Advocacy organisations, the British labour movement and the struggle for independence in Rhodesia, 1965-1980

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire School of Education and Social sciences

November 2015
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Concurrent registration for two or more academic awards

I, Charlie Eperon, declare that while registered for the research degree, I was with the University’s specific permission, an enrolled student for the following awards:

Postgraduate Diploma in Health Informatics, UCL
Postgraduate Certificate in Healthcare Leadership, Open University

Material submitted for another award

I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for an academic award and is solely my own work

Collaboration

Where a candidate’s research programme is part of a collaborative project, the thesis must indicate in addition clearly the candidate’s individual contribution and the extent of the collaboration. Please state below:

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Type of Award
Doctor of Philosophy

School
Education and Social
Abstract

This thesis discusses the struggle for independence in Rhodesia, from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 to internationally recognised independence in 1980. Whilst there are many existing accounts and discussions of the Rhodesia crisis, there is very little work that considers the role of advocacy organisations and the pressure they exerted on successive Governments and the broader left in Britain, and little consideration of the African nationalist movement outside of Rhodesia or the nationalist bases in neighbouring countries. The thesis builds on existing literature by considering how interest in the Rhodesia issue amongst advocacy organisations and the labour movement in Britain fluctuated over this 15 year period, according to key events in the timeline of the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. It examines the methods used by advocacy organisations in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, arguing that they were constrained by pragmatism and adherence to familiar methods of campaigning, as well as a lack of will to break with these methods, one of which was to involve the labour movement and utilise their established networks to publicise the cause. This tactic was met with limited success because, for the majority of the period under consideration, the British labour movement was broadly disengaged with the Rhodesia issue, with other primarily domestic concerns taking precedence, although certain individuals gave ardent support to the cause. The rhetoric of the more middle class led advocacy organisations generally failed to find traction with much of the labour movement. Meanwhile, the African nationalist movement focused its attentions on the British Labour Party in the belief that they were the real power brokers, and maintained a polite relationship with its representatives, whilst espousing a strong anti-British rhetoric back in Rhodesia.
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# List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Annual Delegate Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATUC</td>
<td>African Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Anti-Apartheid Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLEF</td>
<td>Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCJZ</td>
<td>Birmingham Campaign for Justice in Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFMAG</td>
<td>Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIIR</td>
<td>Catholic Institute of International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation (Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Constituency Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLPD</td>
<td>Campaign for Labour Party Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPGB</td>
<td>Communist Party of Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Commonwealth Relations Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATA</td>
<td>Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICB</td>
<td>Fabian International Commonwealth Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLIZI</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWW</td>
<td>Industrial Workers of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDI</td>
<td>Illegal Declaration of Independence (sometimes used interchangeably with UDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPID</td>
<td>Labour Party International Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFU</td>
<td>National African Federation of Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATUC</td>
<td>National African Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAZ</td>
<td>National Archives of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIBMAR</td>
<td>No Independence Before Majority Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOLS</td>
<td>National Organisation of Labour Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUM</td>
<td>National Union of Mineworkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>Overseas Policy and Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLP</td>
<td>Parliamentary Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>POEU</td>
<td>Post Office Engineering Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIO</td>
<td>Rhodesian Information Office (in Washington)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACTU</td>
<td>South African Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMI</td>
<td>Social Movement Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Social Movement Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRTUC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRTUCCUK</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesian Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee in the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUC</td>
<td>Scottish Trade Unions Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGWU</td>
<td>Transport and General Workers' Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUAG</td>
<td>Trade Union Action Group (of the AAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Unions Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNA</td>
<td>United Nations Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral declaration of independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDAW</td>
<td>Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLTBU</td>
<td>Watermen, Lightermen, Tugmen &amp; Bargemen’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZACU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZECC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Emergency Campaign Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Medical Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZUPO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZWG</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Working Group (of the AAM)</td>
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</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

“Africa retained a capacity for arousing passions among the politically conscious in Britain to an extent which few, if any, of those other, far more important areas did. Even the war in the Middle East, with all the implications this had for the many Jews or Zionist sympathisers in Britain, did not touch the raw nerve of British political controversy quite so directly as did the problem of Rhodesia.”

M. Hudson

Whilst Hudson’s phrasing is objectionable, this quote captures the provocative and divisive nature of Rhodesia and its history, as debated amongst those sectors of British society that were interested in its development.

The ‘Rhodesia crisis’ spanned 15 years, claimed the lives of over 30 000 people, brought the Commonwealth to the brink of collapse, and saw the ascendancy of Robert Gabriel Mugabe to the reins of power. Despite the tumultuous and dramatic nature of this period, many aspects remain under or unexplored in existing academic literature, leaving a gap in the telling of this important story.

Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, was a self-governing British colony and from 1953 formed part of the Central African Federation (CAF) with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The CAF lasted until 1963, but was then broken up to allow for the creation of the independent states of Zambia and Malawi under constitutions that fairly enfranchised the African population. Rhodesia remained a British colony with a strong settler regime whose newly elected right wing government, under Ian Smith, rejected Britain’s call to bring forward constitutional reform in line with its northern neighbours. Rejecting this policy, Smith’s government, illegally and unilaterally, declared independence in 1965, generally referred to as the unilateral declaration of

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4 Self-governing meaning that it had an elected Government with control of most internal affairs, but there will still some colonial strictures in place.
independence (UDI). Britain, from this point until the official independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, tried to negotiate a return to legality with a framework in place for achieving majority rule. Meanwhile the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia, tired of fruitless campaigning through constitutional channels, began a guerrilla war against the illegal regime, also in a bid for majority rule. During the period between UDI and the official independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, there were various diplomatic attempts to resolve the impasse and bring an end to the war, eventually culminating in the Lancaster House talks in 1979 and the election of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led by Robert Mugabe. This brief introduction highlights two key aspects of the story, which is manifested as two largely separate bodies of existing academic literature: one that deals with the diplomatic unfolding of the Rhodesia crisis, and another that addresses the guerrilla war.

Whilst there are many existing accounts and discussions of the Rhodesia crisis, there is very little work that considers the role of advocacy organisations and the pressure they exerted on successive Governments and the broader left in Britain, not simply to settle, but to find an acceptable solution to the crisis that did not sell-out Rhodesia's black majority. There is also little consideration of the African nationalist movement outside of Rhodesia or the nationalist bases in neighbouring countries. The following literature review highlights the key arguments and debates in existing studies of the period, and through this, sets out the background to the exploration, in later chapters, of the role of advocacy organisations, the British labour movement and the African nationalist movement, and the role of pragmatism in the struggle for independence in Rhodesia. This introductory chapter will then move on to discuss how the thesis builds on the existing literature; the research questions guiding the study; the methodology applied to carry out the research, and then set out the structure for the following five substantive chapters.

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**Literature Review**

The intended scope of this literature review is to consider the main texts on the subject of the Rhodesia crisis, including those considering the African nationalist movement, events in Britain, and texts on advocacy organisations. After considering existing literature focusing respectively on Britain and Rhodesia, sources providing context to the topic will be considered, followed by relevant theoretical work. The literature review will begin with the final years of the CAF, and its breakup in 1963 precipitating UDI, up to the official independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, although the substantive chapters of the thesis will focus on the period of 1965-1980. This extension is simply to provide context to the discussions that will follow later. The period of the CAF was important in two regards; its demise set in motion events that led to UDI, and it provided a forum that nurtured the proto-African nationalist movement in Rhodesia.\(^7\)

**British Policy in Existing Literature**

The literature focusing on British policy towards Rhodesia during the period under consideration generally takes a governmental approach, and to a large extent fails to engage with the literature on the guerrilla war or nationalist movement. Events are predominantly covered from an elite perspective, focusing on the way in which the Rhodesia situation played out diplomatically, and in Parliament.

Windrich provides a detailed chronological account of British policy on Rhodesia, beginning with the Constitutional Conference of 1961, surrounding the dissolution of the CAF.\(^8\) The text considers policy on Rhodesia from both Labour and Conservative perspectives. This provides a useful inter-party context that enriches the British-oriented narrative of this historical chapter. Windrich also discusses various UN and Commonwealth meetings, which help to put events in context in terms of international opinion, which was generally one of frustration with Britain. Whilst Smith’s attempts to maintain unity in his Rhodesian Front party and campaigning around Rhodesian elections are covered, there is no substantive engagement with the

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\(^8\) Windrich, *Rhodesian Independence*: 12-17.
history of the nationalist movement or guerrilla war. However, it is an invaluable historical text on British policy on Rhodesia from 1961 until 1977, focusing on the governmental and international-organisational level. Whilst some discussion of the annual party conferences (in Britain) is included, and occasional acknowledgement of specific constituency motions put forward, the account largely focuses on party elites. So, whilst drawing no overarching conclusions on the subject of British involvement in Rhodesia, Windrich offers a very detailed and precise account of the diplomacy of the time, and of British policy on the issue.

Published at a similar time as Windrich’s book, and dealing with events in a similar governmental approach, Maxey compares Labour’s strategy to that of the Conservatives, and concludes that in essence it was simply a continuation. Windrich differentiates the two parties’ policies at various points, but this is usually a difference of extent, rather than fundamental character. For example the Conservative Party, or at least its mainstream, was not fundamentally opposed to the idea of sanctions, but did not share Labour’s vision of the extent to which they should be applied. She also points out that African nationalist leaders heralded the election of Labour in 1964 as they were seen to more closely represent nationalist interests, although this optimism did not last.

Prior to UDI, in an attempt to prevent Smith from making such a move, Wilson had threatened the imposition of sanctions if independence were to be illegally declared. When UDI was announced, Britain did implement sanctions, but it did so in stages. Maxey offers an important critique of the sanctions regime, which was also made by other states at UN Security Council and Commonwealth leaders’ meetings and resulted in frustration with Britain. Sanctions were applied over an extended period of time, allowing Rhodesia to adapt and greatly reducing the potential efficacy of this strategy.

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10 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: Chapter 2.
Coggins provides a more recent account of Britain and Rhodesia, again focusing on the British government, and particularly on Wilson. He explores in some detail Britain's efforts to forestall UDI, and when this failed, attempts to negotiate a settlement.\textsuperscript{12} It is a less detailed account than is offered by Windrich, but with the benefit of hindsight, Coggins draws more insightful conclusions about Wilson's overall strategy. It is stated that the aim of sanctions was to try to affect the Rhodesian government without alienating white opposition to Smith. No real indication of the socioeconomic realities behind such a strategy is given, although Coggins states that Rhodesian Front propaganda was successful in placing blame for any economic hardship firmly on Britain. This is supported by Windrich who details the way in which the Smith regime gradually brought Rhodesian media under state control, and continually used it for pro-Rhodesian Front propaganda against both the British and the African nationalists.\textsuperscript{13}

A key conclusion that Coggins draws, which is not made explicit in Windrich's book despite the extra detail in her account, is that the 'Rhodesian issue' demonstrated that realpolitik prevailed over any previously stated commitment to multi-racial democracy.\textsuperscript{14} However, Coggins is not entirely unsympathetic towards Wilson's efforts. He argues that Wilson successfully kept the Rhodesia question from becoming a divisive issue in domestic British politics. This gives a preliminary indication of the influence of pragmatism in decision making on Rhodesia, in this instance with successive Labour Governments. Where Windrich merely chronicles the negotiations and ever increasing concessions offered to the Smith regime by Britain, Coggins argues that "Wilson's basic political aim of offering enough constitutional concessions to induce divisions between moderates and hard-liners in the party, so as to form an interim government of blacks and whites, was not so unrealistic".\textsuperscript{15} This idea of an overriding strategy is not suggested in other accounts of negotiations, but offers an interesting potential meta-narrative to Britain's role in the Rhodesia situation.

\textsuperscript{12} R. Coggins, 'Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa', \textit{Contemporary British History} 20: 3 (2006), 363-381.
\textsuperscript{13} E. Windrich, 'Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State' \textit{African Affairs} 78: 313 (1979), 523-534.
\textsuperscript{14} Coggins, 'Wilson and Rhodesia': 376.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
There are two important articles that explicitly deal with debates surrounding the potential use of force in resolving the ‘Rhodesian issue’. Coggins also addresses this issue, but it is not dealt with in detail and the conclusion is drawn that it was ruled out because of military factors and Labour’s slim majority at the time of the initial decision. Murphy provides by far the most thorough exploration of the possible use of force, and argues that the decision that the military option would not be available was actually made far earlier than is generally assumed. When military intervention in the Federation was being considered, the planning process and conclusions on the subject informed all subsequent thinking on the subject of intervention in Rhodesia. Pessimism about the chances of success of a military intervention became ingrained in political thinking, which affected all successive debates. Contrary to this view, Watts argues that obstacles to the use of force were exaggerated, and that force could have been used in Rhodesia. The reasons cited against the use of force, such as the strength of the Rhodesian Air Force, are systematically discredited, including those given by Coggins for why force was not used. On technical points, Watts may well be correct, but Murphy’s argument on the trajectory of political and military thinking on the subject seems far more relevant and compelling in assessing the actions of the British government. It also serves to highlight the pragmatic approach to policy making on the use of force specifically, as well as in relation the Rhodesia issue more generally; if chances of success of military intervention were deemed low, it was pragmatic to avoid this option.

As mentioned above, Coggins’ analysis is weighted towards Wilson in particular, rather than the government as a whole. It is important to consider Wilson as a leader in exploring Labour Party and government policy on Rhodesia. Wrigley discusses Wilson’s unique strategic methods, using the analogy of a chess player engaged in multiple games. In this sense, he argues, Wilson’s decisions have to be seen in broader

context.\textsuperscript{18} He also argues that Wilson was preoccupied both with image, and with making sure the Tories were always on the defensive. This sometimes resulted in moral principles taking a backseat in the creation of foreign policy. This is supported by Windrich’s discussion of the outcome of the Fearless proposals, whereby Wilson faced considerable opposition from within the Labour Party, but “he appeared to be more concerned with the fact that the Opposition were not disposed to criticise the proposals or attack the Government for their conduct in the negotiations”\textsuperscript{19}

Shifting discussion briefly from the overriding focus on government, Maxey argues that the anti-UDI protest movement had none of the passion of the anti-Vietnam war movement. This can be explained by the fact that there was less press coverage of Rhodesia, there was an underlying anti-Americanism to the anti-Vietnam war movement, and finally the perception that Britain was responsible for the Rhodesian situation, coupled with loyalty to Labour made protesters less vocal.\textsuperscript{20} In discussing the debates and events surrounding Rhodesia House, Brownell argues that, for what popular protest movement there was, the building provided a “galvanising function” because of its physical representation of the illegal regime.\textsuperscript{21} The building itself, and debates around its use, mirrored broader policy on Rhodesia, just as waves of popular protest reflected periods where the Rhodesian situation was more prominent politically.

More generally, though of particular significance in discussing the breadth of focus of the thesis, is Howe’s account of the British left and anticolonialism. Whilst Howe focuses on a period before Rhodesia hit the headlines, ending in 1964, the scope of the book and Howe’s justifications for its remit provide a wealth of material useful to the thesis. There are two main aims of this study; to “survey the attitudes and activities on colonial issues of those groups in British politics who defined themselves, or were defined, as distinctively anti-imperialist and sympathetic to the aims of colonial

\textsuperscript{19} Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 147.
\textsuperscript{20} Maxey, ‘Labour and Rhodesian Situation’: 160-161.
nationalism” and to “evaluate the changing ways in which, arising out of the experience of Empire and decolonisation, more general ideas about imperialism, nationalism, and underdevelopment were expressed among British radicals during these years”.22 The first of these, building up a picture of the activities and beliefs of various groups on the political left in Britain working on anticolonial issues is quite similar to some of the focus of this study, particularly chapter 3. The second aim differs by virtue of Howe’s study discussing a much longer period than is considered in the thesis (1918-1964). Nonetheless, the book provides some very useful ideas about the merits of having such a broad analytical focus, and about the interaction of different groups. Such ideas will be discussed later in the introduction, in exploring in more detail the focus of the thesis, and in later chapters looking at the interaction of the various groups under consideration, particularly chapter 4.

Also of use, although not dealing with the Rhodesia issue is literature about the British Labour Party and broader labour movement during the 1960s and 70s. Young’s volume on international policy of the 1964-1970 Labour Governments describes the disappointment with Labour’s record on foreign affairs during this period, citing the “halfhearted sanctions policy against Rhodesia”.23 Whilst acknowledging Wilson’s skill at holding the Party together and winning elections, Young highlights his dominance in decision-making when it came to foreign affairs, a point supported by Vickers.24 This point is useful in beginning to understand how the Party Leadership, and Wilson in particular, dominated policy creation on Rhodesia, and often failed to listen to the views of the wider Party. Relating the Rhodesia issue to the Wilson Governments more generally, Young argues that it “underlined the way Labour compromised its original promises and principles” and that Wilson’s “government tried to escape contradictory pressures by finding a middle way between high principle and the loss of its soul”.25 Whilst acknowledging that Wilson managed to avoid a fundamental rift

with any of his ‘constituencies’ (the Party, public opinion, the Commonwealth, the UN), his overall record on foreign policy was not a success: “the left in particular felt dismayed, believing that Wilson abandoned any socialist idealism in favour of pragmatism and an obsession with wrong-footing the Conservatives.”26 This again illustrates the pressures towards pragmatism surrounding the Rhodesia crisis: there were many competing constituencies to please or at least appease, and the attempt to find a middle, cautious way inevitably left many disappointed but nonetheless succeeded in maintaining Party unity throughout what was a challenging period.

John Callaghan also highlights Wilson’s reversal on “the rhetoric of moral improvement in foreign policy which the incoming Government had made in 1964”, giving Rhodesia and Vietnam as specific examples of unethical foreign policy.27 Further to this, he captures the divisions within the Labour Party and the broader labour movement, which is important to note here, in order to understand in later discussion that there was no single entity when dealing with Rhodesia, and that the issue was frequently characterised by disagreement. Callaghan notes the first foreign policy defeats in 1968 at the Party Conference, one of which was over Rhodesia, which symbolised the beginning of a “widening rift in the party”, particularly between the PLP and the trade unions over industrial relations.28

Vickers highlights the importance of considering foreign policy in understanding the successes and failures of the Labour Party. She argues that while foreign policy issues may not have played a decisive role in elections, preceded by domestic concerns, they were of vital importance to the Labour Party itself in terms of maintaining a healthy base of grass roots support. This was because the Party’s support base had a far higher proportion of people who were strongly concerned with foreign affairs, than were found amongst the general electorate.29 Such an argument elucidates why it is important to consider the Rhodesia issue and grass roots activism in Britain, and why the Labour Party was pragmatic in not dismissing the arguments of the advocacy

26 Ibid: 218.
movement too forcefully, because to do so would have been to further alienate the New Left of the party who were more actively engaged with the issue.

**Rhodesia**

Literature focusing on Rhodesia during the time period under consideration broadly falls into two categories; that which considers the guerrilla war and nationalist movements, and that which is sympathetic to the Smith regime. Clearly it is important to consider the Rhodesian Front government, but it frequently appears in the literature that focuses more on diplomacy from a British perspective, and also into discussions of the nationalist struggle. For these reasons, this review of existing literature will make reference to texts written from a viewpoint sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front, but will concentrate for the most part on literature on the nationalist struggle, and the way in which this interacted with the Rhodesian government, Britain, and other international players. Literature on Rhodesia and the nationalist struggle encompasses a broad range of themes and a complex interplay of socioeconomic and political dynamics. For this reason, it is difficult to divide the literature into clear groupings or themes. For the sake of simplicity, literature around this subject will be divided roughly into that which covers guerrilla armies, the international relations of the nationalist groups and finally divisions within the nationalist movement.

**The Guerrilla War**

A particularly informative text on the subject of the armed struggle is Bhebe and Ranger’s *Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*. The introduction to this volume sets out its aim of providing an alternative study of the guerrilla war that does not glorify ZANU-PF or overlook the role of ordinary soldiers. Several chapters within this volume offer insight into the strategies of guerrilla armies, both in terms of recruitment and military strategy against the state. Two chapters focusing on ZAPU in this volume take an important step towards redressing the previous politicised bias in writing on the guerrilla war.

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Brickhill’s chapter focuses on the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) between 1976 and 1979, the development of military strategy in this period and provides a detailed description of the technical structure and relationship between the political wing and the armed wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). He outlines the Zero Hour operation, which aimed to end the war through a major military offensive, for which they were also training regular forces to act alongside guerrillas, and to assist in the running of the state if the plan were to be successful. However, agreement at Lancaster House was reached prior to this plan being implemented. An important component of the argument set out by Brickhill is that ZIPRA was more proletarian than the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU’s armed wing, had greater levels of education amongst the ranks of its guerrillas and that this explains their ability to mobilise more effectively without so much reliance on coercion, and also on the planned transition from guerrilla to regular forces.32 However, Bhebe and Ranger note that other authors in the volume argue that the distinction is fuzzier than Brickhill suggests.33

Chapters by Dabengwa and Tungamirai consider ZIPRA and ZANLA respectively. Tungamirai focuses on recruitment techniques used by ZANLA, and states that early on in the struggle they had to resort to press-ganging, which he states was the method regularly used by ZIPRA.34 It is worth noting that this kind of assertion tends to vary according the affiliation of the author. As pressures on land and resources created problems for much of the rural population, Tungamirai suggests that some people became more amenable to recruitment. Furthermore, in the north east of the country, recruitment was facilitated by the support of spirit mediums, a point echoed by Lan.35 In contrast, Dabengwa focuses more on ZIPRA’s external relations,36 which will be returned to later, and discussions between the two armed wings. One such

discussion led to the formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army, or ZIPA. Moore argues that ZIPA represents a more significant strategic innovation than is usually acknowledged, and discusses the strategy of this organisation in some detail.\(^\text{37}\) However, Dabengwa argues that ZIPA broke down over disagreements about strategy.\(^\text{38}\) This literature on recruitment strategies used by the African nationalist movement will be referred to in the final substantive chapter. It explores, tangentially, the successes of the African National Council (ANC) in mobilising support against the settlement proposals negotiated between Ian Smith and the British Conservative Government in 1971. This organisation was established specifically because of the neutrality offered by avoiding the names of ZANU or ZAPU, which hints at the reputations of their sometimes less-than-democratic recruitment strategies.\(^\text{39}\)

**The nationalist struggle and Rhodesian society**

When considering the struggle for independence and the way in which the nationalist movement(s) operated, it is important to consider the peasantry, and socioeconomic dynamics that may have affected patterns of support. A central text on this subject is Kriger’s *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*. Kriger considers the dynamics of peasant support, using personal oral testimony from people involved. This relates to her main critique of many existing studies on similar topics; that they ignore peasant voices, and rely on secondary sources to infer peasant opinions. One central argument is that grievances amongst the peasantry, as it cannot be viewed as a homogenous socioeconomic grouping, are often more important as motivation for participating in the war, than a desire for racial equality. She argues that often supporting a guerrilla group or participating in the war was seen as an opportunity to avenge a personal or community grievance, and that wealthier peasants were often more despised than the ruling regime, as intra-peasantry grievances were more immediate, and therefore more tangible.\(^\text{40}\)


\(^{38}\) D. Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA’, 34.


Related to this argument, Kriger critiques existing studies, for example by Ranger and Lan, for their failure to acknowledge these inter-peasantry grievances. Ranger does acknowledge a multiplicity of identities and traditions within peasant consciousness, yet does not extrapolate this to explore grievances. When considering participation in the nationalist struggle, this is an important motivational factor. This debate can be seen to follow on from an earlier critique of Ranger’s work on peasant consciousness, in which Kriger argues that his conception of this identity is too limited to issues of class resistance, and overlooks the influence of intra-class relations and guerrilla and state violence. Another key text on the subject of society and the development of the guerrilla war is Bhebe and Ranger’s counterpart volume to Soldiers, cited above. It deals with broad ranging issues such as religion, education and the legacies of the war. However, none of the chapters in the volume are directly relevant to the research questions set out below.

**Divisions in the Nationalist Movement**

One of the biggest problems faced by the nationalist struggle, and those trying to aid negotiations for majority rule, was that of divisions within the movement. The nationalist groups and their guerrilla armies never managed to convincingly present a united front, despite the best efforts of the Front-line States, which was a hindrance both in terms of the dynamic of the war, and in seeking a settlement. On this subject, Alexander, McGregor and Ranger argue that “in significant ways, the history of Zimbabwe’s liberation movements is one of failed attempts at unity and of military innovation in the face of an intransigent and powerful enemy.” There are numerous and competing explanations for the divisive nature of the nationalist movement in Rhodesia.

Sithole provides a review of some existing literature that explores class as an explanatory factor for divisions within the nationalist movement. He critiques this

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45 Alexander et al, *Violence and Memory*: 140.
body of work for selecting the wrong tool of analysis, since the whole movement is a struggle for power, and that this is mirrored in its leadership is par for the course.\textsuperscript{46} In an earlier article Sithole argues that ethnicity is a viable, albeit only partial, explanation for factionalism,\textsuperscript{47} a point which is reiterated in the critique of class based analyses, although he never goes so far as to offer a complementary framework for considering factionalism. Sithole argues that the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in 1971 was the first indication of the ethnic dimension entering into the nationalist struggle as it was the first time that “vitriolic accusations and counter-accusations of ‘tribalism’ were levelled at each other by the principal political gladiators in various factions”\textsuperscript{48} This got progressively more divisive and by 1979 there were 7 nationalist groups “all haunted by the ethnic factor”.\textsuperscript{49}

Whilst ethnicity may have a part to play in explaining splits in the nationalist movement, it seems problematic and ultimately futile to attempt to argue that any single factor provides the most compelling explanation for factionalism. Mubako explores division and various attempts at unity within the nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{50} Ethnicity is not absent from the discussion, but the focus is more on power struggles and leadership styles, in other words, practical issues that affected the trajectory of division within the movement. Similarly, Bhebe and Ranger argue that “contrasts which remain between ZIPRA and ZANLA...were not the result of deliberate policy, nor of class or ethnic preferences, but rather the results of specific historical and geographical factors”.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{The advent of UDI}

One of the most important historical considerations, when looking at the reasons behind UDI, is the break-up of the CAF, and the way in which this occurred. As Sills

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid: 27.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid: 33.
\textsuperscript{51} Bhebe and Ranger, ‘Volume Introduction’: 11.
argues, albeit from an overtly pro-Rhodesian Front stance, the break-up of the Federation and the circumstances resulting from this meant that UDI was almost inevitable.\footnote{H. D. Sills, ‘The Break-up of the Central African Federation: Notes on the Validity of Assurances’ \textit{African Affairs} 73: 290 (1974), 50-62.} Sills suggests that Rhodesians were led to believe that the Federation could not be dismantled without their consent, and Winston Field, then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, maintained that he had been promised independence were Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to be granted theirs. Britain maintained that it had never offered this. It was this disagreement over the terms of the Federation break up that precipitated, or at least was the cited reason for, greater hostility in Southern Rhodesia and a hunger for independence. The Federation was also important in terms of fostering interaction between African nationalists from the three territories, as they met to oppose integration from a fear that it would facilitate the extension of power of the white supremacist government in Southern Rhodesia. Day points out that the “Federation failed to provide a politically integrated Central Africa, but ironically it acted as a symbol of European domination which united Africans in the three territories”.\footnote{Day, \textit{International Nationalism}: 62.}

Scarnecchia offers a detailed exploration of the urban roots of nationalist agitation, and how these early patterns of contention gradually shifted and began to shape the nationalist movement of the 1960s and beyond.\footnote{T Scarnecchia \textit{The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964} (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).} More particularly, he looks at the development of the arguments behind nationalist demands for rights, highlighting that in the 1940s and 50s these were based around “the rhetoric of imperial citizenship and workers rights to gain state recognition for better living conditions, or better wages”,\footnote{Ibid: 6.} later giving way to a focus on seeking state power over and above the rights of the individual.\footnote{Ibid: 159.} Scarnecchia also highlights the development of a tradition of violence within the nationalist movement, as early nationalist leaders such as George Nyandoro and James Chikerema sought to transform local urban forms of nationalist organisation into a nationwide movement. As the Rhodesian state began to respond to

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Day, \textit{International Nationalism}: 62.}
\item \footnote{T Scarnecchia \textit{The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964} (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008).}
\item \footnote{Ibid: 6.}
\item \footnote{Ibid: 159.}
\end{itemize}}
these forms of protest and political organisation more repressively, “nationalist politics became less about expanding ideas of reciprocal nationalism and more about defending a core leadership against state repression and against rival leadership factions and their followers.”

In contrast to Scarnecchia, chapters in Alexander, McGregor and Ranger’s Violence and Memory highlight the rural beginnings of nationalism. In his contribution to this volume, Raftopoulos notes that:

The shift in the terrain of struggle to guerrilla war in the rural area in the 1970s further minimised the importance of a strong and critical labour movement, in nationalist political thinking. The emphasis and accent on rural struggle led to a neglect of urban struggles and, more importantly, the link between the two areas of contestation remained weak.

A quote from Moore, drawing on a point made by Ken Flower (former Head of Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and supposed MI6 mole), goes some way to explaining these different foci in the literature looking at the Rhodesia situation:

The Rhodesians believed that there were two separate conflicts (Flower 1987), whereas the Zimbabwe nationalists and, to a lesser extent, the British believed that there was only one. The Rhodesians viewed their “internal situation” as a matter that they could control and focused their concern on independence from Britain.

This is illustrative of the strength of different opinions on the Rhodesia issue amongst, and sometimes even within, the different groups who were involved. It is no surprise that this proliferation of views on the reality of the situation, let alone what should be done, is reflected in in its historiography.

**Grand Narratives**

Also worth discussing in this introductory literature review are the ‘grand narrative’ accounts of the Rhodesia crisis, a phrase borrowed from White’s erudite discussion of

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57 Ibid: 158.
the Pearce Commission. Several studies could be considered to fall into this category. Martin Meredith's, catchy yet accurately titled, *The Past is Another Country* considers the same period of time as the thesis; UDI to independence. In this he considers the formation of the nationalist organisations, the ascendancy of Ian Smith, guerrilla activities, factionalism, the Pearce Commission, the détente period, the Smith-Nkomo talks, the Kissinger initiative, the failings of the Geneva conference, the Anglo-American initiative, the internal settlement and the Lancaster House conference. It is an exhaustive, and exhausting, list, but ultimately it is a work that falls prey to the same division outlined above: there is no dialogue between Britain and Rhodesia, except the accounts of official negotiations.

Another account of Rhodesia history that comes under this heading is Verrier's *The Road to Zimbabwe*, which considers an extended period beginning in 1890. Any book of such scope cannot address the issues involved in significant detail, and Verrier's account again adopts the presiding biases found in much of the existing work on the topic. He does, however, offer the argument that successive British Governments were biased in favour of the white settler regime, in contrast with some of the more favourable accounts described above. A key shortcoming of these ‘grand narrative’ accounts is that they obfuscate the way in which the Rhodesia issue in Britain fluctuated in terms of its prominence. This is a key gap that the thesis aims to address.

Finally, there are various published primary sources that will be consulted in the thesis. This material differs to the secondary literature outlined above, in that it is useful to the thesis, but does not directly contribute to the debates surrounding the topic. For example, there is the thorough and convenient *Who’s Who of African Nationalism*, the (auto)biographies of Barbara Castle, Bishop Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo, and documentary anthologies such as Nyandoro and Nyangoni's

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collection of material relating to the African nationalist movement. These will be drawn on at points throughout the thesis, but do not require further introduction.

**Gaps in literature**

From exploring the literature it can be seen that there is little dialogue between texts dealing with the ‘Rhodesian question’ from a British perspective, which tend to use a solely governmental approach, and those exploring the situation on the ground in Rhodesia, which, broadly speaking, focus on the grass roots and explore the issues of the guerrilla war. Those texts in the former category also seem to concentrate on the earlier diplomatic efforts of the British, initially to prevent UDI and then to seek some sort of negotiated settlement. Whereas the texts in the latter grouping focus more on the later efforts of the guerrillas, as the war gathered momentum and scale, and became increasingly untenable for the illegal Rhodesian regime. There is very little literature dealing with advocacy activity on Rhodesia, almost none that considers the activities of the British labour movement, and none that considers how the Rhodesia issue moved on and off the political agenda in Britain. This thesis addresses these three points, coupled with a consideration of the activities of the nationalist movement outside of Rhodesia and the behaviour of elements of the British Government outside of settlement negotiations. These various narrative threads will be drawn together through the overarching argument that all of the groups under consideration were guided by a pragmatic approach which was at times, ostensibly, at odds with their stated aims. This argument will unfold throughout the substantive chapters of the thesis, and bring into consideration new sources dealing with the activities of advocacy organisations, the labour movement and the African nationalist movement.

Howe argues that existing scholarship on decolonisation falls into three main paradigms: descriptive accounts of the official transfer of power from metropole to colony (narrow empiricism); decolonisation as revolution (revolutionary

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romanticism), and those accounts that see a continuation of a less official neo-colonialism instead of genuine independence (transition to neo-colonialism).\(^{69}\) He goes on to state that:

Much recent work on British decolonisation had taken this form: detailed scrutiny of Colonial Office and other governmental papers in order to evaluate the processes of policy-making that led up to withdrawal. The central focus has thus been on what was influentially baptised, for an earlier period, as the ‘official mind of imperialism’.\(^{70}\)

His study aims to counteract this somewhat myopic view that characterises much of the other scholarship on the subject by broadening the focus of analysis to include “parties, pressure groups, business interests, and the currents of public opinion”.\(^{71}\) He argues that existing accounts of decolonisation have sometimes been guilty of trying to filter out dissenting voices to provide a clearer narrative, to the detriment of historical detail and accuracy. These arguments for a broader focus, and shift away from the official discourses of decolonisation, can be appropriated from Howe to justify the focus of this study. Howe’s ideas about how to address the shortcomings of the broader field of study offers support to the multi-organisational focus of the thesis. By including these different voices, it is hoped that a fuller picture of this chapter of history will emerge.

**Structure and Research questions**

During the collection of archival data it became increasingly apparent that it would be impractical to attempt to break the thesis down according to the different organisations, or groups of organisations, involved. It also became clear that a chronological approach, running throughout the thesis, would not work. At each point in time there was so much happening: settlement negotiations, constitutional changes, general elections, protests, armed struggle and so on, as well as the layer of events underneath this, such as organisational meetings and communications, which facilitated the broader events and processes. Various individuals, groups, and groups of organisations became involved at different times and with different aspects of the Rhodesia situation, such that either a chronological or an organisational approach

\(^{69}\) Howe, _Anticolonialism:_ 5.

\(^{70}\) Ibid: 12.

\(^{71}\) Ibid: 17.
would have been unwieldy and ultimately uninformative. This essentially left the option of a thematic approach to the topic, which felt far more suitable, given the complexity of the situation.

Through the process of collecting archival material, several key themes and questions began to assert themselves, which eventually gave rise to the central research questions:

1. What was the relationship between events in Rhodesia and the political climate of the UK in affecting patterns of support for the African nationalist movement amongst UK based advocacy organisations and the British labour movement?

2. What methods were used by UK based advocacy organisations in supporting the struggle for independence in Rhodesia? Were advocacy organisations constrained by pragmatism and existing ideas about how to campaign, and if so, what effect did this have on organisations’ chosen methods?

3. How did the Labour Party and the trade union movement interact with the other organisations and each other in trying to bring about a solution to the Rhodesia crisis? Were these interactions characterised by cooperation or disagreement?

4. How did the African nationalist movement interact with representatives of the British Government in trying to pursue its aims? Were there differences in opinion or rhetoric between nationalists based at home and those based in the UK?

These four questions then became the basic structure of the thesis, with one chapter based around each question, and a final case study chapter considering all of the research questions simultaneously. The purpose of this final substantive chapter is to consider the answers to the research questions explored in earlier chapters in a more narrative and unified way. A case study seemed the best way of achieving this difficult task, as it provided the opportunity to exploit the narrative virtue of a chronological approach, whilst simultaneously focusing on a small enough historical segment to
allow for sufficiently detailed analysis (as the ‘grand narratives’ of earlier were critiqued for failing to do).

Whilst the structure has been alluded to briefly, as being derived from the central research questions, it is necessary to elaborate on the content of each chapter, taking into account their specific scopes, and how they go about addressing the questions.

Chapter 2 will address the question of whether there was a connection between key events in Britain and Rhodesia, and the levels of support for the African nationalist movement amongst advocacy and labour movement organisations in Britain. This topic dictated a chronological focus, which also served the purpose of providing a more detailed outline of the whole Rhodesia situation to help contextualise later discussion. The chapter explores the events as they unfolded, alongside analysis of what advocacy organisations and the British left were doing at particular times, in order to ascertain whether or not there was a correlation between key events and campaigning in Britain on Rhodesia.

Chapter 3 focuses specifically on advocacy organisations, and explores what methods such groups were using in order to achieve their aims in relation to Rhodesia. There is very little existing literature looking at advocacy organisation campaigns on Rhodesia, and what there is rarely considers the methods used in such campaigns. It is these shortcomings that this chapter seeks to address. Chapter 3 also draws on a subset of the theoretical study of social movements, resource mobilisation theory, to explore through a comparative lens why advocacy organisations chose the methods that they did and how these related to methods used by other social movements working on comparable issues. Drawing on this theoretical work raised the question of whether advocacy organisations were constrained by existing ideas about ‘how to campaign’, and if so how these affected their chosen methods. This chapter discusses the argument that advocacy organisations were guided by pragmatism, and goes into detail about the aims of different organisations, campaigning methods and apparent divergences between the two. It also considers different constituencies of opinion between and within advocacy organisations.
Chapter 4 focuses on the Labour Party and the British trade union movement, looking comparatively at how they interacted with advocacy organisations and the African nationalist movement, as well as with each other. Whilst this Chapter does consider the Labour Party, it continues to move away from the elite-dominated accounts of the existing literature by looking at relationships with other organisations, and the grass roots of the Party in responding to the situation in Rhodesia. It explores how the Labour Party leadership enacted classic balancing behaviour in the way that it interacted with advocacy organisations, the nationalist movement and the broader labour movement, in that it tried to maintain civil relationships whilst resisting the pressures placed on it to give ground over the Rhodesia issue. This argument builds on the discussion in previous chapters around the role of pragmatism as a guiding force behind action over Rhodesia.

From this, the thesis considers the African nationalist organisations. Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether there was a difference between nationalist representatives based in the UK and those based at home (which for the purposes of this analysis includes regional bases, since the organisations were proscribed from operating within Rhodesia for much of the struggle). This question arose when British diplomatic communications were discovered postulating that the differing rhetoric of various nationalist representatives highlighted the difference between local nationalists and their more moderate counterparts in Britain. This posed a question about whether this diplomatic assumption was correct; were nationalists based in Britain more moderate than their colleagues in Rhodesia and if so why? The ensuing discussion considers how the nationalist organisations pragmatically tailored their rhetoric and actions according to audience, with the aim of more effectively furthering their aims and bolstering support for the cause both in Britain and Rhodesia. This chapter challenges the focus in the existing literature on the activities of the nationalist organisations within Rhodesia, and between ZANU and ZAPU. There is very little work, as will be explored in the chapter-specific literature review at the outset of Chapter 4, that considers the international relations of the African nationalist movement, and this chapter seeks to make a contribution to this area of study.
The final substantive chapter seeks to draw together the related but separate analyses of the previous four chapters. Whilst Chapter 1 works chronologically and endeavours to provide a basic narrative thread on which the other chapters can hang, it seemed beneficial to draw them together with a final case study chapter. To this end, a case study was required that provided a sufficient volume of archival material to allow for discussion of the topics raised in all of the other chapters, so it had to be something that spanned a reasonable period of time and sparked interest from all of the different groups under consideration in the thesis. Once these parameters had been established, the choice of case study was simple; the Pearce Commission recurred so frequently in archival material and fulfilled the necessary criteria to allow for this chapter to explore issues discussed in each of the previous ones.

The core contribution to knowledge this thesis makes is a historiographical one. Exploring the Rhodesia issue through a very different range of sources to the oft-cited National Archives ‘official’ papers (albeit in conjunction with these) a more rounded picture of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe emerges. The thesis highlights that among all of the different groups under consideration, there was a common characteristic of being guided by pragmatism which at times lead to actions that appeared to be at odds with stated aims and values. This theme will be explored throughout the substantive chapters of the thesis.

**Methodology**

The central methodological approach of this project is qualitative analysis of primary sources gathered from extensive archival research in multiple UK archives. Included here are the abbreviations of the archives as they occur in footnoted sources. The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC) in the People’s History Museum provided the bulk of the initial research, and included NEC minutes, Labour Party conference reports, Judith Hart’s personal papers, and a large collection of uncatalogued Labour Party International Department material relating to the Rhodesia issue. Rhodes House Library (RH) in Oxford holds the archive of the AAM, as well as the Africa Bureau papers. Research in The National Archives (TNA) was
focused largely on the papers of the Rhodesia Department, a sub-Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (more will be said on this in the next section of the Chapter). There was also a specific collection on the Pearce Commission utilised for Chapter 6. The LSE archives (LSE) were used to consult the papers of George Cunningham and Andrew Faulds as well as the papers of the Fabian Society. Research was conducted at the London Metropolitan TUC Library (TUCL) that holds various TUC policy papers, followed by work in the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the University of Warwick, which holds a more extensive collection of TUC papers. A small amount of research was conducted in the Lambeth Palace Library (LPL) and the Church of England Records Centre (CERC) to consult church papers on Rhodesia, though neither of these represented a substantial part of the primary research.

At the outset of the PhD project it was planned that research would be conducted in the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ). Eventually the decision was made that such a trip would not help to further the aims of the thesis. Through speaking to a contact in Zimbabwe, it was established that much of what was available in NAZ, of relevance to the project, such as nationalist publications, was also available in UK archives. Furthermore the ZANU Archive, which does hold papers of relevance to the study, does not currently permit British researchers access to its holdings. However, much of the thesis concerns organisations in Britain, and there are many relevant archival holdings on the nationalist movement in the various archives mentioned above. Ultimately, it would have been an unnecessary and unproductive trip to Zimbabwe, given the volume of material available in this country, and the severe limitations placed on conducting research there.

One of the key methodological concerns that had to be addressed during the thesis was the lack of consistency in archival documentation. This was not in terms of the qualitative content of the documents, but in the preservation of material itself. For example, there might be a several month period in which the minutes of an advocacy organisation seem to have been meticulously kept, followed by a significant gap. For much of the thesis this was not too problematic. However, for chapter 2, which partially relies on the analysis of the volume of sources at each stage of the Rhodesia
issue, such inconsistencies have a greater significance. Since historical work is, by its nature, largely unscientific, this problem was solved by drawing on what sources were present for Chapter 2, and inferring that, had there been a flurry of activity around a certain date, some trace of this was likely to have remained. There seemed to be enough material at each stage that consistency of record keeping was not too apparent a problem.

The sources available for different organisations are not always comparable; different types of documents have been preserved relating to different organisations, and some of the smaller organisations that had less administrative capacity at the time of operation have commensurably smaller archival material. In Chapter 3, a range of different documents will be used in exploring the methods used by advocacy organisations. A lot of archive space is taken up with meeting minutes, but these are supplemented by letters to members and other organisations, adverts for public events and research papers, all of which speak to the methods used by organisations in pursuit of their aims.

Whilst attempting to thoroughly explore the catalogue of each archive visited, and consult the extremely knowledgeable archivists for further guidance on the topic, there will unavoidably be sources of use that have been missed. There will always be documents on a particular subject that end up catalogued in an unusual place, and therefore end up being overlooked. This problem is highlighted in the “Report on the records of the Africa Bureau and related organisations 1952-1978”, which states that:

The Bureau’s archive consists of papers which were constantly used by a number of different people for equally diverse purposes. Therefore, the arrangement of files and data and correspondence and the order of the papers within those files was constantly changing. To cite a hypothetical example, papers apparently referring to a specifically Kenyan problem might be found in a file labelled Bechuanaland because the last person to consult that file had needed to use them in connection with a similar problem occurring in the latter country. The main principle adopted in sorting these papers was to arrange them according to the reasons for
which they had originally arrived at the Bureau's office or been produced there.\textsuperscript{72}

In early stages of research, valuable advice was given: “you can never ‘finish’ an archive”. Short of doing exactly that, missed documents remain an inevitability, but not one of significance to the research, in that there was no shortage of primary documentation to draw on.

As mentioned in the chapter outline, a subset of social movement theory has been drawn on to assist with the analysis of primary data in the second substantive chapter. This theoretical framework, known as resource mobilisation theory, was chosen, as it offers the possibility of introducing a comparative dimension to the research, which is particular use in considering why organisations chose to use the particular methods of campaigning that they did. There were many different organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, all of which had a slightly different focus or campaign aim, and through applying the lens of resource mobilisation theory, the logics behind their choices in terms of campaign methods become not only more comparable, but also much clearer. None of the other chapters draw on theoretical work to the same extent, as these topics were better explored through more traditional methods of historical enquiry.

A word should be said about the specific period of time selected. Why not begin, for instance, with the break-up of the CAF? Or with the beginning of the guerrilla war? UDI was selected for the starting point of the thesis, in terms of the analysis of primary material, because it provides a clear demarcation between legality and illegality, and the point at which the situation fundamentally changed, not just for the population of Rhodesia, but for Britain as well. No other single date provides as clear a statement of what the Rhodesia crisis entailed than UDI, as it defined the parameters of debate for the following 15 years. Furthermore, it defined the political reality on the ground in Rhodesia, and Hudson states “it was at that time of UDI that the Rhodesian problem really began to make an impact on British politics at grass roots level”, arguing that

prior to this point the issue was characterised by disinterest and lack of awareness.\textsuperscript{73}

The end date requires no explanation, though a caveat is required. Whilst the thesis technically deals with the period up to formal independence, in reality very little is said about the formative Lancaster House conference, and even less of its aftermath. This is because these events have already been quite thoroughly documented,\textsuperscript{74} and by this point the nationalist struggle had reached a tentative, followed by a definitive, conclusion.

**Terminology**

It is necessary to set out exactly what is meant by some of the central terms used in the thesis. Many terms used are self-evident in meaning, and go largely uncontested, and these are not discussed here. Others are less clear and require justification for their use over other ostensibly synonymous terms, or clarification of their meaning where this is broadly contested in existing scholarship.

Perhaps the most contentious term in the thesis is ‘labour movement’. For the purposes of the thesis, this term will be used to refer to the Labour Party, the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and individual unions. It also includes left wing and labour movement publications such as *Labour Weekly* and *Socialist Commentary*. In order to redress the bias of the existing literature, the thesis focuses on local and Constituency Labour Party (CLP) opinion, the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) discussions at party conferences and on Labour Party interaction with the other organisations considered. The policies and actions of the Party leadership will at times be referred to in order to contextualise discussion, but this will be in relation to the other groups involved rather than in isolation as has been the case in previous literature on the topic. The thesis considers many other organisations outside of the labour movement, so it was necessary on a practical level to limit the definition of the latter to a workable unit. This is why the Socialist International and international labour bodies (such as the International Labour

\textsuperscript{73} Hudson, *Triumph or Tragedy?*: 54.

Organisation (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)) are excluded from the definition. The thesis does not explicitly consider Militant Tendency (MT), despite its growing activity within the Labour Party during this period. As Crick argues, it was an era which marked “the rise of the single-issue pressure group”, but such campaigns “did not interest Militant, which saw the new culture as a distraction from the real issues”. This is point is strengthened when he argues that “Militant’s growing influence within the LPYS [Labour Party Young Socialists] went largely unremarked...The Young Liberals, protesting about Vietnam and apartheid, were far more of an embarrassment to Jeremy Thorpe at this time than the LPYS was to Harold Wilson.” Furthermore, MT had a very nationally-focused agenda, and was not even particularly concerned with issues of race until it was criticised for this in the early to mid 1980s, and consequently expanded its list of public demands.

A more notable exclusion from the above definition of the labour movement is the Communist Party (CPGB). This decision was taken because the CPGB differentiated itself from the labour movement: “the British labour movement must be won to ally itself with the movement at present campaigning for a reversal of these policies of betrayal and for support of the Zimbabwe peoples”. In terms of responding to the Rhodesia crisis it played a very similar role to the AAM, and indeed it can be argued that the CPGB acted more as an advocacy organisation than a political party in this context, and yet was by no means at the forefront of campaigning on the issue. In light of these points, the CPGB is referred to at times in Chapter 3, but is not framed as part of the labour movement, nor considered at length as part of the advocacy response to the situation in Rhodesia.

Whilst less contentious than ‘labour movement’, some explanation should be given for the choice of the term ‘advocacy organisation’ to describe the AAM and its contemporaries. The main alternatives to this phrase were ‘charity’ or ‘non-Governmental organisation’ (NGO), the latter being much in vogue in current

76 Ibid.
77 LHASC, CP CENT INT 08 08, CPGB International Department report on Rhodesia, 1969.
paragraph. These phrases are both generic and as such do not describe the particular type of organisation with which this thesis is concerned. The term ‘advocacy organisation’ speaks more directly to the specific type of organisation that this study deals with. The Chambers Dictionary defines ‘advocacy’ as the “recommendation or active support of an idea”. This succinctly captures the aims and activities of the organisations that were active on the Rhodesia issue. Sat Obiyan discusses in detail different taxonomies of NGOs and their various merits, making the case that it is useful to have definitions that capture the essence of what an organisation does, beyond simply being an NGO, but to be too prescriptive is ultimately harmful, in that a precise definition will never be able to describe every organisation. This argument supports the case made here for using the term ‘advocacy organisation’. It is more meaningful than the main alternatives, without creating difficulty by being too prescriptive.

During the thesis, the narrative switches between referring to the five principles and the Six Principles. The five principles were set out to the Rhodesian regime by the British Government, a few months prior to UDI. These were principles that would need to be satisfied “before agreeing to the grant of independence”, and continued to be used throughout the period of UDI up to formal independence. The sixth principle was added in January 1966 when Wilson made a statement in the House of Commons about Rhodesia. The Six Principles read:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

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78 A. Sat Obiyan ‘A Critical Examination of the State versus Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Policy Sphere in the Global South: Will the State Die as the NGOs Thrive in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia?’ African and Asian Studies 4: 3 (2005): p. 304.
79 Hansard, HC Deb, 01/11/1965.
80 Hansard, HC Deb, 25/01/1966.
6. Regardless of race there must be no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.\textsuperscript{81}

The thesis refers to both five and Six Principles, depending on the source being discussed, because, despite the addition of the sixth principle, this was not always referred to.

The idea of pragmatism and its influence on the actions of various groups under discussion is mentioned throughout the thesis. In this context, pragmatism is used to mean its typical dictionary definition of a practical, logical approach to situations and problems rather than one driven by principles or theories. It is not referring to the American philosophical movement. It is for this reason that academic literature on political pragmatisms has not been considered.

Finally: ‘Rhodesia’. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, pre-independence Zimbabwe will be referred to exclusively as ‘Rhodesia’. This was the term used for the majority of the period with which the thesis is concerned. Whilst many members of the nationalist movement used the term Zimbabwe, as a reflection of the change they were struggling for, this was not generally taken up by other states or groups interested in the issue until much closer to independence. The use of the term ‘Rhodesia’ in no way represents any sympathy with the agenda of the Smith regime. It is simply a more historically accurate term, without complicating the situation by switching between the technically correct terms for each period (Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe). Especially since much of the thesis does not follow a chronological trajectory, this would serve only to obfuscate the narrative.

\textbf{Organisational Biographies}

This section of the introduction will present some of the key organisations that the thesis discusses in later chapters. The aim here is to provide a reasonably brief outline of how each organisation started; what its aims were, particularly with regard to Rhodesia; who the key figures were; and how, if this was the case, it was related to other organisations. This section will begin with advocacy organisations, before

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid; Hansard HC Deb 01/11/1965.
looking at African nationalist organisations and then political parties and the labour movement in Britain. A notable organisation that the thesis does not consider is Amnesty International, which clearly did campaign on the Rhodesia issue. The reason for this omission is that the unit of focus of all Amnesty's campaigns is human rights. The thesis is more interested in the political unfolding of the Rhodesia situation, and how the grass roots both in Rhodesia and the UK interacted with this, as well as with each other. The focus of Amnesty's campaigns does not fit well into this exploration.

The origins of the AAM lie in the boycott movement. In June 1959, a meeting was held in London to organise a boycott of goods imported from South Africa. Christabel Gurney, herself actively involved in the AAM, editing the movement's official publication, *Anti-Apartheid News*, from 1969-1980\(^{82}\) wrote about this meeting:

> The main speaker was Julius Nyerere, then President of the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU), joined by Kanyama Chiume of the banned Nyasaland African National Congress, Tennyson Makiwane and Vella Pillay from South Africa's African and Indian Congresses, Michael Scott and Trevor Huddleston.\(^{83}\)

She notes that none of these figures were involved in British politics, but came to be involved through other channels. Also important to note is that the date of the meeting, and its proposed method of campaigning were influenced by anti-apartheid action happening in South Africa. Gurney argues that the anti-apartheid cause was taken up in Britain “by a network of organisations and individuals involved in a ferment of activity on three interlinked issues: the anti-colonial struggle; peace and nuclear disarmament; and opposition to endemic, and growing, racism in Britain”,\(^{84}\) all of which were supported by the New Left.

In the decade leading up to 1959, action in Britain against apartheid had been growing amongst a number of different groups and organisations. Gurney characterises this list as “a network of organisations across the political spectrum, though mainly on the Left, including MCF [Movement for Colonial Freedom], Christian Action, CAO

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\(^{84}\) Ibid: 128.
[Committee of African Organisations], the National Council of Civil Liberties, student bodies, some trade unions, the Communist Party and sections of the Labour Party”. It is apparent how wide-reaching the early boycott movement in Britain sought to be; trying to get sponsorship amongst the labour movement, the arts, academia and from all political parties.

It is sometimes suggested that it was the Sharpeville massacre in South African that galvanised the British public around the apartheid cause and prompted the formation of the AAM out of the existing Boycott Movement, but Gurney argues that in fact the Boycott Movement Committee was already planning for how to ensure the continuation of the movement beyond the planned boycott in March 1960. The roots in the Boycott Movement had a lasting impact on the character of the AAM:

“...It built a structure which involved other organisations working in related areas, but which made the future of South Africa its main concern. It established itself as a non-partisan organisation which set out to appeal to people of any or no Party affiliation. Most significantly it was an organisation which aspired to be an autonomous and democratically run British mass movement.”

The above summary, drawn largely from Gurney’s seminal article on the formation of the AAM, gives a clear impression of the character of the AAM from the outset, and of the range of organisations involved. Also mentioned above; one of the early meetings that gave rise to the Boycott Movement in the UK involved various representatives of southern African countries and the Reverend Michael Scott; who was one of the founding members of the Africa Bureau a few years prior to this meeting. He had “decided that there was a need for an organisation to advise and support Africans who wished to oppose by constitutional means political decisions affecting their lives and futures imposed by alien governments.” It worked on many different issues relating to decolonisation in Africa. Originally its activities were focused on “advising Africans on their problems, obtaining the advice of experts, representing them on international

85 Ibid: 133.  
86 Ibid: 144.  
bodies and encouraging them to exert pressure on governments”, but this changed in the early-mid 1960s as the situation in Africa developed, with many states becoming independent.

In response to the changing political realities on the continent, the Bureau focused more of its time on research, producing detailed publications on various issues, such as the efficacy of sanctions in Rhodesia. With this change, came a shift in the way the organisation was funded, from an early reliance on independent donations to more professional fundraising methods. The Bureau made use of various grants from “British, American and Swedish foundations for specific projects or publications”. Pugh and Mackesy sum up this shift in the nature of the organisation; they state that “the general impression created was that in the last decade of its existence the Bureau was becoming less of a philanthropic body in the old, amateur fashion and adopting the style and professional techniques of a modern charitable agency.”

There was an overlap between the AAM and the Africa Bureau in terms of some of the key figures involved, or at least those names that were on the boards to give weight to the cause of the organisations. As mentioned above, Michael Scott had been involved in what can be considered to be the proto-AAM, the Boycott Movement. The Reverend Trevor Huddleston had also been involved at this time in the AAM.

In response to the settlement proposals negotiated between the Smith regime and the Conservative Government in 1971 (discussed briefly in Chapter 2 and at length in Chapter 6) the AAM called a meeting to discuss tactics. It was decided that an organisation should be established specifically to campaign on this issue, to resist any potential sell-out from occurring. It was called the Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee (RECC). Since it was set up by the AAM, there was a significant overlap in terms of the people involved. This idea was revived later in the decade, again in response to fear of a sell-out, with the sister organisation being called the Zimbabwe Emergency Campaign Committee (ZECC). Again this was called into action by the AAM, and involved many of the same people. Both the RECC and the ZECC involved a

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88 Ibid.  
89 NLS, ‘Report on the records of the Africa Bureau’.  
90 NLS, ‘Report on the records of the Africa Bureau’.  

broad church of other organisations, including church groups, African nationalist representatives, other advocacy organisations, left wing groups, and representatives from the media.  

Established at a similar time to the RECC was the Justice for Rhodesia campaign. It was “formed by British churchmen to press for the defeat of the Salisbury proposals. It was sponsored by Bishop Trevor Huddleston (earlier referred to as Reverend, as he was when participating in the Boycott Movement), Bishop Butler, Lord Caradon and Lord Ritchie-Calder. Mr J Camilleri, of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, was the president of the campaign, and in a letter to Harold Wilson stated that “the purpose of the campaign will be to oppose the settlement, to call for the continuation and intensification of sanctions and to insist on the right of Afri
can self-determination.”  

There are several organisations that are perhaps better known than some of those outlined above, but for reasons of source availability do not feature significantly in the thesis. These organisations will be outlined briefly here, so that where they might appear at sparse intervals in the substantive chapters some context has been provided, but these introductions will be kept brief, as the focus has to be on those organisations about which more is written later.  

The Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) was founded in 1954 to campaign for an end to colonialism, led by Fenner Brockway. It amalgamated several smaller organisations working on related issues. Up to the mid-1960s, the MCF focused on campaigning for political freedoms. After this point it focused more on international economic self-determination. This shift of focus coincides with the point at which this thesis picks up, and therefore means there is less on Rhodesia than might be

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91 MRC, MSS 280/31/1, ‘List of individuals and organisations invited to attend a meeting on Wednesday 29 December 1971 to discuss the setting up of a Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee’.  
93 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Letter from J Camilleri to H Wilson, 27/12/1971.  
94 He worked first as a journalist and became a member of the ILP. Later he became a Labour MP, and throughout his career he worked on various peace campaigns.  
95 Howe, Anticolonialism.
expected from the MCF. The organisation was renamed Liberation in 1970, and continues to this day.

Arising from the earlier Treason Trial Defence Fund, the Defence and Aid Fund was set up in 1956 to support victims of apartheid law in South Africa. Most significantly the organisation raised funds to pay the legal fees of people accused of treason for campaigning against apartheid. It also had a research component to its work, producing accessible tracts on South Africa and other associated regional issues for the general public and other campaigning organisations. It saw the involvement of figures such as Ambrose Reeves and, most famously, Canon Collins.96 This organisation is not prominent within the thesis because the vast majority of its campaigning was focused on South Africa, far more so than the AAM, and much of its documentation is archived in South Africa.

The Fabian Society should be mentioned for the people involved were also instrumental in other organisations or publications mentioned in the thesis, and for some papers it published on Rhodesia. Prior to 1950 Rita Hinden was Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), the special department of the Bureau that was set up “to facilitate research, information gathering and the development of constructive ideas on colonial policy”.97 She later went on to edit Socialist Commentary, a left-wing publication that is drawn on in subsequent chapters. During the period with which the thesis is primarily concerned, the Fabian Society was not particularly active on colonial issues, the FCB having been amalgamated back into the main society a decade earlier, and many countries having already achieved independence. It did, however, publish tracts on Rhodesia, which will be referred to later in the thesis.

As well as highlighting the establishment of the above organisations, it is useful here to outline a few of the key figures involved in advocacy activity specifically during the period of 1965-80. The Ennals brothers, John, David and Martin (from oldest to

youngest) were all involved in different capacities in the Rhodesia issue. John was Chairman of the AAM from 1968-76. David was a Labour politician and served as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 1974-76, and Martin was Secretary-General of Amnesty International from 1968-1980. Guy Arnold, Director of the Africa Bureau from 1968 until 1972, interacted with Ethel de Keyser and Abdul Minty, both heavily involved with the AAM. Ethel de Keyser was a Jewish South African, deported to Britain in 1963 for involvement in anti-apartheid struggle. She became the AAM’s senior full time staff member in 1967, in the position of Executive Secretary. Abdul Minty moved to Britain from South Africa in 1958 to continue his studies. He initially became involved in anti-apartheid work through lobbying the International Olympic Committee to suspend South Africa in 1963. Minty was the Honorary Secretary of the British arm of the AAM from 1962 until 1995. Colin Legum, another Jewish South African exile, hailed from a background in political journalism, working on the Observer as “Fleet Street’s first Africa correspondent” and became a committee member of the Africa Bureau during Guy Arnold’s directorship. Mike Terry led the AAM from 1975, his interest in African politics stemming from a visit to Rhodesia after his A-Levels, and then sustained involvement in student union campaigning. Following time as national secretary of the NUS, he spent two years working at the research department of the International Defence and Aid Fund. With the exception of David Ennals, who was not a member of an advocacy organisation, all of the figures discussed here were university educated.

This demographic, in contrast to that of the leadership of the more traditional trade unions around this time, is indicative of tensions more broadly between the old and new left, and the respective areas of concern of each. As a result of the growth of a new generation of radicals who were generally university educated and frequently employed by the public sector, tensions arose with the more traditional union leaders,

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99 Ibid.
who tended to be manual workers. This can be seen in Chapter 3, during the discussion of the preoccupation of much advocacy work with trying to further engage the labour movement on the Rhodesia issue, which was met with limited success for much of the period under discussion. This class divide between the more traditional elements of the labour movement and the middle class advocacy movement emerges strongly throughout the substantive chapters.

On the subject of labour involvement in anticolonial issues, with a focus on South Africa, Skinner writes that “the attitude of the TUC towards apartheid until the 1970s tended to be influenced by anti-Communist instincts...Moreover, British labour leaders had little experience of race as a workers' issue”.

The subject of nationalist organisations in Rhodesia is not a simple one. Pages of scholarship have been devoted to exploring the fault-lines and divisions that emerged between and within the different groups, a very brief overview of which was provided in the literature review above. Given the proliferation of nationalist groups during the 15 year period with which the thesis is concerned, it is necessary to stipulate a narrower focus on a particular set of organisations. This focus was largely dictated by the availability of primary documentation: the vast majority of archival sources focused exclusively on ZANU and ZAPU, which in turn was predominantly a product of organisational size and importance during the nationalist struggle.

Whilst organisations in Britain, and the British Government, were willing to accept newer organisations should they develop into convincing opposition parties, this condition never really materialised. An exception to this focus on ZANU and ZAPU is found in Chapter 6, in which the African National Council (ANC) is discussed at length. This chapter, as stated above, is a case study focusing on the Pearce Commission. At this time ZANU and ZAPU were both still banned under Rhodesian law from operating within Rhodesia, which made mobilising against the settlement proposals impossible. In this context it was necessary for another organisation to arise, and in this instance there is no limitation of available sources preventing the inclusion of the ANC. Quite

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105 Skinner Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: 121.
the contrary; there are very few sources relating to ZANU and ZAPU during the Pearce Commission, since the ANC so fully stepped into the political vacuum during this period. The formation and character of this organisation will be elaborated on in Chapter 6.

As indicated by the title and the general literature review above, the main British political party discussed in the thesis is the Labour Party. There are several reasons for this focus. First, the Labour Party was in power for the majority of period under consideration; 1964-1970 and 1974-1979, meaning that many of the key developments in the Rhodesia situation took place under a Labour Government. However, this argument in itself is not sufficient, since the Conservatives also oversaw certain key developments, such as the Pearce Commission and the all-important Lancaster House Conference, and the Liberal Party saw greater numbers of its members actively engaged with advocacy work. However, it can be argued that the Conservative Party had a very different relationship with the processes of decolonisation than Labour, and that the latter had a far closer, although not to say easy, relationship with various nationalist organisations. Comments from the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia help to elucidate this point, highlighting the Party's anticolonial stance prior to winning the general election in October 1964. That they were rapidly disappointed in the Party's actions once in power does not detract from the closer relationship the Labour Party had with the ideals of anticolonialism.

Equally, a large proportion of the campaigning on the Rhodesia issue carried out by various advocacy organisations focused on the Labour Party leadership and trying to alter the policy and actions of the Party. This was true for periods when Labour was in power and in opposition. In power the justification for this focus is evident; the advocacy movement wished to alter, or at least place a check on, successive Labour Governments’ handling of the situation. In opposition, advocacy organisations did focus attention on the Conservative Governments, but maintained a dialogue with the Labour Party as a more receptive entity. The reason for this continued preoccupation

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107 RH, Mss Afr. S. 1681, Box 254, File 6, Memorandum about ZANU delegation’s visit to London in December 1964, 06/01/1965.
with Labour is two-fold. First, in opposition, the Labour Party became far more liberal in its rhetoric on Rhodesia, as it was freer to do so without the obligation to act. Therefore during such periods the Party provided a source of support to, and more aligned thinking with, advocacy organisations working on the Rhodesia issue. Second, Labour still had a more powerful voice in parliament than the Liberals and as such, maintaining a dialogue with them provided advocacy organisations with a stronger political ally then if they had solely focussed on lobbying the Conservatives.

The Rhodesia issue was also more divisive for the Labour Party than the Conservatives, as Labour were more closely related to the advocacy movement and broader labour movement. That is not to suggest that the Conservative Party was a homogenous entity on Rhodesia; it was divided between rebels more supportive of the African nationalist movement at one end of the spectrum, all the way through to the pro-Smith right-wing Monday club at the other.\textsuperscript{108} However, the issue did not cause the same intra-party turbulence as it did for Labour. The diaries of Barbara Castle, who had formerly been Minister of Overseas Development, recount how she threatened Harold Wilson with resignation several times over Rhodesia, were a settlement to be made along unacceptable lines.\textsuperscript{109} Judith Hart, then Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, also came close to resigning over Rhodesia, and the two at times conspired over how to exert pressure on Harold Wilson not to sell-out to Smith.\textsuperscript{110}

As much of the thesis is concerned with the Labour Party, it is important to outline its structure to contextualise later discussion. Following the Party’s 1918 constitution, individuals were allowed to join Labour for the first time. This development led to the formation of Constituency Labour Parties (CLP). CLPs collectively were given some representation on the National Executive Party (NEC), which was elected each year at the annual Party Conference. However, unions retained control of 90% of conference votes. In terms of the interplay of the different sections of the labour movement, Minkin argues that:

The economic, incomes and industrial policies of the Wilson Government slowly undermined its base of support in the unions so the Left drew sustenance from a new political alignment in some of the unions. By 1968 the Left had attained a new basis of strength at the Party Conference, the political complexion of the NEC was slowly shifting to the Left, the NEC was becoming more independent of Ministerial influence and the Party office was becoming more liberal in its relationship with the Party in the country.\textsuperscript{111}

As the Wilson Government’s policy shifted farther from the will of the Party around 1968, it suffered increasing defeats at Conference, and as a result of this pressure from the grass roots of the Party, the NEC “slowly shed the role of public apologist for Labour Government policy and took on a new, more active role as the government of the Party.”\textsuperscript{112}

The thesis draws on many sources from the Rhodesia Department. This nomenclature is not entirely historically accurate however. The department was originally the Rhodesia Political Department, and merged with its sister organisation, the Rhodesia Economic Department, in 1972. These were both established in the Commonwealth Office (CO) following the announcement of UDI, then transferred to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) when this was established in 1968.\textsuperscript{113} For the sake of brevity, reference is simply made to the ‘Rhodesia Department’ throughout the thesis. The main subjects the Department dealt with were “political and constitutional questions, including relations between the British Government and the Governor and with the illegal regime”, legal and constitutional issues, political developments amongst both whites and Africans and Rhodesian external affairs including relations with foreign governments and with the FCO, and affiliation to international organisations.\textsuperscript{114} It also dealt with issues such as education, Rhodesian civil servants demonstrating loyalty to Britain, consular questions and the status of Rhodesia House in London, and the residual mission in Salisbury. From this lengthy list of duties, the ones of most significance to the thesis are relations with the African nationalist

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid: 296-7.
\textsuperscript{114} TNA, FCO 36 280, ‘Rhodesia Political Department: The Department’s responsibilities’, undated.
movement, and keeping up to date with and responding to political developments, since these generated the most sources of use to the subject of analysis.

Despite this discussion of the various groups under consideration in the thesis, it is important to note that they were clearly not entirely discrete entities. For example, it was possible, albeit not necessarily common, for members of local and CLPs interested in the Rhodesia issue to have also been active in some of the advocacy organisations working on the issue. It is easy to forget this in what is a study focused on the organisational level, so it is worth noting from the outset this possible overlap between the plurality of groups involved.

This chapter has discussed the core existing literature on the struggle for independence in Rhodesia from both a diplomatic and nationalist perspective, as well as considering shortcomings in this literature on the role of advocacy campaigns. The following chapter begins the substantive analysis of the thesis with a chronological consideration of the Rhodesia crisis, considering how interest in the issue fluctuated in Britain.
Chapter 2 – Topographies of Support

Introduction
From UDI to independence, the Rhodesia issue spanned 15 years. During this period, there were many other international and domestic issues competing for media and political attention. Coggins captures this sentiment precisely:

Major international problems including the war in Vietnam, the Six Days’ War in the Middle East, ‘confrontation’ between Britain, Malaysia and Indonesia in the Far East, war between India and Pakistan, and the development of nuclear weapons by the Chinese meant that Rhodesia was not always of the most immediate importance.115

This chapter therefore takes a chronological look at the entire 15 year period, and considers whether, how and why levels of interest in the Rhodesia issue fluctuated during this period. Specifically, this chapter addresses the question: What was the relationship between events in Rhodesia, the political climate of the UK and waves of support for the African nationalist movement amongst UK based advocacy organisations and the British labour movement?

Mirroring the parameters of the thesis as a whole, this chapter takes UDI as a starting point, and the closing of the Lancaster House conference as an end point. It considers levels of support for the African nationalist movement amongst advocacy organisations and the labour movement in the UK during this 15 year period. In the course of this discussion, reference will be made to key events in the Rhodesia timeline, such as settlement negotiations. A brief discussion of such events will be provided where relevant. The chapter will by no means provide an exhaustive account of the UDI to independence period; such an undertaking would be far beyond the available scope of this thesis, let alone of a single chapter. It is also worth noting that there are many resources dealing with this subject, which seek to fulfil that function

and have been referenced in the preceding literature review, and which will be drawn on again in this chapter.

The main section of the chapter, considering support amongst advocacy organisations and the broader labour movement for the independence struggle, will draw mainly on archival material. There is a wealth of primary material such as meeting minutes of advocacy organisations, minutes and resolutions from trade unions, letters between different organisations and labour movement oriented publications which help to shed light on this issue. This will be supported with an interwoven discussion of the key events of the Rhodesian situation as they unfolded.

There is very little secondary literature that is specifically related to the focus of this chapter. Fieldhouse takes a similar methodological approach, in that many of his chapters work chronologically, looking at events the AAM organised in sequence, and making reference to other key political events as necessary. However, he does not discuss the possibility of a correlation between this timeline of events led by the AAM, and the broader political situation at the time as things played out within Rhodesia, and diplomatically between Britain, Rhodesia and various other parties. His section on Rhodesia contains very little analysis about why the AAM might have been acted as it did at various points, and deals solely with what happened, and when. Windrich’s *Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence* will be used during the chapter to tie the analysis of primary data into the broader narrative of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe. This is because the text gives a detailed chronological coverage of events, focusing mainly on the diplomatic interactions between Britain and Rhodesia, and highlights aspects of the political situation in each country over time.

There is no other secondary literature of particular salience to this chapter, although it is worth noting the absence of some important themes in existing studies. Media coverage is omitted from most accounts of Britain and Rhodesia, which can be attributed to two mutually exclusive explanations, depending on the source under consideration. Many relevant texts were written either during or immediately

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116 Windrich, *Rhodesian Independence*. 
following the struggle for independence, and as such media sources would have been difficult to access. Sources written more recently tend to focus on the diplomatic nature of the situation, in which case access to official FCO documents provide a more detailed and interesting source of information. It is only when focusing on the grass roots engagement with the issue, as this study aims to do, that media sources become more valuable, particularly in the context of this chapter as they can provide an almost quantitative aspect to the research, being more consistently available than any other type of primary material. The idea of fluctuations in interest in the Rhodesia issue has not been addressed directly by any secondary literature.

**UDI onwards, 1965-66**
Fieldhouse argues that UDI served a transformative purpose in the AAM’s campaign focus, and galvanised the increasing sense that the movement could not ignore what was happening in Southern Africa outside of South Africa itself.\(^\text{117}\) It transformed the situation, the political realities and dynamics, but also the sense of urgency that the declaration generated. Whilst there was certainly a real sense of tension before UDI, and urgency amongst the British political elite in trying to prevent it, UDI itself catapulted the issue into the (British) national consciousness with the wave of media coverage it generated, and the political situation it left in its wake.\(^\text{118}\)

The Africa Bureau was well placed to respond to UDI because of its organisational focus on assisting Africans living under “alien governments”.\(^\text{119}\) There was a flurry of Africa Bureau organised activity in the weeks and months following UDI. In a letter to the AAM three weeks after UDI, the Africa Bureau outlined its plans for a meeting on Rhodesia to discuss policies and action designed to end the Smith rebellion. The purpose is twofold – to ensure that the measures taken against the rebel government are effective and to provide leadership of public opinion on the questions of the constitutional future for Rhodesia after the rebellion has been ended.\(^\text{120}\)

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118 The story made the front page of the *Express* (‘After UDI Clampdown’) and the *Mirror* (‘Rebels: Small, frightened men, says Wilson’), and in *The Guardian* alone, there were 14 articles about Rhodesia and UDI the day following its announcement.

119 Rhodes House website, Africa Bureau profile: [http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/bcas/african-bureau.html](http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/bcas/african-bureau.html) [accessed 16/01/2013].

120 RH, MSS AAM 870, Africa Bureau letter to AAM, 01/12/1965.
The meeting referred to was held at the House of Commons on 06/12/1965, and notes from it suggest that discussion covered what British policy on Rhodesia should be, and MPs were asked to clarify their position over the potential use of force. Later that month, the Africa Bureau organised the Rhodesia Action Conference, the report from which recommended that Britain use any means available to end the Smith rebellion, encourage South Africa to comply with UN policy on Rhodesia and that public awareness in Britain should be raised by focusing attention on “individual cases of hardship and injustice”.

Unlike the Africa Bureau, which acted promptly upon the announcement of UDI, there is no trace of any immediate AAM activity in response. This is supported by Fieldhouse’s account of the Movement’s actions on Rhodesia, which works chronologically, and moves seamlessly from UDI itself to 1966. This can be attributed to the AAM’s initial focus exclusively on South Africa, before a later shift to include other parts of southern Africa, which occurred partly as a result of UDI. This meant that the AAM was not in a position organisationally to respond as rapidly as the Africa Bureau did to the declaration. However, this lag in response time was not mirrored by some constituents of the labour movement.

The TUC was quick to discuss its position with regards to Britain and Rhodesia, following the declaration. In an internal correspondence from the International Department of the TUC, prior to a Commonwealth Advisory Committee meeting, it is made clear that “if a statement is required...it should be in support of the British Government”. There is, however, an implicit tension in the TUC’s stance at this time. ICFTU, of which the TUC was a member, released a statement at a similar time proclaiming solidarity with the African workers of Rhodesia “until freedom and democracy prevail”. ICFTU had also written to Harold Wilson urging the use of force and the strengthening of sanctions to end the rebellion. Whilst there is no

122 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: 127-132.
123 MRC, MSS 292B 968 2 S, TUC Inter-Departmental Correspondence, 15/11/1965.
124 Ibid.
archival trace of direct correspondence between the ICFTU and the TUC at this point in time discussing responses to UDI, there is a clear tension here in the outlooks of the two organisations. It also demonstrates a divergence in opinion with the Africa Bureau, which took an immediately antagonistic position with regards to the Wilson Government’s policy.

There was also a swift response from a number of CLPs following the Smith regime’s declaration of independence, taking the form of resolutions sent to the NEC. The vast majority of these “congratulate”, “offer support to” or “fully endorse” the actions taken by the British Government in responding to UDI, namely instituting sanctions and liaising with the UN. However, there were dissenting voices amongst the crowd, calling sternly for military intervention in Rhodesia, or the resumption of direct control by HMG.125 It is of note that, whilst this set of NEC minutes eponymously deals with both trade union and CLP resolutions, there is no trade union presence. Likewise, the February 1966 minutes contain resolutions exclusively from CLPs over the Rhodesia issue. This set of resolutions, however, demonstrated greater diversity of opinion with regards to Government policy. There were far more calls for the implementation of full sanctions, regrets at the omission of oil from the sanctions implemented so far, and statements supporting the idea of military intervention.126 Thereafter, CLP interest in the Rhodesia issue started to dip.127

Also in February 1966, there was activity by several student societies at Bangor University, who collaborated to organise a ‘Rhodesia Teach-In’. For this event, they tried to get speakers to represent a range of different British and Rhodesian views, with members of the Labour and Conservative Parties, “a supporter of the Smith regime” and an OAU representative, as well as aiming to give a more general historical background to the situation.128 The following month, a Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) area council (the Wirral) organised a collection and leaflet distribution session, focussing on Rhodesia, with the tagline “Don’t just talk about

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126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 LHASCH, LPID Papers, Box 146, Southern Rhodesia Correspondence 1961-69, Letter from Jill Hutt on behalf of the Rhodesia Teach-In Committee, Bangor, to David Ennals, 05/02/1966.
Rhodesia or Racial Discrimination – here is a painless way to do something about it”.129

It was not until April 1966 that the AAM began responding more actively to the unfolding situation by planning a national campaign on Rhodesia. The main aspects of this campaign included getting related organisations to assist in lobbying MPs, collecting signatures for a petition and distributing an AAM leaflet entitled ‘Crisis in Rhodesia’.130 The AAM contacted other organisations that might be interested in the campaign, to try to mobilise greater support. The letter gave the impression that the AAM did not expect the rebellion to persist for so long, and given media responses as the situation unfolded throughout 1966, without signs of abating, it is doubtful they were alone in this.131

From this point onwards, the AAM became far more active on the Rhodesia issue, as it became apparent that there was to be no immediate solution. In May 1966 they produced a document that argued against Britain opening talks with the Smith regime, which they believed was the beginning of a British sell-out. It also condemned Britain for letting South Africa get away with overtly flouting UN sanctions, and economically supporting the illegal regime. It argued that, had the British Government recommended that the UN imposed mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, South Africa would have had little choice but to comply.132

Around this time, the Rhodesia Sub-Committee of the Africa Bureau held a meeting to review its position with regards to the continuing situation in Rhodesia. Here it was argued that the sanctions programme was being drawn out, and was therefore unlikely to have any significant impact on the economy and, by extension, the viability of the Smith regime. The Bureau suggested that Britain should make a demonstration of military strength, for example by employing “provocative reconnaissance” against

129 LHASCH, LPID Papers, Box 146, Southern Rhodesia Correspondence 1961-69, MCF poster, March 1966.
130 RH, MSS AAM 870, Letter to Jane Symonds, Secretary, Africa Bureau from Abdul Minty of AAM 25/04/1966.
Rhodesia using air power.\textsuperscript{133} Such a strong suggestion was never likely to hold much sway with Wilson’s Government, but it illustrates the sense amongst some elements of the left at this time that the Rhodesia issue could be brought to a swift solution if only Britain were prepared to use minimal force.

The British Government had begun to approach the Smith regime about negotiations earlier in 1966, and had put these so called “talks about talks” on hold to facilitate a Commonwealth Conference in September. The AAM was quick to respond to these early suggestions of Britain’s desire to reach a settlement. In July 1966 they produced a ‘Manifesto on Rhodesia’ detailing the situation as it stood at the time, in which they referred to the talks as an act that served only to strengthen Rhodesia’s authority, and “severely weakened the credibility of Britain’s policy in the eyes of the peoples and governments of the world”, and restating the importance of a commitment to sanctions and the principle of NIBMAR.\textsuperscript{134}

The initiation of the guerrilla war took place around the middle of 1966, although this date is contested. Even more heatedly, the question of whether it was ZANU or ZAPU who struck the first substantive blow of the guerrilla war attracts debate. Dabengwa argues that, whilst it is frequently claimed that ZANU’s incursion into Chinhoyi that commenced the war, ZAPU was in fact sending small units into Rhodesia as early as 1965.\textsuperscript{135} There was no immediate media or advocacy response to the initiation of guerrilla activities, but then it was consistently played down by the Smith regime, and would not necessarily have been immediately apparent in the UK.\textsuperscript{136}

In September 1966 the first trade union resolution on Rhodesia appeared in the NEC minutes, from the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW):

This ADM believes it is a prime duty of the British Government to prevent the creation of an Apartheid state in Rhodesia. It pledges full support for all

\textsuperscript{133} RH, MSS Afr. s. 1681 Box 258, Rhodesia Sub Committee notes, 17/05/1966.
\textsuperscript{135} Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA’: 27.
\textsuperscript{136} P. Keatley, ‘The Siege of Rhodesia has begun’ The Guardian, 16/07/1968. Article arguing that the reality of the guerrilla war could no longer be denied by the Smith regime, although it had tried to up to that point.
measures necessary to establish a legal government in Rhodesia which will work rapidly towards the achievement of a fully democratic constitution.\footnote{LHASC, NEC Minutes 1964-1969, ‘Resolutions from Constituency Parties and Trade Unions’, 13/09/1966.}

As stated above, by this point the British Government and the Smith regime had begun to tentatively consider the possibility of holding talks about settlement, and it had become increasingly apparent that sanctions were largely ineffective because of the piecemeal way in which they had been implemented. The upcoming Commonwealth Conference placed these issues firmly on the agenda. The NEC minutes go on to address an invitation from the AAM to a “seminar on British policy in Rhodesia and South Africa” and make the decision to “obtain further details” about the AAM before consenting to send representatives to the event. At this time USDAW was one of the five largest and more established unions, but left-leaning in its leadership.\footnote{Minkin, Labour Party Conference: 104-8.} Along with the NEC, its engagement with the Rhodesia issue corresponds to important changes in the situation, particularly the tentative moves towards talks. This shift highlights the growing realisation amongst various interested parties in Britain that the Rhodesia issue was not going to prove easy to solve.

At the TUC Congress in September 1966, a motion was moved by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) condemning UDI and calling on the General Council “to do all in their power to reverse such policy and also promote the principle of ‘one man one vote’, in order to avoid white supremacy”.\footnote{98th TUC Congress Report, 1966: 512.} The Chemical Workers Union tabled an amendment to give the motion ‘teeth’, arguing that given the ostensible failure of sanctions, the Rhodesia issue should be passed to the UN. The General Council advised this to be withdrawn on the grounds that “it is premature to talk about sending this matter to the United Nations with all the complications of the political structure there, before exploring every possible channel to bring about a settlement”.\footnote{Ibid: 514.} The amendment was withdrawn and the motion carried, illustrating broad trade union support for a general condemnation of the Smith regime’s actions.
Also in September, through the MCF, Fenner Brockway sent out a request to advocacy organisations and members of the public to write to him at the House of Lords, in support of an outlined statement on Rhodesia, so that he could present these views to the Government. His statement called for an unequivocal position on NIBMAR. The MCF also released a press statement on the first anniversary of UDI, which tried to publicise the key issues of the Rhodesia situation to the general public, and press for any negotiations to be inclusive of representatives of Rhodesian society as a whole. It is surprising that there is no archival evidence of any other advocacy organisations utilising the one year anniversary of UDI to press the Rhodesia issue and lobby the Government on this basis. However, that is perhaps because of its position following the Commonwealth Conference and tumultuous Labour Party Conference, and not long before the first round of official talks with the Smith regime. There was limited media coverage of the anniversary in the UK, though the Smith Government certainly capitalised on the event, turning it into a celebratory public holiday in Rhodesia. This pattern was often repeated throughout the Rhodesia crisis, with media sources rarely making reference to the anniversary of UDI, except to refer to the actions of the Smith regime, which invariably used the anniversary as a tool to galvanise nationalist sentiment.

Within the labour movement, action on the Rhodesia issue during 1966 followed a slightly different pattern to that of advocacy organisations, with a flurry of CLP resolutions on Rhodesia in the aftermath of UDI, and a slow decline of interest throughout 1966. However, this changed following the September Commonwealth Conference, and the difficulties faced by the British Government in justifying its policies to other Commonwealth nations who overtly supported the African nationalist movement. Interest in the issue grew as it became more apparent that the British Government was willing to negotiate with the Smith regime, although this...
will to settle was much clearer within Cabinet itself than amongst the public. Judith Hart, then Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, confided in Tony Benn, a fellow Cabinet Minister (then Technology), on the 12th October 1966, fearing that there would be a sell-out, and discussing the idea of resignation. He counselled: “to say, just before she thought the sell-out would occur, that there would be no breach of our solemn pledge – and then get sacked.” \(^{147}\)

In November 1966, the ICFTU held an executive board meeting, at which a statement on Rhodesia was passed:

> calling on the British Government to apply the strongest possible forms of coercion against the regime in Southern Rhodesia in order to secure the democratic rights of the Rhodesia people as a whole, stating that sanctions so far had failed in their effect... The statement also called on...the international free trade union movement to take any action possible to help the people of Rhodesia in their struggle. \(^{148}\)

This resolution highlights a discrepancy between the trade union bloc’s support of government policy as demonstrated at the Labour Party conference, and the TUC’s requirement to agree with ICFTU policy. However this is not important on a practical level; the TUC had to nominally agree with ICFTU statements as a member, but in reality it was free to behave as it wished with regards to its relationship with the Labour Party.

**From Tiger into Fearless, 1966-68**

The eponymous Tiger Talks, held on board HMS Tiger between 2nd and 4th December 1966, precipitated a wave of attention on the Rhodesia issue from various organisations and the media. Peter Calvocoressi, then chairman of the Africa Bureau, issued a statement in response to fears surrounding the talks concluding that “independence for Rhodesia without complete and enforceable constitutional safeguards for the African population would certainly lead to another South Africa”. \(^{149}\)

Fieldhouse writes that

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148 TUC, Marjorie Nicholson Papers, Box 8, 901, 1966-7, Meeting of the ICFTU sub-committee and executive board, 24/11/1966.
149 RH, MSS Afr. s. 1681 Box 258, Africa Bureau statement, 02/12/1966.
even before the Tiger talks were over, a conference organised jointly by AAM and UNA [United Nations Association]...called on the British Government to initiate a resolution in the Security Council demanding all-embracing sanctions.”

Further to this the AAM put out several press releases in an attempt to keep the public informed of events surrounding the talks. Socialist Commentary, a prominent labour movement publication, was surprisingly quiet on the issue, despite running numerous articles on Rhodesia before and after the time of the talks. All of these articles deal in quite general, and not unfavourable, terms with the British Government’s response to the situation, but not one of them explicitly mentions Tiger.

The momentum from Tiger-related activity carried forward into the early part of the following year. In January 1967, the AAM organised a joint letter to Harold Wilson, co-signed by the MCF and the UNA “urging that the Government cooperate with the UN in securing compliance with the Security Council’s sanctions resolution.” However, such activities did not last long. Windrich makes the point that the economic situation in Britain was critical in 1967, “and this preoccupation overshadowed the Rhodesian situation for most of the year”. This point is reinforced by the lack of TUC discussion of the Rhodesia issue at its 1967 Congress, in comparison to the previous year. The TUC General Council had discussed the issue in February and decided to take no action on Rhodesia, and this position was reinforced at the Congress in September. Advocacy organisations continued to discuss Rhodesia and what should be done about the enduring situation there, but there was a notable lack of decisive action.

The end of 1967 saw the creation of a new pressure group, called the Movement for Democracy in Rhodesia, the motivation behind this stemming from an AAM meeting on Rhodesia. The organisation described its creation and aims in a letter to the AAM:

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150 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: 132.
152 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 21.
The decision to form an organisation specifically concerned with Rhodesia is prompted by the need to focus on the activity of individuals with personal experience of, or particular interest in the Rhodesian part of the Southern African political scene. Representatives of ZAPU and ZANU have expressed their approval of our undertaking. We envisage our Movement as a pressure group; it will be concerned with the collection of, commentary on and dissemination of information on Rhodesia, particularly to members of Parliament, civil servants, journalists and broadcasters; it will also serve members of the public who respond to our projected announcement of the movement through the press.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1211, Letter to AAM about Movement for Democracy in Rhodesia, 01/12/1967.}

It is questionable how active or effective this group was as an organisation. This is evidenced through the lack of sources relating to the organisation, illustrating their lack of impact in terms of direct action or media awareness. Windrich’s argument about the primacy of the economic situation in Britain during this period seems to hold true, and its effect in reducing interest in the Rhodesia issue is clear even amongst the broader labour movement and advocacy organisations.

The Africa Bureau produced two memoranda on Rhodesia, which heralded a resurgence of interest in the topic in the middle of 1968. The first of these condemned the incursion of South African forces into Rhodesia, “and their active support of the illegal regime”. It also bemoaned the inefficacy of sanctions, what the organisation saw as the process of Rhodesia becoming a police state, and argued that although the British planned to use force only in the event of a breakdown in law and order, law and order should be distinguished from justice. This point, essentially advocating some form of military intervention, was supported by the argument that “sanctions must fail unless there is to be a confrontation with South Africa. But South Africa would not, in the judgement of the Bureau, commit herself to challenging physical British intervention, alone or through the UN”.\footnote{RH, MSS Afr s 1681 Box 258, Africa Bureau Memo, by Jack Halpern, 02/04/1968.}

The second Africa Bureau memo concerned mounting pressure on Zambia. It discussed the South African threats that unless freedom fighters were prevented from using Zambian land for incursions into Rhodesia, South Africa would intervene militarily. The memo praise the British Government for its Security Council initiative
to “extend sanctions and make them more effective”, but calls for the establishment of some kind of international policing mechanism.\footnote{LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 146, Southern Rhodesia Documents 1967-8, Africa Bureau Memo, by Peter Calvocoressi, 29/04/1968.} Whilst 1967 and the early part of 1968 were very quiet in terms of advocacy activity, this period saw clearer opinions established on key issues such as sanctions. It became increasingly clear to the Africa Bureau that this policy alone was ineffective, adding weight to the mounting critique of the British Government’s sanctions policy. The second memo was more obviously in response to the increasingly precarious situation in which Zambia found itself, and the menacing actions of South Africa.

Also in mid-1968, the Labour Party NEC discussed the findings of the Whaley Commission, which had been established the previous year to examine the provisions of the Rhodesian Constitution, and “to advise the Government of Rhodesia on the constitutional framework which is best suited to the sovereign independent status of Rhodesia”.\footnote{LHASC, NEC Minutes, Report of the Rhodesian Constitutional Commission (The Whaley Commission), 22/05/1968.} Windrich characterises this endeavour as a tactic used by Smith to try and ward off dissent from within his own party, and states that the report of the Whaley commission paradoxically met none of the Six Principles, yet was rejected by most of the Rhodesian Front for being too liberal.\footnote{Windrich, \textit{Rhodesian Independence}: 131.} The Whaley Commission seems to have gone almost entirely unheeded by advocacy organisations or the labour movement. There is no coverage of it amongst labour publications, and very little mainstream media coverage. This is because it was viewed as unthreatening in terms of its potential to further harm the African population. It did not involve Britain, who was viewed by advocacy organisations as a key power broker, and in this sense the Whaley Commission was far less obvious as a target than the various rounds of settlement talks.

From this point onwards, there was a surge of interest in the Rhodesia issue, precipitated by the impending Fearless negotiations. Following the talks themselves, held on HMS \textit{Fearless} from 9\textsuperscript{th} to 13\textsuperscript{th} October, 1968, Smith took the draft proposals back to Rhodesia to consult with his cabinet on the issue. George Thomson, then
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, flew out to Salisbury in November for further talks with Smith, but these broke down. There were purportedly several points on which the Rhodesian Front found the new proposals unacceptable, and taken together these amounted to the conclusion that the regime simply was not ready to negotiate along the lines of the Six Principles.\(^{160}\) The AAM organised a series of meetings across the country in response to the Fearless negotiations, concerned that these might lead to a sell-out, and result in Wilson reneging on his earlier pledge of no independence before majority rule.\(^{161}\)

Conversely, the announcement of the Government’s plans to convene the Fearless talks prompted fear amongst the British Council of Churches (BCC) over the possibility of involving itself in any potentially controversial statements of opinion. The BCC’s President, Maurice Chandler, in writing to its General Secretary, Kenneth Sansbury, stated that:

\begin{quote}
I hope the BCC will not think it necessary to pass resolutions while negotiations may be pending. There is really no need for the BCC to keep up a kind of commentary on current political events. The resolution which had been suggested concerning African participation in a settlement was an entirely good one, though I thought it was silly to include offering the good offices of the BCC to help in creating contact between Africans and others. It is really ludicrous for the BCC to propose its good offices in that way, and in any case such a resolution would be regarded as the Archbishop of Canterbury interfering and offering to take part in the negotiations which would be pretty silly. I am sure, however, that you are well aware of all these considerations.\(^{162}\)
\end{quote}

Whilst this is the opposite of the phenomena being explored here, it is nonetheless demonstrative of the broader point this chapter makes, since it shows an immediate and clear response to a key event in the Rhodesia timeline.

The labour movement were also roused into action by Fearless; there was clear concern and disagreement at the Labour Party’s October 1968 conference. This concern stemmed from a perception that Smith was unlikely to settle without unacceptable concessions being offered by the British, since the Tiger proposals had,

\(^{161}\) LSE, Faulds 4 1 13, Letter from Ethel de Keyser of AAM to Andrew Faulds, MP, 29/10/1968.  
\(^{162}\) LPL, Ramsey Papers, 1968 vol. 125, Letter to Kenneth Sansbury from Maurice Chandler, undated.
to many people, already gone too far and still been rejected. However, whilst concern over Rhodesia was clearly growing, the main potential troublemakers in the party had been co-opted into Government:

It was no longer a case of a few rebels who could be dismissed as representatives of the party’s ‘Africa lobby’, such as Mr Alexander Lyon or Miss Joan Lestor. But the obvious leadership for a rebellion against Mr Wilson’s policy – those members who had fought for African majority rule over the previous decade – had been co-opted into the Government, either directly responsible for Rhodesian policy (such as Mr Thomson and Mr Foley) or preoccupied with their own Ministries and also bound by collective responsibility (such as Mrs Castle, Mr Anthony Greenwood, Mr Callaghan and Mr Healey, the latter two having served as Opposition spokesmen on colonial affairs).

A resolution adopted at conference restated a commitment to the principle of NIBMAR, urged the Government to acknowledge its “continuing responsibility to Rhodesia...until majority rule is established”, and instructed the NEC to initiate a national campaign to raise funds “to provide educational and financial assistance for Rhodesian Africans so that they may be better able to assume positions of responsibility in Rhodesia when the illegal Smith regime is replaced”. This resolution was demonstrative of increased awareness of, and interest in, Rhodesia surrounding renewed settlement negotiations. It also illustrated the negative impact the Smith regime had on equality of access to education; an obvious tactic for maintaining the status quo.

A more visible example of labour movement activity surrounding this latest round of negotiations was the notable increase in CLP resolutions submitted to the NEC for the months of November and, even more obviously, December. This delay was attributable to CLPs wanting to wait for the conference and the negotiations to occur before submitting their responses. For November, the resolutions generally set out concern over the upcoming talks, and dissatisfaction at the sense that broader Labour Party voices were not being listened to by the party elite. In December, there were six pages of CLP resolutions submitted to the NEC. Many of these were clearly

163 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 139.
164 Ibid.
166 LHASC, NEC Meeting Minutes, CLP Resolutions, 27/11/1968
submitted prior to George Thomson’s return, and the formal dismissal of the Fearless proposals, as they expressed concern at the Government’s terms of negotiation with the Smith regime. Lots of the other resolutions were very similar in content to the following, from Tonbridge CLP, which “seeks information on the action being taken by the NEC towards implementing the resolution on Rhodesia, adopted at this year’s Annual Conference”.\(^\text{167}\) This burst in CLP activity shows the level of concern surrounding the highly publicised second round of official negotiations with the Smith regime, and the tensions within the Labour Party between the policy of its leadership and the sentiments of the rank and file. This issue will be further explored in Chapter 4.

The AAM followed up on the Labour Party Conference by writing to local and constituency Labour Parties with suggested texts of resolutions to be sent to the Prime Minister, the NEC and the press, regarding possible outcomes of the Fearless talks. The first resolution, in the event of a settlement as a result of the talks, essentially deplored the outcome and the sell-out of the Government in failing to stick to the Six Principles. It culminates in the clear statement that “This Labour Party...finds itself totally unable to support this repudiation both of principle and moral justice”. The other resolution, to be sent out in the event of a failure of Fearless, implored the Government not to “undertake any further humiliating and discreditable negotiations with the illegal regime in defiance of its obligations to the majority people of Rhodesia and its promises to the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the people of this country”.\(^\text{168}\)

The United Nations Student Association (UNSA), in conjunction with other organisations, such as the London branch of the Zimbabwe Students’ Union (ZSU), organised a torchlight vigil to coincide with the three year anniversary of UDI. The organizers of this event tried to get broader involvement in this, in order to help raise a higher profile for the event and the Rhodesia issue more generally. For example Gillian Walker, General Secretary of the UNSA, wrote to Andrew Faulds MP asking him

\(^{167}\) LHASC, NEC Meeting Minutes, CLP Resolutions, 18/12/1968.
\(^{168}\) RH, MSS AAM 1211, AAM resolutions sent to local and constituency Labour Parties, 08/11/68.
to participate, or failing that to donate to the event in order to light a candle in his name, and asking for a prompt reply for “organization and press purposes”.\textsuperscript{169} It is a good example of organizations responding to an emotive date in the Rhodesia calendar to draw support for campaigning and further attention to the issue, at a time when interest could have waned immediately following the breakdown of the Fearless negotiations.

**Post-Fearless, 1969-71**

In early 1969, the AAM organized a torchlight vigil to coincide with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, held 6-7\textsuperscript{th} January. Evidence of this event is found in a letter from the AAM to Idris Cox of the CPGB, but on this basis presumably other sympathetic organizations, both advocacy and political would have been invited to it.\textsuperscript{170} It is not clear exactly what the AAM was seeking from this event, but the letter does state that the emphasis was to be on NIBMAR. This meant encouraging the Government to maintain its often questionable commitment to this principle, and demonstrate this to the other Commonwealth countries.

In February 1969, the Smith regime announced that it would hold a constitutional referendum in May of the same year. These proposals cemented the Labour Government’s claim that its attempts to forge a settlement were perpetually frustrated by the obduracy of the Smith regime. When overwhelming support was demonstrated in Rhodesia for the new constitution, amongst those allowed a say, Smith famously claimed that it would “sound the death knell of majority rule in Rhodesia”.\textsuperscript{171} The Labour Government stated that this new constitution could never be the basis of a settlement, and that it was no longer possible to hold any productive dialogue with the Smith regime. It is perhaps surprising that there seems to have been very little response to the planning and implementation of these constitutional plans amongst UK based advocacy organisations or the broader labour movement, but then it was not a situation in which the British Government could take any decisive action either to please or dissatisfy the pro-African nationalist lobby.

\textsuperscript{169} LSE, Faulds 4 1 13, Letter from Gillian Walker, General Secretary of UNSA to Andrew Faulds MP, 02/11/1968.
\textsuperscript{170} RH, MSS AAM 862, Letter from Ethel de Keyser of AAM to Idris Cox of CPGB, undated.
As a result of the AAM’s eagerness to involve the British labour movement in its campaigning on Rhodesia, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter, it organised a “Conference of Trade Unionists on Southern Africa”, held in late April, 1969. A lengthy resolution was adopted, without opposition, urging trade unions to end any investment in South African firms, preventing the emigration of workers to southern Africa, pledging support for the AAM and the Defence and Aid Fund and generally condemning the ongoing situation of racial oppression. Whilst it seems like an odd time for this conference to have been held, as aside from Smith’s constitutional machinations, the situation was relatively quiet at this time, it can be understood in terms of it having taken time to organise, and therefore being a belated response to earlier key events such as the Fearless negotiations.

A resolution was passed at the 1969 Labour Party Conference expressing anger at the new constitution ushered in by the Smith regime. It advocated the implementation of stronger sanctions “in the knowledge that the use of force is unrealistic”.\(^\text{172}\) In light of this it called on the Government to “bring before the Security Council proposals for stronger mandatory sanctions and...asks the ILO and the World Federation of Trade Unions to call upon trade unionists to assist in implementing sanctions”.\(^\text{173}\) Also of interest are the drafts of two resolutions not reached, and remitted to the NEC, both more extreme in implication. The first of these asked the Government to “seek the agreement of the United Nations to take over the territory until a democratically elected Government takes over”. The second resolution set forth the view that, due to Mozambiquan and South African intransigence, sanctions would never succeed, and therefore any means available should be used, including force, “to end the regime and to give moral and practical assistance to the African people struggling for their freedom.”\(^\text{174}\) It is worth clarifying that Mozambique was unwilling to cooperate at this point because it was still under the control of the right-wing Salazar regime, sympathetic to the Smith regime.

\(^{172}\) LHASC, NEC Meeting Minutes, Resolutions carried by Conference, 26/11/1969.
\(^{173}\) Ibid.
\(^{174}\) LHASC, NEC Meeting Minutes, Resolutions remitted to NEC, 26/11/1969.
These resolutions are instructive of two key points. First, they demonstrated the broader labour movement making a response to the Rhodesian situation, not immediately as events unfolded, as the new constitution had been declared much earlier that year, but rather when there was a clear forum to do so in terms of the Party structure. Second, the resolutions demonstrated a division in views amongst the Labour Party as a whole, with its leadership ensuring that the more radical views of the grass roots were toned down so as not to compromise the Government’s long standing stance on Rhodesia.

In early 1970, the Africa Bureau discussed the situation in Rhodesia as follows:

This is the fifth year of UDI and no solution is in sight. Many western business interests have been involved in breaking sanctions and would dearly like to be able to resume open trading with Rhodesia....It therefore becomes more necessary than ever for those in Britain who wish to see the establishment of a more just society in Rhodesia to urge the Government to take really effective action against the rebel regime.\(^{175}\)

This is another example of an organisation responding to an anniversary, of sorts, in the Rhodesia timeline, rather than to some explicit event, which seemed to become a tactic when there were no newsworthy events to respond to. Whilst the above statement called for continued pressure on the British Government, and suggested that this was every bit as important as at any earlier stage in the situation, there is little evidence of further advocacy or labour movement led activity for much of this year.

At a Security Council session in March 1970, the Labour Party used their first veto on the Rhodesian issue, purportedly because the resolution included strong criticism against Britain failing to use force, and called for sanctions on South Africa and Portugal. The compromise resolution included “a number of practical and effective measures to increase the pressure on the illegal regime”.\(^{176}\) After implementation of the 1969 constitution, the Labour Party maintained a boycott of the Smith regime, which helped it to regain the support of the labour movement by the conference in 1970.

\(^{175}\) RH, MSS AAM 870, Publication called *Africa Bureau Broadsheet*, January 1970.
\(^{176}\) Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 156.
In June 1970, Labour lost a general election to the Conservatives, led by Edward Heath. The Rhodesia issue did not feature heavily in the election campaign, as it was of low electoral concern, reflective of a general lack of interest around this time, since there had been very little activity on it since the rejection of the Fearless negotiations. The Conservatives did try to set out an alternative Rhodesia policy, but this was not possible as Labour had already tested the boundaries of acceptability in their previous attempt at settlement.177

In response to a Labour Party conference resolution of this year, the MCF wrote to the Labour Party, in an attempt to extract some specific information on aid to the liberation movements:

I hope that the NEC are to examine what material aid can be given to the freedom movements and, bearing in mind that reservations are expressed from the platform, I trust that an early opportunity will be taken to decide exactly what kind of material aid will be made available. If the NEC are to set up a special sub-committee (perhaps involving people co-opted from outside the NEC) to make a detailed study, I would be very pleased to offer my services.178

This letter received a brief reply, thanking the MCF and saying that the November meeting of the NEC would be discussing the implementation of the conference resolution.179

In response to fear that the Conservative Government would seek further negotiations with the Smith regime, as set out in their pre-election pledge on Rhodesia, the Africa Bureau wrote, in January of 1971, that:

Britain’s best interest will be damaged by any settlement of the Rhodesia question based upon a compromise designed to relieve the Government of embarrassment. Despite six years of UDI Britain must not opt out of her responsibility. No settlement should be contemplated that does not accord equal justice to all the people of Rhodesia.180

178 LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 89, Misc Correspondence 1970, Letter the MCF to Harry Nicholas, 16/10/1970.
Sure enough, later that same year, the Conservatives announced their plans for further talks with Rhodesia, which precipitated a wave of activity on the issue.

The Labour Party was staunchly opposed to any such talks on the grounds that they represented a tacit acceptance of the 1969 constitution. The Government also encountered opposition from the UN and the Commonwealth, not least because of its decision to resume the sale of arms to South Africa even in light of continued South African military support for the Smith regime. The Government played a difficult game with the Rhodesia issue at this time. Negotiations were not going particularly well and sanctions were up for renewal again in November. In order to prolong talks and so put off disagreement within the Tory party over the sanctions issue, the Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home, went to Salisbury himself. This had the desired effect, and sanctions renewal went unchallenged. The decision to reopen negotiations was also condemned by the labour movement. At the 1971 TUC conference in Blackpool, resolutions were passed stating that the TUC “deplores the Government’s intention to resume talks with the illegal regime in Rhodesia” and that “Congress calls upon the General Council to press positive measures to strengthen trade union opposition to these regimes.”

Renewed negotiations, 1971-72
Moves towards a settlement, or at least moves towards renewed negotiations, sparked a flurry of media attention on Rhodesia, and on the talks themselves. Labour Weekly carried various articles tracking the progress of the talks and the Pearce Commission, and mainstream newspapers were active in reporting the progress of these as well. In ‘The Long Search for a Rhodesian Settlement’, an unspecified Labour Weekly reporter outlined the lead up to, and progress of, negotiations throughout 1971, and dealt with issues such as divisions in the Conservative Party over how to handle the Rhodesian situation. There are other articles in the same edition dealing with the Six Principles

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183 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 173.
184 RH, MSS AAM 162, TUC Conference Resolutions, 1971.
and their bearing on the present talks, and a comment piece on the incompatibility of Britain’s aims in reaching a settlement with those of the Smith regime.  

Agreement between Douglas-Home and Smith was signed on 24/11/1971, with provisions in place for a test of opinion. There was an initial wave of optimism surrounding this agreement, within the British Government, which “was soon dispelled by the mounting opposition, most of all in Rhodesia itself, but also in Britain and throughout the world community, as the full implications of the arrangement were realised.” As the details of the agreement came to light it became apparent that in reality it represented “a virtual abandonment of African interests and a victory for the racialist dogma embodied in the Rhodesian Front’s 1969 ‘Constitution’”. The Africa Bureau put out a press release which concluded that the proposals did not satisfy the Six Principles, the Smith regime could not be trusted to do as it said, it would not be possible to accurately test African opinion, and that only negotiations that involved the nationalists could lead to a fair settlement.

In response to the agreement, the November edition of Labour Weekly reported on the intention of the Labour Party to send a four man mission to Rhodesia to informally gather opinions on the settlement proposals from a representative section of Rhodesian society, including detained nationalist leaders. This visit was to include Denis Healey, Joan Lestor, Tom McNally and Joe Gormley. The Guardian also followed up on this story, including details of an emergency resolution drafted by Joe Gormley and passed unanimously by the NEC, reaffirming Party commitment to the five principles and expressing “grave foreboding” at the agreement signed between Douglas-Home and Smith. This flurry of media attention and responses from the Labour Party and other organisations demonstrates a clear clustering of interest in the Rhodesia issue around a very specific and important event.

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185 LHASC, Labour Weekly, 12/10/1971, ‘The long search for a Rhodesian settlement’ (p. 2), ‘The five barriers to a deal with the Smith regime’ (p. 2), ‘No sell-out to Smith regime’ (p. 5).

186 Wiindrich, Rhodesian Independence: 176.


Of particular interest in considering responses to the proposed Home-Smith agreement was the formation of two new advocacy groups; the Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee (RECC) and the Justice for Rhodesia campaign. The purpose of the RECC was initially “to organise a massive, broadly based demonstration” in opposition to the Home-Smith settlement proposals.\(^{191}\) A document from the early days of the RECC provides a four page list of organisations and individuals to be invited to a meeting to encourage involvement in the new organisation (see Appendix 1). It includes trade unions, MPs, student organisations and various publications.\(^{192}\) In a letter to Harold Wilson, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign was described as being established to “oppose the settlement, to call for the continuation and intensification of sanctions and to insist on the right of African self-determination.”\(^{193}\) The establishment of these two organisations, alongside the attention given to Rhodesia in the press and left wing publications at this time, strengthens the argument that interest in the Rhodesia issue fluctuated over time, and that peaks of interest and activity were concurrent with key events such as settlement negotiations.

Towards the end of the year, mounting anger surrounding the settlement proposals became increasingly apparent. A UN General Assembly resolution rejected the Home-Smith proposals, on the grounds that they were “contrary to the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”. In the Security Council, there were attempts to pass a resolution calling on “appropriate measures to be taken to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise self-determination”, but this was vetoed by Britain.\(^{194}\) The National Organisation of Labour Students also wrote a strongly worded letter to Harry Nicholas, the Labour Party general secretary on an emergency resolution passed at their inaugural conference:

> The National Organisation of Labour Students condemns any attempt to solve the Rhodesian question except by immediate majority rule upon the strictest principle of one man, one vote, together with the repeal of all discriminatory legislation and an immediate programme of education for

\(^{191}\) LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Minutes of meeting convened by the Anti-Apartheid Movement to discuss the setting up of a Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee’ 29/12/1971.

\(^{192}\) MRC, MSS 280 31 1, ‘List of individuals and organisations invited to attend a meeting on Wednesday 29 December 1971 to discuss the setting up of a Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee’, undated.

\(^{193}\) LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Letter from J. Camilleri to H. Wilson, 27/12/1971.

all; therefore, Conference condemns especially the terms negotiated by the Tory Government, and calls upon the Labour Movement to support in every way the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe.¹⁹⁵

Titles of articles on Rhodesia in Labour Weekly also became increasingly dramatic: ‘Rhodesia sell-out’; ‘Now the threat of bloodshed’; ‘Anger mounts against Rhodesia commission’ and ‘Rhodesian deal a ‘transparent farrago’.¹⁹⁶

In January 1972, the meeting minutes of various organisations detail the fervent discussion of the ongoing situation in Rhodesia. The RECC, the TUAG of the AAM and Justice for Rhodesia were all active in the early part of 1972 in response to the ongoing potential for a sell-out to the Smith regime.¹⁹⁷ The Justice for Rhodesia campaign was particularly active, sending out a leaflet about the settlement proposals, and the problems with these, as the organisation saw them. They also held a meeting at Westminster Hall, addressed by representatives of various interests in the Rhodesia issue, including Lord Caradon who set out the case for a negotiated solution to the situation, as per the Government’s plan with the current settlement proposals. The Justice for Rhodesia campaign also produced a second leaflet outlining what policy on Rhodesia should be going forward. The aim was to “have the leaflet widely distributed before the Pearce Report is published, so as to have helped influence the debate on future policy”.¹⁹⁸

Some parts of the labour movement also became more vocal over Rhodesia pending this latest threat of a sell-out. The London Co-operative Society’s Political Committee passed the following resolution from the Staines Co-operative Party at their AGM:

noting the repressive measures taken by Smith’s illegal regime in Rhodesia and the clear evidence of the opposition by the African people against the Home-Smith proposals calls upon the Labour, Co-operative and Trade Union movement to actively campaign against these proposals and to insist on the continuance and strengthening of the United Nations sanctions

¹⁹⁵ LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 89, Rhodesia 1972, Letter from Neil Vann, National Youth Officer of the National Organisation of Labour Students to Harry Nicholas, 21/12/1971.
against this inhuman, illegal and racialist regime of terror against people who want only elementary human rights.\textsuperscript{199}

This was accompanied by a flurry of CLP and trade union resolutions on Rhodesia, and specifically relating to the Pearce Commission around this time.

The Justice for Rhodesia Campaign very clearly planned its activities based on what was occurring in Rhodesia at the time. In a document summarising its activities, the organisation outlined how it shifted its focus according to the progress of the Pearce Commission, and once African opinion had begun to make itself clearly heard, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, they shifted focus to consider how best to lobby for positive Rhodesia policy after Pearce. The RECC also planned its activities to coincide with specific parts of the settlement proposals, organising a march followed by a rally when the commissioners were in Rhodesia conducting their enquiries.\textsuperscript{200} They also organised and held “a constant daily vigil” outside the building that was to operate as the Pearce Commission's London headquarters, and be the site of hearings once the commissioners returned from Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{201} This is a very specific example of activity not only coalescing around key events in the Rhodesia timeline, but of organisations specifically tailoring their events around the form of settlement negotiations. It also illustrates how seriously the Pearce Commission was taken by advocacy organisations working on Rhodesia as a potential avenue to independence on an unacceptable basis.

In March 1972, the AAM organised a conference on southern Africa for trade unions, aimed at promoting their work and raising awareness of these issues amongst trade unionists. One of the key aims of this event was to highlight Britain’s links with the situation in southern Africa, and make suggestions as to what trade unions could do to oppose these links. The conference also sought to highlight the role of organised labour in the political structure of southern Africa at that time. Notes on this event recognise that “there was a lack of representatives from blue collar unions and in

\textsuperscript{199} LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 89, Rhodesia 1972, Letter from Donal McGregor of the London Co-operative Society Political Committee to the Labour Party, 25/01/1972.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid
\textsuperscript{201} MRC, MSS 280/31/1, Minutes of RECC meeting, 10/03/1972.
general the attendance reflected the unions in which the [Anti-Apartheid] Movement has been most active".\textsuperscript{202} Whilst this event was not principally organised to deal with the Pearce Commission and the latest moves towards settlement, the prominence of this issue no doubt played a hand in prompting the AAM to put together such a conference, and in encouraging trade unionists to attend. This period will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6.

The official results of the Pearce Commission were announced on 23/05/1972, but there was already a broad awareness in both Britain and Rhodesia that the proposals had been firmly rejected by a majority of the Rhodesian population. Windrich characterises the outcome as a turning point in the Rhodesia issue, in that for the first time, it became broadly accepted that for any future settlement negotiations to be successful, representatives of the African population would have to be included. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. For now it is sufficient to highlight that once these results had been formally announced, there was a notable drop in activity from advocacy organisations, the labour movement and the press with regards to Rhodesia, because the immediate threat of a sell-out had passed, and it was broadly felt that the Commission had, surprisingly, identified the correct verdict.

In September 1972 at the TUC Congress, the following motion on Rhodesia was carried:

Congress rejects any settlement which grants independence to Rhodesia before majority rule. Congress calls upon the Labour Movement to intensify the campaign to compel the Government and the United Nations to strictly apply the economic sanctions against the illegal regime. Congress requests all members of affiliated Unions to desist from emigrating to, or otherwise assisting, Rhodesia. Congress acknowledges the positive lead provided to the Trade Union and Labour Movement by the 1971 Congress resolution concerning apartheid and Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{203}

It was proposed by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and seconded by ASLEF, which had a history of engagement on the Rhodesia issue. This is demonstrative of persistence in labour movement interest in the Rhodesia issue that


\textsuperscript{203} RH, MSS AAM 162, TUC 1972 Conference Report, no date.
simply was not present prior to the Conservative Government’s attempts at settlement, and the ensuing Pearce Commission.

**Post-Pearce, 1973-76**

Despite their outright rejection, the British Government formally left the Pearce proposals open, just as the former Labour Government had done with the Fearless proposals several years earlier. A 1973 Justice for Rhodesia press statement makes reference to this. It reiterates the organisation’s objectives as being:

“1 To ensure that Britain fulfils its constitutional, moral and historical obligations towards the people of Rhodesia;
2 To persuade Britain to exert its authority in Rhodesia in recognition of the findings of the Pearce Commission; so that
a) the illegal regime is replaced by a popularly elected government;
b) there can be no cause or opportunity for outside powers, and particularly South Africa, to usurp Britain’s authority”

The statement goes on to say that the campaign will be focusing on securing the withdrawal of the settlement proposals, policing sanctions, securing the release of political prisoners and ensuring future negotiations are inclusive.

Throughout 1973, with assistance in publishing from the Africa Bureau, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign put out *Newsbrief Rhodesia ’73*, a regular publication dealing with developments in Rhodesia, and the political handling of the issue in Britain. The first edition of this was put out in February 1973. It contained a story on Ian Smith’s political situation in Rhodesia, updates on the guerrilla war, details about new repressive legislation being ushered in by the Rhodesian Front and various other related stories. Whilst the initiation of such a publication does not directly tally with events in the Rhodesia timeline, 1973 being far quieter than the previous year, it can be seen as a delayed response to earlier activities. The Justice for Rhodesia campaign was only established a year previously, in direct response to the perceived threat posed by the Pearce Commission. Organisationally, it could not have put out a publication of such detail and scope in the early part of 1972 since it was only just

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establishing itself and beginning to raise funds; some resources were required to put together such a publication. It seems clear that Newsbrief Rhodesia ’73 emerged when it did in response to a lingering fear that the Conservative Government would try to reopen lines of communication with the Smith regime and try to resurrect the proposals that had been so firmly rejected the year before.

In March 1973, a second trade union conference on Southern Africa was held, again organised by the AAM. This was a similar event to the one discussed above, providing information and discussions on the situation in southern Africa, and outlining what could be done to help. Aside from this, and the continued publication of Newsbrief Rhodesia ’73, the year remained quiet. However, Windrich notes that the Labour Party had begun to take “a more militant line” on such issues, since being in opposition. It began to take the liberation movements more seriously, and whilst some financial assistance had been provided under the auspices of the Rhodesia Fund for humanitarian purposes, other funding was starting to be considered.

Towards the end of 1973, the Smith regime had begun to hold tentative talks with the ANC, of which the other nationalist organisations were sceptical. Labour returned to power in March 1974, following Heath’s resignation. This was as a result of his failure to form a coalition with the Liberals after the general election produced a hung parliament. At this point, there was no pressing need to act over Rhodesia, since the Conservatives had failed to make any progress on the issue, and the Rhodesian Front-ANC talks were still in progress. This was compounded by Labour’s position as a minority Government. The ANC talks broke down, partly influenced by the overthrow of Portugal’s dictatorship. This was significant in that it established another neighbouring state, Mozambique, with a long common border in the east of Rhodesia, sympathetic to the nationalist movement. This strengthened the position of the guerrilla efforts, and further stretched the Rhodesia Front troops. This led the ANC to believe that it could hold out for a better deal.

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In April 1975 the Africa Bureau wrote to Harold Wilson prior to the Commonwealth heads of government meeting. The purpose of the letter was to set out suggestions on the handling of the Rhodesia issue, such as establishing some form of future leaders training programme, in order to pave the way for independence.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 870, Letter from Sir Bernard de Bunsen, Africa Bureau Chairman, to Harold Wilson, 24/04/1975.} In June of the same year, the Birmingham Campaign for Justice in Zimbabwe and the Birmingham AAM wrote to local and constituency Labour Parties, asking them in turn to write to the Foreign Office and prepare resolutions for the Labour Party national conference to prevent any sell-out in Zimbabwe.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1212, Letter to LLPs and CLPs, 12/06/1975.} This was in response to talks between the newly formed UANC, formed as a result of the Lusaka Declaration the previous year and the Labour Party.

At the AAM AGM in October of the previous year (1974), it was decided that action on Rhodesia should be intensified, and a motion was passed to this effect. As a result of this motion, the Zimbabwe Working Group (ZWG) was established as an interim measure before a Zimbabwe Support Group could be set up. It was decided that the ZWG would concentrate its attention on Britain and more specifically, because of the pace of development, on NIBMAR. This gave a simple unified point of action. At the first meeting of this organisation in April 1975, it was agreed that they should work on getting the Labour Government to support NIBMAR and encourage the UN and Britain to press Mozambique to enforce sanctions.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1207, Zimbabwe Working Group minutes, 11/04/1975.}

Later on in the year, the AAM sent out information on the trials of several nationalists to local trades councils, and other organisations of the labour movement. In a response to one of these letters, the Westminster Trades Council wrote “I have made contact with a number of members and affiliated Branches about the vigil and picket though I am sure you will understand that it is difficult to mobilise people at this time of year”, and stating that their organisation also sent a letter to the Secretary of State asking what proposed steps there are with regards to the trials.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1212, Letter from David Triesman, acting secretary of the Westminster Trades Council to the AAM, 29/7/75.} This kind of activity
was directly in response to events in Rhodesia, such as the aforementioned talks, and their coverage in the British media.

In October, in response to further trials and executions of African nationalists, the AAM put out a pamphlet providing an update on the situation, and advertising a rally and march to be held the following month.\textsuperscript{211} This event was organised to coincide, as closely as possible, with the tenth anniversary of UDI. The pamphlet goes on to provide a brief overview of the situation as it had unfolded since UDI, and as it stood at the time of writing. This shows a response to two different potentially mobilising factors; an anniversary of an important date and actions perpetrated by the Smith regime that received British media attention and were shocking to members of the British public.

Faced with the increasing pressure of the guerrilla war, the Smith regime began to hold tentative talks with Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU in late 1975, and these continued on into 1976. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these talks eventually broke down. With the war gathering pace, Smith made a direct appeal to Britain for help in resolving the conflict and establishing some kind of settlement agreement. In response to this, Britain drafted proposals setting out a transition to majority rule, for which Kissinger pledged American support. Stedman writes that the “United States belatedly “discovered” the liberation struggle [in Rhodesia] in April 1976 when Henry Kissinger toured Southern Africa and signalled U.S. desire to help reach a settlement in Rhodesia”.\textsuperscript{212}

In the minutes of the January meeting of the ZWG, two particularly salient issues are discussed, which highlight the organisation following and responding closely to specific events in Rhodesia. The minutes provide news on hangings in Rhodesia which, as discussed earlier, often formed a point of mobilisation for advocacy organisations. The group also discussed the British South Africa Police’s (BSAP), the infamous Rhodesian police force, affiliation to the International Police Association, which was based in England. This is interesting, because it demonstrates the

\textsuperscript{211} LHASC, HART Box 2 File 29, AAM Pamphlet, ‘Majority Rule Now’, November 1975.

organisation exploring issues that may have more resonance amongst the people with whom they were trying to expand their support base. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

**From the Kissinger initiative to Lancaster House, 1976-1980**

In mid-September 1976 Kissinger led a peace mission to southern Africa. This followed on from a visit earlier in the year to pledge American support. This became known as the Kissinger initiative. It culminated in Smith agreeing to a set of proposals, which set out a two year transition to majority rule, although he later reneged on this agreement by redefining majority rule as ‘responsible rule’. It was also later revealed that the proposals put forward by Kissinger had not been cleared by the African Presidents. He was supposed to offer the Callaghan proposals from the previous year, but believing that these would be rejected, he offered a variation on these that he thought would be more acceptable to Smith.

In October, the AAM wrote to Callaghan about military technology captured from Rhodesian Forces being of British origin, but manufactured under licence in South Africa, in order to circumvent sanctions. There is no archival record of a reply to this letter, or of the AAM publicising the fact in a press release, pamphlet or other kind of publication. Whilst there was no public follow up on this issue, it is still indicative of action being in response to new information coming to light, comparable to earlier discussed responses to things like the trials of nationalists, or settlement talks.

In the same month, the AAM released a statement, entitled ‘The Future of Zimbabwe’, which outlined the situation as it stood at the time of writing, and discussed the Kissinger initiative. A section of text from the early part of this statement reinforces the argument being set out in this chapter:

> The recent developments relating to the future of Zimbabwe require an urgent response by the members and supporters of the Anti-Apartheid movement and a reaffirmation of their commitment to the cause of liberation in Zimbabwe and the armed struggle.\(^{213}\)

\(^{213}\) LHASCH, HART, Box 2 File 29, AAM Statement, October 1976.
The statement goes on to detail the problems with the Kissinger proposals, to call on the British people to actively support the liberation struggle and to maintain pressure on the British Government to “ensure that any constitutional conference is held on a basis acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe”. This is an ideal example of an organisation using a key event, namely the Kissinger initiative, and the publicity surrounding this to try and bolster support for its campaigns and the African nationalist movement, and to maintain pressure on the British Government.

Another key development in 1976 was the formation of the Patriotic Front. This happened as a result of the Geneva Conference, which was convened to discuss the Kissinger proposals. The Front Line States\textsuperscript{214} played an important role here, encouraging the formation of the Patriotic Front so that the liberation movement would present a unified face. Surprisingly, this development received little advocacy attention, but this is perhaps due to it being overshadowed by concern around the Kissinger proposals themselves, as discussed earlier, and also due to earlier attempts at unity in the nationalist movement being short lived and ultimately insignificant. Meredith notes that the establishment of the Patriotic Front was an uneasy accord between Mugabe, the “dedicated socialist intent on establishing in Rhodesia a new order which would, as he put it, ‘assault capitalist and bourgeois tendencies’” and Nkomo, who embodied both.\textsuperscript{215} It took a week of secret talks for the pair to reach agreement, which was announced on 9\textsuperscript{th} October, 1976.

In May 1977, with further African nationalists facing death sentences from the increasingly desperate Smith regime, the AAM began a letter writing campaign. They drafted a letter, which was sent out to various affiliated and sympathetic organisations, such as the London Co-operative Society and the CPGB, to be sent on to Callaghan in order to put pressure on the Labour Government. This letter stated that:

> We are writing out of concern for the many Zimbabweans who have been sentenced to death for opposing the Smith regime...Past efforts by the British Government to stop these executions have proved to be ineffective. Since the United Kingdom is the legal authority in Southern Rhodesia we

\textsuperscript{214} A group of southern African states who worked for democratic majority rule.

\textsuperscript{215} Meredith, \textit{Past is Another Country}: 268.
believe that Her Majesty’s Government should publicly declare that these executions are illegal and therefore amount to murder.\textsuperscript{216}

Whilst this was not one particular event, it was a continuation of earlier events in Rhodesia which received a reasonable amount of media attention, and also a subject that was very emotive and therefore easy to mobilise around people around. The AAM had been active on this issue previously, so they were able to reinstate an earlier campaign, with renewed vigour due to the latest developments in the situation. Towards the end of the year, the AAM also organised a ‘Zimbabwe in Struggle’ solidarity day.\textsuperscript{217} It is not clear that this event was planned to coincide with or respond to any particular events in Rhodesia. It is more probable that it was simply a response to a dearth in activity in Rhodesia campaigning during the year.

In 1978, in response to the increasing pressure of the ever encroaching guerrilla war, the Rhodesian Government decided to pursue a settlement without involving external powers. To this end, Smith held talks with Bishop Muzorewa, who was a longstanding nonviolent campaigner against the regime, and they reached an agreement, known as the internal settlement. This set out a timetable for holding elections, including African parties in the process, albeit still excluding ZANU and ZAPU. With this last caveat in mind, it is unsurprising that these moves towards settlement by the Rhodesian Front did not inspire confidence amongst advocacy groups campaigning on the Rhodesia issue.

These events prompted the Defence and Aid fund to reach out to the labour movement, in pursuit of financial support. In a letter to British trade unions, Cannon Collins set out the situation in Southern Africa. His appeal was endorsed by Mr. Len Murray, who at the time was General Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress. The letter stated that:

Our fund has provided humanitarian assistance in Southern Africa for over two decades. I last made an appeal to the British Trade Union Movement in 1970. Due to the present worsening situation, the importance and scale of

\textsuperscript{216} RH, MSS AAM 1212, AAM Letter to affiliated and sympathetic organisations, May 1977.
\textsuperscript{217} RH, MSS AAM 162, AAM Trade Union Committee Group Minutes, 07/11/1977.
our humanitarian effort has increased and once again it is necessary for me to call upon your Union for assistance.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 162, Letter from Cannon John Collins, Chairman of the Defence and Aid Fund, to trade unions, 10/03/1978.}

This appeal was a clear reaction to the events leading up to, and including, the internal settlement. The nature of the agreement and its exclusion of the two main nationalist groups clearly led the Defence and Aid Fund, amongst other organisations, to fear that the independence struggle would only intensify as a result.

In March 1978, the Zimbabwe Working Group planned a ‘Trade Union Week of Action’. An edition of \textit{Zimbabwe Briefing}\footnote{A publication that the Working Group put together, but which sadly has not found its way into the archives.}, focusing on “White Rule & the African Worker” was made available specifically for this week of action, along with a list of British companies with subsidiaries in Rhodesia. The Working Group had discussed this event with Arthur Chadzingwa, a member of ZAPU, who agreed to encourage speakers on Rhodesia during the week. A member of the Working Group was also invited to do a tour of the northern region after the Week of Action and planned to be speaking to trade unions about Rhodesia in particular.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1207, Zimbabwe Working Group Minutes, 03/03/1978.} These events and actions, whilst reflecting the AAM’s more general strategy for working on the Rhodesia issue, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, can also be seen to be a response to a quiet year in Rhodesia, followed by a dramatic change in events leading up to the internal settlement.

The AAM maintained this level of active campaigning as the year progressed. The Working Group “agreed to organise a number of activities during May and as part of this they were asking the Trade Union Committee to circulate material to trade union journals.”\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 162, Zimbabwe Working Group Minutes, 10/4/1978.} Also around the same time, the AAM sent out a letter to members, making reference to the recent developments in Rhodesia. It stated:

| This month’s AA News contains four pages of information on Zimbabwe and suggestions for campaigning. In addition, representations from members to their MPs will help to build up pressure in parliament against those who are urging the Government to endorse the internal settlement agreement. A detailed AAM commentary on the internal settlement will be |

\footnotetext[218]{RH, MSS AAM 162, Letter from Cannon John Collins, Chairman of the Defence and Aid Fund, to trade unions, 10/03/1978.}
\footnotetext[219]{A publication that the Working Group put together, but which sadly has not found its way into the archives.}
\footnotetext[220]{RH, MSS AAM 1207, Zimbabwe Working Group Minutes, 03/03/1978.}
\footnotetext[221]{RH, MSS AAM 162, Zimbabwe Working Group Minutes, 10/4/1978.}
available shortly. The AAM Executive is planning a national day of leafleting on May 13th, to bring the issues in Zimbabwe to public attention.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 162, Letter to AAM members, undated.}

This line of action was plainly precipitated by the developments in Rhodesia up to and including the internal settlement. It also demonstrates a multi-layered approach by the AAM, the concept of which will be returned to in the next chapter, in responding the situation, indicating how important the organisation felt this issue to be.

The internal settlement also prompted the British Council of Churches (BCC) to produce a press release; "Rhodesia: Deteriorating situation and urgent need for talks", after the perceived failure of this agreement, which the organisation had previously been in favour of. The press release stated that:

> We therefore call on the British Government to redouble its efforts to bring all the parties to the conference table; and we call upon those inside and outside the country to respond to those efforts. With every new incident the need for such a conference becomes more urgent.\footnote{LPL, Coggan papers, 1978, Vol 71, f270, BCC Press Release, 26/06/1978.}

This is a particularly clear example of an organisation directly responding to key events, even if it was, in this case, a slightly delayed response.

The remainder of 1978 and the early part of 1979 was a quiet period in terms of campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. It seems as though, following such a flurry of activity immediately after the announcement of the internal settlement, advocacy organisations were unable to maintain the campaigning momentum up to the elections, since there was such a long gap between these and the initial agreement. It was not until April 1979 that a general election in Rhodesia was held, which swept Muzorewa and his UANC party to power. Muzorewa was installed as prime minister, and the country renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. ZANU and ZAPU boycotted the election, reinforcing concerns about the outcome this process would have amongst organisations in the UK. Speaking about the internal settlement, Kenneth Kaunda said that "the very fact that Ian Douglas-Smith had taken that step – to put a ‘puppet’ in his own place - was an indication that he had begun to feel the pressure of the freedom-
fighters. From that point onwards it was only a matter of time”.224 This captures the populace’s prevalent perception of Bishop Muzorewa at this time.

Later in the year, the AAM submitted a complaint to the BBC for using the term ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The letter of complaint argues that the use of this term “amounts to a form of recognition of the new regime in Salisbury. You will know that the territory is known legally as Southern Rhodesia since it remains de jure a British colony”.225 Whilst this example is not responding to an event as such, the change in name of the country was an evocative campaign point for the AAM, and they clearly seized upon a respected British institution failing to recognise the significance of this change.

In response to fears surrounding the change in UK Government in May 1979, with Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives entering power, and concerns at what new Government policy on Rhodesia might entail, the AAM decided to reinstate the Emergency Campaign Committee, now prefaced Zimbabwe rather than Rhodesia (the ZECC from now on). In a clear statement of concerns, the AAM wrote:

The newly elected Conservative government has stated clearly its desire to return the regime to legality and to lift sanctions. In the United States the Senate has voted for the lifting of sanctions. Various Conservatives and Christian Democratic forces in the EEC have advocated similar policies.226

The organisation also called an emergency demonstration, to be held at the end of June, and stated that the ZECC’s campaign objectives should be “no recognition of the Salisbury regime; no lifting of sanctions but their extension to include South Africa [and] support for the Patriotic Front”.227 These developments in advocacy activity, driven by the AAM but encompassing a much broader range of organisations under the auspices of the ZECC, highlight the sense of urgency surrounding the Rhodesia issue following the election of Bishop Muzorewa, and the change of British Government.

225 RH, MSS AAM 1212, AAM complaint to BBC, 04/06/1979.
226 RH, MSS AAM 1207, Document outlining the formation of the ZECC, mid 1979.
227 Ibid
The ZECC followed up its establishment by launching the ‘Zimbabwe Declaration’. The aim of the Declaration was to provide an opportunity for the views of all those opposed to the policies of the British Government, to be expressed to the Commonwealth and through the Commonwealth, to the people of Zimbabwe. Kenneth Kaunda had agreed to present the signed Declarations to the Commonwealth, in his capacity at the time as Chairman of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. The text of the Declaration was as follows:

We, the undersigned, declare our opposition to any recognition of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and our support for the maintenance of United Nations mandatory sanctions. We appeal to the Commonwealth to reaffirm its commitment to genuine independence for the people of Zimbabwe.228

The ZECC sent out copies of this declaration to be signed by representatives from as many related organisations as possible, such as Trade Unions, local and constituency Labour Parties and affiliated advocacy organisations.229 This is a clear example of an organisation taking the opportunity of an international event, namely the Commonwealth meeting (scheduled for August that year), to push its agenda and galvanise support for its campaign.

At this late stage, the Labour Party began to take on more of an advocacy role. In June, Ron Hayward, then the Labour Party's General Secretary, wrote to all constituency parties and affiliated organisations on precisely this issue. He urged “all Party members to play an active role in campaigning against any sell-out in Zimbabwe”, and went on to encourage people to attend the AAM organised march and mass rally, scheduled for the end of the month. The following month, the Labour Party sent a letter to the AAM, communicating the most recent resolution on Rhodesia passed by the NEC. The resolution, moved by Joan Lestor MP, stated that:

the Labour Party reaffirms its refusal to approve the Rhodesian internal settlement and...believes that there should be no collaboration by Britain with the Salisbury regime and no recognition of any form by a British government. The National Executive Committee expresses its continuing support to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and its sympathy with the

228 RH, MSS AAM 1207, ZECC 'Zimbabwe Declaration', 30/06/1979.
229 Ibid
African front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia who are seeking genuine independence for Zimbabwe under majority rule, and will use every effort with all the parties concerned to achieve a peaceful and just settlement.\textsuperscript{230}

From these actions it is clear that, by this point, the Labour Party stance on the Rhodesia issue was far more closely aligned with that of various advocacy organisations campaigning on the issue than with the policy of the Conservative Government. In this sense the letter and statement can be considered expressions of solidarity for the African nationalist movement, and they are therefore of relevance to the arguments of this chapter.

At the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Lusaka, August 1979, Britain announced its plans to hold a constitutional conference to seek a resolution to the ongoing conflict in Rhodesia, which had only intensified following the internal settlement. The Front Line States then played a key role in convincing the African nationalist organisations to attend. Charlton writes that “the threat from the front-line states was that, had Mr Mugabe refused to go to London and explore the constitutional path, Rhodesia’s economically prostrate neighbours would close down the ‘liberation war’ which was being prosecuted from their territories.\textsuperscript{231} The purpose of this conference was to draw up a constitution which would be acceptable to all sides as a basis for independence. Following this meeting in Lusaka, the TUC drafted a resolution strongly expressing support for the African nationalist movement and hoping for a positive outcome of the upcoming constitutional conference. The resolution ends by encouraging all levels of the TUC and affiliated unions “to respond to appeals by the Patriotic Front for educational, medical and other forms of humanitarian assistance”.\textsuperscript{232} This resolution is far more expressive of support and more strongly worded than any earlier TUC pronouncements on Rhodesia. Much like the Labour Party’s similar shift, this can be attributed to the controversial nature of the internal settlement, followed by the genuine hope and concern arising from the

\textsuperscript{230} LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia misc. memos 1978-80. Letter from Michael Wolfers to Mike Terry of the AAM, 26/07/1979.
\textsuperscript{231} Charlton, \textit{Last Colony}: 68-9.
\textsuperscript{232} LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia misc. memos 1978-80, TUC Emergency Resolution on Zimbabwe, undated.
new attempts at settlement following the Lusaka conference, as well as the leftwards shift in the Labour Party around this time.

The Lancaster House conference, as it was known, was a lengthy affair (10th September-15th December 1979), chaired by Lord Carrington, who was then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. During the course of the conference, advocacy organisations kept a close eye on proceedings, fearing a repeat of any of the earlier attempts at settlement. A ZECC document sets out a provisional timetable covering the early part of the conference, which includes meetings and discussions with Patriotic Front members in order to check on the progress of the talks, and facilitate the planning of future action if required. Agreement was eventually reached, and a timetable put in place for the holding of elections and an official transfer of power.

**Conclusion**

From the chronological exploration of levels of interest in Rhodesia amongst UK based advocacy organisations and the labour movement, obvious fluctuations can be seen. During the 15 years from UDI to the close of the Lancaster House conference, there were apparent spikes and dips in activity levels around the Rhodesia issue.

Archive material explored in this chapter, set alongside the narrative thread of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, clearly demonstrates that activity on the Rhodesia issue clustered around events such as settlement negotiations and controversial actions perpetrated by the Smith Government, such as detentions and hangings of African nationalists. This argument is strengthened by a consideration of the periods during which very little advocacy or labour movement activity was happening in Britain, as these strikingly correlate with times when the Rhodesia issue was much quieter internationally. Following waves of action on Rhodesia, such as large protests, enthusiasm for campaigning generally decreased. The main exception to this was the lead up to, and duration of, the Pearce Commission, during which interest in the issue was more consistent. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. It is also interesting to note

that advocacy and labour movement responses to the situation in Rhodesia were mainly to Government-led actions, particularly those of the UK Government. There was little activity as a direct response to the unfolding of the guerrilla war, or actions of the nationalist movement. This can be attributed to the perception that Westminster was the source of real power, and therefore of potential change, in the unfolding of the Rhodesia situation. This focus on the British Government is something that will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.

As well as a correlation between key events in the Rhodesia timeline and interest in the issue, there were commensurate fluctuations in media attention. During key events, such as settlement negotiations, media coverage of Rhodesia spiked. This then had the effect of creating a more informed and interested public, which effectively meant a more receptive audience for advocacy campaigns. There is relevant theoretical work in the social movement theory canon around the idea of levels of engagement with social issues. Specifically, the idea of consciously trying to ‘upgrade’ levels of engagement from apathetic, to interested, to actively engaged. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Labour movement engagement with the Rhodesia issue followed a divergent pattern to that of advocacy activity. Whilst spikes of interest in the issue are apparent, there was a more general trend of a steady increase in interest in Rhodesia over the 15 years. This was partly due to the TUC becoming less reticent to involve itself in the issue, and also as a result of Labour’s period in opposition in the early 1970s, and again from May 1979, during which times the Party spoke more radically on Rhodesia.
Chapter 3: ‘A Peculiarly British Responsibility’? - Advocacy methods and the struggle for a democratic Rhodesia

Introduction
This chapter will focus on the methods used by UK based advocacy organisations in responding to and supporting the struggle for independence in Rhodesia. Having noted fluctuations in the levels of support for the nationalist cause during the 15 year period under consideration, it is now pertinent to consider what advocacy organisations were doing on an operational level in order to further their aims. The chapter will begin by setting out relevant existing literature on advocacy organisations before moving on to a discussion of social movement theory: a subset of social movement theory, which can assist in elucidating an understanding of the methods chosen by advocacy organisations in their campaigning on Rhodesia. Following this, the theoretical framework will be used to consider archival sources on advocacy organisations and the struggle for independence in Rhodesia. This chapter addresses one main research question: ‘What methods were used by UK based advocacy organisations in supporting the struggle for independence in Rhodesia?’ and a supplementary question: ‘Were advocacy organisations constrained by pragmatism and existing ideas about how to campaign, and if so, what effect did this have on organisations’ chosen methods?’

Resource mobilisation theory will provide a theoretical framework through which to explore the ways in which organisations utilised resources in order to achieve their stated aims. The purpose of employing aspects of resource mobilisation theory in this chapter is to assist in drawing together quite fragmented archival material. The primary sources collected deal with various organisations, at different points during the prolonged struggle for independence in Rhodesia. In this sense, resource mobilisation theory will provide a theoretical lens through which to focus the otherwise disparate archival material, and help to draw some more general conclusions about the nature of UK based campaigning on the Rhodesia issue.
Existing Literature

Existing literature looking at advocacy organisations in the UK, specifically those campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, is very limited. This body of work is dominated by literature that focuses on campaigning around apartheid South Africa, or a more international focus on advocacy for Rhodesia. As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, there is little secondary literature that bridges the gap between diplomatic negotiations and the grass roots struggle for independence in Rhodesia. There are, however, a few studies that offer a tentative link between these two areas of scholarship, such as Fieldhouse’s study of the AAM, Day’s early study of the international activities of the Zimbabwean nationalist organisations and Reed’s dissection of ZANU’s foreign policy. A brief discussion of the problems of these texts was mentioned in the initial chapter, but at this point it is worth returning to Fieldhouse, since it is the primary text on the history of the AAM, and as such offers a good starting point for the explorations of this chapter.

The vast majority of Fieldhouse’s book is focused on the British AAM’s South Africa work, with brief sections on Rhodesia and other parts of Southern Africa. Fieldhouse writes:

As we have seen, in its early years AAM concentrated almost exclusively on what was happening in South Africa itself, fearing that if it got drawn into related conflicts in neighbouring territories its limited campaigning capacity would be overstretched and therefore less effective. But by the mid-sixties it became all too apparent that what was happening in the bantustans and former British High Commission Territories, and the struggles for freedom in Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa, were all inextricably linked to the freedom struggle in South Africa. There was an ‘unholy alliance’ of white racist domination throughout southern Africa and this had to be tackled as a whole.

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234 R Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid.
236 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid.
239 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: 127.
Despite this shift in focus once the ‘unholy alliance’ became apparent, the book is more reflective of the Movement’s earlier position.

In terms of the methods used by the AAM, Fieldhouse provides little information. However, he does comment briefly on what seemed to be the driving force behind the movement’s Rhodesia campaign, and chronologically explores some of the techniques used to campaign. From this it is possible to extrapolate his position on the methods used, which can be used to compare to the archival data and theoretical perspectives introduced later in the chapter. Fieldhouse argues that UDI gave momentum to the AAM’s Rhodesia campaign, and argues that the centre of this was a drive to prevent recognition of the Smith regime, commensurate with the idea of NIBMAR. In discussing the tactics of the Rhodesia campaign, Fieldhouse draws attention to activities such as lobbying on issues like the establishment of economic sanctions (and later, attempts to curb sanctions-breaking by South Africa), making suggestions for conference resolutions to local and constituency Labour Party branches, trying to engage the trade unions in the campaign (although even Fieldhouse admits that this was with “limited success”) and organising public rallies, such as the one held in 1972 to protest against the possibility of a ‘yes’ to the Pearce Commission. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

An interesting point made by Fieldhouse on Rhodesia and its place within the AAM’s campaign is that:

Because Rhodesia, unlike South Africa, was still (at least nominally) under British rule until 1980, it often proved easier to persuade people of the relevance and rightness of the Rhodesian campaign, compared with the campaign against apartheid in South Africa. The Government, politicians and the general public were all more ready to recognise this as a peculiarly British responsibility.

However, this does not align with the place that Rhodesia occupies in the book, or with difficulties faced by the AAM in trying to gain support for its Rhodesia campaign.

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241 Ibid: 131-140.
Another well-known text on the AAM is Gurney’s “A Great Cause”. Gurney was actively involved in the AAM, and edited the movement’s official publication, *Anti-Apartheid News*, from 1969-1980. However, this article is almost entirely focused on South Africa, looking at the movement’s origins in the boycott movement, and how this helped established patterns of operation, for example the movement’s later relationship with the South African Congress Movement. A later article by Gurney has a similar preoccupation with South Africa, but provides a more detailed consideration of the AAM’s methods. She highlights that “international solidarity was symbiotically linked with the progress of the liberation struggle within Southern Africa. Developments within Britain that were quite unrelated to Southern Africa also affected AAM campaigns.” This idea of a link between advocacy activity and events in Britain and overseas was partially picked up on in the previous chapter, considering fluctuations of interest in the Rhodesia issue. She also states that the AAM worked to build support in Britain among the trade union movement, students and churches, and to establish a network of local groups. This idea will be explored in more detail during the course of this chapter.

A text that is suggestive of the potential for introducing social movement theory to consider the work of advocacy movements is Seidman’s chapter on the AAM, although this is equally South Africa dominated. He frames the AAM as a global social movement. Whilst the chapter is instructive in both the challenges posed by and suggested solutions to using social movement theory to analyse such global social movements, the discussion of the AAM itself is, much like Gurney’s first article, entirely focused on South Africa. Thörn’s article adopts a similar focus and also argues that the AAM should be understood as a global social movement. Skinner

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246 Ibid: 471.
has written a fascinating history of international activism, looking beyond the AAM to other advocacy organisations such as the Defence and Aid fund, and interactions between such organisations, but again focuses exclusively on South Africa, and on the earlier period of anti-Apartheid activism, up to 1964.²⁴⁹

Whilst there is undoubtedly some valuable secondary literature on the AAM and its history, this whole body of scholarship is dominated by a focus on the movement’s actions on South Africa, seeming to write the rest of southern Africa out of the story, with the exception of some of the chapters in Fieldhouse’s book. Equally worrying is a lack of literature on any of the other advocacy organisations working on southern Africa during this tumultuous period of struggle against white domination. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, there were many organisations and coalitions that formed to campaign on the Rhodesia issue, and other related issues in southern Africa in this period. Again with the exception of Fieldhouse, and even then confined to the projects orchestrated by the AAM, such as the RECC, these other organisations and initiatives are simply not mentioned in existing scholarship on the topic. This chapter addresses this oversight and provides not simply a brief history of different organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, but a detailed consideration of the methods used by such organisations, after a theoretical exploration of resource mobilisation theory.

**Resource mobilisation theory**

The chapter will now look at some relevant sub-theories in the study of social movements, before applying these to a discussion on the methods used by advocacy organisations. In particular, this section will borrow from the theory in order to explore how advocacy organisations utilised the limited resources available to them, and the reasons behind their chosen methods. This section also explores whether these organisations were constrained by existing ideas about how to campaign, and if so, what effect this had on an organisation’s chosen methods. Whilst the previous chapter considered in some detail the fluctuations in levels of UK-based support for the independence struggle, this chapter will revisit movement involvement but from a

different angle. As will be seen from some of the archival material explored later in the chapter, a significant proportion of advocacy activity, and by extension a significant proponent of their chosen campaigning methods, was directed towards expanding the organisational support base of the cause in the UK. So in this chapter, movement participation will be viewed from the organisational rather than the individual perspective.

This section drawing on theoretical frameworks begins by considering some salient insights from the resource mobilisation approach, or resource mobilisation theory. This perspective is part of what is known as the second wave of social movement theory, and arose in response to what are now referred to as ‘traditional’ approaches. Much of the earlier social movement theory cannon, the first wave, addressed the issue of why movements form. This was generally attributed to the presence of grievances within a society, which a movement then coalesces around in order to seek change. The resource mobilisation approach challenged this perspective by arguing that there is always enough grievance present in any society to sustain a movement, if there is a sufficient level of organisational ability to mobilise around it. So this approach shifts away from the earlier social-psychological influences, to a perspective more informed by socio-economic and political ideas. Much of resource mobilisation theory still deals with movement formation, which is not of use in this context. However, there are some aspects of the theory that deal more closely with the tactics movements employ in relation to their resources,250 and it is this side of theory that this chapter will address first. Whilst resource mobilisation theory arose in the 1970s, and has subsequently been followed by much other work on social movements, it has been used in this context because it is more relevant than later work on a similar subject. Social movement theory moved on to discuss what have been termed ‘new social movements’, and Buechler argues that this theory, or group of theories, relates to a broad range of disparate social movements more concerned with the social and cultural domains than the political.251

McCarthy and Zald set out the difference between the ‘traditional’ approach and the resource mobilisation approach with regards to strategy and tactics. They state that in the traditional approach, it was argued that leaders of social movements use “bargaining, persuasion, or violence to influence authorities to change.” The tactics chosen related to “prior history of relations with authorities, relative success of previous encounters, and ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the oligarchization and institutionalization of organizational life.” In contrast to this, the resource mobilisation approach considers the role of relations with authorities, but acknowledges a broader spectrum of concerns that movements have, such as “mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in targets.” This can cause problems in terms of choice of tactics, as there are competing aims, which cannot all be achieved using the same methods. This approach also notes that “tactics are influenced by interorganizational competition and cooperation.”

Another useful facet of McCarthy and Zald’s comparison is that of the relationship between a social movement and the society in which it is based. They note that the traditional approach is unidirectional in its understanding of how social movements interact with society, in that it considers the effect society may have on a movement’s goals, for example, but ignores “ways in which such movement organizations can utilize the environment for their own purpose”. This approach acknowledges that society is an infrastructure which movements utilise and operate through. “The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centres, pre-existing networks, and occupational structure and growth.”

From this brief discussion of some of the innovations of resource mobilisation theory, it is possible to focus on three particular points with which to analyse advocacy

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252 Ibid.
253 Ibid: 1217.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
methodology in support of the African nationalist cause. The first point is about organisations having a broad range of concerns that occupy their time and by extension the methods they use and the way in which they employ resources. The second point is that competition with other organisations may affect the methods and tactics used by one organisation. Lastly, the relationship between an organisation and society is open-ended; society can be a resource for organisations. Each of these points will be examined in turn, in relation to the archival sources that will be discussed below.

Theoretical discussion will now turn to look at the concept of repertoires of contention, coined and developed by Charles Tilly. Tarrow takes Tilly's work as a starting point, and provides a particularly succinct definition of the term: A repertoire of contention refers to “the whole set of means that a group has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or groups”.258 To expand on this, the notion of the repertoire is that in any society, intended in the broadest possible sense in this context, there is a limited set of actions and processes that can be employed in the process of seeking social change, hence the importance of pragmatism in the decisions and actions taken by advocacy organisations. Tarrow argues that:

The repertoire is therefore not only what people do when they make a claim; it is what they know how to do and what society has come to expect them to choose to do from within a culturally sanctioned and empirically limited set of options.259

Tilly and Tarrow both explore the idea that such repertoires do change over time, but it is generally a gradual process, with occasional flurries of more rapid change and one influenced by the social context in which it takes place.260 Tilly looks at the shift in popular protest in Britain during the mid to late eighteenth century, which he argues took place quite rapidly, but still affects conceptions of protest in the present: “many of the critical changes in popular contention from 1758 to the present crowded into a

259 Ibid: 91.
260 Ibid.
few decades around the end of the eighteenth century”.

Traugott neatly sums up this point:

The metaphor of the repertoire allowed him to stress, without unnecessary teleological assumptions, both the continuity that collective action exhibits over many generations and the sweeping changes in the accepted form of protest that occur only at long intervals.

This theory suggests that any exploration of the methods used by a social movement or its constituent parts must be understood as being constrained and influenced by a particular repertoire of contention established in a particular social context.

Tilly argues that, following the aforementioned period of rapid change, forms of contention “had a national, modular, and autonomous character”. National refers to the fact that issues, unlike the earlier repertoire, were no longer confined to specific local areas, but concerned the country as a whole. By modular, Tilly means that there developed a set of forms of contention that then “served many different localities, issues and actors”. Again this is distinguished from an earlier period in which forms varied from one place to another. Finally, Tilly argues that forms were autonomous, by which he means that claimants represented themselves at all levels of contention, from local to national, rather than employing representatives when issues stretched beyond the local level, as was the case in the earlier period. The work on repertoires of contention will be taken together with that of McCarthy and Zald in exploring the methods used by advocacy organisations in their campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. This theoretical framework underlines the centrality of a pragmatic approach for advocacy organisations in responding to the Rhodesia crisis, as they were limited by a finite repertoire of contention, and had to maximise limited resources through this to further their stated aims. As such a pragmatic and cautious approach was inevitable, particularly so with an issue that fluctuated in and out of the public’s attention at the whim of political developments and media coverage.

263 Tilly, Contentious Repertoires: 34.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
Advocacy Methodology

Despite intending to challenge the bias of the existing literature, it seems logical to begin with the AAM, since this is the organisation on which there is most available archival data, thanks to its size and organisational capacity relative to other organisations that campaigned on the Rhodesia issue. This section of the chapter builds towards a consideration of the constraining influence of pragmatism on advocacy methodology. As stated above in the brief overview of Fieldhouse’s work, it is suggested that the overriding aim of the AAM’s Rhodesia campaign was to prevent a return to legality in Rhodesia under the Smith regime, which is tantamount to the idea of upholding the NIBMAR principle. This is supported by the campaign materials, statements and publications of the AAM, and this conceptualisation of the AAM’s main aim goes some way to explaining what could be seen as a paradox in terms of the AAM’s activities, and those of other organisations, which will be returned to later in the chapter.

Before looking at some of the specific activities undertaken by the AAM in its Rhodesia campaign, it is instructive to consider its intended scope of operations. Fieldhouse argues that “the Movement...tried to engage the political parties, particularly local Labour Parties, and the trade unions in the campaign, although with only limited success during the period of the 1964-70 Labour Governments.”266 This is borne out by the archival data; there are extensive meeting minutes of the AAM’s Trade Union Action Group (TUAG), a sub-group of the Movement, responsible for trying to extend the support of the Movement and involve trade unions, both in the UK and Southern Rhodesia. Minutes from April and May 1968 highlight the decision to pursue contacts with members of Rhodesian trade unions. This culminated with the report of a meeting between AAM representatives and Josiah Maluleke, who was then Secretary General of the Southern Rhodesian Trade Union Congress (SRTUC), agreeing that contact should be maintained.267 This is clearly illustrative of McCarthy and Zald’s

266 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: 132-3.
point about social movements utilising pre-existing networks, and also highlights the political sphere on which the AAM was concentrating.

A letter from the AAM to its general members in 1966 demonstrates the organisation’s preferred methods of campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. It stated that the Smith regime was still in control, and depending on the South African Government for economic assistance. In response to the ongoing situation, the letter announced that the AAM was organising a national campaign on Rhodesia and had declared June to be “Freedom for Rhodesia” month. It urged its members to join this campaign by holding public meetings, distributing Anti-Apartheid News (the regular AAM publication, the next two issues of which would focus on Rhodesia) and ordering stickers and leaflets for general publicity.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1211, AAM letter to general members, April 1966.} It suggested possible actions in support of “Freedom for Rhodesia” month, such as distributing the petition enclosed with the letter, distributing the leaflet ‘Crisis in Rhodesia’, organising local meetings to raise awareness of events in Rhodesia, “Lobby MPs, and organise deputations to the Commonwealth Relations Office”, and to publicise the campaign.\footnote{Ibid.} This provides a good summary of the multiple methods the AAM used in order to support the nationalist cause in Rhodesia, spanning grass roots campaigning in the UK through to engaging with the political elites.

Another way in which the AAM tried to expand its support base amongst UK trade unions was through publicising its cause and activities in relevant publications. In seeking to engage the labour movement, the TUAG identified a need:

- to get correspondence on Southern Africa into union journals, and that each member would look into this with regard to his own journal. Letters and articles should relate to what trade unionists in this country could do. Very substantial efforts were also needed to get motions on to the order papers of national unions who were less sympathetic to the Movement.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 161, TUAG minutes 20/08/1971.}

Various discussions at AAM meetings corroborate this as a tactic the organisation used. Morning Star, Tribune, Labour Weekly, Seven Days, Voice of the Union and individual union newspapers were all targeted as potential forums in which to raise
awareness of the Rhodesia situation amongst the broader labour movement.\textsuperscript{271} Unfortunately it was not possible to identify circulation figures for such publications, as this would have given a clearer insight into the impact of this aspect of advocacy activity.

The AAM TUAG also tried to influence TUC policy with regards to southern Africa, although any direct action by trade unionists was problematised by the Industrial Relations Act of the Heath government in 1971 that “made illegal the withdrawal of labour on grounds of conscience”.\textsuperscript{272} Regardless of this, the AAM persisted in its efforts to strengthen the TUC’s line on Rhodesia, and raise awareness at a shop floor level:

It was agreed that we should work to get the TUC to extend its policy on South Africa to Rhodesia, with particular emphasis on restricting the flow of emigrants to Rhodesia. It was suggested that the TUC should support any workers who continued to recognise sanctions. Resolutions should be moved at shop floor level to create awareness of the situation in Rhodesia and all avenues of propaganda should be investigated.\textsuperscript{273}

This demonstrates a multi-layered approach in trying to expand the AAM’s support base amongst trade unionists; a policy focus at the top down to awareness-raising at the grass roots. The purpose of such campaigning, when viewed through the lens of resource mobilisation theory, was to try to generate new supporters from those who were not currently engaged with the issue, through the use of existing social and political networks.

There are two facets to consider in understanding why the AAM targeted trade unions in such a way. First, one of the more intractable problems faced by the Smith regime in the years following UDI was emigration; people leaving Rhodesia for South Africa or to return to Britain. This left an ever decreasing pool of productive workers contributing to the economy.\textsuperscript{274} A tactic used in trying to combat this trend, was to

\textsuperscript{271} RH, MSS AAM 161, TUAG minutes 29/9/1971.
\textsuperscript{272} RH, MSS AAM 161, TUAG minutes 30/11/1970.
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{274} Despite little discriminatory legislation specifically around labour, other discriminatory laws and widespread informal discrimination, for example the refusal of white controlled union employees to permit Africans to undertake apprenticeships, meant that this pool of workers was predominantly white. On this subject see C. Palley, ‘Law and the
publish adverts in Britain presenting Rhodesia as an attractive place to emigrate to. The AAM tried to combat such propaganda, particularly through the TUC and by lobbying individual trade unions, as evidenced in the previous paragraph. The second and perhaps more important facet of the AAM TUAG’s work stemmed from the relationship between the Labour Party and trade unions. From this angle, trade unionists were seen as a powerful potential resource, particularly given the growth in trade union membership,\textsuperscript{275} in that they were a potential moderating influence on the Labour Party, not on the content of policy itself, but should the latter try to sell-out on the Rhodesia issue.\textsuperscript{276} The union network provided access to a far broader spectrum of people than the AAM could otherwise have reached, and whilst there was a high degree of apathy over the Rhodesia issue for much of the period, unions still represented a source of potential influence over CLPs in safe Labour seats and presented a potential check on the Labour Party leadership through their influence at Party conference and on the NEC, were any controversial decisions to be made. This is indicative of McCarthy and Zald’s point about the range of concerns an organisation has: lobbying the trade union movement was not of direct relevance to the ultimate goals of the AAM but it was seen as one way of trying to expand the support base and place a check on Government policy.

An important aspect of the AAM’s methods of operation was maintaining contact with representatives of the nationalist movement in the UK, in order to help stay informed about the situation on the ground in Rhodesia and inversely to keep nationalists informed about the organisation’s campaigning. This is demonstrated through numerous letters to UK based nationalist representatives requesting speakers for AAM meetings.\textsuperscript{277} A Zimbabwe Working Group report stated that “Representatives of the AAM have continued to keep informed the representatives of the ANC in London


\textsuperscript{276} Minkin, *Contentious Alliance*: 39-40.

\textsuperscript{277} RH, MSS AAM 1225, see for example Letter to Arthur Chadzingwa, Western European representative of PF (ZAPU) from AAM asking for a speaker to address the AAM Trade Union Movement Committee Meeting (5/06/1978) on the general situation in Rhodesia and ZAPU’s assessment and “the ways in which Trade Unions can be of assistance to the liberation struggle there”.

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together with the ZANU branch in the UK of the work being undertaken.”278 This contact with nationalists in the UK was an important aspect of the movement’s work in trying to support its other methods of operation, namely trying to engage political parties and trade unionists on the issue, and grow support for the movement, because personal testimony and primary information on the Rhodesia situation from nationalists based in the UK lent credibility to the AAM’s cause.

As discussed in greater detail in the introductory chapter, Reverend Michael Scott established the Africa Bureau in 1952 to assist Africans who wished to contest their political situation. Later in the Bureau’s life, it shifted its focus to research activities and published documents on various African issues, such as the predicted efficacy of sanctions against Rhodesia.279 This function of the Bureau is evidently more focused than the aims of the AAM, and given this it seems logical that the methods employed by the Bureau might be equally more focused than those of the AAM. As highlighted by its absence in the brief literature review section in this chapter, the Africa Bureau does not feature in existing literature on Rhodesia, and as such, discussions here are based solely on the available archival material, and shed new light on the activities of another advocacy organisation on the Rhodesia issue. The Africa Bureau’s official papers are entirely housed in the Rhodes House archive, with occasional references occurring in other archives through organisational and personal interactions. The chapter also draws on an interview with Guy Arnold, Director of the Bureau from 1968 until 1972.

Many of the Africa Bureau papers relating to its work on Rhodesia are general materials collected for research purposes, which were produced by the nationalist movement itself and other organisations in Rhodesia. There are 13 files, comprising an entire box in the Africa Bureau collection, that highlight different groups and their respective publications, press releases and other assorted papers.280 These documents include early ZAPU statements and policy documents, some editions of Zimbabwe

News (a ZANU publication), copies of speeches, by figures such as Bishop Muzorewa, and ANC statements. These are all primary documents originating in Rhodesia and set out nationalist views and policies on the situation at the various times of publication. The purpose of collecting such documents was clearly to stay informed of the situation on the ground in Rhodesia and the position of the various groups involved in the nationalist struggle as it developed over time. Whilst the AAM papers also hold some similar collections of documents, they occupy a far greater proportion of the Africa Bureau collection, highlighting the importance of the research aspect of the Bureau's work; its chosen method of operation.

Papers from the Rhodesia Sub-Committee of the Africa Bureau discuss a broad range of issues related to the Rhodesia situation such as oil, sanctions and regional politics. All of the minutes from this sub-committee centre around the planning of different research papers, which is closely related to the aforementioned aim the Bureau had in producing research and informed publications on African liberation issues. In the same file as these minutes there are various memoranda and research papers, the results of the planning of the Sub-Committee meetings. One such memo, entitled ‘Rhodesia – Chess Game 1972’, describes parties involved in the situation and the supposed desired outcome of each.281 A background paper, ‘Oil and Rhodesia’ by James Lemkin, a member of the Sub-Committee, discusses some of the complexities and the international dimension of trying to enforce oil sanctions against the Rhodesian regime.

In addition to the Rhodesia Sub-Committee, there was also the Africa Bureau Rhodesia Circle, although the surviving papers for this sub-group are far less extensive than those of the Sub-Committee.282 There are various notices arranging meetings of the Circle, but only one set of minutes, from the very first meeting held under such auspices. The first item discussed at this meeting was whether or not the Circle could do anything with regards to the split in the African nationalist movement, as this was

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282 From the available archive sources it is not entirely clear what the distinction between these two groups was, although presumably the sub-group existed solely to advise the Bureau, whereas there seemed to be some discussion surrounding whether the Circle could at times act independently. There was an overlap in membership between the two groups.
seen as a major stumbling block in assisting the independence struggle and facilitating a solution to the Rhodesia crisis. The meeting concluded that the Circle was probably not able to help with this particular issue but that it “was important that African leaders should realise the seriousness which their divisions had on political opinion in this country.” That said, the minutes give no indication of how the Rhodesia Circle intended to go about ensuring this, although it is noted that one member raised the issue that trying to rouse British public opinion in support of the nationalist cause should be considered but not how this should be done. This is illustrative of competing priorities for one organisation, and the consideration of how best to channel limited resources, which reflects the argument about the broad range of concerns SMOs have in resource mobilisation theory. The file of Rhodesia Circle documents also contains a few draft statements on Rhodesia, further to these minutes and notices arranging further meetings. What is notable about this one set of surviving minutes is the more direct approach taken, or at least considered, by the Rhodesia Circle, compared to that of the Sub-Committee, and the more direct engagement with the Rhodesian side of the situation.

The Africa Bureau organised and held a conference in London in 1965, prior to the announcement of UDI. Speakers at this conference included representatives of academia, left wing media, the Labour Party and the nationalist organisations; a typical cross section employed in advocacy work. The purpose was “to provide information on the present situation in Rhodesia, to consider the implications for Britain of the continuing crisis, and to discuss the policy which should be adopted by Britain”. The conference concluded that:

There was general agreement that British public opinion remained ill-informed about events in Rhodesia: most people were unaware of the large numbers held in detention or restriction without trial and knew nothing of the extent of the breakdown of all relations between Africans and Europeans...The extreme urgency of finding a solution was recognised. This meant that there was little time to mount an educational campaign with the British public. The best method would be to get public attention focussed on individual cases of hardship and injustice.

283 RH, MSS Afr. a. 1681 Box 258, File 10, Rhodesia Circle meeting minutes 25/2/1965.
285 Ibid.
These points highlight the focus of the Africa’s Bureau’s advocacy work on the issue, essentially raising awareness of the details of the situation in Rhodesia in order to gain further support for activism. It is also interesting that the conference concluded that publicising specific cases would garner better results than trying to raise awareness of the situation as a whole. This has now become a staple method in campaigning, with adverts for charities and campaigns frequently employing such a technique. The conference report also briefly discussed opinions on the potential use of force, but unlike the idea of raising the profile of the situation in Rhodesia, this particular discussion did not culminate in any concrete conclusions.

From the records of this conference, and the minutes of the Rhodesia Sub-Committee, two things become apparent about the Africa Bureau’s methods regarding Rhodesia campaigns. The first is that the organisation took into account the general lack of public awareness in formulating its policy on public engagement, and thus the decision to focus on a ‘human interest’ angle was made. This was coupled with the provision of well researched background papers on Rhodesia, intended for those already interested but lacking a deeper awareness. This demonstrates a core point in resource mobilisation theory: that one of the foci or concerns of organisations will be to change mass publics into sympathisers for a particular cause. The lack of evidence regarding the Bureau’s views on what British policy should be with regards to the use of force also shows a greater focus on the micro level of the campaign; trying to get members of the public interested by telling shocking stories about detentions, or in trying to mitigate the potential negative impact of nationalist factionalism on British public opinion, rather than trying to alter the policy of the British Government. Whilst this point is drawn mostly from documents at an early stage of the period under consideration, it is demonstrative of a difference to the methods used by the AAM, which adopted a dual track approach focusing on British government policy and public opinion, both of which fall under Tilly’s national focus in terms of the repertoire of contention.
The Africa Bureau attempted to differentiate itself from other organisations. In an interview with Guy Arnold he stated that they had held a long discussion with Ethel de Keyser and Abdul Minty of the AAM to discuss potential collaboration, but ultimately it became clear that they wanted the Africa Bureau to be led by AAM policy. He also said that there was some suspicion amongst Africa Bureau committee members of the AAM’s methods, for example the organisation of and participation in protests, which the Bureau did not regard as one of its methods, having refocused it attention more directly on research. Formally, the Africa Bureau stated its intention to cease working with the AAM on the grounds that “it is thought best to confine our efforts and our limited resources to pursuing the policies of the Bureau in ways which it believes to be most effective and appropriate to the ends we seek to serve.” This example very clearly demonstrates organisational tactics being influenced by interorganisational competition.

The Africa Bureau recognised the changing political scene, both in Africa and the UK, and the need for the organisation to alter its focus accordingly. It highlighted the increased challenge of funding its operations since many African states became independent: “we can no longer rely on popular interest to supply our financial resources as we did during the struggle for independence.” It argued for a focus on “accurate and specialist knowledge...if we are to assist in the honourable and responsible discharge of Britain’s responsibilities both to the ex-colonies and to Africa as a whole.” It is in light of such arguments that the planned reorganisation of the Bureau was justified. The Bureau shifted its research work to the Africa Publications Trust, a related charity, to allow for limited funds to be focused on “the task of influencing policies”. It was also argued that “policies of protest and demonstration can no longer bring change at a time when direct British political control no longer exists in Africa”. This change in focus was an attempt by the Bureau to further differentiate itself from the AAM, Justice for Rhodesia and other organisations that were still actively organising protests and campaigns. It shows a clear shift in focus to

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289 Ibid
research, and is reminiscent of the Fabian idea of permeation, succinctly defined as "the strategy of spreading Fabian ideas to all receptive parties, leaders, and government officials, and working through them for reform". In this sense the Africa Bureau differed in its methods to the other organisations considered, as it focused very clearly on this strategy of disseminating information to influence opinion on the Rhodesia issue. In this sense, it countered the trend amongst the other advocacy organisations, and the African nationalist movement, of focusing specifically on the Labour Party. However, by the late 1970s, the Executive Committee of the Bureau decided that it had outlived its original purpose, and it was eventually closed down in 1978.

The RECC and later the Zimbabwe Emergency Campaign Committee (ZECC) were both formed from a broad spectrum of organisations, initially at a meeting called by the AAM in December 1971. The agreed purpose of the RECC, at its inception, was “to organise a massive, broadly based demonstration” in opposition to the Home-Smith settlement proposals which were under discussion at the time. This drive to draw a range of sympathetic organisations together to work on the same issue demonstrates an awareness that at pivotal moments, it was important to avoid competing for support and attention as this would ultimately be less effective. At its inaugural meeting arrangements for the aforementioned demonstration were discussed, and a working party established in order to organise it. This working party included representatives from various organisations, both political and advocacy, such as the AAM, the Labour Party and the Communist Party. The demonstration was scheduled to be held February 1972, whilst the commissioners were in Rhodesia gathering opinion, and various ideas for speakers were put forward, such as David Steel, Liberal MP; Jimmy Reid, leader of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Work-in; a representative from the OAU; a Rhodesian ex-detainee and Kenneth Kaunda or Julius Nyerere to represent the regional interests. This event is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

292 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, ‘Minutes of meeting convened by the Anti-Apartheid Movement to discuss the setting up of a Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee’, 29/12/1971.
293 Ibid.
The coalescing of multiple organisations under the auspices of the RECC and ZECC is illustrative of the influence of pragmatism, as it demonstrates an awareness that to compete for support at crucial times in the campaign (particularly the Pearce Commission and lead-up to Lancaster House) would be damaging. It was preferable to coalesce at such times to maximise on media impact and public awareness even if that meant sacrificing subtle differences in opinion about how best to campaign on the Rhodesia issue.

RECC minutes from early 1972 give a more accurate impression of the kinds of groups that became involved in this joint campaign. Under the ‘Present’ section of the minutes there is a lengthy list of names, accompanied by the organisation represented in each case. There were representatives from the National Union of Students (NUS), trade unions, AAM, Africa Bureau, Defence and Aid Fund, Labour Party, Communist Party and the main African nationalist organisations from Rhodesia. This is suggestive of the extent of organisational interaction that the RECC managed to inspire with its anti-Home-Smith settlement proposals activities. It also demonstrates McCarthy and Zald’s point that society can act as a resource for organisations by offering pre-existing structures through which to campaign. There were also two sets of publicity material designed to promote the mass protest that had been organised. One had a print run of 50,000 copies “to be distributed within the next week” [following the meeting] rapidly followed by the second leaflet which gave details of the speakers confirmed for the protest. This demonstrates the scope of publicity the RECC achieved for its protest, and the organisational strength of the Campaign in that it successfully brought a wide range of other groups together, and could then use these sub-networks to distribute publicity materials.

At the same time, the RECC was also designing a leaflet to be distributed at the protest event itself. There was some discussion around what the leaflet should contain and

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294 RH, MSS AAM 1206, RECC meeting minutes, 12/01/1972. Participants included Tim Sheehy of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) and Justice for Rhodesia, Ned Walsh from the AAM TUAG, Howard Smith of Bristol University Union, Polly Gaster of the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (CFMAG), Alan Baldwin of the Africa Bureau, Johnson Ndlovu and Cyril Ndebele of ZAPU, Jack Woddis and Doug Brew of the Communist Party, C. Thompson of FROLIZI amongst others.
any additions and alterations that should be made to a draft version that was circulated at an RECC meeting. It was concluded that the leaflet should include:

- examples of concrete action undertaken by different organisations;
- a request for money for the campaign...raise money for the liberation struggle as well as the campaign; include the name and address of the AAM;
- campaign against emigration to Rhodesia; the facts about the Rhodesian situation... request funds for the African National Council; request funds for the Defence and Aid Fund for Zimbabwe; proposal for a lobby of MPs when the Pearce Commission returns.295

This demonstrates two important points about the nature of the RECC. It shows the interest of different organisations playing out under the auspices of the campaign, and, second, it highlights the divergence of the methods employed by the RECC from those of the AAM or the Africa Bureau, in that it was attempting to fundraise directly for the nationalist cause, rather being a solely research or protest focused campaign. In particular the RECC and the Africa Bureau diverged in their campaigning methods, with the latter completely eschewing protest and demonstrations as a viable method of influencing the situation, given that Britain did not have direct control.

The Justice for Rhodesia Campaign was formed around a similar time to the RECC, in response to a fear of a settlement, with a stated aim to “coordinate and focus some aspects of this work” being done by other organisations working on Rhodesia.296 Its strategy was focused more on the provision of research and information on Rhodesia for Party resolutions and parliamentary questions, publishing articles, lobbying Government and helping to police sanctions than on organising “mass meetings or marches”.297 Direct support for the African nationalist movement did not fall under its remit.298 In 'Report on the Activities of the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign’, a good impression can be gleaned of this organisation’s methods of operation. It highlights that its initial aim was to mobilise opposition to the Pearce Commission’s settlement proposals. In order to do this, the first actions taken were to produce and distribute a leaflet on the subject, and to hold a meeting at Westminster Hall. The meeting was:

295 Ibid.
297 Ibid
298 RH, MSS AAM 1213, Memo to executive members, 15/05/1973.
addressed by Bishop Huddleston, Lord Caradon, Bishop Butler, Eshmael Mlambo of the African National Council, and Jeremy Thorpe M.P. Mr Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, was to have spoken at the meeting, but was prevented from doing so by his detention by the regime. A message of support was sent to the meeting by Harold Wilson.299

This impressive line-up suggests that the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign played an important role in campaigning against the settlement after it was announced. The Justice for Rhodesia campaign’s objectives were two-fold: to “ensure that Britain fulfils its constitutional, moral and historical obligations towards the people of Rhodesia”, and to “persuade Britain to exert its authority in Rhodesia in recognition of the findings of the Pearce Commission” in order that the illegal regime is replaced by an elected government and so that Britain’s authority in Rhodesia is not usurped by South Africa or other external powers.300 Justice for Rhodesia also published the monthly paper Newsbrief Rhodesia ‘73,301 which provided news on the situation in Rhodesia. Its starting circulation was 2000, which rose to 3750 by June 1973, “at which figure, in order to keep within the budget, we must pause”, which demonstrates that there was a greater audience than they could cater for.302 Further discussion of the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign and the RECC will take place in Chapter 6, which focuses specifically on the period surrounding the Pearce Commission.

Arising out of the AAM in the mid-1970s was the Rhodesia Working Group (RWG), an organisation initiated at the AAM’s AGM in October 1974 as a response to a feeling that action on the Rhodesia issue should be intensified. At the initiative’s inception it was decided that the focus should be on Britain. This stemmed from a prevailing perception, not only amongst advocacy organisations, but also the African nationalist movement, that the real power broker in this situation was the British Government. Chapter 5 will explore this point with regards to the nationalist movement in further detail. At the inaugural RWG meeting, it was decided that the organisation should work on getting the Labour Government to support NIBMAR, and that they should

301 Published from the offices of the Africa Bureau.
encourage Britain and the UN to pressure Mozambique to enforce sanctions. It also stated that support for the issue should be developed “through local AA groups, trades councils, CLPs, etc. (fund raising for liberation movement, support for political prisoners, etc.).”³⁰³ At later meetings the group discussed pertinent developments in the Rhodesia crisis, such as hangings, military recruitment and BSAP affiliation to the International Police Association, based in England, in order to provide information on the situation in Rhodesia to the aforementioned target groups to encourage participation in advocacy work.³⁰⁴

‘ZWG report on activity during 1976’, which highlighted the focus and activities of the Working Group, gives an insight into the intended methods of this organisation. “The immediate priority arising from the meeting on 6 March was the production of a leaflet entitled ‘Crisis in Rhodesia’. In total, 50,000 of these have been produced. Their distribution has been widespread.” The leaflet was distributed to various community relations councils, trade unions, trades councils, CLPs, local AAM groups and student groups.³⁰⁵ The report further states that:

A special effort has been made to develop support within the Labour Party especially at the time of the Greenhill visit to Salisbury. A letter was sent to all CLPs as a result of which 13 resolutions at least were submitted to the NEC. In addition we have had a number of requests for speakers.³⁰⁶

This demonstrates the focus on trying to expand UK based support for the issue, as stated in the first set of minutes, and shows the organisation interacting with the broader Labour Party and labour movement; utilising existing structures through which to campaign.

As mentioned above, the ZECC was, like its earlier incarnation, the RECC, formed from the collaboration of other organisations working on the Rhodesia issue. Following the actions of the RECC and the culmination of the Pearce Commission “it was decided that the AAM should be given the responsibility of calling the campaign into action if the possibility of a sell-out was to occur again”, and in response to the newly elected

³⁰⁴ RH, MSS AAM 1207, ZWG minutes 30/01/1976.
³⁰⁶ Ibid.
Conservative Government’s policies on Rhodesia, this is precisely what occurred in 1979. The campaign’s revival was supported by the claim that the British Government:

stated clearly its desire to return the regime to legality and to lift sanctions. In the United States the Senate has voted for the lifting of sanctions. Various Conservatives and Christian Democratic forces in the EEC have advocated similar policies and that therefore the AAM called for an emergency demonstration to be held on 30/06/1979. It was concluded that the focus of the newly formed ZECC’s campaign should be on preventing the repeal of sanctions, and encouraging their extension to South Africa, preventing recognition of the Smith regime and providing support for the Patriotic Front, though it did not specify what form this support should take.

Various conclusions can be drawn about the methods employed by the ZECC, which operated in a similar way to its predecessor. One of its primary concerns was cementing its relationship with UK trade unions, and how to extend the scope of this collaboration to strengthen the campaign. On this topic, it was stated that representatives of the PF should be encouraged to speak at trade union meetings on Zimbabwe, and that efforts should be made to get the TUC to pass a resolution at Congress to encourage broader labour movement action. This highlights the intended methods of the ZECC in seeking greater trade union involvement, and demonstrates a clear acknowledgement of the fact that greater interaction between representatives of the nationalist movement and trade unionists would be helpful in encouraging support for the former amongst the latter. Given that there were at this time over 13 million trade unionists in the UK it is understandable that the ZECC adopted this pragmatic approach.

308 The 1979 Conservative Party manifesto stated that “If the Six Principles, which all British Governments have supported for the last 15 years, are fully satisfied following the Rhodesian Elections, the next Government will have a duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, move to lift sanctions and do its utmost to ensure that the new independent state gains international recognition”. At the same time there were moves in the US senate to repeal sanctions. For details and dates see ‘Chronology: Rhodesia UDI: Road to Settlement’, LSE publication, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/rhodesiaUDIChronology.pdf [Accessed 06/02/2014].
309 Ibid.
311 High Tide of British Trade Unionism: 286
Even after the triumphant announcements of the Lancaster House talks, and the high hopes pinned to it by the British Government and various other concerned parties, there was a notable degree of trepidation amongst UK based advocacy organisations, and some parts of the British media that this would simply be the next act in the ‘comedy of errors’ that was the Rhodesia crisis.\(^{312}\) Indeed, Brickhill argues that during the talks “the nationalist leaders complained that they were forced to compromise their political programme to an unacceptable degree by Britain”\(^{313}\) and Gurney states that during this period the AAM “continued to warn against bad faith on the part of the Thatcher government”.\(^{314}\) In light of this, the ZECC organised a detailed schedule of events surrounding the programme of the Lancaster House talks to prevent it from turning into another sell-out, should that seem to occur. ‘ZECC and the Lancaster House Conference’ set out a provisional timetable of events such as discussions and meetings with representatives of the Patriotic Front to assess the trajectory of the Lancaster House talks and to plan future action, should this be required.\(^{315}\) This demonstrates the organisational interaction of the RECC working in a practical way to liaise with nationalist representatives and take preventative action should the need arise against another proposed settlement with the Smith regime.

It is worth briefly exploring some documents that shed light on interaction between relevant organisations. A letter from Jill Jessop, Secretary of the Fabian International Commonwealth Bureau (FICB), to Jeremy Bray MP,\(^{316}\) states that he had been booked to speak at both a Fabian Society meeting and an Africa Bureau meeting just four days apart on the Rhodesia issue. In order to avoid competition on the same issue, the Fabian meeting was cancelled, and people were encouraged to attend the Africa Bureau meeting instead.\(^{317}\) Similarly, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign made it clear that “since it was important to avoid any appearance of competition with Anti-Apartheid Movement or to duplicate its work, it was felt that local contacts should be

\(^{312}\) LHASC, *Labour Weekly*, No. 411, 21/12/1979, ‘Rhodesia deal riddled with long term snags’.

\(^{313}\) Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’: 70.


\(^{315}\) RH, MSS AAM 1207, ’ZECC and the Lancaster House Conference’.

\(^{316}\) Bray held stronger views on Rhodesia than Wilson, and campaigned for tighter enforcement of oil sanctions. On this see his obituary in *The Guardian*, 05/06/2002.

\(^{317}\) LSE, Fabian Society J73 A 1, letter to Jeremy Bray from the FICB, 21/06/1966.
put in touch with local Anti-Apartheid groups”. These examples again highlight the role of pragmatism in encouraging coordination and cooperation between different organisations, and avoiding duplication of effort. This coordination in itself is an important methodological concern.

Broadly speaking, there was a disconnect between what the nationalist organisations requested from UK based advocacy organisations, and how the organisations responded. ZANU and ZAPU repeatedly requested material and operational assistance from organisations in the UK. This generally took the form of financial aid, but sometimes advocacy organisations would be asked to put nationalist representatives in touch with influential figures in the UK, or to help publish nationalist propaganda. However, the response from advocacy groups was almost always to persist with UK based campaigning and lobbying, rather than responding to the precise requests of the nationalists. This significant point reinforces the argument made earlier that there was a prevailing perception of the British Government as the source of potential change and authority in relation to the Rhodesia situation, which clearly had an effect on the way in which the AAM and other organisations responded to nationalist requests.

The response of advocacy organisations to the requests of the nationalist movement can also be explained by the influence of pragmatism on their chosen methods of operation. Had their actions been more focused on fundraising for the nationalist movement, they would have risked undermining their entire campaigning strategy. Such actions would have alienated those among their support base who viewed ZANU and ZAPU as terrorist organisations but were happy to campaign against apartheid on a constitutionalist basis. Public understanding and media coverage of developments in Rhodesia were also shaped by concurrent events such as The Troubles in Northern Ireland, which would have strengthened the perception of nationalist movements as terrorist in nature. In such a context, advocacy organisations being seen giving material aid to armed ‘terrorist’ groups would have invited media condemnation which would have had potentially damaging implications for their support base. They

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318 RH, MSS AAM 1205, Justice for Rhodesia minutes, 17/04/1972.
would also have risked discrediting themselves with the Labour Party and the trade unions, and therefore losing the capacity to exert influence over government policy. So whilst some members of advocacy organisations, particularly those further to the left, favoured providing material aid to the nationalist movement, rather than an abstracted policy of assistance that prioritised lobbying in Britain, a propensity for pragmatism and moderacy of approach steered the hand of advocacy organisations towards the latter course of action.

This situation was very clearly set out in an Africa Bureau account of a meeting with ZANU representatives Nathan Shamuyarira and Frank Ziyambi:

Ways in which Africa Bureau could help ZANU and African nationalism:
1. On propaganda level – to answer that put out by Anglo-Rhodesian Society.
The Bureau might be able to provide service by being in touch immediately with sympathisers to answer this propaganda.
2. How to raise money for their activities in Lusaka.
3. Put ZANU in touch with sympathisers, such as Archbishop Ramsey, I. MacLeod.319

However, the Africa Bureau Rhodesia Sub Committee notes did not address this specific request for assistance. Instead the Sub Committee spent the majority of its time in the planning of future meetings, and organising the writing of reports on subjects such as sanctions.

This idea of UK based advocacy work not addressing the specific concerns or requests of the nationalist movement is supported by a ZAPU statement, in which Jason Moyo argued that British organisations were yet to play an effective role in giving support to the African nationalist movement. He also stated that ZANU would continue to press them for any assistance they could give.320 This was not that long after prominent advocacy campaigning in the UK surrounding the Pearce Commission, which included the formation of the RECC as discussed earlier. This suggests dissatisfaction from the nationalist organisations over the form that assistance from UK organisations was taking, and a frustration that campaigning was ineffective.

Clearly advocacy organisations in the UK were working with limited resources, and providing substantial financial assistance to ZANU and ZAPU would have been impossible. This is illustrated by a letter from Guy Arnold of the Africa Bureau to Herbert Chitepo of ZANU in response to the latter’s request for funds. Arnold wrote that “the Bureau at present has virtually no money and I am in the middle of fund raising in this country at a time when general attitudes are indifferent or antagonistic towards Africa”. This highlights not only the issue of limited resources that advocacy organisations were working with, but also the problem of fluctuating interest in the Rhodesia crisis, as discussed in the previous chapter, and the difficulties this presented in terms of trying to galvanise support for the cause. However, despite the constraints of limited funds, it seems that organisations were perhaps also limited by adherence to conventional ideas about campaigning. A good example of this notion is the RECC rally organised around the time of the Pearce Commission. Although this was attended by around 15000 people, it served little purpose in the sense that the Pearce Commission was charged with ascertaining African opinion on the latest settlement proposals, the so called ‘test of acceptability’, which was duly found to be resoundingly negative. Mike Terry of the AAM argued that without the strong ‘No’ campaign ‘there was a greater chance that there would have been a settlement in Rhodesia’. However it is implausible that it had any such effect, given the lack of media freedom under the Smith regime and the reasonably robust process of the Pearce Commission. That said, the rally attracted media coverage, albeit not overwhelmingly positive, and therefore served to raise further awareness of the Rhodesia issue in the UK.

The nuanced consideration of social movement concerns as articulated by McCarthy and Zald is reflective of the nature of advocacy organisation activity surrounding the Rhodesia issue. The AAM’s stated aims were simply to campaign against the white racist regimes of southern Africa and, specifically with regard to Rhodesia, to

322 Ibid.
324 See for example ‘43 held after London rally’ The Guardian, 14/02/1972.
campaign against the British Government ‘selling out’ to the Smith regime. However, this aim in itself is not instructive of the organisation’s methods. As discussed above, the AAM took a ‘multi-layered’ approach in trying to extend support for its cause amongst the labour movement; trying to encourage trade union leaders to alter policy and pass resolutions on Rhodesia, and at grass roots by trying to raise awareness and thus mobilise support amongst trade unionists. Whilst it is stated earlier in the chapter that it is difficult to assess the level of success such a strategy had, McCarthy and Zald’s argument about multiple concerns facing social movement organisations helps to shed some light on why this might have formed part of the AAM’s methodology in its Rhodesia campaign.

Whilst a simplistic view of the AAM’s actions might hold that the TUAG was simply trying to expand the support base of the cause amongst another demographic, thinking more carefully about the potential effects of the different campaign strands shows a more complex methodology in play. Trying to raise awareness and understanding of the Rhodesia issue amongst trade unionists has a direct relationship to the British Government (McCarthy and Zald’s point about the traditional focus of social movement studies; engagement with the authorities); the Rhodesian Government (an engagement, albeit indirect, with the object of desired change) and the wider source of potential sympathisers. Whilst the point stands that it is difficult to assess how effective the AAM’s attempted engagement with trade unions was, analysing this engagement through the lens of one strand of resource mobilisation theory helps to highlight the implementation of a far more complex and holistic methodology than is immediately apparent.

McCarthy and Zald distinguish between social movement organisations (SMOs), social movement industries (SMIs) and the social movement sector (SMS). In this instance a SMO would be, for example, the AAM or the Africa Bureau, the SMI would be all organisations and campaigns surrounding the Rhodesia issue, or southern Africa if you wanted to take a broader conception of the SMI. The SMS refers to all social movements within a society, regardless of the cause they are working on, so it is worth being aware of the possible effect on issue competition with other SMOs in
separate SMIs. This leads into discussion of the second point set out above, regarding the effect of interorganisational competition on a movement’s tactics. Since the campaign in support of the African nationalist movement was quite diffuse in terms of the organisations involved, discussion will first be focused on intra-SMI competition.

To a large extent, from sources that touch directly on this issue, it seems that advocacy organisations, or SMOs, were acutely aware of the pitfalls of operating in competition with one another over the Rhodesia issue, and as far as possible sought to avoid this. Two examples discussed above, of Jeremy Bray being booked to speak at two meetings, and this being avoided, and the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign and AAM explicitly avoiding the duplication of efforts, demonstrates that organisations were keen to avoid competition with other similar organisations, although in the case of Justice for Rhodesia and the AAM this point is somewhat weaker since the latter was instrumental in the creation of the former. However, the existence of the Justice for Rhodesia campaign in itself shows a high level of cooperation in the Rhodesia SMI, since it brought various organisations together to work on a focused campaign. This point is also supported by the example of the Africa Bureau consciously differentiating itself from other organisations. Whilst this is the opposite of collaborative work, it shows an awareness of the benefits of organisations working on different aspects of campaigning, according to individual strengths. This aspect of advocacy organisations’ methods is also illustrative of the influence of pragmatism on their strategic choices and ways of working, driven partly by limited sources of funding and support.

It is difficult to argue without further primary evidence of the ways in which the various organisations working on the Rhodesia issue in Britain interacted with one another on a more personal level, although, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, there was an overlap of personnel between some of the main organisations campaigning on Rhodesia. This overlap indicates a desire to avoid duplication of efforts of other similar organisations, and the change in focus of the Africa Bureau demonstrates that where competition contributed to the limited availability of funds, organisations were keen to seek out some kind of niche, or focus, so that campaign efforts could be more productively channelled.
In terms of the effect on tactics that competition with other issues may have had, it would seem to relate directly to the nature of the fluctuating levels of support. Chapter 2 highlighted the correlation between key events in the Rhodesia timeline that received media attention and a boost in advocacy organisation activity. Relating this point to the subject of this chapter, it can be argued that a key tactic used by advocacy organisations was to capitalise on media coverage of key events. A good example of this would be the AAM utilising publicity about settlement attempts to foster anger at the potential sell-out of the British government, in order to strengthen attendance at public meetings and demonstrations on such issues. This links neatly to the third point, borrowed from McCarthy and Zald, which places society as an infrastructural resource that movements can draw on.

Perhaps the strongest, albeit broad, example of this argument is advocacy organisations working on the Rhodesia issue utilising existing social structures through which to focus their operations. Whilst the AAM saw trade unions as an important, largely untapped, pool of potential sympathisers, the union structure also represented an easy way of targeting a large group of people relatively easily, since communication structures were already in place. Whilst Fieldhouse states that the AAM’s strategy of involving the trade unions was met with “limited success”, and examples cited above corroborate this, McCarthy and Zald’s argument would seem to provide an, at least partial, explanation as to why the organisation persisted with this line of activity, even going so far as to establish a sub-group devoted to this aspect of its work.

Various conferences and public meetings led by different advocacy organisations involved in the Rhodesia issue made use of contacts in society, outside of the inner circle of the social movement, in order to help raise awareness of the cause and support the campaign. The Africa Bureau organised a conference on Rhodesia in late 1965 “to provide information on the present situation in Rhodesia, to consider the implications for Britain of the continuing crisis, and to discuss the policy which should

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325 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid: 132-3.
be adopted by Britain”. Speakers at this conference included John Reed of University College Rhodesia, Colin Legum of the Observer and George Cunningham who was Labour Party Commonwealth Officer at the time.\textsuperscript{326} This range of people involved in the conference demonstrates the Africa Bureau utilising sympathetic contacts from different sectors of society in order to provide different perspectives on the Rhodesia issue to conference attendees, and also to try and ensure coverage of the event in circles outside of existing Africa Bureau affiliates. This was the case with many similar events held by other organisations campaigning on Rhodesia; participants represented a cross section of, albeit generally sympathetic, society.

In terms of Tilly’s arguments regarding repertoires of protest, the UK based Rhodesia advocacy campaign was certainly national in nature. Various SMOs were active in keeping up to date with, publishing information about, and responding to the actions of the British Government in relation to the Rhodesia issue. This really formed the focal point of the campaign at all stages, since the British Government was such an integral part of the situation. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, it was when the British Government was most active on Rhodesia, particularly around the times of settlement negotiations and Commonwealth meetings, that UK based advocacy organisations were also at their most active. Whilst the focus was ostensibly international, in that the recipients of the claimants’ actions were Rhodesia freedom fighters, the campaign in the UK largely coalesced around national issues, with some action taken around shocking events in Rhodesia such as public hangings. It is almost certainly the case that internationally based repertoires of action have now, if not superseded, become as prevalent as national forms of protest. In many ways the Rhodesian issue falls into both categories, because of its complex international make-up. Regardless of this, Tilly’s point stands that action was certainly focused over and above a local level, whilst simultaneously making use of local structures of organisation.

The key forms of organisation and operation of the larger SMOs working on the Rhodesia issue were certainly modular. This is particularly noticeable with the AAM,
purely because of its size. It had local branches, which adhered to the same aims and focus as the national organisation, and were tasked with local variants of the national campaign, for example to seek resolutions from local and constituency Labour parties, and to raise awareness of the issue in the local area.327 The modular nature of the repertoire of contention was also noticeable amongst student action. There were many ‘teach-ins’ organised on various UK university campuses to raise awareness of the Rhodesia issue, and try and establish a larger support base for the pro-independence advocacy movement.328

The final point of Tilly’s three-part characterisation of contemporary repertoires is autonomy; the idea that claimants, or social movement organisations, represent themselves directly to the source of the grievance. Going back to data examined earlier in the chapter, relating to the methods used by various organisations, there is lots of evidence of meetings with representatives of the Government, at various intervals during the playing out of the Rhodesian situation, at which organisations directly discussed their concerns on the issue. Clearly, whole organisations were not attending such meetings, but neither were they employing representatives from outside of the movement. Sometimes at public meetings called by advocacy organisations, representatives of the Government or the nationalist movement attended in order to provide a credible direct source of information on the situation, but such meetings were largely aimed at raising awareness and trying to boost the number of supporters of the advocacy cause, rather than directly representing the movement’s concern to power brokers.

From this brief discussion it is clear that Tilly’s conception of the contemporary repertoire of contention is applicable to UK based advocacy organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. If organisations were constrained by familiar ideas about the structure and form that social movement organisations take, it would follow that the repertoire of contention also influences organisations in terms of the

327 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid.
328 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 146, Southern Rhodesia Documents 1967-8, Zimbabwe Review, 2:2 April 1967, article on a teach-in on Rhodesia at Cambridge University; LHASC, LPID papers, Box 146, Southern Rhodesia Correspondence 1961-9, assorted correspondence regarding a teach-in at Bangor University, February 1966.
more specific protest actions and methods they employ. Certainly from the above consideration of advocacy methodology, there are no particular tactics or actions that stand out as representing an innovation in the way that campaigning is carried out. It would seem that the methods used by advocacy organisations working on the Rhodesia issue conformed to engrained social logics of ‘how to campaign’.

**Conclusion**

This chapter identified and discussed the methods used by UK based advocacy organisations in campaigning in support of the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia. From this discussion it can be seen that organisations used a wide range of different methods available to them, with some organisations drawing on a wider range than others. The variety of different methods employed is most closely correlated to the focus and aims of an organisation. The best illustration of this point is the Africa Bureau. It used a narrower range of campaigning methods, often akin to the Fabian strategy of permeation, than the other organisations that had more general aims and used a variety of tactics. Despite these differences between organisations, the central methods used in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue remained much the same: protests, public meetings, the production and distribution of leaflets, and the involvement of other sympathetic organisations to extend their support network, focusing particularly on the British labour movement. These methods, and the particular actions taken by various organisations illustrate the constraints placed on the Rhodesia campaign by the pragmatic approach adopted by many of those leading it. It can be argued that organisations campaigning on the Rhodesia issue were constrained by a more specific repertoire of contention than Tilly’s: one that limited any perceived militancy of action, encouraged the maintenance of a reasonable working relationship with the Labour Party and trade unions never strayed into providing material support for the nationalist movement. This was a repertoire guided by pragmatism and an attempt to maximise the support base for the campaign to the broadest possible audience and therefore exert political influence.

Much advocacy campaigning on Rhodesia met with limited success. With the exception of the Africa Bureau, which decided to close because it was deemed to have
outlived its initial purpose, other advocacy organisations working on the issue survived to see Zimbabwean independence. Survival in itself was an indication of some success, since it required interested participants and a certain level of resources. Furthermore, there was media coverage of many of the advocacy organised protests and events on Rhodesia, and dedicated publications that delivered a greater level of detail on the Rhodesia crisis than the mainstream media was providing. That said, it is difficult to assess what impact such activities had on the trajectory of the Rhodesia crisis itself. It is questionable that, for example, the coverage of events in *Anti-Apartheid News*, or the rally in Trafalgar Square had any impact on the decision-making of successive British Governments on Rhodesia, and certainly the African nationalist movement felt that advocacy organisations were not benefiting their cause. This limited success is a result of the over-cautious approach advocacy organisations adopted as a result of being constrained by pragmatism.

Whilst at first glance it can appear that UK based advocacy organisations working on the Rhodesia issue campaigned somewhat sporadically, and ignored the requests of the African nationalist movement, looking at their activities through the lens of resource mobilisation theory can help to distil the seemingly incoherent picture of events into one that follows a more logical pattern of action. Of particular salience here is the first point borrowed from McCarthy and Zald regarding the range of concerns that a SMO has aside from its specific aims. Applying this point to the actions of the various advocacy organisations considered in this chapter helps to make more sense of the various methods that were being employed, that did not always seem to directly further the aims of the different organisations. Organisations could not simply focus all of their time and resources into fundraising for the nationalist movement, since in order to do either of these things effectively they needed the support and understanding of the British public. However, advocacy organisations were perhaps too concerned with this, and focused almost all of their attention on building support, particular amongst audiences who were preoccupied with other issues, as was the case with the majority of the trade union movement.
It seems clear that the actions of various advocacy organisations in campaigning in
support of the nationalist movement, conform to the three points drawn from
McCarthy and Zald’s seminal paper on resource mobilisation theory. As set out above,
the point about multiple concerns of a movement was of particular use in helping to
decode the initially disparate array of social movement activity on Rhodesia. But
equally, the points on organisational competition and engaging with society as a
resource also help to explain the methods used by organisations. Admirably,
competition with other organisations was avoided as far as possible, which meant
certain organisations re-shaping or narrowing their focus so as not to ‘duplicate
efforts’. It also meant that, when possible, events or campaigns would be co-run by
two or more organisations to maximise efficiency and attendance. The final point,
about society as a resource rather than just the object of intended change, was more
challenging to explore, simply because of available archival material. However, it can
be seen that organisations made use of existing structures, such as local and
constituency Labour parties, trade unions, existing publications, and contacts in
various fields outside of the SMS to help facilitate campaigning.

An important final point arising from the discussion of advocacy methodology,
coupled with the insights gained from applying some theoretical perspectives, is that
there needs to be an analytical separation of ends and means when looking at the
historical trajectory of campaigns. It is easy to consider an organisation’s stated
aim(s), and then move chronologically through its campaign as it unfolds with an
implicit conception that each action is perpetuated by the initial stated aim.
Fieldhouse’s discussion of the AAM unfolds in this way. However, this approach does
not consider how each action relates to the initial focus of the organisation, nor does it
consider the constraints placed on an organisation by the broader context in which it
is operating. For example, the inability to materially support the nationalist movement
because of a pragmatic awareness that this may alienate supporters who saw
nationalists as terrorists but nonetheless supported independence on a
constitutionalist basis. Organisations are influenced by a far broader range of
concerns, a more complex relationship with other organisations and with society, and
with campaigns that have gone before, and it is only through considering the existence
and impact of these things that a clearer picture of advocacy methodology can emerge. Understanding that advocacy organisations were constrained by pragmatic considerations of the reality in which they were operating is key to understanding their chosen methods and actions. This links to the next chapter, which considers the labour movement’s response to the Rhodesia crisis, as the idea of competing concerns plays a key role in that analysis.
Chapter 4: The British labour movement and the Search for a Solution to the Rhodesia Crisis

Introduction

This chapter explores the relationships of British trade unions and the Labour Party with UK based advocacy organisations, the African nationalist movement, and each other. The aims of the chapter are to identify the character of these relationships, and to consider what this can tell us about the Party leadership and the trade union movement’s stances on Rhodesia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there were many other issues on the agenda, with which Rhodesia was competing for attention, and this will be considered in more detail here with specific reference to trade unions and the Labour Party. In this context, Labour Party leadership refers to the prime minister and the Cabinet at times when Labour was in power, and the Leader of the Opposition and shadow cabinet during periods of opposition.

This chapter centres on two research questions: how did British trade unions and the Labour Party interact with each other, and with advocacy organisations and the main African nationalist organisations in response to the Rhodesia issue? The second question is about the character of these relationships; for example were they characterised by positive interaction and mutual support, and if so, how was this manifested in various interactions? In this chapter the Labour Party becomes the central force in the story, around which narratives of the other organisations coalesce. As will be seen, each of the other groups of organisations almost completely focused their attention on the Labour Party, because they were perceived as the key power brokers in the Rhodesian crisis. Therefore, despite the thesis’ stated objective of moving away from elite dominated accounts of the Rhodesian situation, it was not possible to omit the Party leadership from the story. Indeed, by looking at interactions with advocacy organisations, the African nationalist movement and trade unions, the elite dominated narratives found in the existing studies can still be countered.
There is almost no consideration of the role of the trade union movement in the Rhodesia issue in existing secondary literature. As discussed in the literature review, texts focusing on British policy towards Rhodesia during the period under consideration generally take a governmental approach, and to a large extent fail to consider the actions of grass roots organisations or the broader labour movement in Britain. This chapter seeks to counter these elite-dominated narratives of Britain’s engagement with the Rhodesia issue.

Wrigley argues that Wilson had a preoccupation with putting the Conservative Party on the back foot, which could dominate his thinking on the Rhodesia issue. He further argues that this preoccupation with image and the Tories meant that moral principles sometimes took a back seat in the creation of foreign policy. This is reinforced by Ralph Miliband’s analysis of the Labour Party’s parliamentary socialism, which he contended struggled to maintain “a clear distance between itself and its political opponents”. Miliband argued that Labour’s leaders:

Would not venture into territory where they stood no danger of being followed by their opponents, and their opponents would not beat a dramatic retreat from the territory which the Labour leaders felt to be their own.

This point will be taken into consideration in discussing the character of relationships between it and the trade union movement in responding the Rhodesia crisis.

**Labour Party relationships**

In May 1966, Richard Crossman wrote of the personal control Harold Wilson exercised over the Rhodesia issue, committing the rest of the Cabinet to bystander status. He stated that “on Rhodesia, when the Cabinet gets going, the Prime Minister just sits and chats and we occasionally ask him a question and the meeting disintegrates into amiable discussion, because all the decisions are taken by the

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PM”.\textsuperscript{331} This is reinforced by the lack of discussion on Rhodesia in the PLP minutes. This prime ministerial influence was coupled by a strong ‘official mind’ influence of the civil service. Both influences tended towards the same goal of seeking a formal settlement as quickly as possible, whilst ensuring that there was at least some promise of progress towards majority rule, and trying to manoeuvre amongst the nationalist leaders to identify the more moderate characters who were less under the Communist influence. Wilson then had the added goals of trying to maintain Party unity, and trying to put the Conservative Party on the back foot. He pursued a pragmatic policy in relation to Rhodesia, which frequently overrode a commitment to an ethical foreign policy. A good example of this pragmatic approach, from early on in the Rhodesia crisis when it was apparently succeeding, comes from Crossman’s diaries:

First he tried to prevent UDI at all costs; then he put on mild sanctions which wouldn’t upset people; now he’s moving forward to more serious sanctions. Each time he carries public opinion with him and creates a situation in which an unsure Tory leader has been quite unable to display any qualities of leadership.\textsuperscript{332}

These underpinning influences and aims can be seen throughout the Labour Party leadership’s handling of the Rhodesia situation, from its formal negotiations with the Smith regime, to its dealings with nationalist representatives and the advocacy movement in Britain.

Discussing the actions of the nationalist movement in seeking support from and interacting with people outside of Rhodesia, Day argues that the nationalist leaders persistently perceived Rhodesia as a normal colony, and that this assumption coloured the demands nationalists made of the British, for example asking them to rescind laws passed by the Rhodesian Front Government. He states that, “the nationalists have repeated their entreaties over and over again to an almost permanently impervious British Government.”\textsuperscript{333} This point captures the need to include the Labour Party leadership in comparative discussion in this chapter, whilst the thesis aims to move away from such elite dominated accounts. The Labour

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid: 432.
leadership was seen, not just by the African nationalist movement, but the trade union movement and advocacy organisations as the key power-broker of the situation in Rhodesia, and was therefore where much campaigning on the Rhodesia issue was aimed.

A meeting held shortly after UDI between Labour Ministers, represented by Arthur Bottomley, and Nelson Samkange, a ZAPU representative based in London, provides an early example of the type of relationship established between these two parties. Mr Samkange was clearly eager to establish what Labour's post-UDI policy on Rhodesia would look like, and received, what were to become typically, evasive and cautious answers. The (British) minutes state:

Mr Samkange said that while they [ZAPU] broadly accepted that the British Government was determined to bring Mr Smith’s regime down, they did not necessarily agree with the methods being employed. What ZAPU wanted to know was what the British Government intended to do after the regime had been ended... The Minister of State said that...it was not easy to define what would happen afterwards but the British Government would probably be making a statement in due course.334

This sort of exchange was typical of the many to follow between representatives of the African nationalist movement in the UK, and members of the British Government or the civil service. Nationalist representatives often posed difficult questions, relating explicitly to some aspect of British policy on Rhodesia. In response, British officials generally had no direct response, since this would have required setting out a commitment to certain policies. Instead, Labour Party representatives often made vague placatory remarks in the context of a verbal discussion, but did not commit themselves to any particular course of action. Despite this, these exchanges always seemed to take the same diplomatic tone, on both sides.

In a display characteristic of the polite manner in which UK based African nationalist representatives seemed to address British politicians, Samkange wrote to Herbert Bowden congratulating him on his appointment as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. In the letter, he requested a meeting with Mr Bowden,

334 TNA, DO 207 238, Meeting between Minister of State and Samkange, 06/12/1965.
saying “I am ready to meet you any day and at any time which is convenient to you”. Whilst it was not possible to locate a reply from Bowden, the initial letter itself is instructive, since it gives a clear impression of the deferential way in which UK based nationalists addressed members of the Labour Party leadership. This is borne out in many examples, both in writing and in records of face to face interactions. This point will be returned to in greater detail in the next chapter, which will compare the behaviour of African nationalists based overseas, particularly in Britain, and those based at home, including the regional bases of Zambia and Mozambique. The aim of this comparison will be to establish whether there was another fault line in the nationalist movement between these two groups in terms of attitude to, and communications with Britain.

In a memo from Salisbury-based British diplomats, sent to the Commonwealth Office, an account of Mkudu’s leadership of the opposition African national party, the UPP, is provided. It reasoned that his purpose was “not so much to seek personal aggrandisement as to use UPP as a focus and to persuade ZANU/ZAPU elements to sink their differences.” Mkudu and the UPP were far more moderate than either ZANU or ZAPU, believing that majority rule was inevitable in the long term, but that it should be achieved by “evolution not revolution”. Mkudu believed that “British Constitution proposals offer Africans the assurance of real advance”, the African population should register and vote when possible, change should be sought through moderate methods over violent ones and that NIBMAR should “not be interpreted as meaning majority rule tomorrow”; there is bound to be an interim period. This final point, it was reported, Mkudu was struggling to convey to the population in general. In conclusion:

we have nothing to lose and possibly something to gain by giving Mkudu what help we can, particularly over the NIBMAR hurdle. This could take the form a statement clarifying Her Majesty’s Government’s thoughts on what this is likely to involve.

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335 TNA, DO 207 238, Letter from Nelson Samkange (UK ZAPU representative) to Herbert Bowden, 11/08/1966.
338 Ibid.
This shows a willingness on the part of the FCO to accept an interim period short of NIBMAR if it meant moving towards a resolution of the Rhodesia crisis, and the recommendation of this course of action to the Government. It is clear that Mkudu’s moderate views and policy regarding the advancement of majority rule was far more in line with the opinion of the Labour Party leadership than that of ZANU or ZAPU. Given this, the civil service saw the potential for establishing a relationship based on assistance and accommodation, rather than the polite dismissal afforded to the other nationalist groups.

In a meeting between Herbert Chitepo, representing ZANU in Britain, and Herbert Bowden, the former challenged the Labour Government on three specific points: that the British seemed to denigrate the leadership of the African nationalist movement; that there seemed to be no precise definition of what NIBMAR was, and the futility of the present sanctions regime.339 Chitepo elaborated that it was disturbing that “there was no positive programme for the application of NIBMAR”, to which Mr Bowden “spoke of a “long haul” and Sir Morris James thought its application would be “determined by events”’. The ZANU account of this meeting does not detail any British responses to the concerns raised, with the exception of NIBMAR being referred to as a ‘long haul’. The British minutes, in response to nationalists pushing for British-African negotiations following the failure of Tiger state:

the Commonwealth Secretary said that the British Government had always been conscious of the need to keep in touch with African opinion...and that the Prime Minister had had talks with both Mr Nkomo and the Rev. N. Sithole just before i.d.i. [UDI].340

From looking at both accounts of this meeting it can be seen that several points were raised by the ZANU delegation that were either avoided, or answered obscurely by the Labour Government representatives.

A comparable meeting took place the following month between Arthur Bottomley, then Minister for Overseas Development, and ZAPU representatives, Mr Chitsiga (ZAPU representative in London) and Mr Pilani-Ndebele (First Secretary of the ZAPU

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339 TNA, FCO 36 14, ZANU minutes on a meeting between them and British Government representatives, 04/04/1967.
340 TNA, FCO 36 14, British Government minutes on meeting with ZANU delegation, 04/04/1967.
London Office). This meeting began very politely, with Mr Chitsiga saying that it was essentially a courtesy call, since he and Mr Pilani-Ndebele were relatively new to the UK. This quickly moved on to the issue of NIBMAR, as had occurred in the meeting between the Government and ZANU representatives earlier in the month: “Mr Chitsiga said they sought a clarification of the British Government’s position on NIBMAR”. The reply to this evaded the essential thrust of the nationalist question, which was what Britain intended to do regarding the policy. Labour’s reticence to provide a clear answer on this point illustrates an emphasis on maintaining the Party line on Rhodesia in the post-Tiger period. In Cabinet immediately following Smith’s rejection of the proposals, various hypothetical situations were proposed including “a return to the 1961 Constitution during the period before independence, including the suggestion of an Act of Union between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia” and a flexible interpretation of NIBMAR that “did not imply that majority rule would follow at once or even in the near future.”

Mr Chitsiga also tried to push the issue of Britain using force if law and order were to break down, which was strongly rebuffed by Mr Bottomley saying that Britain “deplored talk of violence, and did not believe violence could secure the future for Rhodesia.” This point is reiterated later in the meeting when it is stated that “our reports indicated that at present the situation in Rhodesia could not be described as showing a break down in law and order.” These discussions, as in the two records of the meeting held earlier in the month, give an impression of how the Labour Government and representatives of the African nationalist movement interacted. These face to face dealings illustrate the nationalists trying to get the British to answer probing questions about their policy on Rhodesia, and Labour Ministers giving consistently polite but evasive answers, ensuring the nationalist movement had nothing concrete it could report to the media, or use in later negotiations.

UK minutes report a meeting with a ZANU delegation in October 1967:

341 TNA, CAB 128 41, Record of Cabinet Meeting, 06/12/1966.
342 Ibid.
Mr Shamuyarira recalled with pleasure the meeting he had had with the Secretary of State in July 1964 in Malawi. On behalf of ZANU he congratulated the Secretary of State on his appointment and said that they were confident they could look to him for sympathy. They recognised that he had inherited an awful problem. While the cause was undoubtedly the actions of the illegal regime they nevertheless felt that the British Government’s response had been unenlightened and in particular had two main defects.  

The ZANU delegation elaborated that the British Government appeared to believe in the possibility of a compromise with the Smith regime, and that they “had given no commitment to an alternative government and seemed to have no views on an alternative situation”. These minutes show a growing assertiveness on the part of the African nationalist contingent. Although the encounter begins with the familiar polite, bordering on obsequious, tone, this quickly gives way into an overt challenge to the Government’s position. The reported response from the Secretary of State consists largely of platitudes such as “he wished to see an honourable settlement” and “there was no question of a sell-out”.

Prior to the Labour Party conference in 1967, a memo was issued requesting civil servants to compile notes on certain key figures, in advance of possible encounters with them during the conference. This included a section on ZANU and ZAPU: 

The Secretary of State would like the [Rhodesia] Department’s advice on how he should handle them [ZANU/ZAPU] at Scarborough. Should he go out of his way to meet them, or if they approach him asking for a formal meeting should he agree to see them?

The memo asks for a list of names of likely representatives, and any useful information about them. This document is illustrative of the unequal footing upon which the relationship between representatives of the African nationalist movement and representatives of the Labour Government was based. Prior to any possible encounter with African nationalists, the requisite Labour Minister was able to request background information on the people they would be meeting with, the situation as it

344 TNA, FCO 36 14, UK Government minutes of a meeting between the Secretary of State and a ZANU delegation, 09/10/1967.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
stood, and specific advice from the Rhodesia Department on how best to handle possible questions. The nationalist representatives had none of this support in entering into discussions with the Labour Government. Day’s assertion that it was generally the responsibility of more senior nationalists in the overseas offices to “wring money from local sources” is suggestive of the difficulties nationalists faced in maintaining a presence in Britain.348

In March 1968 Frank Judd led a delegation of Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) members to see the Chancellor, then Roy Jenkins. Although not an example of direct communication between African nationalists and the Labour Government, the documentation surrounding this visit is insightful into the guiding principles behind much of the Government’s policy in this area. The Rhodesia Department memo sent to Roy Jenkins prior to the visit reads:

> We strongly recommend the Chancellor, when seeing the deputation, to take note of any propositions which are made, but to avoid any commitment as to the extent to which we might be prepared to go. He can, of course, reject the use of force... As to any other propositions he should say that he will bear these in mind and convey them to his colleagues as appropriate.349

The way in which this memo advises Mr Jenkins to respond to points made by Mr Judd is clearly reminiscent of the responses given to representatives of the African nationalist movement in earlier examples of meetings. The words “avoid any commitment” in particular evoke the way in which nationalists’ questions are typically sidestepped. Following the above quote, the rest of the brief goes through various general policy points relating to Rhodesia, such as the intended outcome of sanctions, and the continued opposition to the use of force. This example also illustrates the direct influence of the civil service on the Labour leadership and how the Rhodesia situation was handled.

In October 1968, the resumption of talks with the Smith regime triggered a strident response from Frank Ziyambi, the London-based ZANU representative. He wrote to

349 TNA, FCO 36 102, Rhodesia Department notes for Roy Jenkins in preparation for a meeting with a delegation led by Frank Judd, March 1968.
Harold Wilson, signalling the nationalist movement’s continued commitment to armed struggle, since the talks excluded them and this was the only way to proceed. Second, he argued that law and order had essentially broken down in Rhodesia, referring to the guerrilla war, and pointed out that Britain had earlier said it would only consider the use of force in such a case. It called on the British Government to make a choice; “to come out openly and unequivocally on the side of the black majority in Zimbabwe, or on the side of the white settler minority”. There is no official reply to this letter present in the archives, however there is a FCO document discussing how to respond to the letter, which further demonstrates the guiding policy behind Government dealings with African nationalists. The note stated that Number 10 should be advised “not to attempt to send a detailed rebuttal of Mr Ziyambi’s points.” It went on to state that in the view of the Rhodesia Department, “law and order in the usual meaning of these words, has not broken down”. It concluded by saying that these arguments would probably not “weigh” with Mr Ziyambi, and that it would not be a good time to get into a debate with him which he might subsequently publish. This proposed response was characteristic of the dismissive way in which the Labour Party leadership dealt with representatives of the nationalist movement in these earlier encounters, without really engaging with the arguments set out and finding a way of politely ignoring them.

In early November 1968, whilst on a trip to follow up on the Fearless proposals, George Thomson met with the Reverend Sithole and Robert Mugabe in Salisbury. At this time, Thomson was in frequent contact with Wilson regarding the progress of the negotiations with the Smith regime, and very much toed the Party line, telling Kaunda on a visit to Zambia that “the pressures in Britain and elsewhere had compelled the British Government to talk to Smith despite the embarrassment caused to their African allies and to the British Labour Party.” There are two accounts of this

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350 Harold Wilson: “As I have said before, I think that the solution of this problem is not one to be dealt with by military intervention unless, of course, our troops are asked for to preserve law and order and to avert a tragic action, subversion, murder and so on.” Hansard, HC Deb, 11/11/1965.
351 TNA, FCO 36 15, Letter from Frank Ziyambi to Harold Wilson, and Foreign and Commonwealth notes on the letter and how to respond to it, 08/10/1968.
352 Ibid.
353 Then Minister without Portfolio with a responsibility for Rhodesia.
354 Wood, Weeks rather than months: 596.
meeting; British minutes, and ZANU’s record of the meeting, which were “very close in substance” according to a Rhodesia Department assessment. The full British minutes, running to ten pages, highlight the discussion of such issues as the Labour Party’s proposals for settlement, the role of sanctions, the use of force (British and nationalist) and some finer theoretical points of how an actual transfer of power might take place, should any agreement ever be reached. The following passage is indicative of the form which the negotiations in this meeting took:

A further long argument about the use of force ensued, during which Mr Thomson and Mr Foley repeated the reasons why HMG had felt compelled to rule out this means of dealing with the rebellion. The ZANU representatives continued to profess that they were entirely unconvinced by the Minister’s arguments.

This passage demonstrates a familiar exchange of views, without accommodation by either side to move towards any form of compromise, let alone agreement.

Despite some familiarity in the lack of agreement reached in this discussion, the minutes differ from earlier examples in that the nationalist representatives were given equal chance to speak, and provided intricate and comprehensive responses to the arguments set out by the British contingent. This was not always the case. In earlier examples it would be unfair to say that the British held court, but they certainly occupy a greater percentage of space in the minutes, and the responses given by African nationalists were less specific and challenging as those in this encounter. This is perhaps to be expected, given that in this instance the British were dealing with ZANU’s leadership, and the rapidly rising star of Mugabe. This example of interaction between African nationalists and Labour Ministers differs from instances discussed above in that it was held in Rhodesia with high level nationalist leaders, rather than representatives of the movement based in London. This serves to demonstrate the difference of approach between nationalists based in Rhodesia and those based overseas; this is addressed in the following chapter.

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355 TNA, FCO 36 408, “ZANU record of the meeting between the minister without portfolio and Mr Sithole in Salisbury”, 21/02/1969.
On the same day as this meeting, George Thomson met with Joshua Nkomo, who was taken from his place of restriction at Gonakudzingwa. The meeting began with him describing the conditions of his restriction:

They were confined to a compound 35 yards square in which four other restrictees were housed. They had no contact with other restrictees or detainees. There was no radio available and the only newspapers they were allowed were local ones. These had however been recently cut off and Mr Nkomo had not known that Mr Thomson was in Rhodesia until the afternoon of the previous day when the police had told him that the meeting was to take place. 357

This point in itself highlights the inequality of the basis of this interaction; that Nkomo had very little time and no resources to prepare for the encounter with the Labour Ministers, yet the latter will have known well in advance and have had the resources of the Rhodesia Department at their disposal prior to the meeting. This point was certainly not lost on Nkomo who pressed Mr Thomson on the matter, and asked how he was expected to respond to British proposals which he would hear about for the first time at the meeting, and was therefore unable to consult his colleagues. Once discussion in the meeting turned to the Fearless proposals, Nkomo offered his preliminary impression, which was all he had consented to give, abundantly clear. “It seemed that our present proposals were even worse than the ‘Tiger’ proposals which had themselves not been acceptable to him”. 358 Despite Nkomo’s protestations about having neither time nor the opportunity to discuss with his colleagues, the ensuing discussion of the Fearless proposals was of a very similar tone and character to that outlined in the meeting with ZANU representatives. In common with that meeting, the interactions between Nkomo and the British indicated a different tone to those with ZAPU representatives based in Britain, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

This idea about the inequality of interactions between Labour and nationalist representatives is reinforced by the example of Wilson’s visit to Rhodesia shortly before UDI. He met with Sithole and Nkomo in Salisbury, who had been brought to the

357 TNA, FCO 36 498, “Record of a meeting between the Rt. Hon George Thomson MP... and Mr Joshua Nkomo...”, 07/11/1968.
358 Ibid.
capital from their detention camps. They met with Wilson in the late afternoon, having travelled all day in the hot sun, without food. To his credit, Wilson was furious at the treatment the nationalist leaders had received, and insisted that he wouldn’t meet with them until they had been fed the same food he had eaten for lunch. This example illustrates even more starkly than the previous one the unequal footing nationalist representatives were on when conducting discussions with Labour representatives, but also highlights the emotional response that the Rhodesia issue often provoked amongst those in Britain who campaigned in support of the nationalist struggle. Whilst this was unusual for Wilson, it is important in that it highlights that, whatever happened later on, his ultimate stance was one of principled equality.

A month after this encounter, George Thomson met with Frank Ziyambi, a ZANU representative based in London, at the House of Commons. The meeting began with Mr Thomson recounting his meeting with the ZANU leaders in Salisbury, and informing Mr Ziyambi that he had “found them in excellent shape and with their spirit quite unaffected by imprisonment”. Following the meeting in Salisbury, Mr Sithole was removed from prison to face on trial by the Rhodesian authorities, the discussion of which occupied a further portion of the meeting. The meeting was an example of the very polite and even friendly tone which interactions between these two groups often took. Mr Thomson emphasised his pleasure at being able to discuss the Fearless proposals with nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, since it was a rare opportunity “to bring some of their [the nationalist movement’s] leaders rather more fully into the picture”. Towards the end of the encounter a rare moment of agreement seemed to be reached between the two parties:

Mr Ziyambi said that...he would be grateful for an assurance from Mr Thomson that HMG would take no further initiative with Mr Smith. Mr Thomson said that he was happy to give this assurance. The next move would have to come from within Rhodesia. The political opinions of the white Rhodesians were clearly now in a state of flux and we would just have to wait and see what happened.”

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360 TNA, FCO 36 408, ‘Record of a meeting in the House of Commons on 12 December between the Minister without portfolio (George Thomson) and Mr Ziyambi of ZANU’, 12/12/1968.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
Whilst this is a rare example of an African nationalist representative asking a Labour Minister for a concrete assurance and receiving it, in this case it can be attributed to circumstance. The nature of the request happened to correlate with popular opinion on the aftermath of Fearless, and whilst the proposals remained nominally ‘on the table’ it was politically beneficial for Labour to consent to not pursuing further settlement initiatives.

Following the election of Edward Heath’s Conservative Government in 1970, ZANU and ZAPU sent a joint memorandum to the British Government in July 1971 setting out their position in relation to the latter’s most recent actions, and stating that any attempts to negotiate a settlement must prioritise the opinions of the African leadership. It ended with a strong assertion of opinion. “Is it the intention of the British Government to go down in History as having connived with their kith and kin to sell out the six million people? On our part, we shall, forever, show determination to liberate our people.” There is no evidence of a reply to this memorandum, nor was it possible to locate any discussions of it. However, it demonstrates the strength of position of the African nationalist movement at this stage in the independence struggle, and is indicative of a difference in tone between interactions with the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, this being an example of the latter. It also demonstrates the difference between direct interactions and those conducted remotely, with the latter making more general points and adopting a less polite tone than the former. This highlights the instrumental approach of the African nationalists in their dealings with representatives of the British political establishment, and a belief that direct exchanges might be more productive if they utilised this polite tone of interactions, whereas in correspondence they were freer to express the beliefs of the movement, with less immediate consequences.

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363 LSE, Faulds 4 1 13, Letter from AAM to Andrew Faulds MP, congratulating him on taking a stand against the Fearless proposals, 29/10/1968.
364 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 152.
365 TNA, FCO 36 747, ZANU and ZAPU joint memorandum to the British Government, 21/07/1971.
In a letter to a colleague in the Rhodesia Department, a Mr J W D Gray recounted an unofficial meeting he had with Mr Chitepo of ZANU. He stated that “both Mr Chitepo and I were at pains to emphasise that there was no formal character to the meeting.” The letter further stated that “I was able to dress up my interest in Rhodesian affairs by reference to certain family connections”, which shows a slightly unequal balance to the interaction from the outset. The letter then proceeded to outline the key points made by Mr Chitepo during the course of the meeting, which for the most part were simply background information already known by the British, such as Mr Chitepo’s position, and not of relevance here. However, it did make reference to Chitepo’s assessment of ZANU’s view of the British, which is that they were “beginning to regard HMG as their enemy since it appeared to be aligning itself more and more with the white settlers.” The conclusion of the letter merits quoting in full, since it provides a clear and somewhat amusing summation of the British perspective on how to interact with representatives of the African nationalist movement:

Needless to say, I took an entirely non-committal line in response to all these points. Insofar as I made any comments on the settlement or the present situation regarding Rhodesia, it was in line with the briefing which we have received from the Department on this point. Indeed, Mr Chitepo was kind enough to say that he recognised a large number of the arguments which I used!

In late 1971, a meeting was held between Labour Party representatives and a nationalist delegation led by Bishop Muzorewa of the ANC. Whilst this is not strictly within the remit of the thesis, since a focus on ZANU and ZAPU was declared from the initial chapter, it warrants brief discussion for the comparative perspective it offers. The minutes demonstrate a far less antagonistic stance than was adopted by representatives of ZANU and ZAPU, as discussed above. For instance, the Bishop simply advocated the maintenance of sanctions until a resolution was reached that was acceptable to the majority of the population. This demonstrates the moderate ANC stance, compared to the rhetoric of ZANU and ZAPU. Commensurate with the

366 An FCO civil servant.
367 TNA, FCO 36 1031, Letter from Mr J W D Gray to Mr R A C Byatt of the Rhodesia Department, 09/10/1972.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
Bishop’s moderate tone, the meeting began with him being offered £500 towards his campaign from the Labour Party’s Southern Africa Solidarity Fund.\textsuperscript{370} This highlights the growing divergence between the moderation of Labour Ministers, and the more progressive stance adopted by Party Conference. However, support of the ANC would have likely been popular amongst many in Britain, as its more moderate stance offered the intention of gradual change. Furthermore, to those who were uncomfortable with the violence and forceful rhetoric of ZANU/ZAPU, and the overtly racist actions of the Smith regime, the ANC would have offered a comfortable middle ground that corresponded with Labour’s parliamentary socialism. With the Party leadership’s focus on trying to gain the upper hand over the Conservative Party in terms of policy, this can be seen as a pragmatic move. The donation to Bishop Muzorewa also demonstrates the difference in the tone and substance of interactions when representatives of the Labour Party were dealing with someone who was regarded as being more moderate.\textsuperscript{371} Under the auspices of the Fund, the Labour Party later donated £1000 to the Patriotic Front, which was perceived in Britain as a front for unity between the nationalist factions, but the Labour Party would not have given money in this way to the individual nationalist factions.\textsuperscript{372} The Labour Party’s Fund certainly would not have given money in this way to the individual nationalist factions.

In June 1976 Ignatius Chigwendere, a London-based ZANU representative, wrote to Barbara Castle, at this point a back bench MP, about the use of secret trials and subsequent executions of Zimbabweans in Zambia.\textsuperscript{373} The responses to this missive represent an example of more genuine collaboration between members of the nationalist movement and senior Labour figures. Castle passed the matter on to Jenny Little, then International Secretary, and asked her to put it on the agenda of the next International Committee meeting, at which it was decided to ask Joan Lestor to

\textsuperscript{370} This fund was chaired by Judith Hart, and had been set up in 1970 in response to resolution passed at Conference calling on the NEC to offer full moral and material support to liberation movements in southern Africa, and was funded by donations from CLPs and trade unions. See 'Labour gift to African rebels', \textit{The Guardian}, 21/12/1971.

\textsuperscript{371} LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Notes on a meeting with Bishop Muzorewa, December 1971.

\textsuperscript{372} Hansard, HC PQs, 24/05/1979; ‘Labour’s Nkomo Gift’ \textit{The Guardian}, 22/05/1979.

\textsuperscript{373} LHASC, LPID Papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Zimbabwe Correspondence, letters between Ignatius Chigwendere, Barbara Castle and Jenny Little, 11/06/1976-29/07/1976.
investigate the matter. Jenny Little then wrote a reply to Mr Chigwendere informing him of the actions taken. It was not possible to find any further documents on this particular subject, in order to ascertain what happened next. However, the response of Barbara Castle and Jenny Little to the initial concern demonstrates a genuinely collaborative interaction that cannot be seen in earlier examples of meetings between nationalists and Labour Party leadership representatives. The explanation for this difference is the scope of the issue under discussion, and the relative freedom of Britain to act. In meetings discussed earlier, nationalist movement representatives were generally raising very broad based concerns, relating directly to the British Government’s actions and policy, whereas in this instance it was a very specific concern relating to a third party. Furthermore, Castle had always been actively supportive of the nationalist movement and, as Crossman wrote in 1965, “paid the price for her pertinacity in taking the black African point of view and in being the one member of the Cabinet prepared to prevent a settlement in Rhodesia.”

A Rhodesia Department circular from 1969 outlined some guidance notes on contacts with liberations movements. It makes several key points of salience in understanding the character of interactions. It accepts that under more liberal circumstances, many illegal organisations would be legitimate opposition parties, and that, apart from the use of force which is to be opposed, “some political objectives of nationalist movements are in themselves acceptable and have the sympathy of HMG”. It goes on to highlight the importance of maintaining contact with nationalist organisations otherwise future influence could be left entirely to Russian and Chinese Communist elements. It also notes that “it might indeed be in our interests to encourage more moderate elements”. This suggested behaviour could be seen in the way in which donations from Labour Party’s Southern Africa Solidarity Fund were dispensed to the more moderate nationalist representatives. The points set out in the 1969 circular were the guiding policy behind interactions with representatives of the African nationalist movement from this time and throughout much of the remaining

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374 Crossman, *Diaries*: 419.
376 Ibid.
independence struggle. These guidelines behind policy on Rhodesia illustrate the extent to which the Labour Party’s parliamentary socialism coincided with the civil service push for a pragmatic approach in responding to the Rhodesia issue.

These policy prescriptions for how British representatives, Governmental or civil service, were to interact with representatives of the liberation struggle corroborate the points drawn from specific examples of interaction discussed above. The Labour Party and nationalist movement representatives maintained a polite, formal relationship, throughout the period from UDI to formal independence, with occasional more antagonistic interactions. Where direct conversations took place, they often involved a core range of topics: sanctions; the practicalities of how a transition to independence would function; the latest developments with regards to settlement negotiations and so on. Typically, a nationalist representative would raise concerns or pose questions on a topic, only for the Labour Government representative(s) to, as far as possible, avoid dealing in specific terms with the issue raised, and politely reiterate the Party line.

This pattern of interaction gives an insight into the influence of pragmatism on Labour Party policy on Rhodesia. As stated in the circular, cited above, setting out guidelines for interaction, it was important for Britain not to completely ignore African nationalists, lest Communist influence gain more traction. Equally important, though not cited in the circular, were pressures from the UN and, in particular, the Commonwealth, for Britain to be seen to be making efforts to bring about a satisfactory solution to the Rhodesia situation.\(^\text{378}\) Equally, the strength of African nationalist requests would have been politically difficult to implement in Britain, as the Labour Party had no intention of military intervention, and was carefully trying to maintain Britain’s trading relationship with South Africa. So Labour walked a precarious line between various pressures that dictated the nature of interactions with the nationalist movement. On the other side of these interactions, it can be seen that the nationalist movement, too, was guided by pragmatism when dealing with the Labour Party, which was viewed as the key power broker when in Government. The

\(^{378}\) Coggins, ‘Wilson and Rhodesia’. 
nationalist movement leadership was perpetually trying to persuade Labour to alter their policy on Rhodesia, and take a more actively pro-African nationalist stance in the long hunt for a solution. Despite the frustrating lack of progress these interactions seemed to garner, the Labour Party whilst in power could conceivably have delivered the changes the nationalist movement wanted, and so it was pragmatic to maintain civil negotiations.

The chapter will now look at the relationship between advocacy organisations and the Labour Party, in responding to the Rhodesia situation. It is also worth noting here that this section will draw more heavily on examples of interaction between the AAM in particular, and the Labour Party, purely due to the availability of sources.

A letter signed by Barbara Castle, then Secretary of State for Employment, sent to the AAM stated: “I give my full support to the efforts being made by the Anti-Apartheid Movement to secure by peaceful means a life for each individual free from all prejudice on the basis of race or colour”.

This was, unsurprisingly, discussed by the Rhodesia Department prior to being sent to ensure that, in sending the letter, the Government was not contradicting itself. The letter was friendly and, at least superficially, supportive of the AAM’s work. However, it can be argued that such a communication was predominantly a pragmatic move, as the Party was unlikely to ever go so far as to alter its stance on Rhodesia in line with the views of the AAM, but maintaining friendly interactions could have helped to reduce the animosity felt by some advocacy organisations towards the Party. That said, the letter would have represented the more genuinely held views of some back-benchers and Ministers who were firmly on the left of the Party, such as its author.

This example is illustrative of the issue of collective cabinet responsibility acting as a barrier to some cabinet members becoming more fully involved in advocacy campaigns on Rhodesia. At one point in the early 1970s Guy Arnold vetoed Barbara Castle becoming a board member of the Africa Bureau on the grounds that she had not

\[379\] TNA, FCO 36 430, Letter from the Labour Party to the AAM, October 1969.
stood up to the Labour Government’s ‘shambolic’ handling of UDI.\(^{380}\) His analysis was not quite correct, as she had threatened Wilson with resignation,\(^ {381}\) as had Judith Hart\(^ {382}\) but these threats were ultimately not acted upon, nor would they have been publicly known about at the time.

The AAM were often critical of Labour Party policy. However, the organisation also enjoyed broad support among Party members, especially at local and regional level, and some of the AAM’s leadership cautioned that this support could be alienated if they attacked the Party too openly, again illustrating the pressures towards pragmatism exerted by trying to make the best use of limited resources.\(^ {383}\) However, the AAM stridently made their position clear to the Party on numerous occasions. For example:

> The Labour Party should declare that it will withdraw the settlement proposals, negotiate only with representatives of all the people of Rhodesia, and that an independent Zimbabwe will be established on the basis of one man, one vote. At this time, sanctions will be maintained and strengthened and the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for liberation will be supported.\(^ {384}\)

This example demonstrates the AAM taking a strong tone in its dealings with the Labour Government in asserting its views and taking issue with the way in which the Party was handling the Rhodesia situation.

Quite early on in the Rhodesia situation, the Africa Bureau planned a conference “to provide information on the present situation in Rhodesia, to consider the implications for Britain of the continuing crisis, and to discuss the policy which should be adopted by Britain”.\(^ {385}\) Speakers for this event included John Reed of University College Rhodesia, Colin Legum of the *Observer*, George Cunningham who was then the Labour Party’s Commonwealth Officer, and Nelson Samkange of ZANU, amongst others. This conference was discussed in the previous chapter exploring the methods used by

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\(^{380}\) Interview with Guy Arnold, former Director of the Africa Bureau, London, 10 December 2012.


\(^{382}\) LHASC, LPID papers, HART 2 46, Letter to Harold Wilson, 29/11/1966.


\(^{384}\) RH, MSS AAM 852, “Memorandum to the Labour Party working group on Southern Africa”, undated.

advocacy organisations, as it demonstrated the range of people that advocacy organisations tried to involve in events. However, in this context it also illustrates the willingness of the Labour Party to let a senior figure attend in order to defend the Party’s policy on Rhodesia against possible attacks from the advocacy or nationalist contingents. This example demonstrates the Labour Party taking the opportunity to engage pragmatically with an advocacy organisation that was challenging its stance on Rhodesia. It can also be argued that such a move came about due to CLP activism on the Rhodesia issue. The Labour Party showed willingness by sending a representative to the event, but it also gained a forum for defending its views amongst some of its biggest critics.

The relationship between the Labour Party and advocacy organisations was generally characterised by the absence of meaningful interaction. The AAM persistently sent letters and petitions, and tried to arrange meetings with Labour Ministers and there is little to no evidence of responses to these, let alone of engagement with the AAM’s concerns in a productive way. In April and May 1966 the AAM sent a petition to the Government and organised a ‘lobby of parliament’ over the potential for talks to turn into a sell-out, neither of which received a response.386 This pattern was repeated for the duration of the Rhodesia situation with regards to such letters and petitions, suggesting that successive British Governments did not take such initiatives very seriously, or deem them worthy of substantive engagement.

In 1976, the AAM sent a memo to the Labour Party about the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). In an example of positive interaction, and of disagreement within the Labour Party leadership, they received valuable feedback on what to do with it. Michael Foot, then Deputy Leader of the Party, replied to the memo in a letter saying:

that this paper should be kept out of the hands of the F.O. at this stage. One can’t predict Crossland’s reaction, and it would be unfortunate if direct control of the ZPA were to be construed as an invasion of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe by Marxist Mozambique.387

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386 RH, MSS AAM 1211, Letter from AAM to general members, April 1966 and letter from Anne Darnborough ‘Publicity’ to Paul Johnson of the New Statesmen, 01/05/1966.
387 LHASC, HART Box 2 File 29, Letter from Michael Foot to the AAM regarding a memo on the Zimbabwe People’s Army, 06/07/1976.
This response demonstrates differences within the Labour Party in opinion on Rhodesia, and in dealing with advocacy organisations working on the issue. Typically, divisions within the Labour Party over Rhodesia were between the Party grass roots and its leadership but, as evidenced here, there were also divisions amongst the higher levels. Foot, Hart and Castle were all members of the Labour left MPs group and regularly met for dinner around this time. There were also some consistently dissenting voices amongst the backbenchers, most notably Andrew Faulds.\footnote{See for example the correspondence between James Callaghan and Andrew Faulds over the treatment of George Nyandoro at Heathrow airport upon trying to enter the country: LSE, Faulds 4 1 13, assorted letters February-March 1968. Faulds was an actor turned politician who was born in Tanganyika Territory in the early days of its Mandate to the UK.}

An early day motion tabled in December 1968 called for the Commonwealth leaders, at an upcoming meeting, to reaffirm their commitment to NIBMAR.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1211, Memo regarding early day motion: ‘Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Rhodesia’, 18/12/1968.} This was signed by over 80 backbench MPs, and echoed similar calls coming from local and constituency Labour Parties around a similar time, such as Thirsk and Malton’s resolution asking “the NEC if they think the ‘Fearless’ proposals are in line with policy as agreed at the Party conference last month”?\footnote{LHASC, NEC Minutes, 18/12/1968.} There were 34 other resolutions making a similar point submitted to the NEC from CLPs in December 1968.\footnote{Ibid.} This is illustrative of a general difference between the Parliamentary Labour Party and the grass roots, whereby the latter was far more willing to express opinions on the Rhodesia issue and push for genuine positive developments, despite the typically symbolic nature of early day motions. However, the Party grass roots and the trade union movement were by no means monolithic entities (as indeed the Labour Party leadership was not either), and despite protestations against Government policy at times like Fearless, the Trade Union bloc vote often saved Party leadership policy at Conference. This is reminiscent of Miliband’s critique of the Labour Party’s parliamentary socialism. Using the example of the \textit{Challenge to Britain} programme, presented to the 1953 Conference, he argued:

\begin{quote}
As so often before in the history of the Labour Party, the Executive’s programme, meagre though it was, served to neutralize the pressure from
\end{quote}
the Left. At the 1953 Conference, all attempts to strengthen the document were defeated with the help of the trade union bloc vote.\textsuperscript{392}

This also captures the complex dynamics within the labour movement over the Rhodesia issue, in that there was some dissension against the policies of the Party leadership (amongst unions, CLPs and back bench MPs), but more broadly the stance of the labour movement was characterised by disengagement, and a passive support of Government policy.

Another example reaffirms this idea about differing opinions within the Labour Party, and the possibility of more productive interaction with advocacy organisations. The AAM sent a letter to various MPs, chosen for their likelihood to be interested in the Rhodesia issue, and supportive of the AAM's aims. The AAM kept a copy of this letter and used it record who it was sent to and who responded. The letter asked recipients to phone the AAM's office in order to be included in a press release detailing AAM support in Parliament. Of the names ticked, indicating responses, none come as much of a surprise. They include: “Andrew Faulds, H. G. Jenkins, Dr. D. L. Kerr, Joan Lestor, Mr D. M. S. Steel, Mr. R. Davies”.\textsuperscript{393} It is important to note that the Labour Party was not a monolithic entity on Rhodesia, and there were differing opinions on the subject from within its ranks, even at a high level. That said, the letter had been sent out to around 30 MPs and only 6 responded, one of whom, David Steel, was a Liberal, and also strong support of the African nationalist movement's cause. It should be noted that the Liberals strongly echoed the stance of the Labour Party.\textsuperscript{394}

Another counter-example to the majority of those outlined above comes from a period in which Labour was in opposition, close to the end of the Rhodesia situation. In response to a proposed ZECC rally, the Labour Party used this organisation as an intermediary to send a clear message of support to the African nationalist movement, stating:

The Labour Party strongly supports the efforts of the national liberation movement to secure a form of government freely open to all Zimbabweans.

\textsuperscript{392} Miliband, \textit{Parliamentary Socialism}: 322.
\textsuperscript{393} RH, MSS AAM 1211, Letter from AAM to various MPs, undated.
\textsuperscript{394} See for example Hansard, HC Deb, 31/01/1972.
The National Executive Committee believes there should be no collaboration by Britain with the Salisbury regime and no recognition in any form by a British Government.\textsuperscript{395}

Whilst this is a message of support to the African nationalist movement, rather than the ZECC itself, by consciously using the latter as an intermediary, and sending a message stating views such as the ZECC had always propagated, the Labour Party was implicitly supporting the ZECC’s efforts, which was a marked difference to simply ignoring the memos and letters of advocacy organisations as it had done earlier on. It is indicative of the Party’s willingness to more freely support the African nationalist movement, and therefore the aims of various advocacy organisations, whilst it was in opposition. It was also reflective of a leftwards shift within the Labour Party, which was mirrored and influenced by a similar shift in union leadership:

The emergence of ‘a new breed of capable left-wing Labour union leaders’...weakened the intolerant and tightly-disciplined power structure...that had prevailed in the Labour Party throughout the post-war period to the benefit of the right-wing parliamentary leadership.\textsuperscript{396}

The above examples demonstrate that, for the most part, the Labour Party interacted very little with advocacy organisations, on an organisational level. However, the Party cannot be considered unified in its views, and there are instances of individuals interacting more productively with advocacy organisations on the Rhodesia issue. The Labour Party as an entity largely ignored the pleas and protests of advocacy organisations, evidenced by the lack of replies to letters and petitions sent to it by various organisations. When the Party did respond, it was generally to defend its position, and dismiss arguments set out challenging its actions on Rhodesia. It is worth noting that the Labour Party had a history of proscribing certain organisations due to Communist or other extreme influences. In the context of the Cold War, Labour sought to maintain as much distance as possible from potentially Soviet-influenced African nationalist groups. This explains why its relationship with the AAM was often

\textsuperscript{395} LHASC, Box 111 Rhodesia misc. memos 1978-80, Statement to Zimbabwe Emergency Campaign Committee from Ron Hayward, Labour Party Secretary General, undated.

more positive than with ZANU or ZAPU, as it had a similar aversion to interacting too closely with what it saw as Communist-influenced organisations.  

Benn argued that the influence of the civil service threatened the nature of democratic government in Britain, because of the influence that senior mandarins had on the policy making process. Policies of Conservative and Labour Governments bore a close resemblance, despite differences in pre-election manifests. This can certainly be seen with the Rhodesia issue, and the influence of the civil service in constraining senior Labour Party figures’ actions and interactions around the struggle for independence. In guidance notes prior to meetings and conferences where nationalist leaders were to be encountered, civil service memos and briefing notes urged caution and the support of those nationalists perceived to be more moderate. Benn elucidates how civil servants would influence policy by “setting the framework” within which questions about policy are put to Ministers. He argues that this made shifting beyond the set framework very difficult, and in this sense the scope of policy is constrained. Such an argument can be applied to the handling of the Rhodesia situation, and the way in which the Labour Party leadership interacted with representatives of the nationalist movement, and with activists in Britain. The Rhodesia ‘framework’ can be argued to be one of promoting moderacy where possible, being careful not to assist or to be seen to be actively supporting the more extreme elements of the nationalist movement, and to seek a settlement with the Smith regime that could be justified as conforming to the Six Principles.

**Trade union relationships**

There are limited examples of British trade unions displaying, or at least stating, support for the African nationalist movement. The most intricate example of this comes from a resolution adopted, without opposition, at the Conference of Trade Unionists on Southern Africa, 1969, organised by the AAM. It is worth citing the text of this resolution in full:

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397 Fieldhouse *Anti-Apartheid*: 26-7.
399 Ibid: 54.
This conference of trade unionists on Southern African, noting with concern the increasing oppression and exploitation of the African workers and people of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese Colonies,

1) applauds and supports the struggle of the African workers and their trade unions and liberation movements
2) condemns the vicious apartheid system and the Unholy Alliance of Vorster, Smith and Caetano
3) deplores the collaboration of powerful forces in Britain with the white minority regimes of Southern Africa through trade, investment, diplomatic relations, cultural, sporting and other relations
4) urges H.M.G. to implement the 1962 and 1968 U.N. General Assembly resolutions on South Africa
5) urges the British trade union movement to end collaboration with the forces of oppression in Southern Africa, and specifically to
   a) recognise the South African Congress of Trade Unions as the representative, non-racial, anti-apartheid trade union body in South Africa
   b) end the investment of trade union funds in South African companies or in firms which are indirectly exploiting African workers in Southern Africa
   c) end the emigration of skilled workers to Southern Africa
   d) declare its support for the arms embargo, and take steps to assist workers who might be directly affected by it
   e) support the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Defence and Aid Fund.400

The conference was attended by delegates from: the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AUEFM), the NUM (both national and South Wales division), the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association (DATA), the Greater London Council Staff Association, and several trades councils from across the UK. Interestingly this highlights engagement with the Rhodesia issue amongst some of the more traditional working class unions, although the NUM represented “the largest section of the black community in Britain”.401 This example highlights support for the African nationalist movement, and goes so far as to suggest practical measures for implementing this sentiment of moral support, to actually benefit the independence struggle, outlined in section 5 of the statement. However the examples cited below, indicating the frustration the nationalist movement felt towards British trade unions over their inaction, suggest that such ideas were never fully acted upon, or translated into votes at Labour Party Conference.

The following example illustrates the support of the trade union movement for the nationalist struggle in practice, but for different reasons shows that this was simply a façade placed over underlying disinterest and inaction. “We, the undersigned, take this opportunity to send our greetings to Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, Co-Leaders of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, and pledge to do all in our power to help bring about genuine independence to the people of Zimbabwe.”402 Whilst this demonstrates a positive interaction between the two umbrella organisations, it cannot be said to be representative of the overall character of interactions over the 15 year period. This particular statement was made relatively late in terms of the struggle for independence, judging from its salutation to the Patriotic Front, and whilst it pledges support, it is not accompanied by any concrete action reinforcing the validity of this statement. As will be seen, for the most part, interactions between the trade union movement and the African nationalist movement were characterised by disinterest and disengagement on the part of the former, and frustrated attempts to garner support by the latter.

AAM Trade Union Committee minutes provide an interesting example of the feeling towards British trade unions amongst the African nationalist movement. A meeting in June 1978 was addressed by Francis Nehwati, acting on behalf of the PF (ZAPU). Nehwati was President of the Municipal Workers Union in Rhodesia, and had been involved in the trade union movement there for a number of years. Nehwati thanked the AAM and its trade union supporters, but in a plea for solidarity “added that one major obstacle to greater support was the attitude of the TUC in following Government policy. He would like to see the labour movement in Britain doing more to pressurise the Government”.403 This was indicative of the one-sided relationship between the nationalist movement and British trade unions; requests for assistance met with broad disinterest and a lack of involvement. It also reinforces the argument that the TUC, at least until the later 1970s, was willing to follow the Labour Party leadership’s stance on Rhodesia, and was not sufficiently engaged with the issue to argue otherwise. This is not to say there was monolithic disinterest across all trade

402 RH, MSS AAM 1207, Message of support to the Patriotic Front from representatives of assorted UK trade unions, undated.
unions, but there was little concrete or measurable action taken. At the 1975 TUC Congress a motion was moved by the Civil and Public Services Union reaffirming opposition to Apartheid and pledging “support for policies designed to produce majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia”.\footnote{TUC 107\textsuperscript{th} Congress Report, 1975: 500.} The motion was carried without debate, illustrating general support for this sentiment on the Rhodesia issue; however, the content of the motion was hardly contentious. It should be noted that the STUC was far more progressive and vocal on such issues, “refusing to be hidebound by the policies of the Labour government or the TUC”,\footnote{K. Aitken, \textit{The Bairns o’ Adam: The Story of the STUC} (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1997): 204.} due in part to its independence from the TUC, greater understanding of nationalist politics, and structure which was more aligned with those of trades councils. This serves to highlight differences within the labour movement and act as a reminder that there were differences within as well as between the groups of organisations discussed.

The following example indicates the frustration the African nationalist movement felt with the British trade union movement, in terms of the latter’s lack of activity with regard to the independence struggle, given its position in relation to the Labour Party. Jason Moyo, a member of ZAPU and the JMC, made the case that:

> In Zimbabwe we make the distinction between the British ruling class and the British people and we recognise that the British people are also oppressed. However, British organisations do not yet play an effective role in support of the Zimbabwe struggle and we will continue to appeal for as much assistance as possible.\footnote{RH, MSS AAM 1225, Address given by Jason Moyo, 13/01/1973.}

The ‘British people’ can be interpreted here to be represented by British workers, under the auspices of trade unions and the TUC, and the frustration of the nationalists is clear. This lack of interest from trade unions can also be seen in their interactions with advocacy organisations, discussed below.

There are numerous examples of positive interaction between the British and Rhodesian trade union movements, such as the following memo, detailing a request for Rhodesian trade unionists to be allowed on TUC-run training courses in the UK. The memo details a visit from J T Maluleke, Secretary of the Southern Rhodesian...
Trades Union Co-ordinating Committee in the UK (SRTUCCUK) regarding what ex-Rhodesian trade unionists in the UK could do to help their fellows in Rhodesia, in order to “keep the African trade union movement in Rhodesia afloat”, and the aforementioned request for assistance from the TUC. Whilst such examples are interesting, it is unfortunate that the leadership of the trade union movement in Rhodesia was overtly trying to maintain an apolitical stance: “Mr Maluleke’s principle concern is to... maintain a nucleus of reasonably non-political leadership in being until the possibility of normal trade union activity returns”.

In terms of a relationship with advocacy organisations, the British trade union movement was very much the passive participant, rather than the driving force. As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, the AAM persistently tried to gain the support of trade unions for its work on Rhodesia. The main methods the AAM used in pursuance of this aim were the annual conferences on Southern Africa for trade unionists, and by advertising in trade union publications. As highlighted in the previous chapter, it is doubtful that these efforts had much tangible effect. This is evidenced by the following notes from a set of ZECC minutes:

There was a general discussion around the themes referred to in the report from the Working Group. It was agreed that we needed to involve trade unions more in the work of ZECC... At the same time it was welcomed that AAM Trade Union Committee would be devoting time while meeting on July 30th to considering ways in which it could mobilise the British Trade Union Movement on the issue...it was suggested that there was an important need for PF speakers to speak at trade union meetings on Zimbabwe and if possible for there to be speakers tours of the sort that were taking place more generally, with a strong trade union bias, that there should be a major effort to secure a resolution at the TUC and then to stimulate action by regional TUCs in the way suggested by the Working Group.

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407 At this time the trade union movement in Rhodesia was struggling, due to repressive labour legislation and the relationship between local trade union organisations and international labour federations such as ICFTU. On this subject see B. Raftopoulos, ‘Labour Internationalism and Problems of Autonomy and Democratisation in the Trade Union Movement in Southern Rhodesia, 1951-1975’, in Historical Dimensions of Democracy and Human Rights in Zimbabwe, volume 2, ed. T. Ranger, (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2003), 57-76.


From mid-1979, AAM records demonstrate that earlier efforts had clearly had little effect in mobilising trade union support for the Rhodesia issue. This is certainly corroborated by the examples explored in the previous chapter.

So the AAM’s campaign to broaden support amongst trade unionists met with limited success. During the 15 year period between UDI and formal independence, there were many other more direct concerns for trade unionists that would have taken priority over such a ‘distant struggle’. This issue was discussed at a TUAG meeting: “it appeared Trade Union participation at the demonstration was low and that this was partly due to the mobilization among progressive trade unionists on the miners’ strike.”410 The demonstration mentioned was a RECC-organised event surrounding the Pearce Commission; see Chapter Six for more on this.411 This is a good example of the prevalence of more immediate concerns for trade unionists despite the AAM and other organisations’ best efforts to raise awareness and concern. Considering political wrangling over such bills as *In Place of Strife* and the aforementioned Industrial Relations Act of 1971, it is unsurprising that the struggle for independence in Rhodesia was not at the top of trade unionists’ agendas. This relates to the discussion in Chapter 2 of fluctuating levels of support in the UK for the Rhodesia issue, and how the political climate of the UK affected these changing levels of concern.

It can be argued that the rhetoric espoused by advocacy organisations in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue often failed to resonate with and attract the interest of the majority of trade unionists, who were more concerned with domestic ‘bread and butter’ issues. Benn neatly captures this issue:

> The trouble with liberally-minded middle class people is that they are concerned about matters of high principle but it is the immediate injustices and practical issues right close at home and under their noses that they don’t like to tackle.412

This relates to the problems advocacy organisations working on Rhodesia encountered in trying to mobilise the trade union movement in support of their

410 RH, MSS AAM 161, TUAG minutes 17/02/1972.
campaigns. Whilst the struggle for independence in a southern African colony was perhaps never going to be the highest priority for British workers, advocacy organisations would have yielded better results had they couched their cause in the language of industrial relations, drawing parallels between workers’ concerns in Britain, and the repressive conditions African workers were facing under the Smith regime. However, despite the lack of material action on the issue, it is likely that they had some success in raising awareness of the Rhodesia issue.

At the October 1966 Labour Party Conference, a resolution was proposed by Cambridge CLP expressing regret at the Government’s decision to negotiate with the Smith regime. It called for a return to British rule to oversee a swift transition to majority rule, and proposed asking the UN to impose mandatory sanctions. On the last point, some trade union opposition was registered, led by the ASLEF, on the grounds that it could have a detrimental economic impact on British workers. This was countered by a representative of Chelsea CLP, a wealthy, middle class area of London, who argued that “if we cannot make sacrifices for the people in Africa we are not Socialists.”413 This reinforces Benn’s argument cited earlier, and clearly highlights the precedence that domestic concerns took for much of the labour movement, which often precluded action on Rhodesia.

In response to the proposed resolution, the Labour Party leadership made a closing statement which argued that the Government had not agreed to negotiate with the Smith regime, and pressed the technicality that there had never been a period of direct British rule and that therefore it would not be possible to return to this. Furthermore, it argued that pushing for mandatory sanctions would not be realistic and that “the British Government has taken the responsible, the realistic and the intelligent line that we should apply sanctions in a way which can be effective.”414 The outcome of this debate produced an NEC resolution more akin to the policy of the Labour Party leadership, in favour of the proposed resolution, supported by the trade

414 Ibid.
union block vote. This support can be attributed to the trade unions’ general unwillingness to veer too far from the presiding policy of the Labour Party, and a prevalence of self-interest and concern for domestic issues amongst some elements of the labour movement, over more distant concerns. However, at the 1968 Conference there was a “crushing 5:1 defeat” of Castle’s prices and incomes policy, illustrating the beginning of a shift in the commitment of the trade unions to the policy of the Labour Party. Minkin writes that Conference defeats of Government policy started to become more common and “a schism appeared between the Labour Government and the majority of trade unions” as a result of deflationary Government policies and In Place of Strife.

In a letter to Rita Hinden, a founder member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, then editor of Socialist Commentary, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs George Thomson outlined the Government’s stance on Rhodesia. This was clearly in reply to a letter from Hinden, but this initial correspondence could not be located. Thomson stated that she had recognised the core of the problem, as the Government saw it, when she talked about “our having responsibilities, but without the power on the ground”, and went on to suggest that he had been trying to make this point more widely understood. The letter concluded with George Thomson affirming his belief in the Labour Government’s present policy as the only viable option. This letter is indicative of greater interest in Rhodesia on the part of a labour movement publication than was often apparent amongst the trade unions. However, the interest in the Rhodesia issue by Socialist Commentary generally adhered to the broader fluctuations in interest as discussed in Chapter 2. This is unsurprising, since the publication had a vested interest in attracting readership, and had to tailor its stories accordingly. The response from Thomson indicates a familiar limited discussion of Labour Party policy, whilst essentially restating the Party’s commitment to its present actions.

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415 Windrich, Rhodesian Independence: 94.
In a letter to Vic Feather, the General Secretary of the TUC, the Labour Party accepted a recent TUC Congress resolution, and offered brief comment on the Rhodesia situation. The resolution and accompanying response followed the announcement of the findings of the Pearce Commission, and essentially stated a commitment to involving African nationalist representatives in any future negotiations. Being in opposition clearly saw the Labour Party respond more warmly and convincingly to such proposals from other organisations than it did when in power. This letter, and the resolution it was responding to, were indicative of the TUC taking greater interest in the Rhodesia issue.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the issue of the Labour Party leadership and the trade union movement and their handling of and responses to the Rhodesia issue drawing on previously unutilised sources. By marrying up official sources, such as Conference reports and PLP minutes (not that Rhodesia is mentioned much in the latter) with organisational sources such as AAM papers, a new perspective on Labour and Rhodesia has been established. It is clear from the examples above that Labour, much as it had done in communication with the African nationalist movement, never drifted from the party line in responding to comments from the movement, being heavily influenced by its parliamentary socialism and the conservative policies of the civil service. The actions of the Party leadership struck a careful balance between seeking a settlement, trying to maintain unity within the Party, and keeping the trade unions on side. However, as the trade union movement was not very engaged with the Rhodesia issue, with domestic events taking priority, the Party was not obligated to listen very closely when elements of the trade union movement were unhappy with its stance or actions on Rhodesia.

The Labour Party’s willingness to disregard the opinions of the trade union movement was clear. Barbara Castle details Wilson’s eagerness to reach agreement with Smith, and demonstrates the lengths he was willing to go to do this, despite a “resolution just
passed at Party conference demanding NIBMAR”.\textsuperscript{421} She states that Wilson “was being drawn into more and more concessions to keep Smith interested”.\textsuperscript{422} This was felt deeply amongst the labour movement, not only over the Rhodesia issue, but also more broadly, and resulted in calls for change in internal Party democracy during the early 1970s. The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was established on the Labour left in 1973 in response to dissatisfaction with the actions of the Party leadership and a perceived need for radical intra-party reform.\textsuperscript{423} Whilst the CLPD focused solely on issues of intra-party democracy, to avoid the distraction of disagreements over policy, the establishment of this organisation was illustrative of dissatisfaction with the Party leadership’s treatment of the broader Party. The relationship between the trade union movement and the Labour Party leadership over Rhodesia reflected at times this broader climate of dissatisfaction.

From exploring the relationships of the Labour Party and the trade union movement with advocacy organisations and the African nationalist movement, it becomes apparent that there were some key parallels. The Labour Party leadership, with the exception of some dissenting voices such as Barbara Castle and Judith Hart, hedged its bets in its actions over the Rhodesia issue. It maintained pragmatic relationships with the African nationalist movement and advocacy organisations, whilst simultaneously pushing for a settlement even at times when concessions were offered to the Smith regime that would have been unthinkable to those on the left in Britain who were supportive of the nationalist struggle. In responding to questions and demands from these groups, the Labour Party leadership was always careful not to commit itself to any line of action that contradicted its cautious policy on Rhodesia. However, it also recognised that it was beneficial to maintain civil relationships with representatives of these groups, to minimise dissent against its policies, when these were more controversial, for example at the time of the Fearless negotiations. It can be seen that the Rhodesia issue cut across left/right divisions within the Labour Party. Ministers such as Andrew Faulds, who was on the right of the Party, as well as CLPs in more middle class, less traditionally Labour-supporting areas such as Chelsea and Halstead

\textsuperscript{422} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{423} Panitch and Leys, \textit{Parliamentary Socialism}: 135-164.
and District were actively engaged with Rhodesia and supportive of advocacy activity on the issue. That said, Ministers on the Labour left such as Hart and Castle did tend to be more sympathetic and engaged with the issue.

The trade union movement, for the majority of the 15 years between UDI and independence, was broadly disengaged with the Rhodesia issue and this shaped its relationships with the African nationalist movement and advocacy organisations. Whilst there were some revolts against Labour Party leadership policies on Rhodesia, most notably the defeat of Government policy at the 1968 Conference for the most part trade unions did not display an active interest in the issue, and were content to support official policy. Minkin gives an example from the mid-1960s, in which “the Government’s critics on Vietnam and Rhodesia failed to secure the passage of strongly worded resolutions at the 1967 Conference”. However, this started to shift in the mid to late 1970s, as there was a move back to the left within the labour movement, and a greater interest in the Rhodesia issue could be seen amongst the broader left. PLP minutes noted “the need to recapture the loyalty of the working class; and intellectuals who had drifted away from the Party because of our policies on Rhodesia”. As well as highlighting dissatisfaction with the policies of the Party leadership, this also illustrates the key demographic who were most exercised over the Rhodesia issue, as perceived by the PLP.

After the failure of the Pearce Commission to produce a settlement, and the emergent consensus that any future negotiations would be required to involve the African nationalist movement, it can be argued that the Labour Party really took the lead over the Conservatives in terms of perceptions of Rhodesia policy, which created an easier environment for the trade union movement to be more engaged with the issue.

Ultimately, this chapter has demonstrated that Rhodesia was not a simple leadership versus grass roots issue; it was far more complicated than that. Whilst to some extent

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424 Minkin, Conference: 291.
426 Panitch and Leys, End of Parliamentary Socialism: 22-23.
the issue did cut across left/right distinctions, at least within successive Labour cabinets and shadow cabinets, it tended to be those on the left who were uncomfortable with, or actively rebellious against, potential Rhodesia compromises. Rhodesia also became a personal issue, and despite his desire to achieve a settlement, at times ostensibly at any cost, it provoked a more emotional response from Wilson when he was in proximity to the struggle and the realities of life for the African population under the Smith regime.

It is these complex divisions, influences and allegiances that the official accounts of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe ignore, prioritising simply the formal negotiations and policymaking at national and international levels. By drawing on a broader archival base, this chapter has illustrated a far greater level of detail and disagreement than existing accounts capture.
Chapter 5 – Radicalism as strategy? The anti-British rhetoric of the African nationalist movement

Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to draw the attention of the thesis more sharply to the activities of the African nationalist movement, and the international activities of the main nationalist organisations during the period of the independence struggle. As set out in the initial literature review, with the exception of Day’s very early book on the subject, this area has not really been explored in existing accounts of the nationalist struggle. In stark contrast to Britain, literature looking at the African nationalist movement tends to focus largely on issues of grass roots involvement, guerrilla tactics and divisions within the movement, specifically between the main nationalist organisations. This chapter seeks to redress the balance by considering the African nationalist representatives based in the UK, and their relationship with the parent organisations based in Rhodesia or neighbouring countries.

As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 1, and referred to in other chapters, the nationalist movement suffered from factionalism. The thesis is mainly concerned with the two largest nationalist organisations, but there were others besides, and many attempts at unity and further splits over the 15 year period. The question this chapter seeks to address is whether there was a further division in the African nationalist movement between nationalists based at home and their representatives in the UK? This core research question feeds into further questions surrounding the implications of such a division in terms of the relations of the African nationalist movement with the Labour Party leadership, and questions about the strategy of the nationalist movement. It will be argued that the nationalist movement was deeply sceptical that settlement negotiations would produce positive results, and in eschewing these negotiations, there was a tendency to conflate Britain and the Smith regime, and represent them as a unified enemy. This idea will be explored in the course of the chapter.
The chapter begins with an overview of specific literature, in order to highlight how the main research question fits in, and what is missing from existing accounts. Some of this literature has been discussed in the introductory chapter, but it will be explored here in more specific detail. Following this, the main body of the chapter will draw on archival material in considering the main and then subsidiary research questions, outlined above. Thereafter, there will be a discussion of the possible explanations for differences in the nationalist movement identified in the analysis section. This discussion will draw briefly on some ideas of nationalism; as such a concern was clearly central in the independence struggle. By drawing on such ideas, it is possible to gain extra insight into conceptions of national identity that played a role in the independence struggle. It also aids a consideration of how this might have affected any differences or similarities between nationalists based at home in Rhodesia and the regional bases, and those in the UK.

This chapter will draw predominantly on archival material from The National Archives. This source will be particularly useful here, since there are many documents detailing meetings between British representatives and the African nationalist movement in both Rhodesia and the UK, letters between these two groups, along with many copies of ZANU and ZAPU documents, such as press releases and newspapers. Looking at documents such as nationalist newspapers raises the important issue of who such documents were originally produced for. This issue will be covered in the section later in the chapter drawing on conceptions of national identity to explore the strategy of the nationalist movement and potential differences of opinion between different groups of nationalist representatives.

**The issue of factionalism in existing literature**
The main nationalist groups were, from an early stage of the struggle, banned from operating within Rhodesia. This illustrates the vital importance of the international dimension in order to build a full picture of this period of history. The purpose of this literature review is to briefly discuss the few texts that have attempted to address this issue. The most important work on this subject, in terms of focus, is by Day.
Unfortunately, this was published in 1967 and therefore only focuses on a period of nationalist activities overseas, up to 1966. He systematically considers relations with Britain, international institutions, and regional contacts, including nationalist headquarters overseas. The book charts various visits of nationalist leaders, but is largely descriptive and lacks detail or analysis. Equally the time period under consideration is very limited. The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the nationalists were constantly interacting with people outside Rhodesia, much of which was directed at the British and notably seemed to achieve very little. Day concluded that the most important outcome of this period of international activities was gaining military support and training.428 One further point that Day made, more specifically on the topic of this chapter, was that “since 1965 PCC/ZAPU and ZANU have both had London offices, each attacking the other while advocating the same policies on Rhodesia. The nationalist organization in England has not changed, but has been duplicated.”429 This study forms the backdrop to research the key question of this chapter, by hinting at dynamics within and between the nationalist presence in the UK.

In a more detailed article on the international dynamics of the nationalist movement, Reed sets forward the argument that challenging state sovereignty is the cornerstone of any liberation movement’s activities. Therefore, in order to survive, such movements must seek assistance and to a degree operate beyond the boundaries of the state that they are seeking to challenge.430 In this regard it was inevitable that ZANU and ZAPU would look outwards for support. It is stated that initially ZAPU had greater recognition and support from overseas, as it was the older organisation.431 However, this began to change as frustration mounted with Nkomo’s early insistence on a nonviolent strategy. Added to this, Dabengwa suggests that a key turning point was when ZAPU lost its important strategic contact with FRELIMO of Mozambique. This vital contact was taken over by ZANU and provided a sizeable influx of recruits to

431 Ibid: 37.
the ranks of its guerrilla army.\footnote{Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA’, 31.} In this scenario it can be seen that international actors were an important component in the shifting fortunes of the nationalist groups.

A significant external influence on the nationalist organisations and their associated guerrilla armies in the second half of the 1970s was the organisation known as the Front-line States. It originally involved Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania and arose formally in 1976 to assist with the situation in Rhodesia.\footnote{M. Evans, ‘The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives’ \textit{Zambezia} 5: 12 (1984), 1-19.} Reed discusses how the Front-line States tried to formulate a unified policy for negotiations with the Rhodesian Government. This group was very important in eventually steering the nationalists to the negotiating table at Lancaster House, as they threatened to withdraw support from them, support that was strategically necessary for the continuation of the nationalist struggle in Rhodesia.\footnote{Reed, ‘Contested Sovereignty’: 43-51.}

In response to ZANU-PF’s attempts to claim that they were their own liberators, Moore offers a damning critique of this blatant attempt to rewrite history. He argues that “the myth of self-liberation” belies a host of external support, from church groups, neighbouring states, to the Chinese and the Soviets.\footnote{D. Moore, ‘ZANU-PF and the Ghosts of Foreign Funding’ \textit{Review of African Political Economy} 32: 103 (2005), 156-162.} International support was essential to the survival of the nationalist movement, and the eventual success of the guerrilla war. These brief summaries of existing literature on the international dimension of the African nationalist movement highlight why this topic is important, but do not begin to address the issue of how nationalists based at home related to their representatives overseas, and it is to this issue that the chapter will now turn.

\textbf{Another Fault Line?}

Clearly the different groups of nationalists had different purposes and activities to carry out: Day writes that “much of the nationalists’ activity in London is aimed at those who have access to or can harry government Ministers” whilst those based at home were more preoccupied with orchestrating the guerrilla war.\footnote{Day, \textit{International Nationalism}: 39.} Did these
different foci affect nationalists’ perceptions of the situation and their strategy for achieving their aims?

Following a meeting with Judith Hart in London, Herbert Chitepo, who shortly after returned to Rhodesia to become acting president of ZANU, sent a letter further commenting on points raised during the meeting. This letter is interesting as it demonstrates a willingness of Chitepo, if not ZANU in its entirety, to seek genuine collaboration with Britain in resolving the Rhodesian crisis. It is a very polite missive, with Chitepo thanking Judith Hart for giving up her “precious time” to meet with him, and making the case for increased cooperation: “If there was a readiness to co-operate with us, in even only this limited objective [defeating UDI], surely ways and means could be found in consultation with Government or various sections of organised British opinion.” He makes suggestions as to such cooperation, such as getting African support for strengthening the sanctions regime, and effectively distributing British aid to mitigate any ill-effects amongst unintended recipients. This is illustrative of a desire to cooperate with Britain, and persists in the polite style of communication discussed at length in the previous chapter.

However, in a letter regarding a meeting between a member of staff at the Lusaka-based British High Commission and Herbert Chitepo, the nationalist’s transition to a more extreme position following his return to Rhodesia from Britain is set out. The letter states that “in late February when he [Chitepo] left here [Britain] he was suspicious, difficult to convince of our bona fides [letter author’s emphasis] but still open to conviction and anxious to understand our motives and intentions.” This already hints at a change in his attitude, but the letter concludes:

> Possibly because of ZANU’s recent militant activities in Rhodesia and the new aura this has created for the ZANU leaders, Chitepo has turned in the last three months from a bland and not especially militant (though convinced) African bourgeois intellectual, without marked political ability, into a thin-faced, somewhat intense Che Guevara nationalist, surrounded by the ritual number of suspicious strong-arm men.\textsuperscript{438}

\textsuperscript{437} TNA, DO 207 237, Letter from H. Chitepo to Judith Hart, 20/04/1966.
\textsuperscript{438} TNA, DO 207 237, Letter from W. B. L. Monson, of Lusaka High Commission to R. L. B. Cormack, Private Secretary to Minister of State, 03/06/1966.
Whilst this does not explicitly discuss differences between nationalists based in the UK and those based in Rhodesia or the regional bases, it suggests that being in Rhodesia had a radicalising effect.

In a meeting between the Minister of State, Judith Hart, and ZANU representatives (including Herbert Chitepo, Henry Hamadziripi and Washington Malianga) held in Lusaka, there is a notable difference in tone and behaviour of the African nationalist delegation from examples of similar meetings held in the UK. “Mr Washington Malianga broke in excitedly with a demand that the Minister withdraw the word “terrorist” as applied to ZANU’s activities. His demand was taken up by his colleagues including Mr Chitepo and a rowdy scene ensued...The rowdy argument continued for about half an hour.”439 However there was a notable difference between his colleagues and Chitepo, only recently returned from the UK, when it is stated that he alone “always spoke calmly, courteously and rationally to the Minister”.440 It is important to note that this account is probably exaggerated by civil service attitudes towards the nationalists, for example with the use of pejoratives such as ‘rowdy’. However, it is still a useful point of comparison. It is indicative of two important differences: the first between Chitepo and his colleagues, and the second between Chitepo’s response to Judith Hart and civil servants. The first of these differences can most convincingly be attributed to a divide between leadership and rank and file nationalists. In his meeting with civil servants at the Lusaka-based British High Commission it was argued that he had become more radicalised and this later encounter suggests nothing of the sort, suggesting that the differences in behaviour are more accurately attributable to a leadership tactic. The second difference reinforces this argument, since it suggests that nationalist leaders varied their tactics and style of interaction according to who they were meeting with.

In a contrasting example to the ‘rowdy’ meeting discussed above, Nelson Samkange, ZAPU’s UK representative at the time, sent a letter in August 1966 to Herbert Bowden who had recently taken the position of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs.

439 TNA, DO 207 237, Record of meeting between Minister of State and ZANU representatives, 27/5/1966.
440 Ibid.
This letter represents the overwhelmingly polite tone that coloured most of the examples discussed in the previous chapter. Samkange congratulated Bowden on his appointment, and stated that he was looking forward to a happy working relationship. He requested a meeting “any day and at any time that is convenient to you”. The formal politeness of this correspondence was starkly different to the attitude of Chitepo’s colleagues in the meeting discussed above. Similarly, in a meeting between the Secretary of State and a ZANU delegation held in London, this polite tone was replicated. The record began by stating that “Mr Shamuyarira recalled with pleasure the meeting he had had with the Secretary of State in...1964”. More in depth discussions followed, interspersed with such friendly assurances by ZANU, such as “they were much relieved by the Secretary of State’s assurances and noted his commitment to majority rule”. The nationalist delegation did press issues such as sanctions and problems with this policy, but the record of the meeting is regularly populated by such polite and friendly statements as illustrated here. This was dramatically different to the approach of the ZANU delegation who met with Judith Hart in Lusaka 17 months earlier.

In the December 1966 edition of *Zimbabwe News*, a ZANU newspaper published in Zambia, the editorial outlined current opinions on the independence struggle. It argued that Wilson had in the past made mistakes in his handling of Rhodesia, and that he should try to avoid repeating any of these mistakes. Sanctions, it suggested, were not working effectively enough to bring about any sort of meaningful political change, and that in light of South Africa’s decision to aid the Smith regime, “the famous no-force-under-any-circumstances parrot cry must be abandoned”. The editorial in this publication one year later accused the British of collusion with the Smith regime: “The British Government is leaving no stone unturned in its efforts to find excuses to continue its support of minority white rule in Zimbabwe.” Whilst the first editorial was quite mildly phrased, despite making forceful requests with regards to desired changes in British policy, the second editorial made bolder claims about

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442 TNA, FCO 36 14, Record of a meeting between Secretary of State and a ZANU delegation, 09/10/1967
443 Ibid.
where British loyalties lay. The British High Commission in Lusaka sent a copy of this later edition to the Rhodesia Department accompanied by a letter that hinted at an answer to the central research question of this chapter, stating that:

you may be interested in the tone and content of the editorial, which abuses the Secretary of State personally, and the apparently more sincere and friendly attitudes of the ZANU Delegation who met the Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Office on 9 October. It is hard to believe that the record of that meeting and the enclosed editorial both relate to the same organisation.445

In the January 1968 edition of *Zimbabwe Review*, ZAPU argued that the Smith regime has been sending out spies to surrounding independent countries where the exiled nationalists were operating, or in which they had bases. These spies who “are either Rhodesian or South African citizens, all hold British passports given them by the British embassies or directly from London”. This bold claim was highlighted by the British High Commissioner in Lusaka in a letter to the Rhodesia Department in which he asserted that the article highlighted the difference between local nationalists and their more moderate counterparts in Britain.446 This is suggestive that there was a difference between nationalists based at home, and their representatives overseas, as sources explored above have also suggested.

In a letter from Ndabaningi Sithole, then President of ZANU, to Harold Wilson in March 1968 we see the vitriolic anti-British sentiment so often espoused by the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia. The opening sentence set the tone for what was to follow: “We are compelled by both duty and responsibility to call your attention to our utter disgust and contempt at your inept and incompetent handling of the Rhodesian crisis.” The letter repeatedly referred to the Smith Government as “your illegal regime”, asserting full British responsibility for Smith’s actions. The letter posited that the British Government was wilfully allowing the Smith regime to continue, and stated that “we are not deceived by your Pontius-Pilate-like remonstrations”. As if these accusations were not forceful enough, the letter

446 TNA, FCO 36 22, Note from D F B Le Breton (British High Commissioner in Lusaka) to Rhodesia Department, and enclosed copy of *Zimbabwe Review*, ‘Spies from Rhodesia’, 13/01/1968.
concluded “that your attempts to entrench your illegal regime with the hope that it might by default acquire international recognition and internal permanence, will certainly fail”.447 This suggests a growing sense of frustration experienced by the nationalist movement at what it saw as the lack of concrete action the British Government was taking to undermine the Smith regime, and Wilson’s energetic pursuit of negotiations which the nationalists saw as illegitimate.

Following the hanging of three Africans in March 1968, ZAPU’s Lusaka and Dar es Salaam-based Zimbabwe Review published an article entitled ‘Wilson’s Bloody Head’. The article used particularly emotive language in arguing where ZAPU believed the blame lay for this:

We maintain most tenaciously that as the British Government is solely responsible for Rhodesia, it is ipso facto responsible for these dastardly and bloody acts. We put the whole blame squarely and unshakeably on Harold Wilson’s head. Never will this man be able to wash this blood from his head.448

The strength of this article is entirely understandable given the recent and violent loss of three fellow nationalists. What is significant about it is that blame was placed solely on Britain, and on Harold Wilson as a figurehead. The strength of the imagery used is also notable; it could not represent more of a contrast to earlier examples of meetings between nationalists and Labour Ministers in Britain. This reinforces the point made in the previous paragraph regarding increasing nationalist frustration at how slowly the situation was progressing.

In October 1968, Mr T Ziyambi, a ZANU representative based in London, wrote to Harold Wilson. His letter was subsequently discussed by the Rhodesia Department:

This is a clever letter which defines the position of the African nationalists in particular it draws attention to HMG’s willingness to drop the NIBMAR pledge, while remaining firm on the non-use of force...It poses the question whether HMG are really prepared to give independence to the minority and ends by saying there cannot be peace in Rhodesia, unless it is in the hands

447 TNA, FCO 36 15, Letter from N. Sithole to H. Wilson, 21/03/1968.
of the majority, which might come about through a constitutional conference.\textsuperscript{449}

This letter is in stark contrast to the one discussed above from Sithole. It takes a far more measured tone, and does not make accusations about the British controlling or being directly responsible for the Smith regime. Its line of argument is one of reasoning, using the Wilson Government’s own terminology. The letters from Sithole and Ziyambi were ostensibly written for the same purpose, which can be broadly defined as the furtherance of the African nationalist movement. However, the execution of the letters in terms of style and content is completely different. Both are from ZANU, and are written within 7 months of each other, the only difference being the authors and their respective locations at the time of writing.

In a telegram to the Rhodesia Department from the British High Commission in Lusaka, a passage of a ZAPU statement on proposed talks between Wilson and Smith was cited:

we have made it quite clear that neither Wilson nor Smith nor their governments represent the African people in whatever they do discuss, therefore any purported agreement resulting from the forthcoming meeting is bound to be futile and will be doomed to failure. To achieve our liberation we shall continue the armed struggle regardless.\textsuperscript{450}

During the same month, the editorial of Zimbabwe Review discussed 'The Conspiracy' represented by the Fearless talks. It took a strong anti-British tone from the outset by referring to Ian Smith as Harold Wilson’s ‘agent’. The talks were, according to the editorial, an opportunity for Smith and Wilson to devise “ways and means of entrenching white domination permanently in southern Africa”.\textsuperscript{451} These two examples differ from all those documenting communications from British-based nationalists; they are not seeking dialogue with the British or to persuade them of the nationalist perspective on the talks, it is a simple condemnation of the talks designed to encourage the perpetuation and strengthening of the armed struggle as the only viable option.

\textsuperscript{449} TNA, FCO 36 15, Rhodesia Department memo about a letter from Tarisai Ziyambi, Chief ZANU representative for the UK and Europe, 08/10/1968.
\textsuperscript{450} TNA, FCO 36 23, Telegram to Rhodesia Department from Lusaka High Commission, 07/10/1968.
\textsuperscript{451} TNA, FCO 36 23, Zimbabwe Review, 12/10/1968.
Following a visit to Salisbury, George Thomson had a meeting with ZANU’s London representative, Ziyambi. In the course of the meeting, frequent reference was made to a document entitled ‘ZANU’s view of the Fearless proposals’. Both this document and the meeting demonstrated a very different response to the Fearless negotiations than was shown by the telegram and publication produced by nationalists based at home, discussed above. ‘ZANU’s views on the Fearless proposals’, whilst making it abundantly clear that they were considered unacceptable, examined different technical points of the proposals explaining why each one was insufficient. The meeting followed a very similar line, and whilst Ziyambi made clear his disappointment in the Labour Government, this was not accompanied by any of the starkly anti-British sentiments expressed in earlier documents on the Fearless proposals produced in Rhodesia or the surrounding nationalist bases.

In response to negotiations between the Conservative Government and the Smith regime, prior to the Pearce Commission, ZAPU sent a telegram to then Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas Home in September 1971. This was from the main ZAPU base in Zambia, and took a very strong anti-British tone. Once again, the struggle was framed in such a way as to present Britain as the enemy against which the nationalist movement was fighting. It stated:

We are at war against the British Government and its mercenary settlers in Zimbabwe. The talks between these two white men are the same as those between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, whose consequences fill the pages of history with tears... It is a known fact that Britain created the present situation in Zimbabwe and is determined to strengthen the mercenary minority.

The strength of the sentiment expressed here regarding Britain’s intentions in holding the talks is reminiscent of the aggressive tone which nationalists based at home took in meetings in Rhodesia cited above, and of other publications produced by Rhodesia-based nationalists. The idea that Britain was responsible for the Rhodesia crisis was, from the perspective of the nationalists, a useful tool in creating a common and

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452 TNA, FCO 36 408, ‘Record of a meeting in the House of Commons...’, 12/12/1968.
453 TNA, FCO 36 408, ‘ZANU’s view of the Fearless proposals’, not dated.
454 TNA, FCO 36 747, Telegram from ZAPU HQ to Alec Douglas Home, 16/09/1971.
455 See for example ZANU News, Voice of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Review.
distant enemy, which could facilitate their longer-term nation building project, after the resolution of the independence struggle. Equally, the claims about Britain desiring to perpetuate the status quo, and the emotive comparisons, can be understood in the same way. It is also illustrative of the radical tone of communications that nationalists based in Rhodesia seemed to perpetually employ.

In a meeting with Joan Lestor, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Enos Malandu of ZAPU enquired about the Labour Party’s stance on the ANC, since they were currently engaged in talks with the Smith regime with which ZAPU wholeheartedly did not agree. He stated that ZAPU were at that point more afraid of the ANC than they were of Mr Smith due to the talks the ANC had been holding with the Rhodesian Front. Other issues raised during the course of the meeting were the attitude of the Labour Government towards liberation movements and the application of sanctions. In each instance Joan Lestor provided an answer to the question, all of which seem to be accepted without further questioning by the ZAPU representatives.\textsuperscript{456} She stated that the Labour Party had not been avoiding ZAPU, that the Government accepted the ANC as representatives of a portion of Zimbabwean opinion but had no intention to give them “a mandate to negotiate”. She “confirmed that Britain supplied arms to South Africa for use in Rhodesia”, and finally stated that the current Government had tried to strengthen sanctions.\textsuperscript{457} This example showed ZAPU being particularly placid and accepting of Labour’s responses to their concerns. There was none of the vitriol that nationalists based in Rhodesia espoused in their interactions with representatives of British Government, or in nationalist publications produced in Rhodesia.

The Anglo-American proposals also provide numerous contrasting examples of conflicting attitudes of African nationalist representatives. This attempt at settlement came about because Smith’s appeal for help in resolving the conflict prompted the British to draw up an offer of a transition to majority rule in 18-24 months, announced in parliament on 22 March 1976. Windrich states that:

\textsuperscript{456} TNA, FCO 36 1651, Record of meeting between Joan Lestor MP and Enos Malandu of ZAPU, September 1974.  
\textsuperscript{457} Ibid.
The timing of the British Government’s proposals was directly related to the diplomatic exchanges which had been proceeding among the Americans, the Zambians and the South Africans in the aftermath of the Angolan civil war and also to the developments which had been taking place in southern Africa itself.\textsuperscript{458}

Kissinger then pledged support for the British initiative, and warned outside powers from intervening in Africa.

By January 1978, when various diplomatic discussions were being held surrounding the Anglo-American proposals, Joseph Dube of the Patriotic Front put out a press release condemning the proposals and referring to them as neo-colonialist. He wrote that the British government, “especially the Labour administration, has continuously played a dirty role in our situation”. It goes on to argue that the Labour Government expressed racial sentiments and had adopted an attitude of “my Brother wrong or right”, in relation to the white population of Rhodesia. Dube concluded that Britain and America must understand that “the real conflict in Zimbabwe is a war situation and can only be resolved by those directly involved in the war – that is, the British Government and its agent-settlers on one hand and the Patriotic Front on the other”.\textsuperscript{459} This not only eschewed any belief in the prospect of the settlement negotiations to produce an acceptable settlement, but also, once again, conflated Britain and the Smith regime and represented them as the same central enemy. This press release differed dramatically from some later activities of the African nationalist movement in responding the Anglo-American proposals.

As discussed in Chapter 2, 1976 saw the formation of the Patriotic Front between ZANU and ZAPU, which led to some joint interactions with the British. In the same month as the above press release, Joshua Nkomo met with David Owen to discuss the Anglo-American proposals and ZAPU’s position and role within the discussions. The record of this meeting is illustrative of a completely different approach to that outlined in the press release above. The record of the meeting suggests that Nkomo “was quite receptive to the idea” of putting out a press release on the proceedings of

\textsuperscript{458} Windrich, \textit{Rhodesian Independence}: 258.
the talks to give confidence to all parties involved, and the world, that progress was being made. It also shows Nkomo being receptive to Owen’s suggestions that he might be able to hold talks with Smith. This saw Nkomo fully cooperating with the British in trying to bring about a settlement. This example contrasts with the majority of those discussed so far in this chapter, as it shows a nationalist leader based at home, holding positive and collaborative discussions with the British, rather than espousing the negative statements generally expressed by nationalist representatives based in Rhodesia or in regional bases. The reasons behind this ostensible anomaly will be explored after examination of further examples from the period of the Anglo-American proposal.

In February 1978, discussions were being conducted between the Smith regime, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau, which led eventually to the internal settlement. In response to these talks, the Patriotic Front released a press statement condemning them as a sell-out to the African population, and arguing that agreement had been reached with the “connivance and assistance of the British and American imperialists.” This was quite a contrast to the collaboration demonstrated above by Nkomo. It was also at odds with a Patriotic Front statement released a few days later that, as well as condemning the internal agreement, pledged support for further talks based on the Anglo-American proposals. These press releases do not give a clear picture of the Patriotic Front’s position in relation to its opinions of Britain or the Anglo-American negotiations; only that the internal settlement was regarded an unacceptable sell-out. The following example is more in line with the Nkomo discussion mentioned above, and provides a clearer picture of nationalist actions in terms of the settlement talks.

A discussion was held, strictly confidential at the time, between the Patriotic Front, David Owen, then the Commonwealth Secretary, and Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State. This example was comparable to the above encounter between Owen and

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460 TNA, FCO 36 2122, Rhodesia Department memo on meeting with Nkomo, 30/01/1978.
462 TNA, FCO 36 2123, Patriotic Front press statement, 04/03/1978.
463 TNA, FCO 36 2125, ‘Note of a restricted discussion...’, 15/04/1978.
Nkomo, as it illustrates nationalist representatives working collaboratively with Britain, and America in this instance, in pursuit of a settlement, despite the meeting taking place in Dar es Salaam with Nkomo and Mugabe. The attendance of the two nationalist leaders together showed both how seriously the meeting was being taken by the nationalist movement elite, and the willingness of the PF to collaborate when it felt that a settlement was potentially within reach. Whilst the notes of the meeting are very brief, and essentially only précis the points made by the PF, they indicate Mugabe and Nkomo making suggestions as to their requirements for the Anglo-American proposals to work, and promising “they would attend an all parties meeting ‘at any time’. Indeed, the possibility of a date in May was discussed”.464 This differs from earlier meetings held in Rhodesia or surrounding countries between Britain and nationalist representatives, at which there was usually a prevailing tone of animosity, wariness and reluctance to cooperate. It reflected a hope that the Anglo-American settlement talks might bring about genuine and positive change.

Conclusion
The sources analysed in this chapter generally demonstrate a difference between nationalists operating from home; Rhodesia or the regional bases, and those based in Britain. This difference is one of both tone and content of communication. Nationalist representatives based at home, in direct dealings with Britain and in publications discussing the independence struggle, generally referred to Britain as colluding with Smith and the Rhodesian Front regime, seeking to perpetuate white dominance in Rhodesia, whilst adopting a very aggressive and accusatory tone. In stark contrast, nationalist representatives based in the UK were far more moderate in approach. They tended to discuss developments in the situation, rather than condemning Britain’s actions as imperialist conspiracies, and generally spoke to British Government representatives in an overly polite tone as discussed in the previous chapter.

There are two possible explanations for this difference in nationalist communications with and about Britain. The first is that there was a genuine difference in the

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464 Ibid.
extremity and nature of beliefs between those based at home and those based in the UK; that those nationalists who were closer to the armed struggle itself became more radicalised in their views and that this manifested itself in the way in which they talked with and about representatives of the British Government. The other possible explanation is that this difference was a leadership tactic; that nationalist leaders saw that these two approaches were necessary for furthering the aims of the struggle in different contexts. This would explain the situation discussed earlier in the chapter with Chitepo, whereby he was typically liberal whilst based in the UK, and seemed to become more radical almost immediately upon his return to Rhodesia. It would also explain the ostensible discrepancies in the way in which nationalists approached the Anglo-American proposals; with some radical and some moderate communications that did not appear to fit the initial pattern discussed in the rest of the chapter.

A letter from the Rhodesia Department on the behaviour of Herbert Chitepo helps to shed some light on this debate. It stated that “a joint ZANU/ZAPU military command was set up recently which has been quite active inside Rhodesia, but Chitepo is no doubt forced to show a very militant face in order to claim more revolutionary zeal than the other factions.” Presumably this assertion drew on earlier observations of, for example, Chitepo’s transition into “a thin-faced, somewhat intense Che Guevara nationalist, surrounded by the ritual number of suspicious strong-arm men” and it implied that cultivating this persona assisted nationalist leaders in maintaining a following. This argument suggests that vitriolic anti-British sentiments expressed by nationalists based at home were indeed employed as a leadership tactic. However, rather than being employed to present the cause as a fight against a remote enemy in order to mobilise Rhodesian Africans, this letter suggests that it was more about power struggles within and between different factions of nationalist organisations. Most likely, such rhetoric was employed for both reasons; it aided the nationalist cause as a whole but also helped to galvanise individual reputations when required.

465 TNA, FCO 36 1031, Letter from PRA Mansfield (Rhodesia Department) to JWD Gray (UK mission Geneva), 19/10/1972.
466 TNA, DO 207 237, Letter from Lusaka High Commission to Private Secretary to Minister of State, 03/06/1966.
In an article on the internal settlement, Mufuka argued that there was always distrust of the British amongst the nationalists:

Despite denials on the part of the British Government, Rhodesian nationalists have all along suspected that Mr Smith has been advised,abetted and supported by the British Government since the Declaration of Independence in 1965. The ZAPU leader, Mr Nkomo, speaking of the elections, suggested that the whole exercise had been carried out with the 'collusion' of Britain.\(^{467}\)

This suggests that the rhetoric of nationalists based at home was closer to the true opinions of nationalist leaders, and that the polite, more moderate, interactions with nationalist representatives in Britain reflected perhaps the influence of being based in the periphery, in terms of the independence struggle. In this argument, nationalists were naturally sceptical of the British, but when interacting with Government representatives more regularly, and also being closer to pro-African nationalist campaigns from advocacy organisations and the labour movement, this scepticism and anti-British sentiment softened. Conversely, it could also be evidence of a conscious leadership tactic, based on a belief that these kinds of interactions with the British administration would yield more fruitful results. Along similar lines, Mugabe is quoted as having said, “I never trusted the British. Never, at all. I did not think they meant well towards us. In the final analysis, I do not think they wanted the liberation movement, and especially the one I led, ZANU, to be the victor”.\(^{468}\) This, again, is indicative that the anti-British sentiment espoused by the core of the nationalist movement was indeed founded on genuine mistrust.

Combined with the ideas expressed in the Rhodesia Department letter cited above, it can be argued that the most likely explanation behind the ostensible divide in the nationalist movement was somewhere between the two possible explanations discussed. The differences between the movement in Rhodesia and Britain reflected a pragmatic leadership tactic, pursued to maximise the outcome of various interactions the nationalists had, but distrust and hostility towards the British was the genuine position of the majority of the nationalist movement. Such a tactic can be considered


\(^{468}\) Charlton, _Last Colony in Africa_: 66.
to have been guided by pragmatism in the sense that it may have been far more appealing and enjoyable to speak and interact with the British in a manor that reflected the nationalist’s true perception of them, but the belief that they were important power brokers in the situation and that a more diplomatic approach would be more productive constrained the language, tone and arguments used in such encounters. In one sense then the Rhodesia Department analysis was correct; the differences in opinion represented a tactical move by nationalist leaders, seeking both to gain traction in leadership or factional struggles and to gain further support for the nationalist struggle generally, but Chitepo’s “more radical face” was probably closer to his genuine beliefs, rather than the other way around.

This argument is reinforced by the following example of polite communication from nationalists based in Rhodesia. In a 1972 message from ZAPU, the Labour Party was thanked for its help. Even the salutation is suggestive of how different this message is, in terms of both content and style, beginning “Distinguished Comrade”! The letter continues:

We wish to express our great appreciation and admiration for the sympathy which the Labour Party is demonstrating by assisting the oppressed peoples of southern Africa generally, and those of Zimbabwe in particular. For many years now, ZAPU has watched the evolution of the Labour Party policies towards those troubled parts of Africa with keen interest and we feel confident that your party will continue to play an important role towards the eventual solution of the problems of Zimbabwe and of southern Africa as a whole.469

It requires no in depth textual analysis to point out that the tone and content of this message was remarkably different to, for example, “Wilson’s Bloody Head”. It is notable that the message then proceeded to ask for assistance from the Labour Party. Given the origin of the message, and its intended aim, this example reinforces the argument that nationalists shaped their communications with and about Britain according to need, and that the different styles of communication can therefore be considered a pragmatic leadership tactic.

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The chapter will now briefly discuss some theoretical ideas of nationalism, with a view to exploring the potential differences within the nationalist movement and the suggested explanation for why this was the case. Kellas argues that nationalism legitimises the state, rouses amongst citizens “an emotional attachment towards it” and is closely linked to democracy.\textsuperscript{470} In avoiding normative assumptions about nationalism, Özkirimli posits that nationalism “constantly shapes our consciousness and...determines our collective identity”.\textsuperscript{471} He goes on to argue that it affects all areas of life including behaviour and the way in which people speak. This definition could be critiqued for its breadth, however it provides a succinct introduction into the importance of nationalism and issues of identity.

The doyen of theoretical studies of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, investigated this topic with the aim of exploring why cultural factors rouse such deep nationalist sentiment and sacrifice. The term “imagined communities” refers to the core of the theory that argues that the political community is imagined as “inherently limited and sovereign”. ‘Imagined’ refers to the reality that the perceived and experienced bond between members of a political community can only ever be imagined beyond one’s direct friends and family; there will be many members of the community that will never meet but there is still a sense of recognition and an intangible bond. Closely related to this is the community; an enduring sense of fraternity and comradeship despite inequality or hardship.\textsuperscript{472} Finally, Eriksen, in an attempt to draw together primordialist (attributes nationalist sentiment to human nature) and constructivist (attributes nationalist sentiment to historical, cultural and economic factors) approaches to the study of nationalism, also discusses the role of shared memory and shared history in creating and fostering national identity.\textsuperscript{473}

Certainly the legacy and history of the liberation struggle plays a role in contemporary Zimbabwean politics and conceptions of national identity\textsuperscript{474} but there is reason to

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believe that ideas about nationalism also played a role in shaping the independence struggle itself. Both explanations for the difference in approach of home and UK based nationalists can be fleshed out with reference to theories of nationalism. Each of these will be discussed briefly here. Some attention should be given to the question ‘why nationalism’? A liberation struggle, by its very nature, centres on issues of nationalism, identity and statehood, and particularly where colonialism is involved there is a need to recreate both the nation and the state to a new blueprint. In the case of Rhodesia, whilst white settlers saw themselves as Rhodesian in national identity, the African nationalist movement perceived, or purportedly perceived, an extension of British colonialism, which was the conceptual object against which they were struggling. It was not simply a matter of race or class or any other singular characteristic; the struggle centred on nationalism. This is where the terms Rhodesia and Zimbabwe come into the arena: the nationalist movement preferred the latter, which reflected a particular conception of the new state towards which they were aiming. In this sense, nationalism seems the perfect theoretical framework through which to explore nationalist tactics, since it was such a central issue in the Rhodesia crisis.

The theoretical ideas about nationalism, outlined briefly above, can be used to elucidate both potential explanations of the observed difference in the nationalist movement between those based at home and their representatives in the UK. Whilst the evidence explored earlier suggests that the second explanation; the difference as a leadership tactic, is more persuasive, it is worth briefly exploring the first explanation through the lens of nationalism. Synthesising the theoretical ideas of nationalism outlined above, it is clear that identity is central to the concept, and that a sense of shared identity based around cultural connections and shared history confers a sense of community, and of bonds with others within that community, even if people are unknown on a personal level.

Considering these factors as playing a role in national identity helps in understanding why differences emerged between nationalists based at home and their
representatives in the UK. Nationalists in Rhodesia, or the regional bases, were far more intimately involved in the independence struggle as it was unfolding. Many nationalist leaders were arrested and imprisoned for parts of the war, and these experiences were a stark contrast to the life of their counterparts in London. Eriksen’s idea of a shared history and shared memory shaping national identity suggests that nationalist representatives overseas might have a weaker bond to the ‘imagined community’ of a new Zimbabwe that those at home were fervently espousing, and that this could be attributed to different experiences and a different history, albeit in this context immediate, shaping ideas about national identity. It could be argued that these different experiences led ultimately to divergent ideas about how to achieve independence, and a different perception of Britain’s role within the struggle, with nationalists based in London seeing Britain as less of an external enemy, and more of a partner in the struggle against the Smith regime, but one less founded on strong ideas of nationalism than their contemporaries in Africa.

The second explanation of the difference is that it was simply a leadership tactic, designed to seek the best possible results from the intended audience of each communication. In this scenario, theoretical notions of nationalism really flourish. As highlighted throughout the chapter, nationalists based at home frequently espoused ardent anti-British sentiments, painting Britain and successive Governments as the puppet-masters of the Rhodesia crisis, intentionally keeping a right-wing white regime in power. Such sentiments, which appear to be a closer approximation of how African nationalists really viewed the situation, expressed both directly to representatives of the British political establishment and through various publications and press releases, paint a clear picture of Zimbabwean national identity as different to British colonialism and white rule. It can be argued that whether or not such communications were really representative of the views of the nationalist leaders, they were primarily designed to foster a sense of shared identity as a tool for maintaining support for the struggle, but also to assist with post-independence nation-building.
This line of thinking indicates that nationalist leaders may have been intentionally trying to shape the way in which much of the population both experienced the nationalist struggle at the time, and then how they recalled it after independence. If publicity at home had taken a similar tone in response to Britain as nationalists based there adopted, it would have made the struggle a murkier issue, with a more blurred picture of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is not to downplay the fact that the Smith regime was seen and represented in a similarly negative light, but this argument helps to elucidate why nationalists were a seemingly divided front with regards to Britain. It can be argued that the nationalist movement felt that their representatives would get the most benefit from being in Britain if they maintained a dialogue with the Government, but this was never the way in which the independence struggle was represented to the majority of people at home.

This chapter has explored potential differences in approach and political belief between nationalists based at home and their representatives in Britain. Through exploring various archival sources, such as records of meetings between British and African nationalist movement representatives and nationalist publications, it became apparent that there was indeed a difference. Nationalists based in Rhodesia seemed to adopt a forcefully anti-British stance, and conflate successive British Governments and the Rhodesian Front, whilst nationalist representatives in Britain took an ostensibly liberal stance, holding polite negotiations with British representatives, sometimes bordering on the obsequious. However, this dichotomy was not always the case. Some examples that did not conform to this trend were also discussed, illustrating that this divide was not clear-cut.

Given that nationalists based at home behaved similarly to their British envoys when settlement proposals they felt could lead to a resolution became available, it seems that the most likely explanation behind the ostensible difference in views and approach was that it was a leadership tactic, designed to simultaneously maximise support for the nationalist struggle within Rhodesia and build a strong sense of Zimbabwean nationalism as different from the colonial past, and get the most from having a nationalist presence in Britain and direct access to key political figures. This
ties into conceptions of nationalism as playing an important part of the independence struggle, both in terms of mobilising support for the war effort at the time, and with a view to nation-building after independence had been won.
Chapter 6 – Case Study: The Pearce Commission

“It should not be necessary to remind Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith that for two Scots to sit down in the African capital city of Harari (Salisbury) in the 1970s, to try to solve an African problem without Africans, is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. It can never succeed.”
Eshmael Mlambo

Introduction
This chapter differs to the four previous substantive chapters in that it will address all of the main research questions set out in the introduction, and covered respectively in chapters 1-4, but with a specific focus on the Pearce Commission as a case study. It will consider how campaigning on the Rhodesia issue correlated to key events, the methods used by advocacy organisations in responding to the events of the Pearce Commission, how all the parties involved interacted with each other and finally the differences in nationalist movement responses to the events of these settlement proposals between those based in Rhodesia and those based in the UK. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First it will allow for more detailed analysis of certain issues considered in the previous chapters, because of the narrowed focus. Second it offers an opportunity to draw the arguments of the previous chapters together into a more coherent story of what was going on at one important time during the 15 years of the Rhodesia crisis.

The main body of the chapter is structured chronologically, beginning with the UK general election in 1970, and concluding a few months after the publication of the official report of the Pearce Commission. A chronological approach was chosen to allow for coherent analysis of events as they unfolded at the time, and to understand how certain events coincided with key developments in the settlement negotiations and subsequent test of acceptability. Whilst a brief overview of the events of the

Pearce Commission will be provided separately, prior to the main analysis section of the chapter, this approach also allows for historical narrative to be woven into the denser analysis of archival sources.

It is worth briefly addressing the question of why the Pearce Commission was selected as the subject for a case study, particularly given that this was not a period during which the Labour Party was in power. Since the purpose of the case study was to draw the previous strands of analysis together with a narrowly focused sub-topic or period within the broader focus of the thesis, it had to be a topic which provided sufficient archival material. The Pearce Commission was suitable in these terms, but the volume of sources around this particular issue is in itself instructive. It suggests that the organisations involved simply had more to say and were more active on this issue than in response to earlier attempts at settlement. In contrast to the Tiger and Fearless talks before it, the Pearce Commission represented a more concrete and detailed plan to resolve the Rhodesia crisis, and as such garnered a more comprehensive response from the various interested parties. This is particularly evident in regard to the labour movement as it became far more vocal on the Rhodesia issue at this time than it had been at any point previously, in response to a tangible threat of a sell-out. This made the Commission the obvious candidate to develop a case study chapter around.

The chapter will begin with a brief overview of the Pearce Commission; what it was and how it played out, before moving on to a brief literature review, followed by the main analysis section. The overview contextualises the later analysis section, so that when discussion becomes focused on very specific events, the reader may have in mind the broader picture of what was going on, and how the specific fits into the general. The chapter will draw on a broad range of archival sources from all archives visited during the research for this project. This scope of sources reflects the intended scope of the chapter in drawing together ideas from the rest of the thesis in order to amplify and unify themes introduced in earlier chapters.
The Pearce Commission
Prior to the June 1970 general election, the Conservative Party had committed itself to one more attempt at talks to try to resolve the Rhodesia crisis. Around a similar time they also changed their stance on the sanctions regime, saying that it had noticeably had an impact on the Rhodesian economy, and that sanctions would therefore stay in place pending negotiations. The Labour Party was sceptical about Tory efforts at talks, especially since by preparing to negotiate with the regime, they had effectively accepted the 1969 constitution as a basis for these negotiations, which was completely at odds with the 6 principles that successive Governments had purported to work towards. The 1969 constitution had been ushered in after the rejection of the Fearless proposals as an attempt to quell dissent amongst the ranks of the Rhodesian Front, and Smith famously boasted that it would “sound the death knell of majority rule in Rhodesia”. As such, there was great concern amongst advocacy organisations and much of the political left in Britain that it would not be possible to negotiate any acceptable terms of settlement from such a starting point. The scepticism of the Labour Party on this issue was most clearly illustrated at the 1971 conference. A resolution put forward by Knutsford CLP and seconded by the NUM that called on the PLP to ensure that “no deals which do not recognise the Six Principles are made with the rebel regime” was then supported, but deemed “not strong enough” by Denis Healey representing the NEC. This illustrates the Party’s opposition to these attempts at settlement, but also their willingness to indulge in much strong pro-independence rhetoric whilst in opposition.

The Conservative Party faced objections to the resumption of talks at both UN and Commonwealth meetings. They also raised tensions through their decision to resume the sale of arms to South Africa. This issue was inextricably linked to what was happening in Rhodesia, since South Africa was overtly assisting the Smith regime in their fight against the nationalist guerrilla armies. However, international opposition

476 Meredith, Past is Another Country: 75.
477 LHASCH, HART 2 47, Agenda for 69th Annual Conference of Labour Party, Resolution 247, p 54.
478 Rhodesia Herald, 29/05/1969.
and Party quarrels eventually gave way to negotiations.\textsuperscript{480} Lord Goodman visited Salisbury in secret in April 1971, and returned for a “second, more public visit, in June when he was met by African school children and students protesting against racial discrimination. He earned the suspicion of the Africans by making no contact with them on this or subsequent visits”.\textsuperscript{481} Despite difficulties and scepticism about the nature of the terms of settlement that were being discussed, agreement was eventually signed on 24 November, 1971. There was a wave of activity during the following month from advocacy organisations in Britain, and African nationalists in Rhodesia, in response to the agreement having been signed. Despite this early display of concern about the proposals, their implementation was contingent upon them meeting the fifth principle; they had to be “acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole”.\textsuperscript{482}

The mechanism decided upon for employing this ‘test of acceptability’ was a commission, which was to be led by Lord Pearce. The terms of reference of the eponymous Pearce Commission stated that it was necessary for the commissioners to:

- satisfy themselves that the proposals for a settlement...have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia; to ascertain by direct contact with all sections of the population whether the people of Rhodesia as a whole regard these proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence; and to report...accordingly.\textsuperscript{483}

The Commission consisted of a Chairman (Lord Pearce), three vice Chairmen and 20 commissioners. On the demographic of these commissioners, the final report stated that

To enable us to carry out the investigation we felt that we needed Commissioners who had experience of rural and urban Africans, who had shown their capacity for handling people and crowds, who would be able to operate independently and who were capable of forming a balanced and impartial assessment of what they heard and saw. There were persons serving under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office whose previous

\textsuperscript{481} RH, MSS Afr. S. Box 254, File 11, ‘No Future Without Us: The story of the African National Council in Zimbabwe’, Published by Eshmuel Mlambo, ANC representative in Europe, undated.
\textsuperscript{482} Hansard, Rhodesia: Definition of the Five Principles, HL Deb, 16/12/1970.
service had shown that they had such qualifications and could be made quickly available. But it seemed better to get a substantial proportion who had pursued other walks of life.\footnote{TNA, FCO 92 25, Report on the Commission of Rhodesian Opinion, May 1972, 3.}

Despite this proclamation of a desired mix of backgrounds amongst the Commissioners, most were ex-colonial civil service personnel and some were still in the civil service. All had extensive overseas experience, often working as district commissioners in various British colonies in Africa. Perhaps to satisfy the stated criteria of diversity, most of the Commissioners also had experience outside of the civil service, in private industry, the UN, educational institutions and even London Zoo.\footnote{TNA, FCO 92 25, Report on the Commission of Rhodesian Opinion, May 1972, 3-4.} This demographic concerned the Rhodesian Front who feared that these people inherently hated the Europeans in southern Africa, and that their verdict would reflect this prejudice.\footnote{White, “Normal Political Activities”: 329.} It also concerned the African nationalist movement for opposite reasons, who feared that the Commission would simply rubber-stamp the proposals without genuinely investigating African opinion. The quote from Eshmael Mlambo of the ANC at the head of the chapter speaks to precisely this concern.

The Commissioners carried out the test of acceptability from January to March 1972. They had decided to explain the proposals to the Rhodesian people themselves, as well as distributing copies of the proposals in a simplified form, translated into Shona and Sindebele\footnote{TNA, FCO 92 25, Report on the Commission of Rhodesian Opinion, May 1972, 3-4.}, rather than leave it to the Smith Government or others. On this point, the final report noted that “The dividing line between exposition and advocacy is thin, but immensely important”.\footnote{White: “Normal Political Activities”: 329.} White chronicles the crumbling of the Commissioners’ early intentions to implement scientific sampling methods once they were in the field, quickly realising that the political reality trumped any attempts at rigid sampling.\footnote{RH, MSS Afr. S. Box 254, File 11, ‘No Future Without Us: The story of the African National Council in Zimbabwe’, Published by Eshmael Mlambo, ANC representative in Europe, undated.} She goes on to elucidate the methods that the Commission eventually employed:

During the commission’s visit, ‘vote’ became the operative shorthand for the many kinds of responses the commission would receive: written

\footnote{White, “Normal Political Activities”: 330.}
submissions, oral answers, shouts or a show of hands at public meetings – groups of twenty or more – were all described in the vocabulary of the ballot, which tended to obscure how much of the commission’s work went on in public.\footnote{Ibid: 331.}

It can be argued that these initial attempts at a more scientific approach to conducting the enquiry, including for example an opinion poll, were symptomatic of the level of planning and detailed thought that went into what was a very difficult exercise to carry out. That such methods inevitably crumbled in the field indicates a naivety of the original plans. However, the attempts to plan the Commission to such a level of granularity in the first instance demonstrates how seriously the task was taken by those responsible for it, and a desire to seek and represent the actual opinions of the population of Rhodesia.

The Labour Party, in response to fears that the Pearce Commission would not truly reflect the opinions of the population as a whole, decided to send a delegation of NEC representatives (Denis Healey, Joe Gormley, Joan Lestor and Tom McNally) to Rhodesia to observe.\footnote{LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Zimbabwe 1969-86, Correspondence between A. D. Home and Harry Nicholas, 22/12/1971-02/02/1972.} In a letter to the Conservative Party, explaining this request, it was stated that the NEC representatives “wish to…visit Salisbury and another urban centre (probably Bulawayo) and also to have the opportunity of observing the Commission’s work in the tribal trust areas”.\footnote{Ibid.} Douglas-Home was tentatively willing to grant this request, until it was effectively banned by Ian Smith because of the “resolutions supporting terrorist movements which were passed at the Labour Party Conferences in 1970 and 1972”.\footnote{LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Zimbabwe 1969-86, ‘Text of statement issued in Salisbury on Saturday 29 January 1972 by the Rhodesian Government.’}

There was also a great deal of concern amongst the African population in Rhodesia and amongst the Labour Party, the broader left and advocacy organisations in Britain that the Pearce Commission would simply rubber stamp the implementation of the
settlement proposals.\textsuperscript{494} However, such doubts were assuaged when the commission returned with a resounding ‘no’. The official report of the Pearce Commission was published on 23\textsuperscript{rd} May 1972. It represented a turning point of sorts in the Rhodesia crisis, since for the first time the African population had been given a voice, and used it to clearly reject the proposals developed by Britain and the Smith regime. It signified that any future negotiations, if they were to have any real credibility, would have to involve African representation.

Whilst previous chapters have focused exclusively on ZANU and ZAPU, this one will differ in that a case study on the Pearce Commission cannot in good conscience ignore the ANC. White highlights its formation and composition, which supports this point:

The ANC, Muzorewa told the commission in January, had only been formed in December 1971 ‘as a spontaneous grass roots reaction to the announcement of the terms of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals.’ Yet it was common knowledge that the ANC was an invention of the banned political parties. In his autobiography, Muzorewa described how the ANC had been created by a joint ZAPU and ZANU committee. He had been selected as a ‘neutral leader’, and was promised the full support of the two leaders still in detention, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo. The ANC’s executive committee would be equally divided between the two parties.\textsuperscript{495}

This indicates the importance of the ANC’s inclusion in considering the events of the Pearce Commission, since it was a vehicle through which the banned nationalist parties could participate in the political process unfolding, and for the first time have a voice in negotiations around settlement proposals.

As White argues, there is little secondary scholarship focusing directly on the Pearce Commission and where it is discussed, it is “the stuff of memoirs rather than of historical enquiry...because the Pearce Commission fits so neatly into the grand narrative of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe”.\textsuperscript{496} She characterises the Commission, not as a key turning point, but as a ‘stepping stone’ to further developments. However, this argument can be countered with the observation that the Pearce Commission and the


\textsuperscript{495} White, “Normal Political Activities”: 327.

\textsuperscript{496} White, “Normal Political Activities”: 322.
proposals it was designed to test, represented the last bilateral attempt at negotiation in the mode of Tiger and Fearless. The Pearce Commission is also covered in the so-called ‘grand narrative’ accounts of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe discussed briefly in the thesis introduction, but these accounts offer little beyond the formal progress of events.497

What the existing literature on the Pearce Commission does not do, is explore grass roots opinion on the proposals and the test of acceptability in Britain, or consider communication between representatives of African nationalist opinion in Rhodesia with the British political establishment. Quite often when this attempt at settlement is discussed in existing studies, the focus is very much on the test of acceptability itself, whilst the build-up to this point is largely obscured. In reality, the period during which the commissioners were in Rhodesia, gathering opinion on the proposals, was only three months, out of a broader timeline of closer to three years.

**Beyond the ‘grand narrative’?**

This section of the chapter will begin notionally with the British general election of June 1970, since it was the Conservative Party’s election victory that set in motion the events leading up to the Pearce Commission. Whilst Heath made it clear quite quickly after the election that he intended to reopen negotiations with Rhodesia if possible,498 it was believed highly unlikely that “these moves will go further than preliminary soundings”.499

In the Labour Party International Department’s ‘Background Brief on the Situation in Rhodesia’ the point was made that the Party’s policy had remained static since June 1970. The document also set out what this policy was, perhaps most importantly asserting that the Party “rejected the Conservative claim that any meaningful talks with the rebel regime were possible.”500 It stated that since the Smith Government rejected the Fearless proposals in 1968, the Labour Party felt that no settlement

497 See for example Meredith, *Another Country*; Verrier, *Road to Zimbabwe*.
500 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia misc. memos 1971-72, ID/1970-71/79, Background Brief on the Situation in Rhodesia (An information paper), undated.
would be possible without jeopardising the Six Principles, although it noted that the Conservative Party has never acknowledged the last of these Principles ("It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority by the minority, or of the minority by the majority"). 501 This summary of Labour Party policy is indicative of the Party’s willingness to pronounce very clearly on the Rhodesia issue whilst in opposition, particularly in light of media and advocacy attention on the Conservative Party’s attempts at settlement, in contrast to its pragmatic stance when in power.

At the 1970 Labour Party Conference, an Eton and Slough CLP resolution (217) stated that:

This conference reaffirms its belief that there should be no independence before majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and urges the Labour Government to disregard any deal made between the Conservative Government and the illegal regime in Salisbury that does not fully respect the principle of majority rule. 502

However, the annual report had just one brief paragraph on the Rhodesia education fund, which suggests that this resolution was never discussed at Conference. 503 It is interesting that, whilst there was clearly some concern amongst the broader labour movement over what would emerge from Heath’s talks with the Smith regime, 1970 was still remarkably quiet on the Rhodesia issue, and it was not until talks really began that more action from advocacy organisations and the labour movement became apparent. This is indicative of the pattern outlined in Chapter 2 about action on Rhodesia conforming very closely to events. Whilst there was some concern about what would happen with Rhodesia following the 1970 general election, it was only when concrete action was taken that organisations began to respond more vigorously.

The Africa Bureau was quick to respond to the fear that a settlement might arise from renewed talks between the Conservative Government and the Smith regime. In line with this, the organisation issued a press release in January 1971 to state that “Britain’s best interest will be damaged by any settlement of the Rhodesia question

502 LHASC, HART 2 47, Agenda for 69th Annual Conference of Labour Party, undated, p. 54.
based upon a compromise designed to relieve the Government of embarrassment.”

This is a very moderate stance to argue when faced with a potential sell out and is indicative of a pragmatic influence on the rhetoric used to argue against such an eventuality - that it would be counter to “Britain’s best interest” before any mention of the implications for the African population. It went on to argue that despite the persistence of the Rhodesia issue, this was not sufficient grounds to shirk responsibility for the situation there, and that any settlement reached must be in line with the Six Principles.

As negotiations began between the Smith and the Heath Governments, representatives of ZANU and ZAPU were quick off the mark to condemn any attempts at a sell-out and negotiations that did not involve them. Uncharacteristically, they sent a joint memorandum to the British Government, outlining their thoughts on the new round of talks. It is essentially a cautionary note, which stated that the nationalist organisations had heard of the negotiations through media reports. They suggested that if any ‘solution’ was arrived at that did not uphold the principles of self-determination and majority rule, ZANU and ZAPU would “level the blame on the British Government and the British people.”

It also points out that from previous rounds of talks, it should have become apparent that the Smith regime could not be considered as an “honest broker in any meaningful negotiations to settle the Rhodesia crisis”. This communication from representatives of the African nationalist movement was interesting in a number of ways. It did not quite reflect the tone of typical communications from either nationalist representatives based in London or those based at home; it is somewhere between the two. In particular, its condemnation of the British people is unusual, as typically African nationalists had been at pains to convey that they did not see the British people and the Government as the same thing; rather they viewed the British people as also being oppressed.

The comments outlined here, printed in an edition of Zimbabwe News, seem to find a middle ground

505 RH, MSS AAM 1211, ‘Memorandum to the British Government on behalf of ZANU and ZAPU’, undated.
506 See for example RH MSS AAM 1225, Address given by Jason Moyo, 13/01/1973, “In Zimbabwe we make the distinction between the British ruling class and the British people and we recognise that the British people are also oppressed...”.
between the typical positions of African nationalists based at home and their representatives in London, discussed in the previous chapter. The initial comments cited are reminiscent of the frequent anti-British sentiments that were expressed by nationalists based in Rhodesia and neighbouring countries, but the later comments picking holes in the content of the proposals are more akin to the arguments set out by nationalist representatives in Britain. This example reinforces the arguments made in Chapter 5 that perceived differences between the groups of nationalists were in fact indicative of a leadership tactic, designed to maximise returns from each exchange they engaged in.

ZANU representatives based at home issued typically strongly-worded statements on the new round of settlement proposals, saying that “the intention of the British Government in the current talks in Salisbury is to handover the basic rights of the five million people to a fascist settler government”. They highlighted three factors that underpinned this conclusion: that majority rule had been diluted to “government of the so-called ‘civilised and responsible’”; there had been no African representation at the talks so far; and, at that point, no sign of the proposals being put to the people. Finally, the proposals made provision for local councils to have more power on the grounds that this would provide more power for the African population when in reality local councils were subject to central Government control. The purpose of such statements were clearly to rouse popular opinion against the proposals and bolster support for the nationalist movement.

At the 1971 TUC Congress, motions on the Rhodesia issue and southern Africa were passed, indicating a greater labour movement interest and engagement with these issues due to greater awareness that the renewed talks had generated. The motion, moved by the Musician’s Union and seconded by the Chemical Workers’ Union, stated that Congress “deplores the Government’s intention to resume talks with the illegal regime in Rhodesia” and that:

Congress calls upon the General Council to press positive measures to strengthen trade union opposition to these regimes including...Giving full

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support, moral and material, to the Liberation movements in Southern Africa; giving full support to efforts to obtain the release of political prisoners…and breaking of trade union relations with white-only trade unions.\textsuperscript{508}

This motion was carried without debate or amendments, and illustrates a far greater engagement with the Rhodesia issue, and overt declaration of support for the African nationalist movement than can be seen earlier with the labour movement. However, the lack of debate or comment from the platform does not suggest huge grassroots concern for the issue.

Given the agitation of various advocacy groups and the broader labour movement over the 1971 proposals and the planned test of acceptability, it is no surprise that the Labour Party conference of this year gave time to the Rhodesia issue. A resolution, moved by Knutsford CLP, “urges the Parliamentary Labour Party to do all in its power to ensure that sanctions are being vigorously enforced, and that no deals which do not recognise the Six Principles are made with the rebel regime”.\textsuperscript{509} It also made the point that the Rhodesia issue should not be allowed to drift off the agenda before it was resolved. Lawrence Daly of the NUM was called on to second this resolution, and in so doing was more explicit about the relevance of the talks than the resolution itself. He stated that it was almost certain that “any settlement or deal made between the present Tory Government and the Smith regime will be a betrayal of the 5 million African Rhodesians and will be a further prop to the repressive rule of the white minority in that country”.\textsuperscript{510} This sentiment was then reinforced by Healey, in the capacity of NEC representative, who informed conference that the NEC wished for the resolution to be carried, with the caveat that it could be stronger. The resolution was carried by conference, unsurprisingly, as it contained nothing controversial on the subject and the outcome of the settlement negotiations were not, this time, the responsibility of the Labour Party leadership. This example does indicate the labour movement interacting positively with the Labour Party over the Rhodesia issue, however it is not dramatically different to earlier examples in which the movement

\textsuperscript{508} RH, MSS AAM 162, TUC Conference Resolutions, September 1971; 103\textsuperscript{rd} TUC Congress Report, 1971: 569-572.
\textsuperscript{509} LHASC, \textit{The Labour Party Annual Report} 1971, p. 265.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid.
rallied behind the Party; it is only the sentiment being expressed that differs here. The TUC independently echoed the sentiments expressed at the Labour Party conference in a statement issued later in 1971 which argued that the settlement proposals to be tested by the Pearce Commission did not provide a “basis for the development of a democratic state”. This is certainly indicative of a more genuine dovetailing of opinion on the Rhodesia issue than had been seen previously.

The Southern Africa Research Office established a new publication on Rhodesia designed to “provide a more detailed analysis of Rhodesian affairs than is available through the existing media”. Its founder Michael Christie, who also authored ‘Rhodesia: Proposals for a Sell-Out’, a pamphlet condemning Lord Goodman’s settlement proposals, wrote to the AAM enclosing the first edition and suggesting an exchange with AA News, their regular publication. The first edition of the new Rhodesian Review discussed the guerrilla war and the initiation of settlement negotiations as well as the trials and imprisonments of African nationalists. It is significant that, despite advocacy organisations making use of media coverage of events in Rhodesia to increase support for their campaigns, as discussed in Chapter 3, it was clearly perceived that there was still a need for further and more detailed coverage of events in Rhodesia. The initiation of this new publication, the on-going AA News, and various research outputs of the Africa Bureau all serve to illustrate this point. Whilst organisations generally cooperated very effectively in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue, this is one area in which there was a duplication of efforts and potential competition between different organisations working on the same issue. This can be attributed to the constraints of pragmatism in that such publications setting out greater detail on the Rhodesian situation than the mainstream media published was uncontroversial and unlikely to alienate any existing support of the advocacy campaign, but may attract new supporters. It was a less contentious method than channelling funds into material aid for the nationalist organisations.

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511 TUCL, Marjorie Nicholson papers, 39 968.2 2, TUC statement on Rhodesia, 01/12/1971.
512 A small publishing outfit established to publish material relating to issues around politics and decolonisation in southern Africa.
The church had long played a role in the activity of advocacy organisations campaigning on southern African issues, but this latest round of settlement proposals prompted more significant action from this sector than had been seen previously. Prior to the formation of the Justice for Rhodesia campaign in December 1971, which will be discussed shortly, the CIIR’s Southern Africa Group led some campaigning activities specifically addressing the new settlement proposals. Minutes from early November demonstrate the group’s attempt to publish a letter in The Times “setting out the conditions on which a settlement could be deemed possible”, for which they tried to obtain some signatures of prominent figures “including liberal Tories such as Lord Butler and Lord Boyle”, all of whom refused. This tactic was discussed in the meeting, with the opinion expressed that it might have been a naïve strategy, but it had been pursued because it was believed that such signatories would improve the chances of publication and the clout of the letter. The conventional strategy outlined in such a situation was described as asking “well known academics, Church leaders and labour peers”.

As discussed in Chapter 3, a key theme in the methods used by the AAM in campaigning on Rhodesia was trying to involve the labour movement, which met with mixed success. At a TUAG meeting in late November “discussion centred on the particular role trade unionists could play in opposing the probable sell-out on Rhodesia.” The tactics discussed in order to achieve this reflect the methods outlined in Chapter 3; using a meeting of the TUC General Council to encourage trade unionists to take a strong line on Rhodesia, and ensuring the TUC played an active role in discouraging emigration to Rhodesia. The fact that the AAM was still discussing such tactics illustrates the TUC’s lack of engagement with the Rhodesia issue prior to the Pearce Commission.

518 Ibid.
The Africa Bureau issued a press release once the content of the settlement proposals had become clear. It condemned the proposals as translating to “no majority rule in the lifetime of the present white Rhodesians”. The statement also articulated concerns relating to the proposed test of acceptability on several points, stating that it was no substitute for a universal vote, it was unlikely that the African population would be able to speak freely, the nationalist organisations had not been allowed TV or radio time, and that detainees should be released to be allowed to campaign on the issue. They also discussed the issue of the constitution upon which the settlement proposals were based, arguing that it did not effectively provide for a timely transition to majority rule. The statement concluded by reaffirming its stance that the proposals were unacceptable. The Bureau made it clear that it believed Britain should have waited a further couple of years before another attempt at settlement, to allow sanctions and the downturn in South Africa’s economy to put further pressure on the Smith Government, making them more amenable to genuine change.

The Africa Bureau planned to oppose the proposals “by all practical means including support for action by the United Nations and African actions designed to secure their rights and justice”. The notable exception to their “practical means” being material aid for the nationalist movement or no campaign. However, this statement was sent to the press and to all Africa Bureau members, which gives an indication of the how seriously the organisation was viewing the 1971 proposals, since generally press releases were only sent to the press. This highlights that there was a real fear amongst those organisations and individuals in Britain who were engaged with the Rhodesia issue that the 1971 proposals and planned test of acceptability could really lead to Rhodesian independence under unacceptable conditions of white settler dominance, but demonstrates the extent to which a pragmatic approach to campaigning and a limited repertoire of contention prevailed.

At the end of November 1971, the AAM organised a protest meeting called ‘Fight the Sell-Out’ to discuss the situation and inform interested members of the public about

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521 Ibid.
the possible ramifications of the current settlement negotiations. The speakers at this meeting represented the Labour Party, the broader labour movement, the AAM itself and individuals with direct links to Rhodesia, such as Byron Hove, a “former student leader at University College Rhodesia” who had been detained by the Smith regime before escaping to Britain. The AAM also secured broad-ranging support for the meeting from other organisations, such as the Africa Bureau, the NUS, the CPGB, the Labour and Liberal Parties, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the United Nations Association.

As well as those mentioned above, Judith Todd spoke at the AAM protest meeting. She set out some key problems with the settlement, but also made some suggestions as to what could be done to protest against any potential agreement based on the proposals:

It is up to you who care about what the British Government is allowing to happen to the people of Rhodesia to do what you think is best to register your protest. You may use the Churches, the Trade Unions, your MPs, political groups – anything you can think of. But tonight I appeal especially to the Press of this land...What you can do for us is to insist that representatives of the media of this country accompany the Commission wherever they go. By so doing, you may shame the Commission into admitting that they have been asked to do, in six weeks, what no impartial Commission could do in one year.

This brief section of the speech neatly captures a summation of the typical methods advocacy organisations employed in campaigning on the Rhodesia issue. Trying to involve the labour movement, lobbying government and MPs, making use of existing social networks (exemplified here by churches) and involving the media were the main methods seen in Chapter 3, and fall into a fairly typical repertoire of contention. None of these familiar methods strayed into territory that could be perceived as too extreme, and therefore alienate any potential supporters of the campaign. However, Todd’s final suggestion was more innovative, and illustrative of the idea discussed at length in Chapter 2, about protesting tailoring itself to particular events.

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523 RH, MSS AAM 1215, ‘Fight the Sell-Out protest meeting’, Assorted documents, including List of speakers and List of organisations in support of the meeting, 30/11/1971.
524 Daughter of Garfield Todd, who was Prime Minister of Rhodesia 1953-58. She was actively opposed to the Smith regime, and was arrested in January 1972 as a result of this.
December 1971 was a key month in terms of activity surrounding the settlement proposals. Several organisations were established at this time specifically to protest against the possibility of a sell-out following the test of acceptability, which was due to begin the following month. The African nationalist movement in Rhodesia saw the establishment of the ANC, to mobilise support for a ‘no’ to the commissioners, and in Britain two new advocacy groups, or committees, were set up to lobby the Conservative Government and ensure that the test of acceptability was not merely a rubber stamp for a sell-out. Again it is illuminating that organisations, limited by their pragmatic approach to the issue, chose to lobby the British Government rather than to work directly with the no campaign in Rhodesia.

The Pearce proposals were discussed at a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting in December 1971, prior to the commissioners arriving in Rhodesia. Alex Lyon suggested that, in an upcoming debate on Rhodesia, the Labour Party should “show the country just how worm-rotten” the Conservative Party’s settlement proposals were. Joan Lestor stated that the labour movement was still concerned with the Rhodesia issue, and the Party needed to be clear about its position if the Pearce proposals went through and there was dissatisfaction amongst the British left. She also asked “What would be the responsibilities shouldered by a future Labour Government?” This suggested a greater degree of concern for the views of the broader labour movement than was evident amongst the Labour Party leadership over the Rhodesia issue. It can be argued that this concern, and the likelihood of a labour movement swell of discontent were Pearce to have turned out differently, indicates the importance of this series of events in the Rhodesia crisis. Had the Commission returned with different findings, the Rhodesia issue could have been far more explosive and controversial in the early- to mid-1970s than it turned out to be.

On the same day, the TUC General Council made a statement on Rhodesia. Whilst expressing concern over the implications of the settlement proposals, this was far milder in tone than earlier statements by, for example, the Africa Bureau or the

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526 LHASC, PLP Minutes, 01/12/1971.
527 Ibid.
Labour Party Conference. The statement discussed the proposed new electoral system, land allocation, racial divisions in industry, and praised trade unions as holding the potential to counter the current system. It also stated that:

The British people are entitled to expect that a colony which demands independence should be prepared to break with practices which hinder the progress of the majority of its citizens, should respect civil liberty, and should show willingness to offer equal opportunity to men and women of all races, socially and otherwise.\(^{528}\)

Whilst the statement discussed the situation of the African majority, it never explicitly mentioned the nationalist movement, nor did it use any of the strong language that other similar statements drew on, such as ‘condemning’ the proposals. However, it was indicative of a greater interest in the Rhodesia issue by the labour movement than was seen with earlier rounds of settlement talks.

In mid-December at a TUC International Committee meeting, the Rhodesia issue was discussed. The meeting began with one member of the Council arguing that the December 1\(^{st}\) statement, discussed above, did not go far enough: “He suggested that strong representations should be made to Government that independence to Rhodesia should not be granted without a definite arrangement for majority rule”.\(^{529}\) Other members of the Committee felt that the earlier statement was sufficient, and argued that “Congress policy did not go so far as to suggest majority rule before independence was granted”. The latter voice won the debate, with the International Committee accepting the December 1\(^{st}\) statement, on the basis that it “referred to the need for a radical change in approach to the constitutional and social problems of Rhodesia” and called for “the creation of a democratic, non-discriminatory and non-racial society, which alone could justify the claim to independence”. This example demonstrated the tensions within one element of the labour movement over the appropriate strategy to use in relation to the Rhodesia issue, and also shows that, although there was at this time greater interest in the issue, a more moderate approach was still preferred over becoming a more radical voice, along the lines of most advocacy organisations working on Rhodesia. Domestic political concerns at this

\(^{528}\) MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, TUC General Council statement, 01/12/1971.

\(^{529}\) MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, TUC General Council minutes, 15/12/1971.
time almost certainly were more pressing to the majority of trade unionists than foreign policy, with a focus on industrial relations legislation and a wave of union strike action. The precedence of such concerns over Rhodesia amongst a large portion of the labour movement helps to explain the cause of its disengagement with this issue, which prevailed until the late 1970s. However, it should be noted that there were, throughout the period, some elements of the labour movement who were willing and able to go against Party policy. These were often members of the new university-educated left, such as those involved in advocacy work, and CLPs in areas that were less affected by issues such as economic instability and immigration, who had more freedom to focus on causes further from home such as development and decolonisation.

This divide in the labour movement, between those who were engaged with the Rhodesia issue, and those for whom other issues took precedence is further illustrated by the National Organisation of Labour Students (NOLS), who wrote to the Labour Party informing them of an emergency resolution passed at their annual conference. It stated that any attempt to solve the Rhodesian crisis except by majority rule, accompanied by universal education and the repeal of discriminatory laws, would be unacceptable, and therefore condemned the Conservative proposals for settlement. They received a reply stating that the NEC “fully supports your condemnation of the Government’s Rhodesia Settlement.” It restated the NEC’s opposition to the proposals, including specific points on issues such as the length of time for which majority rule would be postponed. The reply reassured the NOLS that “both the NEC and the Parliamentary leadership will oppose this settlement by all means possible and ensure that African opinion clearly sees that we do not condone the Government’s action.” This exchange demonstrated a component of the labour movement engaging with the Rhodesia issue in such a way that was comparable in tone and method to much of the advocacy campaigning. This can be attributed to the generational and occupational difference of this element of the labour movement, to

530 Minkin, Contentious Alliance: 118.
531 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 89, Rhodesia 1972, Letter from Neil Vann, National Youth Officer for the National Organisation of Labour Students, to Harry Nicholas, Labour Party General Secretary, 21/12/1971.
532 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 89, Rhodesia 1972, Letter from Tom McNally to Neil Vann, 03/02/1972.
533 Ibid.
many of the examples explored in this thesis. As a student organisation, there was inevitably less of a preoccupation with bread and butter domestic concerns, and greater freedom to explore socialist ideals of assisting a faraway struggle.

The ANC’s formation was officially announced on the 16th December 1972. White argues that, whilst Muzorewa at the time marketed the formation of the ANC as a spontaneous grass roots response to the settlement proposals, “it was common knowledge that the ANC was an invention of the banned political parties”.\footnote{White, “Normal Political Activities”: 327.} An initial meeting took place between Alec Douglas-Home and ex-detainees representing nationalist opinion, part of the former’s programme of consulting with a wide range of Rhodesian opinion on the settlement proposals. This group, comprising Edson Sithole, Michael Mawema and Cephas Msipa, decided to continue to work together afterwards “to form a body to work for and lead opposition to the Proposals”.\footnote{RH, MSS Afr. S. 1681, Box 254, File 11, ‘No Future Without Us: The story of the African National Council in Zimbabwe’, published by Eshmael Mlambo – European representative of the ANC, undated.} Bishop Muzorewa was “a clear choice for leadership of this body...because he had not been involved in the previous splits in the nationalist movement, nor would he immediately attract a government banning order on the ANC”.\footnote{Ibid.} Following the detention of Josiah Chinamuso of ZAPU, it was sometimes argued that ZANU came to dominate the ANC.\footnote{White, “Normal Political Activities”: 328, citing Centre Party documents on the settlement proposals and the ANC.}

Also in this month, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign was established, in response to fear of a settlement as a result of the negotiations. As discussed briefly in the introduction, the campaign’s chairman, Joseph Camilleri wrote to Harold Wilson to publicise the new organisation and its purpose, which he stated was to “oppose the settlement, to call for the continuation and intensification of sanctions and to insist on the right of African self-determination.”\footnote{LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Letter to H. Wilson from J. Camilleri, 27/12/1971.} The letter concluded by stating how important the campaign’s organisers believed it was to obtain support from the Labour and Liberal Parties to help prevent any sell-out. It also gave a more detailed statement about the Justice for Rhodesia campaign, which as well as outlining the
present settlement proposals and what it felt would be a better alternative, namely
the intensification of sanctions, contained a section detailing what the campaign
argued could be practically done about the situation. In cementing the importance of
the cause, and in line with the organisation’s demography, the document cited
Archbishop Dwyer of Birmingham: “If a settlement is made with Rhodesia without
injustice being righted, at least do not let us pretend that it has.”539 It also made
suggestions such as holding vigils, forming local groups, participating in protests held
by other organisations, getting media coverage and lobbying Parliament. Such ideas
were characteristic of the campaigning strategies discussed in detail in Chapter 3; it is
clear that this organisation operated within a clearly defined repertoire of contention,
despite being newly formed in relation to the specific instance of these settlement
negotiations. It is also indicative of the importance the issue was attributed due to the
possible settlement.

At its inception, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign also wrote to Vic Feather of the
TUC to try to establish some labour movement support for the campaign. The letter
was tailored specifically to encourage the participation of the TUC, stating that "this is
a matter of direct concern to the Trade Union movement generally and to you
personally, since what is at stake is the future of so many millions of workers, in
Rhodesia.”540 The letter included a list of people involved in the campaign; mainly
representatives of various different churches or church organisations, but also
representatives of the Africa Bureau, the AAM, the Defence and Aid Fund and the
Observer, along with the general campaign documents that were also sent to Harold
Wilson and discussed above. This letter draws together and illustrates two key points
that have been discussed in previous chapters. First, it shows the willingness of
advocacy organisations to cooperate effectively in seeking a solution to the Rhodesia
crisis. Second, it reinforces the argument made in Chapter 3 that one of the key
methods that some advocacy organisations (particularly the AAM) utilised was to
work to expand support for the cause amongst the labour movement, especially trade
unionists.

539 Ibid.
540 MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, Letter from J. Camilleri to Vic Feather, 15/12/1971.
Later in the month, the AAM instigated the formation of its own internal organisation to respond to the settlement talks and the possibility of a sell-out. As discussed in Chapter 2 as an illustration of advocacy activity coalescing around particular events in the Rhodesia timeline, the RECC was formed. This initial meeting of the organisation made arrangements for a demonstration to be held in February of the following year. It appointed a working party to facilitate the organisation of this event which included representatives of the AAM, the Communist Party (which the AAM had been reticent to work with earlier on for fear of appearing too radical), the Labour Party and the labour movement.\textsuperscript{541} The range of people involved in the new organisation and its inaugural event very much conformed to the methods used by advocacy organisations discussed in Chapter 3, with the exception of the inclusion of the Communist Party. This shift in an earlier, albeit informal, policy of the AAM indicated the seriousness of the situation as perceived at the time, prompting a willingness to diversify to strengthen the campaign. It was also indicative of more productive interaction between the Labour Party, advocacy organisations and the broader labour movement than it was possible to detect throughout much of the period under consideration, again strengthening the idea that this most recent round of settlement talks were being taken very seriously by all parties. It also reinforces the argument made above regarding the Labour Party’s shift towards espousing more radical rhetoric, reminiscent of, for example, the AAM, now that they were not in government.

The January edition of \textit{Zimbabwe News} carried an entertaining satirical skit about the Pearce Commission on its cover page:

\begin{quote}
‘I am afraid, Smithy, home-boy, the game’s up. The settlement is done for. Those blacks don’t look as if they’ll back down.’

‘But, my dear Alec, you’ll have to find another trick to keep your kith-and-kin in charge here.’\textsuperscript{542}
\end{quote}

The article went on to discuss the Commission more fully, arguing that the African population was doing well at conveying an overwhelming ‘no’ to the proposals, but warning that there was always more to be done. The ANC was congratulated for

\textsuperscript{541} LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, ‘Minutes of meeting convened by the Anti-Apartheid Movement to discuss the setting-up of a Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee’, 29/12/1971.

leading the campaign against the proposals, but the text quickly proceeded to argue that “there must be no revisionism...The armed struggle will still have to be fought out to the finish.” This suggests that whilst the ANC was respected by ZANU for its role in defeating the Pearce proposals, there was a mistrust of the organisation from quite an early stage about what they might go on to advocate afterwards. It was seen as useful by ZANU for the purposes for which it was established; protesting against the proposals, but once these had been defeated there was a clear belief in the importance of a return to armed struggle.

In a press release in early January 1972 the RECC set out an advert for the protest march it was organising for the following month. This was circulated at the time that Bishop Muzorewa confirmed his availability to speak at the march. It concluded by mentioning another, smaller demonstration, planned for January 10th. This demonstration was held at Heathrow Airport and coincided with the departure of the Pearce Commission for Rhodesia. The content of this press release highlighted two key arguments made in earlier chapters. First, it demonstrated an advocacy organisation harnessing the press, in terms of raising awareness but also in referring to ‘big names’ that would resonate with the British public in order to attract greater interest in their campaign. Second it demonstrates the correlation between events and actions on Rhodesia, and the extent to which advocacy organisations not only responded to key events, but also made use of them in order to shape their actions and campaigns on Rhodesia. Another example of this was the demonstration the RECC held in Whitehall, to coincide with a House of Commons debate on Rhodesia:

Sixty people stood for one hour with placards and banners in Whitehall – at the entrance to Downing Street – and a letter finally calling for the withdrawal of the settlement proposals, the maintenance and strengthening of sanctions, and that in future negotiations for a settlement in Rhodesia be conducted with representatives of the African majority and other democratic forces in the country, was signed and delivered.

Donal McGregor of the London Co-operative Society Political Committee wrote to the Labour Party to inform them of a resolution passed at their AGM regarding Rhodesia:


This meeting...noting the repressive measures taken by Smith’s illegal regime in Rhodesia and the clear evidence of the opposition by the African people against the Home-Smith proposals calls upon the Labour, Co-operative and Trade Union movement to actively campaign against these proposals and to insist on the continuance and strengthening of the United Nations sanctions against this inhuman, illegal and racist regime of terror against people who want only elementary human rights.  

This demonstrated greater interest in the Rhodesia issue amongst elements of the labour movement, in response to the threat of a sell-out. It also reinforces the argument made in Chapter 5, about the nature of interactions between the Labour Party and the broader movement, as this letter received exactly the same response as the National Organisation of Labour Students, discussed above.

Towards the end of January 1972, the AAM sent a comprehensive letter to Harold Wilson with the aim of enlisting support for the RECC demonstration, planned for the following month. On the progress of the Pearce Commission, the letter stated that:

> It is becoming clearer each day that despite the repressive actions of the Smith regime, despite the denial of access to the media, the deaths and the detentions, Africans are saying no to the settlement proposals – a reply clearly unforeseen by Smith or indeed Sir Alec Douglas Home.

They argued that, whilst the policy was not without its flaws, sanctions should be strengthened to try and bring about genuine change in Rhodesia. By going down this route, instead of the Pearce Commission, Britain would at least be demonstrating “moral support” for Rhodesian Africans. The AAM called a meeting of representatives of a broad range of organisations to seek to mobilise the “large and growing body of British public opinion which is concerned to oppose” the Pearce Commission and the settlement proposals.

The above was an example of both the methods the AAM used in trying to further its cause, and of the interactions it had with the Labour Party leadership. First, it indicated a willingness to interact with other organisations sympathetic to the same
cause, to reach a broader spectrum of people. The language used in this letter also suggested a strong interest in, and concern with, the Rhodesia issue amongst the British public. This was evidently conveyed to try to convince the Labour Party that it would be in its interests to support the AAM in this campaign. The reply the AAM received from Tom McNally, in his capacity as International Secretary and on behalf of Wilson, stated that the NEC and the PLP have “taken a very firm line on the present workings of the Pearce Commission”. The letter also referenced “private discussions” the NEC had with Bishop Muzorewa, and made the point that Labour would fight in parliament any settlement that did not meet the Six Principles. It concluded by saying that the Party was currently considering its policy on Rhodesia and would clarify this following the return of the Pearce Commission. This letter was characteristic in its lack of a direct answer to the original letter from the AAM. Citing talks with Bishop Muzorewa was a way of legitimising the moral fibre of the Party’s Rhodesia policy without ever clarifying what this policy actually was. It should be noted that although Muzorewa would later be dismissed as an unrepresentative mouthpiece, at this point he was regarded as an important figure by the British Government.

On February 13th 1972, a march and rally was held in Trafalgar Square, organised by the RECC, referred to as the ‘Fight the Sell-Out in Rhodesia demonstration’, attended by around 8000 people. One of the speakers at this event was Bishop Muzorewa, indicating productive interaction between the nationalist movement and advocacy organisations over this issue, albeit under the auspices of the ANC rather than the more radical ZANU or ZAPU. In his address he made it clear how vehemently the African population of Rhodesia opposed the proposals, and that the Smith Government’s claim that an African ‘No’ was because of intimidation was completely false. He also spoke briefly about the ANC, saying that it:

548 LHASC, LPID papers, Box 111, Rhodesia Correspondence 1972, Letter from Tom McNally to Ethel de Keyser, 11/02/1972.
549 ‘43 held after London rally’, The Guardian 14/02/1972. A counter-demonstration was also held, attended by some white Rhodesian and supporters of the National Front – see ‘Demonstrators arrested outside Rhodesia House in London following rally opposed to proposed settlement’, available online at http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/RTV/1972/02/13/BGY508140228/?s=rhodesia [accessed 27/01/2014].
Is the only body in Rhodesia that has any right to speak for the vast majority of the population of Rhodesia. It was formed two months ago as the result of a spontaneous grass roots feeling among millions of Africans who are determined that history shall not record that the Africans of Rhodesia accepted the betrayal of their birthright.\textsuperscript{550}

It is illuminating that he did not mention ZANU or ZAPU, except by allusion to other older African organisations that pre-date the Rhodesian Front, and therefore had some kind of automatic legitimacy conferred by age.

Further comments made by Muzorewa were reminiscent of the argument set out in Chapter 5, regarding anti-British sentiment expressed by nationalists being a tactical move designed to maximise support for the cause. In his speech he stated that “it is sad indeed to think that the \textbf{British people} and their government could allow the betrayal of so many innocent people whose only failing seems to be their faith in the fairness and decency of the British people”.\textsuperscript{551} Then in his autobiography, speaking about this very event, he wrote that:

\begin{quote}
I pondered one of the contradictions of our liberation struggle. At home I battle against white people largely of British extraction who are die-hard racists. ... Here in the centre of London I found myself surrounded by white people who were loudly condemning the racism of the Smith regime.\textsuperscript{552}
\end{quote}

This ostensible contradiction in his opinion of the British people further reinforces the argument set out in Chapter 5. In the context of trying to win support for the nationalist cause, and mobilise support against the settlement proposals and any potential sell-out he referred to the British people as allowing this betrayal to happen, and conflated them with the British Government, which in other contexts were very carefully differentiated between. However, in speaking about this event in a more personal way, he acknowledges support for the liberation struggle amongst the British people present at this event.

In a fascinating article on Rhodesia House, and its history as a kind of extended metaphor for relations between Britain and Rhodesia during the crisis, Brownell talks

\textsuperscript{550} RH, MSS AAM 1216, ‘Text of Bishop Muzorewa’s speech’, undated.
\textsuperscript{551} Ibid, emphasis added.
about its powerful symbolic role for all sides of the debate, particularly as a protest venue.\textsuperscript{553} This was illustrated at the RECC march, which took in Rhodesia House on its route,\textsuperscript{554} and drew on the symbolism of the contested space that it represented. A statement was read out, when the march reached the building, that effectively condemned the actions of the British Government in granting Rhodesia self-governing status, and in trying to sell out to the white regime through the mechanism of the test of acceptability. It ended with the raising of a Zimbabwean flag dedicated to the ideals of democracy, freedom and the fight against racism.\textsuperscript{555}

Minutes from a regular meeting of the RECC committee give a clear impression of the issues with which the organisation was concerned at this time, and the methods it was using to campaign against the Pearce Commission and possibility of a sell-out. As discussed in Chapter 3, through exploring the methods used by different advocacy organisations through the lens of resource mobilisation theory, it became clear that each organisation had a range of concerns outside its specific remit or campaign objectives. This was shown in these minutes by a lengthy discussion about finances, as the RECC found itself in the fortunate position of having a funding surplus. Different suggestions were made as to what should be done with this: using it for campaigning in Britain, assisting the ANC financially or using it to hold another fundraising event to raise money for the defence costs of people who had been arrested at the demonstration in Trafalgar Square the previous month. That the first of these options was chosen serves as a vivid indication of the constraints pragmatism placed on the actions of the advocacy organisations, and illustrates the cause of African nationalist frustration with British campaigning on the issue, not that the surplus was a significant sum.\textsuperscript{556}

The RECC also discussed campaigning very specifically tailored to the programme of the Pearce Commission; a clear example of the argument set out in Chapter 2, only focused on a very specific period of time. The organisation had found out the

\textsuperscript{554} RH, MSS Afr. S. 1681, Box 264, File 3, RECC Minutes, 19/01/1972.
\textsuperscript{555} RH, MSS AAM 1216, ‘Statement to be read out at ‘Rhodesia’ House’, 13/02/1972.
\textsuperscript{556} MRC, MSS 280/31/1, RECC minutes, 10/03/1972.
headquarters of the Pearce Commission whilst it was in London, and the dates of the London hearings. It was decided that for each of these days, a vigil would be held outside the headquarters, with a different organisation taking responsibility for organising cover for a different day. Various slogans were suggested for this period, succinctly stating some shocking facts about the situation in Rhodesia to try and mobilise support amongst the general public, such as “31 people killed, between 2-3000 arrested during ‘test of acceptability’”. This document illustrated some important points made in earlier chapters about the way in which advocacy organisations responded to the Rhodesia situation. First, it demonstrates that there was a high level of cooperation between different organisations working for the same ends. Second, it shows the way in which organisations responded to and used particular events to mobilise broader support for their campaigns. This is demonstrated by the way in which vigils were organised to display phrases from current news reports on Rhodesia to use as visual sound bites at such events, to attract interest in the subject.

Around this time ‘Report on the activities of the Justice for Rhodesia campaign’ was published. The Justice for Rhodesia campaign helped to mobilise opposition to the settlement through the “wide distribution” of a leaflet on the subject, and it held a public meeting in January 1972 addressed by “Bishop Huddleston, Lord Caradon, Bishop Butler, Eshmael Mlambo of the African National Council and Jeremy Thorpe MP.” This was reminiscent of the various methods used by advocacy organisations outlined in Chapter 3, conforming to accepted methods of contention. The range of speakers at the meeting was a typical configuration deployed at such events.

The campaign report provided a clear depiction of the way in which advocacy activity coalesced around particular events and changes in the situation. It is worth citing the report to illustrate this:

Since the riots and shootings in January and the reports coming out of Rhodesia that have made it increasingly clear that the Africans have overwhelmingly and decisively rejected the settlement, and that the Pearce

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557 Ibid.
Commission cannot report otherwise, the campaign has been concerned mainly with its strategy for after the publication of the report, when the Government will find it necessary to decide future policy on Rhodesia.\footnote{Ibid}

Further to the general fluctuations in the levels of interest in the Rhodesia issue, discussed in the first substantive chapter, this example shows how specific advocacy organisation activities and tactics were tailored closely to developments in the situation. In line with this trend, the Justice for Rhodesia campaign produced another leaflet to be distributed through trade unions, church groups and so on, to convey their position prior to the release of the Commission report.

As discussed earlier in the thesis, outside of London and sporadic local actions, the only other notable regional hub of advocacy activity on Rhodesia was in Birmingham, particularly with the Birmingham Committee for Justice in Rhodesia. This can be attributed to the prominence of race as a political issue in both London and Birmingham due to the cumulative effects of post-war immigration,\footnote{I. Gordon and T. Travers, ‘Race, Immigration and Community Relations in Contemporary London’, LSE Race, Immigration and Community Relations in Contemporary London seminar summary paper, April 2006.} and perhaps also the links between Birmingham University and University College Rhodesia. The Birmingham groups operated in a similar way to much of the other advocacy activity that was discussed in Chapter 3 and in the current chapter, as illustrated in the minutes of their ‘trade union liaison group’. The discussion centred on the importance of getting the message about what was happening in Rhodesia out to “the working class movement working in Birmingham factories”.\footnote{MRC, MSS 202 S J 3 2 166, Birmingham Committee for Justice in Rhodesia trade union liaison group minutes, 28/03/1972.} Also discussed was concern that many Birmingham businesses had interests in Rhodesia and were therefore keen to see a settlement with the Smith Government as soon as possible. Trying to mobilise support amongst workers was therefore seen as an important method of countering this tacit support for the Pearce Commission and the possibility of settlement.

In late April the RECC wrote to the TUC in the hopes of setting up a meeting between them and ANC representatives in London. It stated that the ANC were hoping to discuss with the TUC “issues concerning the future of Rhodesia, and in particular the
question of British workers emigrating to Rhodesia”.\textsuperscript{562} The meeting then took place in early May. On the subject of strengthening economic pressure on Smith, which the ANC had expressed belief in as the way to bring about genuine change and force him back to the negotiating table, it was suggested that the ANC should get other African countries to help lobby the US and France to honour the sanctions regime.\textsuperscript{563} On the subject of British emigration to Rhodesia, the TUC stated that they had passed a resolution a year earlier trying to deter people from emigrating to South Africa and that “this action could probably quite easily be extended to Rhodesia”, although it was also pointed out that “the TUC has no real power over workers’ decisions on such matters”. This meeting is perplexing in the sense that it shows the TUC making an effort to meet with representatives of the African nationalist movement and discuss possibilities of what they could do to assist the cause. But equally it illustrates the TUC’s earlier disinterest or apathy over Rhodesia, in that it could easily have taken action on the emigration issue several years earlier, and indeed it still did not commit definitely to acting on this point. As discussed earlier, this very same suggestion was put to the TUC in November of the previous year by the AAM; evidently to no avail. This is further evidence of the propensity of the advocacy movement and its university-educated new left members to phrase its pleas for support to the labour movement in such a way that failed to resonate with the more traditional working-class concerns, particularly at a time of industrial unrest and high immigration. At this time, the TUC still tended to support the policies of the Labour Party leadership, and whilst there were small pockets of support for the ideals of the AAM, this failed translate into a substantial challenge to the presiding view. This disengagement with the Rhodesia issue by a majority of the labour movement frustrated representatives of the African nationalist movement, despite trying to draw parallels between themselves and ‘the people’ of Britain.\textsuperscript{564}

Also in early May, the AAM, together with the NUS met with representatives of the ANC. This meeting arose from a “Zimbabwe meeting of European NUSes in London”

\textsuperscript{562} MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, Letter from Roger Trask to Vic Feather, 29/04/1972.
\textsuperscript{563} MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, Record of meeting between TUC representatives and Canaan Banana of the ANC, 05/05/1972.
\textsuperscript{564} RH, MSS AAM 1225, Address given by Jason Moyo, 13/01/1973.
earlier in the year, after which Bishop Muzorewa requested a further meeting with the British NUS.565 At the second meeting, the ANC emphasised the need for continued strengthening of sanctions, and “the NUSUK representatives were requested to pressurize the British Government not to weaken or remove sanctions and other European NUSes on the need to pressurize their own Governments.” The ANC delegation expressed concern that the British Government might recognise the Smith Government and remove sanctions, or offer de facto recognition and weaken sanctions gradually, either of which would have been disastrous to the African nationalist cause. Towards the end of the meeting the AAM and the NUSUK both declared their commitment to increasing their circulation of detailed information, as an important mechanism for maintaining awareness of the Rhodesia issue.

The record of this meeting shows the ANC interacting productively with representative organisations from the labour and advocacy movements, and making use of existing networks through which to further their aims. That said, the NUS cannot be said to be a conventional part of the labour movement, and was therefore clearly more aligned to the university-educated new left that populated many of the advocacy organisations. This also explains why the ANC had more positive interactions with the NUS than with the more traditional blue-collar unions. This example illustrates more positive and beneficial cooperation between organisations than was often seen in Chapter 4, because of the seriousness with which each group was taking the possibility of a sell-out as a result of the Pearce Commission. This was captured by the final sentence of the meeting record, which reads: “All three organisations agreed to keep in regular contact in order to prevent a sell-out and to increase support for the struggle of the Zimbabwe people.”

At the end of April, Bishop Muzorewa wrote to Judith Hart, essentially to lay the groundwork for a meeting between ANC and Labour Party representatives, when the ANC visited the UK the following month, “to discuss what we believe will be constructive alternatives to the present situation”.566 He highlighted that the majority

565 MRC, MSS 280 31 3, ‘Meeting of NUSUK and Anti-Apartheid Movement with the African National Congress of Rhodesia’, 07/05/1972.
566 LHASC, HART 2 28, Letter and reply from Bishop Muzorewa to Judith Hart, 30/04/1972 and 08/05/1972.
African population was eager to participate in the solution to the Rhodesia crisis, demonstrated by their support for the difficult economic reality that international sanctions inflicted, a fact he trusted the Pearce Commission to report. This illustrated the shift in opinion on the Pearce Commission, amongst African nationalist representatives, advocacy organisations and the labour movement, from one of scepticism about the Commission’s ability and willingness to be impartial and thorough, to one of trust in the work of the Commission as it gradually became apparent that an overwhelming ‘no’ was being reported.

A delegation of the ANC had travelled to London to present their views to the British Government and the British public regarding the settlement proposals. In a press conference prior to the delegation’s departure, Rev. Canaan Banana, Vice Chairman of the ANC, stated that they had made clear their rejection of the proposals directly to Alec Douglas Home. They had also set out their reasons for disagreeing with the proposals: “the way they were negotiated, the absence of any guarantee of majority rule and the fact that they were based on the illegal 1969 constitution.”

It goes on to press for the continuation of sanctions and the convening of a constitutional conference inclusive of African representation. The tone of this speech was very much in line with that of the majority of communications discussed in Chapter 5 between nationalist representatives based in Britain and representatives of the British Government.

Just prior to the official publication of the Pearce Commission Report, the RECC wrote to its members and affiliated organisations to outline its position and organise further discussions regarding the situation in Rhodesia, and to propose future action. The latter argued that if, as the press was then predicting, the verdict was a ‘no’, then the RECC should intensify its campaign for “the maintenance and strengthening of sanctions” and the inclusion of African representation in any future negotiations. It also called for vigilance on any breaking of sanctions and:

568 RH, MSS Afr. S. Box 264, File 3, RECC letter to members, 19/05/1972.
Campaign more intensively against emigration to Rhodesia and against emigration to Rhodesia and against visits by sports teams and entertainers (e.g. it is reported in the Rhodesia Herald of 6 May that Cilla Black is to undertake a tour of Rhodesia and South Africa in Sept/Oct this year).\textsuperscript{569}

This was illustrative of the determination that many advocacy groups exhibited during this period, that even though the Pearce Commission was expected to return a ‘no’, which is what they had campaigned so intensively for over the previous six months, they were already planning the next stage in the campaign.

The May edition of the AAM Members’ Newsletter set out its position on advocacy actions in the post-Pearce period, depending on the final outcome of the Commission. It too called for the continuation and strengthening of sanctions, as argued for by the RECC and the ANC, because:

\begin{quote}
  it is the effect of sanctions which brought Smith to the negotiating table and while they have not brought the downfall of the Smith regime they have been an encouraging sign to the African people of Rhodesia of the support their cause commands in the world at large.\textsuperscript{570}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, the AAM pointed out that the main reason that sanctions had thus far failed to produce a decisive settlement in Rhodesia was because of Portuguese and South African intransigence in complying with the sanctions regime, and that this issue should therefore be a focus for the campaign going forward.

In late May, the Labour Party NEC released a statement about the final report of the Pearce Commission. It congratulated the Commission for having conducted its investigation impartially and thoroughly, and stated that the NEC accepted the final conclusions outlined in the report. The NEC made clear that they believed future negotiations, if they included the representatives of the African population and were based on the 5 Principles, could produce an acceptable independence settlement. The “NEC reaffirms its belief that independence should not be granted, or sanctions lifted, until a settlement is negotiated that is acceptable to the majority of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.”\textsuperscript{571} This statement was characteristic of the Labour Party’s

\textsuperscript{569} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{570} MRC, MSS 280 31 1, AAM Members’ Newsletter, ‘Rhodesian Crisis – the struggle continues’, 19/05/1972.
\textsuperscript{571} MRC, MSS 292D 968 2 2, ‘Resolution on the Pearce Report adopted by National Executive Committee’, 24/05/1972.
handling of the Rhodesia situation throughout the period explored in this chapter. It very confidently asserted the Party’s position, and warned the Conservative Government to adhere to the 5 Principles and, following the Pearce Commission, the newly accepted idea of African inclusion.

Following the publication of the Pearce Report in June 1972, the TUC outlined their views of the Commission and the British Government’s handling of the settlement proposals, stating that:

In industry the racial divisions are matters of practice and not of law. Therefore the TUC believe that in industry the way should be opened for progress towards a non-racial society by means of discussion, agreement, and consent; but the proposed agreement made no reference to such possibilities.\textsuperscript{572}

This argument differed from those set out by advocacy organisations and the Labour Party in support of a ‘no’ to the Pearce Commission, in that it offered a suggestion as to what could or should be done instead, beyond simply the intensification of the sanctions regime. It illustrated the TUC engaging with the issue, and with the Rhodesian labour movement, to a far greater extent than it had done earlier on in the Rhodesia crisis, prompted by the threat of independence granted on the basis of the 1971 proposals. That said the TUC still, in June 1972, had not acted on the issue of emigration, as it had earlier indicated to the AAM and the ANC that it may. It still listed sending “a circular to all unions asking them to discourage emigration to Rhodesia” as a possible course of action, if necessary, indicating that whilst they were more engaged with the Rhodesian labour movement, fundamental concern for the situation had not changed significantly.\textsuperscript{573}

\textbf{Legacy of the Pearce Commission}

A 1973 press statement outlined the new objectives of the Justice for Rhodesia campaign, now that the immediate drama of the Pearce Commission had passed. It offers a useful insight into the legacy of this episode in the Rhodesia crisis, stating that the new aims of the campaign were:

\textsuperscript{573} Ibid.
To ensure that Britain fulfils its constitutional, moral and historical obligations towards the people of Rhodesia;
To persuade Britain to exert its authority in Rhodesia in recognition of the findings of the Pearce Commission; so that
  a) the illegal regime is replaced by a popularly elected government;
  b) there can be no cause or opportunity for outside powers, and particularly South Africa, to usurp Britain’s authority.\textsuperscript{574}

It further stated that the campaign would focus on securing the withdrawal of the settlement proposals, policing sanctions, securing the release of political prisoners and ensuring future negotiations were inclusive. This summation of the new focus of the organisation conveys a clear picture of the legacy of the Pearce Commission. First, and perhaps most importantly, was the fact that the Conservative Party left the proposals on the table, as it were, in the hope that they might still form the basis of agreement, as unlikely as this was given that it would have depended on a miraculous sea-change in African opinion. It also highlighted the perceived importance of maintaining pressure on the British Government over the issue of future negotiations being inclusive of African opinion.

Another important legacy of the Pearce Commission and all that it entailed was the persistence of the ANC. Despite claims early on that the organisation existed solely to see the 1971 settlement proposals defeated and would disband when this happened, “when the Pearce enquiry was nearly over there had been another push from below for the ANC to become a permanent political party.”\textsuperscript{575} The ANC initially found this difficult because they could not let churches and other organisations, such as trade unions, officially join, because if the ANC was then legally banned, these organisations would have been put in a difficult position. Despite these initial difficulties the organisation persisted, going through several different phases, but eventually carrying Bishop Muzorewa, and what had then become the United African National Council (UANC), to a much-condemned electoral ‘victory’ in 1979.

Finally, it can be argued that the Pearce Commission helped to crystallise African nationalist opinions on the future of Rhodesia, and the potential paths to majority

rule. In the official report of the Pearce Commission, an ANC representative was recorded as having said that “if Rhodesian Africans were to be misgoverned by an independent Rhodesia without Britain’s blessing, that would be better than being misgoverned with it.” 576 This conveys the strength of feeling amongst the African nationalist movement which, had the Commission reported a ‘yes’, would have been viewed as a ‘great betrayal’ of the African population of Rhodesia. It also highlights the importance, following the Pearce Commission, of African involvement in any attempts at or discussions regarding settlement.

There is some scope in this case study for a comparison between the operation of social movements in Rhodesia and Britain over the settlement proposals and the Pearce Commission. Earlier in the chapter it was highlighted that December 1971 was a particularly busy month with regards to the progress of the potential settlement, seeing the formation of three new, important organisations, all of which were tailored specifically to campaigning against the proposals, albeit in different ways. In this sense, the formation of the ANC was comparable to the formation of the RECC and the Justice for Rhodesia campaign, in terms of social movement organisation tactics. This section will briefly compare the trajectories of these organisations.

As party theorist Angelo Panebianco argues, how “the cards are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phases of an organisation, continue in many ways to condition the life of the organisation even decades after its formation.” 577 Such an argument speaks to the reasoning behind the formation of the new organisations in both Britain and Rhodesia. In both contexts it was acknowledged that in order to successfully contest the proposals, an organisation with no history, no prior ‘conditioning’, was required. Equally this argument speaks to the trajectory of the ANC following the defeat of the Home-Smith proposals. Muzorewa was selected to be leader because he was an unformed figure as far as public perception was concerned and could be moulded to new, specific aims; he was a neutral mouthpiece for a particular project. In the sense that he represented the

576 Ibid
577 Cited in Russell Building New Labour: 11.
designs of the Smith regime in the internal settlement and on into the 1979 election, it can be argued that he, and the organisation he represented, continued to be simply a mouthpiece, because of that organisation’s conditioning.

For ease of comparison, this brief discussion will focus solely on the RECC and the ANC, although there is scope for the Justice for Rhodesia campaign to be included here. One key area of similarity is that both organisations were established by participants in, or at least adherents of, existing organisations. This suggests that there is some inherent campaigning value in having single issue organisations, since in both instances there were already other groups working on similar, although broader, issues. Admittedly in Rhodesia the context was different as neither ZANU nor ZAPU could have mobilised within the country to the extent that the ANC did because of legal restrictions. However this is not to say that the ANC did not benefit from being a single issue organisation, as it was able to communicate its cause with exact clarity; a ‘no’ to the Pearce Commission, a rejection of the settlement proposals.

Another observable benefit to having formed new organisations specifically to campaign against the Pearce Commission was that neither had any prior history of entanglement with other issues, ideas or causes, even though obtaining a rejection of the settlement proposals was itself part of a broader cause. ZANU and ZAPU both had mixed records of interaction with the African population\(^{578}\) which may have obfuscated the campaign against Pearce, had it been spearheaded by them. Equally the AAM and the Africa Bureau had both done lots of work on other issues, outside of Rhodesia completely, but the RECC was absolutely singular and clear in its focus. These benefits of the establishment of these new, single-issue, organisations were demonstrated by their successes. The ANC was tremendously effective in quickly publicising the settlement proposals and their implications, and therefore in mobilising support for a ‘no’ to the Commission. Equally, the RECC was successful in organising a large demonstration against the Pearce Commission in under two months, and by extension raising awareness amongst the British public of the issues at stake in the newest attempt at settlement.

\(^{578}\) Bhebe and Ranger, *Soldiers.*
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the settlement proposals negotiated between the Heath and Smith Governments in 1970-71, and put to the people of Rhodesia in a test of acceptability led by the Pearce Commission in early 1972. It was an important event in the timeline of the Rhodesia crisis, as it was the first time that the African population had been involved in any part of the settlement proposal process, thus setting a precedent for any future talks. Admittedly the Pearce Commission was not seen as an acceptable method by the majority of the African population, who made it clear that a referendum on the basis of one man one vote would have been fairer, in lieu of full representation at all stages of the talks. Nonetheless, these negotiations and the test of acceptability fundamentally changed what was possible and acceptable in any future talks, and for the first time provided a non-violent forum for the African population to express their views.

Through exploring more closely a key event in the Rhodesia timeline, and considering each of the main research questions simultaneously, a clearer picture emerges of how various groups and organisations responded to the way in which the situation was playing out diplomatically, and how these actions were connected, if indeed they were connected. The research question addressed in Chapter 2 considered whether or not there was a connection between events in Rhodesia, the political climate of the UK, and levels of support for the African nationalist movement amongst organisations in Britain. Further to the conclusions drawn in that chapter, exploring the Pearce Commission illustrated how actions by UK based advocacy organisations and the labour movement not only fluctuated according to events over months and years, but made use of the intricacies of things like settlement negotiations to tailor protest events, for example holding a vigil outside the offices of the Pearce Commission whilst the commissioners were based in London.

This chapter also reinforced the argument set out in Chapter 3 regarding the methods that advocacy organisations used in campaigning in support of the African nationalist
movement, in that it demonstrated them continuing to involve the labour movement in their campaigns where possible, and work with the Labour Party, more cooperatively than in some earlier examples since the Party was in opposition for the period explored in this chapter. Some comparison was also drawn between the formation of new organisations to contest the settlement proposals in both Britain and Rhodesia, illustrating the employment of similar methods despite the dramatically different political and legal contexts in which each social movement was operating.

During the Pearce Commission, and the period leading up to the Commission, more productive collaboration was visible between the labour movement, advocacy organisations and the Labour Party than other periods in the Rhodesia crisis. A large factor in this was Labour being in opposition, meaning that it was more at liberty to explicitly express support for some of the statements and resolutions put forward by advocacy organisations, without this necessitating subsequent action. This had a resulting impact on the TUC, meaning it no longer had to debate whether it should support Labour Party policy on Rhodesia, or align more closely with advocacy organisations on the issue, as it had had to do in earlier periods. This period also represented a reprieve from nationalist organisation frustration with British organisations and the labour movement, and the ANC worked productively with these in the organisation of public meetings and protests.

Due to the formation of the ANC, this case study chapter did not explore the arguments of Chapter 5, beyond a couple of early examples of ZANU or ZAPU communication on the settlement proposals. Despite this, the examples available indicated that nationalist leaders and representatives continued to vary the form of their interactions and communication on the Pearce proposals in line with the argument set out in the previous chapter; that such instances were guided by leadership tactics designed to maximise the outcome from each communication.
Conclusion

Introduction

The thesis has considered how the Rhodesia crisis played out from UDI until internationally accepted independence amongst the grass roots in Britain, and the African nationalists' international efforts as part of the independence struggle. Throughout the thesis existing literature has been built on by considering the role of advocacy organisations and the British labour movement in campaigning in support of majority rule in Rhodesia, as well as looking at the African nationalist movement's relationship with these organisations and successive British governments. This project broke down into four main research questions considering, respectively: how interest in the Rhodesia issue fluctuated over the 15 year period under consideration; the methods used by advocacy organisations in campaigning on the issue and the limits placed on campaigning by an adherence to pragmatism; the relationship between the Labour Party leadership and the broader labour movement over Rhodesia; and finally the differences in rhetoric espoused by nationalists based in Rhodesia, and those lobbying in the UK.

Empirical contributions of the thesis

The primary contribution to knowledge this thesis makes is a historiographical one. In existing literature, Britain's role in and handling of the Rhodesia issue has been looked at exclusively through an official lens, primarily utilising sources housed in The National Archives, such as Cabinet and Foreign Office papers. Equally, existing literature on the independence struggle has largely ignored the international activities of the nationalist organisations, and their discussions with the British Government. By marrying up official sources with organisational sources, and considering the actions of the main nationalist organisations in Britain and with the British, this thesis has moved away from the elite focused accounts of the unfolding of the Rhodesia crisis, and highlighted the actions of advocacy organisations and the labour movement in responding to the crisis, particularly considering the role of pragmatism in shaping these responses. Looking beyond the official sources gives an insight into popular conceptions of the Rhodesia issue in Britain, as well as a more detailed understanding of successive British Governments' stance by considering their
interactions with the nationalist movement, and those organisations in Britain who were supportive of the nationalist cause. Some scholars have argued that Labour’s stance on Rhodesia was essentially indistinguishable from that of the Conservative Party, but its interactions with the nationalist movement and advocacy organisations highlight a level of engagement with the core of the struggle that simply was not present in the Conservative Party. However, the thesis also demonstrated that for much of the period, the Labour Party leadership, too, was constrained by its parliamentary socialism and pursued a pragmatic ‘official mind’ policy of seeking an expedited resolution to the Rhodesia crisis. This would have come at the expense of the nationalist movement, advocacy organisations and the values of much of the left wing of the broader Labour Party. This fear of a willingness to sell out caused frustration amongst the nationalist movement, who nevertheless continued to lobby Labour Party ministers, as they were seen as gatekeepers of the struggle when in power, and still more likely to listen to them when in opposition.

Interest in the Rhodesia issue was not sustained over the 15 year period from UDI to independence. Advocacy organisations and the trade union movement responded instead at times when the dynamics of the situation were changing, or threatened to change, such as settlement negotiations and repressive actions by the Smith regime. Rhodesia jostled for space with many other issues, particularly British domestic economic problems, immigration, as well as comparable overseas issues such as Vietnam. Despite emphasising the importance of gaining the support of the labour movement, advocacy organisations generally failed to achieve this aim, with domestic ‘bread and butter’ issues, particularly industrial legislation, taking precedence. This failure to obtain its active support reflects a broader disinterest in the Rhodesia issue from the labour movement for much of the period. At the outset of the crisis, the TUC aligned itself to the policy of the Labour Party leadership, and this attitude of disengagement and adherence to the views of the Party prevailed amongst much of the labour movement. This only began to change in the late 1970s when there was a leftwards shift in the NEC and union leadership. This disengagement on the part of the labour movement was a source of frustration to the nationalist movement, who continued to look upon the ‘British people’ more favourably than successive governments, but felt that there was not enough productive action on the issue.

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579 See for example Windrich, *Rhodesian Independence*;
Despite its perception of the Labour leadership, however, ZANU and ZAPU both maintained very polite relations through their representatives in Britain. This was in stark contrast to the nationalist movement’s strong anti-British rhetoric espoused in Rhodesia. The thesis argues that this difference in rhetoric and approach to the British was simply a pragmatic leadership tactic, aimed at maximising nationalist sentiment and support for the struggle at home, whilst maintaining positive relationships with the people who were perceived to be the key power brokers: successive British governments.

The common theme emerging from all of the research questions is that, in the absence of an easy or obvious solution to the Rhodesia, a pragmatic approach prevailed over commitment to fundamental views. Advocacy organisations, as well as concerned with campaigning, had to consider their own survival. A good example of this was the reticence of advocacy organisations to give material aid the nationalist movement for fear of alienating key political supporters of the cause as a result of supporting ‘terrorist’ groups. The nationalist movement altered its rhetoric and communication styles according to its audience and aims, ensuring it could still get an audience with Labour MPs, whilst publishing articles at home entitled ‘Wilson’s Bloody Head’. The Labour Party leadership for its part tried to minimise dissent to and dissatisfaction with its policies, whilst pursuing a politically cautious path, the trajectory of which has been discussed in greater detail in other studies.580

Following on from this thesis, there is certainly scope for future research utilising an oral history approach, as this would complement the archive sources uncovered in this study. Oral history would also feed into regional and local studies, drawing on, for example, trades councils and local organisational records in order to demonstrate the regionally diverse constituencies. Equally, social movement theory could be applied to other historical instances of advocacy campaigning, such as CND and the Vietnam War, in order to bring greater understanding of the methods used by such

movements, and interaction between advocacy campaigns and broader society across different campaigns.

**Conclusion**

By exploring the relationship between the African nationalist movement, advocacy organisations and the British labour movement in the struggle for independence in Rhodesia, this thesis has begun to establish a dialogue between literature considering the guerrilla war in Rhodesia, and that focusing on the elite-level diplomatic unfolding of the situation. Two bodies of secondary literature have been drawn on, as well as a novel set of archive sources that have not previously been utilised in studies of the Rhodesia crisis, which has allowed the thesis to draw together the stories of the African nationalist movement and its activities in Britain, advocacy organisations campaigning on Rhodesia, with a more multi-layered picture of the British Labour Party and its part in the Rhodesia crisis. The Rhodesia crisis did not unfold exclusively in the bush, nor exclusively on board HMS Fearless; it was far more complex and multi-layered than that, an idea that this thesis has begun to capture.
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Labour History Archive and Study Centre – People’s History Museum
Communist Party of Great Britain papers
Judith Hart personal papers
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Labour Party International Department papers
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PLP Minutes
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LSE
George Cunningham papers
Fabian Society papers
Andrew Faulds papers
The National Archives
Cabinet office papers
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office papers

Trade Union Congress Archival – University of Warwick
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Alistair Mutch papers
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Appendix 1: Organisations invited to RECC meeting

RHODESIA EMERGENCY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
89 Charlotte Street London W1Z 2DQ : 01-580 5311

List of individuals and organisations invited to attend a meeting on Wednesday 29 December 1971 to discuss the setting up of a Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee

Third World First, Britwell Salome, Waltington, Oxon.
CITHR : Richard Acton.
Miss Sheehy, 41 Holland Park, London W11 2WP
Justice for Rhodesia Campaign: Dr J. Camilleri, 41 Holland Park, London W11 2WP
Amnesty International: Martin Bonals, Turnagain Lane, Harrington Rd, London WC1
The Co-operative Party: Mr T.E. Graham, 138 Buckingham Palace Rd, London SW1
The Co-operative Women’s Guild: Mrs Kathleen Keppston, Pergamon House, 348 Grays Inn Road, London WC1
Fabian Society, Nick Cornish, 1 Dartmouth Street, London SW1
Fellowship of Reconciliation, 29 Great James Street, London WC1
David Harding, 92 Cheyne, New Malden, Surrey
Indian Workers: H.S. Dhillon, 16 Featherstone Rd, Southall, Middx
Barjana Ash, 9/43 Mosso Road, London W2
LCS Political Committee: Alfred Leese, Pergamon House, 348 Grays Inn Road, London WC1
Liberation: Barbara Hash, 313/5 Caledonian Road, London N1
South London West Indian Association: Ruby Narayan, 29 Orlando Road, London SW4
Labour Party Young Socialists: c/o Transport House, Smith Square, London SW1
Peace Pledge Union: Myrtle Solomon, 6 Endenall Street, London WC1
Coordinating Committee Overseas Students’ Organisations: 376 Grays Inn Road, London WC1
Young Communist League: 16 King Street, London WC2
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation: Chris Farley, 3/4 Shavies Place, Haymarket, London SW1
Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau: Polly Gaster, 531 Caledonian Road, London N7
UNSA: Bob Arnett, 23 Albert Embankment, London SE1
National League of Young Liberals: Rosemary Chester, 69 Blackfriars Road, London SE1
Communist Party (London District): Kay Beauchamp, 100 Rochester Row, London SW1
Black Panther Movement: 36 Shakespeare Road, London SE24
154 Barnsbury Road, London N1
NUS: Mike Terry, 3 Endenall Street, London WC1
Labour Party: Tom McNally, Transport House, Smith Square, London SW1
West Indian Standing Conference: Joe Rute, 43 Cambran Road, London SE5
Communist Party: Jack Wadis, 16 King Street, London WC2
British Council of Churches: Revd Hugh Wulder, 2 Eaton Gate, London SW1
British Council of Churches Youth Dept: Revd Roger Murphy, 10 Eaton Gate, London SW1
BCC Community Race Relations Committee: 10 Eaton Gate, London SW1
Baptist Union: David Goodbourn, 4 Southamptom Row, London WC1
Community Relations Committee: 4 Southampton Row, London WC1
National Secular Society: 103 Borough High Street, London SE1
Student Christian Movement: Annandale, North End Road, London NW1
LCS Young Members Organisation: Mr Purbanks, 129 Seven Sisters Road, London N7
Mrs C.E. Weiss, 9 Manor Road, London E10
The Liberal Party: Archie Kirkwood, 7 Exchange Court, Strand, London WC2
United Nations Association: Mrs Myriam Davies, 93 Albert Embankment, London SE1
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: 34 Grays Inn Road, London WC1
The Congregational Church in England & Wales: 11 Carteret Street, London SW1
London Labour Party: Mr Delafield, Herbert Morrison House, 195 Walworth Road, London SEL7
Independent Labour Party: 197 Kings Cross Road, London WC1
International Socialists: 6 Cottons Gardens, London E2
West Indian Students Union: 1 Collingham Gardens, London SW5
Angela Davis Committee: Sam King, 10 Greek Street, London W1
Soledad Brothers Defence Committee: 12-13 Little Newport Street, London WC2
FROLIZI: Nelson Bankapo, 10 Hadley Street, London NW1
Black Unity & Freedom Party: 31 Belgrave Road, London N16
Parliamentary Labour Party: Mr T. Houghton MP, House of Commons, London SW1
Labour Action for Peace: Harry W. Robertson, Hon. Secretary, 81 Orchard Avenue, Croydon, CR0 TNF
Supreme Council of Sikhs: Mr J.S. Sandhu, 162 Great West Road, Hounslow, Middx
International Defence & Aid Fund: Iain L. Evans, 104/5 Newgate Street, London EC1
ZANU: Mr I.T. Chipunguere, 39 St Augustine’s Avenue, South Croydon, Surrey
Mr F.M. Masanzu, Cwrt Fawr, Aberystwyth.
ZAPU: 7 Countess Road, London NW3
SLAM: Christopher Calman & Gregory Hawken, Blackheath Commune, 25 Blackheath Rise, London SE3
SWAPO: 10 Dryden Chambers, 119 Oxford Street, London W1
Unitarian & Free Christian Churches: Essex Hall, 1-6 Essex Street, Strand, London WC2
Young Friends Rhodesia Action Group: J.M. Headley, 47 Magazine Road, Ashford, Kent.
Society of Friends: John Harding, Friends House, Buxton Road, London NW1
RAGE TODAY: Sandy Kirby, 36 Jermyn Street, London SW1
TIME OUT: Tony Bunyan, 314 Grays Inn Road, London WC1X 8BB
SEVEN DAYS: Fred Halliday, 3/4 Shavers Place, Haymarket, London SW1
INK: 73 Princes Gate, London W1
THIRBB: 24 St John Street, London EC1
Alex Lyon MP: House of Commons, London SW1
Robert Hughes MP
Hugh Jenkins MP
Judith Hart MP
Frank Judd MP
Andrew Paulls MP
Joan Lester MP
The Revd Dr Colin Morris: Wesley Chapel, 49 City Road, London EC1
Miss Jean Palk
David Haslam: The Mounts, Teme Crescent, Southampton SO1 9DF
Ron Lightbourn: 152 West Hill, Putney East, London SW15
Stuart Hall: Centre for Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham
John Ennals: UFITAS, St Georges Churchyard, Bloomsbury Way, London WC1
National Union of Mineworkers: 222 Buxton Road, London NW1
Transport & General Workers Union: Transport House, Smith Square, London SWL
AUEW Construction Section: 140 Lower Marsh Road, London SE1
DATA: Onelow Hall, Little Green, Richmond, Surrey
NUFTO: "Fairchild", Roe Green, Kingsbury, London NW9
SOGAT Division A: SOGAT House, 13-16 Borough Road, St Georges Circus, London SE1
SLADE FW: 54Doughty Street, London WC1
NUCOW: 14 Kensington Square, London W8
Bakers Union: 3rd Floor, Station House, Darere Lane, Potters Bar, Herts.
Tobacco Workers Union: 218 Upper Street, London N1
Fire Brigades Union: 59 Fulham High Street, London SW6
NUPE: Civic House, 8 Aberdeen Terrace, Blackheath, London SE3
NUT: Hamilton House, Mabledon Place, London WC1
ATTI:
POSEU: Cressygate House, Hunger Lane, London W5
UFW: UFW House, Crescent Lane, London SW4
ACTIT: 2 Soho Square, London W1
CAWU: 22 Worship Road, London SW19
Musicians Union: 29 Catherine Place, Buckingham Gate, London SW1
NU Sheet Metal Workers: 75-77 West Heath Road, London NW3
AUEW TASS Division 24: 128-136 High Street, Edgewater, Middx.
Association of Post Office Executives: 4 Heyford, Billericay, Essex

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London Federation of Trades Councils: 99 Octavius Gardens, London SW6
Trade Unionists for Race Relations: 8 Charlton Place, Kenton, Middx.
International Transport Workers Federation: Maritime House, Old Town, London SW4
London Trades Council: 42 Doughty Street, London WC1
Surrey Federation of Trades Councils: 44 Selwyn Road, New Malden, Surrey
Leeds Trades Council: "Cornerways", South View, Meanston, Ilkley, Yorks.
Camden Trades Council: 67 Rosal Court, De Beauvoir Road, London N1
Windsor Trades Council: 2 Lonsdale Road, London W1
Swinton Trades Council: 32 Fairway, Off Bolton Road, Pendlebury, Lancs
Stockton Trades Council: 1 Windsor Oval, Thornaby-on-Tees, Teesside
Stockport Trades Council: 26 Bankside Drive, Heald Green, Cheadle SK8 3AJ
Stevenage Trades Council: 15 Shackledell, Stevenage, Herts.
Mid Glamorgan Trades Council, 68 Garfield Avenue, Bridgend, Glamorgan.
Hastings Trades Council: 73 Lewes Road, St Leonards-on-Sea, Sussex
Greenwich Trades Council: 14 Bennett Park, Blackheath, London SE3
Gr Yarmouth Trades Council: 32 Colenb Road, Gorleston, Gr Yarmouth, Norfolk
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Roy Newton
Pat Lyons
Mike Cooley
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Peter Aviss, Students Union, Trent Poly, Shakespeare Street, Nottingham
Lucy Chapman, Students Union, St Marys Coll. of Ed., The Park, Cheltenham
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Dave Forman, Students University, Keele University, Keele, Staffs.
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Shirley Talbot, Liverpool University Guild, 2 Bedford Street North, Liverpool 7
Stan Moref, 90 van Mildert College, Univ. of Durham, South Road, Durham
Anne Naylor, 9 Derriman Close, Sheffield 11
Elizabet Taylor, 6 Yew Tree Close, Macclesfield, Cheshire
Stanley Jenkins, Rydale Flat, Clarence Rd, Eagles Cliffe, Stockton-on-Tees
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Howard Smith, Hall Floor Flat, 15 The Paragon, Clifton, Bristol 8
J. Ryder, 158 Oxford Road, Macclesfield, Cheshire
Richard Purtado, 18 Rocksmead, Bricket, Bedford
T. Upton, 125 Cowden Drive, Bexhill, Sussex
Judy Cotter, ULESA, 12 Causton Road, London N6
Stuart Winstanley, Thames Poly Students Union, Woolwich, London SE
Steve Crighton, Hull University AA Society, 7 Dover Street, Hull
Patricia Mobery, St Anselm's Vicarage, Kennington Cross, London SE1
Association of Jamaicans (UK)
Anti-Apartheid Movement: 89 Charlotte Street, London W1P 2DQ
Association of Trinidadians
TRIBUNE Group
Peter Jones: c/o AAM, 89 Charlotte Street, London W1P 2DQ
Ned Walsh
Union of Liberal Students: 69 Blackfriars Road, London SE1
Appendix 2: ‘Biographical notes on commissioners’

BIographies ON COMMISSIONERS

D BLAIN

HM Diplomatic Service since 1967. 12 years service in the Provincial Administration of Tanganyika, where he was a Senior District Commissioner. 3 years as Assistant Secretary on the staff of the High Commission in Aden.

G R B BLAKE, OBE

Director of a Private Company engaged in the construction industry. 15 years service in the Sierra Leone Administrative Service, most of it in the rural areas.

J E BLUNDEN

Principal Research Officer at the Engineering Industry Training Board. 21 years service in Northern Rhodesia and later Zambia where he was District Commissioner in a number of centres both urban and rural.

J H BURGES

Assistant Secretary to the Southern Gas Board. Served 18 years as a District Commissioner in Northern Rhodesia – subsequently Zambia, holding various posts in Local Government and Community Development.

P L BURKINSHAW, OBE

A Queen's Messenger. HM Overseas Civil Service 1949-64. The earlier part of his service was in Sierra Leone as a District Commissioner and the last five years as a District Commissioner and Deputy Provincial Commissioner in Nyasaland. Deputy Administrator of the Turks & Caicos Islands 1966-68.

I E BUTLER

An Administrative Officer in the Housing Corporation. Spent 13 years in HM Overseas Civil Service in the Gilbert & Ellice Islands and Swaziland, where he was a District Commissioner before and after independence.

T H R CASHMORE


A F DAWKINS

School Master. From 1945-62 served in Sierra Leone mostly as a District Commissioner and Provincial Commissioner, apart from the years 1956-60 when seconded as Administrator in Montserrat.
F W Essex, C.M.G.

Overseas Development Administration. Overseas service 1939-68: served as District Commissioner and later Deputy Financial Secretary in Sierra Leone, as Financial Secretary in first British Guiana (1956-60) and then to the High Commissioner for Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (1960-65). Permanent Secretary Swaziland 1965-68.

D F H H Frost, M.B.E.

Team Leader, Construction Industry Training Board. Served 18 years in Northern Rhodesia. Subsequently a UN specialist adviser to the Swaziland Government on Rural and Community Development.

Miss Freda H Gwilliam, C.B.E.

Deputy Educational Adviser to the Ministry of Overseas Development till 1970 and Chairman of the Executive of Voluntary Service Overseas. Served on a number of Commissions on Education in Africa, including one on African Education in Rhodesia.

J L S Harrison

Member of the Administration of the University of London. Served with HM Overseas Service Swaziland 1949-68 as a District Officer.

J F Hayley, C.B.E.

Overseas Development Administration. Extensive HM Overseas Civil Service experience, serving mainly in Western Nigeria, and also in Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. Subsequently 6 years as a Deputy Director in the UN Secretariat in New York.

P A Large

Assistant Secretary and then a Senior Training Officer in the Chemical and Allied Products Industrial Training Board. Served 15 years in Northern Rhodesia (and then Zambia), holding a number of senior posts in the Provincial Administration.

J D Massingham

HM Diplomatic Service since 1964. Served 5 years in HM Overseas Civil Service in Northern Nigeria, then 5 years in the External Services of the BBC. British Deputy High Commissioner in Sierra Leone 1966-70.
M PATEY, MBF

Adjudicator, Immigration Appeals, Dover. Served 16 years in Swaziland as a District Officer and District Commissioner and, after independence, as Judicial Commissioner.

C G C RAWLINS, DFC, OBE

Director of London Zoo. Served 20 years in Zambia, where he held a variety of posts, including those of Resident Commissioner Barotseland and Resident Secretary Southern Province.

J C STRONG

HM Diplomatic Service. Served 17 years in Tanganyika where he was a District Commissioner and after independence a Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Local Government. First Secretary in the British High Commission, Nairobi 1964-68.

A ST JOHN SUGG, CMG

Retired in 1963 as Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province, of what was then Northern Rhodesia.

A H WHITFIELD

A barrister employed in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Served in Northern Nigeria from 1949 to 1959, latterly as a Senior District Officer.

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Statistician:

R M ALLEN

Overseas Development Administration. Served 10 years in Northern Rhodesia and later Zambia initially as a District Officer and subsequently as a Statistician. Seconded to Botswana as Government Statistician 1968-70.