18<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 27.
- Tyler, T. R. & Huo, Y.J. (2002). Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and the Courts. New York. Russell Sage.
- Valverde, M. (2006). Law & Order: Images, Meanings, Myths. Abingdon, Oxon. Rutgers University Press.
- Verkaik, R. (2007). Police Drivers Take 'Unnecessary Risks' During Car Chases. The Independent. 19<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 13.
- Waddington, P.A.J. (1987). Towards Paramilitarism? Dilemmas in Policing Civil Disorder. British Journal of Criminology. Vol. 27. No. 1. Pp 37-46.
- Waddington, P.A.J. (2002). In Pursuit of the Evidence. Police Review. 5<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 14.
- Waddington, P.A.J. (2010). Police Pursuits: A Case Study of 'Critical Friendship?' Policing. Vol 4. No 2. Pp 119-126.
- Waddington, P.A.J. & Wright, (2008). Police Use of Force, Firearms and Riot Control. In Newburn, T. (ed). Handbook of Policing. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Willan.
- Wainwright, M. (1991). Hopes Buried in Ashes of Meadow Well. The Guardian. 11<sup>th</sup> September. Pg 2.
- Wainwright, M. (2008). Inquiries Launched after Four Die During High-Speed Chases. The Guardian. 17<sup>th</sup> November.
- Wainwright, M. (2009). Police Driver Convicted Over High-Speed Death Crash. The Guardian. 8<sup>th</sup> April.

- Walker, K. (2004). 999 Police Crashes 50 Times a Day. Daily Express. 27<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 2.
- Wall, E. (2009). 'Stinger' Cop Chase Girl Was Murdered. Daily Star. 5<sup>th</sup> August. Pg 13.
- Ward, C. (1989). Police Car Chase Ends in Pile-up. Daily Mail. 10<sup>th</sup> June. Pg 5.
- Ward, D. (2006). Woman Dies after Being Hit by Car in Police Chase. The Guardian. 4<sup>th</sup> January.
- Ward, T. (1986). Death and Disorder: Three Case Studies of Public Order and Policing in London. London. Inquest.
- Weaver, M. (2008). Takeaway Car Crash Kills Four, Reports Say. The Guardian. 11<sup>th</sup> December.
- Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society Volume One. California. University of California Press.
- Weinberger, B. (1995). The Best Police in the World: An Oral History of English Policing from the 1930s to the 1960s. Aldershot. Scholar Press.
- Wells, M. (2000). Broadcaster to Sue Police. The Guardian. 13<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 2.
- West, A. (2005). Caught on Tape: A Legacy of Low-Tech Reality. In King, G. (ed). The Spectacle of the Real: From Hollywood to Reality TV and Beyond. Bristol. Intellect Books.
- Whitehead, T. & Walker, K. (2005). Stop Police Car Deaths. Daily Express. 28<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 1, 8 & 9.
- Whitehead, T. (2005). Police Drivers Kill Thirty People a Year. Daily Express. 27<sup>th</sup> January. Pg 1, 6 & 7.
- Whitehead, T. (2005b). Police Drivers Demand 'Black Box' Recorders to End Chase Deaths. Daily Express. 13<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 17.

- Whitehead, T. (2006). Accident Victims Condemn Rise of Police Supercars. Daily Express. 23<sup>rd</sup> January. Pg 4.
- Willey, J. (2001). Chase Deaths Soar. Daily Mail. 8<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 27.
- Williams, D, (1999). Speeding Police Kill Four in Eight Weeks. Daily Mail. 20<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 40.
- Williams, D. & Morris, L. (1999). Dossier of Death. Daily Mail. 30<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 26-27.
- Williams, D. (1993). Terror As Police Are 'Hunted Down' By Rammers. Daily Mail. 13<sup>th</sup> November. Pg 12.
- Wilson, D., Ashton, J. & Sharp, D. (2001). What Everyone in Britain Should Know About the Police. (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed). Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- Wired.gov. (2010). Code of Practice on the Management of Police Pursuits. Wired.gov. accessed November 2011 at <http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/print/Code+of+Practice+on+the+Management+of+Police+Pursuits+28042010151557>
- Woodcock, J, (1992b). PC Vows To Rebuild His Shattered Life. Daily Mail. 5<sup>th</sup> December. Pg 9.
- Woodcock, J. (1992a). Victims of Car Horror. Daily Mail. 20<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 19.
- Woodcock, J. (1993). The Easy Way Out. Daily Mail. 4<sup>th</sup> February. Pg 5.
- Woodward, T. (1999). Police Put a Brake on High-Speed Pursuit. Daily Mail. 22<sup>nd</sup> June. Pg 6.
- Wright, S. & Boshoff, A. (1999). Police Van Which Hit Newsgirl Sheena Was Faulty. Daily Mail. 30<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 26-27.
- Wright, S. (1999). Parent's Anger Over Payout For PC Driver Who Killed Their Son. Daily Mail. 3<sup>rd</sup> April. Pg 17.
- Wright, S. (2000a). 18,000 Police to Face Driving Tests: Yard Clampdown on Police Danger Drivers after Mail Campaign. Daily Mail. 30<sup>th</sup> March. Pg 1-2.

Wright, S. (2000b). Alarm as Number of Deaths in Police Car Chases Soars. Daily Mail. 6<sup>th</sup> May. Pg 23.

Wright, S. (2002). Police Pursuits Leave Three Dead in a Single Night. Daily Mail. 31<sup>st</sup> August. Pg 43.

Wright-Mills, C. (1959). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford. Pelican.

Wykes, M. (2001). News, Crime and Culture. London. Pluto Press.

Young, R. (1996). Police Driver is fined Over Fatal 100 MPH Chase. The Times. 30<sup>th</sup> July. Pg 3.

Zorn, T.E. & Ruccio, S. (1998). The Use of Communication to Motivate College Sales Teams. The Journal of Business Communication. Vol 35. No 4. Pp 468-499.

## Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 1 of 13)

Year	Series Title	Series Number / Episode / Title	CHANNEL	BROADCAST DATE	Sample #
1993	Police Stop	1	VHS	N/A	1
1994	Police Stop	2	VHS	N/A	2
1995	POCA	Safety Last	ITV 1	17th April	3
	POCA	Tales of the Unexpected	ITV 1	25th October	4
	POCA	International	ITV 1	11th October	
1996	X-Cars	S01E01	BBC One	Unknown	5
	X-Cars	S01E02	BBC One	Unknown	
	X-Cars	S01E03	BBC One	Unknown	
	X-Cars	S01E04	BBC One	Unknown	
	X-Cars	S01E05	BBC One	Unknown	6
	X-Cars	S01E06	BBC One	Unknown	
1998	POCA	Rust Buckets	ITV 1	5th November	7
	POCA	The Unprotected	ITV 1	19th November	8
1999	Car Wars	Caught in the Act	BBC One	Unknown	9
2000	POCA	Crash Test Racers	ITV 1	17th July	
	POCA	In the Driving Seat	ITV 1	24th January	
	POCA	Nowhere to Hide	ITV 1	28th February	11
	POCA	Monster Drivers	ITV 1	3rd July	
	POCA	Brat Pack	ITV 1	19th July	10

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 2 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
	POCA	Round the Bend	ITV 1	31st June	
2001	POCA	Smash and Grab	ITV 1	6th June	12
	POCA	Getting Their Man	ITV 1	13th June	13
2002	Car Wars	Scotland Special	BBC Scots	Unknown	14
	POCA	Race	ITV 1	14th January	15
2003	Road Wars	S01E01	Sky 1	26th July	16
	Road Wars	S01E02	Sky 1	2nd August	
	Road Wars	S01E03	Sky 1	9th August	
	Road Wars	S01E04	Sky 1	16th August	17
	Road Wars	S01E05	Sky 1	23rd August	
	Road Wars	S01E06	Sky 1	30th August	
	Traffic Cops	Picking Up The Pieces	BBC One	18th March	18
	Traffic Cops	Hardliners	BBC One	25th March	
	Traffic Cops	Smashed	BBC One	1st April	
	Traffic Cops	Fatal Attraction	BBC One	8th April	
	Traffic Cops	Seeing Red	BBC One	15th April	
	Traffic Cops	Takeaway	BBC One	18th November	
	Traffic Cops	After Dark	BBC One	4th December	
	Traffic Cops	Twoockers	BBC One	11th December	19

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 3 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
	Traffic Cops	Right Place, Right Time	BBC One	18th December	
2004	Road Wars	S02E01	Sky 1	21st June	21
	Road Wars	S02E02	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S02E03	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S02E04	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S02E05	Sky 1	Unknown	20
	Road Wars	S02E06	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Over The Limit	BBC One	12th April	
	Traffic Cops	Losing Control	BBC One	20th April	22
	Traffic Cops	Bad Attitude	BBC One	13th June	23
2005	Traffic Cops	The Educators	BBC One	17th January	
	Traffic Cops	Bad People	BBC One	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Caught By Surprise	BBC One	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Cause and Defect	BBC One	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Smelling a Rat	BBC One	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Chancers	BBC One	Unknown	26
	Traffic Cops	No Respect	BBC One	Unknown	27
	Traffic Cops	Dizzies	BBC One	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S03E03	Sky 1	Unknown	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 4 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
	Road Wars	S03E05	Sky 1	Unknown	24
	Road Wars	S03E06	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S03E07	Sky 1	Unknown	25
	Road Wars	S03E08	Sky 1	Unknown	
2006	Car Wars	Driven to Violence	BBC One	29th March	28
	Car Wars	Joyriders	BBC One	10th May	
	Road Wars	S04E01	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S04E02	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S04E03	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S04E04	Sky 1	Unknown	29
	Road Wars	S04E05	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S04E06	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S04E07	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Hit & Run	BBC One	16th May	
	Traffic Cops	Playing the Game	BBC One	31st May	30
	Traffic Cops	Pushing Their Luck	BBC One	6th June	
	Traffic Cops	Small Hours, Big Trouble	BBC One	23rd May	
	Traffic Cops	Fatal Distraction	BBC One	2nd May	
	Traffic Cops	Hit & Run	BBC One	16th May	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 5 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
	Traffic Cops	A Stab in the Dark	BBC One	20th June	
	Traffic Cops	Joyriding	BBC One	30th May	
	Traffic Cops	Running Into Trouble	BBC One	9th May	
	Traffic Cops	Weapon Of Destruction	BBC One	13th June	
	POCA	Motorway Madness	ITV 1	24th January	
	POCA	Motorway Manners	ITV 1	24th January	
	POCA	Diversion Ahead	ITV 1	31st January	
	POCA	Under the Influence	ITV 1	7th February	
	POCA	City Limits	ITV 1	14th February	
	POCA	Nicked!	ITV 1	21st February	31
2007	Car Wars	Caught In The Act	BBC One	25th April	
	Car Wars	Mistaken Identity	BBC One	11th April	
	Car Wars	Recovered	BBC One	18th April	32
	Car Wars	Running For Cover	BBC One	2nd May	
	Road Wars	S05E01	Sky 1	8th May	
	Road Wars	S05E02	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E03	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E04	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E05	Sky 1	Unknown	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 6 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
2007	Road Wars	S05E07	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E08	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E09	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E10	Sky 1	Unknown	33
	Road Wars	S05E11	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E12	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E14	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E15	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E16	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E17	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E18	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E19	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S05E20	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	A Stab In the Dark	BBC One	16th May	
	Traffic Cops	Something to Hide	BBC One	13th June	
	Traffic Cops	Desperate Measures	BBC One	15th August	
	Traffic Cops	Crashed Out	BBC One	5th September	
	Traffic Cops	Under Fire	BBC One	22nd October	
	Traffic Cops	Running Wild	BBC One	30th May	

## Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 7 of 13).

Year	Series Title	Series Number / Episode / Title	CHANNEL	BROADCAST DATE	Sample #
	Traffic Cops	Something to Hide	BBC One	13th June	
	Traffic Cops	Bad Boys	BBC One	6th June	34
	Traffic Cops	Walking the Line	BBC One	20th June	
	POCA	Without Due Care	ITV 1	1st October	35
	POCA	The Crushers	ITV 1	15th October	
	POCA	Speed Freaks	ITV 1	12th December	
2008	Police Interceptors	S01E01	Five	9th May	36
	Police Interceptors	S01E02	Five	16th May	
	Police Interceptors	S01E03	Five	23rd May	
	Police Interceptors	S01E04	Five	30th June	
	Police Interceptors	S01E05	Five	6th June	
	Police Interceptors	S01E06	Five	13th October	
2008	<b>Police Interceptors</b>	<b>S02E01</b>	<b>Five</b>	<b>10th October</b>	
	Police Interceptors	S02E02	Five	17th October	
	Police Interceptors	S02E03	Five	24th November	
	Police Interceptors	S02E04	Five	31st November	
	Police Interceptors	S02E05	Five	7th November	
	Police Interceptors	S02E06	Five	21st November	
	Road Wars	S06E01	Sky 1	29th July	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 8 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
2008	Road Wars	S06E02	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E03	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E04	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E05	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E06	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E07	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E08	Sky 1	Unknown	37
	Road Wars	S06E09	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E10	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E11	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E12	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E13	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E14	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E15	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E16	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E17	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E19	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S06E20	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Identity Crisis	BBC One	2nd April	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 9 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
2008	Traffic Cops	Trouble In Store	BBC One	9th April	
	Traffic Cops	Chasing the Dragon	BBC One	16th April	
	Traffic Cops	Riding Their Luck	BBC One	23rd April	
	Traffic Cops	Schools Out	BBC One	30th April	38
	Traffic Cops	Crash Course	BBC One	3rd June	
	Traffic Cops	Dog Day Afternoon	BBC One	30th October	
	Traffic Cops	Caught Napping	BBC One	23rd June	
	Traffic Cops	Dicing with Death	BBC One	25th September	
	Traffic Cops	Fatal Consequences	BBC One	6th October	
	Traffic Cops	Joy Riding	BBC One	16th October	
	POCA	Rural Roads	ITV 1	5th January	
	POCA	Caught on Camera	ITV 1	9th January	
	POCA	Inexperienced Drivers	ITV 1	10th January	
	POCA	Less Lethal Weapons	ITV 1	12th January	
	POCA	Helicops	ITV 1	13th January	
	POCA	Urban Jungle	ITV 1	14th January	
	POCA	Going to Extremes	ITV 1	15th January	39
	POCA	Death Wish Drivers	ITV 1	Unknown	
	POCA	Bad Influences	ITV 1	Unknown	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 10 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
	POCA	Crime Cars	ITV 1	Unknown	
	POCA	Under Surveillance	ITV 1	Unknown	
	POCA	Ultimate Bad Drivers	ITV 1	7th July	
2009	Police Interceptors	S02E08	Five	13th February	
	Police Interceptors	S02E09	Five	20th February	
	Police Interceptors	S02E10	Five	27th February	
	Police Interceptors	S02E11	Five	2nd March	
	Police Interceptors	S02E12	Five	6th March	43
	Police Interceptors	S02E13	Five	13th March	
	Police Interceptors	S02E14	Five	20th March	
	Road Wars	S07E01	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E02	Sky 1	Unknown	41
	Road Wars	S07E03	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E04	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E05	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E06	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E07	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E08	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E09	Sky 1	Unknown	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 11 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
2009	Road Wars	S07E10	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S07E11	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E01	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E02	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E03	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E04	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E05	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E06	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Road Wars	S08E07	Sky 1	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Creepers	BBC One	Unknown	
	Traffic Cops	Hidden Treasure	BBC One	16th April	
	Traffic Cops	A Turn for the Worse	BBC One	23rd April	40
	Traffic Cops	No Mood for Trouble	BBC One	4th June	
	Traffic Cops	Cameras Don't Lie	BBC One	11th June	
	Motorway Cops	Deadly Highways	BBC One	10th October	42
2010	Police Interceptors	S03E01	Five	7th June	
	Police Interceptors	S03E02	Five	14th June	
	Police Interceptors	S03E03	Five	21th June	
	Police Interceptors	S03E04	Five	28th June	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 12 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
2010	Police Interceptors	S03E05	Five	5th July	
	Police Interceptors	S03E06	Five	12th July	
	Police Interceptors	S03E07	Five	19th July	47
	Police Interceptors	S03E08	Five	26th July	
	Police Interceptors	S03E09	Five	6th August	
	Police Interceptors	S03E10	Five	13th August	
	Police Interceptors	S03E11	Five	20th August	
	Police Interceptors	S03E12	Five	27th August	
	Police Interceptors	S03E13	Five	3rd September	
	Police Interceptors	S03E14	Five	10th September	
	Police Interceptors	S03E15	Five	17th September	46
	Traffic Cops	Prying Eyes	BBC One	8th April	
	Traffic Cops	Close Encounters	BBC One	14th April	
	Traffic Cops	A Nose For Trouble	BBC One	20th April	44
	Traffic Cops	Lost & Found	BBC One	8th July	
	Traffic Cops	Crossing the Line	BBC One	21st July	
	Traffic Cops	Moment of Madness	BBC One	28th July	45
	Traffic Cops	Cat and Mouse	BBC One	13th September	
	Traffic Cops	Age Old Problem	BBC One	20th September	

**Appendix 1. Archive Contents List of Relevant Video Material (Page 13 of 13).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Series Title</b>	<b>Series Number / Episode / Title</b>	<b>CHANNEL</b>	<b>BROADCAST DATE</b>	<b>Sample #</b>
	Traffic Cops	Wheels of Fortune	BBC One	7th October	
2011	Traffic Cops	Running on Empty	BBC One	23rd June	
	Traffic Cops	Tickets Credits & Consequences	BBC One	15th July	
	Traffic Cops	Wrong Place Wrong Time	BBC One	7th July	
	Traffic Cops	In for a Shock	BBC One	21st July	
	Traffic Cops	Crossover	BBC One	28th July	49
	Traffic Cops	One Thing Leads to Another	BBC One	4th August	48
	Traffic Cops	Risky Business	BBC One	11th August	
	Police Interceptors	S04E01	Five	13th June	
	Police Interceptors	S04E02	Five	20th June	
	Police Interceptors	S04E03	Five	27th June	51
	Police Interceptors	S04E04	Five	4th July	
	Police Interceptors	S04E05	Five	11th July	
	Police Interceptors	S04E06	Five	18th July	50
	Police Interceptors	S04E07	Five	25th July	
	Police Interceptors	S04E08	Five	1st August	

**Appendix 2. List of 51 Episodes Selected as the Sample (Page 1 of 3).**

#	Year	Programme	Title	Series / Episode	Channel	% PVPs	# of PVPs	# of 'International' PVPs
1	1993	Police Stop 1	N/A	1	VHS	58	8	
2	1994	Police Stop 2	N/A	2	VHS	41	7	2
3	1995	POCA	Safety Last	S01 E03	ITV	29	2	
4	1995	POCA	Tales of the Unexpected	S01 E06	ITV	19	1	
5	1996	XCars	N/A	E01	BBC One	52	4	
6	1996	XCars	N/A	E05	BBC One	10	2	
7	1998	POCA	Rust Buckets	S02 E09	ITV	23	3	
8	1998	POCA	The Unprotected	S02 E11	ITV	17	4	
9	1999	Car Wars	Caught in the Act	S01 E05	BBC One	22	1	
10	2000	POCA	Brat Pack	S03 E08	ITV	54	8	3
11	2000	POCA	Nowhere to Hide	S03 E06	ITV	25	7	2
12	2001	POCA	Smash & Grab	S03 E16	ITV	53	2	
13	2001	POCA	Getting Their Man	S03 E17	ITV	36	8	3
14	2002	Car Wars	Scotland Special	Unknown	BBC One	42	7	
15	2002	POCA	Race	S03 E19	ITV	42	9	1
16	2003	Road Wars	N/A	S01 E01	Sky One	30	7	1
17	2003	Road Wars	N/A	S01 E04	Sky One	44	8	1
18	2003	Traffic Cops	Picking Up the Pieces	S01 E01	BBC One	47	3	

**Appendix 2. List of 51 Episodes Selected as the Sample (Page 2 of 3).**

#	Year	Programme	Title	Series / Episode	Channel	% PVPs	# of PVPs	# of 'International' PVPs
19	2003	Traffic Cops	Twockers	S01 E13	BBC One	42	2	
20	2004	Road Wars	N/A	S02 E05	Sky One	17	5	2
21	2004	Road Wars	N/A	S02 E01	Sky One	33	7	2
22	2004	Traffic Cops	Losing Control	S02 E03	BBC One	21	2	
23	2004	Traffic Cops	Bad Attitude	S02 E05	BBC One	0	0	
24	2005	Road Wars	N/A	S03 E05	Sky One	19	8	3
25	2005	Road Wars	N/A	S03 E07	Sky One	29	8	3
26	2005	Traffic Cops	Chancers	Unknown	BBC One	4	1	
27	2005	Traffic Cops	No Respect	Unknown	BBC One	19	1	
28	2006	Car Wars	Driven To Violence	Unknown	BBC One	18	5	
29	2006	Road Wars	N/A	S04 E04	Sky One	32	6	2
30	2006	Traffic Cops	Playing the Game	Unknown	BBC One	14	1	
31	2006	POCA	Nicked	S04 E06	ITV	47	7	
32	2007	Car Wars	Recovered	Unknown	BBC One	20	2	
33	2007	Road Wars	N/A	S05 E10	Sky One	30	9	6
34	2007	Traffic Cops	Bad Boys	S05 E04	BBC One	14	1	
35	2007	POCA	Without Due Care	S05 E03	ITV	20	4	1
36	2008	Police Interceptors	N/A	S01 E01	Channel 5	36	3	

**Appendix 2. List of 51 Episodes Selected as the Sample (Page 3 of 3).**

#	Year	Programme	Title	Series / Episode	Channel	% PVPs	# of PVPs	# of 'International' PVPs
37	2008	Road Wars	N/A	S06 E08	Sky One	19	4	1
38	2008	Traffic Cops	School's Out	S06 E06	BBC One	16	1	
39	2008	POCA	Going to Extremes	S05 E21	ITV	37	4	1
40	2009	Traffic Cops	A Turn for the Worse	S07 E03	BBC One	18	1	
41	2009	Road Wars	N/A	S07 E02	Sky One	18	3	1
42	2009	Motorway Cops	Deadly Highways	Unknown	BBC One	15	1	
43	2009	Police Interceptors	N/A	S02 E12	Channel 5	6	1	
44	2010	Traffic Cops	A Nose for Trouble	S08 E03	BBC One	0	0	
45	2010	Traffic Cops	Moment of Madness	S08 E06	BBC One	11	1	
46	2010	Police Interceptors	N/A	S03 E15	Channel 5	14	1	
47	2010	Police Interceptors	N/A	S03 E07	Channel 5	4	1	
48	2011	Traffic Cops	One Thing Leads to Another	S09 E06	BBC One	23	1	
49	2011	Traffic Cops	Crossover	S09 E05	BBC One	16	1	
50	2011	Police Interceptors	N/A	S04 E06	Channel 5	16	1	
51	2011	Police Interceptors	N/A	S04 E03	Channel 5	11	1	
Totals							185	35

### **Appendix 3. Interview Schedule.**

\*Please note – this is an outline of the interview structure and will vary depending on the person being interviewed. The example below relates to the Executive Producer.

#### Section One - You & Your Reflections On Production.

1. Can you please outline your job title and responsibilities?
2. Can you please describe how you came to produce this television programme?
3. Why do you think documentaries showing police pursuits appeared when they did? How have they developed and changed and why?

#### Section Two – Programme Production & Audience Considerations.

4. How much artistic licence does the format of programmes like these allow you? How is your creativity constrained or limited?
5. Please describe (chronologically) the mechanics of production – how is a typical programme produced (permissions, script, material gathering etc)?

#### Section Three – Partnership Working.

6. How are participating forces selected and are the officers screen-tested or media trained?
7. What criteria influence the selection of suitable material & who makes these editorial decisions?
8. Can you think of some examples of material / situations that were deemed unsuitable for transmission by one or more parties involved and why? Were they eventually transmitted?

#### Section Four - PVP Rules & Impact on Programming.

9. Do controversies about police pursuits have any impact upon your work?
10. Would you say that changes in the regulation of pursuits have affected the work that you produce? If so, how?

#### Section Five – Social & Cultural Role of PVP-Based Programming.

11. Do you feel that you produce an accurate version of the reality of police pursuits?
12. Do you see your work in terms of entertainment or public information?
13. Is there an inherent tension between these two competing principles? Any examples of this?
14. My research indicates a decline in the visibility of pursuits in police-based ‘ob- doc’ programming over the last decade. Would you agree with this? If so, what would you say are the possible reasons?
15. Any other comments, opinions that you’d like to share?