An Alternative Framework of Analysis
to Investigate China’s Confucius Institutes:
A Great Leap Outward with Chinese Characteristics?

By Xin Liu

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Abstract

This thesis examines China’s contemporary global cultural footprints through its recent development of cultural diplomacy and its global expansion of the Confucius Institute, whose prominent features are investigated by exploring the four specific research questions of ‘why’ China wants to launch cultural diplomacy and the CI, ‘what’ is the vehicle, ‘who’ is the agent, and ‘how’ it is carried out in the field. The thesis challenges the adequacy of the mainstream concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’ that are most commonly cited in the current literature, and argued for an alternative analytical framework that goes beyond and beneath these Western-defined concepts. After deciphering the multiple contexts, Gramsci’s concepts of cultural hegemony and ideology and Said’s critique of Orientalism are adopted to frame a different understanding of the historical and international contexts, while the double-edged role played by nationalism is analysed to deepen our understanding of the domestic context.

The proposed new perspectives are then applied to chart the global cultural terrain of struggle, where the cultural encounters in the shifting global power relations between China’s long-held image as the “cultural other” and the ‘ideological other’ and its self-representations are examined. A comparative case study of the CIs, one of the most visible and controversial manifestations of China’s cultural diplomacy, is carried out to answer the main research question of why China’s similar efforts in promoting its culture were perceived and received differently to other Western countries and encountered unexpected controversies. The answers outline the unique challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy in both the cultural encounters and the interactions between its internal articulations and external communications. Primary data were collected from 25 interviews with staff from nine CIs in five different countries and one Goethe Institute in Beijing. The dynamics between these interweaving contexts elaborate the complexity of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project, whose prominent features are presented as the major research findings of this thesis, while what will make it a truly ‘great leap outward’ is also discussed.
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List of Abbreviations

AAUP: American Association of University Professors
CAUT: Canadian Association of University Teachers
CCC: China Cultural Centre
CCKF: Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation
CCP: Chinese Communist Party
CI: Confucius Institute
CIUC: Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago
CPDA: China Public Diplomacy Association
ECAS: European Association of Chinese Studies
GI: Goethe Institute
Hanban: Office of Chinese Language Council International
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Introduction

0.1 Background and the contexts

China, the oldest continuous civilisation on earth, has survived 4000 years’ history with a rich cultural heritage, and re-emerged as the second largest economy in the world since 2010 (The Economist, 2010). However, since the perception of Chinese civilisation in the rest of the world shifted from admiration in the 17th and 18th centuries, when ancient China was introduced to the West as the model of a secular and humane civilisation by Matteo Ricci (1615) and Voltaire (1756), to growing contempt in the 19th century, when China was defeated in the two Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), China’s image has been misrepresented in many Western countries since this negative downturn until today: from ‘yellow peril’ to ‘red threat’, the transformation brought by China’s modern development seems to have only changed the colour code, from race to regime.

If seen through theoretical lenses, we will be able to see two images of ‘otherness’ here. Firstly, the dichotomy of East and West as cultural entities was dissected by Said’s (1978) critique of Orientalism, in which the Orient was rendered as being the ‘inferior other’ for the Occident to define its own superior identity; in a way, an Orientalist perception of the world is ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall, 1992:185), with ‘the West’ at the centre and ‘the Rest’ as the inferior. In history, although China had mostly been held as a civilised Confucian utopia until the 18th century, it became a rotten Oriental empire towards the end of the Qing Dynasty that had its cultural identity subject to ‘otherness’.

Secondly, this historical legacy was carried onto modern times, when China’s authoritarian regime evolved its image from being ‘the cultural other’ to being ‘the ideological other’. Despite the moving of the dynamic hub of the world economy from the developed Western countries led by the US and Europe to the developing Asian nations led by China and India, the traditional equation of the West with modernity and the Orient with the exotic past remains to be challenged, and has continued to be a particular obstacle to the Chinese attempt at establishing its political identity. As long as China maintains that the values of its political system are fundamentally different from the leading Western countries, China is still considered as the ‘other’ if seen through the framework of hegemony and ideology constructed by Gramsci (1971). Moreover, in the discourse of nationalism proposed by Ozirimli (2005), China again falls into the camps of ‘us’ and ‘them’. These polarised ‘other’ representations uphold each other, and become dual forces of Western domination over China’s power of discourse when they come into play with the power and knowledge relations as defined by Foucault (1980).
It should be noted at this point that the word ‘West’ has different connotations: the shift of economic dynamic hub from the West to the East mainly refers to the geographical domain, while the ‘equation of the West with modernity’ is a shorthand narrative for a political and cultural concept. Hall (1992:186) has remarkably deconstructed the concept of ‘the West’ as “a historical, not a geographical construct”; it is “a tool to think with”, “an ideology”, and “a system of representation”. Despite the diverse variations among the Western nations, the concept of ‘the West’ becomes a means by which such a non-generalisable identity is imagined as “a standard or model of comparison” (Hall, 1992:186), and to a large extent, Chinese scholars, Chinese state media and even government rhetoric have all helped perpetuate the East-West dichotomy in establishing a binary opposition between China and ‘the West’ when they use the term, or more recently, the ‘Western counterforce’ (“西方敌对势力”, xifang didui shili), as if it were a monolith entity: the West wanted this, or the West did that. In this thesis, ‘the West’ is only used, when necessary, as a comparative frame of reference suggested by Hall, or in critical comments on quotations that used the term uncritically.

Another important annotation is needed for Orientalism, which “was the product of a particular moment in the history of European colonialism, and as a result changes and falters with the fate of imperialism” (Dabashi, 2015: 17). Indeed, the whole topography of domination and resistance is changing, the world structure has now shifted from being bipolar during the Cold War era to a unipolar one after the collapse of the former USSR, and then to an emerging multi-polar world today. In this process, miraculous economic development has endowed China with a favourable shift of wealth and power. What is at stake today is not so much the ‘end of history’ as once argued by Fukuyama’s (1989) assumption of the US dominance in the ‘New World Order’ as the logical and necessary culmination of history itself, but the end of West-centrism. Many of the world’s leading powers were negatively affected by the global financial crisis in 2008, while China continued to achieve rapid growth, the direction of moving to a world that no longer rests upon Western hegemony has generated a sense of crisis for those in the dominating positions. This has provided breeding grounds for the perception of the rising China as a ‘threat’, which has evolved into so many different versions since it became topical in the early 90s: seeing China as a military and economic threat (Roy, 1996; Broomfield, 2003), ideological threat (Yee & Storey, 2002; Yang & Liu, 2012), development model threat (Peerenboom, 2007), environmental threat (Bingman, 2010), spy threat (Newman, 2011), energy consumption threat (Richardson, 2014), and intellectual property right threat (Roper, 2014).
In response, the Chinese government believed launching a campaign of cultural diplomacy as a “strategic communication” would help it “get the right message to the right audience through the right medium at the right time” (Anderson, 2009:36). Chinese scholar Guo (2004:30) also argued for the right timing in that:

> The international interest in, and recognition of, China’s role in the global economy and international politics appear to coincide with a Chinese government’s rethink of the image of China as a world power in tune with its reputation as an ancient civilisation.

This shows both an internal and external dimension: internally, China needs to construct a coherent view of its national identity at home that is commensurate with its people’s expectation of China’s rightful place in the wider world; externally, China wishes to communicate with the world the message of Confucius’s belief in ‘harmony with diversity’, and to re-establish its significance as a major power and culture in today’s world, which is marked with economic globalisation, political multi-polarisation and cultural diversification. In Lampton’s words (2008:27), “as China’s power has grown, it has wanted to make itself more charming, more effective, to limit counter-reactions”. Therefore, cultural diplomacy is expected to serve the dual aims of countering the China threat argument and advocating cultural pluralism at the same time, corresponding to the afore-mentioned two images of ‘otherness’.

As the term suggests, cultural diplomacy involves both a dimension of ‘culture’ and ‘diplomacy’, and this new strategy demonstrates changes in China on both fronts. While Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy introduced in 1978 has propelled China to global prominence in recent decades through its economic might, on the diplomatic front, Deng’s strategy was ‘keeping a low profile’. A generally more ‘assertive’ stance of China’s foreign policy in the post-Deng era has been observed and articulated by a number of scholars (Unger, 1996; Shambaugh, 2013a), or in the Chinese discourse, it is geared towards ‘striving for achievements’ (Yan, 2014). Meanwhile, at the government level, culture was declared to be the third pillar of China’s diplomacy after politics and economy in 2004, and Sun Jiazheng, the then Chinese Cultural Minister (1998-2013), pledged to reverse the “huge deficits in the trading of cultural products” (cited in Lai & Lu, 2012:86). Some milestone events in the last decade or so have marked the fledgling of China’s cultural diplomacy: from the debut of the ‘Year of Chinese Culture’ series in France, Italy, Russia, and Australia in 2003, to the opening up of the Confucius Institutes (CIs) all across the globe since 2004; from launching 24-hour cable news channels overseas (CCTV News, CNC) and newspapers (China Daily Asia Weekly and European Weekly) in 2010, to staging the Chinese image advertisement in New York Time Square.
in 2011. The government rhetoric has also shown no ambiguity in its intention to “augment the soft power of Chinese culture and further elevate our national image” (Li Changchun\(^1\), cited in Lam, 2009: n.p.). Wang Chen, who currently heads the Communist Party’s overseas propaganda division (中共中央对外宣传办公室), added that media and cultural units should enhance their “capacity to broadcast, to positively influence international public opinion and to establish a good image for our nation” (cited in Lam, 2009: n.p.).

After significant investments in various high-profile initiatives and projects, including establishing three national bases for international cultural trade, and the one in Beijing claims to be the ‘largest in scale and most comprehensive in scope’ in the world, the numbers released by the Chinese government seem to suggest early success: cultural products and services export grew by 2.8 and 8.7 folds respectively from 2001 to 2010 (Zhu, 2012), and the CIs rapidly expanded to 500 all over the world by the end of December 2015 (Hanban, 2015). However, these numbers were not translated into the desired policy result of “elevating the national image” as quoted above. Rather, the Chinese government was baffled to find China’s image ranking slip down across a number of international polls, which was reflected in a People’s Daily editorial asking ‘How can we make the world like us?’. It started with the question of “Has China's ascending status brought the nation the admiration and the acceptance of other countries?”, the discussion below showed the frustration that when ‘admiration’ is expected, even ‘acceptance’ is not achieved (People’s Daily, 2010):

While China continues to exert a more confident image, it is also meeting some resistance from the world, even from its old friends. From the snooty coverage by overseas media outlets to various polls of public perception in foreign countries, these suggest that China is facing a challenge to improve its image.

Although there is no direct evidence to suggest a causal relation between the ineffectiveness of China’s cultural diplomacy and the decline of favourable values on China, these poll results at least indicate the challenge faced by it. Such polls include The Gallup World Poll, whose rates of ‘very favourable’ and ‘mostly favourable’ views toward China decreased from 18% and 46% respectively in 1979 when the poll began, to 8% and 36% respectively in 2016 (Gallup, 2016); the BBC World Service Country Rating Poll also saw the negative rating of China increase from 32% when the Poll began in 2005 to 40% in 2009 after the Beijing Olympics, and further shot up to the highest level

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\(^{1}\) Li Changchun was the Director of China’s Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress (中央精神文明建设指导委员会主任) from 2002 to 2012, whose main mandate was controlling ideology and propaganda.
of 49% in 2014 (BBC, 2014); in the Pew Global Attitude Survey, favourable views of China's image also continued to tumble in the US and the UK, going down from 50% and 52% in 2009, to 38% and 45% in 2015 respectively (Pew Global, 2015). Manzenreiter's research (2010:39) offered a more insightful and detailed reading of these statistics in pointing that since the BBC rating samples include most OECD countries:

> It may come closer to represent the “West” than the Gallup World Poll. Most countries in Europe and North America tend to evaluate China’s influence more negatively than the world average, which is outbalanced by more positive appreciation in Central America, Africa and Asia (with the exception of Japan, down from 22% to 8%).

This seems to be consistent with the more negative receptions the CIs received in Europe and North America since they rolled out all over the world in 2004. A series of shockwaves have been sent from the North America and Europe against this ‘flagship’ of China’s cultural diplomacy: first from the US State Department against visa renewals for CI teachers in May 2012 (Fischer, 2012), then from the Lyon Confucius Institute in France and McMaster University in Canada, announcing the closing downs of the CIs there in 2013 (Ching, 2013), further followed by Chicago University, Pennsylvanian State University and Stockholm University, who all decided not to renew their CI agreements in 2014 (Volodzko, 2015). These incidents raised a series of questions that made the researcher ponder: when the closing down of the CI was interpreted as “heading for a ‘soft power’ war with the West” (Volodzko, 2015: n.p.), and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was considered to provide “a platform for an ideological battle, between the normative Western forces of a self-defined global consensus and a nation state claiming status as a leader of an alternative to that so-called consensus” (Finlay & Xin, 2010: 895), is cultural diplomacy really a non-menacing platform to showcase China’s peaceful rise, or actually starting a new battlefield? Why China’s similar efforts in promoting its culture were perceived and received differently to other Western countries and encountered unexpected controversies? If cultural diplomacy is a ‘prescription’ to treat China’s image problem, what ingredients in this recipe could potentially generate side effects? And how can we improve the ‘prescription’ to make sure it does not just treat the symptoms but also address the root cause?

Set within the analytical framework of the above debates, this thesis aims to examine the trajectory of China’s contemporary global cultural footprints made through its recent development of cultural diplomacy and global expansion of Confucius Institute, and investigate its distinctive features shown during the simultaneous multi-level interactions: the cultural encounters between China and the rest of the world in the context of shifting global power relations on the one hand; and the interactions between China’s internal
articulation and external communication of its cultural diplomacy on the other hand.

0.2 What is in a title?

History is always the preface to the current chapter being written. If we look back at the first two generations of Chinese leaders since the Communist Party came to power in 1949, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, we can see the former paid more attention to military and ideological power, while the latter placed more emphasis on economic power. Although China has practiced cultural diplomacy for many decades, from the famous Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the early 1970s to Panda Diplomacy in the 1980s, it is fair to argue that it only appeared on the agenda of the third generation leaders as a means to build soft power. Though it is a new mission, the way it is handled at the government level is still heavily influenced by the first two strong leaders.

The Great Leap Forward started by Mao Zedong in 1958 turned out to be such a calamity for the Chinese people and their economy, traditional culture and values, that it was criticised as The “Great Leap Backward” (Bettelheim, 1978) in modern Chinese history. Nearly sixty years have passed and China has made big strides in social and economic changes, yet the imprint left by the Great Leap Forward is so indelible and far-reaching that even today the state-run system that features concentrated state power, national investment and mobilisation is still in place: at the word of government command, national level support and resources are allocated in a campaigning style to create a sensational effect, and it is the number that is used as measurement to show the implementer’s political achievements - from the Olympic medals to China’s GDP growth. The CI as the flagship project of China’s new cultural strategy is just another example. Barr (2015: 187) has commented on “the extent to which it attempts to overtly quantify its culture power” as a feature of China’s approach to cultural diplomacy.

Although Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy was acclaimed as the “Great Leap Outward” in 1979 (Cheng, 1979), it was not fully applicable to the diplomatic front during his time. As discussed earlier, it is only in the post-Deng era that the stance of “keeping a low profile” has gradually evolved into “striving for achievements” (Yan, 2014: 154), and Xi Jinping formally presented the latter as the new strategy in his speech at the foreign affairs conference in October 2013. This change of discourse mirrors the shifts in China’s self-identity and foreign policies. However, in the new book entitled China’s Great Leap Outward: Hard and Soft Dimensions of a Rising Power (Scobell & Mantas, eds, 2014), only China’s economic and military expansions were explored.
Since the induction of the national strategy of ‘Going Global’ (“走出去”, zou chu qu) in the 10th Five-Year-Plan in 2001, the cultural front quickly followed up with The Implementing Regulations of the Going Global Strategy of Radio, Film and Television was published by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television in the same year. A decade later, both the Ministry of Culture and the State Administration of Press and Publication have published their own 12th Five-Year-Plan of implementing the ‘Going Global’ strategy (Zhu, 2012), ushering in the age of a ‘great cultural leap outward’.

The phrase ‘with Chinese characteristics’ was Deng Xiaoping’s invention to define socialism in the Chinese context in the early 1980s, with a view to putting ideological contention between capitalism and socialism on the backburner and focusing on economic development. This term was then used to explain the ‘uniqueness’ of Chinese conditions in almost everything that has the same name but different nature or practice in China. This thesis argues that the changing power position and unchanging power struggle explains the purpose and the timing for China to be engaged in cultural diplomacy. When carrying the shadows of ‘otherness’ and delivered in a trademark state-run method, coupled with its long established party-state and propaganda system and its vastly different political values compared with the dominant Western model, it would only make this classic suffix of ‘Chinese characteristics’ indispensable for an accurate understanding and interpreting of China’s cultural diplomacy and its flagship project of the CI. The thesis will also discuss which measurement will make this cultural ‘leap outward’ truly ‘great’, and how not to repeat the mistakes made by Mao’s Great Leap Forward when the meaning of ‘great’ was translated into blind pursuit of speed and scale in practice.

0.3 Overview of the thesis

In searching for answers to the questions outlined in section 0.1, five chapters have been laid out in making this thesis:

Chapter One is the Literature Review. To set out the theoretical premises for the research, the thesis argues the necessity to look through multiple lenses of the historical, international and domestic contexts in which China is endeavouring to reshape its image. It approaches the subject by first discussing the limitations of the mainstream concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’ in the current literature explaining the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy, and argues that we must look beyond and beneath these Western-defined concepts to examine the complex and intertwined contexts before a broader and deeper understanding of China’s cultural diplomacy can be achieved; the
chapter then deciphers the multiple contexts in which the new theoretical framework is developed by adopting Gramsci’s concepts of cultural hegemony and ideology and Said’s critique of Orientalism to frame a different understanding of the historical and international contexts. Following that, the double-edged role played by nationalism is examined to deepen the understanding of the domestic context. These new theoretical perspectives are hence applied to discussing the vehicle and agent of China’s cultural diplomacy, laying down the theoretical foundations to the answering of the main thesis research question: why China’s similar efforts in launching Confucius Institute are perceived and received differently to its Western counterparts? The answers to this main research question lead to four layers that actually constitute the Chinese characteristics of the CI: its purpose, vehicle, agent and actual practice in the field.

Chapter Two discusses the research methodology, justifying and mapping out the research design, with multiple triangulations to enhance its validity, including methodological triangulation, data triangulation, investigator triangulation and theoretical triangulation. A coding system is also explained in handling the primary data collected from a total of 25 interviews carried out with nine CIs in four different continents and one Goethe Institute in Beijing.

Chapters Three to Five unfold data presentation and analysis along different lines: Chapter Three charts the global cultural terrain of struggle for the CI in four steps by applying the new theoretical framework: from framing the broader context to giving a full representation of the various actors at play in the terrain, then charting the terrain into hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides before examining the interactions among various players at different hierarchies; it also captures two snapshots of interactions among the multiple players and stakeholders to showcase the actual dynamics and intricacies in the field.

Chapter Four moves from the macro level to the micro level by following the same layers of the research questions in giving a comprehensive analytical comparison between the CI and its Western counterparts, with a view to highlighting the different challenges associated with their different positions in the global cultural terrain, revealing a much deeper reading into the differences than what the existing studies have suggested so far, which has only focused on the CI’s government connections and different operating models. Apart from the primary data collected by the researcher’s first-hand interviews and four copies of CI agreements, secondary data is also drawn on to drive the analysis from the micro level further down to the specific case of the CI at the University of Chicago (CIUC), to investigate deeper into this most widely reported closure in the
Chapter Five moves back to the macro level of the global cultural terrain by combining the cultural boundary theory with nationalism traits to contrast the terrain conditions in the East and West blocs to avoid the risk of generalising CI’s features. These three chapters elaborate the complexity of China’s culture diplomacy and its CI project with evidence and theoretical discussions from different angles. They built on each other to reach the four distinctive features of the CI, whose implications are then spelled out by following the same four layers of the research questions.

Finally, the overall thesis conclusion offers an overview of all the five chapters, summarises the key findings and considers what will make the CI project a truly “Great Leap Outward”.

These five chapters inform the logical flow of the whole thesis. Both the new perspectives of examining the subject, the new framework for analysing it, and the different output pictures it will reveal represent the originality of this research in making both conceptual and empirical contributions to building a more complete view of what shapes and features China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI.
Chapter One
Literature Review

1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the contours of prevailing research of cultural diplomacy and China’s undertakings. Recognising that cultural diplomacy is an inherently interdisciplinary research area transgressing traditional disciplinary boundaries of culture, international relations, and communications, and that there is a rich and complex body of literature, a critical review is carried out by identifying the key themes that inform this area of research and exploring them in depth. This will serve as the bedrock for the understanding of the research subject, and to identify areas that are open to more questionings and further explorations, based on which research questions for this thesis will be formulated, and an alternative analytical framework will be proposed where different elements are juxtaposed.

To help sketch the outlines, four angles are taken to form a comprehensive review: the purpose of cultural diplomacy (the ‘why’); its vehicle (the ‘what’); agent (the ‘who’); and the actual practice in the field (the ‘how’). Therefore, this chapter is divided into the following five parts:

The first part unpacks the key concept of cultural diplomacy with a focus on its purpose, followed by a review of the current research examining the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy. Then a different analytical framework is proposed to take account of more hidden factors at play in shaping the historical, international and domestic contexts in which China’s cultural diplomacy campaign is launched. The second part focuses on the vehicle of cultural diplomacy by staging the contending views of sources of Chinese soft power, and the ensued dilemma Chinese government is facing; it also exposes the defects of the current analytical framework. The third part investigates the agent in cultural diplomacy by comparing theoretical debates with the Chinese practice; it also examines the inherent drawbacks of the government-led approach by pitching it against the backdrop of the Chinese propaganda system. The fourth part looks at the current implementation strategies in the field and proposes new ideas, which also represents a potential contribution this study can make to the policy-making process. The last part synthesises the previous discussions of the ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘who’ of cultural diplomacy into a critical literature review related to the CI, the most watched effort of China’s cultural diplomacy and the most controversial one as well, with a view to justifying its relevance in showcasing a cultural diplomacy project ‘with Chinese characteristics’.
1.1 What is cultural diplomacy and its purpose?

1.1.1 Unpacking the key concept of cultural diplomacy

The hybrid term ‘cultural diplomacy’ does not have a particularly long history. It first appeared in the 1934 Oxford English Dictionary, as a laudatory reference for English language teaching abroad, but the concept did not gain much currency until the term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined during the days of the Cold War, which was more than a simple military confrontation and economic wrangling between the two camps, but also a battle of world views and ideologies. It was against this historical background that the concept of ‘public diplomacy’ was proposed in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University when he established the Edward R. Murrow Centre of Public Diplomacy (Centre on Public Diplomacy, 2006). It then appeared across a range of discourses, including academic, journalistic, and governmental. Gullion suggested that public diplomacy is connected with all aspects that fall outside of traditional diplomacy, with an aim to influence citizens of other countries to achieve a positive attitude towards a particular country (Melissen, 2005). Ham’s summary (2001: 4) offered a more discerning insight to this contrast: “traditional diplomacy is focusing on problems whereas public diplomacy on values”.

The end of the Cold War marked the change from a world of geopolitics and power to a post-modernist world of images and influence. Many scholars (Huntington, 1998; Ding, 2008) contend that cultural factors have now emerged as the force majeure in international relations, often superseding diplomatic norms and realpolitik. A more recent definition of public diplomacy that is commonly cited was given by M. McClellan (2004: n.p.): the “active, planned use of cultural, educational and informational programming to create a desired result that is directly related to a government’s foreign policy objectives”. As for how to achieve this, a more detailed description was offered by the U.S. Department of State in its Dictionary of International Relations Terms (1987:85): "public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television".

From the above definitions, it is not hard to understand why many researchers treat cultural diplomacy as a core element of public diplomacy. In other words, public diplomacy often assumes the form of cultural diplomacy, as publications, films, cultural exchanges, radio and television, as well as sports, are all broadly classified as culture.
However, the concept of culture per se is infamously difficult to define. As a most elusive term, its definitions abound and range from the very complex ones to the very simple. Geertz (1973: 5) noted sarcastically that in some twenty-seven pages of Kluckhohn’s chapter on the concept, he managed to define culture in turn as . . . [what follows is 11 different definitions]; and “turning, perhaps in desperation, to similes, as a map, as a sieve, and as a matrix”. According to The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted by the 31st session of the General Conference of UNESCO in November 2001, culture is a “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UESCO, 2001). As pointed out by Robertson (1991), culture has become a globally authoritative paradigm for explaining differences, a means for locating ‘the Other’.

To build on this, Bhabha (1994) highlighted an important difference between ‘cultural difference’ and ‘cultural diversity’, contending that the latter is static and concerns knowledge, while the former stress on the dynamic process and concerns interaction, during which an ‘Other’ culture was involved and a difference was produced between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. In other words, ‘inter-culture’ is conceptualised as a process that focuses on the ways that flows of people, ideas, practices, and ideologies across time and space produce an imagined ‘multi-culture’. Multiculturalism thus addresses the process of mutual recognition, generation, and transformation in this interaction with other cultures, particularly between conflicting cultures, and reveals the contradiction of a dominating culture trying to establish and maintain its authority as well as the tensions and exclusions involved in the process. This distinguished cultural pluralism from the simple fact of cultural diversity; it is “a political response to the injustice done to members of formerly oppressed culture” (Sabbagh, 2005: 100).

From the above we can see ‘cultural difference’ underpins the ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy as defined by Cummings (2009: 1): “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspect of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding” [emphasis added]. The definition given in the Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary echoes this: “the essential idea is to allow people access to different cultures and perspectives, and in this way, foster mutual understanding and dialogue” (Chakraborty, 2013:30). Such exchange implies communication and respect between the cultures involved, which leads on to a sounder understanding of respective values and a reduced susceptibility to stereotypes. This is of paramount importance to China as in both Chinese scholarly and official discourse, a common belief is that China has often been either misunderstood or misrepresented by the rest of the world,
especially in the mainstream Western media; or there is simply a lack of understanding (Yang 2011; Zhang, 2012b; Zhu, 2012; Wang, 2014; Hartig, 2016). The then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011: n.p.) used quite explicit wording of “putting an end to misunderstanding, prejudice and suspicion toward China in the international community” as one of the aims of China’s public diplomacy.

The review so far reveals the fine line between the concepts of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy: whereas public diplomacy is mostly one-dimensional and puts emphasis on policy as it “involves the cultivation of public opinion to achieve the desired geopolitical aims of the sponsor” (Osgood & Etheridge, 2010: 5), cultural diplomacy on the other hand, adopts a multidimensional approach and focuses on mutual understanding and mutual interest, which are the pre-requisites for its effective results. It was also made clear by the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy that it “is not a promotion of its own culture, but rather of understanding and reconciling, as well as learning from each other” (Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report 2011, n.p.).

However, this essential point was sometimes missing from the Chinese discourse, instead, it often uses the phrase of “letting Chinese culture walk out” (Zhao 2012; Zhang, 2012b), “telling our story to the world” (Peng, 2008; Xinhua, 2011), or “projecting soft power” (Lai, 2012; Dai, 2013) that suggests ‘one-way traffic’ to describe its purpose. Other scholars, such as Bian (2009), even described its purpose as fighting against ‘cultural imperialism’ that Western cultural diplomacy was producing. On the one hand, such rhetoric may be driven by the Chinese feeling that its culture has been either misunderstood or suffers from a lack of understanding as discussed earlier, but on the other hand, it also raised a legitimate question: can the stated purpose of ‘fostering mutual understanding’ be achieved in a real sense when cultural difference is actually tied to different power positions in the global cultural terrain? This uneven position may entail the mirror mind-set of ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ on both sides, conveying an image of a ‘battle field’ when phrases such as ‘fighting against cultural hegemony’ and ‘cultural resistance’ are used, even the understanding of cultural diplomacy as an ‘international competition’ (Guo, 2004; Zhang, 2012b) runs contrary to the very purpose of the ‘reconciliation’ of cultural diplomacy.

The next section will contextualise China’s aim in launching its campaign of cultural diplomacy by taking a dual perspective from the international and domestic contexts, as the inextricable connections between the two dimensions form one of the characteristics of China’s cultural diplomacy. Due to this interconnectedness, it is worth noting that the compartmentalisation of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ context is only meaningful on a
theoretical and analytical level, but not in practice. It is also worth noting that both contexts have a historical dimension as well, which will also be explored as historical conditions are the bedrock of today’s global cultural terrain.

1.1.2 Understanding the international context: soft power and image building, or power struggle for cultural hegemony?

This part will first look at the evolving theories and prevalent perspectives that have been taken to explain the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy to this day, followed by a critical review that exposes the limitations of applying those Western-defined narratives in examining China’s cultural diplomacy. After challenging the adequacy and even appropriateness of the mainstream analytical concepts in use, a new framework of analysis will be presented to help form a deeper understanding of the international context.

i) Soft power

Coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, the term ‘soft power’ means “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2004: x). The definition was expanded by adding the word ‘persuasion’ when he explained the new concept of ‘smart power’, a strategy that describes a successful “combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction” [emphasis added] (Nye, 2011: xiii). Again, in another article Nye published in 2012 about soft power in China, he referred to soft power as “the ability to get what one wants by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2012, n.p.). It was also stated in this article that with soft power, “the best propaganda is not propaganda”. This is an ideal situation when ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ merge seamlessly, but the inherent tension existing between the two, whereby the former draws on intrinsic values while the latter depends on extrinsic aids, was never discussed, although it has huge implications on how to build soft power in practice, especially for an authoritarian ‘hard state’ like China (Barr, Feklyunina & Theys, 2015).

According to Li (2009:31), soft power in China is “primarily utilised to refute the ‘China Threat’ thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China’s domestic social-economic reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China’s rise”. However, a question worth pondering is: will state-led persuasion campaign increase or decrease the attraction of a country’s culture, political values and foreign policy, the three sources of soft power defined by Nye (2004)? Nye’s answer to this question was quite blunt in
that Beijing is “trying its hands at attraction, and failing – miserably”, with the explanation being that China “made the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power” (Nye, 2013:n.p.). Yet, ironically, the concept of ‘soft power’ was probably more enthusiastically embraced by the Chinese government than anywhere else, even to the extent of obsession according to Shambaugh (2013b) and Tao (2015).

The concept was first introduced to China in 1993 by Wang Huning, then a professor of International Politics from Fudan University, but who was soon recruited to be the head of the political section of the Central Policy Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee, or China’s brain trust. Wang has been the Director of the Centre since 2002 and the policy adviser and speechwriter to three successive presidents: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi Jinping. Despite the academic and foreign policy debates it has induced at home in the US, the concept of ‘soft power’ has gained considerable currency in both official and scholarly discourse in China, particularly after 2007 when it was adopted into the official lexicon: Chinese president Hu Jintao made it clear at the 17th National Congress that “cultural soft power” has become “a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength” (Hu, 2007, n. p.), and ‘building cultural soft power’ was listed on the agenda in the 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011-2015). When Xi Jinping took over in 2012, he not only continued to endorse this concept, but linked it with the new vision of the China Dream in a speech: “enhancing national cultural soft power is crucial to the realisation of the two ‘centennial goals’ and the China Dream of national rejuvenation” (Xi, 2013, n.p.). Cultural renaissance is considered a key part of the Chinese national rejuvenation, while traditional culture is considered to be what the Chinese cultural soft power is nourished by and rooted in.

Possibly because of its frequent appearance in official rhetoric, there was not much scholarly debate on the concept’s relevance to China but extensive elaborations on its importance for China, almost as a timely cure found for China’s image problem that the government is facing after China’s economic and military rise. Therefore, of the myriad literature about China’s cultural diplomacy, the great majority has attributed its purpose to ‘building soft power’ (Chey, 2008; Fan, 2008; Li, eds, 2009; Glaser & Murphy, 2009; Gil, 2009; d’Hooghe, 2011, Wang, 2011; Lai & Lu, eds, 2012; Zhang, 2012a; Hartig, 2012b; Pan, 2013; Hubbert, 2014;) and ‘reshaping China’s image’ (Wang, 2003; Guo, 2004; Barr, 2012; Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy 2011-2012).

To chime with the narrative of cultural renaissance in China, many scholars (Ding, 2008; Li, 2009; Glaser and Murphy, 2009) have pointed that the theory of ‘soft power’ is not a recent concept but has much deeper roots in China’s ancient philosophies. For example,
Laozi, the founder of Daoism, used the famous metaphor of water dripping through a rock to say ‘what is soft is strong’; Mozi, the founder of Mohism and the advocate of the doctrine of non-offense, argued that offensive uses of forces would sow the seeds of long-standing conflicts like theft and murder; and Sunzi, the ancient Chinese strategist, put forward the best strategy as ‘winning a battle without a fight’; Confucianism, which had been China’s dominant ideology for more than 2000 years, advocated that a state should obtain its leadership status by setting a moral example, and win the allegiance of people through virtue, not by force or imposition of one’s values on others; Mencius, another great Confucian thinker, was known to elaborate on the value of non-coercion and the necessity for a ruler to cultivate his own virtue to attract others:

There is a way to gain the whole world. It is to gain the people, and having gained them one gains the whole world. There is a way to gain the people. Gain their hearts, and then you gain them…. When you are correct in your person, the whole world will turn to you (cited in Bell, 2006:25).

Even in the U.S., Joseph Nye is only considered the inventor of the term ‘soft power’, but not the idea. In the classic book *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organization: on Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates* (first published in 1961), Amitai Etzioni (1961) already noted that power differs according to the means employed to make the subject comply. These means may be physical, material, or symbolic, or what Etzioni respectively called coercive, remunerative, and normative power. Coercive power relies on inflicting physical or psychological pain or deprivation. Remunerative power is the realm of material inducement; normative power relies on the capacity to motivate through the force of ideas and win compliance through creating group norms which individual wishes to identify. Then in another book first published in 1974, *Power: A Radical View*, Lukes (1974:23) also called it “the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires”.

Nye made use of these ideas and coined the new term of soft power in the late 1980s. This notion of cultural power as an alternative to military and economic might has quickly gained popularity around the world and bred a whole new range of vocabulary with ‘soft’, such as ‘soft strategy’ and ‘soft balancing’. It was also warmly embraced by the Chinese government that aims at having a ‘soft rise’ (Wang, 2008: 258). In this sense, cultural diplomacy is expected to be the lubricant to transform China’s rise from a hard rise to a soft rise. It was thus widely acknowledged as the Chinese answer to build and wield soft power.
True, if affluence were to lead to influence, the hard power of economic and military might need to be combined with cultural and values attraction to make the influence positive. Although many scholars have argued that increases in hard economic and military power will produce enhanced soft power (Huntington, 1998), and “economic clout serves as a bedrock for a nation’s soft power” (Lai, 2012:12), this expected synchronised growth between hard power and soft power did not happen in China. Although the Chinese government has been using the indigenous discourse of ‘comprehensive national power’ since the 1980s, a term which encompasses all sources of material and ideational power, it does not claim to be the Chinese version of ‘smart power’, as the biggest difference lies in that ‘smart power’ stresses on the right mix or correct ingredients of soft power (by using culture, political values and foreign policy to attract) and hard power (by using military and/or economic resources to coerce). If D’Hooghe’s (2011) comment on the enormous gap between Chinese political values and the Western prevailing norms can be considered as one of the intrinsic hindrances for China to achieve this balanced mix, its quickly expanding spending on both military and cultural diplomacy may become an extrinsic constraint with an overdose of material power. As Joffe (2006) argued, too much hard power may end up breeding not submission but resistance, likewise, too many financial resources used do not necessarily strengthen soft power but may only make it ‘hard’, which explains why the solution offered by the Chinese government to enhance its soft power could turn into part of the cause of the problem.

Actually, if we trace Nye’s writings about China’s soft power, we can see a notable change in his views evidently shown in the titles, from The Rise of China’s Soft Power in 2005, to Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for Chinese Soft Power in 2009 and China’s Soft Power Deficit in 2012, from What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power, Beijing and Moscow are trying their hands at attraction, and failing – miserably in 2013, to The Limits of Chinese Soft Power in 2015. He likes to quote changing positions in the opinion polls as an indicator of how successful one’s soft power strategy is (Nye, 2004, 2005, 2012, 2013, 2015), which encourages a common view of seeing soft power as a “competition between great powers” (Guo, 2004:20). Although Nye himself claimed that “soft power need not be a zero sum game” (2013, n.p.), the way he pitched China’s soft power growth in 2005 as “at America’s expense” (2005: n.p.) actually says it is. Wang Jisi’s research (Nye and Wang, 2009b: 21) also found that “most of these (American) views assume a zero-sum game perspective and cast a more negative rather than positive light on China’s soft power growth”.

If we remember the purpose of cultural diplomacy as ‘fostering mutual understanding’, we can see why this defies the validity of ‘soft power’ as being the underpinning theory
for cultural diplomacy that clearly does not aim at one side winning over the other but focusing on a notion of a plus sum game. The soft power approach is still a binary one in essence and projects different cultural and value systems as representing identities that are rivals to each other. As the two separate sources of ‘soft power’ identified in Nye’s definition (2004), ‘culture’ and ‘political values’ are becoming increasingly overlapping today, to the effect that the blurred boundary between the two has complicated conceptualisations of Chinese soft power and become a potential barrier for the focus of China’s cultural diplomacy on cultural promotion, which tends to be interpreted as steeped in political value promotion. By the same token, alongside the political value divide between China and most Western countries, the cultural dimension was considered an extra layer of China’s non-Western identity.

Also, since the concept of ‘soft power’ is affixed vis-a-vis China’s rising hard power, which is already causing great concerns internationally, this approach tends to picture China’s cultural diplomacy as a softening agent of the China Threat. It may be useful in analysing the gap between the soft and hard powers of China and exploring why China’s soft power growth does not synchronise with its economic rise, but it is too narrow a lens through which to both view the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy and to evaluate its effects, as it tends to apply the same lens to look at China as the U.S. and fails to recognise the unequal power positions associated with culture and ideology. Rather, the difference it shows is China’s drive is stronger in the soft power competition to match its recent rise in hard power, thus receiving more attention and funding from the central government. This lens has only put China in the limelight as the projecting side that launches a ‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007) while detaching it from the background of the global cultural terrain, which is far from being a level playing field. The ‘soft power’ concept has not engaged with any historical analysis of the legacies of cultural hegemony, knowledge-power nexus and Orientalism, which shaped national imaginaries and political discourses while underpinning the foundation of the current global cultural terrain. Nor did it address nationalism as the domestic driving force for China to launch cultural diplomacy to communicate its fresh self-perception, which is also connected to and regenerated from its own deep-seated historical past. The remnants of the historical contexts, both internationally and domestically, continued to permeate life in China today. If the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy is only examined from the perspectives of ‘building soft power’, it has only scratched the surface.

In short, the current literature shows a lack of questioning on the appropriateness of adopting this West-centric narrative of ‘soft power’ as the main analytical framework for China’s cultural diplomacy, nor does it provide enough guidance to manage the tension
between the two means of ‘attraction’ and ‘persuasion’ that the effects of soft power hinge on. Rather, ‘nation branding’ has become the other topical theme to go side by side with ‘soft power’ in the current research about China’s cultural diplomacy.

ii) Nation branding

Fan (2010:101) came up with the following definition after a review of the origins and interpretations of the concept: “Nation branding is a process by which a nation’s images can be created, monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to improve or enhance the country’s reputation among a target international audience”. In other words, it concerns how a nation as a whole presents and represents itself to other nations, stressing the mobilisation of all of a nation’s forces that can contribute to the promotion of its image abroad. Ramo (2007:12) has argued that:

China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image... Its problem is more complex than whether or not its national image is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but hinges on a more difficult puzzle: China’s image of herself and other nations’ views of her are out of alignment.

The Chinese government seems to attribute its nonaligned image problem to ‘distorted overseas reports about China’, which was reflected in the four policy aims of China’s public diplomacy:

1. Form a desirable image of the state;
2. Issue rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China;
3. Improve the international environment surrounding China; ²
4. Influence the policy decisions of foreign countries. (d’Hooghe, 2007)

On the one hand, these policy aims fit Cull's (2008a:12) description of cultural diplomacy as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad”, at least they can make use of communication channels to provide information to foreign publics who might otherwise be “denied access to balanced information” (Cull, 2008b: 117). On the other hand however, it also revealed the challenge in achieving these aims when a ‘desirable image needs to be formed’, ‘rebuttals need to be issued’ and ‘international environment needs to be improved’. China acted by vigorously launching an image campaign in full scale, first through internationalisation of the Chinese state media: Xinhua news agency, CCTV and China Daily all received vast

² About the international environment, Qu Xing, Vice president of Foreign Affairs University has spelled it out in detail in 2005 that it includes an objective and friendly media environment. (http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/3910287.html)
suits of money to ‘go out’ and explain China’s point of view to the world (Zhang, 2012b). Perhaps China’s best known branding exercise, or the most watched effort, is the Confucius Institute that has been rolled out at an incredible speed to 125 countries by December 2015 since its first inauguration in 2004 (Hanban.org). Xu Lin herself as the Director of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, has taken pride in calling the CI “the brightest brand for China’s soft power” (cited in Xinhua, 2007: n.p.). However, despite these impressive figures in input and output, the effects are less satisfactory so far if measured by the major poll results, including the Gallop, BBC World Service Country Ratings Poll, Future Brand Poll, The Soft Power 30, and the most systematic and comprehensive data from the Pew Global Attitude Survey (PGAS).

The Gallup World Poll claims to deliver survey data that are representative of 95% of the world’s adult population, making use of its vast network of local branches in 150 countries (Manzenreiter, 2010:37). If we take a glance at the Gallup option poll (table1.1), which traces American overall opinions of China from 1979 to 2016, despite the fluctuations in between, a quick comparison at the two ends show a decrease in ‘very favourable’ and ‘mostly favourable’ opinions from 18% and 44% to 8% and 36% respectively; while the ‘mostly unfavourable’ and ‘very unfavourable’ opinions increased from 18% and 7% to 34% and 18% respectively. That is a dramatic shift from 1979, the first year Gallup asked this question when China’s GDP was not even one-tenth of the US GDP, while in 2016, it is over 60% of the US GDP as the world’s second largest economy (World GDP ranking 2016). A similar fall can be observed in China’s position in both the annual Country Ratings Poll for the BBC World Service and the Future Brand Poll: it plummeted to the lowest level in 2014 in the BBC World Service Country ratings Poll since it began in 2005; and in the Future Brand poll, it also came down from 48th in 2009 to 66th in 2012, despite the fact that China has been rated No. 1 since the 2008 Gallup World Poll in the question of ‘who do you think is the leading economic power in the world today’. This fall could perhaps be seen as a signal to Beijing that having the second largest GDP in the world may not automatically push up its national image, instead, the quickly expanding GDP may has raised the volume of China threat argument and reflected adversely in its image ranking.
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^ Asked of half sample

GALLUP

Table 1.1 Favourable and unfavourable perceptions of China.
Source: Gallup, 2016

PGAS is a survey cited by Nye himself to assess America’s soft power. It has tracked China’s positive image in Africa and many Muslim countries from 2002 to 2016, meanwhile, also tracked continuing, and in some cases, increasingly negative images of China in other parts of the world, for example, China’s ratings in the US, Western Europe and Japan have dropped markedly in this time frame. This can be seen from the table 1.2 below:
Views of China (% Favourable)

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Table 1.2 Views of China, created by combing data from the following two sources:
Sources: data from 2002-2012 were available from:
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-U.S.-Image-Report-FINAL-June-13-2012.pdf (p42); data from 2013-2016 were available from
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/

The marked downturn of China's rating captured the subtitle in the 2012 PGAS survey report which reads: ‘China’s Ratings Down in U.S., Western Europe, Japan’. The biggest drop in ratings for China over the last year occurred in Japan, where the percentage of respondents with a positive view plummeted from 34% to 15%, then further down to rock bottom of 5% in 2013. China’s image has also further declined in the U.S.: only 37% of Americans in 2016 expressed a positive opinion of China, compared with 52% a decade ago in 2006. This echoes the result from the BBC 2013 World Service Poll mentioned earlier, also highlighting China in the title of its report: ‘Views of China and India Slide While UK’s Ratings Climb: Global Poll’. Within the report, views of China from its neighbours to the east were shown to have sharply deteriorated:

Only 23% of South Koreans hold favourable views, down ten points since last year. Japanese responses are the most negative in the region, with 64% holding unfavourable views (up 14 points) and 5% holding positive ones, down five points, yielding the lowest rating of China’s influence in the survey (BBC, 2013:8).

Another specific soft power ranking, The Soft Power 30, was described as the ‘clearest picture of soft power to date’ by Nye. The report provides detailed insights into country’s soft power resources and how they are leveraged by using Nye’s three pillars of soft power: political values, culture, and foreign policy. China was rated at the bottom position of 30 in 2015 and climbed up to 28 in 2016 (The Soft Power 30 website).
These snapshots of opinion polls may provide a revealing picture of China’s contemporary international image, but when these figures were cited to explain the mission of China’s cultural diplomacy to reshape China’s image, they were simply adopted as a benchmark without questioning the background of who was constructing these polls. They are all organisations based in the US or the UK: from leading consulting company like Gallup to McCann Group, a major American advertising agency that conducts the Future Brand Poll; from research centre at the University of Maryland that produces the BBC poll, to Portland Communications, a political consultancy and public relations agency based in London that produces The Soft Power 30 report; and the Pew Research Centre is a nonpartisan fact tank based in Washington D.C. True, as Ramo (2007:12) argues, “in the end, what China thought about itself did not matter so much. What mattered was what the world thought of China”, but two questions must be asked: first, what determining factors are shaping the world’s perception of China? Second, when we talk about the world’s perception, how much influence does the Western world’s, in particular the US’s, perception of China have in shaping China’s international image?

Let us explore the first question first. According to Anholt (2006), ‘nation branding’ is the umbrella concept whereas public diplomacy is considered a subset that focuses on the political brand of a nation. It can be inferred that cultural diplomacy is the subset that focuses on the cultural brand of a nation. However, a nation’s brand and image hinges on the overall, or the sum across six areas of national competence. As shown by the national brand hexagon proposed by Anholt (2000, figure 1.3), it visualises and construes the contribution of each of the six scores to the overall ranking, namely perceptions of a nation’s cultural, political, commercial and human assets, investment potential and tourist appeal.

Figure 1.3 The Nation Brands Hexagon, source: Nation Brands Index
Figure 1.4 compares the rating of China’s national brand against that of the UK and South Korea.

Figure 1.4 Brand China compared with the UK and South Korea, 2005, created by combining the hexagons available from the following two sources: Source: China Hexagon was adopted from: http://felten.yi.org/nbi.pdf; the UK and South Korea hexagons were adopted from: http://www.inthekzone.com/report-ranking-images-pdfs/nbi_q1_2005__Anholt-GMI.pdf

It is clear to see that China showed a strong ranking for cultural and heritage, however, this is the only brand dimension where China shines. China was ranked in the bottom for governance and exports, almost the opposite to its Asian neighbour, South Korea; while the national brand of the UK is much better proportioned. It shows culture is only one section within a larger repository of images that constitute the world’s perceptions.
of China, cultural diplomacy alone does not possess the power to transform China's national image. However, it is also important to note that both the economic and political brands have been subject to analysis and review, but the 'people' dimension in the hexagon has been a relatively neglected factor, it is actually the second highest score China got next to 'culture'. This is a potential area cultural diplomacy can play a bigger role, which will be further discussed in section 1.3 of this chapter.

This hexagon also shows that the formation of a national brand is a complex communication process involving different information sources, which relates to the second question raised earlier. As pointed out by Crocker Snow (2005), Acting Director of Edward R. Murrow Centre, public diplomacy has expanded today - by accident and design - beyond the realm of governments to include the media, multinational corporations, NGOs and faith-based organizations as active participants in the field. They actively participate through propagating their views. Yang, Shin, Lee and Wrigley (2008) reviewed previous studies and divided the routes of national image formation into two types of individual experiences: personal and second-hand. Second-hand experience refers to word-of-mouth communications, and information about a country received from other communication channels, including the mass media.

Bhabha (1994:19) has argued that, “economic and political domination has a profound hegemonic influence on the information orders of the Western world, its popular media and its specialized institutions and academics”. As listed above, all the major polls were organised by Western institutions, which is a reflection of such ‘hegemonic influence’. This means national image is much more about power and knowledge, and it is this perspective that is lacking in understanding why China suffers from a negative image. Actually, I argue that this is the ‘root cause’ for China’s image problem that must be treated, while those poll results are no more than symptoms that cannot be relied on to form any effective diagnosis.

In summary, the literature about China’s cultural diplomacy so far, including the government rhetoric concerning China’s policy aims, is very much based on the two Western-defined concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’. However, just employing them to understand the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy would be problematic in three ways: firstly, both concepts put China in the same league as other Western countries and fail to recognise the unequal power positions embedded in knowledge production; secondly, both constructs only reveal the symptoms of a weak ‘soft power’ and a bad ‘national image’, but did not capture and address the ‘root cause’ to these symptoms. Last but not least, both lack a historical perspective to understanding China’s
cultural diplomacy. As Foucault argued (1983b: 209): “We have to know the historical conditions which motivate our conceptualisation. We need a historical awareness of our present circumstance”. Without a historical frame of reference, it can only show a lopsided view and seriously undermine the complexities that China’s cultural diplomacy is placed in, therefore, we must look both beyond and beneath these Western-defined concepts for a broader and deeper understanding. A more sophisticated theoretical framework is needed to reveal the actual patterns underlying the ‘power struggles’ going on in this global cultural terrain that was shaped by history.

iii) Cultural hegemony, power relations, and Orientalism

The new theoretical framework to better understand the international and historical contexts that this research proposes is underpinned by Gramsci’s concept of ‘cultural hegemony’, Foucault’s notion of ‘power relations’ and Said’s critique of ‘Orientalism’ and ‘cultural imperialism’. What follows is an overview of these key concepts and their relevance in constructing the alternative framework for analysis.

A good place to start with is the concept of culture hegemony, which was first formally put forward by Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s as “intellectual and moral leadership whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion” (Fontana, 1993:140). According to the definition in The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought Third Edition, “cultural hegemony is the domination of a culturally diverse society by the ruling class who manipulate the culture of that society – the beliefs, explanations, perceptions, values, and mores - so that their imposed, ruling-class worldview becomes the accepted cultural norm” (Bullock and Trombley, 1999: p387-88). The significance of this notion is that it revealed the ‘super-political veil’ of the traditional concept of culture.

Here, ideology is another important concept as Gramsci contrasted the functions of ‘domination’ (direct physical coercion) with those of ‘direction’ (consent) in defining hegemony as “a complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which will be brought about through the intermediary of ideology” (cited in Mouffe, 1979:181). An enlightening definition was given by Fallers (1961:677): ideology is “that part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns of belief and value”. These two terms of ‘establishment’ and ‘defence’ captured the essence in this process: it aims at creating something new to cope with the cultural threats posed by the ‘other’, but it is also a defence of ‘our’ culture. Gramsci (1971) argued that when the current hegemonic side holds more power over ‘the others’, it can wield its power to ‘manufacture consent’. This manufacturing process was further
elaborated by Foucault (1982), who pointed out incisively that discourse is created and perpetuated by those who have the power and means of communication, and power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, which are reinforced and redefined constantly through the education system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies. Gramsci was visionary enough to take the conventional Marxist theory beyond class struggle to the fight for cultural hegemony as a more significant battle, and Foucault’s (1980) elaboration of power relations revealed how this battle is constant and pervasive in nature.

There is a rich and complex body of literature on ‘power’ through the writings of diverse social and political theorists, from Machiavelli (1961) to Weber (1986). Indeed, as Giddens (1984: 256-7) pointed out, this “conflictual model of power underlies virtually all major traditions of western social and political theory, from the left to the right”. However, Foucault’s biggest contribution is not to define power, but to lead away from the analysis of actors who use power as an instrument of coercion, to shaping the understanding towards the nature of power and the manner in which it functions - the means by which it controls knowledge and vice versa. This is consistent with Gramsci’s notion that hegemony implies the creation of a particular structure of knowledge and a particular system of values: “hegemony establishes a direct and intimate connection between knowledge and the subject to which it is addressed” (Fontana, 1993:160). Their theories suggests analysis to be enmeshed in complex dynamics among truth, knowledge and power (Rowan & Shore, 2009).

It is based on Gramsci’s concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ and Foucault’s theory of ‘knowledge is power’ that Said developed his critique of Orientalism by arguing from a different dichotomy of Occident and Orient, which is not about knowledge but about power: Said dislocated the ‘familiar’ concept of the Orient to expose how the Other helps define the West via contrasting languages, experiences and images in a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (1978: 3). He established that power and knowledge are inseparable components of the intellectual binary relationship with which Occidentals claim ‘knowledge of the Orient’. Actually, Dabashi (2015:15) pinpointed that “the critique of Orientalism was a critique of a mode of knowledge production”.

In the years since its initial publication (1978), Said’s path-breaking study of Orientalism has transformed our understanding of the relations between the ‘West and the Rest’: the study of the Orient by the Occident is not to achieve a truthful knowledge and perception, but to define the relationship between the two, with Western power standing at its very
core. In short, Orientalism established the West’s cultural hegemony over the East, which allowed Occidentals to re-define, and thereby control the Oriental. Under Western domination, the East has lost its power or even the right of discourse to the West. This was best summarised by the famous quote of Karl Marx in the first page of Orientalism: “they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented” (Said, 1978: 1). Madhavan (1993:183) has used the word ‘canonical’ to describe Orientalism, as it is a ‘style of thought’, and still is one of the most powerful analytical concepts today as the globalisation of knowledge and the Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s view of itself as the centre of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what counts as knowledge and the source of ‘civilised knowledge’ (Tchen & Yeats, 2014).

A word of explanation must be entered here again regarding the East and West as ‘binary oppositions’, which makes them appear unified and homogeneous, essentially with one view about the other. Of course, this is not the case, both the East and West are terms covering enormous historical, cultural and economic distinctions; they are used as short hand generalisations here to make a point of the dialectic relationship. Hall (1992: 187) has pointed out insightfully that ‘the West’ has become “the organising factor in a system of global power relations”, and ‘the East’ that covers disparate cultures from the far East to middle East and near East has become a pan-Asian stereotypes that Orientalism is intended to debunk.

Said further claimed that Western representations of the ‘Orient’ amounted to a form of cultural imperialism. One meaning of the term is that representations that claim to be objective and universal, to be statements about the way things are, in fact are the products of undisclosed relations of power. Huntington (1998:184) elaborated this in one sentence: “What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest”. But there is a fundamental difference here: Huntington insisted on the salience of culture in global politics, arguing that in the post-Cold War international system, the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic but cultural. For Huntington, the source of conflict is different values represented by different cultures, while Said’s theory is about how the Orient shall be considered a ‘cultural contestant’. He “challenged the notion that difference implies hostility,” and called for “a new way of conceiving the separations and conflicts that have stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control” in his 1994 Afterword to Orientalism (1994:352), however, in his 2003 Preface to the new print of Orientalism, Said still lamented that we were imprisoned in “labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange” (2003: pxviii).
Despite this repeated call for new ways of viewing the Other as different but equal, China found itself haunted by another antiquated view. Apart from being considered part of the inferior Orient, China was also a representation of the ‘yellow peril’, a psychological fear that was projected mainly on East Asia. It is interesting to observe that the phrase ‘foreign devil’ was used in both the East and West against each other. In modern days, the rise of a communist China has activated this embedded fear when the new term ‘red threat’ resonated the continued fear as a recurrent pattern. In Tchen & Yeats’s words (2014: 16), it “becomes part of the politics of a people. It becomes ideology and faith”. The evolution of China’s image from being the ‘yellow peril’ to ‘red threat’ suggests a system of othering. In a way, if we can argue for a de-Orientalised cultural China in the modern world, this new vision of ‘ideological otherness’ is to re-Orientalise China: the inheritance of being the ‘cultural other’ has revived itself into being the demonised ‘ideological other’.

To a certain extent, Gramsci’s ‘cultural hegemony’, Foucault’s knowledge-power nexus, Said’s ‘cultural imperialism’ and Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ have all partially explained the coercive use of cultural power in international relations. Culture has always been a weapon of the powerful, and cultural resistance is therefore an eternal theme. According to Wallerstein (1991:100), “cultural resistance today is very often organized resistance – not spontaneous resistance, but planned resistance”. Cabral already pointed out in 1973 that cultural resistance may take on new forms (political, economic, armed) in order to fully contest foreign domination.

Thus, under this theoretical framework, cultural diplomacy can be considered as a new form of cultural resistance for emerging powers like China, which has been held as the cultural and ideological ‘other’ and put under the Western hegemonic influence despite the shifts in global economic relations. If taken from Said’s and Gramsci’s perspectives, the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy would be counter-hegemonic, giving it an active defensive edge, completely different from the commonly accepted synonym of launching a ‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007). The mission is not just to ‘issue rebuttals’ and ‘form a desirable image’, but to shift the power relations underpinning those misperceptions, which have the ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ ideology embedded in cultural hegemony. This mission is simply not achievable by treating China’s image problem with a ‘charm offensive’, which can at the best relieve some symptoms.

After analysing the historical legacies in the international context, we must simultaneously take note of the domestic context, which is an integral part in understanding the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy, especially concerning the timing: why do it now? If we go back to the first concept of ‘soft power’, we can see many
scholars (Li, ed, 2009; Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Wang, 2011; Barr, 2012) have argued that its role is not limited to international image building, but applicable to the domestic agenda as well. Actually, it was stated in Hu Jintao’s report to the National Congress that “culture as part of the soft power of our country has become a more and more important source of national cohesion” (Hu, 2007, n.p.). Indeed, some scholars even argued that “soft power is primarily an issue of domestic politics – determining China’s future direction – and only secondarily about international politics” (Callahan, 2015a:219). The Chinese government has always been a firm believer of Lenin’s famous statement that diplomacy is the extension of domestic affairs, and building soft power is indeed communicated a lot to domestic audiences to generate national identity, build national cohesion and safeguard regime legitimacy (Edney, 2015; Callahan, 2015a; Barr 2012; Li, 2009), but there is another domestic dimension that was inadequately addressed in the current literature related to China’s cultural diplomacy: the role played by nationalism as an important driving force. The subject of Chinese nationalism is not under-researched, but more in the sphere of national sovereignty, security and international relations, with its double-edged role in both driving and limiting China’s cultural diplomacy yet to be explored.

1.1.3 Understanding the domestic context: nationalism and national identity

The significance of looking at the domestic context has special bearings on understanding why cultural diplomacy is now considered a priority on the government agenda. In the last three decades, China went through unprecedented transformation in history both in terms of scale and speed – cultural, economic, social and political. When the astonishing developments are shaping up a new China, the old ideology underpinning the regime legitimacy is being shaken. As argued by Hroch (1985), nationalism becomes a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society. Many scholars have argued that in today’s China, nationalism is considered to be one of the two pillars that the national coherence and regime legitimacy rests on: ‘rapid economic growth’ and ‘vigorous defence of nationalist values’. The perception of state-sponsored nationalism as a strategic means to popular legitimacy is common in academic treatments of Chinese nationalism (Unger, 1996; Zheng, 1999, Mitter, 2004; Saich, 2004). This seems to support a generalisation made by Guibernau (1996) that nationalism can be associated with authoritarian regimes that place the interest of their nation above everything. Saich (2004: 347) has observed that “we see the strident appeals to nationalism and patriotism and the fascination with neo-Confucianism”, while Zhao (2000: 20) explained that the Party has effectively “equated patriotism with support for the government and its policies” after 1989. There is a blurred boundary between the
concepts of nationalism and patriotism in China, therefore, in order to get a better grasp of the views just canvassed, we need to clarify the meaning of the term employed.

Of the myriad and competing definitions of nationalism, I found the one offered by Guibernau (1996: 43) most applicable to China. In his view, “nationalism is a sentiment that has to do with attachment to a homeland, a common language, ideals, values and traditions, and also with the identification of a group with symbols which define it as ‘different’ from others”. The strength of nationalism derives above all from its ability to create a sense of identity. Hall (1991: 21) has famously pointed that identity is always a structured representation which has to go through the eye of the needle of the ‘other’ before it can construct itself. “Only when there is an Other can you know who you are… and there is no identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the other” (1996: 344). This coincides with Ozirimli’s (2005) view that the discourse of nationalism divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and shows a tendency to perceive the world in terms of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’.

This tendency of perception entails cultural resistance according to Guibernau (1996), who argued for the two fundamental attributes of nationalism: the political character of nationalism as an ideology, and its capacity to be a provider of identity for individuals conscious of forming a group based upon a common culture, past, project for the future and attachment to a concrete territory. These dual attributes were sometimes referred to as ‘cultural nationalism’ and ‘political nationalism’ (Yoshino, 1992:1), which combined in the creation of an ideology that serves to celebrate and emphasise the nation as the preeminent collective identity of a people. Smith (1991: 91-92) shared this view in talking about nationalism as both a “style of politics” and a “form of culture”, while Ozikirimli (2005) believes nationalism ultimately turns the language of national identity into a language of morality, and renders it the very horizon of a political discourse. He pointed that like other discourses, the nationalism discourse is also about power and domination, and what gives nationalism its power is its ability to bring the cultural and the political attributes together.

If we apply Orientalism and the theory of cultural hegemony in looking at these two attributes of nationalism in relation to China, we can see the deeply and widely embedded pride in Chinese culture was turned into a strong desire to rise against Western domination, and the political character gives the government a sense of mission that goes beyond the cultural scope. These two attributes are reflected in the categorisation of Chinese nationalism made by He and Guo (2000): state and popular. State nationalism refers to any doctrine, ideology or discourse in which the Chinese
party-state strives to identify itself as the nation, while popular nationalism comes from below and represents unsystematic, popular national sentiments. During the Cold War era, nationalist emotions were used to carry out an ideological war against the enemy camp, while China today has shifted out of the party’s ideological control, ‘counter hegemony’ remains the main theme and has infiltrated deeper down in today’s stronger China, where ‘patriotic nationalism’ has taken root outside the state itself. Increasingly, identity and public memory are negotiated in popular culture where nationalism is not imposed by the state so much as it resonated with people’s feelings. As an ancient and continuous civilisation, what gives unity to the Chinese nation is people’s deepest attachment to pre-existing characteristics, culture and traditions. Actually, the emotional investment of individuals in the elements of Chinese culture is a key factor exploited by nationalism, and is easily amplified in a country like China that is highly centralised and always seeks to unify people’s mind. In this sense, cultural diplomacy in China naturally converges state nationalism with popular nationalism, which is passionate about achieving an international status commensurate with Chinese people’s conception of their country’s rightful place in the world.

Another version of popular nationalism He and Guo (2000) identified is cultural nationalism that sees the Chinese nation and Chinese people as being rooted in Confucian tradition and philosophy, and emphasizes the ideological function of traditional Chinese culture in maintaining political order. This shows the particular blending feature between the cultural and political attributes in the Chinese context. Based on this, they summarised the several contending views of Chinese national identity today by producing the table 1.5 below (2000:7), of course with the footnote that the fuzzy borders among the four manifestations in reality always defy such a systematic intellectual definition, and national identity should be seen as an ongoing process rather than a fixed set of boundaries, developed and constantly redeveloped through the interactions of domestic factors and international events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of National identity</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Modern</th>
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<tr>
<td>Han national identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Socialist national identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confucian cultural national identities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civic and territorial national identity</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 1.5 Sources of Chinese National Identity
Source: He & Guo (2000:7), Nationalism, National Identity and Democratisation in China
Unger’s comments (1996: xvii) can be used as an annotation to further explain this table: China’s nationalism comprises an “inter-stitching of state-inculcated patriotic political appeals, Han ethnic identification, and cultural pride; a confusion of aspirations for national greatness alongside growing sub-national assertions of regional identity; open-minded optimism and anti-foreign resentment.” To understand this complexity, we must explore the historical context by tracing the driving forces of social changes in China that has always prided itself as a historically powerful nation with a distinguished civilisation.

China’s name itself, ‘the Middle Kingdom’, suggests its ancient belief of being the centre of ‘tianxia’, which is more than a geographical term. Surrounded by much smaller neighbouring countries throughout history, the tributary system developed after the Han Dynasty gave the Middle Kingdom a strong sense of cultural superiority that the world revolves around China. Therefore, the series of defeats by foreign gunboats in the late Qing Dynasty - the two Opium Wars and the first Sino-Japanese War that were later taught at school as the ‘century of humiliations’ - have ripped apart China’s cultural superiority and also triggered widespread attempts to reform the country. A principal theme of Joseph Levinson’s trilogy of *Confucian China and its Modern Fate* (1968) was the argument that the key transition to modernity in China was the move from culturalism, defined as loyalty to Chinese culture and refusal to look elsewhere for models, to nationalism as the legitimate basis for organized political life. This is evidenced from Dr. Sun Yatsen’s revolution to establish a republican and reinstate the Han ruling by overthrowing the Manchurian Qing Dynasty, to Mao Zedong’s consolidation of communist regime by winning the Anti-Japanese war and rising against American imperialism; from Deng Xiaoping’s re-adaptation of the common aspiration to economically develop China and negotiated for Hong Kong and Macao to be returned to China; to the transitional generation Hu Jintao, who put soft power and cultural diplomacy onto the top of the government agenda for the first time and rolled out Confucius Institutes to implement the strategy; eventually to the current government led by Xi Jinping, whose ambition is best summarised in the new vision of ‘realising the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’ We can easily see the national vision of the China dream is more of a collective ambition than individual aspiration compared with the American dream, and the other contrast being that the China dream is not building something brand new, but a future with the memory of 4000 years of history. Therefore, it is only after a historical review can we fully understand Townsend’s comments (1992:97):

The waters of nationalism steadily engulf all that stand in their path - imperial, republican, and Communist institutions, elite and popular classes, coastal and interior regions, reformist and conservative factions, Chinese at home and abroad.
Other movements and ideologies wax and wane, but nationalism permeates them all.

To a considerable extent, China’s ancient historical grandeur and the deep scar inflicted in its modern history is ingrained in China’s national psyche. This drive to regain glory and dignity, the deeply held and long-standing aspirations for restoring China’s position as a great power in the world is behind both China’s domestic and foreign policies, as summarised by He and Guo (2000: 2): “the core goal of Chinese nationalism is not only to promote and protect the national interests of China, but also to restore its ‘greatness’, or to reassert China’s role in international politics”. However, Chinese nationalism was claimed to be a negative energy, or “No. 1 factor limiting China’s soft power” according to Nye (2015: n.p.). Why is that?

Because the dual characters of nationalism could often render culturally sustained boundaries and identities the subject of political conflicts, leaving the government between a rock and a hard place, as the nationalistic discourse involves a strong sense of morality and can be volatile in nature: while it can be a prop strengthening the legitimacy of a regime, it can also become a spear that the populace aims at leaders who are perceived to be weak in the face of external challenges. It is like a double-edged sword that could muster people together, give unity to the nation by joining the disintegrating fractions of the right and the left, as well as polarised social classes of the rich and the poor, but at the same time, “what the Chinese leaders fear most is a national movement that fuses various discontented groups, such as unemployed workers, farmers, and students, under the banner of nationalism” (Shirk, 2007:62). As argued by Zhao (2013:540):

Seeking status, acceptance and respect on the world stage, popular nationalists routinely charged the communist state as neither confident enough or competent enough in safeguarding China’s vital national interests and too chummy with Japan and soft in dealing with the United States.

Modern Chinese history provides numerous examples of this, the recent incidents such as the anti-US protests in May 1999, anti-Japanese protests that erupted across China in September 2012, and popular reactions to China’s territorial disputes with its Asian neighbours in 2015 raised particular concerns and courted worries that enhanced Chinese capabilities will produce new goals to act upon old grievances. For example, scholars like Unger (1996: xii) worry that China’s growing presence in the world economy and its ever prominent role on the world political stage has begun to “feed Chinese pride, and potentially invites thoughts of Great Power muscle flexing…making it of special importance today whether Chinese nationalism remains relatively benign or becomes
jingoistically assertive." This ‘whether or not’ discussion soon evolved to a given argued by other scholars such as White (2013: 47), who simply stated that “no wonder Chinese patriotism often shades into nationalism and even jingoism – just as patriotism in other countries often does". Shambaugh (2013a: 58) also observed more assertive nationalism from what primarily emerges out of the current domestic discourse on China’s global identities. “This means that however moderate or pragmatic the government seeks to be in its diplomacy, there are powerful domestic forces and voices that call for a more muscular foreign policy”.

A delicate change in such domestic voices among the state media was pointed by Zhao (2013:544) in “a dangerously stunted version of a free press, in which a Chinese commentator may more safely criticise government policy from a hawkish, nationalist direction than from a moderate, internationalist one.” Given the interlinkage between the domestic and international contexts discussed earlier, we can see while nationalism is filling the vacuum of ideology domestically, it is also fuelling the China threat argument internationally at the same time. If China’s non-Western ideology is the breeding ground for the China threat perception, rising nationalism at home is like an undercurrent that supplies water to its life. This can be dangerous in two ways if not kept under control as Chu (2013) explained: on the one hand, the nationalist movement’s historic connection with the champions of political reform made the authority fear anti-Japanese demonstration could spill over into demands for regime change; on the other hand, they are wary of the rise of popular nationalist zeal might influence China’s image and other nations’ perception about its rising. That is why when Nye (2005: n.p.) was commenting on the increase of China’s soft power in 2005, he already mentioned the “undercurrent nationalism as a potential roadblock”. It seems that the more prominent of China’s rise on the world stage, the more salient is the double-edged nature of Chinese nationalism. The conclusion Nye gave in the 2015 article was: “as long as China fans the flames of nationalism and holds tight the reins of party control, its soft power will always remain limited”.

On the other hand, however, it is important to notice the implicit changes in the Chinese nationalism domestically as it is not monolithic as argued by Whiting and Chen (cited in Lampton, 2008: 147), who identified three types of nationalism: affirmative nationalism “fosters patriotism and targets attitude”, it centres exclusively on ‘us”. Here we see an essentially constructive patriotism directed toward inward change and constructive international participation. This reflects the completion of the first stage of building a national identity. The second type, aggressive nationalism, “arouses anger and mobilised behaviour”. According to Whiting, “this is the form of national feeling that most concerns
China’s neighbours as it is focused on ‘them’” (cited in Lampton, 2008: 147) and Callahan (2006) argued that since 1989, national humiliation discourse has aimed to maintain and contain the Chinese nation by focusing on the external Other. Finally, assertive nationalism has the potential to become either affirmative or aggressive nationalism because it “adds ‘them’ as a negative out-group referent to the ‘us’ of affirmative nationalism”. Once mainly internal in orientation, Chinese nationalism today shows an implicit dynamic shifting from being ‘affirmative’ to swinging between ‘aggressive’ and ‘assertive’, which has profound implications for its foreign policy. This is exactly where cultural diplomacy can play its subtle role.

However, despite the rich literature regarding nationalism in China, very few have linked it to China’s undertaking of cultural diplomacy. I argue that at least in China’s case, we have to fully acknowledge the interplay between the two: on the one hand, nationalism as one of the major sources of identity formation gives driving force for China to launch cultural diplomacy: the desire to elevate China’s cultural position and counter cultural hegemony informs the party-state’s decision making, while the popular nationalism gives the state moral support and even a sense of urgency to pursue cultural diplomacy; on the other hand, cultural diplomacy can play a dual role in balancing the ‘double-edged’ nature of Chinese nationalism: when an observable change in its external dimension is showing an increasingly zero-sum approach in China’s foreign policy, cultural diplomacy can help rein it in with its plus-sum approach; and when its internal dimension was criticised to “represent a backward-looking ideology, keeping an eye on the past and obsessed with China’s historical and cultural superiority” (Lei, 2005:495), cultural diplomacy can change this ‘backward-looking’ ideology into a ‘forward-looking strategy, and draw on the cultural confidence produced by the stronger domestic development to turn China from inward-looking to outward-looking.

At the same time, from the inherent attributes of nationalism and the interactions between state and popular nationalism in China, we can see the tight rope between international and domestic contexts. Therefore, viewing China’s cultural diplomacy through only one lens, be it domestic or international, misses the critical ways in which it actually works and will only lead to misinterpret or mischaracterise it. The best cultural diplomacy strategy must seek a balance between internal and external forces: both have historical legacies deeply ingrained, making it absolutely essential to be aware of the complex nature of China’s cultural diplomacy.

Understanding a subject of a complex nature requires a complex approach. If the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy is only examined from the perspectives of ‘building
soft power’ and forming a positive national image through ‘nation branding’, it has only scratched the surface. Therefore, a central contention of this thesis is that the soft power approach is insufficient, or even to the extent of inappropriate, to understanding China’s cultural diplomacy as it neglected crucial processes through which hegemony has been produced and maintained. A three dimensional analytical framework constructed on historical, international and domestic dimensions, and drawing on the tripartite theories of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, and nationalism (see figure 1.6 below) is needed to offer a more comprehensive perspective to answer the thesis research question: why China’s similar efforts in launching the CI are perceived and received differently and encounter unexpected controversies? What prominent features are behind this conundrum?

![Figure 1.6 A Three-Dimensional Theoretical Framework](image)

As Foucault (1982:793) pointed out, every relationship between forces is a power relation, thus all the arrows in the above diagram represents a power relationship. The answers to the research questions would constitute the Chinese characteristics which will be examined at three sublevels of the vehicle and agent of the CI as well as its practice in the field. Relevant literature reviews will ensue in the following sections.

1.2 Vehicle of cultural diplomacy: a theoretical discussion

As shown in the literature review above, China’s cultural diplomacy is mostly understood, both in the academic community and the government sphere, as an endeavour to build and project soft power, which draws on three resources of “culture, political values and foreign policy” according to Nye (2004: 11). Since cultural diplomacy represents aspects that fall outside the remit of traditional foreign policy, most of the current research focused
on the debates about which of the first two aspects should be the main vehicle of China’s cultural diplomacy: culture or political values. The following section will unfold such debates as a theoretical discussion; the actual tension caused by such debates in practice will be fleshed out in the ensuing Chapters of Three, Four and Five.

1.2.1 The two ‘wheels’ of the vehicle

Currently, there are two positions in China contending against each other regarding the vehicle of China’s cultural diplomacy. One is the cultural denomination, believing that ‘culture’ should indisputably be the core of cultural diplomacy, and China is rich in its cultural heritage. Two of the leading proponents are Yu Xintian (2008), director emeritus of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, and Li Haijuan (2004), professor of Shanghai Jiaotong University, arguing that the competition of cultural power is the core of soft power contention in direct confrontation to Yan Xuetong (2007a), who argues political values as the core. In the cultural school, another scholar Hu (2008) further divides culture resources into three sets: political culture, spiritual culture and popular culture. Hu believes that as the current political culture in China is vastly different to the Western political culture, which still dominates the international community, it would be a more uphill struggle on this front, therefore, a wise choice is to focus China’s cultural diplomacy on the other two aspects: spiritual and popular culture. This position can be considered as ‘one wheel’ of the vehicle to serve the purpose of reshaping China’s image from being the ‘cultural other’.

However, a dilemma in this element of ‘culture’ is revealed in its breakdown into traditional and contemporary cultures. Young (2008) summarised the two broad and interrelated issues that have preoccupied China: first, whether and how far to break with the past, and whether to reaffirm and stand by its traditions and values. Here, the nationalism factor discussed in 1.1.3 created an underlying dialectical tension between a political nationalism that emphasises a revolutionary break with the past, and a cultural nationalism that constantly refers to China’s past. The second issue is how much to borrow from overseas, which particularly concerns contemporary culture.

As argued by Guibernau (1996), the extension of global cultural interrelatedness leads to persistent cultural interaction and exchange which produce both cultural integration and disintegration, this has posed a challenge for contemporary Chinese culture. Many scholars have argued that contemporary popular culture is actually a soft belly for mainland China. In a 2008 survey on soft power in Asia conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Whitney & Shambaugh, 2008), China’s historical and cultural
links are the strongest and would presumably have the greatest impact, but China’s
cultural soft power was only rated as “middling” and continued to trail behind not only the
United States, but also Japan and South Korea - both countries have traditional cultures
closely related to China’s, but both have their own distinct popular cultures represented
abroad by such phenomena as manga and anime in Japan, and hallyu or the Korean
Wave in South Korea. However, China has no such readily accessible point of
identification, or a point of convergence between its culture and the rest of the world as
argued by Ren (2010).

This may help explain why China’s current focus is on promoting the traditional aspects
of China’s culture, because they represent the ‘Chineseness’, while the contemporary
popular culture is etched with all sorts of foreign influence, and lacks a clear cultural
symbol. Therefore, the contemporary cultural dimension inherits both the imperative to
be a world culture and the requirement of a more specific nationalism, with the two often
in tension, especially when the contemporary ‘Chineseness’ was tinted with ideology. As
Liu and Lin (2003) argued, the ‘official version’ of Chinese national culture that the
government is attempting to create embodies inherently contradictory elements such as
Confucianism, Maoism, socialism, capitalism, modernism and globalism. This
contradictory entity is a true reflection of China’s historical legacies in shaping its current
identity. Although it is fair to argue that all cultures are fragmentary in their own ways,
perhaps no other culture faces the challenge to the extent of such complexity as China
because of the history it carries, and the two ‘otherness’ it was held at the same time.
Young’s conclusion (2008: 15) was thus disillusive: “China is somehow trapped in itself”.

As mentioned above, the leading figure of the other position of value denomination is
Yan Xuetong, one of the most prominent scholars from the Tsinghua University and the
Editor-in-Chief of The Chinese Journal of International Politics, who argued that “the
central point of soft power is not cultural strength, but political strength” (Yan, 2007a:5).
This argument may be more convincing as a general statement about soft power, and
more applicable to the United States that he used as an example, but Yan believed good
governance and China’s political norms of non-Western origin should be the main source
of ‘attraction and persuasion’ of Chinese soft power, though in his later work (Yan, 2011),
ancient Chinese thoughts were emphasised as the foundation that sustains the modern
Chinese power.

Another flag-bearer for this position is Zhang Zhizhou (2012b), a senior researcher at
the Centre For Public Diplomacy Studies, who also demarcated culture into three sets:
material culture, spiritual culture and ideational culture or values: ‘material culture’ are
tangible and in physical existence, such as architecture, chinaware, silk and terracotta worriers; ‘spiritual culture’ is manifested in intangible forms such as religions, traditions and customs, art and literature; while ‘ideational culture’ refers to the segment including ethics, morals, social norms, and ideologies, etc. He further argued that although the three sets construct the richness of a nation’s cultural image, only values however, is directly relevant to the nation’s soft power. That is because for culture to be translated into soft power, a prerequisite is its mainstream value affinity. In other words, no matter how magnificent its material and spiritual culture may look like, its contribution to building soft power would be limited with the void of value identification. Zhang (2012a: 193) therefore concluded that “in a way, cultural diplomacy is value diplomacy”, which was confirmed in the Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy, 2011-2012. As a policy suggestion put forward in this Report, Zhang further explained that given the two preconditions for values to be accepted by others - they either accord to the public expectations of their existing values, or the value is in the position to lead or persuade the target country’s public - in China’s case, the way forward is to aim at more power of discourse to redefine the international significance of Chinese values, while the current focus of China’s cultural diplomacy is in the material and spiritual cultures, thus less satisfactory in generating soft power. This school has taken a clear counter hegemonic stance against the domination of Western values, thus representing ‘the other’ wheel of the vehicle to serve the purpose of countering the China’s image of being the ‘ideological other’.

We can see both denominations accused the other as the reason for the less satisfactory effects of China’s cultural diplomacy efforts so far, and a more intriguing observation is that they both claim to be the mainstream view embraced by the government, based on the same reference to Hu Jintao’s 2007 speech at the 17th National Congress. The culture school quoted Hu in saying “enhancing the country’s culture soft power” by “creating a thriving cultural market and enhancing the industry’s international competitiveness”, while the political value school quoted him saying “building up the system of socialist core values and making socialist ideology more attractive and cohesive”. Although Glaser and Murphy’s research (2009:16) argued that the “core role of culture was clinched” when the term soft power was included in Hu’s report”, thus the cultural school “had had the greatest impact on policymaking” (2009:13), Yan and Zhang’s political value school is represented by the Centre for Public Diplomacy Studies, established in 2010 as a direct response to Hu’s speech. I believe the tug-of-war between the two schools as the mainstream views very much depend on where to draw the line between ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’, and between ‘cultural value’ and ‘political value’, about the latter there is yet another layer of debate, which will be unfolded in the following
1.2.2 Political values: universalism vs. relativism

It is not hard to see that ideology is the backdrop to many debates on the foreground or centre stage, revealing a key question lurking at the crux of the 'what' debate in China’s cultural diplomacy: are the ‘political values’ specified in Nye’s concept of soft power universal, or, like the first element of culture, whose appeal is actually from its distinctiveness? The Chinese answers are inclined to base their arguments on relativism, frequently stressing the relative nature of culture and ideology, whereas their Western counterparts tend to be more absolute in advocating the universal nature of their ideologies, social-political systems, beliefs and values, believing that political values draw attraction from the universal attributes that can transcend one’s own country and appeal to others. If universalism is used to define ‘the political values’, it means China faces insurmountable constraints in carrying out its cultural diplomacy, as this notion of a unitary and homogeneous model marginalises the distinctive Chinese way: its authoritarian political culture is constantly under assault by the Western model of democracy. So in terms of universal ‘political value’, which is supposed to be the strongest cornerstone of building soft power according to Nye, China seems to have the soft belly in place.

However, if we do not hold on to the Western defined construct of soft power building but look at the purpose of cultural diplomacy, we will see relativism is more applicable in ‘fostering mutual understanding’. Some scholars have argued for ‘Chinese Exceptionalism’ (Feng Zhang, 2011, 2012), while China’s economic success and political values have started the debate between ‘Washington Consensus’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’. Although these arguments are receiving increasing attentions in scholarly debates and the state media, the Chinese government does not assume any offensive stance to promote this, partly because China does not believe in universalism, as explained by Nye (2005: n.p.):

We come from a tradition of missionaries who believe in our values and want to sell them to the rest of the world, the Chinese tradition has been attractive to some of the neighbours in East Asia but it has not been a missionary culture. They haven’t been selling ideas.

Partly because Beijing worries that it could be used by some Western observers to support the China threat arguments. Even Nye himself (2005: n.p.) has cautioned against the rapid increase of China’s soft power in Asia, and stated that “it is clear that
the rise of China's soft power — at America's expense — is an issue that needs to be urgently addressed". This stance was interpreted by the Chinese scholar Zhang (2006: n.p.) as nothing more than a "soft power version of the China threat theory".

From the perspective of cultural diplomacy, and building on Nye's contrast of the Western missionary culture to China's not selling ideas, I argue 'being open-minded' is what is needed in cultural interactions, and the Chinese philosophical concept of Yin and Yang could be looked at as an alternative to the binary divisions of 'Us' vs. 'Other', as well as the associated mentality that 'they are what we are not', but to think of Eastern and Western culture as Yin and Yang that inspire each other, contain a drop of each other, complement each other and depend on each other to form a whole. This idea that aims at nurturing compatibility and harmony is considered to be one of the major reasons why Chinese civilisation stands as the oldest continuous civilisation today, owing to its strong ability to embrace and incorporate different cultural and belief systems throughout history: from the introduction of Buddhism to China during the Han and Tang Dynasties, to Islamism in the Song and Yuan Dynasties, then to Christianity during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Chinese civilisation survived and thrived through all these cultural encounters, and still exists as a major cultural system in the East Asia. It has not aimed at universalism since its global interactions began, but strengthened and enriched itself throughout these encounters.

To sum up, this section also exposed the inadequacy of using 'soft power' to examine cultural diplomacy as it runs against its very purpose, which is not about building universalism but embracing cultural differences. In this sense, the Chinese concept of 'harmony with diversity' explains better the purpose of cultural diplomacy than building one's soft power. Besides, the relationship between 'culture' and 'political values', defined as the two sources of soft power by Nye, shows great tension between 'attraction' and 'persuasion' - defined as the two ways how soft power function by Nye. Within the construct of soft power, we see the centre of gravity of China's cultural diplomacy resides between 'one wheel' where China has abundant cultural heritage and traditions to offer, and 'the other wheel' where China has non-universal and non-Western values to offer. This may reflect the 'odd paradox' argued by Shambaugh (2013a): on the one hand, China is extraordinarily proud and confident in its historical identity, but on the other hand, it shows extreme insecurity. These dual aspects give Chinese cultural diplomacy both a defensive and offensive edge. If the two wheels of the vehicle are not heading in the same direction, it may end up not going very far. A different perspective beyond the soft power framework may help create synergy between the two, but to a large degree, this would depend on the driver of the vehicle, or the agent of cultural diplomacy, which will
be the focus of the review in the next section.

1.3 Agent of cultural diplomacy – an ongoing debate

Despite all the emerging scholarly debates, the practice of cultural diplomacy has been relatively sporadic in China until recently. China has mainly been an exporter of raw materials and manufactured goods and an importer of cultural goods since its opening up in the late 1970s. Segal’s article (1999) argued that China has had limited cultural reach out not only compared to the ‘dominant West’ but also in comparison to Japan, that during the last twenty years, the Chinese government has spent more efforts in resisting and controlling the domestic impact of external cultural influences than in attempting to create any specific external influence of its own: the anti-liberalisation of bourgeoisie and the fight against ‘spirit pollution’ were the major anti-Westernisation campaigns launched by the Ministry of Culture in the 1980s. It was until quite recently that China is observed to have begun systematically promoting Chinese culture abroad for “pride, influence and revenue” (Lampton, 2008: 140).

At the government level, culture was made the third pillar in China’s diplomacy next to politics and economics in 2004 (People.com). Following president Hu Jintao’s speech on building cultural soft power at the 17th National Congress in 2007, a number of new task forces have been assembled: an independent, non-governmental think tank, Charhar Institute, was founded in 2009 with ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘image building’ listed as top priorities in its mission statement. In March 2010, the magazine Public Diplomacy Quarterly was launched by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; in May 2010, a Public Diplomacy Office was established in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011) referred to engaging in public diplomacy as both a pressing task and a long-term strategy. Then in August 2011, the Centre for Public Diplomacy Studies, the first one of its kind, opened at the Beijing Foreign Studies University. On December 31, 2012, the China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA) was established in Beijing as a national non-profit social organisation, with the former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing elected Chairman, who is also the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress. Li (2012) noted in his inaugural speech that the CPDA would contribute to strengthening the soft power of China by mobilising, coordinating and organising social resources and the public for the promotion of China’s public diplomacy in an inclusive and pioneering manner.
This whole host of institutions represent a joint effort from state to academia and social organisations, which appears to indicate an emerging pattern of multi-agent in implementing public diplomacy. As a specific subset of public diplomacy, does the cultural denomination require any special considerations for who should be the leading agent for cultural diplomacy: state or non-state actors? If hard power can be built through government funding, will state involvement work productively or counterproductively when it comes to soft power? The next section will unfold the current debates about the agent of cultural diplomacy both internationally and domestically.

1.3.1 The international debate on agent of cultural diplomacy

Before we delve into the sub-level discussion of cultural diplomacy, there are some general debates over the agent of public diplomacy, which has mainly sprung from its varying definitions. For example, Tuch (1990:3) defined public diplomacy as “a government process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies”. In contrast, Castells (2008: 91) adopted a clear-cut, non-governmental-centred approach to describe public diplomacy as “the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public to harness the dialogue between different social collectives and their cultures”, while Gonesh and Melissen (2005: 7) emphasised that public diplomacy contained “all of the activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft power”. D’Hooghe (2011: 20) also believed that “it is about establishing long-term relationships that will build trust, it is also about domestic understanding of other cultures and values so that public diplomacy actions by both state and non-state actors can be attuned to the local context of the issue at stake”.

In terms of who should be the agent of cultural diplomacy, the above debates are reflected in three positions summarised by Gienow-Hecht (2010: 9): one sees cultural diplomacy as first and foremost “an instrument of state policy”, lacking the participation of private individuals. This was also endorsed by McDowell (2008: 8) in claiming that “for it to be diplomacy, it has to entail a role for the state”. It is obvious to see this position dwells on the ‘diplomacy’ side of the concept.

Contrary to this, another position looks at cultural diplomacy as a way to act outside of politics. This was supported by Ogoura (2006), who argued that scholarship and culture should be independent of political power and, in fact, are often a means of resisting authority. Leonard et al (2002: 55) made it clear that if a government want its voice to be
heard or influence people’s perceptions, it should work “through organisations and networks that are separate from, independent of, and even culturally suspicious towards government itself”. This position has a clear focus on the ‘culture’ side of the concept, it does not address cultural diplomacy as a synonym of public diplomacy, but as a subset that has its own distinctive features.

A third group of scholars define cultural diplomacy as a hybrid term in concept that requires matching hybrid actions in practice: apart from the state, it also needs participation and coordination between government and non–governmental institutions. This is endorsed by the definition given in the Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary: “Cultural diplomacy is practiced by a range of actors including national governments, public and private sector institutions, and civil society” (Chakraborty, 2013:30). This corresponds well to the multi-agent view discussed above for public diplomacy.

1.3.2 The domestic debate on agent of cultural diplomacy

Needless to say, all views have their fair share of followers, even have their corresponding institutions in China. For example, Li (2005: 24) sounded indisputable in his book entitled Cultural Diplomacy that “it is the diplomatic activities through cultural means to serve a political or strategic end undertaken by a sovereign state”. His clear stress on the role played by government is based on his fundamental understanding that cultural diplomacy is, after all, diplomacy, which is of course carried out by the government. This was endorsed by Yang in his edited book entitled Diplomacy (2010: 168), which also defined public diplomacy as a “diplomatic activity organised and conducted by a state government directed at the public in foreign countries”. Foreign scholars who researched about Chinese public diplomacy such as Hartig (2012) also observed that the government-centred approach is the main feature of public diplomacy in Chinese understanding. Chinese scholar Bian (2009) even argued that because of this, it is only natural for cultural diplomacy to take on a strong political colour in its implementation.

For this state-as-agent position, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the leading organisation, which established the Division of Public Diplomacy under the Information Department in 2004 and then upgraded it to Public Diplomacy Office in 2012. However, an important part of its remit was “publicising China’s foreign policies and activities to the Chinese public, thus winning their understanding and support” according to the then Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (Li, 2005). This domestic dimension gave it a distinctive Chinese characteristic. Then in 2013, the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee
declared that public diplomacy should be led by the government; in practice, they are implemented by a complex network of state actors including the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education and the Communist Party’s Publicity Department (Zhang, et al, 2015).

There is also a representation of the public-as-agent position in China: the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which interpreted public diplomacy as a synonym for people-to-people diplomacy (“人民外交”, renmin waijiao) or non-governmental diplomacy (“民间外交”, minjian waijiao). However, its mission statement is worded as serving the “purposes of enhancing people's friendship, furthering international cooperation, safeguarding world peace and promoting common development”, which does not mirror the widely acknowledged purpose of public diplomacy as discussed earlier, nor the one prescribed in the Annual Report of China’s Public diplomacy: “improve China’s international image, safeguard national interest and the independence of values” (2012, Preamble). It therefore can be considered as a supportive arm to the mixed-agent position, yet a very crucial one as it is about the ‘last three feet’, a term coined by Ed Murrow: “the real crucial link in the international exchange is the last three feet, which is bridged by personal contact, one person talking to another” (cited in Clack, 2006: 2). In the case of China, the phenomenal increase of people-to-people contact is supported by equally unprecedented growth in the two-way traffic: hugely improved international mobility of Chinese citizens, evidenced in the year-on-year sharp increase of Chinese students, tourists and entrepreneurs venturing abroad; reciprocated by substantial increase of numbers of ‘foreigners’ coming to China, attracted by its generous offer of scholarships, its booming economy and business opportunities, as well as proliferating international forums and conferences. It is only reasonable to argue that China is now in a better winning position than ever before to close the cultural encounter to the 'last three feet'.

This adds weight to the mixed-agent position that challenges the mainstream view of the government-led approach in China. Hu (2008: 32) has clearly stated that:

Cultural diplomacy is diplomacy carried out by government or non-governmental organizations to serve the end of promoting mutual understanding and mutual trust between nations and peoples, constructing and elevating a country’s international prestige and soft power, through the means of educational and cultural exchanges, exchanges of people, arts and performances, and trade of cultural products, etc.

He also pointed out that it is imperative to curb the government role to prevent its attempt to 'score offside', while more non-state actors should be drawn on in this game, especially because most Western countries has an innate and deeply rooted aversion to
any government manipulated culture. This will only aggregate the deep-running misunderstandings and misconceptions already existing between China and the West countries.

Hu’s above argument echoed many western scholars, like d’Hooghe (2011) quoted above and Seiichi (2008: 191), who sees the government role as a “network hub”: it should focus on low-visibility efforts to create a fertile environment where actors are connected to one another horizontally; ideas and culture are freely created by the private sector, where the market test of interaction between transmitters and receivers is easily conducted, as government involvement is liable to be seen as meddlesome intrusion by the authorities into matters of personal taste and beliefs, raising suspicions and reducing cultural attractiveness.

Hu’s school has received increasing support in recent years. An important endorsement came from Zhao and Zhang in 2010 in an article entitled ‘Reconsideration of China’s public diplomacy at the current stage’, making it clear that public diplomacy can be performed by any state departments, by the society or even by individuals. This was confirmed in the Preamble of the Annual Report of China’s Public Diplomacy 2011-2012, which can be argued to represent a change of understanding at least in the academic circle. For this school, the leading official figure is Zhao Qizheng, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), also the editor-in-chief for Public Diplomacy Quarterly launched in 2010. He spelled out the different actors’ roles in his book (2012: Preface): “the government is the leading party. Non-governmental organizations, social organizations and social elites constitute the backbone forces, and the general public is the foundation”.

This thesis argues that Hu’s view not only accords with the international trend, but more importantly, it fits better with China’s distinctive features as well. It may be a surprising fact that in China, not only all major cultural institutions are state-run, but their directors are also party members and state officials. For example, the Palace Museum director has the equivalent status of a vice minister of culture, so does the director of the National Museum of China. As Goodman (2004) pointed out, it has been the norm for Chinese governments during the last one hundred years to equate Chinese state with the specific government and even political parties. This was also reflected in the Chinese language: there is no clear distinction between the word ‘nation’ and ‘state’. When a national culture was promoted through state organs led by party members, it became government behaviour, and if the target country holds negative attitudes towards the Chinese government, or more specifically, the Communist Party, then government-led cultural
diplomacy would have a very limited role to play, if not counterproductive. There is a contradiction existing between the cultural goals of the Chinese government and its political system's ability to deliver progress towards those goals: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to see China acknowledged as a cultural superpower, at the same time, the CCP’s role in the determination of cultural production makes this extremely unlikely, due to the inherent contradiction between the narrow political nationalism and the wider appreciation of Chinese culture, and the divergence in perception between China as a polity and China as a civilisation.

Here a relevant concept worth discussing is propaganda, which can be traced back to the Reformation, when the spiritual and ecclesiastical unity of Europe was shattered and the medieval Roman Catholic Church lost its hold on the northern countries. According to Welch (2014: 4), the word ‘propaganda’ was first applied to mean an organisation set up for the purpose of spreading a doctrine; then to the doctrine itself; and lastly to the methods employed in effectuating the dissemination. It was during the First World War that the use of propaganda as an organized weapon of modern warfare transformed it into something more sinister, as “what propagandists do is to utilize their own interpretation of the truth in order to sell an ideological point of view to their own citizens and to the world at large”. Welch (2014:17) also argued that:

Propaganda is most effective when it is less noticeable. In a totalitarian regime - indeed any 'controlled' society – propaganda is more obvious and visible and largely tolerated for the fear of the consequences. In a so-called ‘open’ society propaganda is much more problematic when it is hidden and integrated into the political culture.

This telling statement has sharply pointed out two issues of propaganda, being implicit and explicit. Propaganda also exists in so-called ‘open societies’, but when it is hidden and integrated into the political culture, it shows a similar feature to hegemony, which is an invisible power. In a way, it means anything ‘they’ produce is deemed to be propaganda, what ‘we’ do is called public diplomacy.

Explicit propaganda has always been integral to the post-1949 Chinese state. There has been a dedicated Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee for years that took solid control of all forms of media with the aim of utilising them to further its ideological objectives and convince its people the benefits of the new society that the Party has constructed. It is only after 2009 that the English translation was changed to Publicity Department and the old term of ‘external propaganda’, aiming at advertising Chinese achievements and selling the country’s image worldwide, was gradually replaced by ‘public diplomacy’, but some Western scholars such as Edney
(2012) concluded that the propaganda system still shapes the way the Chinese party-state defines and pursues its cultural diplomacy, as it still largely fits the definition given by Nelson in *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States* (1996: 115):

a form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages via mass and direct media channels.

As Nye pointed out (2008: 100), “information that appears to be propaganda may turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country’s reputation for credibility”. He also named China in “making the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power” (2013: n.p.). Dr. Robert Kuhn, a US public intellectual, also a long-time adviser to the Chinese government, has used the expression of ‘an instant killer for credibility’ to refer to explicit propaganda. This would make the argument for government-led approach liable to such danger. As pointed out by Lukes (1974:23), “power is at its most effective when least observable”. Cultural diplomacy must remain subtle; any attempt to make it a government campaign will reduce its impact.

The intertwining nature of domestic and international contexts discussed earlier was also reflected here: when decisions were driven by domestic agenda and made on the ‘tracks’ of domestic standard, they sometimes cannot reach the international domain. A common phrase in use in China since its opening up is to ‘connect to the international railway’, meaning to adapt to the international standard, but in order to do so, it needs reengineering and not just repackaging. Otherwise, it is not hard to understand why the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Party-state, and the blurred boundary between state involvement and the social cultural realm would generate cautions among foreign academics who fear the strings of propaganda attached. It seems the dose of government defining, planning, funding, and leading is one of the ‘ingredients’ that is causing side effects of reducing China’s cultural appeal. This assumption will be further explored and tested out in the next stage.

To sum up, there are changing dynamics in China from the mainstream view of seeing cultural diplomacy as government-led endeavour to wider acceptance of the multi-agent view; China is also learning from its successes and lessons in the actual implementation of cultural diplomacy in various fronts. For example, the success story of the CIs that have rolled out at an incredible speed to 125 countries by the end of 2015 has been accompanied by very mixed receptions, and much criticism is about its top-down operation model: that is, they are state-led enterprises, thus triggered many
controversies for their being used as propaganda tools. This will be further elaborated in Section 1.5. In contrast, the most eminent agent of the American cultural diplomacy comes not from the government but civil society: everything from Hollywood to Harvard. Shambaugh (2013a: 209) articulated well the difference in that soft power is “largely about the capacity of a society to attract others, rather than a government to persuade others” [emphasis added]. Therefore, it is fair to argue that cultural power per se is not necessarily a soft power, it is the soft use of it by the right agent that can work the transition.

1.4 New ideas for the new strategy in practice

Although providing us with rich theories, useful insights and analysis, the body of literature so far has mostly fallen into the discussions of the ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘who’ elements of China’s cultural diplomacy, it has offered little to examine the actual practice in field or facilitate shaping of a more effective strategy for implementation, which is still in its embryonic phase both in terms of research and practice. As d’Hooghe (2011:19) pointed out:

The content and conduct of China’s public diplomacy are suffering from structural problems that cannot simply be ‘fixed’ by intensifying and expanding current activities in the field of soft power projection. Beijing needs to rethink its strategy as a whole.

A new strategy can only be formulated by thinking differently. Melissen has raised the three crucial questions to consider for an effective strategy in 2005: what messages are sent under what circumstances, who received them, and how the messages are interpreted. Based on the afore-reviewed debates on the ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘who’ of China’s cultural diplomacy, more variables are developed through this thesis: I argue who sends the messages, and how the messages are sent, along with how these messages interact with the messages produced by others in the destination also have direct bearings on how they are interpreted.

For example, in the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games, there were performances of 2008 drummers and people acting as movable type printing blocks while forming the Chinese character “和” (peace and harmony), however, “the image of massive numbers of efficient Chinese performers in perfect rows and columns drumming in perfect unison” was commented as “Authorit-awesome” by the Daily Show with Jon Steward, and even interpreted as an all-powerful state that would “take over the world” and “bring down America” by the character Cartman in the episode of ‘the China Problem’
in *South Park*\(^3\) (cited in Gries, et al, 2010: 231). This is a classic case that the original message of China’s peaceful rise being interpreted in the opposite way of China as a threat. There are at least two lessons to be learned from this: first is about who sends the messages. There is a tendency for top-down approach in China by hosting high-profile international events or launching state-sponsored projects, while for domestic audiences they proudly displayed their national achievements, they may be perceived more cynically internationally simply because the government role is so explicit. Cultural diplomacy is a very complex and slow undertaking, it requires a bottom-up approach to succeed, as ordinary citizens convey much longer-lasting and more accessible images of a country than those international events. Government-led approach also tends to demonstrate progress by showing what concrete activities have been carried out than by measuring the actual effects of what opinions have been influenced. Secondly, it is imperative to understand that the messages are not sent to a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that was preoccupied or even embedded with pre-perceptions about the ‘other’, besides, the receiving destinations are also in a different and changing power relations with China in a world of unchanging power struggle. All these dynamics and complexities must be taken into account as variables for an effective strategy.

The short-term goal of China’s cultural diplomacy is to increase ‘the two-way traffic’ to reverse the huge ‘cultural deficit’, but what really mattered is whether the increased traffic generates increased volume of impact in its destinations, and that, to a large degree, depends on these variables. In the meantime, the long-term goal of China’s cultural diplomacy is to show the world merits of its culture and advocate cultural pluralism, believing that no culture is the one culture for the whole of mankind, and no culture is only an exporter or importer. But again, what really mattered here is ‘the world’ is one big place, if China was the ‘sleeping dragon’, and its waking ‘will shake the world’ as Napoleon once predicted, needless to say, this shake would be perceived differently in different regions of the world, depending on ‘soft or hard boundaries of culture’ as proposed by Duara (1996: 49), who believes that “every cultural practice is a potential boundary marking a community. These boundaries may be either soft or hard”. Groups with soft boundaries between them are sometimes so unconscious of their differences that they do not view mutual boundary breaches as a threat and could eventually even amalgamate into one community. Not only do communities with hard boundaries privilege their differences, they tend to develop an intolerance and suspicion toward the adoption of the other’s practices. So, at the waking of the ‘sleeping dragon’, some

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communities with hard cultural boundaries may feel more threatened especially if they depict the dragon as an evil monster in their own culture; while others may be more curious if they only view the dragon as a ‘new’ species of animal; and groups with soft boundaries who are more familiar with the dragon may just need to learn how to live with it, or even ‘dance with it’.

Duara (1996) also pointed that boundaries between communities exist along a spectrum between hard and soft poles and are always in flux: soft boundaries can harden, but hard boundaries can soften as well. In this sense, what carves the boundary and drives its change is also power. Therefore, I believe the cultural boundary theory has direct implications on the implementation of China’s cultural diplomacy, which has the potential to move boundaries. It also highlights the need to tailor the ‘product’ to each destination by gauging the cultural boundaries rather than having one unified model as a fit for all, ‘localisation’ would be essential for a strategy made by centralised approach to work, as the same message sent would be received and perceived differently in the process of interacting with different ideologies, varying cultural boundaries and power positions of the destination. Therefore, ‘localisation’ and ‘interaction’ should be the key words for the new strategy, as commented by Seiichi (2008: 191): “cooperative interaction is what distinguished public diplomacy from propaganda”. To put the two together, it is of vital importance to localise both the products and practice to interact with the audiences from societies that have different cultural boundaries with China.

To sum up, this part of review is also pointing to the need of adopting a new analytical framework to examine the ‘how’ to implement cultural diplomacy, by addressing the new variables added and taking the agent and the interaction with different target audiences into consideration. A comparative case study of the CIs across different continents will be conducted to facilitate this, therefore, the last part of the literature review is devoted to gaining more in-depth knowledge and understanding of the CI, about which very little conceptually-based academic research has been done despite the extensive media attention it gets for both its remarkable growth and the debates it has triggered.

1.5 Confucius Institute: its relevance to showcase cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics

Confucius Institutes (CIs) are non-profit public institutions that aim to “develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international communities” (Constitution and by-laws of the CIs, Hanban website). The first CI was opened in
November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. The latest statistics available by December 2015 indicates there are already 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms opened in 125 countries and regions around the world (Hanban website)\(^4\). The CIs are managed and funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International, known as Hanban in Chinese abbreviation. Directly affiliated to the Ministry of Education (MOE), Hanban was established in 1987, but a new plaque of ‘Confucius Institute Headquarters’ was hung in April 2007 to show its new remit of administration and supervision of the CIs. Although the new office building in Beijing only identify itself as the Confucius Institute Headquarters, and Hanban is only kept in parentheses after the CI Headquarters as the official title of the organisation, it is still the most widely used name in English.

Both the impressive speed of the expansion and global coverage of the CIs, and the extension of the starting contract period from three years to five years with Hanban-guaranteed funding can be seen as evidence for their early successes, gaining them the reputation of the ‘flagship’ of China’s cultural diplomacy (Liu, 2012). However, in the short time-frame of its rapid expansion, the CI has also received its share of criticisms along with applauses, which can be found in a growing body of literature, both in influential media outlets and academic journals. This made it a very illustrative case to show both the opportunities and challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy and its unique Chinese characteristics, thus merits a section of its own to review the related literature. In what follows, the subsections shall reveal the controversies it has stimulated layer by layer.

1.5.1 Controversy in its name and intension

The well-known Chinese philosopher, Confucius (551–479 BCE) is the namesake for the Institutes. This may show China’s intention to copy the success of Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute as it was made clear on its own website that:

> Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain’s experience in promoting their national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions which an aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these were given the name the Confucius Institute.

However, the Chinese version met with unexpected mixed responses. From the Chinese perspective, choosing Confucius as the namesake is an indicator for the revival of traditional Chinese culture, to remind the world that China is not so much ‘rising’ but

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\(^4\) The latest update with these statistics was 512 CIs and 1073 CCs in 140 countries around the world by the end of December 2016 on Hanban website.
reasserting its status while reinforcing the peaceful nature of its resurgence. As Professor Gosset put it (2013), the name of the organization is a reminder that China’s modernization is more about the reinterpretation of the Chinese tradition than a passive Westernization. Nakagawa’s article (2011a) entitled ‘Confucius: What’s in a Name?’ applauded this name in quoting Starr’s two contentions: first, the decision to use the philosopher’s name is almost something that unites the Chinese diasporas as well, it is not divisive as a name such as ‘China Foundation’ may be; and secondly, Confucius is one of the few global brands the Chinese have. They argue that for many in the West, Confucius is usually associated with learning and general wisdom, so it works with the institute and its purpose in terms of branding.

However, the trouble is that Confucius is more than just a cultural icon of wisdom and learning, actually, the translation of ‘Rujia sixiang’ (儒家思想, rujia sixiang) or ‘Rujiao’ (儒教, rujiao) as Confucianism established a narrow link between Confucius himself and the very complex philosophy and value system that was developed over thousands of years after him. Confucianism is a complex system of moral, social, political, philosophical, ethical and quasi-religious thought that has had tremendous influence on the culture and statecraft of China throughout history. Confucian values lie at the very core of traditional Chinese culture and was given an ideological function in maintaining political order. However, the complexity of Confucianism has often been the victim of journalistic simplification, in that the multi-faceted image of Confucianism is often shown one profile of representing authoritarian and hierarchical rule. So in a way, the name itself is like a label for being the ‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’ in the eyes of those who still see China through the tinted glasses of ‘otherness’.

Furthermore, it is not that long ago when Confucianism and its rigid hierarchical character were treated as the personification of China’s ‘feudal’ traditions that caused China’s backwardness during the New Culture Movement in 1912; then denounced by Communist leaders during the 1973 campaign of ‘down with Confucius’ in the Cultural Revolution when Confucian teachings were treated as ‘rubbish that should be thrown into the ash heap of history’. So, when the sage is recast as the promoter of peace and harmony, and rebranded as “a symbol of the new China: educated, orderly, harmonious, respectful, unified” (Barr, 2012:91), much of China’s success is attributed to Confucian thoughts of discipline, hardworking, ethic of mutual obligation, and the value attached to education, it would naturally give rise to the question: how can the same Confucian values hold a society back from modernization for hundreds of years and then suddenly propel it into unprecedented levels of growth over a few decades? The inherent constraint that puts many of the Confucian ideas in conflict with modernity tends to be
challenged by some Western scholars, for example, Louie (2011: 78) simply argued that “Confucius as ‘brand China’ may be an accurate reflection of an ideologically confused country”, therefore, the “naming of the Confucius Institute is not a sound approach in a world where national identity is marketed for political spin” (2011: 99). His views were succinctly summarised in the paragraph below in his thesis entitled *Confucius the Chameleon: dubious envoy for ‘Brand China’*:

Domestically, the advocacy of Confucianism will in practice lead to the promotion of very conservative and inconsistent values. Internationally, if such values are to be paraded as the best of “Chinese” essences, China’s contribution to world culture will be a confused and regressive one. (Louie, 2011: 100)

True, throughout ancient Chinese history, during the Han, Tang and Song dynasties, which were widely considered to have been splendid periods of great cultural, intellectual and political achievements, Confucianism was established and enshrined as an essential element of the statecraft and education. Conversely, in more recent history when China felt the most vulnerable and precarious politically and economically, culture and tradition tended to be blamed by radical reformers and advocates for social-political change as standing obstacles in the way of building a modern China. However, despite all the attempts at its destruction carried out over the past century, either in the name of democracy (the New Culture Movement) or revolution (the Cultural Revolution), Confucianism continues to be entrenched in Chinese political thinking today, and has seen resurgence in popularity in recent years. It is exactly because of the vicissitudes Confucianism has experienced that Zaharna (2014) added that the name has conveyed an extra goodwill to symbolise the longevity of the Chinese culture, as well as the longevity envisioned for the initiative. If longevity is a vertical dimension in time, I argue that the constant revival of Confucianism is not only a sign for its compatibility with the modern world, but also worthy of a place in the horizontal dimension of space: as a counterbalance to the Western values as Yin and Yang elements discussed earlier in 1.2.2.

Here, an important point often overlooked by Western scholars is that the revival of Confucianism is actually more among academics and civil society than government-sponsored. The government is also reacting to developments outside its control, and even inside China domestically, the comeback of Confucianism is not without its opposition: in 2011, the mysterious erection and removal of the Confucius statue in Tiananmen Square after one hundred days only may be seen as an evidence of this divide in opinions among the decision makers. However, when China today needs a symbol to fill the ideological void and unify the nation, Confucianism brings the state
nationalism, popular nationalism and cultural nationalism altogether and provides the basis for the idea of building a ‘harmonious society’ and a ‘harmonious world’, which is essentially a Confucian concept and now written into the mission statement of Hanban.

Looking through the historical perspective allows us to see that when China gains strength again, for almost the very first time in its modern history, a sense of cultural pride ascends. However, this was immediately seen as a challenge to Western hegemony in the eyes of some Western scholars, such as Huntington (1998: 93) who articulated that “East Asia attributes their dramatic economic development not to their import of Western culture but rather to their adherence to their own culture……The revolt against the West is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values.” We can see the arbitrary equation adopted here between ‘cultural pride’ and ‘value superiority’, and a further speculation that the mission of the CI is to promote Confucian values, thus a potential revolt against the Western democratic values and a justification of China’s authoritarian rule.

When such loaded interpretation of the CI’s intention is combined with the government-led approach discussed earlier, it has made many scholars worry that if there were to be a presence on campus, with a Chinese official link, it would be more difficult for academics to maintain their freedom and independence. To address such concerns, Hanban has repeatedly clarified that the CI’s mission is language teaching rather than value promotion as specified in its Constitution, by-laws, and the template contract for partnerships. When the University of Malaya requested to change the name from Confucius Institute to the Kongzi Institute for the Teaching of Chinese Language (‘孔子汉语学院’ Kongzi Hanyu Xueyuan) before it was agreed to be launched in 2009, Hanban was quite happy to approve it. This could be a good idea to clarify the mission and function of the Confucius Institute, while helping dispel and concerns and speculations.

However, since the CI was lauded as the ‘flagship’ or the “central project of Chinese Cultural diplomacy” (Cull, 2009: 12), and most of the research so far has associated its intention with projecting soft power (Kurlantzick, 2007; Paradise, 2009; Ren, 2010; Yang, 2010; Ding & Xing, 2011; Louie, 2011; Yang & Hsiao, 2012a; Hubbert, 2014a; Lo & Pan, 2014; Lueck, Pipps & Lin, 2014; Hartig, 2014a; Scotton, 2015; Volodzko, 2015), it has actually become the very point of attack by some Chinese native scholars, questioning why use Confucius as the official name of the entity, but not teach anything related to Confucian philosophy? This flashpoint is an example of the inherent tensions existing between the two ‘wheels’ of culture and value, as well as between the domestic and international contexts discussed earlier. These dual tensions were further complicated.
by the CI’s position between host and home countries, adding another layer of controversy regarding its operation model.

1.5.2 Controversy in its operating model

Almost all discussions of the CI’s operation model focus on that they do not claim to be independent from the government, and operate within established universities, colleges, and secondary schools around the world, providing funding, teachers and educational materials. This has raised a series of concerns over finance, academic freedom, legal issues, ethical issues, relations with the Chinese partner universities, as well as ideological concerns about improper influence over teaching and research (Chey, 2008; Golden, 2011; Corrigan, 2012; Guttenplan, 2012; Hubert, 2014b; Hughes, 2014; Sahlins 2015). As a result of such concerns, administrators at a number of institutions have opposed the establishment of a CI on their campuses, including the University of Manitoba, the University of British Columbia, the University of Melbourne, the University of Copenhagen, Aarhus University, Southern Denmark University, The University of Oslo, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California, Berkeley, Cornell University, Harvard University, University of California, San Diego, the University of Wisconsin, Tokyo University, Kyoto University, and so on (Sahlins, 2015). Montgomery (2014) also mentioned that both Concordia and McGill Universities in Quebec said they had been approached by the Chinese government to start a Confucius program, but did not sign up for it.

However, 500 universities around the world have opened their doors to the CIs so far (Hanban website). Its establishment follows a formal and regular procedure. Though there are two other types – those entirely run by the CI Headquarters and those entirely run by the host country under license from the CI Headquarters, the third type of a partnership between a Chinese home university, an overseas host university and the CI Headquarters is by far the most common owing to the advantage of sharing establishment and operation costs and the prestige derived from association with host universities (Starr, 2009). The latter advantage was particularly stressed by Hughes (2014:71) in that “when universities allow the activities of CIs to appear on their websites and to use their logos, they provide them with a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of students and the public who expect such brands to guarantee high standard of academic integrity”.

The procedure begins with an application proposal from a foreign organisation (usually a university). The proposal must demonstrate firstly, a strong demand for Chinese
language instruction in the university and local community; and secondly, the willingness of the applicant to contribute (both fiscally and physically) to the establishment and the growth of the CI (Starr, 2009). This has often been used by Hanban as the strongest counter argument against the accusations of China’s cultural invasion: the CIs are invited by their host universities overseas, not imposed upon. But what is not mentioned by Hanban is that the overture is often made by them first, especially to prestigious universities listed in the first paragraph, which have decided to reject the offer, or ‘spurned’ invitation from Hanban as reported by Bloomberg News (Golden, 2011).

Once approved, both institutions will receive financial benefits: every Chinese home university will receive 200,000 RMB (about £20,000) from Hanban as the supporting matching fund per CI set up, and 3000 RMB (about £300) per month per expatriated teacher during their service period abroad. The overseas host university will also receive generous funding from Hanban, including the start-up fund of US$ 100,000-150,000 and an average annual operational fund of US$ 50,000 (Xu, 2011). The startup fund is 100% provided by Hanban, with the subsequent annual operation supported by matching funds from the host partner organization at a mostly 1:1 ratio. By 2014, as published in the Confucius Institute Annual Development Report (Hanban website), the ratio of Hanban expenditure to those of host institutions stood at 1:1.5.

Although the host university is nominally requested to match funding, it is generally provided in kind, such as campus facilities and office space, as well as administrative and accounting services, there is little in the way of out-of-pocket expenses. Because of this, some simply questioned if the CI can represent a soft power strategy, as according to Nye’s definition, while this model may not rely on coercion, it does rely on payments, which “may be attractive for financially stretched educational authorities facing a growing demand for Chinese language instruction” (Hughes, 2014). As mentioned in Hughes’s statement, there is a growing demand for Chinese language instruction, and Hanban sees the role of the CI to meet such ‘growing demand’, actually, it is the starting line of the Constitution and By-Laws of the CIs that “Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language” (Hanban website), but the controversies come from its means to meet the demand as well as the perceived purpose of soft power projection that goes beyond meeting the demand.

For example, the CI’s model has raised scepticism and many concerns with strings attached, though the “strings’ associated with accepting money may be fairly loose” as argued by Paradise (2009: 662), there are still worries that those who pay the piper may
call the tune. The common list of censored topics includes the ‘three Ts’ (Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen), human rights, China’s military build-up and factional fights inside the Chinese leadership (Chey, 2008; Golden, 2011; Mosher 2012; Sahlins 2015). Some critics of China such as the US Congressman Rohrabacher (2012, n.p.) has sounded alarm at this: “The Chinese Communist Party would like to influence American opinion, but if it just buys silence, it is a victory for the Communist regime”. Even inside the US, Rohrabacher’s remarks were criticised as ‘shades of McCarthyism all over again’ by some American scholars such as Paul Smith, who believe that some of the fears are generated by the frustration of the US’s own ability to fund academic projects eroded by the economic downturn: “our national power and prestige are under pressure right now, and I worry that could fuel unproductive resentments against China” (cited in Redden, 2012: n.p.). These different voices from the US show different perceptions of China as a red threat or a benign rising power: the former is focusing against ‘the Other’; while the latter is more introspective about ‘Us’, and more sober-minded about the changing power positions between ‘Us’ and ‘Other’. In a way, they represent the affirmative and aggressive nationalisms from the US side.

The funding issue is also courting more and more questioning domestically. The criticism is mainly about its lack of transparent operations and financial conditions. Some have accused the government of misplacing educational resources for overseas institutions rather than allocating them to poor school districts in China (Ren, 2012). Insiders have revealed that the great majority of the CIs are making financial losses, and have become a bottomless financial pit. Although the Chinese government has expended a huge amount of effort and money establishing and jointly running this network of CIs, viability and sustainability is still a common concern as voiced by Shepherd (2007) in the Guardian article: “if the expectation is that the institute will self-fund after three years, that is totally unrealistic. The Chinese government has to accept that these institutes will require funding for a substantial period of time, 10 to 20 years perhaps”.

To sum up, the various controversies the CI has courted made it an epitome of the complexity that China’s cultural diplomacy is marked with, carrying conflict-ridden forces from cultural hegemony to nationalism, from ideology to its state-led approach whose “scale, speed, resources and strategic thinking” adds to the apprehension (Hughes, 2014:75). With its counter-hegemonic stance, the CI is fighting a ‘defensive’ battle under Western hegemony, but through ‘offensive’ expansion into overseas educational institutions; and its representation in the ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ camps divided by both ideology and nationalism is like having a label of ‘Other’ imposed on it; its position as the flagship project made itself an easy target that attracts mixed responses from applause to
speculation, from doubts to fears, and different interpretations. In the following Chapters Three and Four, comparative case studies will be unfolded in the global context to showcase how the CI’s position in the current global cultural terrain determines the unique challenges it has to grapple with.

1.6. Conclusion

Cultural diplomacy is an endeavour spanning over different nations, territories, races, development stages, social and political systems and cultural traditions, in many cases, it is also over different civilizations in Huntington’s terms. Due to these variances, and the constantly evolving power relationships, it is a very complex subject. While inspired and stimulated by the growing literature about China’s cultural diplomacy, a significant void has been identified in the existing scholarly research that this study has attempted to fill. Challenging ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’ as the mainstream theoretical frameworks constitutes the point of departure for this thesis. The West-centric concept has not engaged with any historical analysis of the role of hegemony and Orientalism in shaping the current global cultural terrain, neither was it a good match with the fundamental vision of cultural diplomacy, which is not a zero sum game, nor a race to win hearts and minds, but a plus sum game of nurturing mutual understanding and mutual respect between cultures, it is the means to achieve the ends of building cultural pluralism, which echoes the ultimate goals of China’s cultural diplomacy.

After clarifying the definition of cultural diplomacy and analysing the inadequacy of the current theoretical framework of ‘soft power’ and ‘nation branding’, this chapter proceeded to present an overview of the historical, international and domestic contexts specifically for China, where the legacies of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, power-knowledge nexus and nationalism were interwoven to create a complex global cultural terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy was launched into. At the core of this complex is power, which lies at the interface of the new three-dimensional analytical framework constructed on the tripartite theories of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and nationalism.

Debates about both the vehicle and agent of China’s cultural diplomacy were then staged, where a dual character can be traced as a permeated feature: Western domination over the power of discourse has rendered China as being both the ‘ideological other’ and ‘cultural other’, with the domestic undercurrent of double-edged nationalism at play, Chinese cultural diplomacy needs to gain external rapport and internal recognition at the same time, thus its purpose must be understood within both the international and domestic contexts. An historical perspective is also indispensable where the ‘Occident’
and ‘Orient’ dichotomy; ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ camps divided by ideology and nationalism, as well as the ‘two wheels’ contention domestically all underpin the tensions and challenges for China to achieve its dual aims of countering the China threat perception and advocating cultural pluralism. Traditional Chinese culture and values function as the two wheels of the vehicle for cultural diplomacy, which takes an offensive and defensive stance respectively. Perhaps no other country’s cultural diplomacy would be etched with such a level of complexity.

All the dual characters described above can be found in the CI, the most well-known and controversial project of China’s cultural diplomacy. What the CI is expected to do is to leverage the attention China’s rise gets and translate the growing influence of China into the growing attraction of Chinese language and culture. The question of ‘how’ to improve the implementation strategy was discussed by proposing some new variables to consider and the new concept of cultural boundary to apply. As the major output of this chapter, a new three-dimensional perspective was proposed, which will frame the critical analysis of the global cultural terrain that the remainder of this thesis seeks to develop. It will differ in significant ways from existing research and tries to define the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy and its CI project.

After laying out the theoretical propositions of this thesis, the next chapter will introduce the research methodology and explain the research design as the road map for implementing the primary research.
Chapter Two
Research Methodology and Research Design

2.0 Introduction

A distinction between the word research ‘methodology’ and ‘method’ is worth making at the very start of this chapter. According to Melia and Dingwall (1997:27), the former means “the study of method”, and the latter is the design and development of “research procedures actually employed”. This chapter will discuss both and the relationship between the two: research method is in a profound sense motivated by the methodological suppositions, therefore, philosophical bases have to be established first as they concern the nature of the subject matter and the rationale of the investigative methods employed by the researcher to assert and defend his/her claims to research findings.

Having developed and established the new analytical framework to answer my research questions in the preceding Literature Review chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to describe the research design procedure and methods for data collection and analysis. Prior to this, it will commence with a brief overview of the philosophical assumptions and the main paradigmatic positions to explain the philosophical stance for this research, because “philosophical questions had to be settled in advance of empirical enquiries” (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 2). The chapter will then proceed to a theoretical discussion of ‘multiple triangulation’, followed by its actual implementations in this research and detailed explanations of the approach to data handling and data presentation. The elements of originality that make this research distinctive and valuable will also be highlighted before the chapter closes.

2.1 Philosophical assumptions and research paradigms

Sanders, Lewis & Thornhill (2003: 3) have defined the three characteristics of research: “first, data are collected systematically; second, data are interpreted systematically; third, there is a clear purpose: to find things out”. This systematic way is best reflected in the research paradigm that can be viewed as “a set of basic beliefs based on ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 107). Guba and Lincoln believe that it is necessary to understand the following three fundamental components before determining which paradigm is to be used in a research:

1. The ontological question: What is the form and nature of reality, and what is there that can be known about?
2. The epistemological question: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?

3. The methodological question: How can the inquirer go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known? (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108)

There are a number of research paradigms that differ from one another in their basic beliefs regarding each of the above three questions. For example, positivism believes that social sciences should endeavour to emulate natural sciences, which is an empirical pursuit with its basis laying in the observation of ‘brute data’: “data which are not the result of judgement, interpretation, or other subjective mental operations” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997: 43). Therefore, it advocates “the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond” (Bryman & Bell, 2007:16), and assumes an objective relationship to the epistemological question, i.e., that knowledge exists external to the researcher, while constructivism believes in a subjective relationship.

Constructivists, notably Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), argued against positivists that differences between the natural and the social sciences were based on logic, the inaccessibility of mental phenomena to direct observation meant that they could not be dealt with objectively, thus “human beings could have no knowledge independently of what was in their minds” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997:98), and knowledge is co-constructed socially by people’s interactions with the world. Therefore, findings are co-created rather than being discovered (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Rickert on the other hand (Cohen & Crabytree, 2006), argued that the essential distinction between the natural and the social sciences was methodological rather than ontological; natural sciences seek to discover general laws, while social sciences are concerned to understand the unique combination of elements that represent a culturally significant phenomenon, which requires the social scientists to attempt to “reconstruct the subjective experience of social actors” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997:101), or “grasp the subjective meaning of social actions” (Bryman & Bell, 2007:19).

Both positivism and constructivism paradigms have been criticised for their radical stances, many contemporary methodologists (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, Hughes & Sharrock, 1997) believe that the development of human knowledge has been severely limited by the positivism-constructivism dichotomy. Realism proposes itself as a neutral position in contrast to the two. On the one hand, it shares the positivism belief that the natural and social sciences can and should apply the same kind of approach to data collection, but realism argues that the scientist’s conceptualisation is simply one way of
knowing that reality; the ideal of objective knowledge requires both methods (Bryman & Bell, 2007). On the other hand, both Travers (2001) and Cohen & Crabtree (2006) argue that realism involves looking behind appearances to discover laws or mechanisms that explain human behaviour, it provides opportunities for discovering emergent knowledge as opposed to testing a priori hypotheses, therefore, it is particularly useful for research aiming at generating new knowledge emerging from the data, or looking at previously researched phenomena from a new perspective.

Since this thesis aims at defining the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy and its Confucius Institute, which involves developing a new knowledge or conceptualisation that has not been generated before due to the majority of the previous research being focused on interpreting China’s activities in this domain, the realism paradigm was considered the most appropriate philosophical stance for this research. The investigation will be carried out mainly through qualitative methods such as interview, observation and text analysis. This brings us back to the third component of the philosophical assumptions: while ontology informs what counts as valid findings/knowledge, epistemology offers insights into research strategies including research design and overall approach, methodology guides the researcher to choose the most effective methods.

In their book Qualitative-Quantitative Research Methodology, Newman and Benz (1998) have explained that qualitative and quantitative research has philosophical roots in the naturalistic and the positivistic philosophies respectively. Guba (1990) further explained that a qualitative approach is regarded as being naturalistic, interpretive, constructivist and an inquiry from within, while a quantitative approach is considered to be rationalistic, functionalist, essentialist, and involving external inquiry. What the researcher must begin with is the nature of the research question, as the research question guides what methods are to be selected. This is a critical decision that needs to be made from the early stages of framing the research questions, since this will influence data collection and data analysis throughout the research, all the way to the validity of research findings, and even have implications on the next steps of the research. Therefore, this decision-making should be a thought-through and constantly-reflected process.

In the process of a thorough literature review, my research questions were carefully recalibrated and sharpened to answering the questions of why China’s similar efforts in launching the CI are perceived and received differently from its Western counterparts, which is further translated into more specific questions by looking at why China wants to launch the CI; what is the vehicle; who is the agent; and how it is implemented in the
field. Therefore, my research questions fall into three levels – from ‘contextual’ to identify the position and nature of China’s cultural diplomacy in the global cultural terrain; to ‘diagnostic’, trying to examine the reasons for China to launch the CI, and the challenges it faces in terms of its perception and reception in the rest of the world; then to ‘evaluative’, trying to assess the effectiveness of the CI project by looking at how its goals are achieved and what barriers exist to its current operation and future improvement, with recommendations given for policy making.

These research questions point me to qualitative study as the most suitable research method as they are investigative in nature, committed to the interpretive understanding of a complex issue, particularly its underlying reasons and motivations, and providing a broad base of insight, knowledge and sound rationale for further decision-making or recommending course of actions. However, qualitative method does have its limitations. The most obvious is the small sample size and difficulty of replicating the research. The researcher would have no way of being sure how representative his/her sample is of the world at large, and human beings (including researchers) tend to perceive patterns and regularities even when they are looking at random data. While Denzin and Lincoln (2005:20) simply referred to the concern for the validity of qualitative research as the “legitimation crisis”, Newman and Benz (1998) have provided a list of criteria to help enhance qualitative design validity, including neutrality, prolonged engagement on-site, and triangulation. Against these criteria, the next section will detail the description and justification of the research design formulated for this study to mitigate the common concerns about qualitative research. With defensible logical connections established between the research questions and research methods, and the enhanced validity of research findings, they may generate ideas and hypotheses for later quantitative research.

2.2 Research design for this thesis

According to Nachmias & Nachmias (1992:77-78), research design is a plan that “guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation”. In other words, it should function as a road map leading to the answers to the research questions.

An important concept which needs to be introduced at this stage is ‘multiple triangulation’. Denzin (1970) took the term ‘triangulation’ from Webb (1966) and developed this notion of ‘multiple triangulation’ which has moved beyond just the use of multiple methods to
study the same phenomenon, but refers to a “typology of strategies that can be combined in one investigation: methodological triangulation; data triangulation; investigator triangulation; and theoretical triangulation” (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 22). Denzin described the essence of this triangulation strategy as the “logic of triangulation” (1978:28). He argued that by approaching research questions from different angles and bringing together a range of different data, the research “has the potential to generate new and alternative explanations, ones that better capture the social complexity that the fieldwork explores” (Denzin, 1978:28). Goetz and LeCompte (1984) also commented on the benefits of ‘multiple triangulation’ as a means of defining, broadening and strengthening conceptual linkages.

As an inherently interdisciplinary research area, cultural diplomacy per se is the product of moves to unite or transgress traditional disciplinary boundaries, drawing on aspects of cultural studies, international relations, and communications. This added layer of interdisciplinary complexity requires the researcher to implement ‘multiple triangulation’ at the level of overall research design to ensure the quality and validity of the research findings. The triangulation shall also aim at producing a compatibility that allows different methods to be blended and integrated, rather than simply comprising distinct approaches that do not complement each other. The next part will unfold the four specific layers of ‘multiple triangulation’ embedded in the design of this thesis.

2.2.1 Methodological triangulation

i) Multiple comparative case studies

Given the in-depth dimension required by the exploratory research questions, and the complexity of the subject area of cultural diplomacy, especially in that it is a contemporary, culturally defined phenomenon, case study is thought to be the preferred method to investigate and gain analytical insight into the subject. Simon’s definition (2009:21) can be quoted here as the best justification for my research:

Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a ‘real life’ context. It is research-based, inclusive of different methods and is evidence-led. The primary purpose is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, policy, institution, programme or system to generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, professional practice and civil or community action.

China’s cultural diplomacy is such a ‘particular project in a real life context’ that is marked by both complexity and uniqueness. Bryman and Bell (2007:63) further explained that
“with a case study, the case is an object of interest in its own right, and the researcher aims to provide an in-depth elucidation of the unique features of the case”. Yin (2014:16) also added that case study is a preferred method to investigate a contemporary phenomenon “especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”. According to Thomas (2016), case study concentrates on experiential knowledge of the case and gives close attention to the influence of its social, political, and cultural contexts, as the case to be studied is a complex entity located in a milieu of contexts or backgrounds. To sum up, a case study would facilitate an overall understanding of the entity as configurations with combinations of characteristics.

The advantages of doing a case study include providing an up-close and in-depth look at the cases, providing the possibility of creating a three-dimensional picture, or what Foucault called a “polyhedron of intelligibility” (2003: 249) when you have a multiplicity of force relations to reckon with. By this he meant that we can only really understand something by looking at it from different directions and using different methods. This way allows a more rounded and more balanced picture of the subject to be developed. Therefore, a case study method fits perfectly well with both the aim and nature of this research. It will be used to develop an in-depth and meaningful dialogue between theoretical ideas and evidence, to chart the global cultural terrain of struggle with a three-dimensional view, and to establish the inductive statements about the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy.

Like most qualitative research methods, case study also suffers from the major disadvantages of lacking generalisability and its limitations to validity. However, Yin (2014:40) has made an important distinction between “statistical generalisation” and “analytic generalisation”: while case studies are not “sampling units” to generate any “statistical generalisation”, they do provide an opportunity to shed empirical light on some theoretical concepts that go beyond the setting for the specific case that has been studied, as “the theoretical propositions that went into the initial design of the case study, as empirically enhanced by your case study’s findings, will have formed the groundwork for an analytic generalisation” (Yin, 2014:40). Though not using the same terminology, other prominent works have also devoted attention to analytic generalisation in distinguishing it from statistical generalisation, such as Mitchell’s (1993) discussion of logical inference and statistical inference; Bromley’s (1986) discussion of case inference compared with statistical inference, and Bryman and Burgess’s (1994) analytic induction. Yin proposed that (2014:68) analytic generalisation “can take the form of a lesson learned, working hypothesis, or other principle that is believed to be applicable to other situations (not just other ‘like cases’)”, “it consists of a carefully posed theoretical
statement, theory, or theoretical proposition”. For this thesis, the lessons learned from the case study of CIs are expected to be also applicable for other activities linked to China’s cultural diplomacy, and the theoretical statements describing distinctive features of the CI should also shed lights on a better understanding of China’s endeavour of cultural diplomacy as a whole.

In terms of the specific case study design frame, Stake (2005:443) made a very good point: “case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied…… by whatever methods we choose to study the case. We would study it analytically or holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically or culturally, and by mixed methods”. This research has opted to do multiple comparative case studies as a way to generate more compelling findings and make the overall study more robust by drawing ‘cross-case’ conclusions. As Swanson put it (1971:15), “thinking without comparison is unthinkable”. Therefore, data collected have been linked to research themes and literature by placing them into conceptual frameworks, and comparisons are made both between different cases, and between empirical findings and the literature review findings.

ii) Case selection process

To undertake a successful case study, the first step is to build a reasoned and representative case. I chose to study the CI for my thesis based on three considerations. Firstly, because it represents the most watched effort of China’s cultural diplomacy and a highly controversial one as well: both its impressive speed of the global coverage, and the extension of its starting contract terms from three years to five years with Hanban-guaranteed funding can be seen as evidence for its early success, however, in the short time-frame of its rapid expansion, the CI has also received its share of criticism, which can be found in a growing body of literature, including both articles in prestigious academic journals and influential media outlets. This made it a very illustrative case to show both the opportunities and challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy. All the dual characters unveiled in the theoretical discussions can be found in the CI, making it a revelatory case of cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.

The second reason is that the CI is indeed a complex entity located in a milieu of contexts: the case study is undertaken in the historical, cultural, political, and international relation contexts, as contextualisation is a necessary step for comparative analysis and for appropriate generalisation of results. It enables the researcher to explore issues such as the relationship between domestic and international contexts, multiple power
relationships between the stakeholders, the complexity of the process of communication among the stakeholders and with the overseas audience. None of these topics would have been easily addressed by using other methods, reflecting one of the advantages of case study method in its “capacity to explore social processes as they unfold in organisations” (Finn, Elliott-White & Walton, 2000: 82).

The third reason is that despite the growing interest in the CI reflected in recent studies and media reports, only a handful of case studies have been done by academics so far, and they only focused on CIs in one country or one continent, such as Germany, Australia and South Africa (Hartig, 2012, 2014). No comparative approach or perspective has ever been applied yet to examine this ‘global’ effort – both its aim to improve China’s ‘global’ image, and the means through ‘global’ coverage make this comparative approach highly relevant and valuable. Therefore, this research will serve as a timely and useful effort to feed back the international data collected from different target countries to the policy process, so that a more effective and responsive strategy can be formulated, and cooperative interaction can be created to make cultural diplomacy a truly plus-sum game.

There were altogether 500 CIs operating in 125 countries and regions around the world by December 2015 (Hanban website), careful thoughts have been put into making a selection of the cases: instead of aiming at a geographical spread, cultural boundaries were considered to select four CIs, two with relatively soft cultural boundaries with China and two with relatively hard boundaries, so that both intra-country and cross-country comparisons are allowed. A pilot study was carried out during the summer of 2013 in China, where a total of 11 people from five different CIs were interviewed, covering both developed and developing countries from four different continents, and four cultural spheres in Huntington’s terms (1998): South Korea in the Confucian cultural sphere of Asia; UK and France in the Western civilisation of Europe; Mexico in Latin America, and Morocco in the Muslim world of Africa. Though the coverage offers a good spectrum, the width may come at the cost of depth, as I do not have enough access to the same spectrum of data sources from each continent. Given the special nature of the CI as a partnership between home and host institutions, it would be ideal to interview both directors sent by the home institutions in China and those hired by the host institutions; similarly, it would gather more balanced views if teachers both seconded from the home institutions in China and those locally hired by the host institutions were to be interviewed.

Therefore, a major modification of the original research design was made following the pilot study: instead of choosing three CIs from three different continents, I decided to focus on two continents, Asia and Europe, to keep the contrasting angle between a
generally East and West cultural perspective. To compensate for the loss of a ‘tripod’ leg from Africa, two CIs were selected and studied from each country (South Korea and the UK), making a total of four comparative case studies. Narrowing down to two countries made it more manageable while also possible to go into further depth. Studying two cases from each country also adds another layer of comparison, making it possible to show either similar results or contrasting results to enhance validity.

By focusing on these two countries, I can draw on my strong connections with both South Korea and the UK to gain access to four very representative cases: The two CIs sampled from South Korea include the very first CI in the world, Seoul Confucius Institute, which was approaching its first ten-year anniversary when the interview took place in the summer of 2014. However, this CI was not in the usual form of a partnership between two universities: it is between Hanban and South Korea-China Cultural Institute; therefore, a second case was chosen to offer comparison in its operating model: the CI at Woosong University in a smaller city of Daejeon in South Korea, partnered with Sichuan University in China. It was also awarded the 2010 Confucius Institute of the Year.

The first CI sampled in the UK is UCLAN CI partnered with Beijing International Studies University, and that is because I work at the host institution, therefore can carry out some nonparticipant observations; the second CI chosen was the Confucius Institute for Business, London, hosted by the London School of Economics and Political Science and partnered with Tsinghua University from China. It was selected for the following three considerations: 1) it is a CI with a special feature of business, the first one of its kind in the world, initiated and supported by five British corporations who also funded some locally hired positions; 2) both the host and home institutions are among the most prestigious universities in each respective country and the world as a whole; 3) its Advisory Council is composed of high profile representatives, including Madam Xu Lin herself, Director of Hanban, and the Minister Counsellor for Education from the Chinese Embassy in London, as well as representatives from its founding body of British Petroleum, Deloitte LLP, HSBC, John Swire and Sons Ltd. and Standard Chartered Bank.

To add yet another important comparative perspective to this thesis, the case study also looks at CI’s Western counterparts. Goethe Institute is selected as there is a cooperation treaty signed in 2010 between Hanban and Goethe Institute in Beijing, based on continuous exchange of new developments in teaching skills and methods. They hold regular meetings, and since Goethe Institute plays the role of a consultancy to Hanban, its founding Director in Beijing, Kahn-Ackermann, has become an advisor to Hanban after he retired in 2011. This layer of comparison will offer particularly important insights
to answer the main research question of why ‘why’ China’s similar efforts in launching the CI are perceived and received differently and encounter unexpected controversies by comparing ‘what’ is the vehicle, ‘who’ is the agent, and ‘how’ it is implemented in the field.

Now that the multiple cases are selected for the comparative study, multiple methods are also used to collect data, clarify meaning, and “enhance interpretability: one set of data gives a handle to understanding another set” (Arksey & Knight, 1999:25). What is more, many researchers (Axinn & Pearce 2006, Morse 2010, Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie 2010) argue that the mixed methods can provide more comprehensive information and allow a wider and more complete picture to emerge, especially if the information from one approach was not identified in an alternative approach. Specifically, this research draws on three methods of text analysis, observation and semi-structured interview to serve this purpose. They will be discussed further in the section below. The greatest attraction of methodological triangulation is that validity is claimed through methodological pluralism because cumulatively it minimises the possibility that the findings may be biased to one particular measurement.

2.2.2 Data triangulation

Data for this case study are collected from various sources including documents, reports, agreements, observations, and interviews. They cover the three subtypes of data triangulation proposed by Denzin (1978: 295) in terms of time, space and person. Because data collected by each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, by drawing on multiple sources of evidence, data triangulation can provide more information and better insights towards a more comprehensive answer to the research question; it can also corroborate the findings and help reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation, and strengthen the construct validity of my case study.

i) Documents, reports and agreements

As Finn, Elliott-White & Walton (2000:41) noted, logically “secondary data collection should always come before primary data collection”. For this research, secondary data are mainly collected either from the Hanban and relevant CIs’ websites, or from each of the CI director interviewed. They include but not exclusive to the organisational structure of Hanban, its mission statement, Constitution and By-Laws of the CI, application procedure to have a CI set up, Confucius China Studies Program, Eight-Year CI Development Plan 2012-2020 (see Appendix 2), statistical reports that evaluate the
success of the CIs during the first ten years, speeches from government officials, *Methods of Evaluating a Model CI in Europe* (Hanban booklet for internal circulation, see Appendix 3), case files that describe the ‘CIs of the Year’, materials from the 2011-2014 Annual Confucius Institute Assembly held in China and executive workshops for CI Directors (in the forms of booklets and DVDs, see Appendix 11).

Apart from these documents from Hanban and CI websites, four agreements signed between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and XXX University on the Establishment of CIs were also collected (see Appendix 7), along with the annual monitoring reports of the CIs interviewed. Texts from other academic institutional websites, including university statements on terminating their CI agreements, The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) report on *Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes*, as well as relevant information from the official websites of the British Council, Alliance Francaise, Cervantes Institute and Goethe Institute were also collected. Altogether these secondary data cover a long span of time, many events and many settings, to reflect the ‘time, space, person’ triangulation discussed earlier. Such documents can be invaluable as sources of background knowledge and for cross-checking the data.

All of the above provide a wealth of information and vital text-based evidence that I can scrutinise; they will help construct interview questions to collect empirical data from directors and teachers of the CIs. Meanwhile, there are also a wealth of secondary data from both scholarly literature and media reports about China’s cultural diplomacy and Confucius Institutes as soft power tools. Examples are drawn from these as supporting evidence, but an important word of warning is given by Smith (1984) that texts become crystallised when we treat them as authoritative representations of stable, objective realities, and there is a danger of crystallising institutional texts by glossing over the various contextual factors associated with the text’s production and use in concrete institutional settings. This means when we focus on the analysis of the report and what the content means for the issue at hand, we shall not forget to question how the report came to be in the first place. Therefore, extreme care is taken in secondary data analysis and interpretation, as most of them are produced for specific target readers, and may present a deliberately biased version of events, both in what is said and in what is left unsaid. These documents are always approached with this questioning frame of mind.

**ii) Observation**

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5 XXX stands for the name of the university as shown on the actual agreement.
Observation is a highly important data-collection method frequently used in qualitative research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) place the methodology in very high esteem when they recommend participant observation as the most comprehensive of all types of research strategies. Dingwall (1997:60) also argues that “where interviewers construct data, observers find it…… the fundamental virtue of observation is that it enables us to document members accounting to each other in natural settings”. He further explained that in an interview study, we choose what messages we elicit, “in observation, we have no choice but to listen to what the world is telling us” (Dingwall, 1997:64). As there is a Confucius Institute operating at the university where I work, and we share a common student body, I am able to utilise both ‘participant and nonparticipant observations’ informally in many of the events organised by the CI or collaborated with student societies. Moreover, I often attend events organised by other CIs in the area, such as guest lectures, anniversary celebrations and The CI Day events. This also allows me to build in the ‘time, space and person’ factors in triangulation by observing similar events organised by different CIs over the years in a variety of settings when different audiences are involved.

Despite the increased validity of ‘non-participant observation’ as compared to ‘participant observation’, there are still obvious pitfalls in this approach as it tends to reflect the bias of the researcher, who is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. The observer’s expectations affect what he/she sees and reports, reducing the validity of the data. As argued by Newman and Benz (1998), the observer’s understanding of the subject’s point of view is a double-edged sword: while it can help capture participants in their own terms, it also subjects the observer’s statements to describing only his/her bias, especially when the observer becomes increasingly blinded to the peculiarities he/she is supposed to observe. However, Becker and Geer (1960:133) argued that “observation of some social event, the events which precede and follow it, and explanation of its meaning by participants and spectators, before, during, and after its occurrence gives us more information about the event under study than data gathered by any other sociological method”.

This is a very convincing statement for observation method to be used in collecting primary data, where direct interactions between the CIs and their target audiences are unfolding, allowing me to access first-hand responses from the participants in-situ, and also their possible comments on the events’ impacts later on. Besides, my mixed role as an insider and outsider helps make myself an invisible observer to reduce the ‘reflexivity’, one of the weaknesses of direct observation pointed out by Yin (2014:106) as actions
may proceed differently because they are being observed. Last but not least, this allows me to compare and contrast my direct observations with the reports/event narratives submitted to Hanban and released on their website.

iii) Interview

At the same time, interviews are drawn on heavily as a method of primary data collection. Qualitative interviewing is considered as a great way to learn detailed information from a single individual or small number of individuals. It is very useful when one wants to gain expert opinions on the subject or talk to someone knowledgeable about a topic (Driscoll & Brizee 2010). Interviews with key players can reveal extensive micro-political activity that was not evident from documents or observations.

There are three major types of qualitative interviewing: the structured, semi-structured and unstructured interview. As Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2003) point out, the semi-structured interview is used in qualitative research in order to conduct discussions not only to reveal and understand the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, but also to place more emphasis on exploring the ‘why’. It is semi-structured because although it contains a list of key questions, they may not be asked in exactly the way outlined on the schedule. Questions that are not included in the guide may also be asked as the interviewer may be inspired by things said by the interviewees. It allows the interviewer to follow up ideas, probe responses and ask for clarification or further elaboration, and similarly, it also allows the interviewees to choose what to say about a particular topic and how much. As summarised by Arksey and Knight (1999:8), the characteristic of semi-structured interview is that “interviewer refers to a guide, which is usually a mix of closed and open questions. Interviewer will use judgment to improvise, it is partly interviewer-led, partly interviewee-led”.

In this research, semi-structured interviews are adopted to explore and understand the perceptions of people directly involved in the practice of cultural diplomacy. As an important way to collect primary data for this research, a group of interviewees are carefully considered in line with data triangulation. Apart from the four selected CIs as case study samples where their Directors and teachers/administrators both hired by the host institutions and sent by the home institutions were interviewed in-situ; more Directors from other CIs, including both locally-hired by the host institution and those sent by the home institutions were also interviewed, making it a total of nine CIs in five different countries (three in the United Kingdom, three in the South Korea, one from France, one from Morocco, and one from Mexico). The Director of the Goethe Institute
in Beijing is also interviewed to facilitate the comparative study of the CI and its western counterparts.

Then the next step is the interview question design. Since interview is a means to serve the ends of answering the research questions, a sensible design is to translate the research questions into specific interview questions in the context of Confucius Institute as this is the chosen case study. Therefore, the research questions were divided into groups of interview questions addressing the purpose of the CI (why), provision of the CI (what), relationship with and interactions between all stakeholders (who and how). With these as the main framework, questions were tailored to different roles of the interviewees at the CI, i.e. Directors, teachers and administrators. There are also a group of questions addressing the differences between the CI and its western counterparts to help answer the research question of why China’s cultural diplomacy faces different challenges. A distinctive comparative angle is reflected in the interview questions bespoke for Mr. Anders, Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing. All the interview questions are included in Appendix 9 of the thesis.

Another important consideration given to interview design is the wording of the questions, to avoid leading and assumptive questions. Then a consent form and briefing letter was produced following the ethical approval of UCLAN and emailed to interviewees beforehand. In a stretch of two years’ time from summer 2013 to summer 2015, a total of 25 in-depth interviews were carried out with people working in CIs in five different countries, this includes the pilot study carried out during the summer of 2013, when 12 people were interviewed with a view to testing how well my research design works in reality, and refining the procedure of my data collection. At this stage, all interviews were recorded, but some were carried out in groups of two or three, so not all of the interviews were fully transcribed. Four key people, including two CI directors, one CI teacher seconded from the Chinese home university and one CI administrator locally hired by the host university, were interviewed again a year later to check for consistency and accuracy. All formal interviews carried out following the pilot study, 13 in all, were fully transcribed.

The pilot study provided me with rich thoughts on how to handle potential problems. For example, I see the point raised by Alvesson (2011) that the interviewee could be the source of ‘problems’ as well, he/she may actually be ‘knowing’ but may be unwilling to tell, for good or less good reasons. Besides, the low degree of structure for a semi-structured interview may mean the interviewees could pull in different, and sometimes irrelevant and unproductive directions for the research, and that too much interview time
is spent drifting in these directions. This is a lesson learnt from my pilot study. As a remedy, the interview questions were revised to a few open questions to start with, but followed by a set of more focused questions with clearer and more specific wording to reduce the chances of steering away from track.

Three group interviews were arranged due to practical considerations when the contact person suggests it as a more efficient way to quickly and conveniently collect data from several people simultaneously. They were carried out with: 1) three Chinese CI directors during the pilot stage; 2) two directors of one of the CIs in South Korea (one was the first Director but retired from the role, one is the current Executive Director); 3) two secondees working at one of the CIs in South Korea. The advantages and disadvantages of group interviews have been addressed by many, including Berg (2009: 165) and Arksey & Knight (1999: 76), each came up with two lists, among which I find the following points highly relevant to my experience: group interviews permit the gathering of a large amount of information in relatively short periods of time and the information obtained may be more complete as interviewees fill in each other’s gaps, and more trustworthy as bias in one account may counterbalance that in the other. Disadvantages include that dominant personalities may overpower and steer the group’s responses, and if the topic is sensitive, individuals may not be willing to disclose detailed, honest information in front of others and instead provide a more ‘public’ response; it is also easier to digress and make the interview prolonged. The facts that the there is no power relations at play among all interviewees, and those in the first group are all retired CI directors while those in the third group are from different home institutions in China have appeased their concerns in speaking out their minds. It is also interesting for the interviewees to exchange views based on their own experiences.

As with other qualitative methods, limitations to validity also exist for interview, when the subjective bias of the interviewer affects the interpretation of the data in ways that misrepresent the subject’s reality. The fact that the researcher is able to probe, use follow-up questions and pay attention to nonverbal cues is debated between two opposing views of either enhancing the data collected (Newman & Benz, 1998) and actually decreasing the validity (Mouly, 1970). To address this concern, all interviewees will be sent the draft chapters and any articles to be published for review and comments, so as to reduce the likelihood of falsely reporting or misrepresenting a perspective, thereby increasing the construct validity.

The above three sections construct the second layer of multiple triangulation: data triangulation. These data collected via multiple methods and from different sources may
or may not be consistent. The convergences are the most critical part in a comparative study: if different kinds of data lead to consistent patterns, they will generate more compelling conclusions; if the data pull in opposite directions, then investigating the reason for discrepancies will shed light on processes that otherwise might not have been recognised.

2.2.3 Investigator triangulation

As an independent PhD research project, there are resource limitations to realise this level of ideal triangulation by involving different researchers, interviewers or observers. However, ideas of neutrality and prolonged engagement on-site proposed by Newman and Benz (1998) are taken on board to reduce any potential bias that could be generated by a single researcher. Doing a PhD on a part-time route lends advantage to the ‘prolonged engagement on-site’ as this is a six-year journey, which allows me to complete the observations, interviews, and primary and secondary data collection over a long period of time. Neutrality is also maintained carefully for academic integrity. The fact that the researcher herself is both an insider and outsider of Chinese culture and can read both English and Chinese texts in the original language, and that there is a change of supervisory team involving a total of four different experienced academics overseeing this project can help mitigate this concern to a certain extent.

2.2.4 Theoretical triangulation

This is a most critical level of triangulation to this research as it distinguishes itself from previous researches in approaching the subject matter from alternative and diverse perspectives. As discussed in Chapter One, the overview of the historical, international and domestic contexts specifically for China to launch its cultural diplomacy reveals that it is interwoven with the legacies of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, power-knowledge nexus and nationalism, while ‘soft power’ has been applied as the mainstream theoretical framework to examine this subject previously. The soft power concept is initiated by, and more often used for dominant powers to reflect on how their cultural diplomacy can play bigger roles in maintaining and consolidating their power positions. It has not engaged with the historical analysis of the roles played by hegemony and Orientalism in shaping the current global cultural terrain that is not a level playing field for all cultures. Theoretical triangulation will be applied in both data collection (the design of interview questions) and data analysis. Then the research findings produced from this process are matched to the four themes of the research questions explored in the Literature Review, i.e. ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘how’, to establish how well the data collected fit the
descriptions of Chinese characteristics derived from the pilot study, based on which the
four inductive statements will be adapted and fine-tuned as a working definition of the
distinctive features of the CI. Both this process and the generated products represent
the key originality elements of this research project.

The statements below are mostly induced from the Literature Review and preliminary
data collected from the pilot study as a hypothetical definition of the distinctive features
of China's cultural diplomacy and the CI project:

1. Why - staged with Orientalism at the background and Nationalism at the
   foreground, China’s Cultural Diplomacy takes on a dual mission of countering
cultural hegemony and China Threat theory at the same time;
2. What - its content mix is delivered with charm offensive to promote its language
   and traditional culture, while maintaining a defensive stance for its modern
   values;
3. Who - The government-led approach to implementing cultural diplomacy may
   reduce the effects of soft power by taking on a ‘hard edge’ in its sponsorship and
censorship;
4. How - Centralized management with globalised outreach, but localised practice
   with interaction with different target audiences.

Its validity as a working definition will be tested and assessed in the three ensuing
Chapters of Three, Four and Five against the data collected through multiple
triangulation and the new theoretical framework proposed, eventually modified to be the
cross-case conclusions. This concludes the description of research design for this thesis.

Table 2.1 offers a summary of the ‘multiple triangulations’ featured in this research:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of triangulation</th>
<th>Specific measures taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methodological triangulation</td>
<td>Multiple comparative case studies Semi-structured Interviews Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data triangulation</td>
<td>Documentary sources range from government documents, CI agreements, CI reports, academic literature, mainstream media reports, to information released on Hanban website and university websites across three continents; Observations of different CI activities in a six-year time span; Interviews carried out in a two-year time span to 25 sources representing five types of roles involving seven different countries; Three subtypes of data triangulation was reflected in time, space and person.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.1 Multiple triangulation for this research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigator triangulation</th>
<th>Single investigator, with prolonged engagement over a period of six year and neutrality supported by the supervisory team to reduce potential bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical triangulation</td>
<td>Critical engagement of soft power theory with alternative analytical frameworks constructed by Orientalism, cultural hegemony, power-knowledge nexus, as well as nationalism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Approach to data analysis

With all the data collected, the development of analytic induction and critical reflection through comparative case studies is at the core of data analysis. As Yin (2014:132) defined, “data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining evidence, to produce empirically based findings”. Yin further explains that there is no fixed formula and the analytic strategy much depends on a researcher’s own style of rigorous empirical thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations. Given that a multiple comparative case study is the chosen method for this research, the ‘constant comparative method’ will be adopted in data analysis.

Ragin (1987) suggested three basic steps in following this strategy. First, the investigator searches for underlying similarities and differences among the cases; second, the similarities and differences identified are shown to be relevant to the phenomenon of interest; and third, on the basis of similarities and differences identified, the investigator formulates a general explanation. In this process, the initial theoretical notions serve as guides in the examination of causally relevant similarities and differences, and the comparison provides the key to understanding, explaining and interpreting diverse outcomes, therefore, a comparative case-oriented strategy is both holistic and interpretative in its approach to analysing data. This process of interpretive inquiry was summarised by Taylor and Bogdan (1984:126) as “continually comparing specific incidents in the data, the researcher refines these concepts, identifies their properties, explores their relationship to one another, and integrates them into coherent explanatory model”. According to Thomas (2016:205), “the basic principle governing the process of constant comparison is that you emerge with themes that capture or summarise the essence of your data”. The next step is ‘theme mapping’ (Thomas, 2016: 207), which allows you to present in diagram forms the ways in which themes may interrelate.

This allows me to develop an innovative way to present and analyse the data collected. Inspired by Yin’s (2014:135) list of methods of manipulations, including putting
information into different arrays; making a matrix of categories and placing the evidence within such categories; creating data displays in flow charts and other graphics; and juxtaposing the data from different interviews, I have come up with a strategy of first charting the global cultural terrain of struggle by following the theoretical propositions of cultural hegemony, Orientalism, knowledge and power nexus. It is these theoretical propositions that have shaped my research questions and data collection, and they therefore also outlined my analytic priorities. Detailed design is delineated in Chapter Three, which is the conflated data presentation, analysis and discussions. Chapters Four and Five continue to apply these theoretical perspectives in unfolding the comparative case studies in two dimensions: Chapter Four will contrast the CI with its western counterparts, while Chapter Five will compare the data collected from different CIs operating in different parts of the world, from East Asia to Western Europe. Theories of nationalism and cultural boundary (Duara, 1996) will also be applied as analytical tools in this chapter.

In terms of interview interpretation, Alvesson (2011:61) challenged the mainstream paradigm of detailed sorting, codification and categorization. He does not see procedures around data collection and processing as the key ingredient in good research, instead, he believes “critical questioning and reflection” are basic ingredients of qualified interpretation work, as “all interview material calls for critical interpretation and rather sophisticated ideas supporting such interpretation”, they shall not be automatically used as a solid building block for knowledge production.

While fully acknowledging the points made, I am not entirely convinced that Alvesson’s novel approach should override the conventional one to interpreting interview accounts, so a balance is struck by combining the two: sifting, synthesizing, sorting, comparing, conceptualizing, mapping and categorizing data with an emphasis on being reflective. In the whole process, I remain committed to pondering the connections, unravelling meanings, relating them to contexts and experience, comparing and contrasting them while developing theoretical insights into the field data.

At the technical level, all interviews were audio recorded which allows me to listen to them as many times as needed to produce full transcripts in an accurate manner. These interviews form the main source of primary data for this research, but they are examined bearing in mind that anecdotal evidence should be avoided. In order to protect the interviewees’ identities, the following coding system was used: they are grouped by the type of roles, and then marked individually in the order of being interviewed.
Table 2.2 below lists all the codes and their corresponding roles of the interviewees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Interviewee/group of interviewees represented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKD</td>
<td>Interviewees as CI Directors in the UK (4 altogether):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKD1</td>
<td>CI Director (from the British host university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKD2</td>
<td>CI Director (from the Chinese home university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKD3</td>
<td>CI Director (from the British host university), interviewed in English;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKD4</td>
<td>CI Director (from the Chinese home university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKD</td>
<td>Interviewees as CI Directors in South Korea (4 altogether):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKD1</td>
<td>CI Director (from the Chinese home university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKD2</td>
<td>CI Director (from the South Korean host university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKD3</td>
<td>CI Director (from the South Korean host university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKD4</td>
<td>CI Director (from the South Korean host university), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKSC</td>
<td>Interviewees as secondees to the CI in the UK (5 altogether)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKSC1</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKSC2</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKSC3</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKSC4</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKSC5</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKSC</td>
<td>Interviewees as secondees to the CI in the South Korea (3 altogether)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKSC1</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKSC2</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKSC3</td>
<td>CI secondee from the Chinese home university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKLH</td>
<td>Interviewees as locally hired by the CI in the UK (4 altogether)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKLH1</td>
<td>CI administrator locally hired by the host university, interviewed in English;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKLH2</td>
<td>CI administrator locally hired by the host university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKLH3</td>
<td>CI teacher locally hired by the host university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKLH4</td>
<td>CI teacher locally hired by the host university, interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKLH</td>
<td>Interviewee as locally hired by the CI in the South Korea (1), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRD</td>
<td>Interviewee as CI Director in France (1), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Interviewee as CI Director in Morocco (1), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MXD</td>
<td>Interviewee as CI Director in Mexico (1), interviewed in Chinese;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Anders</td>
<td>Director of Goethe Institute in Beijing, (1), interviewed in English, no code needed as he agreed to have his name revealed in the paper.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2 Codes for interviewees

To bring this chapter to a close, the nine characteristics of qualitative research identified by Creswell (2007: 37-39) is used as a benchmark to summarise my research method. After careful comparisons, I can confirm this study fits all the characteristics of a qualitative research. Table 2.3 below offers this character check in a glance:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Characteristics of Qualitative Research</th>
<th>This research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>“emergent design” rather than tightly prefigured design</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection</td>
<td>“natural setting”, a source of data for close interaction</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“researcher as key instrument” in data collection</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“multiple data sources”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data analysis</td>
<td>“inductive data analysis”</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>focus on “participants’ meanings”, their perspectives and their subjective views</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>framing of human behaviour and belief through a social-political/historical “contextual or cultural lens”</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fundamentally “interpretive inquiry” - researchers reflects on his or her role</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“holistic view” of social phenomena</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3 Characteristics of qualitative research
Adapted from Table 3.1 Characteristics of Qualitative Research (Creswell, 2007:38)

2.4 Originality of this research

As discussed in Chapter One, the body of literature and the CI-related research so far have offered little to facilitate the shaping of distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy, which is still in its embryonic phase both in terms of research and practice. This leads to the four elements of originality of this research:

1) At the methodological approach level: Orientalism, cultural hegemony and nationalism are employed to construct an alternative framework to analyse the endeavours of China’s cultural diplomacy (so far it is mostly studied under the theoretical framework of soft power);

2) At the research method level: multiple comparative case studies, both between the CI and its western counterparts, and between various CIs operating in different parts of the world, are used to evaluate this global effort (so far the case studies are mostly focused in one country or one region);

3) At the research finding level: the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project are defined that no one has attempted so far;

4) At the application level: the three questions concerning the practice of public diplomacy - what messages are sent under what circumstances, who received them,
and how the messages are interpreted (Melissen, 2005), are expanded to also considering who send the messages, how the messages are sent, and how these messages interact with the messages produced by others in the destination, as the messages are not sent to a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that was preoccupied or even embedded with ‘other’ ideologies, and a receptor in a changing power positions with China.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter began with a discussion about philosophical assumptions and research paradigms to determine the qualitative nature of this research and the rationale of adopting qualitative methods, then it moved on to descriptions of formulating a well-reasoned and carefully-planned research design based on considered utilisation of ‘multiple triangulations’. Benefits of cross validation are reaped by combining different data collection methods and different data sources as the weakness of each can be counterbalanced by the strength of other sources. The data profile of this research, composing multiple sources of documents, 25 interviewees from five different roles sharing their insights and experiences at nine CIs in five different countries, and observations carried out over a period of six years, confirms that both the completeness and confirmation functions of triangulation are important for this research, which was further triangulated by the use of multiple case studies and employment of multiple theoretical frameworks.

With the research design in place, the chapter then explained in detail how cases were selected, how data were collected, how the new analytical framework was applied to data analysis through charting a global cultural terrain of struggle to demonstrate the theoretical research findings, and how a comparative study of the CI with its western counterparts, as well as a comparative study of various CIs operating in Western Europe and East Asia are expected to modify and fine-tune the inductive statements, which will function as a definition of the distinctive features of China’s Cultural diplomacy and the CI project. To conclude, this chapter drew a road map to delineate the logical flow of the research design and its implementation for the whole thesis. The multiple triangulation strategy, particularly the application of multiple theoretical frameworks to data analysis, and the comparative case studies improve the validity of the cross-case conclusions. Meanwhile, the unique research design and the different outputs this thesis will generate also represent the originality of this research.
Chapter Three
Charting the Terrain of Struggle for China’s Cultural Diplomacy and the Confucius Institute

3.0 Introduction

As discussed in the Literature Review, the ‘soft power’ concept is incompatible with the very purpose of cultural diplomacy and lacks a historical perspective in locating the ‘root cause’ of China’s problems, which is a complication co-produced by vestiges of Orientalism, Western cultural hegemony and the power-knowledge nexus; it also fails to show a holistic view of the global cultural terrain where China’s cultural diplomacy is launched into. Therefore, a more sophisticated approach based on both theoretical reflections and empirical investigations is needed to reveal the actual configurations underlying the ‘power struggles’ going on in the global cultural terrain. This chapter adopts the new analytical framework to contextualise the operations of the CIs by focusing on the intercultural interplays between the two sides: the projecting side and the receiving side in terms of cultural diplomacy practice; and the hegemonic side and counter-hegemonic side in terms of the current terrain conditions. This approach can be successfully applied only if we first unpack some of the conceptual apparatus around it, including struggle, power, hegemony and war of position.

3.1 Overview: some key concepts and the roadmap

A good starting point would be the core concepts of power and struggle. As Foucault (1982:793) pointed out, every relationship between forces is a power relation, with resistance to power as part of the exercise of power. But when the currently hegemonic side holds more power over ‘the others’, it can wield its power to ‘manufacture consent’ in Gramsci’s words (1971), who also argued that although hegemony is formed through ‘consent’, it is constantly readjusted and re-negotiated, as there will always be a counter-hegemonic struggle. Where there is hegemony, there is resistance, and this is a two-way process: while the counter-hegemonic side will be engaged in ‘a war of position’, another Gramscian term referring to the cultural struggle of much longer duration and complexity to gain positions of influence that can develop counter-hegemony, the hegemonic side will resist any emerging new forces that could challenge its position. In the case of the CI, its rapid expansion was quickly identified by the hegemonic side as a potential threat to its hegemonic position in the global cultural terrain.
Foucault (1982) has further argued that knowledge impregnated in power is no longer an objective reflection of truth, but is presented and accepted as truth with power in practice, just as Orientalism is about the Occidental using its interpretation as knowledge (impregnated in power) to represent the Oriental. In Foucault’s (1982:795) eyes, there are three types of struggles: against forms of domination, against forms of exploitation, and against forms of subjectivity. This chapter will employ these concepts as frameworks, and the abundant triangular data collected as ‘bricks’ to construct a three-dimensional view of the ‘terrain of struggle’ where the CI is placed: against Western cultural domination, and against subjectivity of the modern day reincarnation of Orientalism. It will also use Gramsci’s notion of ‘war of position’ to examine China’s movements to develop counter-hegemony in this terrain. To this end, the following four steps will be taken:

1) Framing the broader context where all stakeholders can be located;

2) Giving a full representation of the various actors holding different positions in this terrain, i.e. Hanban and the Chinese government, the CI directors and staff from both the home and host institutions, the China-related scholars (both working with and those refusing to work with the CI), media from China and the host country, the general public including students of the CI as the direct target audiences of China’s cultural diplomacy.

3) Charting the terrain into hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides by employing the key concepts from the Literature Review, e.g. Said’s Orientalism, Foucault’s knowledge-power nexus, Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ and the constant struggle for hegemony, to unpack the positions of all forces, and analyse where their perspectives are coming from and grounded;

4) Examining the dynamic interactions among various players in the terrain by placing the interactants’ perspectives at the core while analysing the data, with a focus on confrontations between the two sides of ‘hegemony’ and ‘counter-hegemony’.

3.2 Step one: Framing the broader context in which the terrain of struggle sets

In the Literature Review, both the international and domestic contexts in which China is endeavouring to reshape its image are examined to achieve an in-depth understanding of both the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy, and the vehicle and agent that it employs to achieve this end. To recap the key purposes of public diplomacy, it intends to
‘influence citizens of other countries’ (Edmund Gullion, 1965), to ‘create a desired result that is directly related to a government’s foreign policy objectives’ (McClellan, 2004), or to ‘achieve the desired geopolitical aims of the sponsor’ (Osgood & Etheridge, 2010). As a subset of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy focuses on ‘fostering mutual understanding’ through communication and respect between the cultures involved, based on a sounder understanding of respective values and a reduced susceptibility to stereotypes (Cummings, 2003).

From these definitions, we can see that cultural diplomacy in its hybrid nature involves interactions between two sides at different levels: one side tries to influence the general public of the other side, but because it is meant to serve a geopolitical or foreign policy aim in the long run, and particularly when the cultural programmes are government sponsored, the receiving side may also get other agents involved such as media and academia, who may question, suspect and even resist this kind of influence, or redefine this influence with their own interpretations, especially when the cultures and values on both sides are not held as compatible equals. While this ‘inequality’ may be the very reason for the projecting side to be engaged in cultural diplomacy, it may also be the very reason why the receiving side wants to counter that influence - both the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides want to counter the cultural and value influence from the ‘other side’ before mutual understandings can be reached. Thus we can well imagine the practice field of cultural diplomacy is actually a ‘terrain of struggle’ for this influence. There are various actors of different levels at play in this terrain from both sides, and to add to the complexity is that each group of actors were already influenced, to a different extent, by the pre-existing ‘isms’ in their perceptions: Orientalism, Universalism, Cultural pluralism, Communism and Nationalism.

Like the natural terrain, the cultural terrain is also historically determined. In the long course of history, we have witnessed the shaping and changing positions of different civilisations, and China has been the oldest continuous civilisation on earth today. It has survived four millennia’s vicissitudes, from being a sophisticated culture enjoying the world’s admiration in the 17th and 18th century, to the decline in the 19th century, which eventually gave way to the ‘century of humiliations’ (Kaufman, 2010) from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century when China was defeated by Western gunboats, its culture was also degraded into being the inferior other. However, perhaps a much less recognised reversal is when this inferior position was twisted by Orientalism into being opposite to the Occidental: the Oriental was deemed to be everything the Occidental is not, while the Occidental represents all the universal values. This reversal means Chinese culture was considered inferior not because China was defeated, but because it represents all
the qualities of a mortal danger to the rest of the world. The growing revulsion Chinese
culture received culminated in the ‘yellow peril’ stigma, which revealed the hidden logic
shrouded in Orientalism and its legacy lingering today: being different implies being
decayed and even evil, and thus grants legitimacy for one side and breeds hostility
against the other side. I do not think this legacy is going away anytime soon and argue
that they are hidden as this ‘conversion’ has become a form of ‘knowledge’ that is
consolidated through power of discourse. This power is invisible when it forms a
hegemony, which is taken as the normal state, thus the general public do not see any
injustice in this ‘terrain of struggle’ where the other groups are despised and oppressed.

The unchallenged hegemony of seeing the world as ‘the West and Rest’ means this
injustice just continued. During the Cold War period that ensued in the mid-20th century,
this perception of China as the Other was revived into being a ‘red threat’ as China was
again deemed to be in the opposite camp, that of Communism. The end of the Cold War
with the collapse of the former Soviet Union seems to have consolidated the Western
belief of Universalism, as alleged by Fukuyama (1989: 4) that “What we may be
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of
post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final
form of human government”. In a sense, if a general Western ‘culture hegemony’ was
formed in the post-colonial world, a more specific ‘ideology hegemony’ was also formed
in the post-Cold War era. This modern reincarnation of Orientalism echoes the evolution
of China’s image from being the ‘cultural other’ into being the ‘ideological other’.

Of course, the world continues to change. In direct response to Fukuyama’s The End of
History (1989), Samuel P. Huntington wrote a 1993 essay, The Clash of Civilizations,
which was then expanded into a 1998 book, in which Huntington came up with the notion
that ‘the clash of civilisations’ would be the new framework in understanding “the
remaking of world order”, claiming that culture would replace ideology to become the
new defining factor in global politics, which has “evolved into multipolar and multicultural
for the first time in human history” (Huntington, 1998: 2). The significance of this ‘new
world order’ cannot be underestimated, as it made history, yet it is important to note that
‘multi’ cultural just means more than one, it does not necessarily mean an equal position
among the ‘multi’ players, actually, it is far from being an equal distribution of power and
influence among these ‘multi-cultures’ coexisting in this terrain. Therefore, it is important
to pinpoint that the claim made by cultural pluralism is not just an end to Universalism,
but a beginning to shift inter-cultural relations from superior-inferior to a counter balance
in a cultural terrain with more dynamic interactions among all cultures.
However, this can only happen when the counter-hegemonic cultures can gain more power. Foucault (1980) explains that in this ‘power cycle’, discourse is created and perpetuated by those who have the power, and the discourse created by them will constantly reaffirm their position as the centre of power. In other words, the hegemonic discourse functions like ‘trenches’: it keeps the hegemon in the powerful position, and keeps the others off at the periphery or in inferior positions. They may change the ‘rhetoric’ to build the trenches as there is a changing wind in the discourse about all ‘isms’: when Orientalism is losing ground to the discourse of cultural pluralism in the globalised world today, its effects are still lingering and actually revives itself in the discourse of anti-Communism. While it is not politically correct to dismiss the ideal of cultural pluralism, people can still be openly vocal about anti-Communism, and the post-Cold War China is still seen as a Communist country, though this is more of an ‘ideological mask’ that the West has put over China’s face based on the same binary perceptions: the perpetuated polarisation mind-set of defining ideology of the ‘Other’ in relation to ‘Us’.

Therefore, in this uneven terrain, what the hegemon is trying to do is still to consolidate the trenches and marginalise the ‘Other’, only under the disguise of a different rhetoric, but based on the same Orientalised understanding of the ‘ideological other’, without seeing that the Otherness is actually a ‘mask’ painted with their subjectivity and arbitrarily imposed on China, not the actual face of the real China that they failed, or rather, refused to see. Instead, they used the ‘mask’ to demonise China and used the hegemonic position in discourse to turn the ‘mask’ into ‘knowledge impregnated in power’ that became accepted as the true face of China over the time. Just as Foucault (1980) argued, discourse joins power and knowledge, and its power follows from the general public’s casual acceptance of the ‘reality’ with which they are presented: a reality that the culturally privileged Western elite produced a discourse of the ‘Other’ to reinforce its own power-knowledge equation. When one stays under the ‘mask’ for a long time, the ‘mask’ becomes part of one’s identity. Thus, one of the goals of China’s cultural diplomacy is to unveil the true face of China to the rest of the world.

From the above we can see the historical movement that has shaped the terrain today, and the nature of the current relations and interactions between the two sides need to be understood in such historical context. Unlike the natural terrain, the cultural terrain is much more dynamic and ever-shifting, driven by all sides’ endeavours of cultural diplomacy, which in itself was a product of history when cultural factors were more and more recognised and used as a tool to win the war of position, therefore, the cultural terrain can be reshaped in a matter of decades, due to the dynamic relationships among
various forces at play. Gramsci had highlighted the constant nature of the fight for cultural hegemony in the 1930s: for the hegemonic side, the need to keep fighting to maintain its hegemonic position is made ever more pressing by the shifting new terrain marked by cultural pluralism, in which the counter-hegemonic side is fighting for an equal share of influence.

There is also a domestic dimension that needs to be examined in this context frame - the role played by nationalism. As argued by Joseph Levinson (1968), the key transition to modernity in China was the move from culturalism to nationalism, which has been rejuvenated as the new ideology for contemporary China. As discussed in the Literature Review, the long-held mission to restore China’s ‘greatness’ since the birth of modern China has now been reflected in the domestic media ambience and highlighted in Xi Jinping’s new slogan of ‘realizing the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, announcing to its own people and the whole world China’s ambition to regain its position as a great power in the world. It clearly formed a strong domestic driving force for China to implement its cultural diplomacy, but the double-edged nature of nationalism also entails cultural resistance according to Guibernau (1996), which works both ways between the projecting side and the receiving side, another hidden force adding to the tension in this terrain of struggle.

The above by and large describes the historical, international and domestic contexts for the current global cultural terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy has been launched into. The next section will take a closer look at the actor level for the CI in this terrain: who they are, which positions they take, and what roles they play.

3.3 Step two: Giving a full representation of the various actors from different positions at play in this terrain

This part will draw on the primary data collected in presenting the specific terrain of struggle for the CI by looking at all the stakeholders at play, including:

- The Chinese government and Hanban;
- The CI directors and staff, a joint force of host and home institution;
- China-related scholars (both working with and those refusing to work with the CI);
- The media (both in China and the host country);
- The general public in host countries including students of the CI.

3.3.1 The Chinese government and Hanban;
Hanban, or the CI Headquarters, is registered as a non-profit organisation (NPO) with corporate status, but it is the Chinese government that covers all of the expenses for the CI headquarters and its work of expanding CI activities overseas, as they are considered to serve the national strategy of building cultural soft power. Hanban is just another typical example of China’s ‘state-run system’ - a legacy of central planning that is both envied and feared abroad. Its top management are all high-ranking government officials: the Chairperson of the Council of the CI Headquarters, Madame Liu Yandong, is also China’s Vice-Premier; and the Hanban Director, Madame Xu Lin, is also a Counsellor of the State Council (with the rank of vice-minister). Therefore, it would be no overstatement to describe it in actual fact as a quasi-governmental organisation that strongly reflects government views. In addition, according to its official website, Hanban actually comprises representatives from 12 state ministries and commissions, including the General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the State Press and Publications Administration, the State Council Information Office, the State Language Committee, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and the State Development and Reform Commission.

As stated on its official website, Hanban is “committed to providing Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide, it goes all out in meeting the demands of foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of cultural pluralism and the building of a harmonious world” (Hanban website). On its tenth anniversary, the CI received congratulatory letters from both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang (2014 Special Issue of Confucius Institute), showing the highest level of national endorsement. Xi has commended CI’s contribution to creating “people-to-people, heart-to-heart communication”, highlighting CI’s role as cultural diplomacy and generating soft power to win hearts and minds. Li mentioned the hope that the CI would carry forward the Confucian philosophy of ‘harmony without uniformity’, enhance civilisational diversity and the harmonious world, reaffirming the aim of China’s cultural diplomacy in advocating cultural pluralism.

As discussed in the Literature Review, cultural pluralism is ‘a political response to the injustice done to members of formerly oppressed culture’ (Sabbagh, 2005:100), the direct guidance from the central government represents such a political response, wishing to re-shape the cross-cultural terrain into a more level playing field where they felt the Chinese culture has been ‘formerly oppressed’. At least, this represents the grand
vision held by the highest level of the Chinese government. Whether this is only theoretical or rhetorical is beyond the scope of discussion of this thesis, but what can be observed is that at the implementing level of Hanban, this grand vision was translated into a specific target of establishing 1,000 Confucius Institutes by 2020: Hanban Director Xu Lin confirmed in an interview that the CI aims to overtake the Alliance Francaise, which was founded in 1883 and has over 800 establishments all over the world, as large as the British Council, Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute combined. What Paris has managed to realize in 130 years will be achieved by Beijing in less than two decades. This target was announced with pride, as Hanban is confident of achieving it with both policy support and ample financial input from the ‘above’.

Again, whether this target is achievable or not is unknowable, but what is clear is that even if the numbers are met, it does not mean the grand mission of cultural diplomacy would be accomplished. Meanwhile, what is also known is that Hanban is progressing well onto hitting the target. The latest statistics available by December 2015 indicated there are already 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius classrooms opened in 134 countries and regions around the world (hanban website). However, this perfectly rounded figure is a bit dubious as artificial, or reminiscent of the ‘catch up mentality’ in Mao’s 1950s slogan of ‘overtaking the UK in 15 years’, a slogan brimmed with rising nationalism but triggered the disastrous Great Leap Forward, which tore up the very fabric of Chinese society and economy.

If the competition in terms of steel output during the Great Leap Forward period was an indicator of a nation’s hard power, the CI’s competition today against its Western counterparts is argued as a race to build a nation’s soft power. When there were comments about CIs being exported faster than China’s high speed trains, Madame Liu Yandong, Vice-Premier and Chairperson of the Council of the CI Headquarters, simply used the new nickname of ‘soul high speed train’ to refer to the CI in her speech for the tenth anniversary. This analogy was actually used by Shambaugh (2013a) in criticising China’s unsophisticated approach to building soft power as constructing high-speed rail - by investing money and expecting to see development. Of course, soft power cannot be built this way; it may even hinder soft power.

A historical lesson should be learned from the Great Leap Forward: even economic power cannot be measured just by one single dimension of steel output, it is simply dilettante to measure soft power by the number of CIs. However, both the Methods of Evaluating a Model CI in Europe (see Appendix 3) and CI of the Year set a series of numerical thresholds: How many students were enrolled? How many students sat the
HSK test? How many people participated in the China Day/CI event? These quantifiable measures of outputs tell us nothing about the impact: Does the student enrolled in a taster session continue to study Chinese? Does the number of candidates doing HSK show their better understanding of China? Does participating in a China Day mean any internalised knowledge? Does enjoying Chinese food and the chopsticks activity translate into a change of attitude towards contemporary China? Obviously, the answers cannot be found in those specious numbers, but as told by UKLH2 during the interview, “I think Hanban is still number-driven, they just want to know how many activities have been carried out in how many schools” (Appendix 10). UKLH3 admitted that although their UKD was awarded an individual prize by Hanban for his outstanding work, “we will never be awarded a ‘model CI’, as our student number is not that big” (Appendix 10). UKD2 also expressed his concern that the CI tends to go a bit “too far, too fast”, because “this suits the taste of the Chinese decision makers: they want to see things happen quickly. It is the Chinese speed” (Appendix 10).

This number-driven and speed-proud mentality risks rendering the CI into a kind of vanity project. During the interviews, many Chinese Directors (UKD2, UKD4 and SKD1) have mentioned it as a ‘box to tick’: the Chinese university wants the CI as a proof of ‘internationalisation’, as this has become one of the most distinctive indicators for university prestige. However, once this box is ticked, little attention is paid to what is going on in these CIs, and UKD2 put it more specifically: “The home institution only cares about this result to show their achievement and get the ¥200,000 matching fund, but does not care much about the process and quality of the end product” (Appendix 10). There are also cases of setting up a CI to simply tick the box of ‘Yes, we have one’: in China, there is a vertical line of management between the Ministry of Education (MOE) and universities, as UKD4 disclosed: “in a way, we were entrusted with such a task by the MOE and are obliged to carry it out as a way of supporting the Ministry’s work” (Appendix 10).

To sum up, as a key actor in this terrain, the Chinese government has a clear vision and ambition to promote cultural pluralism. It is communicated as a national strategy with abundant financial support channelled down to the next level, while Hanban as the implementer at the forefront, tends to reduce the vision somehow to building more CIs as a measurement of its success, counting the number of flags in the world map as China’s increased soft power. What needs to be measured more is the impact produced by these CIs, whose day-to-day activities are delivered in the target country by a joint team of directors and staff both locally hired and secondeed from China.
3.3.2 The CI directors and staff, a joint force of host and home institutions

As explained in 1.5.2, a typical CI’s team is composed of a ‘foreign Director’ appointed by the host institution, an office administrator (or two) paid by the host institution, a Chinese Co-Director, and a number of tutors sent by the Chinese home institution and paid by Hanban. Another important mechanism is that each CI has a Board of Advisors with members of the host institution, usually its president and professors as decision makers. The Director from the host institution also takes the leadership role in approving CI plans, whereas the Chinese Co-Director is mainly responsible for implementing the plan and communicating with Hanban. In essence, the CI functions like a joint venture, serving a common goal but also different interests vested by the two partner institutions. As UKD1 commented, “It is fair to say Yes, both partner institutions have common understanding of the CI’s goal in the main, as it was actually written into the agreement and it will add to the reputation of both universities, however in reality, each side has its own agendas and expectations” (Appendix 10).

For the Chinese home institutions, the CI is often used as a flag or poster for internationalisation and an opportunity to travel abroad. One MRD stated quite candidly that “the choice of having a CI in Morocco is to respond to the university’s grand strategy of internationalisation in different continents, and Morocco is chosen as our presence in Africa” (Appendix 10). UKD4 gave a very revealing answer about the three-point mandates he was given by the home institution president before he left for the post: Number one, do not get into any trouble (political misstep or diplomatic faux pas); Number two, nurture a good relationship with the partner institution; Number three, try to do a good job for Hanban. This comes as the last point. This is an honest reflection of the priorities from the perspectives of the home institution. A common theme in the Directors’ pre-departure trainings is the teaching of Zhou Enlai, China’s first premier and foreign minister, “there is no small issue in foreign affairs” (“外事无小事”, waishi wu xiaoshi). With such admonishments, it is understandable why Chinese directors tend to be overcautious and lack initiative in their role.

For the overseas host, a common theme is their expectations of using the CI as a platform to establish or expand their connections in various fronts with ‘China’. It is interesting to note that all the interviewees have mentioned the whole country of China as a subject they want to interact and connect with, not just their partner universities. The CI was used in a way as a proof of connections with China and a commitment to developing long-term relations. In this sense, having a CI on campus is also a bonus point for these host institutions to leverage more benefits beyond the Chinese
programme. This is particularly the case for CIs established in a relatively small city. The FRD in such a situation mentioned the value of the CI in the eyes of the local city council as a platform to build and expand relationships with China, the rising economic power. But sometimes, this may mean the CI will only serve a transitional purpose, like at Stockholm University, who terminated its contract with Hanban in 2014 because “today we have a completely different level of academic exchange with China, which makes this collaboration redundant” (Zhang, 2015: n.p.). There are other reasons behind this decision, which will be discussed in section 4.2 of Chapter Four.

An interesting observation is the recurring theme among the answers to the question of the CI’s mission given by Chinese directors and secondees, they have all addressed the question ‘from the state perspective’ first: “to build a bridge for spreading Chinese culture, to open the information channel to foreigners who do not have enough understanding of China, and reduce the bias from the media” (UKD2); “to play a role as people-to-people diplomacy” (UKSC2), (Appendix 10). As explained earlier, Chinese home institutions are all directly under the auspices of MOE, which is also Hanban’s immediate superior in the hierarchy. The CI is a mission entrusted by MOE to Hanban to be accomplished through these home institutions, so in a sense, they are a ‘common interest community’, while host institutions and Hanban are ‘non-complete common interests entities’; more importantly, the state-run system may be very alien to and incompatible with the host institution system: the relationships between universities and governments are starkly different in China and most Western countries, where university autonomy is strongly upheld. It would be hard to imagine a British university management talking about ‘serving the national interest’ in institutional partnerships. In this sense, the “interests are different in scale and character”, as argued by Sahlins (2013: n.p.): as an instrument of the Chinese government, Hanban wants to spread the influence of the Chinese state worldwide; by contrast, host institutions are concerned only with their parochial welfare as academic institutions.

From the above we can see a gap between the overall mission and specific objectives of the CIs, as the mission is set by the government, while the objectives are set by the universities, who are self-interested entities. Sometimes, there are mismatches, leaving the CI caught in the middle. For example, UKLH1 complained about the two partner institutions not “sharing the same understanding about the CI’s goals, as the host institution hopes that the CI should contribute to income generation and put a lot of pressure on the CI, which has nothing to do with the original intention of setting up a CI” (Appendix 10). There are also cases when these ‘inconsistent goals’ have eventually led to a CI closure: the story of Penn State University CI will be looked at in more details in
section 3.5. The tension caused by different administrative structures and cultures of the host and home institutions will also be explored further in section 3.5, which deals with the dynamic interactions among the players.

To summarise, as a player stationed in ‘the receiver’s side’, the CI is a joint force of both sides, we can see there are common grounds for both partners, but also different angles to consider their own individual interests. The common ground is to provide Chinese language programme and introduce Chinese culture; the angle from the home institution is more for the international face of the university, and gaining work credits for the MOE, while for the host institution, it may serve as leverage to better position themselves in gaining more from China’s economic rise. Between the two levels of government and institutions, we can see a contrast between long-term strategies against relatively short-term moves. Also, CIs come in many forms: a less prestigious university with a smaller budget would see the CI as a good trade-off for serving its own students’ needs while recruiting more students from China; while more elite institutions feel they can make a deal, as Hanban wants to borrow their prestige to improve the CIs’ credibility. Therefore, it is fair to argue that though all CIs serve the same purpose all around the world, that common goal is spelt into different specific objectives by the different players in this terrain as they are coming from different positions, which is further reflected in the different portfolios of their provisions. These will be elaborated in more details in section 4.3 of Chapter Four.

3.3.3 China-related scholars (both working with the CI and those refusing to work with the CI)

Foucault (1980) has explained in his power of discourse theory that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge and ‘truth’, which are reinforced (and redefined) constantly through the education system, the media, and the flux of ideologies. Gramsci was more explicit in pointing that “knowledge is not an established body of data and ideas possessed by a culturally superior entity; rather, knowledge is itself the product of the ‘conversation’ between teacher and student, and ‘truth’ is understood as the intersubjective’ product of the interaction” (Fontata, 1993: 151). Therefore, a change of China’s cultural image may only happen when a new counter-discourse begins to gain access to the centre of legitimate knowledge. China-related scholars are academics standing at this very centre of knowledge and very sensitive to this new discourse, they follow closely the Chinese government rhetoric, or in most cases, the English translation of the Chinese speeches, and based on their own interpretations, their perceptions and receptions of the CI’s presence on overseas university campuses are rather divided.
Many American professors have sounded alarm at such counter-discourse as ‘ideological infiltration’. For example, Chicago University professor emeritus in Anthropology Marshall Sahlins devoted a chapter to ‘Official Chinese Views on the Politics of Culture and Confucius Institutes’ in his book Confucius Institutes, Academic Malware (2015), he collected many government speeches, including the one given by Liu Yunshan, Ministry of Propaganda in 2010:

Coordinate the efforts of overseas and domestic propaganda, further create a favourable international environment for us…. With regard to key issues that influence our sovereignty and safety, we should actively carry out international propaganda battles against issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Human Rights, and Falun Gong. Our strategy is to proactively take our culture abroad…We should do well in establishing and operating overseas cultural centres and Confucius Institutes. (Sahlins, 2015: 6)

Wang Gengnian, Director of China Radio International, in a 2011 speech said: “we should quietly plant the seeds of our ideology in foreign countries, we must make good use of our traditional culture to package our socialist ideology” (Sahlins, 2015: 8).

Words such as ‘propaganda’ and ‘socialist ideology’ are used as evidence to show China’s intention through expanding CIs overseas, particularly because the CI’s government background may ‘reduce academic discourse’ on campus. The most sensational alarmist talk was from American socialist Mosher (2012), who dubbed the CI ‘a Trojan horse’, seeing this external ‘other’ now becoming part of a living community of ‘us’. Such remarks were refuted by other American scholars, such as Paul Smith, a professor for area and languages studies at Harverford College, who worried that the frustration of US’s own ability to fund academic projects eroded by the economic downturn could “fuel unproductive resentments against China” (Redden, 2012, n.p.). There are also quite strong counter-arguments from other China scholars, such as Nakagawa (2011b: n.p.) who has concluded after speaking to a range of people (including China scholars, journalists and CI directors) that “I’ve seen little to support the notion of Confucius Institutes as ominous propaganda”. Two Taiwanese scholars, Yang and Hsiao (2012: n.p.), have put forward their strong doubts that the CI-related activities are combining cultural transmission with purposeful, explicit propaganda, and believe one “may not argue arbitrarily that CIs must be involved in intelligence collection or operating with specific political intent as indicated by some criticisms”. This is supported by Robert Saunders (2006: n.p.), an assistant professor of history and politics at the State University of New York: “the Chinese government has reaped so much benefit from the CI, that doing anything that might jeopardize their image and their acceptance by foreign government and institutions is just not worth it".
As a matter of fact, many posts of ‘foreign Directors’ are taken by such pro-China scholars, and most CIs have China scholars as members of the board, such as Tim Wright, professor of Chinese Studies and executive board member of the Confucius Institute at Sheffield University. He was quoted to say, “the Chinese government is well aware of the danger of the CI being perceived in this way. We are given more or less a free rein to do what we want. Someone who wished to undermine China might not be welcomed at the institute, but then the British Council didn’t exactly put on talks about the IRA” (Shepherd, 2007).

The most heated debate amongst academics was started after Professor Marshall Sahlins published an article China U in November 2013, which received a rebuttal from Professor Edward McCord of George Washington University. Both scholars work on campuses with CIs, but McCord believes CIs are “hardly a threat to academic freedom” and we should “let a hundred flowers bloom”, while Sahlins believes CIs are “academic malware” (China File, 2014). The published “Debate Over Confucius Institutes” was intensified after the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) submitted a report in June 2014, calling on American universities to rethink their relationship with CIs. The debates were published in two parts on China File in July 2014, focusing on “the costs and benefits of having a CI on a university campus, the economic forces at play, and the role of China in university life more broadly”. These debates involved far more scholars (24 in total), but only a handful of them had first-hand experience with the CI. Their contributions embodied how divided their stands are: voices can be heard from both ends of the spectrum, which sets the conflict-ridden context in which the CIs are operating and seeking to realise their goals.

One important observation here is that most of the counter-arguments come from people who have either done research, or worked with/for the CI first hand, while those accusing the CI of being a propaganda tool are those who either shut the doors to CI, or judged it based on speculative thoughts or media reports. McCord (2014: n.p.) has pointed out that the greatest problem with the “anti-CI literature is that it often leaps from suspicions and concerns to a conclusion of fact”. Said has pointed that (1996: 238) “nothing is easier for people to deal with something that is different than to portray it as dangerous and threatening and to reduce it ultimately to a few clichés”. Communism is such a cliché for China. In commenting on these criticisms of the CI, UKLH1 has expressed her frustration that these are not coming from people who have connections with the CI, nor students or the general public, but “professors who refuse to have any dealings with the CI and just believes that CI’s remit is to promote Communism”. This is obviously an
oversimplified sense of causation that seeks to de-legitimise any opposing perspective by putting on an ideological label. However, a point made by Professor Heilmann at the University of Trier in Germany, also the founding director of a China think tank in Berlin, Mercator Institute for China Studies, is worth special mentioning. He thinks that, overall, the CI issue looks far less ideologically charged from a European perspective, and that the overtones of great power rivalry with China that appear to drive parts of the U.S. debate about CIs, are mostly missing in Germany and the rest of Europe.

To sum up, the China-related scholars are a special group of elites from academia that can be called people who are at the very centre of the centre of knowledge. They can play the role of opinion leaders, but it is common to see them take completely opposing stands in even the same institution, and there are divergent views concerning the CI’s ideological overtone across the globe. Most importantly, their debates tend to be highlighted by another influential player in this terrain, namely, the media, which will be the focus of the next section.

3.3.4 The media (both from China and the host country);

It is known to all that no matter how objective one media outlet claims to be, each serves its own purposes and interests, in Hartley’s words (2011:214), all communication “has some sort of spin”. As quoted earlier, Foucault (1980) believed the media was another means by which knowledge-power nexus was reinforced. It is one of the most effective tools for reinforcing power and hegemony, a very powerful player in shaping people’s minds through the languages it uses, the stories it tells, and the images it conjures up. As clearly argued by Manzenreiter (2010:43):

Responsibility for the misperception is also with the mainstream media that are playing a leading role in the fabrication of a master narrative on the natural order of states and societies that position the West at the pinnacle of human civilisation. Rather than preparing the space for a dialectic exploration of alternative modes and views, the media contribute to the reinforcing of national stereotypes.

Therefore, the “improvement of the international media environment and gaining more power of discourse" are listed among the main aims of China’s public diplomacy. To achieve these goals, an internationalisation campaign of Chinese state media was also sponsored by the government: Xinhua news agency, CCTV and China Daily all received vast sums of money to ‘go out’ and explain China’s point of view to the world (Zhang, 2012b). Barr (2011:45) provided a statistical comparison in terms of government funding:

China has committed US$ 6.5 billion for the overseas expansion of its main
media organisations. A little comparison may help put this into perspective: the USA currently spends about US$750 million annually on international broadcasting, whilst UK funding for BBC World Service runs at less than US$400 million per annum.

What sets Chinese media apart from its Western counterparts is that they are state-run, and subject to the leadership of a number of competent ministries, including the CPC Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture, the General Administration of Press and Publication, and the State Administration of Radio, Film and TV. They hold the power of appointment of key staff, resource allocation and final approval of content. Therefore, it is not an overstatement that the Chinese media are the conduits of government's voice. What is more, the domestic rhetoric is rather explicit and open about media control, which is often reported in English. For example, the following remarks were made by Li Changchun, head of the CPC Propaganda Department from 2002-2013, in a speech to the All-China Journalists Association in October 2011:

The journalist front must have a high sense of political responsibility and historical mission, deeply studying, propagating and implementing the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee in order to promote the great advancement and flourishing of socialist culture (cited in Hughes, 2014: 61).

After Xi Jinping came to power, an even tighter control of state media can be observed, first from his tour of the top three state-run media outlets in February 2016, when a sign of “the central television’s family name is the Party” was displayed to welcome him (Wong, 2016), then from his address to the All-China Journalists' Association and winners of China News Award and Changjiang Taofen Award, the country's top two journalism awards, in November 2016:

He urged the country's journalists to follow "the correct political direction," conform to the CPC Central Committee, adhere to the Marxist view of journalism, stick to the standpoint of the Party and the people and uphold socialism with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua, 2016).

Under such media ambience, a blunder would be an accident waiting to happen. The most classic example was when Li Changchun was quoted in The Economist in 2009 that the CI was “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”—a statement that has been frequently seized upon by critics as evidence of the CI’s politicised mission. Then in a plenary session in October 2011, the CCP Central Committee has published a key resolution on promoting the development of “socialist culture” in which the CIs were described (along with the Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television) as part of the drive to “create new methods of propaganda to strengthen our international right to
speak, respond to foreign concerns, improve international society’s understanding of our basic national conditions, to display our country’s image of civilisation, openness and progress” (cited in Hughes, 2014: 55). These open rhetoric may explain why the CI was often associated with ‘propaganda’ in many media headlines all over the world. For example, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has openly opposed the establishment of CIs in universities, arguing that they were nothing more than a Chinese design to widen influence by ‘using culture as a propaganda tool’ (Times of India, 2009). Even neutral Swiss press carried such headlines as ‘Propaganda tool of the People’s Republic’ and ‘Chinese culture centres spark propaganda fears’ when reporting the opening of the Geneva Confucius Institute in 2012.

Besides, the official rhetoric for the CI’s goal is to give the world a ‘correct’ understanding of China: in UKD1’s words, “to enhance British understanding of China, and reduce the estrangement and bias from the media” (Appendix 10). But the question is: can this be done by a medium that is also biased? Hartig (2015:252), a German researcher on the CI, argues that “CIs do not present the ‘real’ China to the world, but rather a ‘correct version’ of it, which limits their ability to project China’s strategic narratives effectively”. This correct version, as described by Perry Link in the afore-mentioned ‘Debate Over Confucius Institute’, is an “overly rosy portrait of Chinese society”, “not only smaller than the whole but crucially different in nature” (China File, 2014: n. p.). When the Chinese government aims at unveiling the ‘true face’ of China to the rest of the world, it is actually using cultural diplomacy as plastic surgery to show a ‘beautified face’ of China without realising that there is any problem of doing so. In Guttenplan’s words (2012: n.p.), “they want to change the perception of China – to combat negative propaganda with positive propaganda”, but such thoughts are problematic: there is no such thing as ‘positive propaganda’; it will only meet with negative reception if it is identified as ‘propaganda’. As Dr. Robert Kuhn, a US public intellectual and a long-time adviser to the Chinese government as well as a columnist for China Daily, explained, when the information communicated is 100% good and positive, the credibility rate with American audiences is zero. In other words, ‘rich’ information can still create a ‘poor’ image. On the other hand however, it also shows the legacy of seeing China as the ‘ideological other’: almost a knee-jerk reaction that anything ‘they’ produce is deemed to be propaganda that must be resisted.

One necessary explanation here is that the Chinese translation may take partial blame, as the Chinese word ‘xuanchuan’ is a neutral one meaning ‘publicity’, it has been routinely translated as ‘propaganda’ in the Cold War era and was kept in use till today. But English translation has become such a critically important issue in the globalised
media world today, the awkward English version offered by many of the Chinese
government websites and news outlets often lends itself as a hilt to be used against
China. For example, in a speech given by Li Changchun at the CI Headquarters, he was
quoted saying “using the excuse of teaching Chinese language, everything looks
reasonable and logical.” In attending a national conference on propaganda and ideology,
he was again quoted as saying “they must vigorously sing the praises of the
achievements of the CCP, socialism, the reform policy, and [the glories of] the great
motherland” (cited in Lam, 2009: n.p.).

A recent example shows that this kind of ‘eulogy’ style domestic report could have a fatal
effect on a CI partnership: the only official reason given by the University of Chicago for
suspending negotiations with Hanban concerning the CI agreement is that one domestic
medium, the *Jiefang Daily*, disclosed in an admiring and flattering tone that “the
University panicked at Xu Lin’s firm stance after receiving her personal letter and phone
call, and immediately agreed to keep the CI open” (Wang, 2014, n.p.). This actually
pushed the result to the exact opposite: the ongoing negotiations were immediately
aborted and decisions were made by the university to terminate the contract. This is
obviously a result Hanban regrets, probably more so to know the trigger, they would
never imagine such a local media report written in Chinese and meant entirely for
domestic readers, would fall under the scrutiny of the American media. This suggests an
urgent need for domestic media to develop an awareness of the ‘sans frontiers’ nature
of its audience in this globalised and digitised world.

As for the Western media influence, UKD3 interviewed commented that “information in
the West about China is often filtered and selected by journalists who know little about
China or have a biased view of the country” (Appendix 10). Evidence of this kind of
selective reports can be found from secondary data: the only two universities that hosted
a CI and cancelled the Dalai Lama’s visit were repeatedly reported as evidence of the
CI’s infringement on academic freedom: the University of North Carolina (in 2009) and
the University of Sydney (in 2013) (reported by BBC, Bloomberg, The Sydney Morning
Herald, etc). In contrast, a number of other universities hosting a CI have all invited Dalai
Lama to visit and give a speech; these include the University of Stanford (October 2010),
the University of Miami (October 2010), the California State University in Long Beach
(May 2011) the University of Maryland (May 2013) and LSE (Jun 2014), just to name a
few. Actually, Emory University has hosted the Dalai Lama a few times for a series of
public and campus events, as he holds the title of Presidential Distinguished Professor
there. The CIs in these universities were not involved in these activities, nor did they
intervene or try to block such visits. Yet, these facts were never mentioned by the media
as counter-evidence to show that the CIs did not infringe on academic freedom. These show a clear ‘agenda-setting role’ (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) played by media by deliberate coverage of topics or events with the goal of influencing, and sometimes with the effects of swaying, public opinion.

Similarly, there were reports about the University of Calgary being delisted as a recommended institution for Chinese students heading abroad after it awarded the Dalai Lama an honorary degree in February 2010 (reported by the Globe and Mail, CBC News). However, no western media ever bothered to point out that a number of other universities that also awarded honorary degrees to the Dalai Lama, such as UCLA, the University of Michigan, Emory University, Rutgers University and the University of Aberdeen, who all had a CI opened on their campus after the award of the degree. Their application to and recognition by the Ministry of Education was not affected by this incident at all. Actually, there are even a number of universities, including the University of Maryland, Miami University, and the University of Minnesota, which awarded the Dalai Lama an honorary doctorate after a CI had been set up on their campuses.

Moreover, the termination of the CI agreements in 2015 with Chicago University, Penn State University, and the University of Stockholm have been played up all over the press as sensational news (reported by Reuters, the Economist, the Times High Education, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Forbes, South China Morning Post, to name a few), yet the new opening of the 101st CI in the US following these incidents in February 2015 at the University of California Santa Barbara did not appear in any major news outlet. There is no doubt that if it were another ‘closing down’, it would not fall off their radar. All the above incidents can serve as direct evidence of selective media reports, which is a form of ‘covert bias’, based on which sweeping accusations were made concerning the CI’s infringement of academic freedom.

Of course, it is only fair to mention that on the other side of the coin, there are also different views and voices in the Western media. For example, the Guardian carried a report titled ‘Not a propaganda tool’ in 2007 (Shepherd); and in 2011, another article in The Economist stated that China “has been careful not to encourage these language centres to act as overt purveyors of the party’s political viewpoints, and little suggests they are doing so”. There were also more voices from the Chinese media outlets in English offering counter-arguments, such as the answer given in the Global Times article ‘Why is Washington so scared of Confucius?’ (2012) is “the issue shows the US cultural confidence is not as strong as we thought. Only culturally weak countries have such sensitivity”. Then in 2015, following those CI closures, the China Daily USA carried an
article in response to the “chorus of concern”, stating that “Confucius Institutes are building bridges rather than Great Walls to share knowledge about the history, culture and language of a rising world power which has been in the shadows” (Watkins, 2015). The article also finished with a quote from Confucius: "Real knowledge is to know the extent of one's ignorance". However, as Anderson pointed out (2007: 84):

Most newspaper readers are 'pre-prejudiced' in so far as they prefer to buy the newspaper that most suits their political viewpoint. From this point of view, the written and online news media most generally reflect and reinforce rather than re-shape their audience’s view of the world.

It means the multiplied quantity of overseas distribution of the Chinese media do not necessarily mean the influence they exert also multiplied, as many are distributed through free circulations and do not get read or watched by the target audiences. Actually, in the report of The Soft Power 30, the lack of “political and press freedoms” were listed under the weakness of China’s soft power, while BBC was named among the pillars of British soft power, which was rated No. 1 in 2015: “Over 1700 foreign correspondents are based in the UK, and with a dynamic media market of its own, London is the global media capital” (The Soft Power 30 website). This shows the huge gap the role media plays in contributing to a country’s soft power.

To sum up, the Chinese media in this global terrain still has only a limited role to play for various reasons including its propaganda and ‘eulogy’ style, and the English ‘language hegemony’ that dominates the international media landscape. Instead of helping the CI by offering counter-evidence of those ungrounded accusations, the Chinese media are often quoted as evidence of the CI’s official links and political overtone. The mainstream Western media still dominate the information order and are often pervaded with discourse portraying China as the ‘ideological other’, which was criticised by the Chinese media and government as ‘Cold War mentality’ (Ding, 2008; Zhang 1998; Zhang 2010). However, it is the media in the host country that are exerting direct influence on the main target audiences of China’s cultural diplomacy, the general public in host countries.

3.3.5 The general public in host countries including students of the CI

In a 2001 report produced by the China National Tourism Administration, it was mentioned that when China was promoted as a tourist destination, a frequently asked question is: “China is a socialist country, can American citizens travel to China?” (cited in Zheng, 2015: 100). Of course, the level of understanding/knowledge about China held by an average member of the ‘general public’ in the host country has improved tremendously in the past decades, but it is still lagging. As explained by UKSC2, “for
foreigners who have never been to China, their impression of the country is the one conveyed by the media, which is very tarnished in many countries" (Appendix 10). A common phenomenon is that tourists tend to look for the more ‘backward’ side of China as the ‘real’ China when they first visit, even when everything they see with their own eyes are real. For example, UKD1 said the highlight of the trip to China was ‘nights out on a bicycle to local areas’, a similar example was given by Hubbert (2014a) in her recounts of the ‘Chinese Bridge Summer Camp’ that “the night market with snacking on unidentified creatures roasted on a stick” was what they perceived to be a “form of Chinese authenticity”.

UKLH1 elaborated this with an example:

Most people in the local community have a completely outdated knowledge and understanding about China, their image of China is a country where farmers work in the field everywhere with no modern buildings and modern lifestyle, very poor and backward. What is even worse is those who have never been to China but thought they knew a lot about China. Most of their perceptions of China are based on media reports, such as about China’s one child policy and child trafficking, Tibet riots, etc, and use this as their judgement of the whole country. (Appendix 10)

Or, as UKD1 said:

For some people they based their whole understanding of China on the only book they’ve read – Wild Swans; as for contemporary China, again they based their knowledge on only one media report they’ve read or watched - about China’s environmental problems. (Appendix 10)

This is why UKD3 believed that “China is a much misunderstood country”, thus the CI’s role is to “show them a China that is not shown in local media” (Appendix 10). In other words, the CI can offer a new counter discourse, to influence the general public and CI students with people-to-people contacts, to teach people Chinese so that they can get access to vastly more sources of first-hand information about China, and to correct some of the mystified or imagined ‘knowledge’ about China, like the example given by UKLH1: “one primary school pupil said to her parents that the teacher told them ‘Chinese people eat dogs’. Kids like that age never question what the teacher says, so we need the CI to educate people”. She said quiz is used as a means of knowledge transfer to school students and teachers: “the ‘true or false’ statement would help to some extent dispel the common misconceptions by explaining the correct answers” (Appendix 10).

If the above represents the average knowledge level about China among the general public, it does not actually fall far short of that among the educated elites on a university
UKD3 admitted in the interview that “when I was young, I was taught only British and European history, music and art, and know nothing about Chinese history or Asia”; he also gave examples of a Europe-centric view of one little town in Britain claiming to be ‘the first gunpowder factory in the world’, “it may well be the first one in Europe, but the world is not Europe” (Appendix 10).

Even for students in today’s world, their knowledge about China is still haunted by the phantom of the ‘otherness’: The Chinese cultural image seems to be either antiquated or tinted with ideological colour. SKSC2 gave an example when she asked a Spanish student about the image of Chinese people in his mind before coming to China, the answer she got was “men wearing long pigtail hair and hats in the Qing style” - an image of China over 100 years ago as an empire. This offers an interesting comparison with another answer given by UKLH3 - China during the Cultural Revolution when “everyone wore Red Guard’s caps” - an image of China 60 years ago painted with Mao’s ideology. SKSC3 added that “many students thought China is a similar country to North Korea before they visited it, because of ideology”. UKD1 also cited the comments of a British student on the first trip to China that he “does not feel Beijing is very political as imagined: I am not being watched, I can go to places freely and talk to people on the street freely” (Appendix 10).

These are vivid descriptions of China’s image as being the ‘ideological other’ among the general public. Hubbert (2014b: 340) explained this as highly “culturally constituted, not by Chinese culture but by U.S culture and the ideologies of democracy that shaped their conceptions of Chinese state intentions and practices” because Communism is a “product of both historical discourse and contemporary analysis that take the nature of Communism for granted”. This confirms the view that the receiving end of China’s counter discourse is not a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that was already occupied or even embedded with ‘accepted forms of knowledge’ shaped through media and the flux of ideologies.

However, no one can ignore another significant aspect of contemporary China in this terrain: China has become the second largest economy and the largest trading nation in the world, an undisputable rising power on the economic front. This adds an extremely important dimension to the general public’s perception of China. According to UKSC4 interviewed, most of the CI students are school students and the general public, they do not feel the rising China as a threat in their life, instead, “the more developed Chinese economy is, the more attractive China becomes, as more and more people would be interested in studying China to find out how it can achieve such growth” (Appendix 10).
It is interesting to note that ‘China’ is mentioned as the subject of study here, not just Chinese language.

This perspective was also shared by answers from SKD2 and SKD4, who both confirmed that because they are so close to China, they see the huge opportunities offered by China’s booming economy:

Korean people nowadays are very interested in going to China for various activities, be it trade, educational or cultural exchanges, so there are more and more people learning Chinese. Over the past 10 years, we offer more and more opportunities for our students to go to China, there are also more and more students and tourists coming from China. For big shops and tourist information centre they all hire staff speaking Chinese, this means more job opportunities for Chinese-speaking skills (SKD2, Appendix 10).

SKD4 also gave examples of students changing major from Japanese to Chinese after failing to get any jobs with their Japanese skill set, and in the Business School, it is compulsory for students to take a second foreign language after English. “Due to the decreasing number of students taking Japanese, they simply closed the course, and between Russian and Chinese, the majority of students chose to learn Chinese” (Appendix 10).

Of course, it is important to remember that all the interviewees in this project are working for the CI, and most of the people they work with are those who are already ‘interested in China’: students who choose to learn Chinese out of their own will, and members of the general public attracted by the CI outreach activities in the community, so in a way, this is a China-friendly circle, but nevertheless, they represent a huge potential for cultural diplomacy to play a constructive role. Therefore, as the target audience in the host country where the CI is based, the general public represents the group of players with the largest number and least vested interest in this terrain, they are very responsive to China’s changing power position in the world as well. They may have been influenced by the local media and the ‘othering’ discourse about China, but can also be influenced by the new counter-discourse and people-to-people contacts offered by the CI.

3.4 Step Three: Charting the terrain into hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides by employing the key concepts

At the turn of the 21st century, we find our world beset by a growing sense of global connections, which transcends national and regional borders and boundaries; nowhere is it more evident than the cultural realm. At the same time, as boundaries have become more fluid and the movement of people and capital accelerates, questions of cultural
boundary have become more contested than ever, a remapping of the global cultural terrain becomes necessary to reflect the shifting positions.

Now that the shaping of this ‘terrain of struggle’ has been explored and the various actors at play been presented, the analysis of it can only start with a reasonable understanding of the current terrain configurations. Therefore, the next step is trying to determine the boundaries within the terrain between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides by employing the key concepts again, and examining the deployment of all the actors at play. This process considers the following questions: how the global cultural terrain is constructed and deployed by particular actors at particular times in history; how has the flow of commodities, peoples, and ideas influenced the relationship among different actors in this terrain; and what power dynamics underpin these inter-cultural connections and the shifting of the cultural terrain.

A good place to start is the framework of cultural hegemony constructed by Antonio Gramsci that has been elaborated in the Literature Review, he believed that cultural hegemony exerted an inordinate influence and had the potential to suppress other cultural expressions to the point where if diversity is not lost, cultural equality is.

If we apply this concept in looking at this terrain, it will not be hard to see that the first group of players ‘Chinese government and Hanban’ has taken a clear counter-hegemonic stance, as the development of cultural pluralism is declared as the main goal and mission of China’s cultural diplomacy. In 2012, Hu Jintao said the following in a speech:

> The hostile forces in the international community are hastening their steps to westernize and separate (disintegrate) our country. The ideology and culture fronts have been their key areas of infiltration. We must deeply understand the seriousness and complexity of ideological struggles, and take powerful measures to cope with them. (cited in Sahlins, 2015: 7)

Even if we disregard the arguable appropriateness of the English translation, the Chinese government’s counter-hegemonic stance is plain to see; it also shows a stronger China is ready to become more defiant in fighting against Western hegemony. However, Castells (2009: 19) has put forward a strong argument to the effect that power is derived from networks. It is constituted by a “specific configuration of global, national and local networks in a multidimensional space of social interaction”. Therefore, in this terrain, “the state becomes just one node (however important) of a particular network”. Any national government, no matter how powerful, has but limited power over how information is received, as their voices will be in competition and interaction with the
others in this terrain.

The second group of players (‘the CI directors and staff’) is a bit more complex, as it is a joint force of host and home institutions, but sharing the common goal of promoting Chinese language and culture. Therefore, as one entity, they are at the forefront of the counter-hegemonic side from China’s perspective, though physically, they can be based in a host country that is well resided in cultural hegemony. It is important to point that when a culture becomes hegemonic, it becomes “common sense” for the majority of the population, it means the CI has to grapple with an invisible force. It is not surprising that they find the current terrain not a ‘level playing field’ as pointed by UKLH2: “I feel Chinese culture is considered as a weak culture here, it is not really a level field we can play in. Because you are trying to promote and sell your things, which would naturally put yourself in an inferior position” (Appendix 10). An example given was that of a Chinese New Year performance, which is paid for by Hanban, but the CI has to first deal with the unenthusiastic city council and theatre, then face the challenge of filling all the seats, even with complimentary tickets. UKD1 from the same CI also added: “the popularity of our programme or event in the UK and the local area is no match for a Hollywood blockbuster, or a European exhibition in China. At least in China, people are willing to pay for such performances, while here, even with complimentary tickets, it’s not easy to fill the theatre” (Appendix 10). So the CI’s position can be described as head-to-head against the hegemonic side.

The third group of ‘China-related scholars’ is only classed as one group because of their position at the very centre of knowledge; however, even if they are physically standing at the same centre (in the same host institution for example), their viewpoints could be miles apart, or even stand at opposite ends of the spectrum, from strongly hegemonic to strongly counter-hegemonic. Chicago University could be a handy example to show the divide. Hanban Director Xu Lin told the BBC reporter during the 2014 interview that: “Chicago University visited us many times, they are strongly interested in establishing a Confucius Institute, so they chose us, it is not Hanban who pushed them…..the concerns are only from very few people, but the sound is very strong” (Sudworth, 2014: n.p.). This seems to be consistent with the common pattern revealed from my interviews, as UKLH1 commented: “people who disagree have the loudest voice, people who benefit from the CI are not as outspoken”.

Or rather, because they do not have a voice to be heard. During my interview with the Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing, Mr. Anders made an interesting comment:
Most of the media reports I read about the CI are negative, about the Communist influence, but I’ve also heard the contrary, people who are involved in the business saying No, we’re free to do what we want. What are you writing there? Ask me! I can tell you it is not true (Appendix 10).

Yet, their voices are only heard among a small circle, while those scholars who dwelled on the Orientalist discourse have their stances amplified by the mainstream media, reinforcing their discourse.

Of course, the ‘media’ group is also divided into two camps, working hand-in-hand with the divided academic discourse. Bhabha (1994: 19) believes that “economic and political domination has a profound hegemonic influence on the information orders of the Western world, its popular media and its specialized institution and academics”. In this dynamic terrain, we can see China’s growing economic power challenges the US economic domination, while the American power of discourse also challenges China’s political values. The Western media are like a barometer of the changing temperature in the global economic and political climate: they keep a close watch on the ‘other’ side, including the Chinese media, who may have some potential to fight the ‘war of position’, yet the potential is far from being fully unleashed. It needs to learn how to better fight the counter-hegemonic battle, especially when English remains the international media language.

For the last group, it is only fair to argue that the ‘general public in the host countries including CI students’ spread across both the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides, but one thing clear is that as the target audiences, they are not a vacuum chamber as argued earlier, so the counter-discourse the CI is trying to provide does not go through a one-way conduit; rather, it is a two-way interplay with the discourse already produced by others in the destination. Another thing also clear is that China’s rise is undisputable and affects the power positions with the host countries the CIs are located in, creating a more favourable terrain for the CI to work the magic in ‘the last three feet’.

From the above we can see that none of the groups of players are monolithic; they all contain internal dynamics or even some conflicts to a certain degree. This ‘terrain of struggle’ may be best summarised by Said’s remarks that it is a struggle between the ‘relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony’ (1978:5). In practice, there is no clear-cut division in which some players stay on the hegemonic side while others stay on the counter-hegemonic side: their relationships and positions are more shaped by the intercultural interactions with other players in the terrain, making the relationship both complex and circular and interweaving. More importantly, as Foucault (1982:793) pointed out, every relation between forces is a power
relation, which is circular: it is “actions upon actions of the others”. Such intertwining interactions will be fleshed out in the next section by following through some lines of interactions.

3.5 Step Four: Examining the dynamic interactions among various players in the cultural terrain of struggle

As presented in the sections above, the ‘terrain of struggle’ is a dynamic complexity with five main groups of actors at play. This section will attempt to delineate such complexities and intricacies by mapping out some snapshots in these interactional cycles, as what we are looking at here is an ensemble of actions which induce and modify one another.

3.5.1 Snapshot 1: Chinese government → Hanban → CI → China-related Scholars → media → Chinese government

At the Chinese government level, Hu Jintao’s speech at the 17th National Congress in 2007 about building cultural soft power as “an important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength” carried implicit policy prescriptions for government departments in the areas such as cultural diplomacy. As explained earlier, Hanban is such an organization committed to the claimed mission of developing cultural pluralism and contributing to the construction of a harmonious world, while the CI was considered as a key project to implement this strategy. Directly responding to Hu's speech in 2007, a new plaque of ‘Confucius Institute Headquarters’ was hung in Hanban to show its new remit of administration and supervision of the CIs.

The following speech given by Madame Xu Lin, Director of Hanban, clearly shows the vertical hierarchical structure of the Chinese government:

Every year since 2004, Li Changchun gave numerous important instructions to the CI and visited CIs in 15 countries when traveling abroad. He has established a favourable image as a Chinese leader in the international society. The series of important instructions by Li Changchun on the CI are theoretical treasures of the CI undertaking. We studied them in the past, and we must continue to study them now and in the future (Sahlins, 2015: 7).

This speech was given in 2011, after Li was quoted in The Economist in 2009 saying that the CI was “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up”. The eulogized visits by Li to the CIs in Xu’s speech was also mentioned during one of my interviews with SKD4, but as an example explaining how the CI is courting criticisms for its political
For example, when state leaders visit other countries, they would normally attend unveiling ceremonies for CI's, it is good this time Xi Jinping did not visit a CI in South Korea, but the Halla CI in Jeju was unveiled by Li Changchun, giving it a strong political colour. The CI’s image among the media and general public is very government-related, we were often questioned why we are serving the Chinese government (SKD4 is a South Korean).

The government role in cultural diplomacy was much discussed in the Literature Review. Hu (2008) has pointed that the West has an innate and deeply rooted aversion to any government-manipulated culture. Domestic rhetoric from the Ministry of Propaganda will only make the implicit manipulation explicit, such as the Minister Liu Yunshan’s speech to “make sure that all cultural battlegrounds, cultural products, and cultural activities reflect and conform to the socialist core values and requirement” (Sahlins, 2015: 6). Other scholars such as Seiichi (2008) also argue that government involvement is liable to be seen as ‘meddlesome intrusion’ by the authorities, raising suspicions and causing reflexive backlash.

One such backlash incident happened during the annual meeting of the European Association of Chinese Studies (EACS) held in Portugal in July 2014, when Xu Lin ordered four pages about the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation (CCKF) to be torn out from the volume of conference programme and abstracts. Actually, both Hanban and CCKF are sponsors of this conference; Xu’s overbearing and arbitrary manner shocked the 300 participants who were present there and then, and later, through media report, it shocked a far wider audience within academia. The president of the Association, Professor Greatrex from the University of Lund, publicly criticised Xu’s action as “totally unacceptable” as this was “the first time in the history of EACS that its conference materials had been censored”, and “censorship of conference materials cannot and will never be tolerated by the EACS” (Greatrex, 2014a, 2014b).

This incident happened right among the China scholars, and an academic conference held abroad is probably the worst possible platform to stage China’s censorship. When freedom of speech and belief are protected by law in many European countries; Hanban is showing that a Chinese government decree can override academic freedom, but the vertical line of Chinese government over university and media do not translate across the border. Almost on the contrary, in many Western countries, universities and media are at the very centre of the greatest challenges to governments. While the incident was reported in the Western media (the Wall Street Journal, BBC News, the Diplomat, EACS website) as an outrage, it was lauded as an act of patriotism in the Chinese press under
the headline of ‘There is no shame in Hanban tearing up overseas conference program’ (Li, 2014). In the report, the blame was put on the EACS, who “should not lack clarity over the gravity of the Taiwan problem for China. The reference to the CCKF in the program should not have appeared in the first place” (cited in Sahlin, 2015: 38). But CCKF has been funding the conference for the past two decades. Despite Xu herself emphasising during the BBC interview that the content she removed was ‘not academic but political’, this incident was quoted as evidence of the CI’s threat to academic freedom: the Wall Street Journal reported it under the headline ‘Madam Xu’s Party Line, Beijing confirms that Confucius Institutes subvert Western academic freedom’: “After vehemently denying for years that the CIs have any kind of censorship agenda, Beijing has now tacitly acknowledged that this was false”.

Actually, more frictions were disclosed in a BBC article entitled ‘Confucius institute: The hard side of China’s soft power’, written by the BBC interviewer of Xu Lin in December 2014. The starting line reads as the following:

For starters she accepted a request for a BBC interview. Admittedly she came quickly to regret it, demanding that we delete a large section of our recording.

……

After we had finished the recording, along with her deputy and her press officers, she kept us for well over an hour, insisting that she had been misled into agreeing to the interview and demanding that we erase, there and then, the section about Portugal......We refused to delete our tape.’ (Sudworth, 2014)

These two incidents were quoted together as examples of the Chinese government’s “very heavy-handed and very public attempts at censorship” (Scotton, 2015, n.p.). The BBC incident showing Hanban “demanding” that a foreign media organ “delete” a section of an interview recording, and then having the “demand” “refused” indicates how the relationship between the media and the government differs drastically in China and the UK; on the other hand, it also shows the potentially conflicting interface between domestic and international contexts faced by the Chinese media: when they are written to feed the national pride in China’s growing power and stature, in how China is becoming tougher in safeguarding its national interests, it can be used by the Western media as an alarming proof of China’s hard edge.

These incidents embody a few cruxes in this line of interactions that involves government, academia and the media. As explained earlier, the latter two were subject to the hierarchical rule of the government in China, which even casts shadows over China scholars abroad, according to the 2008 report submitted by the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC):
This takes the form of providing both positive rewards to ‘friendly’ scholars – such as preferred access to interviews and documents – as well as taking punitive actions such as denying visas for academics who anger Beijing. These rewards and punishments offer the Chinese government leverage over the careers of foreign scholars and thereby encourage a culture of academic self-censorship” (USCC report, 2008).

Actually, the same thing applies to foreign journalists. Melissa Chen, an American journalist working for the English-language arm of Al-Jazeera was denied renewal of her visa and press credentials in 2012, which was widely reported as ‘being expelled from China’ by the Washington Post (Richburg, 2012), the Guardian (Watts, 2012) and Al-Jazeera English. When government control is extended to foreign academics and journalists in such an explicit manner, it will not be compatible or acceptable in the international domain, but the state-run nature of China’s cultural diplomacy determines that a stern domestic approach would definitely prevail when such incompatibility occurs, at the cost of causing conflicts. When counter-hegemonic endeavour was driven by an authoritarian government, it may be backfired to be felt as imposing hegemonic influence as well, especially when Xu’s action would appear to be a denial, not a defence, of the image of a harmonious and tolerant China that Hanban is so keen to project. The EACS incident is particularly detrimental in that Taiwan has always been part of the Chinese nation, the only consensus that has been reached across the Taiwan Straits since 1949. Therefore, its culture should be considered part of the cultural diversity in China, yet it was rejected by Beijing’s cultural diplomacy. What is more, the opposite media reactions this incident received inside China and abroad exemplified the contradiction existing between the cultural goals of the Chinese government and the current political system’s ability to deliver progress towards those goals as discussed in 1.3.2. Therefore, a state-run approach could contribute counterproductively to the effects of cultural diplomacy, as government sponsorship is already seen as a ‘hard edge’ in the breeding of ‘soft power’, let alone censorship or ‘agenda setting’ influence extended beyond its border.

Actually, censorship and government control of China’s public sphere have been widely reviled as features of authoritarian rule and have already given ammunition to its critics. What is happening in the Chinese universities only gave more grounds to this worry: the CCP directive issued to local party committees in May 2013 had officially banned the discussion of seven topics in universities and the media on the grounds that they were “dangerous Western influences”. The seven topics are: universal values, freedom of speech, civil society, civil rights, the historical errors of the Chinese Communist Party, crony capitalism, and judicial independence (Liou & Ding, 2015:138). The Chinese journalist Gao Yu, who was accused of leaking this ‘state secret’ to western media, was
initially sentenced to seven years in prison and then reduced to five years after her appeal in November 2015, which was also widely reported by all the mainstream Western media such as BBC and CNN, adding another dimension, human rights, to this censorship issue.

The speech given by Xi Jinping in December 2014 calling for tighter ideological control in universities was also put under the media spotlights, including the BBC, Guardian, Daily Mail and Reuters. As a direct response to Xi’s speech, the Chinese Education Minister, Yuan Guiren, jumped on the bandwagon and called for a ban on textbooks that promote Western values, and warned against “remarks that slander the leadership of the Communist Party of China and smear socialism” in the classroom (Xinhua, 2015a). When Western values and textbooks are banned in Chinese universities, such acts are not recognised as counter-hegemonic actions, but countering its own principle of ‘harmony with diversity’ claimed as the very goal of China’s cultural diplomacy, it also runs against the definition of cultural diplomacy per se by reducing ‘mutual understanding’ to one-way explanation.

What is worth noting is that the same Minister told a prominent government advisory panel four years previously that restricting the use of Western teaching materials was wrongheaded. This stark reversal revealed the growing tension between academics and party control on the one hand, and the power of bureaucracy on the other hand. If the MOE can change direction like a weathercock, Hanban and universities under its direct auspices will just have to trim their sail to the wind, and it is not hard to understand why the number one ‘rule of thumb’ according to UKD2 was “do less, err less”, echoing UKD4’s first mandate is not to “get into any trouble”, as they are working for the position, not the mission. One smart way of avoiding getting into trouble while getting the work done is shared by UKLH3: by working with the Students’ Union and organising forums through them, “as it would have more political sensitivity and is more likely to cause disputes if organized by the CI”. For example, Global Media was the theme of one such forum, where they discussed the media censorship issue very openly. “This shows inclusiveness of different views and respect for academic freedom” (Appendix 10). This is indeed a very good example to show how the interaction with the student body is utilised to tone down the CI’s government colour.

As for censorship of topics inside the CI, Hanban’s explanation is that political discussion is not the CI’s remit, and CI teachers do not have the expertise or knowledge to handle such discussions. This view was echoed by UKSC5: “after all, I am not a teacher of politics, I cannot offer an expert answer, and I would not want my language class to
evolve into a politics class” (Appendix 10). Nor does Hanban want this - all the CI secondees interviewed said that during the pre-departure training organized by Hanban, they were instructed to either respond with government rhetoric, or try to divert the topic when politically sensitive discussions arise in the classroom. According to UKSC5:

The advice Hanban gave us in pre-departure training is to take the Chinese government stand to speak for China, tell students Chinese official views. After all, I’m sent here by the Chinese government, of course I would not say anything negative about China. I would safeguard China’s national interest; this is my personal view anyway as I am very patriotic. To see the country image tarnished is like ruining my own image…….They also advised us not to engage in extended debates with students, if students stick to their views, we can only present our views in a mild manner and avoid head-to-head confrontations (Appendix 10).

Probably UKSC2’s stance is more advisable: “I would not say the students are wrong, but I think it is necessary to let them know the Chinese views. Then it is up to them to decide if they support this view or not”. This accords with UKLH3’s explanations: “our main purpose is to offer a platform where different views can be put forward, not to argue who is influenced by whom” (Appendix 10). This approach of ‘just letting them know’ is how counter-discourse is gaining access to the knowledge centre from the Chinese perspective, but it is also identified and resisted as ‘ideological infiltration’ from the hegemonic side, thus keeping the two sides wrestling in this ‘terrain of struggle’. For example, according to empirical evidence provided by Hubert’s research (2014b: 330):

Inside the classroom, the CI teachers reinforced an idea of a China defined by its cultural glories and modernization feats, not its political practices. Whenever politically laden topics emerged from classroom discussions, I observed that the teachers quickly refocused students on language acquisition and cultural activities.

This approach is fine pedagogically in a language class, but as Hartig (2015) argued, it was complicated by the fact that it is precisely those sensitive topics that are probably most familiar to the CI target audience as they regularly appear in the media. This caused a potential perception gap which hampers the credibility of CIs. Yet it does not stop at this lack of credibility, as Hubert’s research (2014b) concluded, because China is routinely imagined as politically repressive, the purposefully apolitical nature of its pedagogical materials and classroom practices sometimes served as an impediment to Hanban’s efforts, as this “political absence” is interpreted as “authoritarian presence”, thus “reinforcing perceptions of a repressive Chinese government apparatus”. All of her interviewees recognised that Hanban’s “attempts to depoliticise the classroom had this paradoxical effect” (Hubert, 2014b: 339).

Most of the foreign Directors of the CI have expressed their views with a rhetorical
question: “there are so many other things we can do, why must we touch the ‘minefield’ when the fund for the CI operation is provided by the Chinese government?” (UKD1) However, such a response indicated the existence of self-censorship which is always an inherent danger that may or may not operate at a conscious level. UKD1 used the British Council as a defence as “they wouldn’t want to talk about IRA either”. UKSC2 cited the example of “foreign teachers who came to China to teach 20-30 years ago, some of them have a missionary background and would infill religious influence in their teaching, but it does not mean their students will be converted to Christianity”. UKD2 simply retorted: “no one would claim if you study in the US and taught by Americans, you’ll be in danger of indoctrination, or being guided or governed by the American government. Why would you start saying this about China?” (Appendix 10)

This ‘double standard’ is obviously built on the Western cultural hegemony in this ‘terrain of struggle’, but just as Gramsci believed, the fight for hegemony and struggle for power is ceaseless; if the hegemon starts to worry about lose the hegemonic position, the sense of crisis would be translated into an urge to fight on to keep that position, especially by the academia and the media. So, when Chinese UKD4 can comment rather sensibly that “they are very alert, which is understandable”, this ‘understandable alert’ tends to be escalated into alarms on the hegemonic side based on their speculative assumptions that the CI’s remit is to ‘promote Communism’, which is used as a synonym for ‘Chinese ideology infiltration’. For the CIs that are located in the centre of the hegemonic side, an important job is to disable such alarms. UKD2 used himself as an example to disprove the assumption: “I do not think the CI is trying to sell political ideology, I myself am not even a Communist party member. It is not listed as a criterion to select the CI directors or teachers. What we want to do is cultural promotion, and in today’s information era, it is impossible to brainwash people, local people have full access to a wealth of information”. UKLH3 also used the example of her won case to reject the accusation that the CI teachers are brainwashed by the Chinese government: “I was locally hired by the host institution as a fulltime staff and has never been brainwashed by the Chinese government. I went through a rigorous recruitment process. We also have locally hired office administrators and language instructors” (Appendix 10).

Some noticeable adjustments have been made by Hanban as a response to the changing dynamics in this terrain; one interesting change of tone is about the CI’s function in increasing China’s soft power. In 2007, Xu Lin proudly claimed that CI is the “brightest brand for China’s soft power”, which was made the title line in the Xinhua report, but by 2010, she emphasized that CIs “are not projecting soft power, nor aim to impose Chinese values or Chinese culture on other countries…… just hopes to be truly
understood by the rest of the world” (cited in Yang, 2010:243). Also, recognising that this current terrain is not a level playing field, and that very few of the partner institutes are from the Ivy League Colleges in the US or state-run universities in Japan (Ren, 2010), Hanban made a series of moves in order to enlist more prestigious universities, dispel their apprehensions and prevent further closing downs. For example, not insisting that universities adopt a policy that Taiwan is part of China, and deleting the reference to Falun Gong participation in its recruiting criteria after it led to the closure of the CI at McMaster University in 2012, which has caused very negative media reports. Video materials on the CI Online platform about ‘the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea’ were also deleted after being criticised and labelled as ‘Anti-US propaganda’ (Robertson, 2012).

However, these changes did not receive all positive responses. Both the actions taken by the counter-hegemonic side and the reactions received from the hegemonic side were subject to interpretations that can be poles apart from both sides: from the Chinese side, it can be interpreted negatively as they mean China gave in to the Western hegemonic influence, or as positive learning experience of making cultural diplomacy more subtle; from the hegemonic side, they could be considered as a positive sign of China conforming to the Western standard; or they could be negatively labelled as measures of expediency to exchange for long-term gains. As professor Nylan of Chinese history at the University of California at Berkeley hinted, compromising does not necessarily mean that Hanban has abandoned its political mission, only that they have become subtler about it (Mosher, 2012).

Whichever interpretation is correct, these responsive actions taken by Hanban close the first loop line of interaction from the government level feeding back to the government level. It is not such a straightforward picture in practice though, with vertical interactions mixed with horizontal ones, and more delicate interplays taking place at every sub level. Vertically, the topography of this ‘terrain of struggle’ is characterised by the hegemonic side maintaining the superior position and dominating the academia as the source of legitimate knowledge, with Western media occupying the moral high ground through power of discourse; on the other hand, the Chinese government hierarchy is also exerting top-to-down influence over the CIs and the Chinese media; whilst horizontally, there are cultural encounters across different types of cultural boundaries, and constant struggles for cultural influence between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic sides in this terrain. These interwoven interactions are three-dimensional and conflict-ridden. The next section will examine another snapshot at sublevel with a view to adding more nuances to this picture.
3.5.2 Snapshot 2: Hanban → home institution of the CI → host institution of the CI → Hanban

The Confucius Institute is born out of a triangular partnership: Hanban, home institution and host institution. Hanban provides funding through budget control, it convenes the annual assembly, examines the CI reports, and organises training for both Chinese directors and tutors from the home institutions before their departure, and also pays for directors from the host institutions to fly to China for the annual assembly and training programmes. From each of these remits, Hanban can exercise control as authority: they decide on whether to approve the budget or not; who needs to be trained on what and by whom; and censor the news release on their official website. At the CI level, the host side supplies the position of Director, and Chinese side is the Co-Director, revealing a triangular and vertical structure among Hanban, host institution and home institution.

Sometimes, the embassy also participates as a fourth party, as explained by MOD and UKD1. The staff working at the Education Section of the Embassy or Consulate are seconded from the Ministry of Education, so they belong to the same 'system' as Hanban, and their supportive, monitoring, and supervisory role is considered as their competent 'line of business'. On the other hand, the CI also needs the support from the embassies, including some resources provided by them; they would always be invited to important CI events, and the annual report submitted to Hanban was also copied to them.

However, concerning the accusation of government involvement, a common theme from my interviews shows that this accusation is not justified: all the UKDs and SKDs interviewed denied Hanban ever said NO to their activities. It is just that the budget will usually not be fully approved:

More or less, it’s half-half: half of the activity budgets will be approved. But usually we would still carry them out even if we did not get Hanban's funding, we just make the scale smaller, in other words, for things listed on our plan, we'll make sure they happen, but the scale depends on if we can get Hanban’s funding to make it big or not” (UKD1, Appendix 10).

There are also cases that due to the tedious procedure of approving the budget, the planned activity was already completed before Hanban replied with the green light or red light (UKD1). In addition, UKD 2 commented:

I think CI is trying to play down its government involvement, CI has become part of the school at the host institution, subordinate to the council whose members are
from both partner universities; Hanban does not play a part in CI’s day-to-day management, and the finance is managed by the host institution, we do not have our own ‘little coffers’ (hidden reserve) (Appendix 10).

However, he did give an example concerning Hanban’s censorship of information released on its website, it is about one original CI report on a guest lecture which in content was favourable to China, but since the topic itself contained a derogatory term, even if it was disputed in the lecture, the whole entry was deleted, as Hanban has zero tolerance for discord – every word showing on the official website must be 100% positive.

It is important to note that there are many examples about some proposed topics for lectures and conferences not approved by the CIs themselves as a practice of self-censorship discussed in 3.5.1, such as a conference on China’s Human Rights. There are also a few cases of CI closures due to such disapproval from Hanban. These will be looked at in more details in section 4.3.2 of Chapter Four.

For the CIs based in a host country with a hard cultural boundary with China, the relationship with host institutions could pose more problems. Many such problems are due to general cultural differences or different ways of doing things, such as the decision-making process, notice time, efficiency and procedure. Occasional cultural frictions would also occur between Hanban and the host institution; for example, on the global venture of having a China Day in Sep 2014 to celebrate the CI’s tenth anniversary, UKD3 commented quite candidly:

I think it’s a terrible mistake, it hasn’t taken into account the different cultures in different countries, and different cultures of different kinds of universities. In the UK, it’s way too early to organize such a big event in mid-September. The timing is quite wrong, most students would only arrive on campus for induction, the last thing they want to participate in is a China Day. It’s also on a Friday, a holy day for Muslims, any Muslims in the country wouldn’t be here. This is the kind of drawback. I think Hanban needs to recognize that we all have the same objectives, and follow the same kinds of plans, we recognise their leadership, we recognise the importance of all working towards the same goals, but we should also recognise cultural differences around the world, in exactly the same way we want people around the world to recognise Chinese culture. It is a two-way process, we need people in Britain to recognise other cultures, and we also need the Chinese authority to recognise there are different cultures” (Appendix 10).

This is an extremely important message for Hanban to listen to, as it is not from the media but from the CI Director, who made the application to have a CI set up in the first place, and run it on a daily basis to help accomplish the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy. If they also think some practice runs counter to exactly what cultural diplomacy is about - promoting ‘mutual understanding’ of ‘cultural diversity’, they would lose faith in the CI. When such opinions were fed back to Hanban, it was handled in the
Chinese way: listen to the majority’s voice, but UKD3 argued that:

Democracy doesn’t always work. In the discussion of that example of CI Day, there were probably four people in the room who felt exactly the same way, other people from other countries are all right because they have a different timetable. In a way, it looks like most people are happy, we are the minority, just a small number of awkward British people, but that’s because our culture is different, it is not about what the majority want, it is about how to make it work in individual areas” (Appendix 10).

As a pro-China scholar himself, what UKD3 suggests is exactly what the CI claims to be trying to promote: ‘harmony through diversity’; however, its centralised and unified approach defies its own goal. Hanban needs to become a better listener in these communications, and adopts a more responsive method to suit the local culture.

Another source of friction is the tutors provided by Hanban. There are some hiccups according to UKD3:

Hanban reserves the right to select the tutors, no British university would ever make an appointment. There is a potential clash as the university demands that it makes its own appointment. At the moment, this hasn’t become a conflict, but we know it is there lurking when the appointment is made (Appendix 10).

In other CIs, however, this kind of frictions have already been escalated to conflicts. If we look at the few CIs that have decided not to renew their agreements with Hanban, we can see that they all, in one way or the other, have to do with this arrangement of having Hanban select and train teachers before sending them over to the CIs, which invites the suspicion of compromising academic freedom on campus. Host institutions were asked “why risk the reputation for academic freedom and integrity by subcontracting teaching and research from a Chinese government that has repeatedly shown itself to be inimical to these values?” Some host institutions were criticised that accepting such appointments is to “ignore or dismiss the unsavoury political aspects of Confucius Institutes so long as they get a good deal” (cited in Sahlins, 2015: 62). These questionings are obviously from the China scholars holding onto their hegemonic positions and moral high ground, but Hanban and the CI need to have counter-measures in place, as these scholars are using their power of discourse at the knowledge centre to influence the general public in the host country.

For example, to address the three common concerns shared by the CI closures so far, namely recruitment and control of academic staff; choice of curriculum and texts; and restriction of debate, the following adjustments were already made by Hanban:
1) In 2009, Hanban established ‘Confucius Institute Scholarships’ to recruit overseas students on the MA course of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages in China, followed by scholarships granted to CIs all over the world in 2010 to train locally hired Chinese teachers.

In April 2013, a Hanban directive was distributed regarding jointly setting up positions of CI head teachers who are locally hired by the host institution but paid by Hanban fund. In other words, Hanban is paying for the salary of CI head teachers who are appointed by the host institution following their own recruitment procedures, as long as the host institution grants the position a formal employment contract and “pledges to maintain this position over the long-term” (Appendix 11). By the end of 2014, thirty positions of CI head teachers had been established according to Hanban’s Annual Development Report.

These measures were a response to feedback from the frontline and can kill two birds with one stone: while relieving the pressure of teacher supply from the home institutions, and the worries of reduced academic discourse in the host institution, it will offer students equal access to different voices on the debatable questions, and help improve the ‘quality and expertise’, which will be discussed in more details in 4.2.2 of Chapter Four.

2) Increased international cooperation in developing Chinese language teaching materials with Cambridge University Press, Mandarin Matrix Press, and Espaces et Signes Press of France, etc. was reported in the CI’s Annual Development Report 2014.

3) In the Eight-Year CI Development Plan 2012-2020 (Appendix 2), “to formulate rules regarding the exit mechanism of CIs” was already listed under the first ‘Major Task’.

If the first two are responsive measures, the third one is very pro-active and forward-thinking, as it was proposed in 2012, before any of the CI closures took place.

Another common cause of conflict has to do with access to funds. Hanban allocates the operating fund to the host institution/school account, and the host institution is supposed to match the funding, but it is mostly provided in kind, such as campus facilities and office space, as well as administrative and accounting services. When the CI needs to use cash payment for events and activities or procurement, even if they are using the ear-
marked fund that they are fully and solely eligible to use, they have to get approval from the host institution/school authority, which may delay the process for various reasons. If the CI Director happens to be the Dean or Head of School, it may help speed up the process, but such delays often constitute the most frustrating part of the CI’s relationship with the host institution, because these delays are not just bureaucratic traits, in some cases they even breed power struggle.

In contrast, along the other line of interaction between the CI and the home institution, all interviewees felt the relationship was relatively trouble-free, as all home institutions have a special CI Office designated to communication with Hanban and with the host institutions abroad. However, according to SKD1, “once the directors/teachers are expatriated, the home institution pay little attention to what’s going on out there, they just pay ‘ear service’ to the annual report once the CI is set up”, echoing the earlier statement that having a CI set up and running is considered as ‘mission accomplished’ by some home institutions, so “as long as you don’t bother them, they won’t bother you much. But if you need support from then, usually they are very supportive” (UKD4). Such unconditional support comes from the fact that the CI and the home institution are on the same counter-hegemonic side in this terrain.

However, the line of interaction becomes much more complex when we look at the triangular partnership as a whole. If we can use the metaphor of intercultural marriage for CI’s partnership between a Chinese home institution and an overseas host institution, we can see it experiences common problems faced by such relationships: cultural differences reflected in decision-making on a daily basis, trivial or major, could potentially lead to power struggles and conflicts. In a traditional Chinese family hierarchy, the mother-in-law is a very powerful figure to whom the young married couple should show reverence if not obedience, while Hanban’s role is like a ‘rich mother-in-law’ who provides for the new couple generously to build a new life. In a way, along this line of interactions, it is very much like family issues: there is always drama going on and no easy way to judge who is in the right, who is in the wrong. The intercultural marriage only exaggerates the complexity, as the ‘Chinese husband’ looks up to his mother and expects the ‘foreign wife’ also to show obedience to her ‘mother-in-law’, which is not always compatible with her native culture, plus the rich ‘mother-in-law’ can only speak Chinese. Even if the ‘foreign wife’ is learning the Chinese language, she may find it hard to communicate with her ‘mother-in-law’ in the Chinese way.

The positive side is that the ‘mother-in-law’ does not live with them and tries to give them autonomy to make their daily decisions, and the young couple tries really hard to balance
both sides’ interests as they have a common wish to live happily ever after. However, a few such marriages have ended in a divorce so far. These will be looked into in sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Chapter Four. A quick example that can be cited here is Pennsylvania State University, whose Dean Susan Welch confirmed in a written statement on their university website that over the past five years: “we worked collegially with our partners at the Dalian University of Technology. However, several of our goals are not consistent with those of the Hanban, which provides support to CIs throughout the world” (cited in Redden, 2014b: n.p.). They are quite clear in putting the blame on Hanban while stressing the good partnership with the home institution. When asked to elaborate on the specific ways in which the goals differ, a professor in the Asian Studies department and a former Penn State CI Director said via email:

I will say that in my experience as CI director one of the major frustrations with the relationship was that we consistently had more ambitious ideas for the ways CI funding could be used -- mainly to support research not only in the humanities or on Chinese culture, but also on science, politics, the environment, and a variety of other topics -- that the Hanban regularly rejected as too far outside the official CI remit (which they would tell us was mainly ‘cultural’)”. Meanwhile, "A lot of what the Hanban wanted us to do didn’t make sense given our institution, faculty population, and student population…Had they been flexible, it would have helped Confucius Institute succeed here (cited in Jacobs & Yu, 2014:n.p.).

To summarise all these interactions, one thing that needs to be emphasised is its dynamic and responsive nature - every interaction could be both a cause and an effect of a change, just as Foucault put it (1982:789): “when faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of response, reactions, results and possible inventions may open up”. Therefore, they should not be examined in isolation but studied in an integrated manner. The complexity of the interactions between the elements of the ‘triangle’ was further complicated by the relationship between government and university that is completely different in nature cross the two sides: universities hold strong power of discourse as independent constituents of academia in many host countries, while in China, they’re subject to the leadership of the MOE and the ideological control exercised by the Party State.

3.6 Conclusion

Unlike the usual approach to examining how China is crafting its soft power by engaging in cultural diplomacy, this chapter presented and discussed the research findings by applying the alternative analytical framework in charting the ‘terrain of struggle’ that China’s cultural diplomacy is launched into. It has developed an argument that this is an uneven terrain both in terms of unbalanced powers with hidden barriers for the
counter-hegemonic side, and also a hierarchical one influencing the interactions between many players. This perspective has allowed us to gain a three-dimensional view over the massive amount of data collected.

This chapter has first framed the broader context of the terrain in which the CI has placed itself, and presented the various actors on the different sides, holding different positions, and playing different roles in this ‘struggle’. The complexity of the interplays among all stakeholders is also unpacked by mapping out two snapshots, using primary and secondary data as evidence to support the theoretical discussions.

Both culture and ideology help draw the line between the two sides of hegemony and counter-hegemony in this terrain. Compared with the line of ‘cultural superiority and inferiority’ carved by Orientalism, more antagonist camps of ‘friends or enemies’ were created by Communism, and China’s attempt at gaining more power of discourse was often accused of ‘ideological infiltration’ by the hegemonic side. Therefore, in terms of the ideological context, Communism appeared to be the biggest stumbling block behind the CI’s setbacks in some Western countries. Actually, it appeared to be the lens China was envisioned, supporting the finding from the Literature Review that ideology is the new form of ‘otherness’: Communism was thought to be the other end of binary oppositions to freedom and democracy, which has further resulted in China being imagined as the ‘opposing force’ in the ‘terrain of struggle’, and anti-Communism lies at the very heart of many of the speculations and criticisms against the CI.

Promoting cultural pluralism, thus contributing to the construction of a harmonious world, is the rhetorical goal of China’s cultural diplomacy set by the highest level of Chinese government, but it does not seem to lend enough power to the ongoing battle of ‘isms’ taking place in the current contested terrain, the drive to this claimed goal was disrupted in the interactions between players from different sides and various levels in this terrain, with some rigid Hanban practice even showing signs of running against the defined goal of its cultural diplomacy.

The next chapter will engage in an analytical comparison between the CI and its Western counterparts. It will continue to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ to reveal the hidden barriers existing in this terrain. Once these barriers are exposed, they would shed lights on the most fundamental differences in the terrain conditions for the CI and its Western counterparts apart from just having different operating models. It will also look at what factors in the terrain would drive some of the CI partnerships to an end.
Chapter Four  
So Similar, So Different, So Chinese -  
Analytical Comparisons of the Confucius Institute  
with its Western Counterparts

4.0 Introduction

As a ‘latecomer’ to cultural diplomacy, Hanban did not try to hide its intention to copy the successes of ‘forerunners’. It is made clear on its own website that “benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain's experience in promoting their national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions with an aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these were given the name of Confucius Institute” (Hanban website). Therefore, it is a self-identification that the CI is seen as the Chinese version of the UK's British Council, France's Alliance Française, Germany's Goethe Institute, and Spain's Cervantes Institute. Although it is incomparable with the Alliance Française in terms of history and scope - over 130 years and 800 establishments (Alliance Française website), or the British Council in terms of impact - it administers 1.5 million examinations each year (British Council website), comparisons are frequently made between the CI and these organizations in both media and academic literature. This Chapter however, will try to show how a different picture can be revealed by adopting the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ and the theoretical frameworks of Orientalism, culture hegemony and knowledge-power nexus to engage in analytical comparisons. It will also go a step further in revealing the ‘differences in similarities’ and ‘similarities in differences’, as well as the reasons behind them. It will unfold the comparisons in the same layers as discussed in the Literature Review: their purposes, operating models and provisions.

4.1 Purposes

4.1.1 Similarities and differences

If we look at the British Council, Alliance Française, Goethe Institute, and Cervantes Institute, it is easy to see that all these countries engaged in public diplomacy are trying to achieve a similar goal, namely to improve their international status and the position of their culture in the global multicultural spectrum through the promotion of their languages. For example, on its official website, the British Council says:

The British Council creates international opportunities for the people of the UK
and other countries, and builds trust between them worldwide. We call this cultural relations. … Our work in English aims to bring high quality language materials to every learner and teacher who wants them. … We encourage international students to come and study in the UK, and British students to experience life abroad.

There is a clear two-way engagement that reflects very well the definition of cultural diplomacy discussed in the Literature Review: “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspect of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”. The word “want” also shows its superior position in the cultural terrain as “demand” could be driven by practical needs, while “want” is driven by voluntary desire.

Similarly, the Goethe Institute states the following on its website:

The Goethe-Institute is the cultural institute of the Federal Republic of Germany with a global reach. We promote knowledge of the German language abroad and foster international cultural cooperation. We convey a comprehensive image of Germany by providing information about cultural, social and political life in our nation. Our cultural and educational programmes encourage intercultural dialogue and enable cultural involvement.

Alliances Française’s website states:

All Alliances Françaises work towards three essential tasks:

- Offering French classes for all, both in France and abroad
- Spreading awareness of French and Francophone culture
- Promoting cultural diversity

Cervantes Institute uses the slogan of “Spanish, a language for dialogue” to highlight the interactive nature, followed by one-line introduction on its website:

The Instituto Cervantes was established by Spain in 1991 to promote and teach Spanish and to spread the culture of Spain and Spanish speaking countries.

They all suggest learning the language is only the means to the end of appreciating cultural diversity. Actually, at the founding of the British Council in 1935, the Prince of Wales clarified that:

We are aiming at something more profound than just a smattering of our tongue. Our object is to assist the largest number possible to appreciate fully the glories of our literature, our contribution to the arts and sciences, and our pre-eminent contribution to the political practice. This can best be achieved by promoting the study of our language abroad (cited in Pennycook, 2013: 147).
Similarly, China with its Confucius Institute is just no exception here:

As China's economy and exchanges with the world have seen rapid growth, there has also been a sharp increase in the world's demands for Chinese learning. (Hanban website)

Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multiculturalism, and to construct a harmonious world. (the CI Constitution)

As non-English-speaking countries, France, Germany and Spain have all used the wording "(to) promote" their languages and "spread" the culture, while the CI did use "promote" in explaining that this is to learn from its western counterparts, but in the formal document of its Constitution and By-Laws, it was carefully worded as offering the service to "satisfy the demands" and "enhance understanding". These deliberations reveal at least two differences in the similarity of the purposes:

1) To "satisfy the demands": instead of actively "promoting" its language, or "spreading" its culture, the CI puts itself in the position of "responding" to the growing demand for learning the Chinese language, "the unprecedented China fever" and "Chinese language fever" (Hanban website), which is encouraged by the economic rise of China.

2) To "enhance understanding": this indicates there is insufficient understanding of the Chinese language and culture at the moment, or rather, even some distorted understandings as discussed in Chapters One and Three, setting a different priority for the CI in comparison to its Western counterparts.

These differences show a mixture of 'pride and prejudice':

1) In the domestic context, there is a dose of national 'pride' because of the recent rise of China: the "rapid growth" of the economy and the "sharp increase" in the demand for learning Chinese not only justifies what the CIs are trying to do, but signifies the growing influence of China, which is articulated and communicated through the new leadership vision of the 'China Dream of national rejuvenation' to the domestic audience. While constructing domestic legitimacy, it is a proud task to be called on to "satisfy the demands".

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2) In the international context however, there is a need to counter the existing ‘prejudice’, or misconceptions that discursively defined China outside its borders. To “enhance understanding” is therefore a proactive task the CI sets itself with the hope of also constructing global legitimacy. As one scholar noted, “the founding of the CI is, by and large, an image management project…..to promote the greatness of Chinese culture while counterattacking public opinion that maintains the China threat” (Guo, 2008:36).

The above analysis shows that the different wording of the CI’s purpose actually reflects its different position in this terrain of struggle, which can help further explain the next question: why, unlike its Western counterparts, the CI’s intentions were often questioned with suspicions of cultural invasion or ideological infiltration, particularly by some academics and media in North America and Europe?

4.1.2 Why is the CI’s purpose perceived differently?

This question was also asked by a China Daily article in 2010: “perhaps no one will call Goethe Institute, Alliance Franchises or Cervantes Institutes propaganda vehicles or tools of cultural invasion. So why all the fuss over China’s Confucius Institute, which share the same goals?” (Chang, 2010). Disappointingly, the article did not really answer, or even attempt to answer this question; instead, it just gave its own answer to explain the title: ‘No need to fuss over Confucius Institute’. This thesis argues that an answer can be found through the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’, which reveals the biggest difference between the CI and its Western counterparts: it is the same competition, but not a level playing field and they occupy completely different positions in this terrain of struggle dominated by Western cultural hegemony.

As discussed in the Literature Review, the above question must be studied in its international context, where Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, Foucault’s theory of power relations and Said’s critique of Orientalism can be employed as the analytical frameworks. Section 3.1 explained that while the counter-hegemonic side will be engaged in ‘a war of position’, the hegemonic side will resist any emerging new forces that could challenge its hegemony. When the CI emerged as a new force in the terrain, it was recognised as such a challenge that needs to be resisted, and some Western countries simply used their power to determine what they think the CI’s goal is, and further, use the power to turn their voices into the truth, just like Foucault has argued
that knowledge impregnated in power is no longer an objective reflection of truth, but is presented and accepted as truth with power in practice.

This is how an Orientalist understanding of China is maintained in a global culture terrain shaped by Western hegemony. When the hegemonic side may perceive China’s rise is at their expenses (Nye, 2005), it is hard for the Chinese appeal of cultural pluralism and harmony to be accepted. The recognition has to start with an understanding of China’s cultural diplomacy not seeking to negate the hegemonic culture, nor to replace it with a new hegemony; rather it wishes to offer an alternative to view cultural interaction as a plus-sum game. With this in mind, I think the contribution the CI can make to achieving this purpose is to start with tipping the balance by letting as many Westerners understand China in Chinese language as the educated Chinese can speak and read in English. It is not rare for programs of China Studies offered in Western countries to be taught in English and by academics or sinologists who cannot speak or read the Chinese language. Only when this change occurs can we begin to lay a foundation for a possible equal dialogue.

However, as argued in Chapters One and Three, the CIs operating in some Western countries can be described in a position of the ‘last three feet’ with the hegemonic side, this means the CIs have to face a lot stronger resistance from the hegemonic side, who controls the power of discourse and tends to highlight the ideological connotations in the concept of culture to justify their resistance. As discussed in the Literature Review, the contents and boundaries of culture as a most elusive term are open to debate, especially concerning its relationship with ideology, but the hegemonic side can again wield its power to disseminate its own version of interpretations and highlight a particular aspect of culture to justify the type of resistance they want to generate.

On the other hand, some Chinese Directors’ comments on the differences between the CI and its Western counterparts may ‘lend hilt’ to the other side, for example, UKD4 said:

> We have to have a firm stand about the ‘five poisons’- Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Falungong and democratic movement, there are principles that we must stick to as government sponsored teachers, this is one of the differences between CI and Goethe Institute and British Council, we are state sponsored, so the minimum we should do is not to harm national interest. This is the bottom line. (Appendix 10)

The above open rhetoric about the CI being state-sponsored and how they would safeguard national interest feed speculations about the CI’s purpose. Hughes (2014: 54) argued that “while the more modern idea of public diplomacy has been very attractive in China in recent years, it is still shaped by the norm of seeing culture as a tool for the
preservation and promotion of the CCP power”. Pan’s research (2013:29) also concluded that “CIs function as agents of the state by relaying knowledge and information regarding China’s language, cultural traditions, way of life and foreign policies, in order to foster international recognition of China as a civilised and harmonious society”. These were seized upon by critics such as Mosher (2012: n.p.) to claim that the seemingly benign purpose of the CI leaves out a number of purposes both salient and sinister, namely “sanitising China’s image abroad, enhancing its soft power globally, and creating a new generation of China watchers who are well-disposed towards the Communist dictatorship”. This is a typical Western hegemonic perspective as it is the wording that describes China’s purpose is ‘sinister’, not necessarily the purpose itself, actually, shaping preferences in attitudes towards a particular country is named as the very goal of public diplomacy by its founding father Gullion (Melissen, 2005). UKD3 commented that: “Chinese intention is not sinister in itself, it is only read as sinister because Chinese is seen as the Other, and therefore different motivations” (Appendix 10).

Besides, the political dimension is not a unique ‘Chinese characteristic’. Belanger (1999:678) argued that “cultural diplomacy has never been apolitical, even if in general, and quite naturally, it claims to be so”; and Taylor (1997:80) put it more blatantly that “cultural diplomacy is very much a political activity designed to serve national interests in an ostensibly cultural guise”. Again, the hegemonic side controls power to leave their own activities under the cultural guise, and only unveils the political intention for CIs as if it only applies to them. This perceived political intention induced more resistance from the hegemonic side who already occupies the vantage points, making the uphill struggle of the CI more arduous.

Therefore, despite the similar missions of these organizations, the actual journey and ‘road conditions’ of getting there are so different that even the similar intention gained a political dimension for the CI. For other organizations who share the same political values, their mission is simply language and cultural promotion that is considered ‘harmless’ and not conflict-ridden, and the hegemonic position they occupy helps to shape this process into a natural flow from high to low, while for the CI, its mission was interpreted as challenging the current culture hegemony by spreading their own ideologies, thus considered as a threat.

However, these fundamental differences that put the CI in an extremely disadvantaged position in the terrain were hidden barriers that are rarely mentioned in the Western
media or academic literature, instead, they tend to seize upon other differences at a more visible level, namely the CI’s operating model and government background.

4.2 Operating Models

The establishment of the CI follows a formal and regular procedure as detailed in 1.5.2. The fact that it begins with an application proposal from a foreign organisation is often used by Hanban as the strongest counter argument for the conspiracy theory: the CIs are invited by their host universities overseas, not imposed on, let alone invaded them. Another important mechanism is that each CI has a Board of Advisors with members of the host university, usually its president and professors as decision makers. The Director from the host university is also taking the leadership role in approving CI plans, whereas the Chinese co-Director is mainly responsible for implementing the plan and communicating with Hanban.

4.2.1 Chinese rationale behind choosing the model

It is true that the CI did not copy its Western counterparts’ model of operation. Instead of being based in city centres, the CI chooses to operate within established universities and institutions, or partner with city councils, providing funds, teachers and educational materials. This is an excellent strategy of “creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society” (Cox, 1983:165). It is a modern day annotation of Gramsci’s term of ‘war of position’, expanding its scope of analysis from domestic politics to international relations. The CI’s operating model can be viewed as a deliberate move in the ‘war of position’ to counter hegemony. From China’s point of view, its rationale can be found in the following three points:

1) The significance of establishing CIs in overseas universities can be revealed in the de facto existence of China as no longer the external ‘Other’, but part of a living matrix of ‘Us’. This is a vitally important move following the knowledge-power nexus: If the discourse in a classroom implicitly either mainstreamise or marginalise certain ideas or values, by being there and telling its own stories, and influencing students with people-to-people contacts, the CI would be able to play its subtle role in enhancing mutual understanding.

This was endorsed by the ethnographic research findings of Hubbert (2014 b: 348), that “the more personal contacts students had with CI teachers, the less China appeared the epitome of an authoritarian state”. Also, since most educated people
in the host countries do not read Chinese, their understanding of China mainly relies on second hand information in English, which is infiltrated with Western hegemonic perspectives and Orientalist representations. In this sense, language learning is the first step in gaining a more balanced understanding of China, which are the two identified mandates of the CI.

2) Secondly, using universities as a vanguard would give cultural diplomacy a more non-official face, and universities can be driven by their own motivations to pursue “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspect of culture” with foreign academic institutions as defined by Cummings (2003). Universities can play the roles of autonomous ‘diplomats’ to aim for a win-win partnership.

3) Moreover, according to the three layers of public diplomacy suggested by Cowan, Geoffrey and Amelia Arsenault (2008:10), the CI model is actually leading the move from ‘Monologue’ to ‘Dialogue’, then further to ‘Collaboration’, which was defined as “initiatives that feature cross-national participation in a joint venture or project with a clearly defined goal”, because “nothing creates a sense of trust and mutual respect as fully as a meaningful collaboration”. Collaboration can be a more effective public diplomacy technique simply because when working together, participants can learn from each other, respect each other by not viewing difference as a barrier but a source of insight and synergy, and they may be able to find a common ground in at least one area of importance to them, which in turn can generate a structure to form more lasting relationships, and generate knowledge and insight that neither had before.

This model was further elaborated by Zaharna (2014: 9) who used the case of the CI to exemplify a “network collaborative approach” with “relational structures and relational dynamics” as its pivotal features, they can help “extend the reach and sustainability of the communication” by “transforming the target audience into stakeholders”. This “stakeholder perspective is reinforced through co-created narratives and shared identity as well as shared ownership of the initiative” (Zaharna, 2014: 32). Cowan & Arsenault’s theory (2008) was also endorsed by the Obama Administration in moving the US public diplomacy “from the old paradigm, in which our government speaks as one to many, to a new model of engaging interactively and collaboratively across lines that might otherwise divide us from people around the world” (cited in Dale, 2009: n.p.).
The rationale seems to make sense in theory, and according to my interview findings, the model appeared to be working in practice as well. The question of ‘advantages and disadvantages and why the CI chooses to be based in overseas universities’ has surprisingly generated only positive answers, which provided useful evidence in the field to support the merits of the collaborative approach on the one hand, but also needs to be treated with caution on the other hand as a potential ‘selection-on-the-independent-variable’ bias, as all the interviewees are working for or with the CI, while those who oppose this mode may not have chosen to work in the CI in the first place.

A long list of advantages were mentioned for this model, for example, both the MOD and MXD mentioned the “the speed and scope the CI has managed to achieve so far, it is very efficient”. What is more important than efficiency is the sustainability pointed out by UKD2: “Hanban is very smart in creating this model, it utilises the good platform provided by British universities to build creditability and trustworthiness. It also helps with long term development” (Appendix 10).

This echoes Zaharna’s (2014) argument that the collaborative approach helps with sustainability by transforming the host university into stakeholders, which also include local community as pointed by UKD3 who illustrated this point with an example:

It requires the local community to make a positive commitment, a partnership with a university or local school gives you a partner who has already made that first step, they are more likely to act as the bridge… If we were based in city centre, we could encourage local universities to offer a Chinese degree course, but why would they want to listen to us? I doubt it would have any influence on our curriculum at all. I cannot believe they would have been able to persuade the Pro Vice Chancellor and colleagues to include Chinese as part of our degree to improve student experience, and build Chinese studies into the research, while because CI is part of the university, we now have achieved this (Appendix 10).

An extra bonus of having these local stakeholders on board is to gain ‘credibility’ as commented by UKLH2: “it gives public more faith in your product, to see it based on a university”; the point was also supported by the example given by UKSC2: “It helps with identity building and recognition, for example, when we run a event and CI’s brand is new to the local community, the university logo which also appears on the banner or stand would help establish trust and status”. The merit of ‘learning from each other’ argued by Cowan & Arsenault’s (2008) was also endorsed by one SKD4: “Having a host university means more solid support, it facilitates mutual learning and cooperation between Chinese and overseas universities” (Appendix 10).

Perhaps the most hidden but potentially biggest benefit for China from this model was
revealed by UKD1: “Hanban can assemble hundreds of university presidents/vice chancellors from all over the world to Beijing every year to listen to them, if the effects are not to ‘brain wash’ them, at least to tame them not to ‘sing an opposite tune’” (Appendix 10). This annual conference also invites a wide spectrum of ‘honourable delegates’, from officials to academia, from media to business, and senior advisors/consultants of various cultural organizations such as the British Council, Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute. They represent the elite groups that cultural diplomacy targets, and the CI’s model has created a multilevel face-to-face engagement, leveraging the knowledge and power equation. Therefore, both theory and practice seem to suggest that this model is a smart strategy in the ‘war of position’.

However, everything changes colour through the tinted glasses of ideology, even the right form of collaboration does not look right for China. Of course, it is fair to argue that although collaboration has the potential to engender such positive relationships, not all collaborations managed to realise this potential. When placed in this ‘terrain of struggle’, this model is again perceived differently by the other side, its potential constraints, both endogenous and exogenous, came to the fore during interactions with the hegemonic side. By **endogenous** constraints, I mean factors from within the CI structure, while the **exogenous** constraints are caused by factors outside the structure. The next section will first look at the endogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model.

### 4.2.2 Endogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model

Compared to Alliance Française’s identity as being “a private higher education establishment” and “a local not-for-profit organisation operating autonomously with no political or religious commitments” (Alliance Française website), the CI does not claim to be independent from the government, actually, it has a double identity as pointed out by Kahn-Ackermann (2014): its headquarters Hanban is a government organization while the CI exists as a local organization overseas as part of the host university. This double identity can also be reflected in the three forms of cultural diplomacy prescribed by the Berlin-based Institute of Cultural Diplomacy (cited in Pan, 2013:24):

1. **State-sponsored cultural diplomacy**, which is often used by governments for distinct political purposes;

2. **Independent or semi-independent cultural diplomacy institutions**, such as the British Council and the Goethe Institute, which take an informative and exchange-based approach to the promotion of national culture; and
(3) potential cultural diplomacy channelled by academic institutions or individual artists, academics or professionals involved in academic exchanges and cooperation.

The CI actually falls into form one and three at the same time. These two irreconcilable identities have led to a “clash of missions” according to Hughes (2014), who used the same example of using university logo as mentioned by UKLH2 and UKLC2 earlier:

There is a big difference between organising a conference with a Chinese university or working with academic colleagues from China on the one hand, and allowing an institution that has the mission of promoting the values and interests of the CCP to have a long-term base on campus and to share in the prestige of the university by having a page on its website and use of its logo, on the other. (Hughes, 2014: 57)

This clash of missions has raised a series of concerns over finance, academic freedom, as well as ideological concerns about improper influence over teaching and research. The most sensational way to describe this double identity is the "Trojan horse" with ulterior motives dubbed by Mosher (2012). Despite Xu Lin’s direct confrontation with this accusation in a *China Daily* article (Qu, 2012), saying that “CIs are definitely not Trojan Horses, since we are holding no weapons in our hands”, Mosher (2012, n.p.) perceived this difference as so vital that it invalidates the whole comparison of the CI to its Western counterparts:

Unlike Alliance Francaise, the Confucius Institutes are not independent from their government; unlike the Goethe Institute establishments, they do not occupy their own premises. Instead, participating universities agree to provide office space in exchange for funding, and to cede academic control to the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

Jocelyn Chey (2008:42), a former diplomat and expert in Australia-China relations, also disagreed with the view of the CI as a counterpart to the Goethe Institute or Alliance Française, as the close links between the institute and the Chinese Communist Party "could lead at best to a 'dumbing down' of research and at worst could produce propaganda".

As explained in Chapter Two, all interviewees participating in this research, except Mr. Anders of the Goethe Institute in Beijing, work at the CIs, and it is interesting to note that none of them viewed the CI’s government background as a drawback, but more of an advantage to make its quick expansion possible. However, the ‘quick expansion’ per se was seen as leading to fears of China as a threat when the word “alarming speed” (Dale, 2014) was used by the Western media.
CI’s double identity could explain why some of the advantages in the Chinese eyes would turn into disadvantages in the critics’ eyes, such as its location at the “centre of knowledge dissemination”. UKSC2 mentioned this as an advantage: “It stands at the centre of knowledge dissemination, to have access to students and faculty, it is better targeted as university students are elite groups and backbone of the country” (Appendix 10). However, this was perceived as a potential constraint that can lead to worries of reduced academic freedom and ideological infiltration as well as procedure issues as the CI teachers are not appointed by the host universities. As pointed out by UKD3:

In universities that uphold academic freedom, this could pose ‘potential concerns’ or ‘occasional cultural frictions”, as “what we’re looking at is a conflict between the structure of the large organization of CI on overseas campus and its goals of seeking to achieve and promote a favourable picture of China. (Appendix 10)

These ‘potential concerns’ that ‘could’ be caused were often turned into judgmental assumptions by those who shut the doors to the CI. What we can see here is an important line of difference between the discussions of ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’ of the CI model: all the advantages were raised by the interviewees with facts of what has happened, such as the rapid expansion of the CI, while the disadvantages are mostly potential constraints that were supported by little evidence but speculations or worries that things may happen if we had a CI.

Interestingly, with regards to the negative aspect of the CI model, although all the 25 interviewees pondered over it, there is only one answer provided by the MXD, and in comparison with the GI: “CIs could be very uneven in quality, unlike the Goethe Institute that has a standard, the CI is restrained in its ability to follow the Goethe Institute model, both in terms of getting approval and registration overseas and in management expertise” (Appendix 10).

Kahn-Ackermann (2014), the first Director of the Goethe Institute (GI) in Beijing and currently advisor to Hanban, shed more light on this difference in quality and expertise in one of the talks he gave in comparing the CI with the GI: the Headquarters of the GI guides and supervises all the GIs worldwide to maintain the standard, while Hanban only provides funding and teachers to each CI, which is a local organisation in its legal status and management. The other difference is the GI trains and develops its own staff, the position of the GI Director could be a lifetime career, while the CI does not have ‘its own people’ on its premise: both the Chinese director and teachers are seconded on a short-term basis and some do not even speak the language of the host country. They are not trained adequately to conduct intercultural communications, let alone become
an expert in this profession that requires a lot of knowledge, skill and experience.

The defect in its quality assurance mechanism was also recognised by Hanban itself. The CI’s quick proliferation in the past ten years only adds to the difficulty of ensuring high-quality instruction. Actually at home university level, the supply of full-time professional teachers for secondee positions is a real challenge, many home institutions lack understanding of the needs of their foreign partners and local conditions, and also lack expertise of teaching Chinese as a second language according to Li (2008). The high turnover rate of the CI tutors (two-year contract based) makes it harder to maintain standard and continuity of teaching, or to expect long-term commitment and initiative from the teachers. As a new measure to tackle this problem, Hanban has modified the contract to three years as from September 2013. While it may help relieve the concern of teaching continuation and student experience overseas, it may make things even harder at home for Chinese universities to find enough willing and qualified candidates, especially for countries that are not considered as attractive destinations in many parts of the world. Many of the interviewees have mentioned the ‘sacrifices’ they have to make for such overseas postings: interrupted career ladder, family separation and children’s education are the three major restraining factors. Even for attractive destinations like the UK, most of the UKSCs interviewed still complained about delayed promotions, and difficulties in getting visas for their children to join them and study in the UK. The challenge is much more salient for CIs in Africa. For example, after two years’ service, the MRD’s conclusion is:

I don’t think the government should try very hard to establish CIs in remote and poor parts of Africa, as the conditions are too harsh for the teachers, it is difficult to send people there, no quality staff means no quality provision, and therefore no impact produced, it would be a waste of money and effort. The teachers have to sacrifice a lot, both in term of their personal life and health, while the impact it can produce is very limited, it’s just not worth it (Appendix 10).

This was supported by Hartig’s (2014:57) research focusing on CIs in Africa, which identified “lack of skilled teachers who are willing to go to Africa” as “one of the most crucial issues”. The Chinese Ministry of Education estimated that 100 million people outside China would be learning Chinese by 2010 (Peters & Zhang, 2011), and the gap of teacher shortage worldwide was five million in 2014 according to Chen & Yu (2016), which means many CIs have to use MA students or high school teachers as volunteers. Actually, all the three SCs I interviewed in South Korea fall into this category. Though eligibility for becoming a volunteer has raised the bar from “any applicant with a HE diploma, including retired Chinese subject teachers from university, secondary and primaries schools”, to “post-graduate students and in-service teachers who hold a
degree in the areas of teaching Chinese as a second language, Chinese literature, foreign languages, education, history and philosophy” (hanban website), it still raised concerns about teaching quality, especially when qualified locally hired teachers were turned away because of the free staffing from Hanban. When locally hired teachers from Taiwan were fired to make place for Hanban sponsored less experienced teachers, outrage and protests followed, giving it a political overtone.

The other potential problem pointed by Kahn-Ackermann (2014) is the double-edged nature of being engaged in a cross-cultural collaboration: the two CI directors from the host and home universities have to work together collegially. It sounds wonderful when both sides are in harmony, but in reality, all kinds of misunderstandings, disagreements and even conflicts could arise in this process. Many of the examples given in section 3.5.2 of Chapter Three prove such constraints could be real problems in practice.

Another example of the double-edged feature of the CI model is its ‘long-term development’ could be very reliant on the host university as ‘the other half’: the recent incidents of closures have all shown that the CI’s life can come to an end if they lose the support of the host university. For example, when the CI’s function of opening contacts with China was served, it led to the Stockholm University not renewing the agreement as “its usefulness had been outlived”, and actually, even a change of staff at the host university could have a direct bearing on the CI’s fate. For the same example of the Stockholm University, the decision was already once announced in 2008 to remove the CI from its campus due to concerns of undue influence (Fiskesjö, 2015), but the termination was not executed due to strong support and influence from its Director, Professor Torbjörn Lodén, until his retirement in 2014. The other case of the LCI closure also had to do with change of Director, which will be looked at in more details in section 4.3.2.

Actually, this ‘human factor’ was mentioned by all the Directors interviewed as a key factor: a different Director behind the wheel of the same CI could mean taking different directions and paths, as each CI has a clear hallmark of the Director’s personal style, competence and perceptions of China. For example, some Chinese Directors do not speak good English or the language of the host country; and some foreign Directors may not speak a word of Chinese while his/her predecessor/successor could well be an overseas Chinese with acquired citizenship of the host country. This change of Director also has a direct effect on the CI’s day-to-day work, as UKLH4 put it:

At the time when our Director was the Head of School, the CI was in close working
relations with the host school, but since the new Director took over, the CI is on its own tracks with little convergence with the host school, even on Open Days, we have our own stand, kept a distance from the school stand, we also teach different students with no overlapping groups. It seems each side feels that we do not need each other (Appendix 10).

All these exemplified that the double-edged feature means some of the merits could also produce side effects, just as some of the advantages can be perceived as disadvantages by the other side. If these can be understood as endogenous constraints that are results of factors from within the CI structure, the next section will look at the exogenous constraints caused by factors outside the structure.

4.2.3 Exogenous constraints of the CI’s operating model

Though operating as the Cultural and Educational Section of the British Embassy, the British Council claimed itself to be a "stand-alone organization" according to its chief executive Martin Davidson, who believed the CI is “not comparable” because “they are being embedded in university campuses. The real question has to be one of independence. Are we seen as simply representing the views of the government? Or is there a degree of separation?” He went on to query the government funding that comes with it: “I doubt they have to say, ‘we’ll only give you this money if you never criticise China.’ The danger is more of self-censorship — which is a very subtle thing” (cited in Guttenplan, 2012: n.p.).

How can the British Council, who also gets funding from the government and is even based in the embassy, accuse the CI of lacking independence when it is based on a university campus? Was this merely due to its government connection? A distinction must be made here between government connection and affiliation. Hanban does not just get money from the government; it is under the leadership of the government, while the British Council defines itself as "the world’s leading cultural relations organisation" which “focuses on developing people-to-people links and complements government-to-people and government-to-government contact” (British Council website). Its role to ‘complement’ government contact, not to ‘implement’ government aims may represent the ‘degree of separation’ in Davidson’s words. In the GI Director Anders’s words, the GI actually enjoyed ‘autonomy’:

We are a world-wide structure and I’m very happy to have the autonomy. After the WWII, we were very concerned about propaganda, the political instrumentalisation of culture, it was written into the German constitution that arts and culture has to be autonomous, it is not a field of government influence. Therefore, the freedom of art is upheld. We’re getting our money from the
Foreign Ministry, but as an association, not a state organisation. The GI is not affiliated to the ministries or housed inside the embassies, and the GI Director is not part of the diplomatic mission (Appendix 10).

Kahn-Ackermann (2014) actually referred to this as a “small difference” between the CI and GI’s government background, as they both rely on government funding and support, which is of “tremendous help but also a burden”, so both institutes have to walk the same tightropes between the “political and cultural realms”, but I argue the real ‘big difference’ lies at the ‘political realm’, which represents the exogenous constraints of the CI model. According to Li & Dai’s research (2011) on the CI’s International Media Environment, the top three factors contributing to the CI’s negative reports are: Communism, propaganda, and threat/danger. Actually, the three factors are interrelated one another. In Germany, critics and sinologists fear that the influence of the Chinese state on the CI would put “German universities at risk of becoming mouthpieces for the Chinese Communist Party” (Ricking, 2012). Here we can see the ‘equation’ discussed earlier: the Chinese government is equated with the Communist Party, which is a synonym for authoritarian ruling and a threat to democracy, therefore, people who dislike the Chinese political system tend to see state involvement in the CI as ‘dangerous communist propaganda’. In other words, being the ‘ideological other’ is a more salient label, overriding the similarity in government funding with this one big difference that “springs from the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system” (Hartig, 2012: 70).

On the other hand, this speculation is encouraged by the Chinese government presence, which tends to be much more ‘in the limelight’ compared with Western government’s backstage role, a lot of CI’s media exposure is because of a high-profile official visit from the government. Actually, such pictures were often used in negative Western media reports about the CI. For example, a picture of Xi Jinping unveiling a CI plaque in Melbourne in 2010 was used in the 2014 BBC report about the closure of Chicago University CI; and the Telegraph report used the picture of Liu Yandong, Vice Premier and Council Chair of the CI Headquarters, speaking at George Washington University CI in 2013. Xi Jinping’s picture of attending a function at the Stockholm CI in 2010 was also used by South China Morning Post in its 2015 report on Swedish University Severs Ties with Confucius Institute. In comparison, pictures of state leaders are rarely found in the websites of the British Council, Alliance Francaise, Cervantes Institute or Goethe Institute.

When the interview question of ‘how the CI is compared to its Western counterparts’ is asked, “government presence” was blurted out as an answer without hesitation by
SKD4:

Cervantes/Goethe Institute are non-governmental while the CI is governmental, and often takes on a political colour. The CI should be a non-governmental organization for cultural transmission, but it serves a national strategy and the Chinese government has spent a lot of money on it every year, so they have their stand and want to show this through their visits (Appendix 10).

A reading of the Milestones in 2014 in the CI’s Annual Development Report (hanban website) shows 16 high profile official visits to CIs by Chinese top leadership, including six from Xi Jinping himself. These visits seem to make the implicit government connection more explicit. Lo, a political science professor at the University of Waterloo that hosts a CI, called the CI’s controversial activities “unintended consequences of their close alignment with Beijing” (cited in Little, 2010). These “consequences” support the discussion in the Literature Review: the dose of government defining, planning, funding, and leading is one of the ‘ingredients’ that are causing side effects of reducing the cultural appeal while courting fears of ideological infiltration.

If government presence is an overt demonstration of the CI’s the government affiliation, censorship is a covert indication, even if it is not directly about what the CI can do, its existence in the domestic environment could be considered a source of exogenous constraints as well. A recent example was given during my interview with Mr. Anders: a blacklist was published by the Ministry of Culture in August about 120 pop songs that are not allowed to be aired anymore:

This act raised a lot of questions in the Western context and immediately made problems for the CI, as they are the representative of Chinese cultural organisation in the host country, people would ask: what is going on in your country? From this you see a heavily censored country, one must be aware everything happening here (in China) has an influence in the outside world (Appendix 10).

At the same time, the international media environment may represent another source of exogenous constraints for the CI as they did not have much voice heard. Both overt and covert biases can be observed in the international media reports regarding the CI. For example, in Guttenplan’s New York Times article (2012) titled ‘Critics Worry About Influence of Chinese Institutes on U.S. Campuses’, Mosher’s ‘Trojan horse’ accusation and other criticisms were elaborately reported, but they would not point out to readers that the criticisms all come from people who do not work with the CI, and only use their secondary information or so-called ‘knowledge’ to judge it, nor would they show the profile of Mosher as an advocate for human rights in China, using ideological differences
as a sweeping allegation to ignore the CI’s focus on language teaching that does not necessarily has any political aims. The only counter argument came from Mr. Byrne as a CI Director from LSE, who denied there had been any pressure from his Chinese partners to steer clear of any areas. “Our focus is on the language of business and culture. We’re not here to engage with difficult issues”. No views from China were ever represented in this article. Even when China is given a voice in some of the Western media, it tends to be left in a position trying to justify what it does. When media decides on what to write, what not to write, how much to write, who to interview and what questions to be answered, these decisions are loaded with the power of discourse.

So far, the discussions have revealed that despite the number of merits of the CI model, it also comes with both exogenous and endogenous constraints that that set the CI apart from its Western counterparts. As Starr (2009) has summarised, these constraints fall into two categories: ‘insiders’ with practical concerns and ‘outsiders’ with ideological concerns. In this uneven terrain of struggle, advantages and disadvantages are like mirror images. It is important for the CI to understand how and why many of the advantages could potentially be a ‘double-edged sword’ and perceived as disadvantages by the other side, because after all, what matters most is how to make the partnership work. In order to make it work, the CI model has demonstrated a high level of flexibility and responsiveness, which will be discussed in the next section as another aspect of the difference to its Western counterparts.

4.2.4 Flexibility and responsiveness of the CI’s operating model

Compared to its Western counterparts, such as the Goethe Institute, which follows a standard operating model all over the world prescribed by the Headquarters, the CI’s model is given more room for flexibility to fit into the local conditions, and is more responsive to different bargaining powers and capacities of the host universities, as well as emerging challenges. In order to provide more text based evidence to showcase this flexibility and the adjustments made to the CI’s operation over the years, four CI Agreements (see Appendix 7) were collected to trace the changes: two were signed in the UK (April 2008 and 2009); one was signed in the US (July 2013), and one was signed in Poland (September 2014). In order to see the evolving developments throughout the years, these agreements will be referred to by the year they were signed, i.e. the 2008 UK Agreement. Of course, no conclusion can be generalised from comparing these four Agreements, but the feature of flexibility and non-uniformity is evident.
1) The framework remains the same under the title of ‘Agreement Between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and XXX University on the Establishment of Confucius Institute at XXX University’.

2) One addition was made to Article 3 Executive Institution in the 2014 Agreement: “The institute must be launched within one year after this agreement is signed”. This amendment could be a response to the aborted agreement signed with Toronto District School Board in 2012. A similar case was the agreement signed with Stuttgart Media University in August 2014 and was cancelled in 2015.

3) In Article 4 Scope of Activities, there are two notable changes in wording. Firstly, “academic activities” used in the 2008 and 2009 Agreements was replaced by “language and cultural exchange activities” in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements, in line with the changes in the official document of Confucius Institute Constitution discussed in section 3.5.1; secondly, in the agreement signed in 2013, the description of “other activities” was changed from “with authorisation and by appointment of the Headquarter” to “as mutually agreed”, which clearly shows more respect and attention paid to equal partnership.

4) Similarly, in Article 5 Organisation, the wording was changed from “The institute must accept the assessment of the Headquarters on the teaching quality” to “The institute will collaborate with the Headquarters on the assessment of teaching quality”, which again shows more of an equal relationship between the Headquarters and the CI.

5) Article 6 Obligations contains most variations, for example, the start-up fund provided by Hanban varies from 50,000-150,000 US Dollars just among these four Agreements; Some prestigious universities such as the Chicago University received 200,000 US Dollars start up fund, (Sahlins, 2013) and Penn State University was even awarded 1 million US dollar’s grant to create the CI according to its website (http://news.psu.edu/tag/confucius-institute). Other examples of disparity include teacher’s accommodation cost: the 2008 Agreement stated that the Headquarters will pay for the “air fares, accommodations and salaries” for the Chinese instructors sent by them, but no accommodation was included in the 2009, 2013 and 2014 Agreements, and it was specified in the separate Agreement on Provision of Chinese
Language Teachers signed between Hanban and the host university that the host university will “provide accommodation”.

6) The biggest disparity was found in Article 7 Financial Support, which only existed in the 2008 and 2009 Agreement and started with the same statement that “The Confucius Institute will be jointly funded by the XXX University (host University) and the Headquarters”, but not followed by any specific ratio defined for the host university contributions to the operating fund in the 2008 and 2009 Agreements. Then in the 2013 and 2014 Agreement, this part was moved to “The obligations of the host university” in Article 4/6, and the ratio was specified as “should not be less than the amount provided by the Headquarters”, which means a minimum of 1:1 match fund from the host university.

By 2014, as published in the Confucius Institute Annual Development Report, the ratio of Hanban expenditure to those of host institutions stood at 1:1.5. According to SKD4, some CIs operating in Asia (especially in Japan, South Korea and Singapore) simply do not request operating funds from Hanban but only apply for teacher support and other intangible things. This gives the full spectrum of how operating funds are provided, from 1:1 and 1:1.5 matched by the host university, to 100% provided by the host university.

7) Another important change can be identified in Article 10 Term, following the same line of “The agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity”, the older version says “Either party, if it wishes to terminate the Agreement must notify the other in writing during the 90 days before the end of the Agreement, otherwise it will automatically continue thereafter unless and until it is terminated by either party giving to the other not less than 90 days written notice”; in the Agreement of 2013, this wordy sentence was changed to a succinct one: “The Agreement will be subject to renewal only by mutual written agreement of both parties”. This change made the renewal a much more considered and transparent process, clearing worries of a ‘done deal before you know it’.

8) In Article 12 Termination, the older version has only mentioned in such an event that the host university should “make appropriate arrangements for the enrolled students and other workers” while in the Agreement of 2013, it was added that the host university shall “promptly reimburse the Headquarters for any excess funds” advanced by the Headquarters under this Agreement, over and
above non-cancellable commitments and costs incurred” by the host university as of the date of termination. This may mean more financial consequences to consider when termination decisions are made.

It is important to bear this responsiveness in mind when analysing the CIs as there is no standard formula. Similarly, flexibility and non-uniformity are also seen in the next section that will move on to the last aspect of the comparison: its provisions.

4.3 Provisions

According to paragraph 11 of its Constitution and by-laws (2007 version), Confucius Institutes provide the following services overseas: 1) provide Chinese language teaching; 2) train Chinese language instructors and provide Chinese language teaching resources; 3) hold the Chinese proficiency test (HSK) and tests for the certification of Chinese language teachers; 4) provide information and consultative services concerning Chinese language education and China’s culture, economy and society; 5) conduct research on contemporary China (Ren, 2012:12).

It showed a clear focus on language teaching, with the word ‘language’ repeated in the top three services, while culture was only mentioned as an area of its consultative services in point four. Unable to identify since which year the change was made, but at least after 2012, the information on Hanban website was changed into: “4) provide information and consultative services concerning China’s education, culture, and so forth”; and “5) conduct language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries” (hanban website). It is noticeable that “cultural exchange activities” were specified and replaced “research” in the old version. These two aspects of provision will now be compared with the CI’s Western counterparts.

4.3.1 Cultural activities, the ‘what’ and ‘how’

As shown in 4.2.4, despite the centralised input from Hanban and the globalised outreach of the CI, no standard ‘recipe’ can be found for all the CIs. Each CI has its own way of operation, which is allowed if not encouraged, by Hanban, and determined by the specific factors within the home and host institutions. For example, the ratio between language and cultural provision varies from CI to CI, depending a lot on the host institutions: if they are not offering any Chinese language programs, then the CI can add great value in running Chinese modules or even setting up a degree course; if otherwise, then the CI will add value more in the cultural provisions, both for the host university and to the wider
community. Penn State University is the latter case, as one professor of Comparative Literature and Asian Studies explained, since we have a “very robust Chinese-language program”:

We did not use Chinese teachers from Hanban at Penn State, and did not use Hanban pedagogical material, this meant that much of the work the CI could do was restricted to a fairly narrow range of activities within the university - cultural activities and events by visiting Chinese troupes promoted by Hanban for instance, and then some other activities outside the university (support for community events) (cited in Redden, 2014b: n.p.).

Among these cultural activities, the most popular one is ‘China Day’ at schools, with repertoires including calligraphy, Chinese brush painting, food and tea tasting, taiji, shuttlecock, Chinese knot and lantern making, language taster, quiz and lectures, just to name a few. Such cultural activities are often criticised for reducing the diversity of China’s cultures to a “uniform, quaint commodity” characterised by Taiji and Chinese dance performances, it tends to become a “taxidermised” version of Chinese culture, or a product of “culturetainment” as criticized by Lionel Jensen, an associate professor of East Asian Languages at the University of Norte Dame, meaning “the abridgment of Chinese civilisation in the name of digestible forms of cultural appeal can be readily shipped overseas” (cited in Redden, 2012, n.p.). This commodity concept is actually closely related to the CI’s new nickname of ‘spiritual high speed train’: it may go very far very quickly, but the impact it can produce may be short term. This was echoed by UKD1’s comments that “most of these are ‘superficial stuff’”, UKD3 also pointed that

One of the dangers of CI is that it can project a slightly folk culture, like using thatched cottages to represent England, they do exist in a few places, but they are not really what England is about; traditional Chinese dance is important, but it does not really capture the real rich modern range of Chinese culture (Appendix 10).

During the interview, Mr. Anders, Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing, also enunciated that:

The main and obvious difference is our understanding of culture is much broader than those held by the CI concerning cultural activities. Their notion of culture is very traditional, also in a way very repetitive, meaning they are very much focused on calligraphy, Chinese cooking etc. These aspects of life are important, but it would be more successful to open up discussions of contemporary society, to engage with the discourses of the country where they are. The CIs are very close to the academic world, they are easily linked up to the other departments of the University, for example, if they do a symposium on something, such as China’s urbanisation or digitalisation, the CI can bring in somebody from China, this would be a more interesting role to play. (Appendix 10)
On the one hand, these interview findings seem to support Shambaugh’s (2013) observation of China’s cultural ‘footprint’ of being increasingly broad across the globe, but not particularly deep. On the other hand, it shows the dilemma for the CI: since it is based on university campus, it has the stage to play a bigger role, but at the same time, the controversies it has caused suggest it is safer simply repeating those harmless, traditional cultural activities. Therefore, it is up to the individual CI’s position and vision to use the scope available, either in a more trailblazing manner, or a more ‘play it safe’ mode.

The second difference mentioned by Mr. Anders in the interview is the approach:

Our approach is to develop everything we do together with our partners in the respective countries, for example, we work closely with ministries and the academic world in China to promote professionalization of German teacher training, while my observation is that the Chinese approach is very much focused on themselves: talking about the significance of Chinese tradition and culture, emphasizing the difference of the Chinese way, of course, it is right there are differences and that’s why we’re here, to discuss the differences, but we felt the different approach is they want to promote themselves, and we promote the partnership. (Appendix 10)

It is a little ironic being compared this way as the CI model itself is a partnership. Going back to the earlier example of the global China Day Hanban initiated in September 2014, it was considered a bad idea by UKD3 interviewed:

Because of the misunderstandings of China, people need to be persuaded in a more subtle way to take China seriously, they need to watch a good film, a wonderful cultural show, then they feel, Oh gosh, China is good, but having a China Day in town is something like, an unfriendly analogy, having a Jehovah's Witnesses Day, a kind of Day that a set of people with a particular interest, it doesn’t fit into British culture, we don't have other days - we don’t have a Germany Day, or US Day, a China Day is in a way almost reinforces the sense that China is quite a different culture. (Appendix 10)

Nothing is more critical than getting your own partner on board to make the partnership work. Hanban is actually using the Goethe Institute as a consultant, they meet regularly to exchange ideas, the above two points made by Mr. Anders can provide good food for thought for Hanban.

4.3.2 Research, an unique element associated with the CI’s model

A quick comparison between services offered by the CI and its Western counterparts
would show one distinct element that was only offered by the CI: research, which may have to do with its unique model of being based on university campus. Compared with the deletion of “economy and society” from its scope of consultative services in point 4, the complete change of content in point 5 of its mandate is very intriguing, while the explanation for the reasons behind the removal of “research” is nowhere to be found (none of the interviewees was even aware of the change). It may suggest that Hanban wishes to avoid controversial activities that might make the cooperation difficult and lead to some ill-defined relationships, or even closures.

However, despite the removal of the word “research” from the list, the work of research was not entirely called off, in the directive Hanban issued in 2011, it asked each CI to conduct research on Chinese culture and “foster a new generation of sinologists” (cited in Kluver, 2014). Then in November 2012, it launched the new ‘Confucius China Studies Program’ to take on more of a facilitator’s role in channelling research from overseas campus to China. This program is a series of research projects including generous scholarships for ‘PhD in China fellowship’, ‘Young Leaders in China Fellowship’ as well as ‘Understanding China Fellowship’ that serves to support academics from foreign universities to “undertake research with Chinese researchers in China” (Hanban website). This could be considered a clever move of ‘stepping backward is actually moving forward’ in the battle for the power of discourse by inviting foreign scholars to study the ‘Other’ with the ‘Other’ in the ‘Other’s land, also being consistent with the CI’s priority task: “let more foreigners come to experience China first hand” (UKLH3); but it has also attracted scepticism from some critics who interpreted the “new generation of sinologists” as “China watchers who are well-disposed toward the Communist dictatorship” (Mosher, 2012). This view was refuted by UKD2: “but no one would say if you to study in the US with a full scholarship, you’d be polluted and anything you wrote would automatically be in favour of America” (Appendix 10).

However, this new-found form of research sponsored by Hanban, the ‘Confucius China Studies Program’, was still mentioned as a direct reason leading to the closure of the Lyon Confucius Institute (LCI) in September 2013. It was rarely reported until “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes” was published on China File following the AAUP’s report submitted in June 2014. Gregory Lee, Chair of the LCI Board participated in Part II of the debate and explained that since a “new director taking his instructions directly from Beijing arrived in Sep 2012”, he “insisted strongly on a deeper integration of the LCI in the University itself” through participating in teaching of the University degree programs and partnership with the university research centres on the Confucius China Studies Program to send PhD students to study in China (China File, 2014). As
disclosed in a BBC report titled: *Investigation: Behind the Closed Door of LCI*, the Chinese Studies program at Lyon 3 University also offers courses in Min Nan Dialect (spoken in Taiwan) and Taiwan studies. The CI's new move was perceived as gaining leverage over independent research, and when this “interference” was deemed to be “inappropriate since it would put in doubt our academic freedom” thus refused by the LCI Board, Xu Lin, the Hanban Director, demanded the resignation of the LCI Board chair and announced without warning the suspension of Hanban’s annual fund. As a result, one locally hired teacher was fired, and the LCI eventually ceased its activities in September 2013, becoming the first CI closed down due to research controversy. Both sides felt hitting a bottom line that could not be compromised (BBC, 2015).

If we look into the reasons behind the Penn State University CI’s closure, a similar dose of ‘research’ can be detected. This CI is one of the few that have specified “research” in its mission statement, and according to the report in *New York Times* (Jacobs & Yu, 2014), it was “Hanban’s regular rejection of their research plans, including those on the environment, science and politics, saying they were beyond the scope of CI’s mission” that led to the termination of the partnership.

An interesting comparison can be made between the LCI’s case, where it is Hanban’s demand for the CI to offer sinology PhD scholarships in China through its partnerships with the university research centres that caused the relationship to stumble; while in the Penn State’s case, they wanted to utilise the CI’s resources to support more activities in humanities research, but these ideas were rejected by Hanban for being too far outside the official CI remit. These two cases may seem to contradict each other, but if we look at the actual ‘war of position’, we will see it is the same fight for power: the significance of the Confucius China Studies program is that China’s contribution to research is not just in the form of funds, but more in terms of ‘knowledge’ production, while just providing funds to the host university to do research that the CI has no direct participation does not contribute to gaining positions of influence at all. However, in the current terrain where the US and Europe hold and try to maintain their ‘positional superiority’, it seems no matter whether the CI wants to be actively engaged in research or passively refuses to get involved, they all lead to the same discord in the partnerships.

Another interesting observation concerning the Confucius China Studies Program is when the Institute for International Education (IIE) made the announcement on their website in February 2015, a special note was added in full-capitalised letters: “NOTE THAT DESPITE THE NAME OF THE FELLOWSHIP, THIS IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE "CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE" PROGRAM. IT IS MANAGED BY THE
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION." (IIE website) This clarification reveals the delicate balance that Western academic institutions are trying to strike: Yes we want your money, but we do not want your money to contaminate our reputation.

We can see from these examples that research can be a flashpoint in the interactions between China scholars, host universities, and the Chinese government. A deeper investigation is thus worthwhile to look at a more influential CI closure, the one at the University of Chicago (CIUC) who claims to be “research oriented”. Of the seven CI closures that have taken place so far, the University of Chicago created the biggest sensation by announcing not to renew its agreement when Hanban was celebrating CI’s first ten-year anniversary in September 2014. Then in the same week, Penn State University also made the closing announcement, making a big impact through wide media coverage (reported by BBC, Reuters, the Economist, Times High Education, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Telegraph, South China Morning Post, to name but a few).

The CIUC’s closure was then referred to when the Stockholm University announced its decision to close its CI in December 2014, and further in June 2015, when the Stuttgart Media University decided to ‘scuttle’ its plans to establish a CI as per its contract signed with Hanban in August 2014, “after various discussions with representatives of politics and economy and did not succeed in finding the necessary support” (cited in Redden, 2015). The long lasting effects made CIUC a very illustrative case to show the challenges faced by China’s cultural diplomacy. Besides, the University of Chicago only came to this decision after lengthy negotiations with Hanban, which can function like a micrograph of the ‘terrain of struggle’ that merit a detailed investigation into this process.

4.4 To be, or not to be - A Tale of the CIUC Closure

Since the first CI’s establishment in 2004, it has quickly expanded to 500 all over the world by December 2015, while seven CIs have ceased to operate so far. The first two closed in 2010 were not extensively reported: one was the CI at Osaka Sangyo University in Japan, which was closed in March 2010 due to spy concerns (Lumsden, 2015); the other one was closed by the local Security Bureau in Yakutsk of Russia. These do not include the aborted CI agreements: one was signed with the Toronto District School Board in 2012 but was cancelled in 2014, and one was signed with Stuttgart Media University in 2014 and was cancelled in 2015. The former decision was made as a result of 20 to 2 vote among the trustees after parents, teachers and students protested against any involvement of the Chinese government in Canadian schools (Reuters, 2014). This incident was featured in the documentary of In the Name of Confucius released in December 2016.
(Tîrnoveanu, 2016). The later five CI closures from 2013-2015 received much more media attentions and triggered a lot more debates: apart from the Lyon Confucius Institute that was closed by Hanban in 2013 (Hughes, 2014), the other four decisions to terminate their renewable CI agreements were all made by the host institutions - Macmaster University in 2013, Chicago and Penn-State universities in 2014 and Stockholm University in 2015. There were also two universities in Canada that have severed their ties with the CI, but the CIs continued to exist with college level partners: one is the University of Sherbrooke, who acted on the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT)’s appeal for “universities and colleges in Canada which currently host Confucius Institutes on their campuses to cease doing so” and severed ties with the CI on 31 December 2013 after months of failed negotiations, saying that Hanban’s arrangement no longer met the University’s international plans, leaving the CI in Quebec only hosted by Dawson College. Then in June 2015, the University of Waterloo also decided to “withdraw” from the four-party partnership in the CI following a campus consultation, leaving the CI remain open hosted only by its affiliated Renison University College (Montgomery, 2014).

If we look at the sheer number of these closures, the tiny proportion of 7 out of 500 may be rightfully considered a sign of ‘success’ of the CI, however, if we look at their calibres and locations, we will note the fact that all the closures after 2013 took place in North America and Europe, the most targeted areas where perceptions of China have been the most unfavourable, thus received the most concentrated CI spreads: according to statistics released by Hanban in December 2015, there are 157 CIs in North America and 169 in Europe, over 65% of the global total. The uneven distribution is more obvious if we look at the number of Confucius Classrooms: 801 out of the 1000 classrooms (over 80%) in the whole world are located in these two regions (Hanban website). All the Hanban-sponsored student summer camps and school principal visits, nine in total in 2014, were only from these two regions as well (CI Annual Development Report 2014).

Besides, all the five host universities are prestigious institutions: McMaster is rated No. four among all Canadian universities and the highest among all the 13 that host a CI in Canada; The Lyon Confucius Institute (LCI) partners with two universities (Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3, and Université Lumière- Lyon 2); Stockholm University was the first in Europe to host a CI, its closure left a big gap in Norway, Sweden and Denmark where no major universities now host a CI; and Chicago University is the highest rating one among all the 100 American universities that host a CI. The section below will take a closer look at the closure of the CIUC.
4.4.1 The ‘Trilogy’: three key documents and their subtexts

To set the scene for this investigation, three key documents that led up to the final announcement will be presented in a timeline: the Chicago University petition, the AAUP report and the Chicago University statement, followed by a close reading and subtext analysis that continue to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ to decipher the messages conveyed and examine different players’ roles in driving CIUC to this result step by step.

i) The Chicago University petition

In April 2014, 108 professors, including seven department chairs from the Chicago University, signed on a petition to “urge the Council of the Senate to terminate the contract with the Confucius Institutes”. Among the reasons presented, the four points below were highlighted (the full text can be found in Appendix 4):

--The fact that Hanban is an agency of the Chinese government, whose global agenda is set by high officials of the Party-State, makes it a dubious practice to allow such an external institution to staff academic courses within the University and approve funding for its research proposals.

-- It subjects the University’s academic program to the political constraints on free speech and belief that are specific to the People’s Republic of China. The Executive Director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) was quoted that Canadian colleges and universities were compromising their own integrity by allowing Hanban “to have a voice in a number of academic matters such as curriculum, texts, and topics of class discussions”.

-- It was established in the McMaster case and has since been corroborated as well in an American Confucius Classrooms that the Hanban teachers are trained to ignore or divert questions on issues that are politically taboo in China, such as the status of Taiwan, Tiananmen, the pro-Democracy movement, etc.

-- Although the University of Chicago has ignored the provisions in the Agreement specifying that Hanban will supply texts and course materials for Chinese language instruction, the University of Chicago is hosting a CI under privileges not available to many other schools, the effect is that, mindful only of its own welfare, the University is participating in a worldwide, politico-pedagogical project that is contrary in many respects to its own academic values.

The wording of ‘dubious practice’ and the quotes emphasised in italics suggest a logic that because Hanban is “an agency of the Chinese government”, which is a party-state, therefore, to submit research proposals to them for approval is dubious practice, as it is to subject the University’s academic program to the “political constraints on free speech
and belief” (According to its official website, CIUC was founded as a “research-oriented” CI). For such a radical conclusion, there was no evidence given except the ‘counter’ evidence that the University of Chicago “has ignored the provisions in the Agreement specifying that Hanban will supply texts and course materials for Chinese language instruction”, and as quoted earlier, Penn State University also “did not use Chinese teachers from Hanban at Penn State, and did not use Hanban pedagogical material”, which means this did not happen due to their ‘privileges’, and all these are no more than speculative assumptions. This confirms what Mc Cord (2014: n.p.) has argued that the greatest problem with the “anti-CI literature is that it often leaps from suspicions and concerns to a conclusion of fact”. Actually, the choice of not using Hanban supplied textbooks is not such a rare ‘privilege’, according to Xu Lin, “only 12.5% of the institutes used textbooks published in China, the others used teaching materials composed in foreign countries” (Qu, Zhao & Cheng, 2012).

The McMaster case was cited as an evidence, which is about one individual tutor who hid her faith in Falun Gong in order to get the job, and based on one individual case, the CAUT’s statement made a blanket assertion and appealed for all Canadian universities not to compromise their own integrity by “allowing Hanban to have a voice in a number of academic matters such as curriculum, texts, and topics of class discussions”. Hanban was clearly treated as a source that would impose inappropriate influence over such academic matters as it is identified as a government organisation. But not using ‘teachers from Hanban’ is a deceiving change of concept here: Hanban as a government organisation has no teachers, all teachers were recommended and sent by the home universities in China. If teachers from Chinese universities are considered as not fit for teaching Chinese abroad, then it is no longer a covert, but an overt claim for the sole legitimacy of ‘Us’ to teach about ‘the Other’ under the hoisted banner of academic freedom. It is such a classic case mirroring the famous quote of Karl Marx in the first page of Orientalism (1978): “they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented”.

As for its accusation that “Hanban teachers are trained to ignore or divert questions on issues that are politically taboo in China”. This is again paradoxical: if the CI teachers are accused of ‘ignoring or diverting’ such questions, are they encouraged, or even allowed, to engage in these discussions and have the Chinese voice heard? Isn’t this self-contradictory in criticising censorship by censoring voices from China? True, the interview findings of this research did confirm that during the pre-departure trainings, the CI tutors are advised to avoid or divert discussions of politically sensitive issues. Hanban’s stand is always that political discussion is not the CI’s remit, and the CI
teachers do not necessarily have the expertise to handle such discussions either. The teachers are on a mission to teach Chinese language and do not have to “introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject”. This is to borrow a line from the AAUP’s definition of academic freedom: “teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject” (AAUP website). A fine line needs to be noted here: if the ‘subject’ is Chinese language teaching, then “politically sensitive issues” can be argued to be “controversial matter which has no relation to their subject”. If this is the definition endorsed as the core principle by more than 200 national scholarly and educational associations, then it is another classic example of double standard when the CI teachers doing exactly the same thing would be accused of interfering in ‘academic freedom’. This is not a definition of freedom but one of hegemony in essence.

Of course, the CI teachers are not a homogenous body, they come from various backgrounds and are delivering various content of teaching in various styles. They are a rather heterogeneous group of teachers in this sense, yet both sides seem to refer to this group as one monolithic: both in the accusations against ‘Hanban teachers’ in the petition and the defence against ‘the CI teachers’ given by Hanban, though both sides could be referring to an actual minority in this group of actors in their arguments. The common thing shared in this group is they are the commanders of classrooms. Said (1993: 206) has commented on the power of classroom discourse with a punch: “One is taught to be patriotic, to understand certain, carefully selected aspects of history of this country, and so on. It’s very powerful.” Because it is so powerful, it can help maintain hegemony by not only deciding on what can be said and what cannot, but also who can say it and who cannot.

The other common trait of ‘the CI teachers’ is they are sent by the home universities in China, not recruited by the host universities, which reflects back to the McMaster case where both the discriminatory hiring and the fact that host university cedes hiring decision entirely to Hanban was at the core of the disagreement. Actually, in the negotiation process between Hanban and the University of Chicago as disclosed by Redden (2014b), an ad hoc committee charged with evaluating the CI function issued a report proposing some significant changes, including “replacing the three instructors hired through the Confucius Institute and Hanban with instructors hired directly by the East Asian languages department”. The report concluded that “a permanently renewable and adequately large group of locally hired, trained, and supervised Chinese language instructors would be preferable to these temporary, ‘outsourced’ teachers”.

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Hanban is willing to consider this and actually has already initiated changes on this practice in 2013 as discussed in 3.5.2, because Hanban is aware of the issues about ‘quality and expertise’ as discussed in 4.2.2. It was also acknowledged by the CI staff themselves. UKSC4 commented:

I think there are two main differences compared with Alliance Francaise, first is that they hire local people to do it, second and more importantly, they charge for their language services. Here, when we offer many activities for free, it actually make people suspect if there is any hidden intentions. Also, in Cervantes Institute, they have staff expatriated from Spain to China as a permanent job, while in CI, all teachers are from Chinese universities on a short time basis, by the time we learned how to do a better job, we’re leaving (Appendix 10).

However, the negotiation process was aborted suddenly as disclosed in the university’s statement, which will be looked at later following the time line.

ii) The AAUP report

Then in June 2014, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) submitted a report On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes, calling on American universities to rethink their relationship with the CIs (the full text can be found in Appendix 5), claiming that “Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom. Their academic activities are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China”.

The report compared the CI with the British Council, the Goethe Institut, and L’Alliance Française, and pointed that

These latter three entities are clearly connected to imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of ‘soft power’, but none of them is located on a university or college campus. Instead, their connections to national political agendas and interests require that they be established in sites where they can fulfil their mandates openly without threatening the independence and integrity of academic institutions in host countries.

The report concluded that AAUP joins CAUT in recommending that universities cease to permit CIs to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.

From the above we can see the report very much echoed the key points in the petition: the “protection of academic freedom” was hoisted as the banner at the very start, allying with CAUT to make the appeal for the whole North American campuses to cease their
involvement in the CIs. The CI’s function is again interpreted as “an arm of the Chinese state” under the supervision of Hanban, which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice premier to “advance a state agenda” in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate. Three days after the AAUP report was released, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua responded with an angry editorial titled “China Voice: Fear, ignorance behind calls to stem Confucius Institutes” (Ren, 2014), saying that the claims made by the report actually “expose not so much communist propaganda as their own intolerance of exotic cultures and biased preconceived notions to smear and isolate the CPC”. As a counter-argument, the Xinhua article emphasised the role of the CI Board and management committee that consists of both Chinese and foreign scholars, including many professors and university presidents of the host institution, who have their direct say in decision-making.

It is interesting that the AAUP report also put the CI in comparison with its Western counterparts, and even recognised that these Western institutions “are clearly connected to imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of soft power”, but the ‘imperial pasts’ was brushed off lightly as a passing comment, ignoring that this ‘past’ is 500 years of colonialism and capitalism that created today’s West-centered world in terms of culture, economy and politics; it is a past with lingering influence of Orientalism and Western cultural hegemony that still shapes today’s global cultural terrain, and puts them in an superior position in pursuing the ‘ongoing geopolitical agendas and the objectives of soft power’. However, the power position was dismissed as an understatement, while putting an overstatement on location as the critical difference, as the sites of the CIs “threaten the independence and integrity of academic institutions in host countries”.

iii) The Chicago University statement

Then after five months’ negotiations, a statement was made regarding the CI on September 25, 2014 by the University of Chicago (full text can be found in Appendix 6), stating that “the University and Hanban have engaged in several months of good faith efforts and steady progress toward a new agreement. However, recently published comments about UChicago in an article about the director-general of Hanban are incompatible with a continued equal partnership”. It then quoted the article7 saying Xu Lin wrote a letter to the college president containing only one sentence: “If your school

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7 The full article in question can be found at: http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2014-09/19/content_17605.htm
Surprisingly, in this final CIUC statement announcing the University’s decision to suspend negotiations for the renewal of the agreement, the repeated accusations of “academic freedom” disappeared and only one reason was mentioned: the state-backed *Jiefang Daily*’s article, which sang an eulogy to Xu Lin in showing how powerful she is: “That attitude of hers made the other side anxious, and they quickly replied that they’d continue to operate the Confucius Institute” (Wang, 2014): the University of Chicago is the ‘they’, who finds Xu’s attitude “incompatible with a continued equal partnership”. As explained in Chapter Three, there is a vertical hierarchy between Ministry of Education/Hanban and universities in China as well as between Chinese government and the state media, meaning that the Hanban Director can talk to a Chinese university in such a commanding manner, and there are often eulogy-style media reports about government officials in China. However, here Hanban is dealing with an American University that cherishes its reputation as independent from government influence, and is already under intense internal questioning of jeopardising such a reputation. It also regards itself as holding a superior position and finds Hanban’s imposing stance ‘hegemonic’, thus resisted it with full pride. *The Economist* article of ‘Confucius Institute: About Face’ called Xu Lin’s statement a “boastful challenge”, and the *Business Spectator* also criticised the hard-line behaviour of officials like Xu, “who still think and act like party ideologues who like to assert their authority and bully people into submission” (Cai, 2014). As commented by a professor at University of Chicago on the lengthy negotiations, “the Chinese officials were heavy-handed, condescending and difficult” (cited in Redden, 2014). In a way, this feeling of not being treated as an ‘equal partnership’ left them with no choice but to end the relationship altogether.

We can see the knock-on effects from this chain of events, especially when the first CI closure at McMaster was cited in the petition, and the Chicago’s closure was further referred to in the following closures. The CIUC case has offered us a lot of food for thought: Gramsci has viewed the “education relationship as a political relationship” (Fontana, 1993: 145), and the closure revealed such hidden power relations at the core of these interactions. Just as Foucault once pointed out (1982: 794-795), “at every moment the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries”, and “a relationship of struggle between two adversaries is the result of power relations with the conflicts and cleavages they engender”. The closure of CIUC is an example of such a cleavage. When the CI was trying to be engaged in a ‘war of position’, it found itself being dragged into a ‘battle of location’, the hegemonic side holding vantage positions can easily manoeuvre a blocking action based on the CI’s
location on campus: it is both accused for ‘political censorship’ when the CI teachers avoided discussing contentious topics, and ‘ideological inroads’ when those issues were discussed. It was these dual accusations that brought it to a deadlock, raising the classic question of ‘to be, or not to be’: it seems for the CI, to discuss, or not to discuss those sensitive topics, they are equally accusable of violating ‘academic freedom’, which is a recurring key word in most of the criticisms against the CI. Through the repetition of the same discourse, this perception of the CI is manufactured as a generally accepted ‘truth’, and the CI’s attempt at fighting back could backfire and trigger resistance.

It also shows the counter-productive role played by Hanban as the third party, which is fatal in terminating the partnerships of both LCI and Penn State University CI, and now CIUC. It offers further evidence that government-led approach can have deadly effects. On the other hand, Kahn-Ackermann’s (2014) very incisive comments concerning these CI closures support this point from a different angle: “this decision (of closing down the CI) has nothing to do with the CI, it is made by people who dislike the Chinese government and their policies and simply use the CI to show their discontent… Cultural Centre is very easily made a target to show such resentment, the Goethe Institute has encountered similar problems, when it was shut down in Iran following the Iranian Revolution”. With full agreement to Kahn-Ackermann’s comments, I still believe there are lessons to be learned from these incidents. Isn’t it the very purpose of cultural diplomacy to turn adversaries into partners with mutual understanding? So the question must be considered: what can we learn from these closures to facilitate better mutual understanding? Reflections and implications for the operations of the CI and the emerged policy recommendations will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has continued to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’ to examine what sets the CI apart from its Western counterparts operating in the same terrain. Theories of Orientalism, cultural hegemony and knowledge-power nexus were applied to make analytical comparisons that addressed a much broader and deeper dimension beyond the superficial differences in operating models. The results can be summarised as being ‘so similar, so different, and so Chinese’:

- The missions are very similar, one can even venture to say government involvement is also a similarity, which are all in conformity with the definition of cultural diplomacy;
• What is visibly different is the deliberated wording of the CI’s purpose, its specific operating model and unique element of research in the menu of provision, but when pitched against different historical, cultural and ideological contexts, a much hidden and vital difference is revealed: the uneven condition in this terrain dominated by Western cultural hegemony, and the ensued different power positions and relations between the CI and its Western counterparts. This hidden difference explains the perceived differences in the CI’s intentions and government involvement;

• The Chinese government’s presence both ‘behind the stage’ and ‘on the stage’ of cultural diplomacy is a distinguished Chinese character. It brought the government ‘background’ to the ‘foreground’, thus easily seized by the hegemonic side to generate resistance.

Through the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’, we can see how some of the similarities between the CI and its Western counterparts were converted into differences: the similar purpose of language and culture promotion was interpreted with political connotations, turning the CI into an imagined propaganda vehicle; the similar funding sources from government was also interpreted as ‘strings attached’ for the CI because of the different ideology of the Chinese government. This lens revealed that the difference is not in the organisation itself, but in power relations with others, as sharply pointed out by Foucault (1982: 791), “the fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships, is to be found outside the institution”. If we detach the organisation from the terrain of struggle it is placed into, we distort and inhibit the possibility of a comprehensive analysis.

A specific example is the CI’s purpose, for we can see a clear disjunction between Hanban’s aspirations and the external perceptions of it. Of course what matters is not how the CI sees its own intentions, but how it is perceived by others, just like the famous Henry Kissinger quote: “It is not a matter of what is true that counts but a matter of what is perceived to be true”, by the hegemonic side, I shall add, and the power they hold transforms this perception into accepted ‘knowledge’.

While the differences in operating model are surely a major source for setting the CI apart from its Western counterparts, it is also a simplification that does not challenge the Orientalist grounds or the ‘positional superiority’ the hegemonic side occupied in this terrain of struggle. Instead, this difference was magnified under the ideological spectacles, and tied to the above two perceived ‘differences’ in the CI’s purpose and
government background, to the extent of negating the comparability of the CI to its Western counterparts. The way they over-interpret the difference is just a strategy of struggle, as Foucault (1982:794) pointed out indeed, “between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle, there is a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal”, which drives to the same point: the real difference still rests in power relations, and hegemony is maintained by the “locking together of power relationship with strategy and the results proceeding from these interactions” (Foucault, 1982:795).

From Hanban’s point of view, in a way, it is looking up to the CI’s Western counterparts as role models to learn from and targets to exceed. Hanban’s grandiloquent ambition to condense the achievement of Alliance Francaisie of 130 years into 16 years is supported by the Chinese government which seems to be proud of the CI as the ‘spiritual high speed train’, a nickname happily adopted by Liu Yandong, Vice Premier and Chairperson of the Council of CI Headquarters. However, the government presence as another critical difference that sets the CI apart from its Western counterparts is a major source attracting scepticism. Perhaps, there are better ways of utilising government input to move the CI’s model to a more constructive collaboration and equal partnership by sponsoring locally hired positions appointed by the host universities.

This Chapter has also dissected the few cases of CI closures so far, especially the CIUC, to reveal what lessons can be learned from these incidents. The next Chapter will pursue further along the lines of argument begun in previous chapters, and attempt at an evaluation of the research findings from Chapters Three and Four, based on which, the four inductive statements presented in Chapter Two about the prominent features of China’s culture diplomacy and the CI project will be amended.
Chapter Five: 
Prominent Features of China’s Confucius Institute

5.0 Introduction

Chapter Four demonstrated why the CI is ‘so similar, so different, and so Chinese’ compared to its Western counterparts, this chapter will further elaborate its ‘Chinese characteristics’ by continuing to employ the lens of ‘terrain of struggle’. A diagnostic description of the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project will culminate in four statements that correspond to the four themes of the research questions set out at the very beginning, i.e. why China wants to launch cultural diplomacy and the CI project, what is the vehicle of the CI, who is the agent, and how it is carried out in the field. This output represents one of the key elements of originality of this research project.

However, one thing that must be borne in mind is that China’s cultural diplomacy aims to engage with the entire world, so that any generalised conclusions would not be tenable given the uneven conditions in the global terrain as argued in Chapters Three and Four. Therefore, a comparison and contrast of the primary and secondary data collected in the UK, US and South Korea will be undertaken first before any conclusion is drawn.

5.1 Comparing and contrasting the terrain marked by soft and hard cultural boundaries

As discussed in the previous chapters, both the aim of China’s cultural diplomacy to improve its position in the global cultural terrain and the means through global coverage of projects such as the CIs give this endeavour a global nature. However, ‘the globe’ is one big place, marked by various boundaries: cultural, social, territorial, political, racial and psychological. Chan and McIntyre (2002: xv) define boundary as “the interface between two entities; it marks the end of one and the beginning of another”. Duara (1996:49) elaborates the cultural boundary in that “every cultural practice is a potential boundary marking a community. These boundaries may be either soft or hard”: groups with soft boundaries between them do not view mutual boundary breaches as a threat, while communities with hard boundaries tend to privilege their differences, and develop
an intolerance and suspicion toward other cultures.

This narrative offers a useful insight into the analysis of this ‘global terrain of struggle’ at another sub level marked by cultural boundaries. As explained in Chapter Two concerning case selections, four CIs were selected from East Asia (South Korea) and Western Europe (the UK), to keep the contrasting angles where cultural debates are historically referred to as the Orient and Occident. By drawing on primary data collected through a similar set of interview questions in the UK and South Korea, and some secondary data concerning CIs collected from the U.S., the section below will examine how the interactions differ in the different blocks of the terrain, and how the CI adapts its strategies to these blocs by gauging the cultural boundaries of different natures.

5.1.1 One mission statement, two different priorities

According to the CI’s Constitution and By-laws, it is a non-profit public institution that aims to “develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese language overseas and promote educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other international communities” (Hanban website). There seems to be a general consensus among all interviewees concerning its purpose, with a few directors emphasising the careful wording of “introducing” Chinese culture instead of “promoting” it, to be sensitive to the worries or fears of China’s supposed ‘cultural invasion’ in the recipient country (SKD1 and SKD4). However, despite the unanimous understanding of the two-fold mission of the CI, a clear difference in terms of priority setting can be observed from the responses gathered from the UK and South Korea.

In South Korea, where the geographical vicinity, cultural closeness, economic and business connections with China mean that many people have been to China already, language teaching was made a clear central task of the CI, as pointed by SKD2:

China is our neighbour, the closest country to us, historically we were heavily influenced by Chinese traditions, Chinese literature and other aspects, so Korean people nowadays are very interested in going to China for various activities, be it trade, educational or cultural exchanges, there are more and more people, both old and young, learning Chinese, we have tens of thousands candidates sitting the HSK tests every year, the largest group in the whole world. (Appendix 10)

This may help explain why the very first CI in the world was established in Seoul, because South Korea has been the number one source country of international students learning Chinese in China since 2000 (Caijing, 2012). The host organisation of this first CI is an institute that has started to promote HSK tests in South Korea since 1993, thus
it has had a decade-long relationship working with the MOE in China before the CI was set up in 2004. According to SKD1, SKD2 and SKD3 interviewed, CIs in South Korea have focused a lot on selling HSK exams and offering scholarships to high school students to study in China.

This priority of language teaching was also clearly recognised by SKSC2: “I think our primary goal is language teaching, and through language teaching, probably infiltrate to other layers, such as culture”. SKSC1 put it more bluntly that “they (Korean students) are very pragmatic, not interested in the cultural aspects, they only care if they can speak the language well nor not”. (Appendix 10)

SKD1 even commented that:

There is really not much need for the CI to ‘promote’ Chinese language and culture here, in fact, there is such a high demand and inner drive to master the language that more and more Koreans are voluntarily learning the language in the hope to use it as a tool to tap into opportunities offered by this next door neighbour. As for culture, some of the traditional Chinese cultural practices were kept better in South Korea than in China. (Appendix 10)

Actually, Hanban is aware of this regional difference and some CIs operating in Asia (especially in Japan, South Korea and Singapore) do not request operating funds from Hanban but only apply for project funding, as explained by SKD4:

Some universities offer Chinese as compulsory degree modules, so they pay for Hanban sponsored teachers’ salary into CI’s account as their operating fund. This is not a significant amount of money for the university to bear. This would gain them more freedom than requesting operating fund from Hanban. (Appendix 10)

This forms a stark contrast to most CIs in other parts of the world that are attracted by Hanban’s funding to nurture the language program, both in Africa (Hartig, 2014a) and the U.S. (Sahlins, 2015). The attraction for learning the language is also a lot less in the UK compared to South Korea. According to Young (2014), being born a native English speaker is both a blessing and a curse as 39% hold the perception that “most people speak English”. When commenting on the fact that the number of UK students choosing to study foreign languages at university level has been in steady decline for the past seven years, Worne (2015), Director of Strategy at the British Council, used “can’t, won’t, don’t” to sum up the British national view on speaking foreign languages. This was confirmed by responses received from the interviewees: UKLH2 commented that “Chinese is not yet a language popular enough that would automatically attract students to learn, actually, it still has the reputation of one of the hardest languages to learn".
Therefore, in UKSC5’s words, “trips to China are the ‘appetiser’, culture is the ‘main course’, and language teaching is the ‘side order’” (Appendix 10).

Unlike South Korea, organising trips to China is a highlight event for all the other CIs interviewed (in the UK, France, Mexico and Morocco). In UKD3’s words, this is “to provide a window into China, for those who would otherwise live with their prejudices and ignorance with China”. All the interviewees mentioned the visitors’ excitement or even shock to see ‘the real’ China with their own eyes compared to their imaginative impressions of the ‘Other’. For example, in the UK, in a local school’s pre-departure briefing meeting for their first trip to China, UKLH1 was asked if 200 pounds is enough to buy a house in China. In Morocco, where China has always been pictured as a poor developing country and their own as a developed country, students simply could not believe or even accept that the airport in Beijing is much more modern than their own at home. Therefore, UKD1 believes “it is very important for us to offer students the starting opportunity to walk into China”. These organised tours (both for school principals and students) have significantly changed their perceptions through first-hand experiences:

The travel to China funded by CI plays a very positive role in changing students and school headmasters’ impressions of China, many school partnerships were formed, and exchange of visits fruited following the agreement. There are also many degree students decided to go to China for MA courses on CI scholarships after graduation. (Appendix 10)

The significance of such personal contacts with China was also enunciated by UKLH3:

When CI can offer opportunities like this to someone who does not have much expectation, or even some negative expectations of China, to see China with his own eyes and see the difference from media image, Hanban has already achieved its initial purpose. They gain one more person who likes China and wants to speak for China. (Appendix 10)

This was echoed by UKSC5 who works in a different CI in the UK:

In advanced class, all our students have been to China and seen modern China with their own eyes, so they all have a good knowledge about China, more willing to accept the difference, to recognise China as a different country from the West, and they would express the difference in a more respectable way. They are able to understand China in the Chinese way. If people do not have the knowledge, they tend to take the opposite stand……Therefore, the scholarship we offer is a great thing, for foreigners to study and stay in China for a period of time. No matter how much we try to teach, or tell them about China here, it will never match the first-hand experience. After having a positive experience of China, the students would come back to talk up China, no need for us to make a painstaking effort. It is much more convincing than what we want to feed their mind. (Appendix 10)
According to UKLH3, this is why in a language class in the UK, the CI’s main job is “to arouse and keep students’ interests in China. Once they are interested, they would want to know more, and once they know more, they would have more objective views”. Then the CI can invite such experts who have already formed objective views of China as guest speakers:

When the guest speaker is a dignitary ‘foreigner’ to talk about China, Chinese culture and Chinese economy, the effects are much better than a Chinese speaker. They play a very constructive role in helping enhance understanding of China, they are not blowing trumpets for China like propaganda, but have a very fair tone. (Appendix 10)

The above explains the rationale of the cultural focus of the CI’s function in the UK, as for Chinese language teaching, “it focused a lot more on nurturing and keeping students’ interests” according to UKSC2, as “our main goal is to correct misunderstandings of China held by foreign countries”. He carried on to elaborate this ‘infiltration process’:

To start with, we need to get more foreigners interested in China, then after getting some knowledge and understanding, they may want to go to China and see it for themselves, then they can come back to influence more people, to generate a radiation effect. It takes a long time to work the infiltration. (Appendix 10)

Citing figures from China’s MOE, Lampton (2008) highlighted that over 30 former students who undertook studies in China hold ministerial positions back in their own countries; more than 10 have served as their country’s ambassadors to China; 30 hold high level positions in their country’s embassies in China; 120 are associate professors or professors and hundreds more serve in cultural, economic and trade entities involved with China. Now with the CIs reaching out into 125 countries in the world, this potential benefit can only build up over time.

This corresponds very well with the rationale of Hanban elaborated by Xu Lin herself, who has once said in an interview:

The CI sends over 10,000 tutors and volunteers a year abroad, each of them would teach a minimum of 200 students, and there are another 200 families behind these students. Through them, foreigners would see the amazing changes taking place in China, and the good qualities of Chinese people. (cited in Wang, 2014)

This shows the charm of cultural diplomacy as people-to-people diplomacy on the one hand, and the intention of Hanban to entrust the CI to play such a role; on the other hand, it also helps explain why the U.S. is home to the biggest number of CIs (109 CIs and 348 Confucius Classrooms) in the world, and UK has the most concentrated coverage (29 CIs and 108 Confucius Classrooms) in Europe. In contrast, in the whole of Asia (110 CIs
and 90 Confucius classrooms in total) where the demand for Chinese language learning is arguably stronger, and the whole of Africa (46 CIs and 23 Confucius Classrooms in total) where the demand for Hanban funding in expanding Chinese provision is arguably stronger, their stronger desire and interest only made them less prioritised target destinations of the CI, because the Chinese government wants to use the CI to ‘correct misunderstandings of China’, and these misunderstandings are more prevalent in the host countries with hard cultural boundaries with China.

The above appears to reveal a pattern of ‘one mission statement, two different priorities’ delivered by the CIs in the different blocs of the terrain with different cultural boundaries: regional differences are clear and allow for localised priorities: language teaching is the core function of the CIs in the East Asian countries like South Korea, where traditional China enjoys a very respectable culture image and modern China offers new opportunities; while in the West European countries like the UK, where vestiges of Orientalism and the Cold War mentality are amplified by the distances in culture and space, Chinese cultural introduction and enhancing local people’s understanding of contemporary China is given more weighting, with trips to China as a particularly effective tool. The next section will look at how the two different ‘priority’ tasks of the CIs are carried out in the field.

5.1.2 The different ‘wheel’ focus in left-driving and right-driving countries

In the Literature Review, the metaphor of ‘one wheel’ and ‘the other wheel’ was used to indicate the two positions concerning the ‘what’ to be delivered on the vehicle of cultural diplomacy: one position emphasises the spiritual and popular culture (Hu, 2008), representing ‘one wheel’ to serve the purpose of reshaping China’s image of being the ‘cultural other’; while the other position argues that ‘cultural diplomacy is value diplomacy’ (Zhang, 2012b), representing ‘the other’ wheel of the vehicle to serve the purpose of countering China’s image of being the ‘ideological other’.

From the CI’s own mission statement cited in 5.1.1, we can see it has an intentional focus on Chinese language and culture introduction as it defines its own role as that ‘one wheel’ of the vehicle. It thus tries to evade discussions of political values in its teaching and cultural exchange activities. However, after charting the ‘terrain of struggle’ in

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8 The above statistics of the CI numbers were released by the Hanban’s website up to December 2015: [http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm](http://www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm). Interestingly, the number of Confucius Classrooms decreased in both US and UK from 356 to 348 and from 111 to 108 respectively by May, 2016. None of the closures of the Confucius Classrooms were reported anywhere in the media.
Chapters Three and Four, it is evident that the separation of the two ‘wheels’ only exists in theoretical discussions. It is not possible to draw clear lines between the two in reality, because the two ‘Otherings’ of China (culturally and ideologically) have developed into a complex whole. Just like the Chinese saying goes, ‘the trees long for peace but the wind will never cease’. For example, UKD4 stated that “our understanding of the name Confucius is purely cultural related, but in the West, it was interpreted as cultural infiltration, and that means brainwash” (Appendix 10). There were even scholars like Jacob Kovalio (2010) who came up with a questionable label of ‘Confucommunism’.

This transmutation from cultural promotion to brainwash shows the Western hegemonic stance on the one hand, and a mixture of culture and ideology on the other. True, as Fallers (1961:677) defined ideology, it is “that part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns of belief and value”. Despite China’s repeated efforts to separate the CI’s cultural promotional role from anything to do with ideological infiltration, it could not stop such criticisms and worries, because China’s image as the ‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’ has grown to become an organic whole over the years, making the separation of the two a one-sided wishful thinking for the Chinese government. This is exacerbated when the CI’s voluntary compliance with its role as the ‘one wheel’ was interpreted as censorship in many host countries. This can be seen from the case of CIUC discussed in 4.4, where dual accusations were made against the CI for both ‘political censorship’ when the CI teachers avoided discussing contentious topics, and ‘ideological inroads’ when those issues were discussed.

However, on the other side of the globe, ideology seems not to be a barrier to the CI’s mission of culture promotion: all the SKSCs answered the question of “how do you handle sensitive questions?” in a very relaxed manner: “Korean students are generally very reserved and quiet”, said SKSC2, who also described a typical scenario in class:

Generally, Korean students do not like to talk about politics, when sensitive topics arise, they would say, ‘let’s not discuss politics’ and change topics to something that interests them, mostly about where to go for travelling and eating, topics that would not hurt people’s feelings. So politics is off the table. (Appendix 1)

Rather than intentionally avoiding discussions of ‘politics’, cultural traits is an important reason for this as explained by SKSC3: “Korean students are very polite, they genuinely care the feelings of the teacher, if they think the question would upset a Chinese person, or make the teacher uncomfortable, they would not ask”.

In contrast, students from the UK are from a different culture that encourages questioning
in class: “There will be students vocally questioning China, especially in the advanced class where students are able to express themselves freely”, said UKLH3, who explained her approach to handling such discussions:

As the teacher I'll make sure the class is not dominated by any one student, both in terms of speaking time and the viewpoints. I'll make sure other students and other views can be voiced too, so usually I'll set the rule, every student has 3 to 5 minutes to express their views, as long as they do not go off topic and speak English (Appendix 1).

The above shows a difference not only in the focus of the CI’s function, but also different ways of delivering it. If we continue to use the metaphor of ‘vehicle’, the difference between the CI’s practice in South Korea and the UK can probably be likened to driving in left-driving and right-driving countries: in South Korea, it is like driving on the same side of the road as home, things go smoothly due to similar driving habits; however in the UK, the CIs need to be more careful in adapting to the left-driving practice, otherwise, they may run into unexpected problems and be ‘honked at’ without realising what is wrong. In other words, when the vehicle is on the road, what matters most is to comply with local driving practice, and that indicates a different focus on the different ‘wheel’.

5.1.3 See China and read China: first-hand knowledge vs. third-hand stories

Aside from understanding the local road conditions and driving practice, it is as important to have adequate local knowledge about the target audiences, especially about what they already know about China and how they acquire that knowledge. As mentioned in the Literature Review, it is imperative to understand that the messages from China are not sent to a vacuum chamber, but a receptor that is preoccupied or even embedded with pre-perceptions. In other words, this is not a one-way dissemination but a two-way interaction between two sets of identities: the sender’s view of China and audiences’ perception of China.

An example from my direct observation shows how deeply embedded such pre-perceptions can be: in a talk about China, the New Land of Opportunities given to a local high school, the CI teacher asked if any students in the audience have been to China before, only one raised his hand. So the teacher said she would show them a BBC video first and then asked students to share their impressions of China with some key words after watching it. It is a two-minute video clip called China China (BBC, 2009). There is only one-word narrative ‘China’, repeating itself numerous times throughout the video with thousands of different snapshots from China, from varied landscapes to a wide variety of wild animals, from diverse dishes to different ethnic groups, wearing different
costumes and following different lifestyles in rural and urban China, the message is quite strong and clear: This is all China, a country of vast diversity. Yet, when the floor was given to students, the first answer (not from the one who has been to China before) of the key word was ‘Communism’. Even the British teacher at present was baffled: where did he get that from? There is not even a glimpse of red flag during the video, nor any images of Chinese leaders or government.

It is a serious question worth pondering: where do people get pre-perceptions from? As pointed out by Morley and Robins (1995:133), “we are all largely dependent on the media for our images of non-local people, places, and events, and the further the ‘event’ from our own direct experiences, the more we depend on media images for the totality of our knowledge”. Manzenreiter (2010: 43) simply attributes the responsibility for people’s misperception to the mainstream media that “rather than preparing the space for a dialectic exploration of alternative modes and views, the media contribute to the reinforcing of national stereotypes”, echoing Said’s argument back in 1978 (1978:26) that one aspect of the electronic postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed: “so far as the Orient is concerned, standardisation and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the 19th-century academic and imaginative demonology of the ‘mysterious Orient’”.

In the modern world today, mass media and cultural exchange programs are probably the two strongest image shapers that influence and shape public perceptions of a country according to Kunczik (1997). For China, they work well hand-in-hand in most of the Asian countries, while in Western countries such as the UK and US, where fewer people benefit from direct experience in visiting China, media works hand-in-hand with power of discourse consolidated by the cultural hegemony, leaving the general public more subject to media influence, or more dependent on media images for their knowledge of China, especially when “the Western media which arrogate to themselves the right to represent all non-Western Others, and thus to provide ‘us’ with the definitions by which ‘we’ distinguish ourselves from ‘them’ ” (Morley & Robins, 1995:134). It is at this point that we need to consider the impact of Western media on ‘the Rest’, and the impact of representations of ‘the Other’ on Western audiences, like the ossified image of China planted in that student’s mind that can become so deeply embedded that if it does not generate resistance, at least it forms an inertia to embrace a new understanding of China.

It is common sense that first-hand knowledge is the knowledge you have acquired from personal experience; second-hand information is information learnt from someone who has first-hand experience; while third-hand information can only be called ‘stories’ learnt
from people who did not experience the subject and only receive the information from people with second-hand experience. Therefore, even when presented as 'fact,' or with an 'air of authority' such as mainstream media, and even when the reporter is reporting live or write the report in-situ, the audience can only see or read what is edited and modified (intentionally or unintentionally) by the reporter, thus can be best classed as second-hand information, while editorials written by commentators with second-hand information can only be taken as 'stories' that may not enable the audience to get to know the whole truth. In other words, the audiences experience events, not first hand, but through perception, thus need to be reminded that what-they-think-they-know may not be the ‘truth’, or may not be as reliable as it first seems.

Both the geographical and cultural distances between China and Western countries such as the UK and US can expand the gap between first-hand knowledge and third-hand stories. As discussed in Chapter Three, among all the players in this terrain of struggle, the media plays a critical role in shaping people’s perceptions. Examples were given about selective news reports and selective interviews, even for reports about the CI where there are people-in-the-know available with important first-hand experience, they are not fully engaged with as the media report can be an attempt to exploit pre-established assumptions. Scholars like Clifford and Marcus (1986) have explained this with the Foucauldian version of the question of representation: it always involves a relation of power as well as a relation of knowledge, between the representor and the represented. Within media studies, the issue has been addressed in terms of ‘media imperialism’. For example, in the works of Schiller (1992), Mattelart et al (1984) and Tunstall (1977), there has been considerable analysis of the cultural consequences of the West’s long-exercised control over the world’s media systems, and there is a complex process in which the media plays a vital role in having influence over their audiences.

For example, Willnat and Metzgar’s (2012:24) research on ‘American Perceptions of China and the Chinese: Do the Media Matter?’ is based on the content analysis of 886 news stories about China published in the New York Times throughout 2010 and a national online survey conducted in early 2011. The findings show significant associations between respondents' media use and their views of China’s economic, political, and military power. Their findings generally support the assumption that the American public is influenced primarily by media agenda setting and framing processes, and that “respondents with more news exposure hold more negative perceptions of Chinese foreign and economic policies”. Other similar research (Mattimore, 2010; Zhang, 2007) undertaken through analysis of the China-related reports in American mainstream
media also found that the US press seldom constructed a favourable image of China, but tended to focus on negative issues such as censorship, internal controls, and human rights abuses. They also tend to adopt a negative angle even in reporting developments made in China, such as the Olympic successes or breakthroughs China made in exploring outer space, the reporting is persistently constructed in an anti-Communist frames and Cold War mentality.

More specific research about the CI-related reports in The New York Times (Liu, 2014) found that 35.3% reports were negative, 31.4% were neutral and 27.5% were positive, which is on the whole consistent with Li & Dai’s (2011) research about the overall American media environment for the CI, sampling 33 media including newspapers, journals, TV, radio and websites, and concluded that 50% were negative reports, 15% were neutral and 35% were positive.

There was also similar research done in South Korea concerning their media coverage about China. One study entitled Chinese News in Korean Media was carried out in 2005 by Yoo, who analysed 632 randomly selected articles from one of the major Korean newspapers, Joong Ang Ilbo, from January 2000 to November 2004, just before the first CI was set up. The study found that overall attitudes of the Joong Ang Ilbo toward China were neutral (54.7%), but 33.3% remained unfavourable. It also found a few recurring themes constructing positive images of China: the economic growth of China and the development of China in technology, cultural and diplomatic fields. Another more recent study done by Xu (2010) focused on a case study of Chosun Ilbo from 2007-2008: it found that it had more reports on China than other developed countries such as the US and Japan. Of these China-related reports, 59.4% were neutral, and 20.5% were favourable, in other words, 79.9% of the reports were not negative, showing an overall friendly media environment toward China in South Korea. In January 2015, a seven-episode documentary Super China was aired by KBS TV in South Korea, which completely ‘shook’ China: even the Chinese media could not believe this was made by a ‘foreign media’: instead of showing the dark side of China ridden with poverty and human rights issues, it projected the ‘superness’ of China in a very positive light, so positive that many Chinese audiences commented that it had done a better job than China’s own central television CCTV. This documentary also gave a thorough introduction of China, from history to culture.

There has also been research particularly focused on South Korean media reports on the CIs operating there: Jin (2013) sampled five mainstream newspapers and three TV channels, namely KBS, MBC and SBS, and collected their reports of the CIs from
November 2004 to November 2012. The research found that for the first two years since the very first CI in the world was established in South Korea in 2004, the main content of CI-related reports was mostly ‘positive’, about the academic and cultural exchanges as well as opportunities to learn Chinese language provided by the CIs. Then since 2006, ‘soft power strategy’ has become the most frequently mentioned theme in the CI-related reports, Jin’s research (2013: 239) found that:

Owing to the far-reaching influence of Confucian thoughts in South Korea, and the homogeneous nature of Confucian culture in Korean society, the fact that the CI was identified as a tool of enhancing Chinese soft power did not lead to more criticisms or oppositions of it; instead, they are more focused on the revelations this may have for South Korea.

Even in other Asian countries with less amicable media environments than South Korea, the most recent 2015 Pew reports found that “Overall, despite historical and territorial frictions, Asia-Pacific publics tend to view their regional neighbours in a positive light”, and “Asia-Pacific views of China are far more positive than the perception held by Americans” (Pew Research Centre, 2015).

As mentioned earlier, due to the close relationships between China and South Korea and the geographical vicinity, more and more people from South Korea have already seen China with their own eyes, or watched Chinese films and TV series at home, and most importantly, have had opportunities to interact with Chinese people in shops, universities or companies. The examples discussed in 5.1.1 about students from the UK and Morocco changing their views about China following their visits also show that first-hand knowledge is the most powerful tool to combat third-hand media bias. It also justifies the priorities of the CIs in target countries with hard cultural boundaries are to provide opportunities for people to see the real contemporary China with their own eyes. This would appear to be the most effective method to correct their distorted perceptions shaped by reading and learning West-centric materials with third-hand information.

To sum up, the different media environments in the South Korea and US discussed above help explain the different foci of the CIs: more on the language teaching in East Asia as the historical connection and cultural influence, geographical vicinity and people exchange help achieve the aim of enhancing mutual understandings; while in Western countries such as the UK and US, the geographical and cultural distances mean the media plays a stronger role in shaping the general public’s perception of China, hence the CIs focus more on providing opportunities for people to visit China, and more chances for local people to have face-to-face interactions with Chinese people through more access to the CIs, so that they can help achieve the goal of combating the
unbalanced media influence.

5.1.4 Soft cultural boundary and hard nationalism boundary

Among scholars of boundary studies, Wallman (1978) talks about how boundaries mark members off from non-members in a similar term as ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. Newman and Paasi (1998) argue that boundaries and identity are different sides of the same coin, with the former creating and being created through the latter. This identity creation ability was also discussed in the Literature Review concerning the power of the nationalism discourse, which also divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Ozirimli, 2005). What is under-discussed is the relationship between nationalism and cultural boundaries, whose interaction renders the boundary dynamic and fluid. Shapiro (2004:34) has argued that cultural governance grows out of Foucault’s understanding of power as a productive force that is generated by social relationship, aiming at “making territorial and national/cultural boundaries coextensive”.

However, the most important attribute of cultural boundary is that it is always in flux as pointed by Duara (1996): soft boundaries can harden, and hard boundaries can soften as well, and what distinguishes cultural boundary from the territorial and national boundary is its dynamic nature as a relative concept with a reference object. In the frame of reference for this research, China’s cultural boundary with South Korea and the UK are at different marks in the spectrum as evidenced by the primary data presented in the above sections from 5.1.1 to 5.1.3: the level of cultural understanding, people exchange, and media influence as well as their relative positions in the global cultural terrain all contribute to the differences. Duara used the example of changing cultural boundaries between the Manchu and Han in Chinese history in his book, while I believe this narrative has contemporary and global relevance when such mutual transformations can find perfect demonstrations in looking at China’s cultural boundaries with South Korea and the UK respectively.

The cultural boundary between China and the UK is arguably a harder one of the two as Europe is where Orientalism was bred and the UK was in a different ideological camp from China during the Cold War era, so China was held as both a ‘cultural other’ and ‘ideological other’ in the past. If the lack of understanding of Chinese culture was partly a result of a lack of interest from the hegemonic side, the economic rise of China in the globalised era, along with the trans-border exchanges and people mobility can help generate and stimulate such an interest. As early as in 1848, the then Prime Minister, Henry John Temple, made the famous statement that no allies or enemies are eternal,
but only our interests are perpetual. Common national interests in working together can create an agent in softening the traditional boundaries. As Chan and McIntyre state (2002: xv), “boundaries are in a constant state of flux, being created, maintained, elaborated, contested, eroded and deconstructed”. Oommen (1995) has applied the contradictory trends of ‘isms’ in today’s world to explain such changes:

It is a world of ‘endisms’ (end of history, ideology, nation, geography), ‘postisms’ (postindustrial, postcapitalist, postmodern) and ‘beyondisms’ (beyond the nation-state, beyond the Cold War). Endisms represent the disappearance of boundaries, postisms signify the emergence of new boundaries and beyondisms allude to the elongation of boundaries. (Quoted in Chan & McIntyre, 2002: xiv)

Oommen thus concluded that the rise and fall, construction and deconstruction of different types of boundaries, including cultural boundaries, make up the very story of human civilisation and of contemporary social transformations. As argued earlier, this shows what carves the boundary and drives its change is actually power, and cultural diplomacy can potentially play a role in moving the boundaries along with the power shift. The new knowledge of ‘not the end of history’ and ‘beyond the Cold War’ and the culture flows across established boundaries facilitated by cultural diplomacy can help move the relatively hard cultural boundary between China and the UK towards the softer side.

Meanwhile, the role nationalism plays could potentially move the relatively soft cultural boundary between China and South Korea towards the harder side as well. Robinson (2014:9) argued that “nationalism describes the creation of an ideology that serves to celebrate and emphasise the nation as the preeminent collective identity of a people”. As discussed in 1.1.3 in the Literature Review, the strength of nationalism derives above all from its ability to create a sense of national identity, which is constructed against ‘the other’, thus entails cultural resistance. Its dual attributes of being a ‘style of politics’ and a ‘form of culture’ (Smith, 1991) also complicate the cultural face. For example, in the interview with the SKLH, she mentioned the distaste of local people when seeing China’s national flags dotting around their city centre squares for CI’s China Day events. It is fair to argue that in Asian countries of the same Confucian cultural circle, this ‘otherness’ is more carved by the line of nationalism, or rather, cultural nationalism. In the book Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, Yoshino (1992: 1) defined cultural nationalism as: “Cultural nationalism aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people’s cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate or threatened”. Robinson (2014:161) has commented on cultural nationalism in colonial Korea that:

As the idea of nationalism rose among Korean intellectual at the turn of the century,
the Confucian tradition came under attack as an obstacle to the creation of a strong national identity. Subservience to foreign ideas and cultural norms inhibited the development of a unique, self-conscious Korean identity. Nationalist, therefore, work to exhume the Korean past as a repository of nationalist symbols smothering under a mantle of excessive veneration for Chinese culture.

A number of scholars (Forsby, 2011; Li, 2008a; and Yan, 2011) have argued that there has been a Sino-centric tendency to direct attention inwardly towards the distinctness of Chinese identity. This is most conspicuously demonstrated by the rise of nationalist rhetoric from the 1990s and onwards. Sino-centrism signals an identity shift towards an increasingly self-centred-China more attuned to its distinct civilisational history. This gave its neighbouring countries a very mixed feeling. As explained by SKD4, Korean people’s feelings about Chinese culture is “very mixed”:

There are aspects of Sadaejuui\(^9\), or admiration and worship of China from history; there are also components of contempt. Because Korea had been a tributary state to China for thousands of years in history, that some of the Confucian traditions or rituals that we carry out here in South Korea was already extinct in China, for example, our wedding and funeral ceremonies are more particular about rituals; and we never say ‘Traditional Chinese Medicine’ here, it is known as ‘Traditional Korean Medicine’.....Actually we (the CI) are being very careful in using the word ‘introducing’ Chinese culture instead of ‘promoting’ it, we always have to clarify that we are only providing opportunities. (Appendix 10)

This carefulness in avoiding the wording of ‘promoting Chinese culture’ was shared by SKD1 from China, saying that “Koreans are very sensitive to ‘cultural invasions’ from China, they would accuse you of doing this if you do too much”. Another example is at the University of Malaya, the name of Confucius Institute was changed into Confucius Chinese Language Institute (孔子汉语学院) before it was agreed to be launched. This could be a good idea to clarify the mission and function of the Confucius Institute, while helping dispel the concerns and speculations.

A hardening of boundaries occurs when one group privileges their cultural practices. Another way that could lead to a hardening boundary less consciously is when one group celebrates its distinctive culture. For example, the difficulty in selling traditional Chinese dance performances was also mentioned by SKD4, though for a different reason compared to Europe and the US: “Chinese art performance is not exotic enough for

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\(^9\) Sadaejuui (lit. "serving-the-Great-ism," Hangul: 사대주의, Chinese: 事 大 主 义 ) is a Korean term which evolved in the mid-20th century from a more widely used historical concept. According to Wikipedia, Sadae literally means "dealing with the great" or "serving the great" and interpreted as "loving and admiring the great and powerful"; Juui means "ideology" and it is conventionally translated as "-ism." The Chinese term is sometimes translated as Flunkeyism in English, I think it is more accurate to keep the Korean expression here.
Korean audience, we’re very familiar with these art forms, and we also have our own folk dances. It is not as fresh and exciting” (Appendix 10). If Orientalism may be blamed for the lack of popularity of such performances in Western countries such as the UK and US, in East Asia, it was regarded as being ‘not exotic’ enough, or dismissed because this crossed the boundary that they wish to maintain as their own. This shows a delicate balance the CI needs to strike.

On the other hand, China suffers a similar ‘loss of identity’ in such cultural encounters when aspects of culture that China takes pride in its distinctiveness and splendour, tend to be blurred into a general Oriental culture in Western countries. Like UKSC4 shared:

Sometimes I cannot help feeling disheartened that after some painstaking efforts in explaining cultural traits of China, the students just said, well, it’s very similar to Japanese culture, not much difference it seems. Like once, after one hour into a paper cutting session held in a shopping centre to celebrate Chinese New Year, a participant asked if this is from Japan. (Appendix 10)

SKSC3 also mentioned that in terms of contemporary art and culture, it is China that is in the weak position and copying everything from the South Korea, not the other way round. These mutual feelings show that nationalism is working as a two-way process, especially between China and other Asian countries that are familiar with and influenced by traditional Chinese culture. This ‘us-centred’ nature of nationalism acts like a ‘double edged sword’ that could harden the soft cultural boundary. Nationalism is used to offer defence in protecting one’s own national identities and draws the national cultural boundaries, which can be hardened by the increasingly assertive Chinese nationalism that emerged out of the domestic discourse and provides a driving force for China to pursue its dream of national rejuvenation. These changing dynamics in China's identity shift has been felt by its Asian neighbours. In Jin’s research (2013:239) of South Korean media reports about the CIs, one of the findings is that “when the general public reads reports revealing the huge national interests of China behind the CIs, such reports tend to stimulate the rise of nationalism”.

Nye (2015) believed this rise of nationalism has reduced the universal appeal of Xi’s ‘Chinese Dream’ while antagonise its neighbours in the South China Sea and elsewhere. As one Indonesian official put it when speaking of his concerns about China: “the problem the Indonesian military has is not that China is communist, it is that China is nationalistic” (quoted in Lampton, 2008: 144). In this sense, nationalism has a particularly sensitive role to play in China’s cultural diplomacy to its Asian neighbours. On the one hand, countries in Asia, especially East Asia, are familiar with Confucianism and Confucian values, which carry universal meanings in this region on a par with freedom
and democracy in the West. According to the constructivist understanding of identity formation, the historical past is highly significant in forming the identity of the present. Anderson (1991:12) has pointed in his famous book *Imagined Communities* that “nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which—as well as against which—it came into being.” Therefore, China’s civilisation and historical legacies have the potential to summon common interests and orientations among those who share its legacy, and to be reconstructed and reinvented to help create an ‘imagined’ Asian identity and values (Cho & Jeong, 2008). On the other hand, China’s cultural diplomacy needs to tread a fine line between not appearing as too imposing when promoting the traditional aspects of its culture, and not too aggressive when showcasing the contemporary side of China that is involved in territorial disputes with a number of its neighbours.

In summary, a soft cultural boundary may coexist with a hard nationalism boundary, and vice versa in this terrain of struggle, which means that the CI has to navigate very carefully in both East Asia and West Europe, drawing on the different attractions of its offerings. That explains why despite the centralised input from Hanban and the globalised outreach of the CI, no standard ‘recipe’ can be found for all the nine CIs interviewed, and stark differences can be observed in their day-to-day activities between South Korea and the UK. It explicates the need to tailor the ‘end products’ to each destination by gauging the cultural boundaries rather than having one unified model as a fit for all, ‘localisation’ would be essential for a strategy made by centralised approach to work, as the same message sent would be received and perceived differently in the process of interacting with different ideologies, cultural boundaries and power positions of the destination. In a way, cultural boundaries reconfigure themselves and become more dynamic in the process of cultural diplomacy, which will transfer the traditional way of viewing different cultures as barriers, but as different perspectives, thus contributing to knowledge generation.

### 5.2 Prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI

Based on the analysis and discussions in Chapters Three to Five, four statements are summarised as diagnostic descriptions about the distinctive features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project along the four themes of the research questions set for this project, i.e. why China wants to launch cultural diplomacy, what is the vehicle of the CI, who is the agent, and how it is carried out in the field. They started as a theoretical deduction from the Literature Review as outlined in 2.2.4, then they were carefully and
critically recalibrated with both primary and secondary research findings under the new analytical frameworks with a clearer focus on the CI project. A comparative perspective plays a critical role in this process, and the words of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ countries are used below as “tools to think with” (Hall, 1992), as historical, political and cultural constructs rather than a geographical one.

1) **China’s cultural diplomacy is launched in an uneven global terrain.**

In Western countries with a relatively hard cultural boundary, China’s cultural diplomacy was staged with Orientalism in the background, and anti-Communism in the foreground, giving China a dual stance of fighting for cultural pluralism on the cultural front, and against universalism on the ideological front;

In Eastern countries with a relatively soft cultural boundary, the softness can be hardened by the double-edged nature of nationalism, which provides the driving force for China to launch its campaign of cultural diplomacy, but simultaneously the defending force for recipient countries to safeguard their national cultural identities.

2) **The vehicle of the Confucius Institute carries one mission statement on two wheels: ‘one wheel’ focuses on Chinese language teaching in countries with relatively soft cultural boundaries; and ‘the other wheel’ focuses on cultural understanding in countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries.**

The different geographical and cultural distances between China and the recipient countries, and the different media environments justify the different priorities.

3) **The government-led approach to implementing the CI is generating some side effects with its sponsorship, censorship and presence on the foreground.**

Such side effects appear to be shared concerns across different cultural boundaries.

4) **The globalised outreach of the CI is sustained by a centralised input with localised practices for more responsive interactions with different target audiences.**

Together these four statements constitute the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project. A clearly contrasting feature is shown in the first two statements between countries of relatively soft and hard cultural boundaries, while the
latter two aspects show similar features across different cultural boundaries. In comparison with the earlier four inductive statements presented in Chapter Two, clear and substantiated changes can be seen in the first two statements, that is because the multiple competing forces and different power relations in the terrain were teased out through the comparative case studies of the CI in this research. It shows the challenges of making this ‘cultural leap outward’ truly great, and suggests that China’s cultural diplomacy must differentiate its approaches and foci in the field as the terrain conditions vary substantially by region and countries, and its policy-making process needs to respond to both international and domestic contexts, which interact with each other.

Although the thesis focuses on the CI, the above research findings can be related broadly to the features of China’s cultural diplomacy, especially statement one and three, which also applies to other forms and fronts, such as internationalisation of the Chinese media, sports and artistic exchanges to name a few. Different fronts will face different challenges and have different features, but it is the same contested terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy is launched into, and by similar government-led approach. The implications of these features on the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy will be discussed in the concluding chapter in the same order as the four statements.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has built on the analysis and discussions of the previous chapters in presenting the four statements summarising the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project, from the four perspectives that framed the research questions at the very beginning: the different international and domestic contexts that define the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy; the vehicle of the CI that carries the shared mission but different priorities; the agent that drives the vehicle, fast yet with constraints; and the actual driving practice of the vehicle to suit different road conditions. A comparison of the East and West blocs in the global cultural terrain was carried out first by applying the cultural boundary theory and examining the roles played by media and nationalism to help sharpen the statements. Cross-case primary data was drawn on to lend validity to the researching findings.

The implications of each of the Chinese characteristics will be discussed in the last concluding chapter, with specific initiatives proposed for future practice. It will also point out the road forward for future research.
Conclusion

6.0 Overview

China’s expanding global presence goes hand in hand with its deeper engagement across cultural, economic, and diplomatic realms of international affairs. Amidst its growing influence, China has been trying to carve out a new identity in the global cultural terrain. The cultural diplomacy campaign was launched to fulfil this new mission. At the same time, when the China Dream of national rejuvenation is staged by President Xi Jinping, its push to regain the glory of Chinese culture has prompted both the Chinese society and China watchers to rethink China’s historical, ideological and cultural heritage.

Academic interest in the study of China’s cultural diplomacy has only recently developed into a substantial body of research. However, its focus has almost been exclusively on how it is functioning as a tool to build China’s soft power. The aim of this thesis was neither to measure the soft power generated by China’s cultural diplomacy, nor to argue whether or not it has been successful. Instead, its point of departure was to show the limitations of applying the Western-defined narrative of ‘soft power’ in non-Western contexts, and why an alternative and more sophisticated theoretical framework is needed to look beyond and beneath it in order to illuminate the complex nature of China’s cultural diplomacy. Only by capturing the intricacies between the intertwined multiple contexts can we begin to acquire a deeper and more precise understanding of its Chinese characteristics.

This thesis has organised its arguments around the purpose, vehicle, agent, and field practice of China’s cultural diplomacy. Chapter One of the Literature Review dealt with definitions and theoretical discussions. It re-conceptualised China’s cultural position in the world from the pre-modern period to contemporary times, and developed new lines of academic inquiry by critically reviewing the mainstream arguments and proposing an alternative analytical framework to investigate the hidden barriers to China’s cultural diplomacy, based on which the thesis research questions were specified and justified. The relevant literature review of the CI, which operates in a terrain of struggle in which China is ‘othered’ both culturally and ideologically, further elaborate the thesis’s critique of the concepts of soft power and nation branding as the analytical framework. Chapter Two explained the rationale and the actual design of ‘multiple triangulations’ employed to carry out this investigation. Chapter Three challenged the adequacy of the existing
lens of ‘soft power’ to view and analyse the very complex terrain conditions, and adopted
the new analytical framework in surveying a three-dimensional global cultural terrain of
struggle. Chapter Four applied the new lenses to examine the primary data through
comparative case studies of the CIs to its Western counterparts, with a view to answering
the research question of why China’s similar effort in launching the CI are perceived and
received differently and encountered unexpected controversies; Chapter Five adopted
yet another comparative lenses of ‘cultural boundary’ to refine and consolidate the
research findings by comparing the CIs operating in East Asia to those in West Europe.
The three key chapters demonstrated how China’s cultural diplomacy impacted upon
both China’s interactions with the world in its ascent to global prominence, and the
perception of its rise from the rest of the world situated within different geopolitical,
ideological, cultural and historical contexts. They also identified the structural limits and
operational challenges faced by the CI through analysing the rich empirical data, and
pinpointed that the main challenge of China’s cultural diplomacy lied in how to counter
the old perceptions of ‘otherness’ with China's own self-representations, and how to
nurture mutual understanding with the prevalent Western-defined assumptions and
values. The concluding chapter also included some recommended initiatives that the
Chinese state can take to fully utilise the efforts that it has made to advance the country’s
cultural diplomacy.

This thesis made an original contribution to the emerging study of China’s cultural
diplomacy by taking an alternative approach to gaining insight into its Chinese
characteristics. Transcending traditional disciplinary boundaries of international relations,
cultural studies and communications, it argued that an accurate understanding of China’s
new image needed to be framed in the historical, domestic and international contexts,
which are constantly interacting with each other and cannot be looked at in isolation from
one another. Both the internal dynamics of change and the external geopolitical and
economic shifts of power, as well as the historical contexts, were examined in exploring
how the old Chinese discourse of anti-imperialism has returned in the new discourse of
anti-cultural hegemony, and how the formation of China’s international image was fused
with the creation of new identities within China itself, whose vision today is shaped by its
own historical experiences. Throughout the thesis, the alternative analytical frameworks
have been employed to deepen and enrich our understandings of the four specific
research questions by examining the relevant facets of China’s cultural diplomacy
through a comparative case study of the CI. It then concluded with an exploration of what
forms the prominent features of China’s unprecedented cultural leap outward.

6.1 Summary of the key findings
This research challenged the appropriateness of using ‘soft power’ to judge and analyse China’s cultural diplomacy and argued for a more sophisticated analytical framework. First of all, by comparison with the definition of cultural diplomacy, which is meant to be a plus sum game of nurturing mutual understanding and mutual respect between cultures, it is evident to see the ‘soft power’ concept still adopts a binary view of political cultures being incompatible with each other, thus tends to interpret cultural diplomacy as a zero sum game to win hearts and minds. Besides, the two separate sources of ‘soft power’ identified in Nye’s definition (2004), ‘culture’ and ‘political values’, have become increasingly overlapping, to the extent that the boundary between the two has blurred. As long as China maintains that the values of its political system are fundamentally different from those of the modern Western world, its soft power would be considered lame, thus the impact produced by cultural diplomacy would be very limited if examined through this lens.

Secondly, the concept of ‘soft power’ is inadequate as the main analytical tool because it has not engaged with any historical analysis of the legacies of cultural hegemony, knowledge-power nexus and Orientalism, which formed the interwoven foundation of the current global cultural terrain, rather, it applied the same lens to look at China as other Western countries and failed to recognise the unequal power positions associated with culture and ideology.

Thirdly, it did not address the domestic context either where nationalism is a driving force for China to launch cultural diplomacy, it converges state nationalism and popular nationalism in that “nationalism as a shared value between the Chinese state and Chinese populace has played an increasingly important role in shaping the trajectory of China’s rise” (Zhao, 2013:553). Therefore, it is not only inadequate but also inappropriate to use ‘soft power’ to explain and examine the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy.

After challenging ‘soft power’ as the mainstream theoretical premise by exposing its inadequacies, this research proposed alternative perspectives of using cultural hegemony, Orientalism and nationalism as the new frameworks of analysis to look both beyond and beneath the old frameworks for a broader and deeper understanding of China’s cultural diplomacy. It has found that both culture and ideology helped draw the line between the two sides of hegemony and counter-hegemony in the global cultural terrain of struggle. Compared with the line of ‘cultural superiority and inferiority’ carved by Orientalism, more antagonist camps of ‘friends or enemies’ were created by anti-Communism, and China’s attempt at gaining more power of discourse was accused of
‘ideological infiltration’ by the hegemonic side. This supported the finding from the Literature Review that ideology is the new form of ‘otherness’.

These new frameworks revealed a three-dimensional picture of an uneven global cultural terrain, both in terms of unbalanced powers with hidden barriers for the counter-hegemonic side, and also hierarchical barriers influencing the interactions among various players in this terrain. The comparative case studies of the Confucius Institutes - both between the CI and its Western counterparts, and between CIs in South Korea and those in the UK - drove the differences from the surface to the very core. The most fundamental difference lies in the terrain conditions: it was the different power position in the terrain, not the actual location of where the CI is based, that lied at the root of the perceived differences in its intentions and government involvement. While differences in operating model were certainly a major source for setting the CI apart from its Western counterparts, it was an over-simplified explanation that did not challenge the Orientalist grounds or the ‘positional superiority’ held by the hegemonic side in this terrain of struggle. Rather, the difference of the CI’s location on campus was magnified under ‘ideological spectacles’, and tied to the above two perceived ‘differences’ in the CI’s purpose and government background, to the extent of negating the comparability of the CI to its Western counterparts.

However, no matter which lens was adopted, it all pointed to one shared finding regarding the Chinese government’s presence: both ‘behind the stage’ and ‘on the stage’ of cultural diplomacy, which was arguably counterproductive as a major source for attracting scepticisms. Enough evidence has shown that the government-led approach in implementing cultural diplomacy was generating some side effects from its sponsorship, censorship and presence on the ‘foreground’. This thesis argued that there are better ways of utilising government input to move the CI’s model to a more constructive collaboration and equal partnership by engaging the host institutions.

In the next level of comparison, this thesis examined how countries in East Asia where shared cultural roots underpinned the relatively soft cultural boundaries, sought to shore up the national identities through nationalism; whereas in Western countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries to China, the disputes that the CIs caused served as a reminder that language teaching and cultural activities can be politically charged. Soft or hard, cultural diplomacy does not necessarily cross cultural boundaries intact, but has the potential to soften hard boundaries. The analytical angle of cultural boundary showed us that on the one hand, “the normal response to foreign influence is to build walls” (Pool, 1990:66), so boundaries do exist, and disputes over and about them involve sovereignty
and nationalism, often resulting in conflicts. On the other hand, we now live in an age where human movements across national borders are happening on an unprecedented scale, delivering new conflicts and new anxieties, but also new knowledge and new communities. This would allow cultural diplomacy to play a more conducive role in facilitating flows of people, ideas, and cultures between China and the rest of the world.

Finally, developed from and sharpened by the analysis and discussions of the previous chapters, four statements summarising the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project were put forward from the four perspectives that framed the research questions at the very beginning: the different historical, international and domestic contexts combined with different cultural boundaries interweave the complex backgrounds for China’s cultural diplomacy; meaning that the vehicle of the CI needs to carry the shared mission but deliver different priorities in different parts of the cultural terrain; the government as the agent should not just focus on speed but needs to be aware of the side effects produced by government sponsorship and censorship; and the actual driving practice of the vehicle also needs to be adapted to suit different road conditions.

In summary, this thesis combined the richness of critical literature review and contemporary scholarly debates with new insights developed in conceptualising China’s cultural diplomacy from multiple theoretical perspectives. Its Chinese characteristics were both established from an extensive review of the growing literature and grounded in substantiate field studies that explore trans-regional and trans-national cultural encounters and interactions. Its central argument is that China’s cultural diplomacy, as a political response and even a moral claim on cultural pluralism, has to be understood from crossovers of historical grandeur of Chinese culture, Western cultural hegemony in modern history, China’s recent economic rise accompanying global power shift, and the undercurrents of nationalism at home. Therefore, posing China’s cultural diplomacy as a projection of soft power is highly charged and oversimplified at the same time. The new analytical frameworks allowed us to see a much more sophisticated discourse on China’s cultural diplomacy. Under these multiple intertwined contexts, there is a non-alignment between the vision shown through the lens of ‘soft power’ and the empirical reality constructed through my field study. Under the new perspectives, cultural diplomacy is not just an articulation of the Chinese soft power, but rather, a grand strategy to bring these contexts together in realising China’s ‘national rejuvenation’ politically, economically and culturally.
However, there are multiple challenges in realising this grand strategy and in making this ‘leap outward’ truly ‘great’: the challenges lie in the long-term nature of this contested terrain of struggle and the current position of Chinese culture, therefore the greatness needs to be measured not just by how big the stride is or how extensive the footprints are, but more importantly, by measuring how deep the footprints are and how long-lasting the impact is. It is a ‘Great Leap Outward’ only if the leap is well landed and well received.

Of course, the above findings should be treated with a degree of caution because it was largely based on the case study of the CI. However, it is believed that the study was of a sufficient scale and depth to yield results that could apply as general features of China’s cultural diplomacy. Each of the Chinese characteristics will also have implications on the general practice of China’s cultural diplomacy, which will be discussed in the section below in the same order as the four statements.

6.2 Implications of the prominent features on the practice of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI

Now that the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project have been refined based on the gathering and analysis of the primary and secondary data of this search, it is hoped to shed light on the actual practice in the field: How can China better translate its cultural resources into desired policy outcomes? How can the side effects produced by China’s ‘prescription’ of cultural diplomacy be managed? And how can the ‘China Model’ of cultural diplomacy be improved? This section will look at the number of implications that emerged following the findings, and what initiatives can be taken to bring about changes in a positive and coherent way. These changes should aim at elevating the subtleness and sophistication of cultural diplomacy in practice.

6.2.1 Purpose: understanding the target audience better

The current thinking of projecting soft power means the approach to cultural diplomacy tends to be Sino-centric and not focus enough on the target audience living within distinct political, social and cultural contexts. The analysis of the different terrain conditions in Statement 1) suggests that China’s cultural diplomacy must recalibrate itself carefully against the cultural boundaries with the recipient countries, and aim at long-term effects rather than short-term results. To achieve its stated purpose of promoting cultural pluralism, number and speed driven mentality must be reverted as it can be counterproductive in many ways and attract scepticism, especially when they are achieved through free language classes and CI events at the government funding.
Cultural diplomacy can only work the magic like a drip feeding, slower but going deeper with longer effects.

As argued by Rawnsley (2013), audiences for international communications and cultural flows decide whether and how they will accept, internalise and act upon the message, and this decision may depend on a range of other internal and external influences, such as education, family, media and travelling that affects and determines their responses. Therefore, more effective cultural diplomacy has to aim at achieving a balance of the variables that best frame the production of knowledge and understanding of China for the target audiences, and more importantly, not treating them as passive audiences who receive messages but stakeholders with whom to engage.

For example, in Western countries with relatively hard cultural boundaries with China, more focus can be put on showcasing the sophistication of Chinese culture, to help dispel Orientalist misconceptions on the one hand, and better understand Chinese cultural DNA as a peace-loving nation on the other hand, that a stronger China is not a threat as the China Dream aims at reinstating the ultimate goal of creating a harmonious world through the Confucian ideal of ‘harmony with diversity’. In terms of content delivery in the classroom, more debates can be held in Western universities as debating is a much more welcomed culture than one-way input. Both sides’ arguments can be heard and students can be exposed to alternative views to those dominating their own education and media environment while finding the process intellectually stimulating.

In Asian countries where their cultural understanding of traditional China is a lot better, more focus can be put on showcasing the opportunities provided by contemporary China, while more sensitivity should be given to recipient countries’ national cultural identity, especially those who were tributary states to China in history. The promotion of Chinese language and culture should aim at celebrating cultural differences and compatibilities. People-to-people interaction should play a bigger role in enhancing mutual understandings.

6.2.2 Vehicle: promoting Chinese culture as an internalising process rather than an uniform product

The ‘culturetainment’ trend of reducing the diversity of Chinese culture to a uniform commodity discussed in 4.3.1 needs to be addressed. Again, as an organization promoting culture, the CI ought not treat its target audience just as an ‘audience’ to impress, but as individuals to interact and engage with, by offering what caters to their
interests and needs, not simply giving a ready-made uniform product as a fit-for-all. This is what Statement 2) implies in practice.

For example, Hanban sponsors tours of university art troupes all over the world. In Asian countries that are much more familiar with Chinese folk dance, such university-standard tours can be reduced and redirect the fund for more activities engaging the target audiences while enabling internalisation of cultural appreciation. For example, using the fund as awards to students’ competitions, such as Chinese writing, photography, video or drama, that students are the main participants and active creators; the awards can be trips to China or scholarships to study in China.

The other example of uniform practice is that Hanban would allocate a large number of teaching materials and textbooks to each CI (3000 volumes as specified in most of the agreements), but as discussed in 4.4.2, they were often used as evidence of government control in some host counties even if only 12.5% of the institutes used textbooks published in China according to Xu Lin, as this is not a mandate from Hanban. Therefore, the choice of not using Hanban-sanctioned textbooks can be used as a strong counter-argument to those ungrounded accusations, and such wasteful donations can stop going to those countries as they were gathering dust on the shelf or being left in a warehouse. (Of course, such practice can continue in other parts of the world where the donated books are more needed and actually used). Instead, the funding can be offered through a bidding process that the host university can bid for with their expected outputs, this would be a much more effective way of utilising the fund, by again engaging the receiver as the stakeholder and active participant.

Just like the metaphor used in Section 5.1.2, the vehicle must adapt itself to different driving practices in left-driving and right-driving countries, and make necessary changes to its configuration to suit different road conditions. Most important of all, the vehicle of cultural diplomacy is supposed to provide a long-lasting journey of ‘fostering mutual understanding’ by bringing the two sides together, not like a high speed rail that may impress people and attract them for a free ride at first, but may lose passengers after they have experienced the standard ‘product’.

6.2.3 Agent: playing down the roles and presence of the government

As argued throughout Chapters Three to Four, in the prescription of cultural diplomacy, the dose of government defining, planning, funding and leading is one of the ingredients that are causing side effects, particularly for China, whose identity as a polity reduces
the cultural appeal of its identity as a civilisation. The authoritarian nature of the Chinese government may cause its challenge to Western cultural hegemony to rebound as being challenged. Many criticisms of the CI are not about what CIs did, but about what the Chinese government did not allow them to do, resulting in a least desirable outcome: the negative perception based on what did not happen could wipe out the positive effects of what did happen. Therefore, the implied advice from Statement 3) is to play down the roles and the presence of Chinese government. This can be done by putting the two partner institutions more in the limelight for CI events, especially for academic conferences and forums, Hanban can continue with the role of ‘helping build the stage’ with funding support, but not as actors appearing on the stage as well, nor as producers making decisions on the lines of the play. More trust and autonomy should be delegated to the two partner institutions, and less government presence should be made in CI opening ceremonies and major events. The roles played by the Board of Advisors should be made more visible through media communications and more voices should be given to people-in-the-know who can offer substantial counter-evidence and more convincing counter-arguments than government defence.

It is commendable to see a number of very responsive and pro-active new practices were initiated and auctioned by Hanban such as those outlined in 3.5.2, however, there are also other measures in store that may reap some ‘side effects’ while only addressing the ‘symptom’ of teacher shortage problem. For example, according to the MOD, some embassies have now proposed to allow spouses of diplomats to fill in positions of the CI teachers through competitive examinations. This only applies to CIs that are close enough to Embassies and mostly located in non-English speaking counties that suffer from a more serious teacher shortage. The benefits are to help with teacher supply and offer job opportunities for embassy staff’s spouses at the same time, but the drawbacks are obviously stronger government colour attached to the CI, which may override the benefits.

Apart from reducing government presence, a more important change should be made to its role in implementing cultural diplomacy. As argued by Seiichi (2008: 191) in the Literature Review, the government role should be more of a “network hub”, focusing on low-visibility efforts to create a fertile environment that enables cross fertilisation between cultures. For example, Hanban can create a bidding system with transparent procedures that is open to any organization - regardless of whether it is privately or government owned, Chinese or foreign, as long as the bidding party can come up with an initiative that serves the purpose of promoting Chinese language and cultural and enhancing mutual understanding, it can get government support to generate the desired output. The
CI may continue to be the ‘flagship project’, but more initiatives should be created. As argued in the Literature Review, the multi-agent view represents the future development of cultural diplomacy, as it can mobilise and unleash more nodes to activate a whole network. When a government is functioning just like a major node in this network, the desired elevation of subtleness and sophistication in cultural diplomacy can be achieved.

6.2.4 Implementation: involving both partners equally as stakeholders

The analysis and discussions of the few cases of CI closures in Chapter Four suggest that the CIs are more likely to be controversial if the host university entirely relies on the CI to deliver the whole Chinese language and studies program. If the host university has their own course team or locally hired lecturers, and only use CI’s expertise on language teaching and cultural activities, the risk would be largely reduced and more manageable. If a lesson can be learned from reflecting on these closing-downs, the most important message is to respect the cooperation as an equal partnership by both sides. Mutual trust is at the core, and it can be built by working together. Specifically, I would suggest keeping the CI as a separate arm to the body of university offering with locally hired lecturers or researchers, rather than outsourcing the whole provision to the CI. It allows the host university to take advantage of Hanban’s generous support for expansion of the language program and enrichment of cultural activities, without restricting freedom of inquiry for students to investigate potentially sensitive topics, while adding the benefits for students to have access to diverse international points of view, including those sponsored by Hanban. Cooperation will surely be encouraged between the CI teachers and locally hired staff. This blend would help nurture a healthy balance and create a more ‘equal partnership’ that both parties can benefit from while minimising the worries and fears of reduced academic discourse on campus.

If more adjustments can be made when considering new CI partnerships, it is highly advisable to choose a host university that already has its own course team or at least one staff in teaching Chinese and/or Chinese Studies; It is interesting to note that according to Methods of Evaluating a Model CI in Europe, one of the criteria (point 10.3) is “the ratio of local Chinese teachers and secondees from China should reach 1:1” (Appendix 3). If the host university does not have its own course team/staff, then it is advisable to apply for setting up positions of CI head teachers to jointly deliver the teaching with the CI secondees.

Localisation is another key word for implementation: Statements 1), 2) and 4) all suggest a strong need to localise the practice of the CI. As discussed in 4.2.4 and 4.3.1, flexibility
is actually already a unique feature of the CI model and there is no standard formula prescribed for the CI provisions all over the world, but localisation needs to go a step further in offering an individualised diet that best matches each CI's conditions and the needs of the target audiences; it can only work to its full effect with a better quality of CI provisions, and capacity building can help in this regard.

Capacity building is a term created in the 1990s by UNDP, which defined it as a long-term, continuing process, in which all stakeholders participate in “the creation of an enabling environment with appropriate policy and legal frameworks, institutional development, including community participation, human resources development and strengthening of managerial systems” (UNDP website). It has since become a conceptual approach to development that focuses on understanding the obstacles that inhibit organisations from realising their goals while enhancing the abilities that will allow them to survive, adapt, and thrive.

As discussed in 4.2.2, a quality gap needs to be narrowed when compared the CI to its Western counterparts, which can be achieved through capacity building. Specifically, pre-job training provided by the host university should become systematic and mandatory before the CI teachers start teaching, to ensure quality and align the CI teachers with the academic standard required by the host university. This is of vital importance that I argue for it to be included in the CI agreement under the ‘Obligations of the Host University’. So far, there are only pre-departure trainings offered by Hanban before teachers leave China, usually they are very general in nature as it is the same training for teachers being sent to different countries, and the part of the training regarding how to handle politically sensitive issues was often cited as evidence of government control. Pre-job training in situ is currently not compulsory and very sporadic: by making it a compulsory duty of the host university, it would give the host institution the ‘relational structures’ and ‘shared identity’ proposed by Zaharna (2014), making them feel like a stakeholder in a truly collaborative entity. It will benefit the tutors themselves, the student body and the CI as a whole.

When we consider the initiatives mentioned in the above four aspects, we can see how they address the three extended questions added to Melissen’s (2005) model discussed in 2.4: apart from answering questions of what messages are sent under what circumstances, who received them, and how the messages are interpreted, this thesis proposed to also consider who sends the messages, how the messages are sent, and how these messages interact with the messages produced by others in the destination. A common theme in making the above recommendations lies with engaging ‘the receiver’
as a stakeholder rather than a passive receiving end or inactive nodes: from engaging the target audience, to engaging the host university and seconded staff from home university, and more non-state actors as agents of cultural diplomacy. The implementation of cultural diplomacy should evolve from a vertical approach that is government-centred to a horizontal one that is network-based, which can facilitate more collaborations and generate synergy.

It is worth mentioning that Hanban has adopted a very positive learning attitude. In the 9th CI Conference held in December 2014, one of the presidents’ forums’ was committed to discussing the CI function of cultural exchange and academic research, and this forum was chaired by Kahn-Ackermann, former Director of the Goethe-Institute (China) and currently senior consultant for the CI headquarters. The annual conference is a useful scheme for CIs all around the world to listen to each other and the advisors, to reflect and act on improvements.

6.3 The road forward: some open issues

Apart from shedding light on the prominent features of China’s cultural diplomacy and the CI project, this research also provides a constructive foundation for future studies. China currently has 500 CIs all over the world, further research would be needed to explore more field-based issues, especially in North America and Africa where this research was not able to focus on due to its limited scope. In addition, new quantitative research is highly desirable to evaluate the impact of the CI program, as the one completed by Tao and Page (2013) was based on a statistical analysis of the data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey. They disproved the hypothesis that “the number of Confucius Institutes in a country should be positively related to favourable opinions about China among that country’s people”, and concluded that “the number of Confucius Institutes and classrooms appears to have no significant impact at all on foreign public’s perceptions of China”. In analysing the possible reasons for this “most disappointing finding”, one was “they are simply too new to show effects”, and the other was that “in a hasty pursuit of scale, these institutes might have sacrificed quality” (Tao & Page, 2013: 863-864). Tao and Page also methodologically note that the CIs are more concentrated in Europe and North America where perceptions of China have been the most unfavourable. Even if the CIs have positive effects, “ordinary regression methods could produce a null or negative finding due to simultaneity bias” (2013: 864). Given that the first CI was only launched near the end of 2004, any conclusion drawn based on a 2007 survey statistics could only be tentative. Now with over a decade to look back on, a more up-to-date quantitative research to evaluate the CI’s impact as well as the impact of the
Confucius Studies Program, especially from the alternative angles other than the ‘soft power’ lens would be highly valuable, so that some sort of answers can be provided to the question mark in this thesis title: is China’s cultural diplomacy a ‘Great Leap Outward’?

More future research is also needed in taking a reflexive perspective in evaluating the CI’s impacts on the Chinese partners. For example, Paradise’s research (2009) found that people in the education field do not like the idea of ‘soft power’, believing that power per se is aggressive. They prefer instead to think of the CI as a vehicle for academic exchange and mutual understanding. Therefore, Paradise challenged the grounds of judgment, contending that the standpoint of expanding Chinese ‘soft power’ may be the wrong standard for measuring the CI’s success. Pan (2013) also argued for the increasing international students studying in China gain Chinese universities improved international image. Rather, as China attempts to bolster its innovation and scientific capability, increased communications and exchanges with foreign academic institutions facilitated by the CIs could be a huge benefit.

I believe Paradise’s comments are extremely useful in evaluating the CI’s impact, as the endeavour of cultural diplomacy aims at “fostering mutual understanding” (Cummings, 2009:1) by connecting the two sides through exchanges, its effects should also be evaluated from both sides. So far, very little evaluation has been done from the perspective of the Chinese side, and even from the receiving side, it has been limited to measuring the change of China’s national image or the success of building ‘soft power’. At least, one good positive output produced by expanding the CIs, as pointed out by Ren (2010:20), is “it stands as both an action for propagating Chinese culture and also a process for rediscovering it”. I would like to add, it is both an endeavour to reshape the image of China, and a process of self-development and learning from the collaboration. Adopting a new lens would allow one to see the effects in a different colour. For example, judging the CI according to how Chinese university administrators view them may produce a conclusion of a different sort. Questions such as how much the Chinese universities have benefited from their participations in the ventures, and how successful they have been in playing their roles as ‘cultural diplomats’ need to be answered. These questions may help open up a wider spectrum of research topics for the possibilities and limitations of China’s cultural diplomacy. At this stage, this thesis serves as a precursor to move scholarship in that direction.

The other direction for future research could point to other endeavours of China’s cultural diplomacy, such as the China Cultural Centres (CCC) mentioned in Mr Anders’s interview. He made an interesting remark that the CI is indeed “not comparable” to the
GI, not because of its government connection, but because the GI’s official counterpart is actually the CCC in Berlin. CCCs were set up as government-sponsored cultural centres since the 1980s. By the end of 2016, a total of 30 centres have been established all over the world (Xinhua, 2016) through Agreement on Mutual Establishment of Cultural Centres between China and XXX (name of the host country), the ones set up in Berlin and Madrid have made it quite clear on their official websites that they are the counterparts of Goethe Institute and Cervantes Institute respectively. They follow the same model and are all based in prime locations in the host country and fulfil similar functions, including holding cultural activities, teaching and training, and information services (CCC website). In a way, they are parallel organisations to the CIs: one is under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, and one is under the Ministry of Culture who appointed and expatriated CCC Directors.

Though earlier in establishment, CCCs are much slower in global expansion with much lower visibility, thus causing very few disputes. There is currently very little research about the CCC, a comparative study exploring the different features and different models between the CCC and the CI would be very beneficial for providing answers to the question of how to make the ‘cultural leap outward’ great.

Last but not least, the cultural boundary theory can be applied in further depth to generate a more detailed map of the global cultural terrain. When a culture meets a hard boundary with another culture that holds a hegemonic position, the chances of having a conflict are greater than two cultures sharing a soft boundary, and the roles played by ideology and nationalism in drawing such boundaries also need to be further elaborated. There is plenty of scope to refine the charting of the global cultural terrain of struggle.

To conclude, this thesis has taken stock of what findings have been generated from the current body of literature; identified the gap or its limitations, then filled the gap by developing and employing a new analytical framework, and completed with pointing out further gaps to be filled with future research.
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Appendix 1: Quantity, Distribution and Annual Growth of the Confucius Institute all over the world (source: www.english.hanban.org)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>洲别</th>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>国家数</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>孔子学院数</th>
<th>Number of CIs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>亚洲</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>非洲</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>欧洲</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>美洲</td>
<td>America</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大洋洲</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>总计</td>
<td>Total (by the end of 2015)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

孔子学院年度增长情况
Annual Increase of Confucius Institutes

![Annual Increase of Confucius Institutes](chart.png)
Appendix 2: *Eight-Year CI Development Plan 2012-2020*

**Development Plan of Confucius Institutes**

(2012—2020)
Development Plan of Confucius Institutes (2012—2020)

This Plan has been formulated in an effort to further develop the Confucius Institutes (CIs), promote educational exchange and cooperation between China and the world, utilize CIs as a comprehensive platform for cultural exchange, and showcase the Chinese culture to the world.

I. Background

Thanks to China’s stunning economic and social development as well as its rising international prestige, an increasing number of countries seek to forge friendly relations with China, and the role of the Chinese language in international communication is more keenly felt. With the mission of promoting the Chinese language in the world, CIs have endeavored to build a global Chinese language and culture network. The past few years have witnessed the rapid expansion of CIs, both through the improvement of its academic quality, and the popularity of its brand projects. We have created a new model for language and cultural exchange between China and the world, chartered a new path for showcasing the Chinese culture, and achieved extraordinary development. As a model for Sino-foreign educational and cultural exchange and cooperation, CIs have contributed significantly to the promotion of Chinese language in the world, fostering of Sino-foreign cultural exchange, and deepening of friendship with other peoples. By the end of 2011, 358 CIs and 500 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) have been established in 105 countries and regions around the world. The total number of registered students has reached over 500,000. Despite such growth, CIs have not been able to completely meet the rising demand of Chinese learning worldwide; highly qualified professional teachers are in short supply; textbooks that cater to different needs are not adequate; the academic quality could be further improved; and the resources call for better integration.

In a globalized world, embracing the diversity of civilizations and enhancing cross-cultural understanding have become the common goal for many countries in their pursuit of further development. As China develops itself, more people in the world are attracted to the rich and vibrant Chinese culture, and more countries have integrated Chinese language teaching into their national education systems. Through learning the Chinese language and culture, overseas Chinese are bound even closer to their cultural roots. Against the background of an everincreasing demand for Chinese learning worldwide, further development of CIs will help promote Sino-foreign educational exchange, the internationalization of education, and the training of professionals needed for Sino-foreign cooperation in different fields. Further, by presenting a civilized, democratic, open and progressive country, CIs may help people around the world understand China better. Therefore, we should be keenly aware of our responsibility and take advantage of favorable conditions, so as to strengthen CIs and usher into a new chapter for their development.

II. General Requirements

A. Guidelines

We should, in response to the need of China's public diplomacy efforts and people-to-people exchange, grasp the golden opportunity and strategically select the locations of CIs. The core task of CIs is to engage in Chinese language teaching and improve
academic quality. We aim at the best quality for every CI that we establish. As a comprehensive platform for cultural exchange, CIs should help promote the Chinese language worldwide, as well as the friendly relations between China and the rest of the world.

B. Basic Principles

Scientific positioning with unique characteristics. We should integrate Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange, offer courses according to local conditions and needs, and undertake cultural exchange with unique characteristics, so as to meet the diverse and multi-facet needs of Chinese learners worldwide.

Government support and operation in civil sector. We should draft a general plan, improve policy measures, and stress the focus of CIs on public welfare and its non-governmental nature so as to fully mobilize support from society stakeholders.

Sino-foreign cooperation and indigenous development. We should adhere to the model of Sino-foreign joint programs run by schools, universities, enterprises and communities, and adopt a unified name and constitution. We should also leverage Chinese and foreign stakeholders, abide by the laws and regulations of CI's host country, and respect local cultural traditions and customs, in order to achieve joint establishment and joint management.

Serve the local people and achieve win-win. We should fully leverage CIs as a comprehensive cultural exchange platform, promote exchange among different peoples and civilizations, and strive to boost local economic, educational and cultural development.

C. Development Objectives

By 2015, we will have established 500 CIs and 1,000 CCs around the world. The total number of students will reach 1.5 million, among which 1 million will be registered at local CIs/CCs, and the remaining 500,000 will be registered at Confucius Institute Online. The number of qualified full-time and part-time teachers will reach 50,000, among which China-sent and locally recruited teachers will account for 20,000 and 30,000 respectively. We will also foster the development of Internet, radio and TV-based Confucius Institutes.

By 2020, we will have established a global network of CIs that features unified quality standards, testing and accreditation, and selection and training of teachers. We will have a team of qualified full-time and part-time Chinese language teachers (of both Chinese and non-Chinese citizenship), who can meet the demand of Chinese learning. We will have compiled Chinese language textbooks in multiple languages, and with a broad coverage. We will have established a global communication system for the spread of Chinese language and culture, which possesses a wide range of functions and broad coverage. Collaboration between China and foreign countries, and that between the government and civil sector will be improved. Chinese will become a commonly learned and used language worldwide.

111. Major Tasks

A. Focus on development priorities and improving the academic quality and level
We should have an overall plan for the selection of CI sites so as to establish a wide network of multi-tiered and diversified Cls. Taking into consideration the local conditions and requirements, we should build different types of Cls. Most Cls should identify Chinese language instruction as their main task, and striving to become, in their respective countries, centers of Chinese language teaching, local teacher training, and Chinese language testing and accreditation. We should support qualified Cls to offer advanced Chinese language teaching and conduct contemporary China studies, turning them into important academic platforms that enable a deeper understanding of China. In order to meet the diverse needs of learners around the world, we should encourage Cls to develop their own special features, such as a focus on business, traditional Chinese medicine, martial arts, culinary art, arts, and tourism among others. We should also encourage Cls in some countries to combine Chinese language teaching with cultural exchange and vocational training, so as to help students acquire not only proficiency in Chinese but also vocational skills.

We should encourage combination of Cls/CCs with the national education system of host countries, career development prospect of local students, and programs for studying in China, which will improve the effectiveness and attractiveness of Cls. We should set up a comprehensive quality assessment system, and formulate rules regarding the exit mechanism of Cls.

B. Set up teaching and human resources management systems

Accelerate setting up a team of competent administrators. We should improve selection procedures for CI directors, and build up a qualified and committed team of full-time directors, who understand education and are adept in coordination and management. Most Chinese directors should be selected from mid- or senior-level officials of Chinese partner institutions. We should also enhance pre-service and in-service training of directors.

Set up a team of professional teachers. We should formulate and issue the Standards for International Chinese Language Teachers, implement qualification certification for such teachers, and formulate measures for evaluating positions and professional titles of teachers in accordance with the characteristics of international Chinese language teaching. We should optimize the academic discipline of International Chinese Education, and train qualified teachers who meet different levels of teaching needs, with a particular focus on cultivating high caliber talents. The majority of teachers should be recommended by Chinese and international partner institutions of Cls. Any shortfall should be met by volunteers who recently graduated from Chinese universities, Chinese students studying in respective countries, and overseas Chinese. In the meantime, we should speed up our efforts to set up a highly qualified team of full-time and part-time teachers from China, who are committed to working in Cls for a long period of time or even for their entire professional career. We should step up support to cultivate and train local Chinese language teachers, increase the number of "Confucius Institute Scholarship", and recruit more international students to pursue a master's degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL). We should actively assist overseas Chinese-language schools in training teachers, support and encourage overseas Chinese to engage in Chinese language teaching.

Increase the number of volunteers dispatched abroad. Most volunteers should be selected from the pool of college graduates, M.A. and Ph. D. students who major in humanities and social sciences. Improve benefits for volunteers. We should aim at selecting and cultivating full-time International Chinese teachers and administrators among outstanding volunteers.
C. Set up international Chinese language textbook and teaching resources system

Formulate Standards for International Chinese Language Education and Guidelines for the TCSOL Materials Development. By mobilizing Cls and other sectors, we should revise and compile a series of textbooks for Chinese language and culture that are informative, attractive, and suitable to different needs; compile and develop cultural readings, multimedia courseware, practical teaching aids and reference books; and assist Cls to compile a wide range of local textbooks and teaching resources that cater to the different levels and needs of preschool children, students at primary, secondary and tertiary level, as well as adults. Enhance the training of local Chinese language teachers on using textbooks. We should constantly seek reform and innovation in pedagogy, develop a database of teaching cases, integrate Chinese language teaching with local culture, and explore effective measures to break language/cultural barriers, and to teach Chinese and introduce China to foreigners. We should further develop the Confucius Institute Journal, by adding more editions in foreign languages, enriching the content, enhancing the quality and expand its readership base worldwide.

D. Set up a Chinese proficiency testing service system

Conduct marketing plans and operations, and provide a wide range of tests by learning from the marketing experiences and successful models of international testing services, and by relying on the strength of Cls. We should integrate testing with teaching, and offer paper-based, computer-based and Internet-based tests to cater to the diverse needs of Chinese learners of different age and different groups, in order to create a brand name that is recognized around the world. We should accredit large scale and high quality foreign Chinese proficiency tests, and build a global Chinese proficiency testing system.

E. Conduct Sino-foreign cultural exchanges activities

Deepen Sino-foreign cultural exchange and cooperation. We should, in accordance with local needs, assist Cls in setting up Chinese cultural display and experience corners and book shelves; promoting quality products that showcase the Chinese culture, conducting featured cultural events, and introducing Chinese history, culture and development cases.

We should make full use of CIS’ platform and draw upon the cultural achievements of other countries.

IV. Key Projects

—Set up bases to cultivate and train teachers. We should rely on Chinese universities to continue the development of Bases for International Chinese Education and Promotion, in order to improve the capacity for and quality of Chinese language teacher training. We should collaborate with foreign universities to set up university Major in Teaching Chinese, establish a series of teacher training bases, with particular emphasis on the training of local Chinese teachers.

—Set up a talent pool of volunteers. Universities should recruit more students majoring in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (TCFL) and foreign languages other than English; expand the scope of knowledge of TCFL students; add more courses in humanities, history, and philosophy; and encourage students majoring in humanities and social sciences to take courses on TCFL. We should recruit volunteers from more channels and develop a program of overseas internship for M.A. students majoring in International Chinese Education.

—Implement the International Chinese Language Teaching Materials Project. We
should establish a Steering Committee and an International Expert Panel for International Chinese Teaching Materials. We should approach Chinese and foreign universities with a sound basis and high enthusiasm, and entrust them to develop regionally based Chinese Teaching Materials in multiple languages. We should, by working closely with Chinese and international publishing houses, create a vertical textbook supply chain from compilation to publishing and to distribution. We should set up a resource bank for International Chinese Teaching Materials so as to provide information service for pedagogy research and textbook compilation.

—Further develop Confucius Institute Online. We should exploit more language versions and programs, and build an international digital platform for Chinese language and culture promotion, which enables Chinese language learners from around the world to log on the website using their mother tongues. We should also encourage and support Cls worldwide to conduct distance teaching and learning.

—Conduct the "Confucius China Study Plan". We should sponsor outstanding young scholars from all over the world to visit China, to conduct research or pursue academic degrees. We should endeavor to set up Teaching Chair Positions for China Studies in internationally renowned universities, subsidize the publication and translation of valuable foreign works that introduce China, and support Cls to host symposiums on Chinese culture research.

_____ Build Model Cls. We should build a number of Model Cls to play an exemplary role in terms of expanding the number of students, improving the academic quality and enhancing the social impact of Cls.

—Organize CI Brand Projects. We should arrange lecture tours of experts, performance tours of college students, and Chinese Teaching Materials exhibitions. We should continue to hold "Chinese Bridge"

Competitions for Foreign College Students and Secondary School Students. We should invite more foreign school principals to visit China and more foreign students to participate in summer (winter) camps in China.

V. Safeguard Measures

A. Provide more funding support

Identify multiple sources of fundraising and set up a sound mechanism for funding Cls. We should seek to diversify the sources of fundraising, encourage and attract support from Chinese and international enterprises, individuals and other sectors. We should optimize the financial administration of CIS, step up our efforts for inspecting, auditing and assessing the performance of CI funding allocated by the Chinese side.

B. Enhance coordination

The Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, as the highest decision-making body, is responsible for formulating and amending the Constitution and By-Laws of Confucius Institutes; examining and approving the development strategies and plans of global Cls; reviewing annual reports and work plans of the Headquarters; and discussing issues of significance concerning the development of Cls. The Executive Council Member agencies should consolidate all available resources, fulfil their respective duties, and support the development of Cls. The Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), as the administrative body in charge of the daily affairs of the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, should provide better service for and further enhance the administration of Cls. We should step up study on the sustainable
development of Cls. We should draft quality standards for international Chinese language teacher, teaching materials, courses, and tests. We should enhance the inspection and supervision of Cls. We should set up pilot Confucius Institute Headquarters Regional Service Centers, in order to provide more immediate information consulting and services, and promote the sharing of teaching resources among Cls within the region.

C. Mobilize and involve all relevant stakeholders

All local governments concerned should support primary, secondary schools and universities to take an active part in the development of Cls/CCs, by utilizing such mechanisms as Sino-foreign business cooperation, sister cities, and sister schools. The governments should, pursuant to the objectives and tasks set forth in this plan, draft feasible and practical supporting measures, and allocate and implement tasks accordingly.

All universities concerned should play a leading role in the building and operation of Cls. They should incorporate the CI program into their own overall plan for development and core undertakings. Furthermore, the Universities should carefully plan and organize their respective CIS, and have dedicated personnel to oversee their operation.

Chinese enterprises seeking to develop themselves in the international market should actively support Cls. We should encourage qualified enterprises to set up scholarships for CI students, and to give preferential recruitment to local candidates who have studied in Cls. We should encourage large-scale enterprises, which retain a large number of local employees and meet the necessary conditions, to establish Cls.

We should fully mobilize stakeholders from society. Through such policies as offering tax incentives according to the law, and providing guide fund, we should attract all interested parties at home and abroad to take part in and support CI programs.
Appendix 3 Methods of Evaluating a Model CI in Europe

Methods of Evaluating a Model Confucius Institute in Europe (Draft)
Methods of Evaluating a Model Confucius Institute in Europe (Draft)

Foreword

The Confucius Institute has completed its first decade since its establishment in 2004. The first Confucius Institute in Europe was established in 2005, and 158 Confucius Institutes have been successively set up in 38 European countries in the past ten years. With the spirit that "the Confucius Institute belongs to the whole world as well as to China", to run the Confucius Institute in a more scientific and better way in its second ten-year development, one of the most important plans is to select a certain proportion of outstanding Confucius Institutes as "Model Confucius Institutes", building up flagship Confucius Institutes in Europe to promote Chinese language teaching and spread Chinese culture there.

The Criteria for Model Confucius Institute

(I) Prerequisite Requirements (the necessary conditions for application)

1. The Confucius Institute (hereafter referred as the CI) should have run for at least five years since its establishment;

2. The CI should have been awarded the title of "Confucius Institute of the Year" for at least once;

3. The CI should have served both the university and its local community in the following aspects:
   3.1 It should have offered credit courses and held at least 5 academic lectures for the university each year, and organized extracurricular activities all year round such as HSK tutorials, Q&A sessions, etc.,
   3.2 It should have played a leading and influential role by holding such activities as teacher training, academic lectures, teaching material recommendation, etc.;
   3.3 It should have established at least 3 Confucius Classrooms and 5 Chinese language teaching sites;
   3.4 In terms of community service, it should have kept long-term cooperative relations with at least 5 local government institutions, enterprises and/or non-government organizations, and carried out such activities as Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange.

4. The CI should have fixed office and teaching spaces;
4.1 It should have independent working and teaching space of at least 400 square meters;
4.2 It should have space of up to 1,000 square meters as shared space;

5. There should be stable annual enrollment of at least 800 students;

6. The CI's HSK test site should cover all tests including HSK, HSKK, YCT and BCT, with an annual total of 1,000 test-takers;

7. The CI should have held Board Meeting of the Confucius Institute annually, and kept close cooperation with its Chinese partner institution;

8. The Chinese and local directors of the CI should have cooperated with each other harmoniously with a clear division of responsibility;

9. The CI should have a five-year development plan with a full set of rules and regulations;

10. The CI should have a certain number of Chinese and foreign staff:
    10.1 There should be at least 10 Chinese language teachers (including the Chinese director) and volunteers dispatched by the Headquarters, with appropriate placements at different levels;
    10.2 The host university (institution) should have offered at least 5 full-time or part-time members of staff (including the local director);
    10.3 The ratio of local Chinese teachers and the teachers dispatched by the Chinese side should reach 1:1.

(II) Additional Conditions (the CI should meet at least ten of the following requirements)

11. The program of the Confucius Institute Scholarship should be fruitful with at least 10 outstanding students recommended to study in China annually;

12. The CI should keep good cooperative relations with the local government and civil organizations, and hold 5 large-scale cultural and academic activities each year; meanwhile it should cooperate well with local Chinese cultural communities to help with local Chinese education;

13. The CI should be self-sufficient, able to pay for its local Chinese language teachers, compile teaching materials independently and organize teacher training;

14. It should have held at least one international conference in the last 3 years;

15. It should have hosted the Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in Europe;
16. It should have undertaken at least one sub-program of the Confucius China Studies Program in the last 3 years;

17. The Director of the CI should be a locally well-known sinologist or scholar with the professional title of associate professor and above, and should enjoy good academic relations with related academic institutions or organizations in China;

18. The institute should be the centre of local Chinese language teacher development and the base for teaching material research and development with an influential radiating effect; it should also enjoy good cooperative relations with the local college or department (unit) to which it is affiliated;

19. It should have held about 30 cultural activities annually in the last 3 years;

20. It should have taken part in large-scale regional activities concerning exhibitions or artistic festivals at least once in the last three years;

21. It should have held such programs as Summer Camps or Overseas Principals' Tour to China 3 times in the last 3 years;

22. Its budget and final accounts and its implementation should be in good condition (with at least 30 budgeted projects each year; a completion rate of over 90%);

23. The president of the host university (or local Chair of the Board) should have attended the global Confucius Institute Conference at least twice in the last three years;

24. The president of the host university should be or should have been a member of the Council of Confucius Institute Headquarters, a senior consultant, a consultant or an expert by special appointment;

25. The CI established Alumni Association or Fund, which should be working effectively and fruitfully;

26. The institute or its directors should have won national level awards;

27. Contestant(s) sent by the CI should have entered the top 30 in the "Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign College Students, or its group contestant should have entered the top 16 in the "Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign Secondary School Students;

28. The HSK test centre of the Confucius Institute should have been awarded the title of Overseas Chinese Test Center of the Year granted by Hanban at least once;

29. The income of the Confucius Institute from tuition fees and social donations, and its capability of raising fund from multiple channels should have increased gradually over the last three years;

30. Other achievements approved by the Jury Committee.
II. The Selection and Verification

(I) Composition of the Jury Committee and the Marking Standards

1. Composition of the Jury Committee:
The members of the Jury Committee consist of the representative of Confucius Institute Headquarters, Chinese and foreign experts, directors of Confucius Institutes outside Europe and the representatives from the Chinese partners of those Confucius Institutes.

2. Grading Standards:
Each of the "necessary conditions" accounts for 5 points, for a total of 50 points; each of the "additional conditions" accounts for 2.5 points, for a total of 50 points. The total score is 100 points.

(II) The Application and Verification Procedures

1. Application:
The CI needs to submit the application form to Confucius Institute Headquarters, which must be reviewed and approved by the Board of the CI and signed both by the Chinese and local Chairs of the Board.

2. The frequency of selection and evaluation
Once every two years.

3. Verifying procedures:
   3.1 Preliminary evaluation: The Jury Committee selects 25% of the applying institutes for the second evaluation;
   3.2 Second evaluation: The selected institutes send representatives to take part in the defense meeting organized by the Jury Committee;
   3.3 Third evaluation: After the top 20 Confucius Institutes have been assessed on the spot by the Jury Committee, the Committee will submit its evaluation report to the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters for final approval;
   3.4 Final evaluation: The Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters carries out the final evaluation and decides on 10 Confucius Institutes as the first group of Model Confucius Institutes in Europe.

III. Conferring and Revoking the Title

(I) The Conferring Institution and the Period of Validity
1. The title of Model Confucius Institute is conferred by the Confucius Institute Headquarters;

2. The period of validity is 5 years, and this title can be retained only after passing the re-evaluation when its period of validity expires;

(II) Benefits and Privileges

3. The CI will be presented with the nameplate of the Model Confucius Institute;

4. In applying for the programs of Confucius Institute Headquarters, a Model Confucius Institute, under the same conditions, enjoys priority (for example, it may apply for an extra number of Confucius Institute Scholarship);

5. The Model Confucius Institute may be provided with the Director Incentive Fund by the Confucius Institute Headquarters as the special budget for the director to hold intercultural communication activities;

6. The Model Confucius Institute can apply for funding for developing the "hardware" of the Confucius Institute to improve its operating conditions;

7. The Chinese partner of the institute may receive financial support for key projects from Confucius Institute Headquarters;

(III) Obligations

8. The Model Confucius Institute should play a leading and model role in summing up and promoting its operational experience;

9. The Model Confucius Institute should undertake the professional instruction task designated by Confucius Institute Headquarters concerning teacher training and answering questions from other Confucius Institutes;

(IV) Revoking the Title

10. The title will be revoked when the CI fails to play the role of a Model Confucius Institute;

11. Or when the CI is involved in activities that has gone contrary to the constitution or principles of the Confucius Institute and has caused pernicious consequences;

12. Or when any of its full-time staff have severely violated the regulations of the Confucius Institute;

13. Or when the institute fails to pass the evaluation at the end of the five-year term;
(V) Interpretation and Details

14. The right to interpret the regulations belongs to the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters.

(VI) Others

15. The applying institution should provide detailed, full and accurate supporting materials (including data and hard evidence) in applying for the Model Confucius Institute;

16. The requirements of a Model Confucius Institute with special characteristics will be adjusted by Confucius Institute Headquarters with reference to the above mentioned standards;

17. These methods are to be revised once every five years.
Appendix 4: University of Chicago Petition to the Committee of the Council

We, the undersigned, having serious reservations about the presence of the Confucius Institute within the academic program of the University of Chicago, respectfully request that the Council of the Faculty Senate debate and decide whether to renew the contract this Fall with the Head Office of the Confucius Institutes, Beijing (Hanban). For reasons that follow, we believe that the Council has jurisdiction in this matter, and that terminating the relationship with the Confucius Institutes would be consistent with the intellectual principles and values of the University:

--Although it is generally acknowledged that decisions concerning the establishment of entities with teaching responsibilities ("education") fall within the purview of the Council for approval, and although the original Agreement with Hanban signed on 29 September 2009 prominently included such teaching, the creation of the Confucius Institute was not brought before the Council at that time. We believe it now falls to the Council to remedy that oversight with regard to a contract with Hanban which specifies: in Article 4, that the Confucius Institute will undertake the teaching of Chinese language, provide Chinese language teaching resources, and train Chinese language instructors; and in Article 6, that Hanban will provide 3000 volumes of Chinese books, teaching materials, and audio visual materials, as well as “send sufficient numbers of qualified instructors…and pay for their airfares and salaries.” (The Agreement of September, 2009 is appended to this email.)

--The dubious practice of allowing an external institution to staff academic courses within the University is here exacerbated by the fact that Hanban is an agency of the Chinese government, and that the global agenda of Hanban, according to its own Constitution and ByLaws, is set by high officials of the Party-State, to whom the Head Office reports annually. It may also be noted that research proposals approved by the Chicago Confucius Institute are sent to Hanban for approval for funding.

--Among the problems posed by Hanban’s control of the hiring and training of teachers is that that it thus subjects the University’s academic program to the political constraints on free speech and belief that are specific to the People’s Republic of China. The more so since the Hanban Constitution specifies that Chinese law applies to the activities of Confucius Institutes, and that the University of Chicago’s role in the hiring does not extend to the selection of the Hanban teachers. The University apparently reserves the right to refuse teachers proposed by Hanban, but that right has never been exercised. Among the unwanted effects, the University may well be complicit, then, in discriminatory hiring, as was exposed in the well-known case of McMaster University in 2011-12. A Hanban teacher was dismissed when it was revealed she was a follower of Falun Gong; and when the case was brought before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, McMaster was put in the position of defending itself against a charge of discriminatory hiring contrary to Canadian law and its own academic principles. McMaster thereupon did not renew its contract with Hanban. Indeed the Governing Council of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), representing some 68,000 teachers in more than 120 colleges and universities, recently passed a resolution “calling on universities and colleges in Canada which currently host Confucius Institutes on their campuses to cease doing so. And those contemplating such arrangements to pursue
them no further.” In an accompanying statement, the Executive Director observed that Canadian colleges and universities were compromising their own integrity by allowing Hanban “to have a voice in a number of academic matters such as curriculum, texts, and topics of class discussions.”

--It was established in the McMaster case and has since been corroborated as well in an American secondary school CI (“Confucius Classroom”) that the Hanban teachers are trained to ignore or divert questions on issues that are politically taboo in China, or indeed criminalized, such as the status of Taiwan, Tiananmen, the pro-Democracy movement, etc. These questions do arise in Chinese language classrooms, even as they may be prompted in videos or the history texts of advanced language courses. A petition submitted to the New South Wales Parliament in 2011, signed by some 10,000 citizens, called for the termination of CI Confucius Classrooms in the public secondary and primary schools of the province, on the grounds that “the NSW government has admitted that topics sensitive to the Chinese government including Taiwan, Tibet, Falun Gong, and human rights violations would not be included in these classes,” and that “Confucius classes are directly linked to and funded by the Chinese government.”

--Although the University of Chicago has ignored the provisions in the Agreement specifying that Hanban will supply texts and course materials for Chinese language instruction, this is not the case in the numerous smaller colleges in the US and around the world, as well as in the hundreds of Confucius Classrooms in secondary and primary schools, that are not in a position to provide their own Chinese language curriculum. In Chicago public schools alone, there are 42 Confucius classrooms operating by Hanban rules.

--Although as just noted, the University of Chicago is hosting a CI under privileges not available to many other schools, the effect is that, mindful only of its own welfare, the University is participating in a worldwide, politico-pedagogical project that is contrary in many respects to its own academic values. Indeed by lending its good name to the CI project, the University, nolens volens, is helping to promote an enterprise that compromises the academic integrity of many universities around the world even as it is inimical to its own.

For these reasons, we urge the Council of the Senate to terminate the contract with the Confucius Institutes.

Appendix 5: The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) report
On Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes

This report was prepared by the Association’s Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure in June 2014.

Globalization has brought new challenges for the protection of academic freedom and other faculty rights. In the operations of North American universities in other countries, administrators often refer to local customs, practices, and laws to justify practices that the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) would not tolerate on North American campuses. In 2009, our two organizations adopted a joint statement—On Conditions of Employment at Overseas Campuses—setting forth appropriate employment standards for overseas campuses of North American universities and stating our commitment to see that those standards are met.

Globalization has also meant that university administrators have welcomed involvement of foreign governments, corporations, foundations, and donors on campuses in North America. These relationships have often been beneficial. But occasionally university administrations have entered into partnerships that sacrificed the integrity of the university and its academic staff. Exemplifying the latter are Confucius Institutes, now established at some ninety colleges and universities in the United States and Canada.¹ Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom. Their academic activities are under the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China. Most agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims and practices of the government of China. Specifically, North American universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate.

Confucius Institutes appear designed to emulate the cultural ambassadorship and programming associated with, for example, the British Council, the Goethe Institut, and L’Alliance Française. These latter three entities are clearly connected to imperial pasts, ongoing geopolitical agendas, and the objectives of “soft power,” but none of them is located on a university or college campus. Instead, their connections to national political agendas and interests require that they be established in sites where they can fulfil their mandates openly without threatening the independence and integrity of academic institutions in host countries.

Allowing any third-party control of academic matters is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom, shared governance, and the institutional autonomy of colleges and universities. The AAUP joins CAUT in recommending that universities cease their involvement in Confucius Institutes unless the agreement between the university and Hanban is renegotiated so that (1) the university has unilateral control, consistent with principles articulated in the AAUP’s Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, over all academic matters, including recruitment of teachers, determination of curriculum, and choice of texts; (2) the university affords Confucius Institute teachers the same academic freedom rights, as defined in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, that it affords all other faculty in the university; and (3) the university-Hanban agreement is made available to all members of the university community. More generally, these conditions should apply to any partnerships or collaborations with foreign governments or foreign government-related agencies.

Appendix 6: Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago


The University of Chicago has informed Madame Xu Lin, director-general of Hanban and chief executive of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, of the University’s decision to suspend negotiations for the renewal of the agreement for a second term of the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago (CIUC). Since 2009 the University of Chicago and Hanban have worked in partnership to develop the CIUC, which has benefited research on China and collaboration between the University of Chicago and academic institutions in China. The University and Hanban have engaged in several months of good faith efforts and steady progress toward a new agreement. However, recently published comments about UChicago in an article about the director-general of Hanban are incompatible with a continued equal partnership.

The University is therefore suspending negotiations for the renewal of the agreement at this time. The University of Chicago remains committed to supporting the strong connections and longstanding collaborations between University of Chicago faculty and students and Chinese scholars, students, and institutions. As always, the University is guided by its core values and faculty leadership in all matters of academic importance.

The article mentioned in the statement was a report published on September 19 by the state-backed Jiefang Daily. Ms. Xu appeared to have revealed details about her conversations with university administrators. The paper said that she wrote a letter to the college president containing one sentence: “If your school has made the decision to pull out, then I agree.” She said the same thing in a phone call to the university’s representative in Beijing. “That attitude of hers made the other side anxious, and they quickly replied that they’d continued to operate the Confucius Institute,” the report said.

7.1 UK Agreement, 2008

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS
AND
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE

FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE

DEFINITIONS

In this Memorandum of Co-operation, unless the context otherwise requires:

'Headquarter' Confucius Institute Headquarters, Hanban The Office of Chinese Language Council International, 17th floor, Fangyuan Mansion B56 Zhongguancun South St Beijing, 100044, PR China

'UCLan' University of Central Lancashire Preston, Lancashire, PR1 2HE United Kingdom

'BISU' Beijing International Studies University No 1 Dingfuzhuang Nanli, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100024, PR China

In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and Britain, support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and increase mutual understanding between the peoples of China and Britain, the Confucius Institute Headquarters ("the Headquarters") and the University of Central Lancashire hereby agree as follows.

Article 1 Purpose

The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the Headquarters and University of Central Lancashire in the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the University of Central Lancashire.
Article 2 Character
The Confucius Institute at the University of Central Lancashire shall be a nonprofit institute with the purpose of enhancing intercultural understanding in Britain by promoting courses of Chinese language and culture.

Article 3 Executive Institution
Whereas, the University of Central Lancashire and Beijing International Studies University agree to work together and with the authorisation and appointment of the Headquarters, Beijing International Studies University will construct the Confucius Institute with the University of Central Lancashire as the executive institution. The two parties of cooperation can sign the supplementary agreement on the matters not settled by this Agreement. The supplementary agreement should be audited by the Headquarters before signing.

Article 4 Scope of Activities
The Confucius Institute at University of Central Lancashire can serve the following Chinese teaching courses and programs according to the local instance:
1. Teach Chinese using a variety of methods including multimedia and the Internet;
2. Train teachers to teach Chinese in primary schools, high schools, colleges, and Universities;
3. Administer the Chinese Proficiency Test and tests to certify ability to teach Chinese as a foreign language;
4. Teach Chinese courses of various types in various areas for all circles of person;
5. Sponsor academic activities and Chinese competitions;
6. Show Chinese movies and TV programs;
7. Provide consulting services for individuals wishing to study in China;
8. Provide reference materials for the educational and other professional individuals.

Article 5 Organisation
The Confucius Institute shall have a Board of Directors made up of representatives from UCLan and BISU. The Board of Directors shall have the responsibility for the operation of the Confucius Institute.

Article 6 Obligations
The obligations of the Headquarters:
1. To authorize the use of the title “Confucius Institute”, and provide logos and institute emblems.
2. To provide multimedia coursewares and other teaching materials, supplementary materials, and audio-visual materials authorized by the Headquarters; and to authorize the use of online courses.
3. To provide 50,000-100,000 US Dollars as a start-up fund, payable to the University of Central, Barclays Bank Account.
4. To provide 3,000 volumes of books, audio-visual, and multimedia materials.

5. To send one or two Chinese instructors and pay for their air fares, accommodations and salaries.

**The obligations of the University of Central Lancashire**

1. To provide an appropriate site for the Confucius Institute to carry out its activities; to provide the necessary conditions and facilities to establish the Confucius Institute.

2. To provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and provide the related payment and take charge setting and maintaining a cost centre for the Confucius Institute that will be audited on an annual basis.

3. To provide necessary working conditions for the Chinese instructors.

4. Assist the Chinese party at the Institute with all immigration procedures.

5. Agree to discuss with the Headquarters any further requirements of the Confucius Institute.

**Article 7 Financial Support**

The Confucius Institute will be jointly funded by University of Central Lancashire and the Headquarters, and it should finally assume sole responsibility for its profits or losses by charging language course fees and other programs.

**Article 8 Intellectual Property**

The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of "The Confucius Institute", its related logo, and plaque (or badge) as its exclusive intellectual property. The University of Central Lancashire cannot continue to apply or transfer the title, logo, and plaque (or badge) in any form, either directly or indirectly, after this agreement has been terminated.

The provider owns intellectual property of the certain program. The two parties can consult the owner of the co-operated programs. In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult with each other friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ according to the related laws and regulations.

**Article 9 Revision**

With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may from time to time be revised through a process of negotiation and discussion in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill and any revisions will be made in writing, in both English and Chinese, and signed by authorized representatives of the parties.

**Article 10 Term**

The Agreement shall be effective on the date when the two parties sign below. The Agreement shall have a period of validity of 5 years. If, during the 90 days before the end of the Agreement, neither party notifies the other in writing that it wishes to terminate the Agreement, then it will automatically be extended for another 5 years.
Article 11 Force Majeure
Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the event of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any other cause beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance of this agreement impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under the situation shall inform the other party so the program may be delayed or terminated in order to mitigate the loss of the other party.

Article 12 Termination
This Agreement shall be terminated in one of the following cases.

1. Either party may terminate this Agreement upon giving written notice at least six months in advance of their intention to terminate.
2. The two parties have no aspiration of cooperation at the expiration of the term.
3. The Agreement can not go through or can not achieve the anticipated aim because of comedown of the condition.
4. If the act of one party of the Agreement severely harms' the image and reputation of the Confucius Institute, the other party will terminate the Agreement immediately and reserve the right of claiming.
5. The Agreement can not go through because of force majeure.

The termination of the Agreement can not affect some other agreement, contract and program between the two parties.

Before the Agreement is terminated, all parties should make appropriate arrangements for the enrolled students and other works

Article 13 Dispute Settlement
In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult with each other friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ at the place this Agreement signed.

Article 14 Agreement Language
This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one copy in Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The Agreement, in both languages, shall have the same effect.

Article 15 Other Terms
Other matters not settled by this Agreement shall be solved through friendly, cooperative negotiations between the two parties.
The Confucius Institute
Headquarters

Date. 28th April, 2008
University of Central Lancashire

Dr Malcolm McVicar

Vice Chancellor

Date: 28th April, 2008
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS OF CHINA
AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL IN THE UNITED
 KINGDOM ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and the United Kingdom (UK), support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and increase mutual understanding among people in China and in the UK, according to the Constitution and By-laws of Confucius Institutes, the Confucius Institute Headquarters of China ("the Headquarters") and the University of Liverpool, UK for the establishment of a Confucius Institute at the University of Liverpool (the Institute), hereby agree as follows:

Article 1 Purpose
The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the Headquarters and the University of Liverpool in the establishment and management of the Institute.

Article 2 Character
The Institute shall be a non-profit educational institution.

Article 3 Executive Institution
The University of Liverpool is desirous of collaborating with the Xi’an Jiaotong University (XJTU). The Headquarters will authorize and appoint the XJTU to construct the Confucius Institute with the University of Liverpool as the Chinese executive institution. The two parties of cooperation will sign the supplementary agreement on detailed matters of the cooperation. The supplementary agreement should be audited by the Headquarters before signing.

Article 4 Scope of Activities
The Institute can serve the following activities according to the Constitution and By-laws, and local instance:
1. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language teaching resources;
2. Training Chinese language instructors;
3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers;
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China’s education, culture, and so forth •
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities;
6. Other activities with authorization and by appointment of the Headquarters;

Article 5 Organization

1. The Institute at the University of Liverpool shall adopt a Director Responsibility System under the leadership of the Board of Directors.
2. The Board of Directors is formed with members nominated from two parties, and its duties include: formulating and amending the Constitution of the Institute; formulating development plans for the Institute; decision-making on the significant issues including teaching, research and management; fund raising; appointing and dismissing Directors of the Institute; examining and approving the budget proposal and final financial accounts of the Institute; reporting to the two parties on the management status and significant issues.
3. Two collaborating parties appoint one director respectively.
4. The institute must accept the assessment of the Headquarters on the teaching quality.
5. The Institute activities must be in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws, and also respect cultural custom, shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations, both in the UK and China.

Article 6 Obligations

The obligations of the Headquarters:

1. To authorize the use of the title "Confucius Institute", logos and institute emblems.
2. To provide teaching materials, coursewares and other books according to the necessary, to authorize the use of online courses. To provide 3,000 volumes of Chinese books, teaching materials, and audio-visual materials for the first time.
3. To provide the necessary start-up fund, and provide a set amount of annual fund according to needs.
4. To send numbers of Chinese instructors based on the requirements of teaching, and pay for their air fares and salaries.

The obligations of the University of Liverpool

1. To provide a fixed office place and appropriate sites for teaching and other activities of the Confucius Institute; equipped with office and teaching facilities, and with responsibility for the setting, management and maintenance.
2. To provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and provide the related payment; to provide necessary working facilities and life conveniences for the Chinese instructors.
3. To assist the Chinese party on the visa application and residence procedures.
4. To open the special account for the Confucius Institute in the local Bank of China or other bank approved by the Headquarters.

**Article 7 Financial Support**

The Confucius Institute will be jointly funded by the University of Liverpool and the Headquarters. In principle, it is not less than one half shared by the University of Liverpool. The Institute draws up annual budget proposals and final financial accounts independently. It should finally assume the sole responsibility for its profits or losses by charging language course fees and other programs.

**Article 8 Intellectual Property**

The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of "The Confucius Institute", its related logo, and emblem as its exclusive intellectual property. The University of Liverpool cannot continue applying or transfer the title, logo, and emblem in any form, either directly or indirectly, after this agreement has been terminated.

The provider owns intellectual property of the certain program. The two parties can consult the owner of the co-operated programs. In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult with each other friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ according to the related laws and regulations.

**Article 9 Revision**

With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may be revised during its implementation and any revisions will be made in writing, both in English and Chinese, and will take effect as signed by authorized representatives of the parties.

**Article 10 Term**

The Agreement shall be in effect on the date when the two parties sign below. The Agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity. Either party, if it wishes to terminate the Agreement must notify the other in writing during the 90 days before the end of the Agreement, otherwise it will automatically continue thereafter unless and until it is terminated by either party giving to the other not less than 90 days written notice.

**Article 11 Force Majeure**

Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the event of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any other cause beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance of this agreement impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under the situation shall inform the other party in writing that the program may be delayed or terminated, and duly take the effective measures to mitigate the loss of the other party.

**Article 12 Termination**

This Agreement shall be terminated in one of the following cases:

1. Either party intends to terminate this Agreement upon giving a written notice at least six months in advance of their intention to terminate.
2. The two parties have no aspiration of cooperation at the expiration of the term.
3. The Agreement cannot go through or cannot achieve the anticipated aim because of comedown of the condition.
4. If the act of one party of the Agreement severely harms the image and reputation of the Confucius Institute.
5. The Agreement cannot go through because of force majeure.

The termination of the Agreement cannot affect some other agreement, contract and program between the two parties.

Before the Agreement is terminated, the University of Liverpool should make appropriate arrangements on the enrolled students and other workers.

**Article 13 Dispute Settlement**

In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult each other friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ of which this Agreement falls within the competence.

**Article 14 Agreement Language**

This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one copy in Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The Agreement, in both languages, shall have the same effectiveness.

**Article 15 Other Terms**

Other matters not settled by this Agreement shall be solved through friendly, cooperative negotiations between the two parties.

The Confucius Institute
Headquarters [HANBAN]
Chief Executive

University of Liverpool
Vice-Chancellor

Dr. XU Lin

Sir. Howard Newby

Date:

Date:
In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and the United States, support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and increase mutual understanding among people in China and in the United States, the Confucius Institute Headquarters of China ("the Headquarters") and Texas A&M University, USA ("TAMU"), hereinafter jointly referred to as "the parties", for the purpose of continuing the Confucius Institute at Texas A&M University ("the Institute"), hereby agree as follows ("the Agreement"):

Article I. Purpose
The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the Headquarters and TAMU in the continued management of the Institute. The Institute shall be an educational institution.

Article 2. Scope of Activities
The Institute will provide the following activities:

1. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language teaching resources;
2. Training Chinese language instructors;
3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers;
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so forth;
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities;
6. Other activities, as mutually agreed.

Article 3. Organization

1. The Institute at TAMU shall have a Director Responsibility System under the leadership of the Board of Advisors.
2. The Board of Advisors is formed with eight members nominated from Ocean University of China (authorized by the Headquarters in written form) and TAMU, each party shall nominate four of them, and its duties include: maintaining and
amending the mission of the Institute; formulating development plans for the
Institute; decision-making on the significant issues including teaching,
management; fund raising; examining and approving the budget proposal and;
reporting to Ocean University of China and TAMU on the management status and
significant issues.

3. Ocean University of China and TAMU shall appoint their own Director.

4. The institute will collaborate with the Headquarters on the assessment of teaching
quality.

5. The Institute activities must be in accordance with the mission of the Confucius
Institute, respect cultural customs, and shall not contravene the laws and
regulations, both in the USA and China.

6. The Institute draws up annual budget proposals and final financial accounts
independently. TAMU will be in charge of the Institute's daily operation and
management. TAMU will be responsible for the fiscal management of funds.

Article 4. Obligations

The obligations of the Headquarters:

1. To authorize TAMU to use the title "Confucius Institute", logos and institute emblems.

2. To provide teaching materials, course texts and other books as necessary, to
authorize the use of online courses and provide necessary audio-visual materials.

3. Provide a mutually agreeable amount of annual funds.

4. To send Chinese instructors to TAMU, and pay for their air fares, salaries, and living
expenses. The Parties shall execute an Agreement regarding the obligations
associated with the Provision of Chinese Language Teachers.

The obligations of TAMU

1. Provide a fixed office place and appropriate sites for teaching and other activities
of the Confucius Institute; equipped with office and teaching facilities. TAMU will be
responsible for the management and maintenance of facilities.

2. Provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and provide their
allotted salary.

3. Assist in processing the visa applications and home locator service for Chinese
instructors.

4. Provide a set amount of annual funds, which should not be less than the amount
provided by the Headquarters.

Article 5. Financial Support

TAMU acknowledges receipt of $43,126 in revenue from 2011 and $80,000 in
payment for 2013, bringing the Year One (I) funding from the Headquarters to
$123,126.

Payment shall be made using the following information:
**Financial Institution Information (ACH)**

Account Name: Texas A&M University Office of Sponsored Research Services  
City and State: College Station, Texas  
ACH Routing Number: 111900659  
Account Number: 6070982738  
Bank Name: Wells Fargo Bank N.A.  
Bank Address: San Francisco, CA  
ACH Contact Name: Annie Jackson

**Financial Institution Information (Wire)**

Account Name: Texas A&M University Office of Sponsored Research Services  
Routing Number: 121000248  
Account Number: 6070982738  
International Swift Code: WFBIUS6S  
Bank Name: Wells Fargo Bank N.A.  
Bank Address: San Francisco, CA  
Wire Contact Name: Annie Jackson

Additional funding shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties based on a proposed budget for the subsequent year, submitted to the Headquarters, annually on September 15 by TAMU.

**Article 6. Intellectual Property**

The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of "The Confucius Institute", its related logo, and emblem as its exclusive intellectual property. The Headquarters grants TAMU a non-exclusive, royalty-free, non-transferable, right and license to use, reproduce, and display (to the extent not prohibited by applicable law) the name of the "Confucius Institute", and its related logo during the term of this Agreement. TAMU is not authorized to use or transfer or license others to use the name or logo, in any form, either directly or indirectly, after this Agreement has terminated. The Institute will follow the intellectual property policies of Texas A&M University in matters concerning intellectual property created by the Institute.

**Article 7. Publicity**

TAMU shall not use the name of The Headquarters, or the name of The Headquarters employees, in any advertising, promotional or sales literature without the prior written consent obtained from The Headquarters in each case. The Headquarters shall not
use the name of TAMU, or the names of TAMU employees, in any advertising, promotional or sales literature without prior written consent obtained from TAMU in each case.

**Article 8. Notices**

All notices or communications to either party by the other will be delivered personally or sent by express mail, postage prepaid, addressed to such party at the following respective addresses for each and will be deemed given on the date so delivered or so deposited in the mail unless otherwise provided herein.

To TAMU:

Technical: Kelly Kleinkott  
Assistant Director, Global Support Program  
Director, Confucius Institute  
3371 TAMU  
College Station, Texas 77843-3371  
Phone: (979) 845-3099  
Fax:  
Email: kkleinkort@tamu.edu

Contractual:

Beth Milam  
Senior Contract Negotiator  
400 Harvey Mitchell Parkway South, Suite 300  
College Station, Texas 77845-4375  
Phone: (979) 845-4904  
Fax: (979) 862-3250  
Email: bmilam@tamus.edu

To Headquarter:

Chao Feng  
Assistant Director  
129 Deshengmenwai Street, Xicheng District, Beijing  
100088, P.R.China  
Phone: +86 (0) 10 5859 5940  
Fax: +86 (0) 10 5859 5842  
Email: fengchao@hanban.org
Article 9. Export Administration

It is understood that TAMU is subject to United States laws and regulations controlling the export of technical data, computer software, laboratory prototypes and other commodities, and that its obligations hereunder are contingent upon compliance with applicable United States export laws and regulations. Furthermore, it is understood that the transfer of certain technical data and commodities may require a license from one or more agencies of the United States Government. Each Party will comply with applicable U.S. export control laws including without limitation the Export Administration Regulations and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as currently codified or later amended. This section survives any termination of this Agreement.

Article 10. Confidentiality

To the extent authorized by the law, the parties may wish, in connection with work contemplated under this Agreement, to disclose confidential information to each other ("Confidential Information"). Each party will use reasonable efforts to prevent the disclosure of any of the other party's Confidential Information to third parties for a period of three (3) years after the termination of this Agreement, provided that the recipient party's obligation shall not apply to information that:

a) is not disclosed in writing or reduced to writing and so marked with as confidential within thirty (30) days of disclosure;
b) is already in the recipient party's possession at the time of disclosure thereof;
c) is or later becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the recipient party;
d) is received from a third party having no obligations of confidentiality to the disclosing party;
e) is independently developed by the recipient party; or
f) is required by law or regulation to be disclosed.

In the event that information is required to be disclosed pursuant to subsection f. and to the extent authorized by the law, the party required to make disclosure shall notify the other to allow that party to assert whatever exclusions or exemptions may be available to it under such law or regulation.

Article 11. Independent Contractor

For the purposes of this Agreement and all activities conducted hereunder, the parties shall be, and shall be deemed to be, independent contractors and not agents of employees of the other party. Neither party shall have authority to make any statement, representations or commitments of any kind, or to take any action which shall be binding on the other party, except as may be explicitly provided for herein or authorized in writing.

Article 12. Severability

If any of the provisions of this Agreement or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is rendered or declared illegal for any reason, or shall be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby, but shall be enforced
to the greatest extent permitted by applicable law.

**Article 13. Revision**

With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may be revised during its term and any revisions will be made in writing, both in English and Chinese, and will take effect as signed by authorized representatives of the parties.

**Article 14. Term**

The Agreement shall be in effect on the date when the two parties sign below. The Agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity. The Agreement will be subject to renewal only by mutual written agreement of both parties.

**Article 15. Force Majeure**

Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the event of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any other cause beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance of this agreement impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under the situation shall inform the other party in writing that the program may be delayed or terminated, and duly take the effective measures to mitigate the loss of the other party.

**Article 16. Termination**

Either party may terminate this Agreement and terminate all of its obligations pursuant to this Agreement:

1. If the other party fails to perform, keep and observe any terms or conditions required by this Agreement to be performed and fails to cure such default in accordance with the paragraph below, or

2. For convenience with six (6) months written notice to the other party. In the event of termination for convenience, TAMU shall promptly reimburse The Headquarters for any excess funds advanced by The Headquarters under this Agreement, over and above non-cancellable commitments and costs incurred by TAMU as of the date of termination.

In the event of a default, the non-defaulting party will give the defaulting party written notice, pursuant to Article 8 of this Agreement, to correct such default. If the default continues for thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of such notice, the non-defaulting party may terminate this Agreement by written notice to the defaulting party sent pursuant to Article 8 of this Agreement.

The termination of the Agreement shall not infringe upon any other agreement between the two parties.

In the event this Agreement is terminated, the parties agree to work together to make appropriate arrangements for the enrolled students and other work in progress.
**Article 17. Dispute Resolution**

Any dispute, controversy or claim between the Parties that may arise out of this Agreement or in relation to this Agreement shall be settled amicably through cordial consultations between both Parties or submit to non-binding mediation before a mediator mutually agreed by both parties.

**Article 18. Agreement Language**

This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one copy in Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The Agreement, in both languages, shall have the same effectiveness.

**Article 19. Miscellaneous**

Other matters not settled by this Agreement shall be solved through friendly, cooperative negotiations between the two parties.

Nothing in this Agreement constitutes or may be construed to be a waiver of the sovereign immunity of both parties.

This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties relative to the subject matter, and may only be modified or amended by a written agreement signed by both parties.

Confucius Institute Headquarters (HANBAN)  
Texas University  
Chief Executive  
President  
XU Lin  
R. Bowen Loftin  
Date: 2013.7.12  
Date: aj June 2013
 AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS OF CHINA
AND
UNIVERSITY OF GDAŃSK OF POLAND
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE AT UNIVERSITY OF GDAŃSK

In order to strengthen educational cooperation between China and Poland, support and promote the development of Chinese language education, and increase mutual understanding among people in China and in Poland, according to the Constitution and By-laws of Confucius Institutes, the Confucius Institute Headquarters of China (“the Headquarters”) and University of Gdańsk of Poland, for the establishment of Confucius Institute at University of Gdańsk (the Institute), hereby agree as follows:

Article 1  Purpose
The purpose of this agreement is to identify the rights and responsibilities of the Headquarters and University of Gdańsk in the establishment and management of the Institute.

Article 2  Character
The Institute shall be a non-profit educational institution.
Article 3  Executive Institution

University of Gdańsk is desirous of collaborating with China Youth University for Political Sciences. The Headquarters will authorize and appoint China Youth University for Political Sciences to construct the Confucius Institute with the University of Gdańsk as the Chinese executive institution. The two parties of cooperation will sign the supplementary agreement on detailed matters of the cooperation. The supplementary agreement should be audited by the Headquarters before signing.

The Institute must be launched within one year after this agreement is signed.

Article 4  Scope of Activities

The Institute can serve the following activities according to the Constitution and By-laws, and local instance:

1. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language teaching resources;

2. Training Chinese language instructors;

3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers;

4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China’s education, culture, and so forth;

5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities;

6. Other activities with authorization and by appointment of the Headquarters.
Article 5 Organization

1. The Institute at University of Gdańsk shall adopt a Director Responsibility System under the leadership of the Board of Directors.

2. The Board of Directors is formed with members nominated from two parties, and its duties include: formulating and amending the Constitution of the Institute; formulating development plans for the Institute; decision-making on the significant issues including teaching, research and management; fund raising; appointing and dismissing the director of the Institute; examining and approving the budget proposal and final financial accounts of the Institute; reporting to the two parties on the management status and significant issues.

3. Two collaborating parties appoint one director respectively.

4. The institute must accept the assessment of the Headquarters on the teaching quality.

5. The Institute activities must be in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws, and also respect cultural custom, shall not contravene concerning the laws and regulations, both in Poland and China.

6. The Institute draws up annual budget proposals and final financial accounts independently. University of Gdańsk will be in charge of its daily operation and management. It should finally assume the sole responsibility for its profits or losses by charging language course fees and other programs.

Article 6 Obligations

1. The obligations of the Headquarters:

(1) To authorize the use of the title "Confucius Institute", logos and
institute emblems.

(2) To provide teaching materials, coursewares and other books according to the necessary, to authorize the use of online courses. To provide 3,000 volumes of Chinese books, teaching materials, and audio-visual materials for the first time.

(3) To provide $150,000 start-up fund, and provide a set amount of annual fund according to needs.

(4) To send numbers of Chinese instructors based on the requirements of teaching, and pay for their air fares and salaries.

2. The obligations of University of Gdańsk

(1) To provide a fixed office place and appropriate sites for teaching and other activities of the Confucius Institute; equipped with office and teaching facilities, and with responsibility for the setting, management and maintenance.

(2) To provide necessary administrative personnel (full time or part-time) and provide the related payment; to provide necessary working facilities and life conveniences for the Chinese instructors.

(3) To assist the Chinese party on the visa application and residence procedures.

(4) To open the special account for the Confucius Institute in the local Bank of China or other bank approved by the Headquarters.

(5) To provide a set amount of annual fund, which should not be less than the amount provided by the Headquarters.

Article 7  Intellectual Property
The Headquarters exclusively owns the title of “The Confucius Institute”, its related logo, and emblem as its exclusive intellectual property. University of Gdańsk cannot continue applying or transfer the title, logo, and emblem in any form, either directly or indirectly, after this agreement has been terminated.

The provider owns intellectual property of the certain program. The two parties can consult the owner of the co-operated programs. In the events of any dispute, the two parties should consult with each other friendly or submit to the jurisdictional organ according to the related laws and regulations.

Article 8  Revision

With the consent of both parties, this Agreement may be revised during its implementation and any revisions will be made in writing, both in English and Chinese, and will take effect as signed by authorized representatives of the parties.

Article 9  Term

The Agreement shall be in effect on the date when the two parties sign below. The Agreement shall have a period of 5-year validity. Either party, if it wishes to terminate the Agreement must notify the other in writing during the 90 days before the end of the Agreement, otherwise it will automatically be extended for another 5 years.

Article 10  Force Majeure
Parties hereto will be released from their obligations under this agreement in the event of a national emergency, war, prohibitive government regulation or any other cause beyond the control of the parties hereto that renders the performance of this agreement impossible. In the event of such circumstance, the party under the situation shall inform the other party in writing that the program may be delayed or terminated, and duly take the effective measures to mitigate the loss of the other party.

Article 11 Termination

This Agreement shall be terminated in one of the following cases:
1. Either party intends to terminate this Agreement upon giving a written notice at least six months in advance of their intention to terminate.
2. The two parties have no aspiration of cooperation at the expiration of the term.
3. The Agreement cannot go through or cannot achieve the anticipated aim because of comedown of the condition.
4. If the act of one party of the Agreement severely harms the image and reputation of the other party.
5. The Agreement cannot go through because of force majeure.

The termination of the Agreement cannot affect some other agreement, contract and program between the two parties.

Before the Agreement is terminated, University of Gdańsk should make appropriate arrangements on the enrolled students and other works.
The undersigned hereby are duly authorized by each institution to execute this Agreement.

This Agreement is written in Chinese and in English. Each party shall keep one copy in Chinese and one copy in English of the signed Agreement. The Agreement, in both languages, shall have the same effectiveness.

Confucius Institute                    University of Gdańsk
Headquarters (HANBAN)                  Rector
Chief Executive                        

XU Lin                                  
Date: 20/9/14

Hab. Bernard Lammek                    
Date:
Appendix 8: Information Sheet and Consent Form

INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS

I’m a Senior Lecturer and Chinese Course Leader at the University of Central Lancashire, also a part-time PhD student conducting a research into Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics——A Great Leap Outward? My study will focus on the distinctive features of China’s Cultural Diplomacy, and evaluate the series of factors affecting its impact through a comparative case study of Confucius Institutes in South Korea in Asia, where the very first CI in the world was set up; and UK with the most concentrated CIs in Europe; with a view to providing a contrasting angles between a generally East and West cultural perspectives, and contextualizing China’s contemporary global cultural footprints by looking at ‘why’ China wants to launch cultural diplomacy and the Confucius Institute, ‘what’ is the vehicle of the CI, ‘who’ is the agent, and ‘how’ it is carried out in the field.

This research involves interviews which might take about 45-60 minutes. As a Director/staff of the Confucius Institute, your views and experiences are invaluable for this study. I’m therefore seeking your help with the above research project by answering some interview questions. The information you provide will be used to write thesis and may be seen publicly if it leads to conference papers or publications, but it is assured that the information you provide will be anonymous; that is, your name will not be recorded anywhere and no personal information will be revealed from which you could be identified. You will receive a copy of the thesis and have access to any conference paper or publication arising from the research.

Your participation is voluntary and based on adequate understanding of both the proposed research and the implications of participation in it. If you wish to withdraw from the project, you may do so without question at any time, or even after the interview, you can just inform me by email. You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t
want to answer and still remain in the study. If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project, you may contact me or my supervisors, Dr. Petra Bagley, Dr Jenny Clegg, and Dr. Anandi Ramamurthy at the details given below. If you are willing to participate, please sign the consent form. If you wish to receive a summary of the results by email, please leave your contact details on the consent form.

Please accept my deepest appreciation for your cooperation and time in advance.

Researcher: Xin Liu
Contact: xliu13@uclan.ac.uk
Tel: 0044-1772 893121
Supervisors: Dr. Petra Bagley
Contact: PMBagley@uclan.ac.uk
Dr. Jenny Clegg
Contact: jclegg4@uclan.ac.uk
Dr. Anandi Ramamurthy
Contact: ARamamurthy@uclan.ac.uk
CONSENT FORM

The Consent Form is retained by the researcher for their records. The Information Sheet is kept by the participant.

The participant may request a copy of their consent form.

Title of research project: Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics----A Great Leap Outward?

Name of researcher: Xin Liu

Tick the box that applies, sign and date and give to the researcher

I agree to take part in the research project specified above.              Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand the information about my participation in the research project, which has been provided to me by the researcher.            Yes ☐ No ☐

I agree to be interviewed by the researcher and allow the interview to be audio-taped.                                      Yes ☐ No ☐

I agree to make myself available for further interview if required.                                 Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the interview before publication. (only applies to the CI Directors) Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that my participation is voluntary and I understand that I can cease my participation at any time.            Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that my participation in this research will be treated with confidentiality.            Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that any information that may identify me will be de-identified at the time of analysis of any data.                  Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that no identifying information will be disclosed or published.                        Yes ☐ No ☐

I am aware that I can contact the researchers at any time with any queries. Their contact details are provided to me.            Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that this research project has been approved by the UCLAN BAHSS Ethics Committee.                      Yes ☐ No ☐
Participant's name: ______________________________________________________

Participant's signature: _________________________________________________

Date: ________________________

☐ Please tick this box and provide your email or mail address below if you wish to receive a summary of the results:

Email: ________________________________________________________________
研究课题及研究人基本情况

我是英国兰开夏中央大学的资深讲师和中文课程主管，也是一名兼职在读博士生，我的研究课题是《中国特色的文化外交》。该研究将着重于探索中国文化外交的特征，并评估对其实施效果有影响力的一系列因素，研究方法包括对孔子学院做一组对照案例研究：选取建有全球首家孔院的韩国和有着全欧最密集孔院的英国，以期通过东西方不同文化的视角和土壤来审视中国开展文化外交的目的，手段，行为主体和行为方式，从而更好地理解和诠释当代中国在全球的文化足印。

该研究包含一个时长约为 45-60 分钟的采访。作为孔子学院的院长/教师，您的观点和经验对该研究至为宝贵。我因此请求您的参与和帮助。您提供的信息将被用于撰写论文，或许会在学术会议及期刊上发表，但本人保证您所提供的信息均为匿名，也就是说，您的姓名将不会出现在任何场合，也不会泄露任何暴露您身份的信息。您也将收到最后完成的论文，及所有发表的跟该研究有关的学术成果。

您的参与是自愿的，并基于对该研究课题的了解。如果您有意退出，可选择在任何时候毫无条件地退出，包括在采访结束后，您可以通过电子邮件通知我。您也可以选择拒绝回答采访中的任何问题而继续参与该课题。如果您有任何疑问，或希望获得有关此研究的任何资料，请同我本人或我的导师取得联系。如果您愿意参与，请在知情同意书上签字。

在此，我谨对于您的合作和时间，表示最诚挚的谢意。
博士生：刘昕
联系方式: xliu13@uclan.ac.uk
电话: 0044-1772 893121
博士导师：Dr. Petra Bagley
联系方式: PMBagley@uclan.ac.uk
博士导师：Dr. Jenny Clegg
联系方式: jclegg4@uclan.ac.uk
博士导师：Dr. Anandi Ramamurthy
联系方式: ARamamurthy@uclan.ac.uk
知情同意书

研究课题名称：中国特色的文化外交

研究人姓名：刘昕

请在相应方框中打钩，填写左下角的联系信息并签名后交还给研究人。

我同意参加上述研究课题  Yes  □  No  □

研究人向我介绍并提供了关于该研究课题的基本情况。 Yes  □  No  □

我同意接受采访，并允许对采访录音。 Yes  □  No  □

我同意在后期有需求时接受进一步的采访。 Yes  □  No  □

我清楚我有机会在论文发表之前看到采访记录。（仅限于孔院院长） Yes  □  No  □

我清楚我的参与是自愿的，并可在任何时候选择退出。 Yes  □  No  □

我清楚任何会泄露我身份的信息会在数据分析时做模糊处理。 Yes  □  No  □

我清楚不会发布或发表任何有可能泄露我身份的信息。 Yes  □  No  □

我知道我可以就任何疑问随时联系研究人，她已提供给我联系方式。 Yes  □  No  □

我知道该研究课题已经过兰开夏中央大学职业道德委员会批准通过。 Yes  □  No  □

参与人姓名： ______________________________________________________

参与人签名： ______________________________________________________

日期： ______________________

□ 如果您愿意收到最终论文或其他研究成果，请在此方框中打钩，并提供您的电子邮件

电子邮件： __________________________________________________________
Appendix 9: Interview Questions

Interview Questions
For CI Directors:

Warming up questions:
1. How long have you worked at the CI? Is your role as CI Director a fulltime one or part-time? (What other roles you have?)
   请问您在孔院工作多久了？您做英方院长是专职还是兼职？

2. Confucius Institute was regarded as the flagship of China’s Cultural Diplomacy, what is your understanding of its mission?
   孔子学院被称作是中国文化外交的旗帜，您如何理解她被赋予的使命？
   Possible follow-up question: how do you see its role in the background of China’s recent rise and rejuvenation?
   您认为孔子学院在中国的崛起和复兴的背景下可以发挥哪些作用？

3. From your experience of handling daily affairs (day-to-day operation), what are the opportunities and challenges for CI to achieve these aims?
   从您的日常工作中，您认为孔院要实现这些意图面临哪些机遇和挑战？
   Possible follow-up question: Do you feel cultural differences between East and West is more of an opportunity or challenge for your work? Could you give some examples?
   您觉得东西方的文化差异对您的工作更多意味着机遇还是挑战？可否举例说明？

4. Why do you think CI is based in overseas universities? What are the pros and cons compared with the models of its counterparts, such as the Cervantes/Goethe Institute that are based in city center?
   您觉得孔院为什么决定开在外方的大学校园里？同歌德和塞万提斯学院的方式相比，您觉得孔院的方式有哪些利弊？

5. Apart from language teaching, which aspects of Chinese culture is promoted through the CI activities? Which aspects of China is the general public most interested in learning? /What kind of questions are the most popular?
   除了语言教学外，孔子学院主要向所在国展现中国文化的哪些方面？当地民众最感兴趣了解中国的哪些方面？/他们最喜欢问的问题有哪些？
   Possible follow-up question: in the process of interacting with local people, did you sense any common biases in their general perception of China? What can CI do to change this?
   在跟当地民众接触的过程中，您感觉他们对中国的了解在哪些方面存在偏差？孔院可以做些什么来纠正这些偏见？

6. Could you tell me one most successful and one less successful event you’ve
organized so far?
可否给我们分别介绍一个贵院认为开展得最为成功/最不成功的项目/活动？

Possible follow-up question: in the process of carrying out such activities, are there anything quite different from your expectations (for both successful and unsuccessful events)?
在开展这些非常成功或不太成功活动的过程中，有什么跟您原先的预期非常不同的吗？

7. I noticed in the CI Constitution, among the five services it provides, the last one has been changed from ‘conducting research on contemporary China’ to ‘conducting language and cultural exchange activities’. According to you, what are the reasons behind such change?
根据孔院章程，孔子学院一共提供五种的活动中，最后一项从‘开展对当代中国的研究’改为了‘开展中外语言文化交流活动’。在您看来，汉办为什么会做此修改？

8. What are your comments on the new ‘Confucius China Studies Program’? Is your institute involved in any way? 您对‘新汉学计划’有何评价？你们有哪些具体的参与吗？

9. As the sponsor, how does Hanban oversee the work of the CI? In what areas do they hold the decision power (have the say)?
汉办作为出资方如何监管孔院的工作？他们在哪些事情上有决定权？

Possible follow-up question: Has it ever occurred to your CI that a project budget was not approved by Hanban?
你们有无碰到过项目报批没有通过的情况？

10. The CI Constitution prescribes that Hanban will be responsible for the evaluation of CIs, could you tell me how this is done and what are the criteria?
孔院章程中规定汉办负责对孔子学院的评估，可否介绍一下他们怎样评估和评估标准？

Possible follow-up question: Can you use examples to illustrate what kind of rewards and sanctions are in place?
你可否举例说明具体有哪些奖惩措施？

11. Which aspects of the training provided by Hanban you find most useful?
您觉得汉办提供的外方院长培训哪些内容最有用？

12. What areas are the local media interests in CI? Is there a channel that Hanban is informed of all the local media reports, including controversial ones if there are any?
当地媒体对孔院的报道都关注哪些方面？汉办有无渠道可以了解到当地的媒体报道，包括有争议的或负面的报道？

13. Could you describe the relationship between the three parties - Chinese university, its host university, and Hanban? Can you use an example to illustrate the communication mechanism among this triangle?
您能否描述一下中方共建院校和外方合作大学以及汉办这三者的关系？可否举例说明一下这三者间的沟通机制？
14. Do you think both sides of the partnership (Chinese home university and the overseas host university) share an unanimous understanding of the goals of the Confucius Institute? Could you elaborate with some examples?
您觉得中外双方大学对设立孔子学院的目的的理解是否一致？可否举例说明？

15. What sorts of issues are of common concern on the CI Annual Conference organized by Hanban?
每年的孔院大会上一般讨论哪些共同关心的话题？
Possible follow-up question: When 'model CIs' share their experiences on this conference, do you feel if a replicable common model more encouraged by Hanban, or a more individualised/localised model? Compared with other CIs, What is your most distinctive feature?
当模范孔院在大会上介绍他们的经验时，您感觉汉办更鼓励标准化模式还是特色模式？跟其他孔院相比，你们的最大特色是什么？

16. Are there any new offerings in your work plans next year? (finishing) Anything on your 'wish list'?
你们孔院在今后的工作中有无计划新的内容？有没有什么您特别希望能发生的？

For Chinese Co-Directors:
针对中方院长：

Warming up questions:
1. How long have you worked at the CI?
请问您在孔院工作多久了？
2. What are the biggest appeals/attractions of this position to you when you applied? What significance does this overseas posting have on your career development?
您申请这个职位对您最大的吸引力是什么？您认为外派的这段经历对您的职业生涯有何影响？

(About the purpose of CI)
same

(About CI’s provision)
Same

(About the role of Chinese government and communication among the triangle)
Same, with two extra questions:

1. Could you please briefly describe the selection process and criteria for appointing the Co-Director of Confucius Institute representing the Chinese university?
可否请您介绍一下中方院长的选拔过程和标准？

2. During your overseas posting, who appraises your work, is it your home university or Hanban?
For CI tutors (secondees):
针对中方外派老师:

Warming up questions:
1. How long have you worked at the CI? Is this your first overseas posting?
请问您在孔院工作多久了？这是您第一次外派工作吗？

2. What are the biggest appeals/attractions of this position to you when you applied?
您申请这个职位对您最大的吸引力是什么？

3. Compared with your previous job at the University, what are the differences, if there are any, to working for the CI now? Any differences from your expectations?
您觉得在孔院工作和原来在中方大学工作相比，有什么不一样吗？跟你自己的预期有什么不一样吗？

(About the purpose of CI)

4. What do you think are the goals for the Confucius Institute? According to you, what role can CI play in the background of China’s rise and rejuvenation?
您认为孔子学院的目标是什么？它在中国的崛起和复兴的背景下可以发挥哪些作用？

5. Do you think both sides of the partnership (Chinese home university and the overseas host university) share an unanimous understanding of the goals of the Confucius Institute? Could you elaborate with some examples?
您觉得中外双方大学对设立孔子学院的目的的理解是否一致？可否举例说明？

(About the provision of CI)

6. Apart from language teaching, which aspects of Chinese culture is promoted through the CI activities? Which aspects of China is the general public most interested in learning?
除了语言教学外，孔子学院主要向所在国展现中国文化的哪些方面？当地民众最感兴趣了解中国的哪些方面？

   Possible follow-up question: in the process of interacting with local people, did you sense any common biases in their general perception of China? What can CI do to change this?
   在跟当地民众接触的过程中，您感觉他们对中国的了解在哪些方面存在偏差？孔子学院可以做些什么来纠正这些偏见？

7. Could you tell me one most successful and one less successful event you’ve organized so far?
可否给我们分别介绍一个贵院认为开展得最为成功/最不成功的项目/活动？

   Possible follow-up question: in the process of carrying out such activities, are there anything quite different from your expectations (for both successful and unsuccessful events)?
   在实施这些项目的过程中，有没有什么与您预期大不相同的地方（无论是成功还是失败的事件）？
在开展这些非常成功或不太成功的活动中，有什么跟您原先的预期非常不同的吗？

8. What are the most popular/frequent questions you get asked by your students?
   学生最喜欢问什么样的问题？
   Possible follow-up question: How do you handle sensitive questions?
   碰到敏感问题你如何处理？

9. Do you follow local/national media’s reports about China? What are your thoughts of those controversial or negative ones?
   您关心当地媒体对中国的报道吗？你如何看待哪些有争议的或负面的报道？

（about role of Chinese government）
10. What kind of pre-departure training did you receive from Hanban? Which components have the most practical value according to you?
   您在国内赴任前接受过汉办安排的哪些培训？您觉得最有用的是什么？
   Possible follow-up question: Any trainings after you arrive?
   赴任后呢？

（about the love triangle）
11. Could you describe the relationship between the three parties - Chinese university, its host university, and Hanban? Can you use an example to illustrate the communication mechanism among this triangle?
   您能否描述一下中方共建院校和外方合作大学以及汉办这三者的关系？可否举例说明一下这三者间的沟通机制？

12. During your overseas posting, who is responsible for your appraisal, could you tell me what are the criteria?
   外派期间，谁负责对你工作的评估，可否介绍一下评估标准？

（finishing）:
13. Do you feel the two year term of service is too long, too short, or just right? Why?
   您觉得2年的任期长短合适吗？为什么？
Interview Questions for Mr. Anders, Director of the Goethe Institute in Beijing:

1. Hanban made it clear on its own website that “Benefiting from the UK, France, Germany and Spain's experience in promoting their national languages, China began its own exploration through establishing non-profit public institutions with an aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries in 2004: these were given the name of Confucius Institute.” It is almost a self-identification that Confucius Institute is the Chinese version of Goethe Institute, and comparisons are frequently made between CI and GI in media and academic literature. Do you agree or disagree on these comparisons? What are the major differences and similarities between these two organizations according to you?

2. As you may know, CI is mostly based on overseas campus of the host university while GI is located in city center, what do you think are the pros and cons of CI’s operating model?

3. Why, unlike its western counterparts, CI’s intentions were often questioned with suspicions of cultural invasion or ideological infiltration?

4. Do you think it is a level playing field for every country that is engaged in culture diplomacy?

5. What are the biggest challenges you face at work?

6. You may have heard of the few cases of CIs being closed down recently, including 1 in Russia, 1 in France, 1 in Canada, 2 in US and 1 in Sweden, any comments on the reasons behind these closures? What lessons do you think CI can learn from them?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Role of the interviewee</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Venue of interview</th>
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<td>GB</td>
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<td>MXD</td>
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<td>28/07/13</td>
<td>Home university in Beijing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Anders</td>
<td>Director of Goethe Institute in Beijing, no code needed as he agreed to have his name revealed in the paper.</td>
<td>GM</td>
<td>13/08/15</td>
<td>Goethe Institute in Beijing</td>
<td>English</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 11: Implementation Plan for the “Confucius Institute Head Teacher Position”

With the purpose of further strengthening the building of Confucius Institutes’ teachers team, improving the teaching quality and level of Confucius Institutes and ensuring their sustainable development, the Confucius Institute Headquarters/ Hanban of China (hereinafter referred to as “Hanban”) has decided to cooperate with host universities of Confucius Institutes to set up the Head Teacher Position.

I) Responsibilities of the Head Teacher

A Head Teacher is a full-time employee who takes full responsibility for organizing and managing Chinese language teaching of Confucius Institutes under the leadership of the Institute Directors. Main responsibilities of the Head Teacher are as follows: to develop teaching plans based on the Chinese language needs of the host country, the host university and local community; to select teaching materials and formulate teaching outline based on actual needs; to train and guide teachers and volunteers of the Confucius Institute and carry out teaching assessments; to conduct Chinese language teaching; and to establish and manage the teaching archives of the Confucius Institute.

II) Application for the Head Teacher Position

The Head Teacher Position shall be set up by host universities on a voluntary basis. Each Institute can apply to set up one Head Teacher Position. The Institute that applies for such a position shall be running for at least two years, and have more than 200 registered students.

Application process: 1. The host university of Confucius Institutes that meet the requirements shall submit to the Confucius Institute Headquarters the Application Form for the Confucius Institute Head Teacher Position; 2. Confucius Institute Headquarters organizes experts to review and decide whether to approve the application; 3. Confucius Institute Headquarters signs the Agreement to Jointly Set Up the Confucius Institute.
III) Requirements for the Head Teacher

The Head Teacher shall meet the following requirements: the Head Teacher shall be passionate about working in Confucius Institutes and abide by the laws of the host country and China, as well as the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes. The Head Teacher shall hold at least a master’s degree, be proficient in Chinese and the language of the host country, and possess strong overall capacities such as cross-cultural communication and organizational skills. For Head Teachers who are native Chinese speakers, they shall attain at least Grade A (Level 2) in the Mandarin test held by China's State Language Work Committee. For Head Teachers who are non-native Chinese speakers, they shall attain new HSK level 6 in the Mandarin test. The Head Teacher shall have at least five years of Chinese language teaching experience or have taught for more than two years in Confucius Institutes. The Head Teacher shall meet relevant legal requirements of the host country; meet the health requirements as set out by the university hiring process; be citizens of the host country or have permanent residency, or shall at least have a work permit.

IV) Process for the selection and recruitment of the Head Teacher

Head Teachers will be selected based on open recruitment, expert review by Hanban and university appointment. The specific procedures are as follows: 1. The host university will conduct open recruitment around the world based on the requirements put forth in Section III of this plan. 2. The host university shall submit the Recommendation Form for the Confucius Institute Head Teacher Position along with the application letter of the candidate to Hanban. 3. Hanban reviews the application and gives an official response.

Hanban shall reserve the right to recommend outstanding graduates of the Master's degree scholarship program in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL), and under the same condition, these candidates will be given priority in the
V) Funding

In principle, the salary of the Head Teacher shall be set in reference to the salary standard of teachers in local universities of the same condition. In case the standard is lower than that of Hanban sent teachers, the salary of the Head Teacher can apply Hanban’s standard. There are two modes of funding, from which one should be selected:

1. Hanban shall be responsible for the full salary of the Head Teacher over the first 5-year period and 50% of the salary over the second 5-year period. The host university shall be responsible for 50% of the salary over the second 5-year period, and the full salary starting from the third 5-year period.

2. Hanban and the host university shall each be responsible for 50% of the Head Teacher’s salary over the first, second and third 5-year period.

Hanban will fund the training of the Head Teacher in China or in the host country, and provide necessary teaching materials, reference books and teaching aid.

VI) Program Management

1. The host university should integrate the Head Teacher Position into the university’s employment position system, and pledge to maintain this position over the long-term. The host university, according to relevant university regulations, should provide the Head Teacher with benefits, medical insurance, pension and necessary office space and equipments.

2. The host university, according to its relevant regulations, shall sign an employment contract with the Head Teacher With a trial period of one year. If the Head Teacher passes the annual assessment, his/her employment contract can be renewed.

3. The host university is responsible for conducting the annual assessment of the Head Teacher based on the assessment criteria for Head Teachers and taking into account Hanban’s comments. For Head Teachers who fail the assessment, the host university may decide to terminate the employment contract, and immediately notify Hanban of such decision.
4. Over the program’s implementation period, if the host university undergoes one of the following situations, Hanban shall reserve the right to terminate the contract and put an end to funding:

- Violation of the laws of the host country (region) or China;
- Failure to fulfil the obligations as stipulated in the agreement or violation of the agreement terms;
- The Head Teacher Position being vacant for one year or more;
- The usage of funds for the Head Teacher Position violates the terms of the agreement.

5. Over the program’s implementation period, if any program-related issue arises, both parties shall settle the issues through friendly consultations; and in case of failure to reach a consensus, neither party can unilaterally terminate the agreement. Either party, if it wishes to terminate the agreement, must notify the other in writing 3 months before the end of the agreement, and the agreement shall be terminated once a consensus is reached between the two parties.

Source: http://english.hanban.org/node_43089.htm#no1
Appendix 12: CI Conference Program and Executive Training Program

The 8th Confucius Institute Conference Program, Dec, 2013

Reflect Back, Look Forward (English version provided to the delegates)

Day 1: Opening Ceremony
Chaired by Yuan Guiren, Ministry of Education, Vice Chair of the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters
Key note address by: Liu Yandong, Vice Premier, Chair of the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters
Followed by speech by conference delegates
Award ceremony of “Confucius Institutes (classroom) of the Year 2013”; “Confucius Institutes Individual Performance Excellence Award”; and “Outstanding Confucius Institute Chinese Partner”

Confucius Institute Best Practices Forums
Topic 1: Chinese Language Teaching
Topic 2: Brand Cultural Activities with Special Feature
Topic 3: Facilitate Primary and Secondary School Chinese Teachers to Acquire Certification
Topic 4: Developing the Testing Market
Topic 5: Improving the Teaching Conditions of Confucius Institute
Topic 6: Development of Teaching Materials and Digital Resources
Topic 7: Supporting the Development of Confucius Classrooms
Topic 8: Confucius Institutes and “MOOC”

Day 2: President’s Forum
Topic 1: Confucius Institute Planning and University Development ---- Serve the colleges
Topic 2: Confucius Institute Planning and University Development ---- Serve the community
Topic 3: Confucius Institute Day (to be held globally on 27th Sep 2014 to commemorate CI’s 10-year anniversary)
Topic 4: Implementation of the “Confucius Institute Studies Program’
Topic 5: Development of Local Majors in Teaching Chinese
Topic 6: The Role of the “Head Teacher” Position
Topic 7: Achievements of Translating and Publishing Chinese and Foreign Cultural Readings

Closing Ceremony
Chinese Culture Lecture: Confucius in My Imagination
Lecturer: Mr. Mo Yan, Nobel Laureate in Literature 2012, Renowned writer and professor of Beijing Normal University
Closing Speech by: Xu Lin, Member of the CPPCC National Committee, Counsellor of the State Council, Chief Executive of Confucius Institute Headquarters and Director General of Hanban
Executive Training Program of Confucius Institute Directors

**The 2008 workshop** only lasted for two days, following the 3-day Annual Conference in Beijing. According to the Program booklet:

Goals: the workshop is designed to specify Confucius Institute’s mission, ideas, objectives and tasks, and further improve the managerial capacity of directors to ensure high teaching quality of Confucius Institute.

Content: The workshop will feature seminars on ‘Comparison of Chinese and Foreign Cultures’ and the ‘The Chinese Economy in the International Arena’, discussion of the orientation and development of Confucius Institutes, their organization and management, quality of teaching faculty, curriculum design and teaching materials’ development, fund-raising and financial management, implementation of special programs and so on.

The 2013 workshop lasted for 8 days, with 6 days of full schedule, the keynote speeches are listed below:

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<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<td>Prof. Xu Jialu, Vice Chairman of the 9th and 10th NPC Standing Committee</td>
<td>An Introduction to Confucian Classics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Tang Min, professor of the economics dept. of CPC Party School of the Central Committee</td>
<td>New Policies of the New Chinese Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Qizheng, Dean, School of Journalism and Communication of Renmin Uni, Former Minister, State Council Information Office</td>
<td>Public Diplomacy in the Modern Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Zhang Weiwei Director of the Institute of China Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences</td>
<td>The China Model and its Future: A Global Perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Zhang Weiwei Director of the Institute of China Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences</td>
<td>How to Introduce China to the World</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. David Gosset, Deputy Director for European Relations at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS)</td>
<td>The Chinese Renaissance and Its Global Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Zhou Ning, Xiamen University</td>
<td>Western Images of China in the Last Century</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Li Tiangang, head of the Religious Studies Department of the School of Philosophy at Fudan University</td>
<td>Communication and Integration: Early Globalization Between China and West</td>
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<td>Prof. Ke Chuanren, Professor of Chinese and Second Language Acquisition at The University of Iowa, Confucius Institute Director</td>
<td>Some Observations on the Difference between the U.S. and Chinese Discourse Systems</td>
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<td>Prof. Ding Chun, Center for World Economy Studies, Director of Centre for European Studies, Fudan University</td>
<td>Economic and Social Development in China Since Reform: Performance, Problems and Challenges</td>
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<td>Prof. Wu Xinbo, Deputy director of Institute for International Studies, Director of Center for American Studies, Fudan University</td>
<td>Peaceful Development and Win-Win Cooperation: A New Outlook of China’s Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Chen Hong, Director of Institute of Intercultural Communication, Nankai University</td>
<td>Book of Changes –The Classic of Chinese Civilization</td>
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<td>Prof. Zhou Zhenhe, Institute of Chinese Historical Geography, Fudan University</td>
<td>History of China: Territory and Culture</td>
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<td>Prof. Qian Xiaoyan, Xiamen University</td>
<td>Experiencing Chinese Medicine: Meridians and Acupuncture</td>
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<td>Dr. Diarra Boubacar, China Primary Health Care Foundation</td>
<td>Health Care on Traditional Chinese Medicine</td>
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<td>Prof. Xiong Qingnian, Director and Researcher of Center for Higher Education, Fudan University</td>
<td>The Inheritance and Development of Cultural Tradition of Chinese Education</td>
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<td>Prof. Gong Ke, President of Nankai University</td>
<td>China’s Higher Education: In a New Phase of Reform and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Sun Tao, Nankai University</td>
<td>China’s New Rural Development: Exemplified by Huaming Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jiang Yuanxun, Jin Junmei Founder.</td>
<td>Chinese Tea and the World</td>
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