'Divided Within Itself': The Parliamentary Labour ‘Right’ and the Demise of Post-war Revisionist Social Democracy in the 1970s

The article seeks to identify a neglected dimension of the ‘crisis’ and schism of British social democracy in the 1970s from within the ranks of the parliamentary Labour ‘right’ itself. Accounts of the so-called ‘Labour right’ and its influential revisionist social democratic tradition have emphasised its generic cohesion and uniformity over contextual analysis of its inherent intellectual, ideological and political range and diversity. The article seeks to evaluate differential responses of Labour’s ‘right-wing’ and revisionist tendency as its loosely cohesive framework of Keynesian social democracy imploded in the 1970s as a means of demonstrating its relative incoherence and fragmentation. The ‘crisis of social democracy’ revealed much more starkly its complex, heterogeneous character, irremediably ‘divided within itself’ over a range of critical political and policy themes and the basis of social democratic political philosophy itself. The article argues that it was its own wider political fragmentation and ideological introspection in the face of the ‘crisis’ of its historic ‘belief system’ which led to the facture of Labour’s ‘dominant coalition’ and the rupture of British social democracy.

Keywords: Labour Party; social democracy: revisionism; Social Democratic Party (SDP)
Introduction

The amorphous catch-all concept of the ‘Labour right’ is of course not without its difficulties. Designation of the label ‘right-wing’ to individuals and groups of a left-wing party is often problematic and unsatisfactory, given its often pejorative implications.\(^1\) There has also been a tendency to conflate complex (and often conflicting) groups of traditions and ideas in some sort of undifferentiated non-left, moderate and often loyalist tendency. Richard Heffernan, for example, sums up the orthodoxy of writing Labour’s history when he describes the party as a ‘left–right political coalition fashioned by its labourist political culture…The historical division most…alluded to is that between a majority right and a minority left’. The traditionally dominant position of the former in the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) has ensured a ‘centrist, indeed predominantly right-wing institution’ and ‘leadership support base’.\(^2\) Hence, Alan Warde has been able to suggest that it is ‘unfortunate that ideological diversity within the Party has been distilled into the hoary imagery of a left-right continuum’. While ‘serviceable enough in everyday usage, the distinction becomes a liability in precise, historical analysis’. One of the principal objections is that, by failing to acknowledge the ideational range of inexact or approximate political categories and ‘neglecting to specify the content of alternative [philosophies and strategies] at stake’, it ‘imposes non-existent continuities’ and uniformity. The ‘fact that [Labour’s] right has been, variously [and often simultaneously], socialist, utilitarian, and liberal, with distinct and important consequences for British politics, is lost from view’.\(^3\)
By contrast, this article seeks to disassemble and disaggregate what many have considered to be Labour’s homogeneous ‘right-wing’ and ‘revisionist’ tendency. It identifies the heterogeneous political character and ideological dimensions of Labour’s so-called post-war ‘dominant coalition’. It addresses this broader ideological and political terrain in the context of post-war dilemmas, debates and divisions of revisionist social democracy that culminated in its fracture and then rupture in the 1970s and early 1980s. It suggests that the ostensibly cohesive ‘Labour right’ was rather a complex, heterogeneous, loose coalition of tendencies, profoundly divided over a range of political themes and even foundational philosophical principles. By foregrounding its intrinsic ideological diversity rather than promoting its explanatory expedient homogeneity, it is arguably less surprising that the ‘Labour right’ and its broadly revisionist social democratic mind-set was found ‘divided within itself’ as the loosely adhesive framework of Keynesian and ‘Croslandite’ social democracy imploded during the 1970s. It was the inability of this influential and diverse body of Labour opinion to unite in the face of existential external and internal threats, as much an effect of its own political fragmentation and ideological introspection as that of a resurgent ‘Labour left’, that had important consequences for the Labour Party, social democracy and British politics.

Firstly, the article considers some of the conceptual difficulties of defining the ‘Labour right’ in terms of standard criteria used for assignment to Labour’s broad left-right ideological spectrum. Secondly, it addresses potential analytical limitations of principal conceptualisations of Labour’s traditionally dominant ‘right-wing’ or ‘revisionist’ tendency, which largely neglect the underlying complexity of ideas, accents and habits,
preferences and implicit tensions of the ‘Labour right’, and the latent and incipient political fissures of Labour’s revisionist social democracy itself. It provides a sympathetic critique of attempts to disaggregate Labour’s dominant centre-right coalition to offer more discriminating and fluid conceptions of its constituent beliefs, ideas, traditions, personal affiliations, political strategies and tactical considerations. Thirdly, it addresses the theoretical basis of its ideological and political disposition(s), including the potential and prospective conflict of core concepts of ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ in Labour’s revisionist social democracy. Finally, it identifies potential sources of conflict and division and their impending consequences in pivotal episodes of economic and industrial policy. This putative friction of social democratic philosophy was expressed in critical policy and political disputes over industrial relations and trade union reform and the practical limits of public spending commitments of Labour governments in the 1970s. Ultimately, the longstanding tensions and nascent divisions of revisionist social democracy played out in internal party debates and strategies and differential outlooks and subsequent trajectories of Labour’s ‘social democrats’ following the 1979 election defeat, a perspective that is routinely overlooked or underplayed in explanations of the Labour’s split and formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981.

‘Defining’ the ‘Labour Right’

As noted, the nebulous concept of the ‘Labour right’ is difficult to define or classify in a circumscribed and objective manner. One difficulty is that ‘few in the Labour Party admit to being on its right unless they are about to jump ship’. In their ideological battles with
the ‘Bevanites’ or ‘Tribunites’ in the 1950s, for example, the ‘Gaitskellite’ tendency claimed to represent the centre of the party in their loyalty to the party leadership against the socialist left. The so-called ‘centre’ and ‘right’ of the parliamentary party are not always clearly distinguishable. It is ‘difficult to decide where the line is’. Where, for instance, does the ‘large and amorphous’ centre of the party, or even the ‘Morrisonian consolidators’, give way to the ‘firm right’?

In their classic study of the origins, formation and political trajectory of the SDP, Crewe and King provide definitions of varying degrees of specificity in their attempt to explain the rupture of British social democracy. On a very broad level, they define Labour’s pre-secessionist right-wing as ‘all those...who did not think of themselves as left-wingers and did not belong to left-wing organisations like the Tribune Group or the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy’. Accordingly, there were ‘about 150 MPs on the Labour right in 1981, comprising most of those who did not vote for Michael Foot on the first ballot’ of the 1980 leadership contest. A tighter definition might reduce the number ‘to about 120’, somewhere between those who voted for Denis Healey on the first ballot (112) and those who voted for him on the second (129), although not all those who voted for Healey might be considered committed right-wingers. They also suggest that a different prior indicator of party allegiance produces a similar outcome. 118 MPs, who in July 1975 signed a letter of support for Reg Prentice in his deselection battle with his left-wing constituency party in Newham North-East, remained in the 1979 parliament.
There were a number of partly overlapping right-wing factional groupings in the PLP in the 1970s. The Manifesto Group, formed in 1974 primarily to offset the increasingly influential Tribune Group and organise the right-wing slate for shadow cabinet elections, could depend on a core membership of around eighty, but this reflected a broader centre-right range of opinion in the party. The combined vote of the ‘two indisputably right-wing candidates’, Jenkins and Healey, in the first round of the 1976 leadership contest was eighty-six, but was arguably not an absolute reflection of right-wing representation in the PLP, as a number considered to be of the right supported Callaghan as the most effective anti-left unity candidate. None of these estimations appear adequate or tell us much about the constituent traditions, beliefs, ideas, preferences and strategies of the ‘Labour right’ by the mid-1970s. Beyond narrow personal affiliations and tactical considerations, there is a need to say more about the criteria used to define placement on Labour’s left-right ideological spectrum.

‘Revisionists’ and ‘Consolidators’, ‘Social Tendencies’ and Intellectual Currents of the ‘Labour Right’

Dimensions of the ‘Labour right’ have been represented in three main ways. Firstly, there are those who emphasise the standard left-right dichotomy and, occasionally, a nebulous, non-aligned centre, motivated by the desire ‘to hold the ring and reconcile the warring factions’. The basic distinction has often been framed in terms of divergent attitudes to the centrality of public ownership and the meaning of socialism. Secondly, those who adopt variations of a rudimentary distinction within the ‘Labour right’ between intellectual, revisionist social democrats and non-intellectual, pragmatic, trade union
These broadly useful, if fixed, schemas frequently posit homogeneous, unchanging ‘doctrinal’ blocs or factions that cohere around fundamental ideological positions on a single theme or set of related issues. They often do not account for intrinsic complexity or anomalies of such broad categories in particular contingent historical contexts or political circumstances. There has also been an inclination to conflate the parliamentary Labour right with a dominant revisionist leadership tendency, and lump together the non-revisionist right in an ill-defined ‘centre’ or ‘consolidator’ camp. They also say little about the diversity and contradictions of Labour revisionism itself.

Rudimentary distinctions of ‘Labour right’ tendencies have been consolidated against the backdrop of the SDP split in a ‘loyalist and secessionist’ framework. Thirdly, there has been some attempt, partially characterised by recognition of recurrent, systematic intra-party ‘segmental’ competition that often transcends conventional party dimensions or exposition of underlying intellectual and philosophical currents, to provide a more eclectic sense of the constituent traditions, ideas and strategies of the ‘Labour right’.

The orthodoxy of circumscribing the ‘Labour right’ is seen in standard conceptions of its role in the wider party, particularly in relation to public ownership. Thus, ‘right’ was ‘simply used in the labour movement to denote the established leadership of that movement and its policies…For over sixty years ‘Right’ has meant those who wish to move slowly, if at all, towards a socialist society in which the major part of the economy will be collectively owned’. Alternatively, variations of a distinction between, for instance, the ‘machine-union Right’ and the ‘Fabian intellectual Right’ have been presented. Historically, they shared support for parliamentary democracy, belief in
limited nationalisation and opposition to forms of revolutionary socialism and communism. The ‘machine-union Right’ was sustained through the 1930s-50s by trade union leaders such as Ernest Bevin and party organisers such as Herbert Morrison. As the ‘right’ dominated the party at critical points, it had little need of theoretical justification and principal intellectual influences were Liberals, Keynes and Beveridge. By the 1950s, the ‘Labour right’ was broadly identified with its support for consolidation of the policies and achievements of the post-war Attlee governments. Gaitskell’s emergence as party leader in 1955 aroused a desire to develop a clearer intellectual case for Labour’s social democracy which, in turn, precipitated a clearer distinction between ‘revisionists’ and ‘consolidators’ as Labour’s ‘two schools of moderation’. His efforts to ‘redefine the party’s ideology and purpose’ helped to elaborate a ‘specifically ‘Right’ ideology, which sequentially ‘served those calling themselves social-democrats. Nearly all…[SDP] defectors [were] those who followed Gaitskell in this exercise between 1955 and 1963’.17 The latter points particularly represent questionable assertions which fail to address the historic and contingent dynamics, tensions and divisions of Labour’s social democratic revisionism and subsequent ‘post-revisionist’ initiatives in the 1970s.18

Arguably, ‘consolidators’ were less distinguishable, cohesive and ‘organised’ as a tendency of the parliamentary Labour right. They lacked the intellectual foundations of Labour revisionism and lacked any firm organisational basis, but ‘possessed enough stable characteristics to merit separate recognition’. The amorphous social democratic ‘consolidator’ tendency was significant as much for the range and influence of its personnel as its political strategy. Parliamentary representatives of this tendency at
various points have included an assortment of experience and opinion of the ‘Labour right’, ranging from Jim Callaghan, Healey, Roy Hattersley who, like Healey, had a more ambiguous relationship with ‘Jenkinsite’ revisionism, Eric Varley, Fred Mulley and John Golding and, more recently, the likes of Gerald Kaufman and Austin Mitchell. Crosland also ‘drifted towards this camp after tactically deserting Jenkins around 1972’. Centre-right trade union leaders ‘proved firm advocates’, among whom there was ‘hostility towards the Left, but also a will [to keep] Jenkins at arms-length’. Key ‘consolidator’ themes included constitutionalism, antagonism towards Marxist and other doctrinaire political philosophy and a ‘marked distaste’ for factionalism of both left and right varieties. In the absence of an explicitly intellectual position, ‘consolidators’ exhibited ‘other, less sophisticated, identities’. They were essentially ‘Labour loyalists, orthodox and moderate, [largely] working class in personnel and character’ Their primary concerns included ‘Labour unity, halting the Left, winning elections, and consolidating Labour in public office’. Although ‘Revisionism and Consolidationism occupied…common ground [on issues of defence, if not always Europe]…their accents, styles…priorities [and tactics often] differed. So too did their ultimate destinations’.19

Variations of the standard ‘consolidator-revisionist’ distinction of the ‘Labour right’ in relation to policy preferences is not without its limitations. As noted, attitudes to the Common Market were not an unambiguous reflection of divisions between them.20 A number of ostensible ‘consolidators’ cut their ideological and political teeth as erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionists. Although he remained to fight inside the Labour Party in 1981, as a self-professed, unreconstructed Croslandite egalitarian and pro-European, Roy
Hattersley, for instance, would not be considered to be a ‘consolidator’ in the Morrisonian or even Callaghanite sense. Although he was to develop a more ‘consolidatory’ approach as politician and minister in the 1970s, Crosland himself also uneasily straddled the conventional ‘revisionist-consolidator’ distinction. The post-1981 split in the Labour Party is used as an almost post-hoc justification of a distinction between separatist, right-wing ‘revisionists’ and loyal centrist ‘consolidators’. Labour’s post-war revisionist tradition is reduced to the relatively small, liberal, unequivocally pro-European and ultimately secessionist ‘Jenkinsites’.

Further attempts to construct the main currents and encounters of Labour’s post-war strategic thinking have been framed in essentially ‘cultural’ terms as a contest between factions or ‘social tendencies’ advocating competing strategies or ‘visions’. This perspective contends that ‘intra-party conflict can best be understood in terms of competing strategies’, in which ‘strategy is more than ideology and where segments, as bearers of strategy, are not reducible simply to organized groups with boundaries identifiable through the conscious appropriation of a group identity’. Participants are understood as ‘collective bearers of social interests within a complex social system which [acts as] a severe constraint on both consciousness and action’. These intra-party ‘segments’ and ‘strategies’ are variously defined as ‘social reformist’, ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘technocratic-collectivist’ and ‘Keynesian socialist’ – ‘qualitative’ and ‘technocratic’. ‘Social reformism’ provided the ‘architecture’ of the post-war ‘consensus’, and consisted primarily of ‘the New Thinkers’, the ‘Gaitskellites’ or ‘Revisionists’ who, ‘instead of reviving socialism, substituted a quite distinct tradition of political thought – New
Liberalism’. Socialist ‘fundamentalism’ is represented as the antithesis of, and subordinate to, ‘social reform’. ‘Technocratic-collectivism’ is described as largely a temporary expedient; as a product of those who frequently ‘seek to procure a compromise between various segments in the Party’. It is considered either as ‘opportunistic pragmatism, or…‘centrist’ tactic aimed at establishing unity’. ‘Technocratic-collectivism’ lacked the ‘ideological coherence of Social Reformism. It was a hybrid combination of…themes, which bore…relationship to classical Fabianism, but…drew on several traditions of thought within the Labour heritage’. 23

This perspective usefully locates Labour’s intra-party dimensions and tendencies in wider currents and conflicts over the party’s social strategy. It acknowledges the demise of ‘social reformism’, particularly in the period 1970-78. It further recognises that at different times each of the respective ‘strategies’ or ‘visions’ divided, ‘producing an additional or alternative understanding…from within the original’, including the bifurcation of ‘Keynesian socialism’ into ‘liberal’ and ‘socialist’ variants, the ‘first signs of which emerged in the 1950s, though the major split occurred in the early 1970s’. However, the (re)construction of ‘pure types of strategic orientation’ remains reminiscent of standard, often undifferentiated, political categories of left, right and centre, or fundamentalism, revisionism and the compromise of centre-left technocratic ‘modern socialism’ or ‘Wilsonism’.
With the odd important exception, few studies have directly addressed the ‘intellectual stockpot’ of Labour’s political thought. Histories of the Labour Party have often ‘tended to ignore the political thought underlying its development’, and influential views of Labour as a ‘non-ideological party, intent merely on gaining parliamentary power irrespective of principle’, have tended to neglect the ‘diversity and limitations of its political thought’. Arguably, this has been partly a reflection of the perceived ‘moderation’ and ‘pragmatism’ of a historically dominant and established right-wing parliamentary leadership. Efforts to identify its constituent traditions, ideas and general ‘intellectual milieu’, which challenge ‘received opinion of the Labour Right being a homogeneous group’, go some way to explaining the underlying intellectual and political variability of ‘subsequent events and divisions within the Party’s hegemonic group’.

These intellectual traditions have been variously presented as ‘radical liberalism’ associated with Roy Jenkins, with its intellectual roots in the thinking of Edwardian New Liberalism; the intellectual ‘Fabianism’ of Hugh Gaitskell; the ‘democratic socialism’ best represented in the work of Tony Crosland; the ostensible ‘trade union economism’ and ‘non-intellectual gradualism’ of the likes of Jim Callaghan and George Brown; and the ‘pragmatic radicalism’ of such diverse ‘centrists’ as Wilson, Healey, Richard Crossman and Peter Shore, whose ‘rhetoric [was] often at variance with their practice’, and who shared a ‘technocratic approach to problems and a belief in statism in the sense of running the economy and social welfare provisions’.

These ‘groups of ideas’ are often conflated in manageable political ‘chunks’, although Tim Bale strikes a note of caution that the ‘interaction of ideology and political actors’ is
far from clear. It assumes that abstract, ‘rootless’ and ‘exogenous, pre-existing ideological preferences’ are the source of political perceptions and preferences, and neglects ‘how the variations in those preferences’ are, at least in part, created and recreated by ‘variations in institutional location’ and the ‘power-political’ creed. It suggests an overly instrumental link between ‘ideologies and the interests of the various components of a party’, and contributes to the artificial separation of the ‘world of power struggles evidenced in the nitty gritty of manoeuvres over rules, roles and regulations’, on the one hand, and ‘some disembodied universe we call ‘political thought’’, expressed in sacred tracts and texts, on the other.26


A distinct literature of ‘Labour right’ theory emerged in the aftermath of the achievements of the 1945-51 Labour governments in the writings of the so-called ‘New Thinkers’. Broadly, they aimed to revise traditional socialist analysis on the basis that the excesses of pre-war capitalism had been ameliorated by the welfare policies of the Attlee governments, and the socio-economic changes of the post-war years had rendered capitalism manageable for social purposes.27 Crosland’s subsequent major work, The Future of Socialism (1956), delivered by far the most sustained and fluent synthesis of post-war revisionist social democratic thought. It offered a core revisionist framework, political analysis and strategy around which broadly similar intellectual dispositions could coalesce.28
Crosland forcefully deconstructed traditional socialist arguments concerning the nature of capitalism as it manifested itself ‘in post-war British…society after several years of Labour government’. The harsh, private and profit-driven character of pre-war capitalism had been dismantled and replaced by a ‘qualitatively different kind of society’. In light of the apparent transition to a reconfigured ‘social capitalism’, he proposed a significant revision of traditional socialist ‘means and ends’. On the basis of changes in the economic order, he predicted growth on a scale sufficient to produce an adequate fiscal dividend to underwrite the case for the redistributive egalitarianism at the core of his ideological schema. The particular economic arrangements were less important; it was the social management of economic growth that now mattered. The reformulation of democratic socialism emphasised consistent and stable economic growth, the expansion and equalisation of educational opportunities and a mixed and balanced public-private industrial sector that reflected changing social trends and aspirations.

Crosland’s work represented an attempt to recast the conceptual balance of Labour’s socialism in ethical rather than economic terms. His ideas unsurprisingly met with strong ‘fundamentalist’ resistance and ‘came to stand for the platform of the Right within the party’. They offered ‘an intellectual expression to the concerns and aspirations of many on the right…of the party’ and, in the hands of the new revisionist leader, Gaitskell, his ‘writings [were] an important weapon against the Bevanite Left’. In the institutional factional context, his concern to shift ‘from an economic to a social conception of equality’ and demote traditional socialist arguments and methods, Crosland’s work was
caricatured as a right-wing Gaitskellite manifesto. Although his revisionist analysis broke with Labour’s established doctrine, Crosland’s case ‘pursued traditional socialist lines’ and ‘both inequality and class feature strongly’. His prescriptions included a strong degree of redistributive equality. It was largely his critique of ‘sacred means’ that angered traditionalists, ‘even when his ideas were radical in their policy implications…or when they expressed concerns which were shared by the Left’.

Although the precise form of Crosland’s ‘democratic equality’ remained undefined, he intended a thoroughgoing transformative equality that sought to overthrow traditional patterns of status, privilege and wealth in British society. To view him simply as ‘on the right’ or as a ‘revisionist’ conceals more than it reveals of the far-reaching character of his analysis and prescriptions. His explicit egalitarian philosophy and vision of democratic socialism distinguished him from less intuitively egalitarian revisionists such as Jenkins and Douglas Jay, who were brought together as much by the force of Gaitskell’s charismatic leadership and the prospect of Labour government after a number of fruitless years in opposition in the 1950s as by a shared sense of instinctive egalitarianism. As more pressurised conditions for growth and public expenditure in the 1970s undermined the economic foundations of Crosland’s egalitarian philosophy, a distinctive ‘liberal’ strand of former Gaitskellite revisionism was already moving away from (if they had ever fully accepted) the precepts of ‘Croslandism’ (as was a more circumspect Crosland himself).
Labour Party revisionism is seen to represent the ‘most influential perspective concerning social democracy in [Britain] since the Second World War’ and, during the 1950s, was ‘established as the basis of Labour’s social democracy’. The ‘revisionist approach’ is often represented as a uniform, fixed and hegemonic intellectual project. Revisionism is defined simply in terms of views of a particular socialist method (nationalisation) and broader economic preference (reformed capitalism). However, the term ‘is…problematic, a short-hand for a clutch of sometimes disparate approaches’. Its analytical value depends on ‘remembering the historical disjunctures and complexities of that very tradition’. David Lipsey, Crosland’s erstwhile political advisor, reminds us of its relative fluidity and that ‘revisionists revise’. Revisionism, as a relative, historically contextual and progressive disposition, is ‘not a body of doctrine. It was not what…Bernstein [or Crosland] thought. Revisionism was and is a cast of mind…that says: here is the world, here are the most important facts about it, here are the values we bring to bear on the facts, here are our conclusions’.

On this reading, ‘revisionism’ represents a historically-dependent and informed process or task of (re)emphasis and modernisation, as opposed to an inclusive ideological or doctrinal perspective. It does not possess a set of core ideological principles but rather offers a practical means to pursue and accommodate change. It is a tradition only in the sense that it is a continuous reflection of specific practices: scrutiny of means, analysis of contemporary perspectives and policies and some radicalism in a willingness to embrace
Labour Party revisionism has incorporated diverse, historically-specific varieties of political thought, ideas and strategies, influenced by and ranging from Bernstein, Tawney, Jay, Durbin, Crosland, the ‘post-revisionist’ concerns of the 1970s ‘Jenkinsites’ and others, through to the ‘neo-revisionism’ of those such as Hattersley, Giles Radice, Bryan Gould and Austin Mitchell in the 1980s, and even the rethinking of fundamentals undertaken by ‘New’ Labour in the 1990s.  

Labour Party revisionism of the mid-1950s was not without its own distinctions and discrepancies. It included a ‘complex of ideas’ associated with a wider grouping of ‘self-styled ‘revisionist’ thinkers’, ranging from the ‘ethical’ revisionism of Allan Flanders’ (and the Socialist Union) to the ‘sociological’ current of…Crosland’ and Michael Young, with Rita Hinden’s *Socialist Commentary* offering an intellectual bridge to the different ‘social democratic networks’. While Gaitskellite revisionists were broadly united on what they saw as problematic aspects of traditional socialist doctrine, there was far less consensus on the conceptual basis of their own social democracy, and they consequently failed to establish a ‘clear unequivocal doctrine of equality complete with strategies suitable for its realization’. Differences over essential ingredients of social democratic theory and politics, including redistribution, education policy and the nature of equality itself exposed a ‘void in Gaitskellite egalitarianism’, and indicated a source of ‘future division within Keynesian socialism which was later to prove extremely damaging’. Gaitskellite revisionists such as Jenkins and Jay (and often Gaitskell himself), ‘developed an increasingly liberal bias, stressing individual freedom, a predominantly free market economy and a broad equality of opportunity’. Crosland appeared to develop
‘rather different ideas’. His central ‘organising principle’ for Labour of greater social equality differed from and, like Young, made him vigilant of a ‘straightforward meritocratic equality of opportunity’. Although broadly supportive of his conviction that ‘equality’ should be regarded as the centre-piece of socialism, embryonic divisions were discernible in education policy and approaches to industrial relations as early as the 1950s, which reflected differential ‘visions’ of ‘equality’ and the ‘egalitarian future’. Subsequent political differences over industrial relations reform, the priorities of social democratic political economy and Europe exposed both ‘personal and policy disagreements, and the obvious difference of vision in which they were rooted’.43

**Tensions of Revisionist Philosophy: ‘Equality’ and ‘Liberty’ in Social Democratic Thought**

A fundamental difference of political principle between left and right (and between the ‘Left of the Left’ and the ‘Right of the Left’) is the ‘difference in the relative priority assigned to…traditional ideals of liberty and equality’: ‘for the Left of the Left, equality has unequivocal priority over liberty…for the Right of the Left, equality has priority over liberty provided…both are constrained by the ancillary value of justice’. On the egalitarian left, the ‘priority given to equality can genuinely follow from a conviction that without a restriction on the liberties of the better-off…the absolute as well as the relative position of the disadvantaged is bound to worsen’. On the liberal left, a Rawlsian ‘appeal to justice can genuinely follow from a conviction that all inequalities have to be defensible to those who are disadvantaged by them and that all institutions ought
therefore to be so designed and controlled that privilege is distributed as widely as is compatible with basic individual freedom’.\textsuperscript{44}

An implicit theme of the ‘new revisionist thinkers’, and one which was to reappear explicitly in the 1970s and in the ‘exit’ texts of those who left to form the SDP in 1981, was some discussion of whether the amplified pursuit of equality was a danger to freedom and individual liberty.\textsuperscript{45} Jenkins had written that the ‘desire for greater equality has been part of the inspiration of all socialist thinkers and of all socialist movements. The absence of this desire, indeed, provides the most useful of all exclusive definitions of socialism. Where there is no egalitarianism there is no socialism’. He also noted that the protection of liberty was still necessary, ‘ensuring that our new society of near equals is left confronting a state machine in which power, both economic and political, is as widely diffused as possible’.\textsuperscript{46} This philosophical dilemma emerged more starkly in the 1970s as New Right critiques of trade union collectivism and the dangers of the expansion of the state through increased public expenditure found a sensitive and receptive audience among liberal social democrats.\textsuperscript{47} It remained an ‘unresolved problem’ of social democratic theory; the dilemma of reconciling an ‘individual-focused and negative concept of freedom – absence of restraint – with trade union collectivism and the culture that sustained it’. One revisionist strand had ‘always defined freedom in positive terms as ‘something that needs to be enlarged’ rather than as simply the absence of restraint’.\textsuperscript{48} Another now openly questioned whether the pursuit of equality had ‘gone far enough’ and whether it was time to ‘reassert’ the ‘freedom of the individual’.\textsuperscript{49}
Divisions over a range of key political and policy themes in the 1970s revealed essential conceptual tensions of revisionist social democracy. Emerging differences in the nature of respective ‘socialisms’ privileged either collective, comprehensive and egalitarian or pluralistic, decentralist, anti-corporatist and libertarian principles and priorities. The latter signalled a radical departure from ‘old-style [Croslandite] revisionism’. For a younger generation of revisionists, the general mood of the party and disappointment at the perceived limitations of the 1974-79 Labour government ‘reinforced the glaring need for a break’ with previous revisionist politics.\(^{50}\) Throughout the 1970s there were calls from the social democratic ‘right’ inside and outside Parliament to move beyond traditional revisionism in response to the rise of the new left and increasing trade union power. They argued for Gaitskellite revisionism to adopt a new, more populist strategy to respond to the new desire for participation. They often described themselves as ‘Social Democrats’ to differentiate their method from traditional revisionism, and emphasised the point that inequality in power and status should be reduced by a more local, grass-roots approach. Some further took up the call for Labour to rethink its relationship with the large trade unions and to endeavour to develop community politics and small business relationships. They emphasised the guiding principles of pluralism, independence and freedom, and argued for so-called ‘Jenkinsite’ social democrats to establish a new, breakaway political party to reflect changing ideological priorities, as Labour had, beyond redemption, become too collectivist, left-wing and trade union-dominated.\(^{51}\)

John Mackintosh, as exemplar of the ‘new’ political philosophy of ‘post-revisionism’, arguably became the most notable and vocal social democratic theorist of an acute anti-
left, anti-labourist and anti-corporatist position. Before his untimely death in 1978, he was convinced that the failures of Labour in power were an indication that the revisionist politics of the 1950s were now out-dated, a position broadly supported by an emerging ‘post-revisionist’ and ‘Jenkinsite’ analysis.\textsuperscript{52} His critique of traditional revisionism was the claim that it lacked a sophisticated economic understanding of the mixed economy and its problems. Central to this analysis was the case that Labour’s failure (and British decline generally) was a defect of the very growth of corporatism that it had done so much to create and which produced feelings of impotence and indifference in the electorate and its governing institutions. Traditional revisionist social democracy had contributed to the devaluation of parliamentary democracy in favour of corporate pressure groups such as the CBI and the TUC. Crosland’s libertarian rejection of nationalisation had not gone far enough. It had been unable to break sufficiently from the statist strategy of the corporate socialists and the Fabians in its demands for equality and welfare. Principles of democracy, participation and citizenship were compromised by corporate interests that ‘governed’ the country, including the trade unions upon which Labour was dependent. He was fundamentally opposed to the primacy of the interests of those with a monopoly on economic power, whether they were financiers, multinational corporations or unions controlling key sectors of the labour force, regardless of party affiliations and considerations.\textsuperscript{53} In his critique of the ‘corporate power of organised labour’, Mackintosh was developing the anti-labourism and anti-collectivism implicit in revisionist thinking to a new level. Arguably, the social democratic wing, as it was now called, was developing a perspective and ‘reaching a point where the [new] ‘revisionists’ could find no home in the Labour Party’\textsuperscript{54}. 
Again, this critical conceptual distinction was not a new one, and had its roots in theoretical differences of 1950s Labour revisionism. The social scientist Michael Young was head of Labour’s Research Department and primary author of Labour’s 1945 general election manifesto. However, Young was uncomfortable with the conceptual development of Labour’s post-war doctrine, particularly the ascendant revisionist dictum that socialism was about a narrowly-defined ‘equality’, pursued through largely statist means. While not fundamentally opposed to the central place of ‘equality’ in Labour’s ideological prospectus, he was acutely aware of the dangers of an unmediated ‘equality of opportunity’, as his most famous work, *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, demonstrates in savage satire. For Young, ‘equality’ represented only part of a broader project of the ‘assertion of human dignity and…community’, bound up in a wider concept of ‘brotherhood’, which socialism should represent. Simultaneously, there needed to be increased emphasis on both individual choice and reciprocal ‘community’, which offered opportunities to participate in and contribute to an active democracy beyond the realm of politics and the state.

Arguably pre-empting the new ‘libertarian’ concerns of 1970s ‘post-revisionists’, Young offered a strand of social democratic thought distinct from mainstream Labour revisionism: it was idealistic and less constrained by party and political concerns, but also more unequivocally forward-looking and cutting much more explicitly and responsively with the grain of social trends. He appeared much readier to shed the socialist state ascription in a rapidly changing socio-economic climate that he perceived to be
outstripping even a ‘Croslandite’ analysis. He appeared to be willing to synthesise concepts and ideas otherwise considered contradictory to establish a clear link between notions of (traditional working class) community and (new) individualist consumerism. A willingness to acknowledge and fuse new socio-economic and consumer developments with core concepts also suggested a more openly appreciative view of the market in society. Labour revisionism’s adaptation of a ‘sentimental egalitarianism’, based on a narrow and standardised concept of ‘merit’ and Morrisonian ‘technical efficiency’, would not offer the receptacle for a decentred and inclusive notion of the ‘classless society’, in which a ‘diversity of values’ – individual, family, neighbourhood and communitarian – prospered. The sharper political deviations of social democratic revisionism in the 1970s arguably reflected the outcome of the more cerebral intellectual debates of the 1950s. For some, they represented a choice between Crosland’s adaption of the ‘old [Fabian] centralism with a bit of local agency delivery and consultation’ and Young’s petition for a full ‘radical devolution of economic and political power to people in their neighbourhoods and workplaces’. Crosland won and Labour remain(ed) ‘wedded to the Croslandite’ strategy.

Critiques of Labour revisionism’s state-centric and corporatist instincts in the 1970s reflected an increasingly explicit conceptual schism of social democracy between those who privileged ‘equality’ and those who now privileged ‘freedom’ as the basis of their political thought. While many, including Jenkins, Rodgers and Shirley Williams maintained recognisably ‘egalitarian’ principles, the perception of a new, dangerously collectivist and illiberal political environment prompted the critique of the allegedly
defensive and fixed positions of earlier Labour revisionism. Of course, there remained a
degree of coherence and cross-over of views that owed something to common roots.
Hattersley, for instance, was a prominent pro-European supporter of Jenkins before the
former’s entrenched ‘Croslandite’ views of public expenditure and equality took him
away from the emerging ‘Jenkinsite’ liberal position. Shirley Williams retained
fundamentally egalitarian and redistributive values; in the pursuit of social justice, she
continued to ‘believe in relatively high taxation to pay for good public services’, but her
self-perception was one of a ‘modern’, ‘radical social democrat’ with clear liberal and
libertarian instincts and priorities:

The old demands for equality were replaced with new demands for freedom, and [echoing
Michael Young] the old belief in economic growth led by large and socially responsible
corporations had been replaced by the new belief that ‘small is beautiful’…It was in their calls for
freedom that the specific nature of the Social Democrats was revealed most starkly. In harking
back to the decentralist traditions of…Cole and William Morris, they were throwing a veil over
the class nature of those traditions…[the] response that the market should be freed from the fetters
of state control was an indication of the retreat from the revisionist values of social equality and
welfare.

Differential perspectives of the relative priority afforded to core social democratic
principles in the context of enforced theoretical re-engagement in the 1970s, and reflected
in a series of critical political and policy disputes, offer a neglected dimension of the
‘considerable defector-loyalist puzzle’ of the SDP. Crewe & King suggest that the answer
lies in the nature of respective backgrounds in, and attachments to, the Labour Party.
Although supportive of the future founders of the SDP on the critical Common Market
issue, Hattersley remained in the party in 1981 on the grounds that ‘by...background
and...path of entry into the Labour Party...[he] was very much a party machine man’.

But where does this leave someone like Bill Rodgers? Autobiographically, he claims his
roots as ‘someone who believes in social justice and doesn’t find acceptable the social
inequalities which were all around me...growing up in the 1930s...Because I’m basically
a Labour man and I joined when I was sixteen’.63

Hattersley, for instance, retained a fundamental belief in the egalitarian foundations of
freedom, and never wavered from the ethical framework established by Crosland:
socialism ‘is about the pursuit of equality and the protection of freedom – in the
knowledge that until we are truly equal we will not be truly free’ and the ‘good society is
the equal society’.64 In contrast, a sharper sense of the necessary limits and potential
dangers to freedom of egalitarian ‘redistribution of material wealth’ based on high levels
of public expenditure is apparent in the pre-SDP ‘exit’ texts. A common theme of this
writing is the argument that interpretation of socialism as just equality, and equality only
in terms of distribution, represents a narrow definition that underplays the ‘predisposition
for liberty’ of ‘any thinking democrat’. The relentless pursuit of equality through
distribution might be used as ‘justification for abandoning liberty...to be sure of
achieving equality’. Rodgers, for instance, argued in post-Croslandite (‘Jenkinsite’) terms
that just as ‘public ownership was not socialism’, a new preoccupation with ‘public
expenditure is not socialism either’.65
Rodgers and other ‘Jenkinsites’ were increasingly critical of the view that (high) public spending was, by definition, virtuous. As the ‘mass abundance’ predicted by Crosland did not materialise, and as levels of economic growth receded, they were concerned with the lack of attention paid to wider socio-economic concerns and developments. An emerging fiscal theme was ‘value for money’ from public spending and across the public services. Public expenditure should be ‘dependent on achieving economic growth and rising personal living standards first’. Arguably owing more to Evan Durbin than Crosland, whom Rodgers considered to be ‘courageous and clear-headed…about…freedom’, they crucially emphasised issues of individual liberty, more freedom from the state and individual control of personal lives. This demanded greater attention to individual freedom, including lower personal taxation, and to certain spheres of collective activity such as industrial democracy, in which individuals were more effectively included in decisions governing their working lives. The general thrust of the perspective was that Labour should recognise that individuals were now placing personal consumption and individual freedoms above the pursuit of equality. It was a view that ‘lacked any sense of Crosland’s commitment to equality as the central feature of Labour’s vision of the future’.

Conclusion

[Labour’s] ‘radical right’ was actively actioning to differentiate [itself] from what [it] saw as the…hard right…or…trade union right.
If the Labour left has been notoriously schismatic, neither has the ‘Labour right’ in practice been a uniform, loyalist unit. For much of the post-war period, the complex ideational, ideological and political predispositions of the ‘Labour right’ were concealed within the loose cohesive framework of Keynesian (and Croslandite) social democracy. As this framework crumbled in the 1970s, giving rise to a new range of policy and political concerns, including membership of the Common Market, the character of industrial relations, emerging weaknesses of traditional social democratic political economy and a new radicalised realignment of influential trade unions and more organised and assertive Labour left, the compound intellectual and political character of the ‘Labour right’ and revisionist social democracy was exposed.

The intention here has not been to develop an alternative model or schema of the ‘Labour right’. It has been to identify principal representations of the parliamentary Labour right and to indicate some of their limitations, ambiguities or inconsistencies against the backdrop of catalytic empirical episodes. The cases or examples offered are by no means exhaustive, but intended to illustrate a line of argument and enquiry rather than to systematically document each framework or narrative. Efforts to characterise the ‘Labour right’, arguably driven by conditions of theoretical application, have taken three broad forms. Firstly, a schema based on the standard monolithic political dimensions of ‘left’ and ‘right’ (and nebulous and shifting ‘centre’). Secondly, a rudimentary distinction of between old ‘trade union right’ ‘pragmatists’ and intellectual revisionist ‘dogmatists’, to borrow Drucker’s terms. However, it is not always clear where or when the boundaries of the distinction apply. Like the limited standard dimensions of ‘left’ and ‘right’, they may
be taken to imply that such groupings possess a uniformity and universality of outlook. A simple distinction between ‘labourists’ and ‘revisionists’ fails to reveal the diversity of ‘Labour right’ ideas and politics and the intrinsic tensions of Labour revisionism itself, particularly as the cohesive force of its intellectual foundations fell away in the so-called ‘crisis of social democracy’ from the late 1960s onwards. As one key participant reflects, ‘it’s always more complicated than that’. The distinction approximates in only:

‘a very, very rough and ready kind of way…if you take the so-called radical revisionists…it’s not the case that they all went over to the SDP, where as the trade union right did not all not go over to the SDP. How would you classify somebody like [James] Wellbeloved, for example? He certainly isn’t…at first sight one of the intellectual revisionist social democrats, but he did go over to the SDP. On the other hand, how would you classify Giles Radice who did not go over to the SDP or Philip Whitehead who did not go over to the SDP…so…there are a lot of nuances for that picture’.69

Thirdly, there has been a wider attempt to distinguish the variety of ‘Labour right’ political thought and the underlying intellectual influences of its component traditions and personnel. The extent to which the ‘world of ideas’ can be separated from institutional and political context as a guide to preferences and priorities is more problematic. As one set of commentators note, ‘ideology and behaviour that are relatively straight forward to identify or quantify deviate most unpredictably from traditional core positions in response to political and external factors and events’. A set of perceptions and preferences developed in political life and conflict might, at best, ‘only approximate to a pure orientation’. It is preferable to analyse political identities and affiliations both ‘through time’ and ‘in time’. It is important to think relationally as well as categorically.70
There is a need to consider the interaction between core positions and political and institutional context.

The political and institutional environment of revisionist social democracy from *circa* the late 1960s offers an apposite context in which to explore this interaction in terms of contentious and divisive episodes of European policy, trade union reform and the future of social democratic political economy; and to consider the explanatory limitations of standard fixed conceptions of Labour’s intra-party dimensions and the neglected role of the estrangements and implosion of the ‘Labour right’ and Labour revisionism itself in the crisis and schism of British social democracy in the 1970s. From this perspective, Labour’s subsequent shift leftwards and the long(er)-term gestation of the SDP can be explained by the disconnected and incoherent response of the (revisionist) ‘Labour right’ to the new dilemmas of social democracy and its critics as much as by a resurgent Labour left and the more immediate intra-party constitutional disputes after 1979, or merely as a split over European policy and divisions in the party.71 Rather, the roots of the SDP involved a gradual process of alienation from both the wider party (left) and traditional (‘hard’ or ‘trade union’) ‘labourist’ colleagues of the ‘Labour right’ itself. Seemingly irrevocable differences over a range of policy themes and developments revealed the emergence of fundamental conceptual and philosophical as well as political disparities of Labour revisionism and the complex and composite ‘Labour right’.

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3 A. Warde, *Consensus and beyond: The development of Labour Party strategy since the second world war* (Manchester, 1982), 3.

4 David Marquand, Interview.


8 Crewe & King, *SDP*, 17, 105-6, 534.


11 Crewe & King, *SDP*, 534.


18 The pivotal case of British membership of the European Common Market betrays the notion of cohesive and consistent Labour revisionism from as early as the summer of 1962, following Harold Macmillan’s decision to seek entry in 1961. The history of the issue exposed a broad range of revisionist social democratic perspectives – from the outright support of those such as Jenkins, Bill Rodgers, David Marquand and Shirley Williams to the more studied ambivalence of Anthony Crosland and Denis Healey, to the outright opposition of those such as Douglas Jay, Patrick Cordon Walker and Gaitskell himself.


19 McKee, *Right-wing*, 16-18. Differences between the respective ‘Labour right’ tendencies here centred on policy priorities, party management and campaigning tactics. Issues of contention included the apparent ‘Euro-zeal, social elitism and suspect party loyalties of some revisionist social democrats’.


23 See Ellison, Egalitarian, ix-xiii, 73-4, 187-200; Warde, Consensus, 9-24, 43-5, 75-7; 94-5, 125-40, 211; also see T. Bale, Sacred Cows and Common Sense: The Symbolic Statecraft and Political Culture of the British Labour Party (Aldershot, 1999), 4-5.


25 See Daly, Crisis, 48-63.


30 M. Francis, ‘Mr Gaitskell’s Ganymede? Re-assessing Crosland’s The Future of Socialism’, Contemporary British History, 11 (2), 1997, 50-64; A. Howard, ‘It is savagely appropriate that the 25th


34 Wickham-Jones, Economic, 14, 34-5.

35 See Beech Political, 43; Desai, Intellectuals; H. M. Drucker, ‘Changes’, 374-5, 388; also see B. Brivati, ‘Revisionists’, Socialist History, 9, 1996, 109-14 for a critical perspective of this tendency.


Even within the ‘sociological’ current, theoretical differences existed between Crosland’s social democratic centralism and Young’s own de-centred, local and participatory vision of the good society, which involved a conceptual distinction in the relative priority afforded to ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’ in social democratic thought.


Ellison, Egalitarian, 73-4, 92-8, 103-4, 105-6, 107-8; also see C. A. R. Crosland, Socialism Now and Other Essays (London, 1974), 15.


Jenkins, ‘Equality’, 69, 88-9, 90.


See J. Gyford & S. Haseler, Social Democracy: Beyond Revisionism (London, 1971); Taverne, Future, 147; also see Foote, Labour, 238-9, 249-51; Owen, Face, 5, 295.

From this perspective, the assertive power, priorities and influence of trade unionism in the 1970s acted as a major obstacle to industrial modernisation and national economic development, as well as a test of the rudiments of individual freedom: National Library of Scotland (NLS), John P. Mackintosh Papers, 323/8, ‘Britain’s malaise: political or economic?’, typescript of the 1977 Fawley Lecture, University of Southampton, 23 Nov. 1977. J. P. Mackintosh, ‘Is Labour facing catastrophe?’, in Marquand, John P. Mackintosh, 167; J. P. Mackintosh, ‘Taming the Barons’, in Marquand, John P. Mackintosh, 115

54 Foote, Labour, 243, 246.


59 Marquand, Interview; Marquand, Progressive, 166-78; Rodgers, Interview; Dick Taverne, Interview.
60 Marquand, Interview; S. Williams, Interview; also see Foote, Labour, 246-8, 325-6; S. Williams, Politics is for People (Harmondsworth, 1981).

61 Foote, Labour, 252-5; also see Whitehead, Writing, 339-46.

62 Crewe & King, SDP, 104, 113-14.

63 Rodgers, Interview; also see W. Rodgers, Fourth Among Equals (London, 2000), 1-22; The Politics of Change (London, 1982), vi.


65 D. Owen, Face, 6-7; Rodgers, Politics, 7-9. The view represents a contrasting reformulation of egalitarian goals, and the centrality of public expenditure to those ends, to that expressed in Hattersley’s observation of the resolution of the IMF crisis that ‘[s]ocialism is about equality and we cannot have greater equality if we cut public spending’. Although Rodgers himself was unhappy with the stringent IMF terms and Healey’s initial response, as he believed that appropriate levels of taxation and public spending were indispensable to social justice, he adopted a more measured approach to the public expenditure dilemma. Ultimately, he felt that Crosland’s proposals ‘were not credible as the alternative’ and the need to be ‘hard headed enough to do the sums…to recognise that in the end we have to find a solution that the IMF found acceptable…you have to have balance’: R. Hattersley, Who, 178-9; Rodgers, Fourth, pp. 291-2; Rodgers, Interview.

66 W. Rodgers, ‘Socialism Without Abundance’, Socialist Commentary, July/Aug. 1977; also see Owen, Face, 6; Rodgers, Politics, 4-8.

67 Ellison, Egalitarian, 200.

68 Marquand, Interview.

69 Marquand, Interview.

Annual Conference of the UK Political Studies Association (PSA), University of Lancaster, April 1991;
Warde, Consensus, 21-2.

71 Marquand, Interview; John Tomlinson, Interview; and see Desai, Intellectuals, 145-52, 162; Whitehead, Writing, 339, 340-1.