Language in Ernst Bloch’s Speculative Materialism: A Reading of Anacoluthon

By

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‘Philosophy will always, to my way of thinking, be an aid to discovery rather than a matter of strict demonstration.’—Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, p. 2

‘To think is to transgress.’—Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, p. 2
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INTRODUCTION

§1. QUESTION-THESIS

The essence of the world is gay spirit and urge to creative forms; the Thing in Itself is the objective phantasy. (PA, p. 5)

Das Wesen der Welt ist heiterer Geist und Drang zum schaffenden Gestalten; das Ding an sich ist die objektive Phantasie.

What follows is a piece of theoretical philosophy which aims to employ Ernst Bloch’s metaphysical materialism to begin to reflect on the materiality of language in a utopian context. It amounts to a speculative-linguistic appraisal of Bloch’s key utopian philosophical categories. Indeed, inasmuch as underlying Bloch’s materialist philosophy is a model of reality which views the world’s essence as ‘gay spirit’ and as ‘urge to creative forms’, and which considers Kant’s Thing In Itself (Ding an sich) precisely as an ‘objective phantasy’ (ibid.), my line of questioning is as follows: how can the materiality of language be speculated on within this, the utopianism of Bloch’s philosophical framework?¹

One cannot respond to such a question as this without first providing one’s interpretation of Bloch’s framework. If in order to subject this framework to a

¹ Of course, the notion that matter is gay spirit and urge to creative forms and that the Thing in Itself constitutes an objective phantasy requires unpacking. It should be noted that Bloch’s formulation here arrives very early on in his philosophical career: a text of 1902 entitled “On Force and its Essence [Über die Kraft und ihr Wesen]”. Bloch (1885-1977) was around seventeen years of age at the time of its composition. The notion of “objective phantasy,” Hudson (1982, p. 71) writes, originates from the writings of the Catholic theologian Jakob Frohschammer (1821-1893), principally his work Die Phantasie als Grundprincip des Weltprocesses (1877). Little work has been attempted that sheds light on this deep influence. Regrettably my study does not change this unfortunate state of affairs.
speculative-linguistic appraisal one is required to grapple with the manner of this framework as such—a task still in its infancy—so then to my mind, both questions are of a piece. The study below paves the way for this concomitant questioning to be responded to. It is in its architectonic structured as such.

More specifically, negatively formulated, neither is my study an attempt to argue for or against the cogency of Bloch’s philosophical arguments in themselves, nor for or against the plausibility of my theorisation of language’s materialism as it will be derived from the categories of Bloch’s philosophy. It may seem then that the scope of this study is rather limited. Part of my study’s originality, however, lies in a positive formulation of its intention: it creatively extends Bloch’s philosophy towards a materialist speculation on language; and contrariwise, brings contemporary philosophising of language to a point whereby it may begin to speak Bloch’s conceptual language. Indeed, my original contribution to philosophical knowledge is to have modestly carried this task through: to have opened up Bloch’s corpus utopicum2 to questions pertaining to the materialism of

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2 “Corpus utopicum” expresses the idea that Bloch’s corpus is itself not yet complete; it bears life and thus is open to utopian realisation. Jameson touches on this line of thought:

[The neglect of Bloch is due to the fact that his system, a doctrine of hope and ontological anticipation, is itself an anticipation, and stands as a solution to problems of a universal culture and a universal hermeneutic which have not yet come into being. It thus lies before us, enigmatic and enormous, like an aerolite fallen from space, covered with mysterious hieroglyphs that radiate a peculiar inner warmth and power, spells and keys to spells, themselves patiently waiting for their own ultimate moment of decipherment. (1974, pp. 158-9)
language, and, relatedly, to have opened up contemporary and nascent speculation on the materiality of language to Bloch’s neglected oeuvre.³

With the study-question provisionally laid-out (it will undergo a degree of refinement as this Introduction progresses) it is appropriate to touch on my study’s general thesis. My argument will be as follows. The categories which constitute Bloch’s materialism, together with my reading of the overall metaphysical outlook they establish, allow me to conceptualise what I shall call a “utopian cadence” of language. Whilst Bloch himself does not speak of language in such specific terms as these, I show that the philosophy he fashions grants just such a speculative-linguistic application. Now, to bring the specificity of this utopian-linguistic cadence into view, to communicate it, I will read the rhetorical-syntactical figure of anacoluthon. As deriving from an old Greek term, the word literally translates as “not following” and is assigned to the plane of syntax, of syntactical construction. Whilst Bloch treats of anacoluthon only once in his corpus, I shall read this figure as possessing a substantial importance to any speculative-materialist conception of language Bloch’s thought might implicitly contain or permit to be developed. With Bloch one can read the figure of anacoluthon utopically.⁴

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³ My response to the study-question is provisional rather than conclusive. If there were time and space enough a whole polyphony of paths of inquiry would open up on the question of how best to think language within the horizon of Bloch’s little studied materialism. It will soon become clear that this openness is inextricable from Bloch’s materialism itself, wrought through as it is with openness and searching. The type of philosophical thinking that Bloch encourages indeed is exploratory rather than definitive.

⁴ Like Schelling and Hegel before him, Bloch nowhere articulates a unified philosophical appraisal of language; indeed, much as have Adorno’s been described (Hogh, 2017), Bloch’s reflections on language can be termed fragmentary in nature. A similar state of affairs is witnessed in Bloch’s approach to aesthetics. Kessler (2006, p. 29) claims Bloch’s aesthetic theory does not stand as a separate object over against his philosophy but is integral to it, or as Vidal (2012, p. 13) says, is immanent to Bloch’s corpus (see also Freeman, 2006, p. 231), signals that the importance of fragmentation to Bloch’s way of thinking and expressing, such that any theory of language Bloch might
§2. THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL CONJUNCTURE

[...] reason [...] stretches its wings in vein in thus attempting to soar above the world of sense by the mere power of speculation.—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 591-B 619)

At this point I would like to sketch out the intellectual context within which my study finds itself. My aim to think language’s materiality with the aid of Bloch’s philosophy arises from and is nourished by definite philosophical conditions, conditions which remain live but which, as I shall show, however paradoxically, exhibit a marked unfamiliarity with Bloch’s utopian mode of thought. Given that my study does not appear out of the blue but in some sense is a determinate response to what is presently front and centre for philosophical thought, so then the provision of a schematic map of the conditions of which I speak will enable me to disclose the pertinence of what will be my line of questioning and indeed, furthermore, will help me to better indicate what my original contribution to philosophical knowledge consists of.

In the first instance, continental philosophy is found at a new juncture in its history, a juncture that may be described, to employ a phrase from Bloch himself, as ‘a new blossoming of materialism’ (*TL*, p. 267). Below I will briefly outline the pertinent features of this new blossoming of materialism, which has become known as “new materialism” and/or “speculative materialism.”
That materialism as an approach to philosophising the world could have blossomed once more speaks to the idea that it could have died. The sap of materialism is given with what has recently become known as the **speculative-materialist turn** (Bryant *et al*., 2011, p. 1). Largely inspired by the French thinker Quentin Meillassoux (2016, p. 117) and his self-stated ‘original reactivation of materialism’, the new turn to speculation has rediscovered the legitimacy of posing to the world’s essence materialist-realist questions.⁵ More fundamental still, reality’s nature is back on the agenda.

It is important to my study to note that such philosophical exploration has, to a large extent, been put under erasure during much of the previous century. Under the dominance of post-structuralist tendencies of thought, but also the direction of analytically informed philosophies of language, the longstanding notion that human beings possess the capacity to grasp wider reality’s true nature was thought, at root, to be a preposterous notion to hold to.⁶ Philosophers who count as belonging to the new speculative turn see themselves as counterpoints to a linguistically-inclined scepticism termed the “linguistic turn,” a movement of thought to which both post-structuralism and analytical philosophy of language definitely belong. As Hogh (2017, p. 3) writes, a consequence of this long dominant sceptical philosophical programme was the radical separation of linguistic from non-linguistic reality.

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⁵ For want of space I cannot go into any real depth on Meillassoux’s contribution to—or instigation of—the new speculative turn. Nor is his conception of the absolute (*qua* the necessity of absolute contingency) much important to my reading of Bloch. For works on or by Meillassoux, see Harman’s *Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making* (2011), Paul J. Ennis’ *Continental Realism* (2011), and indeed Meillassoux’s first work that set him on the path to notoriety, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency* (2009).

Significantly, these new speculative philosophers trace this linguistic form of scepticism, in which language only refers to itself and as such remains independent from the world of which it is ostensibly a part, back to the wide-ranging effects of Immanuel Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophical thought. It is to Kant’s laying down the philosophical conditions for such a sceptical approach to breathe that I now briefly outline.

The general thrust of Kant’s philosophy can be clarified for present purposes by pointing to the following short but no less infamous passage. The passage in question concerns Kant’s desire to shift philosophical focus from the object (dogmatic metaphysics) to the subject (transcendental philosophy), such that the philosopher shall now concern herself ‘solely’ with reason’s ‘own inner constitution’ (A 695), not that of the object itself. Indeed, the objects of philosophical thought, says Kant in the passage in question, are to be approached no longer such that our—the human being’s—knowledge conforms to these objects’ nature—a tendency Kant calls dogmatic metaphysics—but rather such that these objects ‘conform to our knowledge.’ (B xvi; my emphasis) In shifting the point of departure for philosophy from object to the human subject’s reason, Kant thereby is propounding an ‘unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves’; in the process Kant is found to severely restrict human reason’s capacity to respond adequately to metaphysical questions, questions which Kant concedes are all so natural to human curiosity (metaphysica naturalis) (B xxix & B 22). Kant thus enseels philosophical thought within its own
categories of human experience (B xvi.). This slightly confusing fruit of the Kantian project is clearly visible in Kant’s notion that human reason finds itself in a ‘peculiar fate’ he says, in which, ‘burdened by questions’ ‘prescribed by the very nature of reason itself’ (i.e. reason just is speculative), ‘it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer’ (A vii.). Kant repeats such claims in the Appendix to his “Transcendental Dialectic”:

[…] all those conclusions of ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of possible experience are deceptive and without foundation; […] human reason has [however] a natural tendency to transgress these limits, and [therefore] transcendental ideas are just as natural to it as the categories are to the understanding […]. (A 642)

Not even the most ‘severest criticism’ (ibid), Kant says, can thwart this natural tendency towards transgression of limits. This point returns me to the contemporary moment, because the underlying motivation of the contemporary turn towards a speculative-materialism is at root a desire to re-confer upon philosophical thought speculation’s canonical intent: to know reality as it truly is. And therefore, whilst in some sense born-up by the limits which Kant designated as philosophical thought’s unquestionable horizon, contemporary speculative philosophers seek to move out into that horizon so as to discover something new (Bryant et al., 2011, pp. 1-3; Grant, 2006, p. 1-21). The emergent speculative turn is thus more than willing to overcome

7 Reason, Kant says, must ‘never soar beyond its limit, outside which there is for us nothing but empty space.’ (A 702)

8 Curiously, transgressing limits is delivered up to philosophical form in Bloch’s materialism (as Kessler [2006, p. 22] notes, the transgression of limits is a ‘Grundstruktur’ of Bloch’s philosophy). In this light, the transgression of limits would have to feature in a Blochian approach to language.
what Puntel (2011, p. 33) terms ‘Kant’s negative charges’ against metaphysics; it is willing to ‘utter the unconditional’, as Adorno (2001, p. 39) has elsewhere described this speculative tendency; it is willing ‘to make a statement about [...] what the Being is that lies behind all things’ (ibid.). Placed within this context it is important to stress in passing that the recent speculative movement’s apparent unity of thought glosses over what in truth is a fractured, heterogeneous content. Once speculative thought escapes Kantianism’s restrictions there thus is witnessed its renaissance of expression, in which the absolute undergoes a diffraction of philosophical determination (see Shaviro, 2016, pp. 30 & 33-9 & Niemoczynski, 2013, p. 15). As Bryant (2016, p. 71) writes, while philosophers of the turn are united on the front of re-grappling with questions of realism and materialism, nevertheless they produce ‘quite distinct positions that are in many respects opposed’ vis-à-vis ‘what constitutes the real or the material.’ But as Kant himself had written long before this moment: ‘seemingly infinite variety need not hinder us from assuming that behind this variety there is a unity of fundamental properties’ (A 653), however asymptotic such properties may serve to be. And, indeed, such a fundamental property uniting the diverse responses of a renewed speculation—these responses’ affinity or continuity, or to borrow from Kant, their ‘common horizon’ (A 658)—is simply the failure of Kant’s own efforts to ward off human reason’s natural tendency towards speculation—to ‘discipline’ (A 709) reason’s natural attraction towards transgressing the limits of possible experience. Indeed, Kant’s failure here is precisely a necessary failure, and this, somewhat paradoxically, by his own admission and estimation, even if such a failure was what Kant sought so hard to disallow. It is within this experimental space of failure, of
incompleteness, of dissatisfaction, this ‘empty intervening space’ (A 659) exposed by Kant himself, that there has emerged the present blossoming of new shapes of speculation, shapes that cannot be equated with or simply reduced to forms and figures of times gone by. In sum, differing absoluta—i.e. conceptions of the absolute—mark speculation’s contemporary landscape.\(^9\)

I may now return to the main focus of my study. Against the backdrop outlined above the following question presses: Where do Bloch and a speculative-materialist philosophy of language figure in the horizon of this emerging philosophical landscape? The answer, simply and briefly, is that they do not. They do not possess any sort of substantial standing in current debates and in fact are almost non-existent in such debates as they currently stand. This precisely is what suggests to the contemporary moment two limits of its recent re-turn to speculation; if not dispensation of the former (Bloch), then at least the latter’s omission (language) ought to keep contemporary speculation from resting satisfied with itself. Despite rare exceptions, of which I shall momentarily discuss, it is safe to say that neither Bloch nor a speculative-materialist approach to language are much countenanced in contemporary speculative research; and this, I assume, makes of the two allies. Such limits, then, certainly give rise to my study, which will aim to overcome them: ‘To think is to transgress.’ (PH, p. 2)

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\(^9\) An overcoming of Kant’s iconoclasm therefore produces—to employ Barber’s (2010, p. 167) curious formulation—a ‘polyiconicity’; that is, a proliferation of absoluta (see Barber, 2012). As Whistler (2012, p. 117) insightfully notes, the fundamental orientation of the new speculative turn is kataphatic in essence (as opposed to apophatic).
Detailing these inter-related limits will help to refine my study’s motivations and also better distinguish its original contribution to knowledge. I shall take each in turn.

[1] Against this backdrop it is apparent that Bloch’s materialism is discounted from figuring as a legitimate inheritance for contemporary speculative philosophers. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the contemporary blossoming of speculation is indifferent to a philosopher who throughout the 20th century upheld speculation’s importance and therefore its spirit. The distinct lack of interest in Bloch found among those who count as contemporary speculative philosophers is curious but by no means inexplicable. Curious because Bloch described his philosophy as speculative-materialist long before the term became vogue (M, p. 377; see also Moir 2013a, p. 121 see also Moir, 2013b). Not inexplicable for the reason that Anglo-American scholarship that would seek to investigate the depth of insight and the implications of Bloch’s philosophical intervention remains, in my view, in its infancy. Significantly, neglect of Bloch is an overriding feature of his reception in Germany; for all intents and purposes Bloch’s body of thought remains a largely under-articulated moment of 20th century German philosophy—within Germany itself. It can be argued, in sum, that the implications of what I shall term Bloch’s utopian revolution for ontology, for epistemology, for the philosophy of history, political philosophy, and for aesthetics are yet to be fully explored and, as such, have so far
failed to inform present speculative concerns. All in all, then, Bloch’s influence is hardly radiant.¹⁰

Despite this neglect the fact of the matter remains that whilst Bloch is a curious sort of speculative philosopher he is a speculative philosopher. His guiding conviction being that

Philosophy seeks the whole, its task is the Totum, the totality, the universal hanging-together of appearances, the one handle, the one view of the world.

(1985d, p. 17)

[Die Philosophie geht aufs Ganze, ihre Aufgabe ist das Totum, die Totalität, der universale Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen, der eine Griff, der eine Blick auf die Welt.]

There is, however, a peculiarity to the speculative in Bloch’s way of thinking. The peculiarity in question is rooted in Bloch’s throwing into doubt a longstanding position in the philosophical tradition; namely, that the totality towards which speculation aims is already in existence. This “one view of the world” of which Bloch speaks in the passage above (i.e. totality) is, to his lights, not yet in existence. This move has momentous ontological

¹⁰ Proof of a disavowal of Bloch in English scholarship can be found with Bowie’s (2003) otherwise comprehensive introduction to German philosophy, from Kant to Habermas; Bowie elides even a mention of Bloch. More specific to the contemporary turn to speculation one find Bloch referred to not once in what are arguably the speculative turn’s three key texts: New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (2011), and Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity since Structuralism (2016). However, if the French 20th century philosopher Giles Deleuze can count as ‘an immediate progenitor of the speculative turn in Continental philosophy’ (van Tuinen, 2016, p. 95), how much more so can the same be said of Bloch? And to Germany, whilst a steady flow of publications exist in Germany through such journals as the Bloch-Almanach and Vor-Schein, Bloch-reception in Germany remains conspicuously absent (see Hermann-Sinai & Tegtmeyer, 2012, p. 10). Although the details of why this is the case do not concern me here, suffice it to say that Bloch thought speculatively during an historical juncture in which speculative modes of thought were considered intellectually obsolete both East and West of the dividing ideological-political line.
repercussions. From this move Bloch suggests something ground-breaking: the one view of the world that is so far lacking cannot be merely the philosopher’s dark spot—it too must be the world’s dark spot. The lack of speculative achievement, the lack of the human mind having achieved the aim of its most natural desire is in truth rooted in an ontological lack.

The above is a very brief appraisal of Bloch’s position on the nature of speculation. My account shows well, though, that unquestionably Bloch attempts to provide his own singular path beyond Kant’s restrictions, as outlined above: ‘the concept of the Absolute’ Bloch writes, ‘can find a new, an unsuspected strength.’ (SU, p. 171) This new strength in speculative thought, however, is found only in exiting the old, as even Kant himself had attempted according to his own manner, i.e. the object of philosophy must orbit the human mind, not the human mind these objects. In truth, for Bloch, all things, including the human mind, orbits the not-yetness of speculative totality. As Moir (2013b, p. 169) writes, if ‘Bloch’s materialism is speculative insofar as it presupposes both a concept of totality just as it does one of finality’, then what offsets Bloch’s form of speculation from the philosophical tradition is that he conceives totality as the finality of its own process.

In Chapter I, I will elucidate this conception of totality in more detail. It can be said to constitute a novel approach to teleology; an “open teleology,” perhaps. Indeed, both Holz (2008, p. 14) and Moir (2013a, p. 121) stress that Bloch’s form of speculation is materialist in that it derives from “speculari” (to look out) as opposed to “speculum”; the latter, derived from Augustine and taken up by Hegel anew, denotes mirror thinking (cf. Whistler, 2013c). Bloch’s speculation is guided by a totality not already present, by a
totality that cannot be, therefore, simply reflected by thought. It is in this sense that Bloch is closer to Kant than, as one will find, is often made to be the case. Bloch suggests—perhaps somewhat hyperbolically—that all hitherto philosophy up to his own seat in the tradition has neglected this perspective on the nature of speculative totality. It is suggested by Bloch that the history of philosophy has ultimately been blind to the future tense of the really real: ‘an overwhelmingly static thinking did not name or even understand this condition’ of reality, ‘the voice of tomorrow.’ (PHE, pp. 6 & 117; my emphasis). The ‘blossoming field of questions’ that opens up once adequate attentiveness is lent to a futural idea of totality leads philosophy away from a contemplative gaze and turns it toward a way of speculating which sees future in things and in the world and indeed in the very notion of totality itself (PHE, p. 6). As Bloch writes: ‘Philosophy will have conscience of tomorrow, commitment to the future, knowledge of hope, or it will have no more knowledge.’ (PHE, p. 7) A conclusion can be drawn from this: a speculative-materialist approach to the philosophy of language must, in the horizon of Bloch’s thought, integrate within its approach this outward-looking, transgressive, utopian conception of speculative totality.

Bloch, then, is a speculative philosopher because he rejects the idea of gnoseological limits on what thought can think—whether that be a priori

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11 It is an interesting question to pose whether Bloch’s approach to speculation allays doubts as to the very possibility of speculative materialism. Doubts as to the compatibility of speculation and materialism are raised by Toscano (2011, p. 87-9), for instance, for whom the Hegelian inheritance of contemporary speculation (i.e. sympathy for the Hegelian critique of Kantian restrictions on reason) problematises the legitimacy of contemporary speculation’s suggestion that it be materialist. If materialism is to be authentic it must, claims Toscano (ibid., p. 89), posit an extra-logical reality such that being and thought are not identified. The question of whether Bloch’s identification of being and thought (and language) in a shared non-identity, a shared incognito, might give Toscano the opportunity to re-think the manner in which he frames the problem at hand is not one I pursue here, but is, nevertheless, a question that requires attention in itself.
categories of the sort one finds in Kantianism or by socially determined ideological configurations. This is certainly not to suggest that Bloch does not recognise limits at all but only that such limits, for Bloch, ought to be grasped ontologically and not solely epistemologically. There is always a really real surplus at work in any and every limit:

Philosophies are their age expressed in ideas, but their great themes, because they can never be exhausted and cannot even be wholly formulated in a single epoch, lie far beyond each respective age (PHE, p. 885).

And the ‘most central of these themes’, Bloch says, ‘is Verum Bonum.’ (ibid.) The Verum Bonum (the Truth and the Good) is the red thread of philosophical diversity.¹² This is why, in my view, a Blochian approach to philosophising language would ideally have as one of its central concerns the precise manner in which an intending of the Verum Bonum permeates the very fibre of language.¹³ I will suggest throughout this study that such an

¹² To give a brief indication of what is meant by Verum Bonum I need only mention the traditionally conceived transcendentals of being, i.e. the One, the Good, the True, and their proximity to reflections on the affirmative divine attributes (the “unity,” “truth,” and “goodness” of God—beauty (“pulchrum”) also counting among them for some (see Aertsen, 2012, p. 6). Bloch’s relation to theology and equally theology’s relation to Bloch has been consistent as much as it has been contested (see Herrmann-Sinaï & Tegtmeyer, 2012; Bloch, 2009; Moltmann, 2014, p. 124). The issue of the transcendentals of being and of transcendentalism is not one I touch upon in any detail in this study. My reading of anacoluthon in Chapter III, however, runs along a similar logic to that given by Freeman in the context of Bloch’s theory of aesthetics:

Because a focus on the primal ontological ground for human experience informs Bloch’s aesthetic, it is “transcendental” aesthetic. By transcendental here I mean that Bloch claims to offer insight into the structure of the world and the human by analysing cultural phenomena not just in terms of their formal or sociological characteristics but for evidence of the way in which they reveal the universal structures of being itself. (2006, p. 235)

In other words, for me, anacoluthon linguistically reveals the transcendental structures of being itself. Incidentally, the notion of “transcendental materialism” has traction with the recent speculative turn, particularly Johnston’s work (2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2014d). The notion of a “transcendental materialism” also echoes the work of the Blochian scholar Zimmermann (2004).

¹³ Philosophy is not ideological “all the way down” but rather in touch with the existence of an extraterritoriality (a domain beyond the given) (Blechman [2008, p. 182] speaks of the simultaneity of ‘historical inscription and transcendence’ in Bloch’s philosophy). In my view, Bloch seems to be
intending can be found present in language in anacoluthic discontinuities of speech.

The point to stress once more, however, is that Ernst Bloch is a speculative philosopher but one hitherto having suffered neglect. In a strange twist of fate, Jürgen Habermas’ (1970, p. 325) reproach directed at Bloch, namely that Bloch unacceptably ‘skips Kant’ and thus regresses to a pre-Kantian, dogmatic standpoint—that Bloch is too speculative, that he freewheels, runs amok, or careers ahead with speculation (Kant’s disparaging word for this was “Rasen” [M, p. 471])—is now the very real basis for the contemporaneity of Bloch’s materialism (see Thompson, 2013, p. 10). In fact, Bloch’s relevance is slowly becoming a question. There is a growing suspicion of his importance for present philosophical concern. Žižek’s recent claims are perhaps best representative of this growing tendency. Bloch is, he writes,

one of the rare figures of whom we can say: fundamentally, with regard to what really matters, he was right, he remains our contemporary, and maybe he belongs even more to our time than to his own. (2013, p. xx)

suggesting that this transcending surplus is philosophy’s very impetus, no matter the epoch, such that in its very capacity to account for the situatedness that each time anew gives birth to and constricts it, philosophy is capable of transgressing the limits of its socio-historical situatedness and in fact already has done so in the very act of recognising such limitedness: ‘To think is to transgress’ (PH, p. 2), as Bloch says (a statement which announces the whole purport of his philosophy and one that could well be transposed into a rudimentary premise for a materialist theory of language: “To express is to transgress”). The lodestar of this noetic and linguistic trangressionism is the Verum Bonum—this is the invariant of direction of noetic and linguistic creation. But to transgress can only really be philosophy’s first intention if philosophy’s first impression is the transgressive dynamic of being itself.

Indeed, the new speculative turn’s proclaimed instigator, namely Meillassoux (2009, p. 7), describes his project as a return to ‘the absolute outside of precritical thinkers’. That said, Bloch’s and Meillassoux’s respective speculative approaches are in instances incompatible (see Moir, 2012a). It ought to be made clear that, contra Habermas’ claim that Bloch skips Kant, there is every indication to indicate that Kant is very important for Bloch’s materialism (see my discussion of Kant and Hegel in Chapter II).
My study redresses this lacuna in the research programme of contemporary speculation by exploring Bloch’s underappreciated oeuvre, doing so with an eye to philosophy of language. I contribute an answer to the question of in just what sense Bloch’s philosophy can be described as *living philosophy*.

[2] The speculative turn also exhibits a marked aversion to questions orbiting the place of language in its renewal of materialist-realist lines of philosophical inquiry. As is the case in its lack of interest in Bloch, this apparent reluctance on the part of contemporary speculative philosophers to broach questions concerning the materialism and realism of language is not entirely inexplicable. The recent turn to speculation is after all a self-proclaimed counterpoint to modes of thought which take language or discourse as philosophy’s Archimedean point. As a determined attempt to purge philosophy of teaching a logico-linguistic pre-determination of being or nature (Grant, 2006, p. 19), it is not surprising that contemporary speculation is hesitant to grapple with the place of language within its programme. It must be noted, though, that this tendency easily leads to a point of blinding accepting the notion that language constitutes an irredeemable enemy of speculation *tut court*. As Avanessian has cogently written, in these circumstances, the speculative turn becomes such an unmitigated offensive against ‘linguistic monism’ (Barad, 2007, p. 44) that an impression of the mutual exclusivity between speculation, on the one hand, and language on the other, presents itself as necessary and thus as insurmountable. As he writes:

The renewed interest in [...] materialism in contemporary Continental philosophy comes with a polemic [...], it directly opposes or objects to the
theoretical projects of the *linguistic turn*. Ontology, it would seem to follow, is inaccessible to any kind of philosophical endeavour anchored in a philosophy of language or in linguistics. (Avanessian, 2016, p. 199)

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that those who treat of language as an object of speculative inquiry appear fundamentally counterintuitive to (contemporary) speculation’s inherent purport, i.e. to escape a philosophical entrapment in that which is all too human. Despite all of these concerns, however, there are voices emerging within the speculative turn itself which announce a desire to overhaul this obvious limit (indeed, recognising the limit is in the very least the commencement of its overcoming).

Whistler (2010), for instance, firmly articulates the need to overcome this unwillingness to speculatively engage with language. Lest contemporary speculation fail on its own terms to think absolutely, Whistler argues that this new movement of thought ought not to ignore language as an object of its inquiry (ibid., p. 3). To back-up this claim Whistler refers to Grant’s notion of an “extensity test.” To be speculative is to be extensive (Grant, 2006, p. 19; cf. Siebers, 1998, p. 73) and a philosophy will be extensive if and when it encompasses the universe within its concepts, including, crucially, an understanding of itself (indeed its linguistic expression or articulation) through such concepts.\(^{15}\) What an employment of this extensity test allows the recent speculative turn to reveal is its elimination of linguistic inquiry (Grant, 2006, p. 21). Contemporary speculation turns out not to be

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\(^{15}\) This notion of an “extensity test” has some basis in Bloch’s philosophy. For Bloch, “to think” means “to transgress,” but transgression is not for its own sake. Philosophical thought always aims at overcoming the world’s ‘uncanniness’ [*Unheimlichkeit*]; indeed, as part of that, the uncanniness of the philosopher’s questioning *ich*, a darkness and an unknowing which always just is philosophy’s commencement (Bloch, 1985d, p. 17). As Bloch writes: ‘Philosophy seeks […] the one view of the world.’ (1985d, p. 17) The strangeness of Bloch’s philosophical intervention is that he inscribes this “seeking for the one view” as the process of being itself.
speculative enough, then; insofar as language is a part of the world any disavowal of the linguistic renders contemporary speculation contrary to its very notion of thinking absoluteness.

Against this backdrop there arises the opportunity to subject language to speculation. As Avanessian notes, there exists an opening through which to think language speculatively as ‘an object in the same dimension as other objects.’ (2016, p. 205)

[C]an language be transformed from the universal medium in which philosophy takes place into a regional object on which philosophy speculates? (Whistler, 2010, p. 338; cf. Whistler 2012, pp. 100-1)

Despite the evident infancy of this question—at least for contemporary speculation—there has been some moves made to respond to it. Perhaps unsurprisingly these have been provided by the same authors who have best identified contemporary speculation’s “linguistic limit.” Both thinkers dispute the conviction which posits the existence of an unbridgeable opposition between philosophy of language and speculation (in fact, it could be said that to presuppose such opposition inadvertently reasserts the linguistic turn’s notion of an insurmountable rift between language and world). But Avanessian and Whistler—these are authors I am referring to—offer different ways of proceeding within this new found opening in speculation. Below I briefly outline these respective responses and offer passing analyses. I ought to stress that whilst I find both responses to the problem at hand as coming short, and for different reasons, I think that their respective attempts to grapple with the place of language amidst the renewal
of speculation prove to be important stimuli for my project of thinking language’s materialism in and through Bloch’s thought. In fact, it could be said that both Avanessian’s and Whistler’s responses serve as foils for my study. Nonetheless, ultimately my claim will be that both Avanessian and Whistler’s respective solution to the problem, despite the merits of each, are ‘deficient in utopian thought and lacking an adequately prospective view’, to borrow a sentence from Bloch (*LE*, p. 55). With the help of Bloch’s philosophy it is possible to contribute to addressing this deficiency.

To begin, it would be well to say that the ontological presuppositions which underlay Avanessian and Whistler’s respective contributions fundamentally place into question an *ontology of objects*, the latter of which, as Puntel (2011, pp. 121-2) importantly claims, is subservient to a subject-predicate propositional form for its own articulation.

[a] I start with Avanessian. The basic direction of Avanessian’s (2016, p. 199) thinking is to propose and begin to develop a ‘speculative ontology of language’. This project is motivated by the following conviction:

I believe contemporary speculative philosophy can and should be accompanied by a realist or materialist linguistics, a poetics or a theory of language that reflects the unavoidable relation of thought, language and the world. (ibid., p. 204)

Avanessian’s thesis is somewhat peculiar because it draws an ontology *from* the nature of language itself (as opposed to reading language into an already standing ontological speculation, as my method will proceed below with Bloch). Avanessian’s commencing claim is that far from being
antithetical to ontology, ‘language always already contains an ontological thesis’: ‘the world that language mediates is made up of relations, not of objects.’ (ibid., p. 199) From this distinction, in which relations maintain an ontological precedence over objects, Avanessian then asserts that language therefore possesses ‘an immanent knowledge and can thus claim for itself a higher degree of realism than our perception, which presents us with things alone.’ (ibid.) What is being proposed here is the idea that language registers or stages the nature of the real (as opposed to the linguistic turn’s position, which holds the real to be inaccessible to the human being who is always already encircled within language). It ought to be noted in passing that Avanessian’s view here is not entirely original. It is also held by another speculative philosopher, namely Puntel (2008, p. 6), who equally asserts that ‘[a]mong the most important implications of language […] are its ontological implications.’ Nevertheless, Avanessian is one of the few scholars to have seriously treated of this idea (and continues to do so), and his underlying premise that language does not restrict speculative access to the real but rather serves as a window out onto the real, is a crucial premise for my study.

However, it is worth dwelling with Avanessian’s proposals for one more passing moment so as to draw out a number of specific points of difference between his and my own approach to the problem at hand: to think language’s materiality. For instance, whilst I follow Avanessian’s overriding presupposition that ‘a speculative ontological approach to the capacities and mechanisms of language can capture its realist ontological dimension’ (2016, p. 200), I differ with him—placed as a I am within the horizon of
Bloch’s philosophy—in what the realist dimension compositionally consists of that language is said to capture. For Avanessian, the ontological dimension that language captures within itself consists of ‘a realism of relations.’ (ibid., p. 199) And yet, while I show that, for Bloch, a speculative ontology of language also would show that, far from being arbitrary in its relation to matter (pace the “linguistic turn”), language in fact expresses, in and through its capacities and mechanisms, the very compositional nature of matter (that is, ontology), the ontological composition (or disposition) that is so expressed in and through the capacities and mechanisms of language is different in Bloch’s philosophy than that which underlies Avanessian’s line of inquiry. Briefly put, Bloch’s materialism—the rudiments of his ontological composition—proposes not so much a realism of relations (plural) as a realism of relation (singular): the relation between incompleteness and realisation (and the process from one to the other). On my reading of the fundamental composition of Bloch’s materialism (covered in Chapter II), such is what language refers to and what therefore it expresses in its own “capacities” and “mechanisms.” In sum, Avanessian’s contention that a speculative ontology of language must come ‘to a different understanding of referentiality’ (ibid., p. 201) is one that is supported by Bloch. Nevertheless, Bloch provides an alternative referentiality to that provided by Avanessian.

[b] The ontic-ness which language captures within itself is, with Bloch, a much more temporal-dynamic ontic-ness. This is, I believe, much more in

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16 This point is picked up in Chapter III, where I develop a reading of anacoluthon as it appears in Bloch’s philosophy. I argue that anacoluthon for Bloch is a linguistic phenomenon expressing Avanessian’s claim that ‘language leads us right into the world’ (2016, p. 199), but to a world in process toward what has not-yet become. Herein lies my difference with Avanessian. Language does not apprehend a relational ontology so much as a processual ontology with a direction of futurity.
keeping with Whistler’s (2010) alternate proposal vis-à-vis a speculative-materialist approach to language.

As mentioned, Whistler also sees the contemporary turn to speculation as erring on the topic of the place of language within it. So as to overturn this state of affairs he takes his cue from the German idealist philosopher F.W.J Schelling, particularly the latter’s Naturphilosophie. For present purposes, the pertinence of this approach resides in the fact that the broad tendency of Bloch’s thought has been dubbed indeed a Marxist unfolding of Schelling’s philosophy. Habermas’ (1970, p. 319) suggestion that Bloch constitutes a ‘Marxist Schelling’ perhaps is the most explicit example of this line of thought. As will be shown, the nub of my contention with Whistler’s account of a speculative approach to language is found on the site of what type of Schellingian Bloch precisely may be said to be and what this may mean for an interpretation of Bloch’s materialism.

17 Whistler has developed fuller accounts of Schelling’s naturalistic approach to language and indeed to the symbol. See Whistler’s Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the System of Identity (2013a) and ‘Naturalism and Symbolism’ (2016). At no point do I touch on Bloch’s theory of the symbol, despite its belonging together with what can be described as his speculative-materialist approach to language.

18 Just what Habermas exactly means by this he does not make entirely clear. There is no doubt, however, that Habermas employs the characterisation as a disparagement, even if against his own intentions he is onto something:

In Schelling’s “System of Transcendental Idealism” the unconscious assumes the double meaning of an impulsive subconscious of the “dark foundation of nature” and a winged superconsciousness out of the “voluntary favour of a higher nature”; likewise, Bloch separates the nightly dream’s unconsciousness from the day dream’s, the no-longer-conscious from the not-yet-conscious of the future. In this view, the romantic pathos of an antiquarian approach misses an entire sphere of ciphers, symbols, mythical elements which appear not only in legends but in viewing nature and art, in dreams and visions, in poetry and philosophy. (Habermas, 1970, p. 318)

I must make clear that my intention is not to explore this Schellingian inheritance in Bloch’s thought, nor its Marxist inheritance for that matter. Habermas’ point, however, is an insightful one and does come to bear on my critical analysis of Whistler’s approach to the materialism of language (see below, especially fn. 23). For work on Schelling in the context of the recent speculative turn, see Corriero & Dezi’s (eds.) Nature and Realism in Schelling’s Philosophy (2013). For work on Bloch’s inheritance of Schelling in relation to philosophy of nature, see Zimmermann’s Nothingness as Ground and Nothing but Ground: Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature Revisited (2014).
For now I return to Whistler. Whistler unfolds his piece on a speculative reflection on language from, in the first instance, Schelling’s critique of Kant, that same Kant who is said to have reduced all questions of nature to the ethical organism alone—recall that philosophy to Kant’s lights is said only to be concerned with the subject, not the object. Whistler attempts to properly think through Schelling’s naturalistic treatment of language, a move that sets out an alternative to this, Kant’s ‘ethicisation of nature’ (ibid., p. 340; see also Guyer, 2000, p. xxxviii), and therefore may be said to re-orient thought back towards the object. A damaging result of the Kantian treatment that ethicises nature is the result of “phenomenalism”: that is, the process of ‘a reduction of nature to what can be experienced’ (ibid.). Nature’s reduction to the experiential alone inevitably leads to a ‘theory of bodies’ that is underpinned by a ‘disinclination to go beyond the given and uncover its conditions.’ (ibid.) Bloch has much sympathy for the broad tendency of this Schellingian critique of the Kantian approach to nature (or matter), in which phenomena are not posited as exhausting the generativity that produces their existence. Bloch would concur that philosophy’s maintaining an interest ‘in natural phenomena’ alone—in place of ‘productive nature’—will ultimately prevent philosophy from being philosophy, i.e. from getting at that which ‘exceeds such phenomena’ (ibid.). It ought to be highlighted in passing that the echoes here with Avanessian are plain: bodies/objects ought not to be given ontological precedence. The difference is that Avanessian holds relations to be the ontological point of departure, while for Whistler’s Schellingian approach ‘dynamics’ (ibid.) serves as the starting point for speculation on the nature of nature (and thus on the nature of language). Not then “relations
before objects” but “dynamics before bodies.” As Whistler writes: ‘Central to this change in perspective is a tireless concern with how the phenomenal is generated; it is this which is of interest, not phenomenal bodies themselves.’ (ibid., pp. 340-1)

How, then, to Whistler’s mind, is the naturalistic generation of language’s phenomenality to be grasped in the Schellingian context? For a Schellingian ‘speculative linguistics’ (ibid., p. 342) any speculation on language is incorporated into the abovementioned generative approach to philosophising nature. In this fashion, words constitute the objects of language and therefore are treated as physical phenomena (products or bodies, as it were), just like any other natural bodies or products. Language is seen as a product of nature’s productivity, then, language is the continuing result of ‘dynamic forces […] which generate other natural phenomena’ (ibid., p. 343).

It is this recourse to treating of the word as a natural product (think of the implications of this for religion) that provides Schelling the room to think the natural generativity of language at a more fundamental level. And Schelling tends to think this linguistic generativity through recourse to geology:

Can words, Schelling asks, be thought of on the model of natural objects, produced by dynamic forces analogous to those which generate other natural phenomena (like mountains)? And in so asking, he raises the possibility of treating the formation of words on a geological model. (Whistler, 2016, p. 103)

Insofar as the science of geology excavates the earth’s layers to discover the deep past to which these layers belong, so then can language be

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19 This claim certainly resonates with Bloch, and interestingly does so close to a discussion of language: ‘Genuine realistic poetry deals with process, from which the facts have been artificially isolated and reified.’ (LE, p. 114)
treated, as a natural product, in the light of a philological geology in which the present phenomenal state of language is traced back to the deep past: ‘Both sciences [i.e. philology and geology] proceed beyond the phenomenally given to the forces which generate them, and, as such, both venture into empirically inaccessible depths.’ (ibid., p. 345)

To my mind, the crucial points which ought to be drawn from Whistler’s approach to a speculative-materialist appraisal of language are the following. It has to be stressed that, in the context of Bloch’s materialism, Whistler’s Schellingian-inspired response is pertinent due to its prioritising generativity. However, what is problematic in this response is that it is seen to direct language-speculation towards that which lies in the primordial past, i.e. the generativity of (linguistic) phenomenality is subterraneanly located, and therefore the movement of speculation directs itself down and back (into the past), and not, as is the case with Bloch’s form of speculation, out and beyond (into the future). As Bloch himself writes, it is ‘the horizon of the future’ which ‘gives reality its real dimension’ (PHE, p. 285; emphasis removed). The form-ation of words will be seen to proceed forwards for Bloch: ‘The legitimate will to remember the ground [das Entsinnenwollen auf den Grund], the primum agens of origin, finds its fund in the Now’; ‘its Wherein [Worin] and Whence [Woher] is only detectable ex fundamento in the Whither [Wohin] and What-for [Wozu].’ (TE, p. 215) One has to speculate ‘ahead [nach vorwärts’], not back (TE, p. 216). Once more:

the Omega of the Where To explains itself not with reference to a primally been Alpha, supposedly most real of all, of the Where From, of the origin, but on the contrary: this origin explains itself first with reference to the Novum of
the end, indeed, as an origin still essentially unrealised in itself, it first enters reality with this Ultimum. \((PHE, p. 204)\)

In the horizon of what is most vital for Bloch’s philosophical thought, Whistler’s speculative account of language pales into the primordial. If it be true, then, that Bloch is Schellingian in scope, he remains, and resolutely so, a Marxist Schelling: for Bloch, what has not yet become determines the direction of his speculation. The generativity that produces phenomenality, i.e. the ‘unconscious production of givenness’, as Bloch (1985c, p. 200) is, for Bloch, futurally directed.\(^{20}\) In sum, the attractiveness of Whistler’s approach lies in its prioritising dynamics over objects (generativity over what is generated).\(^{21}\) This will be an important feature of my reading of anacoluthon. The downside, however, is the temporal direction Whistler prioritises in this generativity. With an eye to my discussion in Chapter II on analogy, one could say that Whistler’s approach to linguistic generativity is protological, whilst Bloch’s remains eschatological. Nevertheless, Whistler’s (2012, p. 99) ‘hyper-realist attitude to sense’ (his hyper-naturalistic approach to language) serves as a springboard with which my own study proceeds.

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\(^{20}\) See \(PA, p. 119\), where Bloch intimates a form of speculation in which the inexperiential side of phenomenality possesses an ‘aurora bearing [aurorische Seite]’, which, as such, Bloch coins as ‘not-yet-conscious [Noch-Nicht-Bewußt]’; this is opposed to the archaic ‘no-longer-conscious [Nicht-Mehr-Bewußten]’, which evidently directs Schelling’s geological approach to linguistic generativity, and which in Bloch’s eyes is tied to the Freudian thematic. Disputation with Freud (and Freud’s apparent repetition of Platonic anamnesis’ backward logic) cuts right across the whole of Bloch’s philosophy. For a study that situates Schelling’s connection with the Freudian notion of unconscious, see Ffytche’s \(The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche\) (2012).

\(^{21}\) Part of my argument in Chapter III will be to show that anacoluthon displays within language the primacy of the process of language over the product of language, the forming over what is formed. This relates to Schelling’s philosophy of nature, in which, as Bloch (1985c, p. 203) says, Schelling challenges natural researchers not to forget nature’s productivity over its product (this echoes A.N. Whitehead’s [1978, p. 21] designation of Creativity as ‘the universal of universals characterising ultimate matter of fact’). To gloss the point in Schellingian terms: anacoluthon marks the slippage in language between the ‘infinite productivity’ and the ‘finite products’ of nature, within language (Bloch, 1985c, p. 203). Bloch unequivocally politicises this Schelling-motif by relating it to Marx’s analysis of the reification of human labour into fixed commodity-objects (ibid., pp. 203-4).
Whistler’s approach allows me to query the legitimacy of speculative linguistics laid upon utopian foundations. Is there not room to think a futural physics in which the vitality of nature is truly vital because open to the new? Could not the generativity of linguistic phenomenality be thought futurally? *Can a futurally-directed processuality/generativity be the matter of speculation on language?* Bloch’s materialism allows me to explore this notion.

I am not the first to have spotted the potential that Bloch’s philosophy possesses for philosophising language in an original register such as I have just queried above. Steiner (1975, p. 209), a literary theorist, is one of the few commentators to have fully recognised that Bloch’s philosophical axiomatic—i.e. the notion that speculative totality or fulfilled Being (*totum esse*) is not-yet *in* being but constitutes that which all things urge towards—as a potential site through which to renew philosophy of language. In an important remark, Steiner writes: Bloch’s ‘semantics of rational apocalypse have general philosophic and linguistic *application*.’ (1975, p. 217; my emphasis)22 However, whilst it is clear to Steiner’s mind that Bloch’s utopian philosophy could significantly inform philosophy of language, Steiner’s remarks are suggestive at best. Their implications go undeveloped. Indeed, just what a linguistic application of Bloch’s philosophy entails (Steiner’s intuition) must systematically draw on the categories of Bloch’s materialism, but this is just what (perhaps unsurprisingly) Steiner does not attend to. My

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22 Elsewhere Steiner (1996, p. 24) speaks of Walter Benjamin’s ‘messianic linguistics’—Benjamin being, like Adorno, a close associate of Bloch’s. In my mind this gives a degree of justification to explore the possibility of a “utopian-materialist linguistics,” and it is precisely toward developing the beginnings of such a linguistics that Chapter III devotes itself through providing a reading of anacoluthon.
study makes good on Steiner’s intuition by setting out a linguistic application of Bloch’s philosophy. It will be an application which sees language as immersed in and expressive of the world as urge to creative forms, with the Thing in Itself as the objective phantasy: ‘the true poetic correlate’—as ‘Marx once called it’—is, Bloch avers, ‘the “dream of a thing” in the world.’ (LE, p. 114; my emphasis) A speculative philosophy of language, then, just is a utopian philosophy of language.  

§3. METHOD

Having laid-out my study-question, its thesis, and the contemporary backdrop which lends to it its proper departure point and direction of travel, I now will make two remarks concerning my study’s broad methodological approach.

[1] My approach to reading Bloch’s corpus is akin to montage, a concept or artistic practice Bloch associates with porosity (LE, p. 454). With regard to montage, Bloch writes that ‘[o]nly the artificial and abstract viewpoint produces continuity—it does not engender breaks in style, which has led to montage.’ (LE, p. 118) The porous technique of montage is such that a variety of disparate elements break into a frame where they would not usually belong, thus engendering a fragmented image but an image seeking to portray a core truth of reality: reality qua discontinuity. In this light Bloch

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23 I will have occasion to return to Steiner’s intuition in more detail (Chapter III). This is because Steiner’s (1965, p. 341) claim that Bloch’s expressionistic style of language belongs to the ‘Pythagorean genre’ inadvertently lends support to my reading Bloch’s materialism as a form of analogic metaphysics. As I show in Chapter II, Pythagorean speculation is the conceptual inception of analogy.

24 “Porosity” and montage intersect on the site of a fluidity of boundaries: ‘Walter Benjamin’, Bloch writes, ‘has described Italy as “porous,” implying not a classical but a baroque interplay: an object that lacks boundaries, but that is nonetheless bound together.’ (LE, p. 451)
calls montage, especially as employed by ‘Leninist of the stage’ Bertolt Brecht, ‘a force of production.’ (HT, pp. 229 & 206) In order to undertake the necessity of creativity (recall, Bloch did not possess an explicit philosophy of language), I draw on the whole breadth of Bloch’s corpus, bringing together all number of comments and observations on diverse subject-matter; always with an eye to their significance for the study’s question (language turns out to be omnia ubique). As Bloch casts my approach: ‘the montage of the fragment out of its old existence is the experiment of its refunctioning into a new one here.’ (HT, p. 207) Bloch’s corpus thus becomes ‘a kind of laboratory, an open experimental space’ (HT, p. 226) for the speculative-materialist philosopher of language.25

Perhaps nothing brings one into closer contact with a thinker than translating him into one’s mother tongue.—McInerny, 2003, p. 3

[2] The final remark is a note on translation. A large portion of Bloch’s collected works have yet to undergo translation into English.26 This therefore makes confrontation with the original texts a necessity. The problem

25 The drawback of this montage-like approach lies in its failure to treat of the variations of themes and categories which inevitably took place as Bloch developed his philosophy from its early to more mature stages (a point made by Geoghegan, 1996, p. 27). Is something not lost if such differences are readily glossed over? My approach, however, treats of the corpus as a unity. Any conceptual variations witnessed through the development of Bloch’s philosophy constantly harbour an unchanging intention—an invariant of direction. One owes it to the task of philosophy to treat Bloch’s works in such manner that what is being searched for in them is precisely a core of truth. That from the earliest to the latest stages of Bloch’s entanglement with the human mind’s perennial questions there is mediated—amidst the variations, digressions and detours—an enduring insight, dark perhaps but always there, vitally informing (see Boldyrev, 2014, pp. 7-8).

Bloch’s works evoke a sense of chronological stillness despite stylistic changes or reformulations of his philosophical and political stance. His aim is at a collection of evidence toward hope, the Noch-Nicht, the utopia whose latency and tendency Bloch tries to map as his own philosophical and literary cosmology. (Weissberg, 1992, p. 33)

26 Although a recent contract with the publishing house Brill now means that many of Bloch’s most precious contributions to philosophy will over the coming years be finding their way for the first time into the English language (Thompson, 2013a, p. 11).
becomes one of how best to approach the task of translation, especially when the topic under consideration here is the speculative-material nature of language as perceived within the horizon of Bloch’s philosophy. Could something be lost on Bloch’s view of language if it be incorrectly transfigured over into English?

One can get a bearing on this problem by turning to the manner in which Hegel has evoked problems for his English translators. Indeed, it has almost become a reflex action to claim that Hegel is for the most party unreadable and that the ‘peculiarity and flexibility’ of Hegelian syntax confirms the obscurity of its philosophical content. It is said that ‘Hegel is one of the philosophers about whom the question of readability is almost immediately raised.’ (Cassin, 2004, p. 386; cf. Adorno, 1993, p. 89) Hegel’s language problematicity lies in its unexpected employment of everyday speech (one could say, then, that it is almost montage-like in this respect):

[With Hegel] ordinary language is rapidly enveloped and invested by phenomenological or speculative discourse, and this is shown by ruptures, anacolutha, and other anomalies that rapidly increase, to the confusion of the reader. (ibid., p. 388; my emphasis)²⁷

Such use of language for Hegel befits the movement of the Thing in Itself—rupture, contradiction. This is an important point because it serves to

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²⁷ A more fluid, open form of syntax is common to German philosophy. As Forster (2002, p. ix; my emphasis) notes, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) was against ‘any grammatical or lexical straitjacketing of language’; this led, Forster suggests, to Herder’s seemingly ‘emotional and grammatically undisciplined’ form of expression; to this effect Herder ‘artfully’ employed ‘rhetorical-grammatical figures’ such as ‘anacoluthon, aposiopesis, brachylogy, chiasmus, hendiadys, oxymoron, and hysteron proteron.’ Of an earlier thinker within the German tradition, Paracelsus (1493-1541), Weeks (2008, p. 40) notes of the integral place of ellipse and anacoluthon: Paracelsus, he writes, ‘is above all a writer of the voice’ (ibid., p. 41; my emphasis).
compound the problem of how best to translate him. Hegel was a constant non-contemporary interlocutor for Bloch, and the problems with translating Hegel seem to spill over into Bloch’s own philosophy. Bloch’s style is portrayed—particularly by its detractors—as especially taxing. Much of the problem relates to Bloch’s association with German Expressionism; in fact, he is considered the philosopher of this avant-garde movement. The difficulty lies, I think, in the manner in which Bloch’s style of expression is inextricably bound to the compositional structure of his materialism. As I will hope to show, Bloch’s processual, incomplete conception of matter militates against a type of philosophical clarity that can be pocketed as one easily does a coin. This does not entail esoteric consequences, but it must be said that Bloch’s at points oneiric idiom (the same is said of Hegel’s [ibid, 28]

28 For example, Bloch’s ‘reader feels as though he were amid the fumes of an alchemist’s laboratory’; Bloch is ‘a preacher of intellectual irresponsibility’ whose prose is ‘verbiage of intolerable complexity.’ (Kolakowski, 2005, pp. 1124 & 1143-4) Interestingly, Kolakowski is repeating Stalinist criticism directed at Bloch. Bloch’s Marxist re-visionism was said to translate into a mystical, irrational, and obscurantist style of language (see Kessler, 2006, p. 33). That a vehement anti-Stalinist (Kolakowski) relies upon similar criticism as the vulgar Marxists ought to give pause for thought; it is analogous to orthodox Marxist critiques of Expressionism which, mirroring the Nazis’ judgement of the avant-garde movement, perceived it as degenerate.

29 For a pertinent study on the historical context of German Expressionism, see Bushart’s (1990) Der Geist der Gotik und die expressionistische Kunst, in which the tendencies of socialism, utopianism, expressionism and gothic revival (tendencies all discernible in Bloch’s first book) are woven into an illuminating explication of the immediate post-First World War production of German art. Steiner is well aware of these tendencies:

As early as the essays of 1912-17 and Thomas Münzer, Bloch makes of the act of writing a peculiarly individual and urgent deed. Though strongly influenced by Expressionism, Bloch’s earlier prose has its own abrupt lyric insistence. In Bloch’s mature style, there are pages we can set beside Hölderlin and Nietzsche for their subtle brightness. Like few other masters of German, he has broken the generically ponderous, clotted norms of German syntax. (1985, p. 113; my emphasis)

Adorno is also attuned to Bloch’s rich, versatile, free expressionism:

The tempo is more than the mere medium of a subjectively excited delivery. Its intensity is that of something to be expressed, the breakthrough that, explicitly or implicitly, forms the theme of every sentence Bloch ever wrote, a breakthrough he tries to evoke through the figure of his speech. This tempo is comparable to the expressionist tempo, which abbreviates. Philosophically, it indicates a change of attitude toward the object. The object can no longer be contemplated peacefully and with composure. (2008, p. 216; my emphasis)
p. 387) does produce a number of problems concerning the translation of his work. The best way to tackle this problem is to approach the task of translation as Bloch’s contemporary Walter Benjamin perceived it. Without going into the specificities of Benjamin’s (1999a) approach, the point made at very end of his essay can be cited to highlight my general approach. The following passage from Rudolf Pannwitz’s *Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur* is drawn on by Benjamin:

> “The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue. […]. He must expand and deepen his language by means of the foreign language.” (ibid, pp. 261-2)

Benjamin speaks of translation producing ‘birth pangs’ in one’s own language (ibid., p. 256); the afterlife of a work, through its translation, effects the recipient language such that it undergoes a stepping beyond itself into new expression. As will become clear during the progression of my study, this process echoes the very nature of Bloch’s materialism.

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30 This is, I think, compounded by Bloch never writing in English, despite having lived in America in exile. Evidence exists to suggest that Bloch held a low opinion of English. Reflecting on the life of the German language in a foreign land (the German emigres in America), Bloch writes that great philosophers can have broad effects without their language (the most concrete example is the continued existence of Hegel), but they can only be understood in the “original,” that is, in their place of linguistic origination. (1994, p. 383)

[große Philosophen ohne ihre Sprache zwar weitergetrieben werden (das konkreteste Exempel ist das Fortleben Hegels), aber verstanden werden können sie nur im „Original“, das heißt in ihrer sprachlichen Ursprungsstelle.]

31 Moir & Siebers (2011) scrutinise the manner in which Bloch’s thought informs not only an approach to the praxis of translation but also reveals a truth-content of the process of translation itself. Querying the notion of “translation as utopia,” they write that

It is not unconditionally the case that translation is hope, but the parallels permit closer consideration. For example, just as does hope, so translation presupposes a still
§4. OUTLINE OF THE WORK

My thesis is arranged into three parts. In the first instance a good amount of groundwork is required before I can begin to speak of any linguistic application of Bloch’s materialism. My study’s first two chapters, then, are of a propaedeutic nature. Together they elucidate the central categories that make up Bloch’s materialism. Summarised schematically, in Chapter I, I will present and critically discuss the fundamental categories constituting Bloch’s materialism. These categories number six in total—they are, I will argue, crucial to fostering a Blochian approach to language’s materiality. There I unpack the philosophical positions, inheritances and novel philosophical effects they entail. If for Bloch’s materialism the essence of the world is gay spirit and urge to creative forms, then at this early stage of the study I elaborate the categories through which Bloch thinks this to be so. In sum, I argue in Chapter I that Bloch’s materialism can be understood as a dialectic between incompleteness and realisation.

I then proceed in Chapter II to submit Bloch’s materialism to an original interpretation. I show how Bloch’s materialism can be seen to constitute an experimental form of analogic metaphysics. Reading this materialism as an experimental form of analogic metaphysics allows me to make sense of what Bloch means when he says that the Thing in Itself is the objective phantasy;

32 I do not translate works which have already undergone translation into English—The Principle of Hope being the foremost in this case (see abbreviations list for an indication as to the works). All other translations of are my own; they are of those works that remain available only in German (the vast majority of works, it must be said). I have sought transparency. Wherever I translate Bloch at length I provide the original passage in parentheses underneath.
it also allows me to bring closer together matter and language. To substantiate my reading and to bring into view its consequences, I will sketch the analogy of being as it has appeared at key stages in the history of philosophy, i.e. ancient Greek, medieval, and modern. This will open up a path through which to conceptualise language as a transgressive process; the utopian cadence I mentioned above.

In Chapter III, I develop the implications of the previous two chapters’ findings for a speculative-materialist approach to language that can be described as Blochian. To achieve this I will narrow my focus by reading the rhetorical figure of anacoluthon. This figure of speech serves as a nodal point in which my analogic reading of Bloch’s materialism becomes visible and meaningful for a speculative-materialist approach to language. My argument will be that anacoluthon is a figure of language that embodies the findings of the previous two chapters. Anacoluthon constitutes a linguistic expression of the incompleteness, the processuality and the urge for realisation that marks Bloch’s conception of the world’s ontology. The figure expresses the urge to creative forms in a transgressive process of speaking into the new.33 I refer to this transgressive process of speaking into the new, exemplified by anacoluthic interruptions, as a process of “je über hinaus”: a process of ever-beyond-and-out toward that which is not-yet. Bloch’s new materialism is a materialism of the new; I read language as showing, in anacoluthic expression, the same ontological disposition. Linguistic

33 In the context of Bloch’s philosophy, Zimmermann (2004, pp. 656 & 660) speaks of an Unsagbaren-Sagbaren dialectic. This dialectic between the sayable and the unsayable is, Zimmermann implies, the root of process for Bloch. As such, the transgressive process unique to language of which I speak of is transgressive because its purpose is always one of expressing that which remains unexpressed or, as the case may well be, inexpressible. I understand Zimmermann’s assertion to be correct, and I further its insight by reading anacoluthon in tandem with it.
production is utopian, and the anacoluthon gives one to think this in a concrete manner. As Bloch writes: ‘Every production intends an element of the seventh day of creation, as the statement of the previously unsaid, the human hearing of the previously unheard’ (*PHE*, p. 982).\(^\text{34}\)

\(^{34}\) Bloch assigns *creativity* a fundamental place within his conception of matter, so much so that one can say with Bloch utopia stands as a newly founded *transcendens* of being, a thesis comparable to Fetz’s (1990) claim that A.N. Whitehead’s process philosophy proposes the notion of “creativity” as a new transcendental of being.
CHAPTER ONE
MATTER

INTRODUCTION

The persistent presence of the concept of matter throughout the Western philosophical tradition (from the pre-Socratics to the present day) leaves commentators no choice but to designate it a topos of philosophy (Lange, 1908, p. 3). As McMullin (1965, p. 1) argues, ‘to trace the story of matter is almost to trace the story of philosophy itself’; matter is ‘the oldest conceptual tool in the Western speculative tradition’, and whether the case be ancient or modern, ‘an initial judgement about the role attributed to matter’ is ‘decisive in orienting a philosophical system as a whole.’ (ibid; my emphasis) Such claims ring true when they are applied to Bloch’s philosophy. From beginning to end, Bloch’s thought concerns the concept of matter and the role attributed to this concept unmistakably orients Bloch’s philosophical thought in its (open) totality (see Münster, 1987, p. 571).

The upshot of this for my study is that a speculative-materialist philosophy of language that wishes to speak in Blochian tones must first grasp the role that Bloch attributes to matter. In what follows, then, I will provide an exposition of the categorial lineaments of Bloch’s materialism, i.e. the main categories that make up his concept of matter. It consists of three parts, division immanent to Bloch’s materialism. In §1 I will deal with the broad departure point of Bloch’s materialism, best described, I think, as an
“ontologisation of Kant,” which, as such, hardly resonates with Kant’s intention of confronting central questions in epistemology.\textsuperscript{35} Having dealt with what I consider to be the broad starting point of Bloch’s materialism, in §2 and §3 I will then deal with the substantive categories which make up this move; namely, the categories of “tendency” and “latency,” respectively. As well as treating of each in a substantive fashion, both the genealogies and the \textit{really real} dialectical interaction between tendency and latency will be dealt with, too.\textsuperscript{36} I will show that, whilst tendency describes the processuality of matter’s searching for its own what-ness, latency deals with the nature of what-ness when what-ness is conceived of as really not-yet. In the same spirit of coherency I will also analyse three other Blochian categories which feed into this approach: “Front,” “Novum,” and “Ultimum” (\textit{PHE}, pp. 198-205; Siebers, 2012a, p. 412). In a letter to the theologian Paul Tillich, Bloch describes these three categories as the ‘most un-thought through \textit{[undurchdachtensten]}’ (1985b, p. 827) in the vast expanse of philosophy’s ongoing history. Their consideration will serve to better illuminate the stakes of the tendency and latency categories. All these categories—tendency, latency, Front, Novum, Ultimum—will be crucial to my linguistic appraisal of Bloch’s speculative materialism.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Put schematically, I understand by “ontologisation of Kant” the gesture by which Bloch inscribes the question of what matter is into the constitution of matter itself, such that matter in itself is a searching for its own what-ness (\textit{TE}, p. 209). For an equally significant ontologisation of Kant, see Heidegger’s \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics} (1997).

\textsuperscript{36} Bloch’s philosophy did not begin \textit{de novo}. In spite of Holz’s (1975, p. 121) legitimate claim that only by way of bracketing oneself from the presuppositions of the tradition of materialism can one then glimpse the proper import of Bloch’s concept of matter, it is nevertheless only through a knowledge of that tradition that this process of breaking free actually occurs. All this is to Bloch’s temper of mind: any suspension of tradition relies upon tradition.

\textsuperscript{37} While I treat of each category analytically as if each stood alone, I do so only for the purpose of clear elucidation. In truth all Blochian categories presuppose each other—each is pregnant with the
§1. ONTOLOGISING KANT

The starting point of Bloch’s materialism, to my mind, consists of an ontologisation of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophical thought. As I have briefly stated Kant’s position in the Introduction, this turn consists of the objects of philosophical thought being scrutinised no longer as if our knowledge conforms to the nature of such objects—a metaphysical tendency Kant terms dogmatic metaphysics—but as if they ‘conform to our knowledge.’ (B xvi; my emphasis) It constitutes a shift, whereby the subject of thought is given precedence over the object of thought. Philosophical thought thus no longer deals with objects (or things) as they are in themselves, Kant declares, but instead deals with objects as they are for the human mind. What does it mean, then, to claim that Bloch ontologises this Copernican turn? It lays in Bloch’s inscribing incomprehensibility into matter’s own ontological constitution. The question of what matter is thus becomes a question matter fundamentally asks of itself. As Bloch writes:

What is matter? This question is […] the own most question of all matter itself, its resolution-experiment in progress. It is the What-problem of human contents together with not only our sustaining but cosmically enormous, encompassing nature. (TE, p. 209)

[Was ist Materie?, diese Frage ist…das eigenste, das noch in seinem welthaften Lösungsversuch befindliche aller Materie selber. Es ist das

next. Furthermore, the porosity between categories relates to the speculativeness of Bloch’s thought: these categories do not exist beyond the reality of which they speak, rather they immanently emerge from reality’s process. Blochian categories are thus forms of being-there (Daseinsformen), existence-vocations/determinations (Existenz-bestimmungen) (EM, p. 66). As such their ‘contents widen and change in the course of history and in the light of the new’, i.e. the Novum (Siebers, 2012d, p. 162).
As I will outline further in Chapter II, for Bloch, the basis of the really real incomprehensibility of what matter is resides in matter’s really real incompleteness, i.e. matter’s “what-problem,” the ‘kernel of the world’ (PA, p. 146), is not yet resolved according to Bloch because matter’s essence has yet to finish its journey. Keeping in mind that my claim of Bloch ontologising Kant could well constitute a thesis in itself, below I will briefly attempt to unpack my claim a little further.

[1] If Kant’s influence in the history of philosophy is ‘vast and protean’ (Gardner, 2015, p. 1), then in Bloch Kant receives a new, utopian inflection. To substantiate the claim in question here I can turn to Bloch’s notion of the ‘darkness of the lived moment [Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks].’ (PA, 149) Writing to Adorno in 1935, Bloch puts a seal on his guiding philosophical insights: ‘the darkness of the lived moment, the form of the inconstructable question, not-yet-conscious knowledge, and a new utopian substance’ (1985a, p. 435). As a systematic thinker—even though the art of his system is an open architectonic—Bloch thinks these insights as related and cohering. But it is the first insight—the darkness of the lived moment—that constitutes Bloch’s starting point proper and in a sense is that which his other key insights circulate around. Thus Bloch’s philosophy and the world
itself circle the same “thing.” ³³ To clarify the ‘root idea [Grundgedanke]’ of his philosophy Bloch opts to employ an ocular analogy:

What is very near, what immediately rises up before my eyes, I cannot see. It must give a distance there. Then can it first be objective. Otherwise it is not yet once shaped, much less representational. In proverbs it is simply felt: what he weaves, no weaver knows - at the foot of the lighthouse there is no light – the prophet is never honoured in his own land… (TL, p. 340).

[Was sehr nah ist, was unmittelbar vor meinem Auge aufragt, kann ich nicht sehen. Es muß ein Abstand da sein. Dann erst kann es gegenständlich sein. Im anderen Fall ist es noch nicht einmal zuständig, geschweige gegenständlich. In Sprichwörtern ist es sehr einfach gefühlt: Was er webt, weiß kein Weber – Am Fuß des Leuchtturms ist kein Licht – Der Prophet gilt nichts in seinem Vaterland…]

A blind spot is the birthplace of (Bloch’s) philosophy just as it is the origin of the capacity to see the world. What makes one’s visual field possible is not in one’s visual field but rather is extraterritorial to it (Bloch sometimes enlists the verb “ausstehen” to make this point, literally: “out-standing”—both in the sense of “standing outside of” and “yet to be given”). ³⁹ Philosophy, then, is an attempt to step outside or beyond itself so as to see itself in an unconstrained manner (recall that Bloch’s speculation is based not on the

³³ This returns me to the speculative peculiarity of Bloch’s materialism, namely that the identity of thought and being resides in a real non-identity: “the centre in itself is still night, incognito, ferment, around which everyone, everything, and every work is still built.” (SU, p. 173)

³⁹ As Zimmermann (2001, p. 17; my emphasis) importantly notes, Bloch conveys his philosophical point of departure with an ‘optical analogy’. This is an old motif of philosophy of course. In the Metaphysics for instance, Aristotle writes: ‘For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.’ (993b1, 10-15)
mirror-thinking of *speculum* but the logic of *speculari*: “to look out”). The theologian Jürgen Moltmann (1978, p. 73) quite correctly describes Bloch’s corpus as an overture to a future arrival, namely, to an overcoming of this blind spot: to a point where the weaver knows what is woven, where the lighthouse illumines its nearest nearness. The possibility of this future arrival is the semantic content of Bloch’s philosophy; it is central for developing a utopian ontology of language.

One of the philosophical peculiarities of Bloch’s thought is to have lent to this blind spot an immense degree of importance in the task of understanding both the world and the subject who thinks the world. This peculiarity can be grasped, I think, as an ontologisation of Kant’s approach to the question of what matter is in itself. There is, however, a problem that arises with this analysis of Bloch’s philosophical departure point. The problem bears of what I have suggested in the Introduction, namely that the speculative turn in Continental philosophy is fundamentally kataphatic in direction.

In a well-known remark from *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1962), Ludwig Wittgenstein names the inexpressible “mystical”: ‘Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.’ (6.5.) Expressing that the world is, is in some sense what constitutes the stakes of Bloch’s “blind spot.” But the approaches of Bloch and Wittgenstein radically diverge on the point of this inexpressibility: ‘Whereof one cannot speak,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘thereof one must remain silent.’ (7.) Bloch is party is the recent speculative-materialist turn in Continental philosophy in that he, too, seeks to counterpoint this tendency of

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40 This point comes across quite clearly in a composition titled “What is Philosophy, as Searching and Attempting?” (*PA*, pp. 395-401)
apophatic thought, even if, as I will show, apophaticism remains present in his philosophy to some extent.\textsuperscript{41} As does Kant, Bloch certainly endorses an incommunicability; the darkness of the lived moment constitutes an ‘innermost speechless in-itself [innerste sprachlose Ansich]’ (TE, p. 13). But there is an important point that needs emphasising if one is to begin to speak within and about Bloch’s materialism. For without an attempt being made to represent the dark spot, even if in a radically negative index as with Wittgenstein, one would not know of its existence. Only in the act of expressing what is real and true about oneself is this dark spot, as it were, brought into the light of day. Bloch intimates this when he ties expression to coming up against an inadequacy in relation to what was meant but missed. It is a recurring motif of his materialism: ‘What we are in ourselves is dark, too close. What we become outwardly [äußerlich] […] so often is not in accordance with who we are.’ (PA, p. 13) This blind spot so close to home—a space Bloch also at times calls ‘hollow being’ (ibid., p. 20)—is indeed a space of real emergence; not only of speech, but of that which is and of that which could become. This process of becoming-outward is thus an important one in the horizon of Bloch’s materialism. Incognito moves out of itself and thereby expresses itself, both in the sense that it expresses that it is incomplete and in the sense that it searches to transgress its own incomprehensibility.

In that matter’s ambiguity is placed not merely over on the epistemological side but registers matter’s ontological condition, so then irrational expression

\textsuperscript{41} As Freeman writes, for Bloch ‘the temporal now is intrinsically unfixed and can only be expressed through approximation and negation’, the ‘open process of movement toward an unknown […] cannot be described in positive terms.’ (2006, p. 129) Thus an apophatic element weaves what is on the whole Bloch’s affirmatory philosophical outlook.

[48]
is not given license. In Bloch’s mind, matter’s incompletion opens up space for experimental expression, both of itself and of the philosopher whom speaks of it: ‘the word matter originated from mater, meaning a fruitful world-womb experimenting with forms, figures, shapes of existence’ (M, p. 17). Bloch discusses this point around the notion of preciseness. Matter’s incompleteness does not entail one adopt the most austere (Entsagung) philosophical language imaginable, nor for that matter does it entail (pace Wittgenstein) silence. As Bloch writes somewhat elusively:

Vagueness can be identical with expression of the highest precision; because materiality, that in itself is not yet determined, likewise cannot be expressed in the usual sense of preciseness, otherwise one falsifies it. (TL, p. 293)

[Vagheit kann nämlich der Ausdruck von höchster Präzision sein; denn Sachhaftes, das an sich selber noch nicht bestimmt ist, kann auch nicht im üblichen Sinn präzis ausgedrückt werden, oder man verfälscht es.]

Bloch’s determinations of matter therefore necessarily carry a ‘precise vagueness’ (TL, p. 293); in other words, Bloch avoids attributing to matter a preciseness that would seek in a contrived manner to overturn matter’s real objective incompleteness. In a curious inflection this point Bloch shares with Kant, albeit owing to quite different reasons and based upon quite different registers of philosophical concern. Whilst for Kant, on the one hand, the

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42 As Bloch characterises his thought as ‘model-like thought [modellhaftes Denken]’ (TE, p. 12), in the sense of experimental probing (a notion Bloch dis-relates from positivism and empirical science and which, in fact, he considers congruent with the really real, incomplete substance of the world).

43 As Bloch says, one of the earliest insights of speculative-materialist thought is ‘the view that the world is not as it sensuously appears’ (M, p. 24 & 25). Mutatis mutandis, this is precisely Kant’s position: matter as it is in itself is not what it appears to be for the human being, whose a priori categories of the understanding and whose pure forms of intuition (space and time) limit matter’s “whatness” to the field of the human’s possible experience.
problem is decided epistemologically, in that the philosopher is said to be incapable of reaching beyond both her forms of intuition and her categories of understanding in order to witness matter as it is in itself; on the other hand, for Bloch, matter’s “in itself” remains undetermined in its core essence; matter’s ontology is as of yet incomplete and thus it “what-ness”—an important category for Bloch, as I will show in Chapter II—cannot be foreclosed by any all-encompassing definition. This general ontological determination of matter comes to the fore in Bloch’s materialism-book, *Das Materialismusproblem, Seine Geschichte und Substanz*. The impression of this book is the idea that the history of materialism represents a falsification of matter’s true nature in that what (at least at present) cannot be defined—because still undergoing *self*-determination—was always being restrictively defined. Nevertheless, I think it is correct to say that Bloch sees this history as indirectly foregrounding the idea that, like utopia, matter’s proper content is an “indefinite something” which self-creates various *real* responses to its own *real* mystery, not merely conceptual responses—again, one can read this ontologically if one so chooses. Thus, Bloch gives one to think the history of materialism as a history of coming up against an unknown and

44 For Plato, matter does not denote a definite material existent but *existent privation* as such, i.e. that which is radically extrinsic to and thus devoid of potentiality for true, pure being. To Plato’s mind, matter is erotic desire for its contrary (the Good, the One) and is therefore that which longs for its own demise. Aristotle, on the other hand, conceives of matter as more than an irremediable privation of being but pure potency *for essential being* (Eslick, 1965, pp. 43-50; FitzGerald, 1965, p. 65). Primary matter for Aristotle is not ‘an original, pre-existing stuff’ but ‘an intrinsic, constitutive inadequacy (potentiality) in actual, existing being.’ (Luyten, 1965, p. 111) I devote a separate subsection to this Aristotelian theorisation of matter as possibility in Chapter I; Aristotle’s notion of matter as incomplete, as possibility, is fundamental to Bloch’s materialism, even if the two philosophers diverge on their reading this possibility.

45 “Indefinite something” is borrowed from Edith Stein and her analysis of the Aristotelian notion of *prime matter* (*Urstoff*). Stein writes of prime matter: it is ‘an “indefinite—yet not wholly indefinite—something.”’ (2002, p. 177) This resonates with Kant. As Stein’s footnote reads: ‘When we speak of an “indefinite something” in everyday language, we do not refer to something which is in itself indefinite, but to something which we cannot define.’ (Ibid., p. 578, fn. 115; my emphasis)
likewise a real process of attempts to articulate this unknown—and again, not merely conceptually. In sum, this history unwittingly attests to matter’s really real plasticity. The philosophical contents of this history, although not utter misapprehensions to be simply discard, nonetheless restrict what in truth remains an ongoing, experimental process. Once more, as Bloch writes, matter is ‘a fruitful world-womb experimenting with forms, figures, shapes of existence’ (M, p. 17).

[2] The above remarks bring me back to Habermas’ (1970, p. 325) contention that Bloch simply ‘skips’ Kant. Here Habermas’ contention may act as a foil by which to outline my own. For in truth, contra Habermas, Kant stands as a vital figure in the creation of Bloch’s materialism, not least because the classical German philosophical tradition structures much of Bloch’s conceptual insights. So then, rather than skipping Kant’s philosophical revolution in any crude sense of the term, Bloch plays with Kant’s findings—he skips with them. From this Bloch provides a Copernican revolution of his own: a utopian turn. If Kant’s philosophy articulates the viewpoint that matter as it is in itself stands as a limit and so a highly problematic concept, then this limit is restricted to an epistemological register alone. Transgressing beyond this Kantian insight, Bloch boldly extends the notion of limit and unknowing-ness over and out into ontology—speculari, not speculum. Thus, when Kant describes matter as a concept both limiting and problematic, thereby suggesting matter constitutes a ‘concept of a noumenon’ (A255/B310-11), so then there is much here that plays to the motif of Bloch’s materialism. Bloch, however, makes of this noumenon an
objective phantasy, i.e. that which is ontologically imagined and, to Bloch’s mind ontologically sought for, and thereby ontologically not yet real.

For Kant, matter (as a limit concept) is limiting in its curbing ‘the pretentions of sensibility’ to know the thing in itself (A255/B310-11)—matter’s conceptual content orbits the human mind and therefore what matter is in itself cannot be known. And yet, one does find Kant stating in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that ‘the possibility of a living matter’ is a concept which ‘contains a contradiction, because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes [matter’s] essential characteristic’ (5: 394), but one of the premises of that work is that mechanical causation amounts to an inadequate explanation of the self-organising matter of organic nature. To my mind, Bloch’s position can be understood as rendering productive Kant’s negative epistemology; insofar as Bloch ontologically broadens Kant’s agnostic definition of matter so he develops a philosophical sensitivity toward a new, processually open concept of matter. If matter cannot be defined as such because in itself there is something extra to what it currently is, then this outstanding element is not simply unknowable for the human mind but is really extraterritorial to the present state of matter’s existence—a residue or surplus of indeterminacy. Kant calls this indefinite but not wholly indefinite something—not wholly indefinite because known as indefinite—‘the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves.’ (A143/B182) And he quickly calls attention to the point that whilst matter’s “in itself” remains an indefinite field laying beyond the limits of sensibility (the limits of possible human experience), this indefinite field is no arbitrary invention; the “beyond-ness” of what for sensibility is experienceable is definitely there, it is only inaccessible to
sensibility. Kant’s central claim here, then, is just that matter as it is in itself is indefinite for human experience, since the a priori categories of the understanding and the pure forms of intuition necessarily impose their structures onto any human comprehension of matter. As Bowles writes of this:

Kantianism maintains that a rigorous ontology, that is, the attempt to purge our own contribution from what we comprehend and let things be as they really are, will only ever lead to blindness. If the formal structures of experience are removed, then the ability to grasp something also vanishes. This is why for Kant to try to think matter is to confront the impasse: that the content of form, pure nakedness, is always beyond our reach. (2000, p. 2; my emphasis)

Bloch offers his own speculative route beyond Kantianism, then, by claiming that this blindness at the heart of Kant’s proposal does not fall on the human being’s side alone, as Kant claims, but rather is a cornerstone of matter itself. This move puts a new—and what Bloch thinks is a utopian—spin on Kant’s critical project, which intended to demarcate the limits of reason in order to ward off attempts to come to and decide upon this fundamental blind spot. If it is ‘at such moments of incomprehension [those moments when human experience experiences its own limits] that matter is encountered’, as Bowles (ibid, p. 3) asserts in the context of Kantianism, then it is Bloch’s claim that matter is in itself indefinite and that it is only because of this—matter’s real indefiniteness—that matter is indefinite for human experience. One could say: through us matter encounter’s its own incognito, its own lack of what-ness.
Sensation, Kant says, cannot immediately be in touch with transcendental matter, because, on Kant’s insistence, sensation is always already conceptual. Owing to this, transcendental matter is the non-conceptual element of the concept; but it is also ultimately extraterritorial (incomprehensible) to the conceptual. At the same time, however, transcendental matter is both the condition of possibility and thus the impetus of conceptual responses, for synthesis ‘occurs because it meets something’ different, because it encounters something other than its conceptual scheme (Bowles, 2000, pp. 5-6). Consequently, when Kant says that without material nothing whatsoever can be thought, in that one’s concepts would be contentless (A 77), he is asserting that without a limit to the conceptual that indicates a beyond—indeed without incomprehensibility—there would be no process of conceptualisation at all. This goes back my objection to Wittgenstein: the blind spot is not completely redundant in what it does but is key to the whole operation of conceptual expression—and, for Bloch, ontological expression. Something beyond the concept is what gives rise to the concept. More still, incomprehensibility is what prevents the process of conceptualisation from completing itself. Incomprehensibility—Bowles also calls this the ‘non-conceptual factor’ (ibid., p. 2)—is therefore both the source and the termination—or death—of conceptualisation (indeed Bowles identifies matter’s incomprehensible beyond with death and annihilation; with Bloch, quite differently, this beyond of the real is the principle of hope). As Bowles writes in a passage with definite Blochian tones, and which more positively frames his previous identification of incomprehension with death and annihilation:
It is precisely because synthesis has, as it were, shut down that we are able to waken to a new day in which we and the world are more open. The systole and diastole of synthesis do not mark an auto-affection: as though synthesis were sufficient unto itself and the breakdown comes from within. For Kant, the heart beat would not fire without the provocation of matter. Matter intrudes when form fails, when the capacity to comprehend the world deserts us (ibid., pp. 12-13; my emphasis).

Bloch’s ontologisation of Kant—his utopian turn, as it were—resides, in part, in how one reads this idea of form. As I will show later on in this chapter, form, for Bloch, is not that which is imposed upon matter, but that which is born from matter. Moreover, this relates to the idea that matter, as that which in itself is ultimately non-synthesisable, is as such that which ‘makes us create anew.’ (ibid., p. 14) An inherent creativity is at work here: the concept of matter is inhibited by that which it does not know; this unknowing produces the conditions and allows conceptuality to step out beyond itself.46

Bowles’ reading of Kant is particularly useful for my purposes since it allows me to throw into relief the intriguing yet difficult crux of Bloch’s position, namely, as I have claimed, his ontologisation of Kant. Bloch’s thought extends Kant’s findings beyond the limits of reason (to think is to transgress) and thereby constructs a new materialist ontology. The incomprehensibility of matter is not that condition which makes only human beings create anew; it is that condition which makes matter itself create anew: new forms and shapes of its own existence. Matter’s incomprehensibility goes all the way

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46 Adorno intimated similar such tendencies. ‘Dissatisfaction with their own conceptuality is part of their [i.e. concepts’] meaning’, Adorno writes; indeed plain here is ‘the constitutive character of the nonconceptual in the concept’ (2004, p. 12). For Adorno, materialist philosophy (and thus his negative dialectics) is a conceptual transcending of the concept, is an attempt to think the non-conceptual by way of the concept (ibid., p. 15).
down (matter in itself is not just incomprehensible for human beings) because indeterminism (possibility) is a real and objective condition of matter. The peculiar and vitally important consequence of this model is that incomprehensibility is seen not simply as the wellspring of creative conceptual life, as Bowles’s reading of Kant holds, but as the very creative fount of being itself. In sum, Bloch can be said to displace the rudiments of Kant’s metaphysics of knowledge into the light of a new metaphysics of being (this is what is meant by “ontologisation”). It is for this reason that Bloch designates the concept of matter as indicating a really real problem, i.e. not merely an epistemological problem:

[...] the substance of the world, the matter of the world, is itself not yet concluded, but is located in a utopian-open, that is, on a not yet self-identical, manifested footing. (TE, p. 102)

[...die Weltsubstanz, die Weltmaterie ist selber noch nicht abgeschlossen, befindet sich noch in utopisch-offenem, das heißt, noch nicht selbstidentisch manifestiertem Stand.]

Bloch propounds the idea that matter in itself is just this searching for its own good and proper attribution, is in itself just an intending after a ‘harmony with its own content’ (TE, p. 259). To return to the topic of language briefly and to my Introduction, it can be said that Avanessian’s intent to create a new approach to the problem of referentiality finds a response in Bloch’s materialism: Bloch’s materialism offers a new understanding of referentiality because he offers a new understanding of what language is referring to: incognito, mystery, incomprehensibility.
Having outlined what I consider to be the starting point of Bloch’s materialism, I will now turn to the two mutually implicating categories of tendency and latency, whose explication will flesh-out my reading of Bloch’s materialism as consisting of an ontologisation of Kant.

§2. TENDENCY

The importance of “process” for Bloch, understood as an ontological category, cannot be overstated. Bloch’s materialism holds process and development as intrinsic features of matter. Bloch’s category ‘tendency [Tendenz] acts as a counterpoint to concepts that conceive of matter’s inner constitution as immobile, thing-like, mere extension, and altogether complete—all of these notions are, by Bloch’s lights, subsumable under the idea Klotzmaterie (TL, pp. 250-60; M, p. 17). Tendency accords with Bloch’s intention to think process as an ‘existential mode of matter’ (LM, p. 176). To a large extent Bloch is guided by Heraclitus’ famous dictum that “everthing flows” or “everything is in a state of flux” (panta rhei), but Hegel’s dynamic conception of dialectical becoming is also key here. Echoing the Hegel’s notion that one must think substance as subject, Bloch indeed writes in The Spirit of Utopia that one must think ‘substance as process’ (SU, p. 160). Thus “tendency” confounds much traditional ontological philosophising in which substance is deemed unchanging, and thereby Bloch emphatically breaks with metaphysical substance doctrines (see Zimmermann, 2014, p. 66). As such, Bloch is often considered a process philosopher insofar he considers process and dynamism as anterior to being (Geoghegan 1996, p. 28). To Bloch’s mind being comes at the end of process, thus process
precedes being. As Hudson writes of this, Bloch’s materialism is akin to modern process philosophy insofar as the latter

[H]as concentrated on the need to break with philosophies which conceive of the world as complete and unchanging, and [instead] develop[s] new categories for a world of becoming. (1982, p. 69)\(^47\)

Processuality’s decisiveness is without question: ‘there is no process [\textit{Bewegung}] without matter,’ Bloch says, ‘no matter without process’ (\textit{LM}, p. 122). The chiasmus indicates the inseparability—the convertibility—of matter and process. Matter “and” process really are just one: ‘process-matter [\textit{Prozeßmaterie}]’ (\textit{M}, p. 121). As Schneider (2006a, p. 65) writes of Bloch’s materialism: ‘Undoubtedly process [\textit{Bewegung}] is a where. […] Relative forms of matter are bound to time, have history, are history.’ This emphasis on matter not simply as having history but \textit{being} history, \textit{being} process, expresses the crux of Bloch’s “first determination” of matter as tendency. Tendency attempts to re-think matter as lively and becoming, then, but in a manner peculiar to Bloch alone. Below I outline a number of important points concerning Bloch conception of matter’s processuality.

[1] To bring the specificity of this first moment of Blochian matter into clearer view it may be helpful to formulate an objection to its positing a unity of matter and processuality. It could be reasonably objected, for instance, that mechanical materialism—a material theory Bloch finds in many respects

\(^{47}\) Henri Bergson and A. N. Whitehead are commonly associated with “process philosophy.” The extent to which Bloch’s processual conception of matter is easily mapped onto the likes of Bergson and Whitehead is uncertain, no studies have been undertaken. Any future investigation on this issue would have to contend, however, with Bloch’s often critical stance towards Bergson (see \textit{PHE}, pp. 201-2).
anathema to his own—equally attributes movement to matter (M, p. 246).  

This returns me once more to Kant, for Kant was keen to establish Newton’s mechanically derived *Principia Mathematica* (1687) upon metaphysical foundations. In the first instance, Kant (2004, p. 15) considers motion (or ‘phoronomy’, Kant’s doctrine of motion) as matter’s first determination, and insofar as this is the case so then this would seem to parallel the Blochian prioritisation of process over any already completed material substance. But the type of motion so posited by Kant is in truth far from coterminous with the sort of process Bloch has in mind, and the difference pivots on the idea of inherence. For Bloch, process is constitutive of matter, that is, it pertains to matter’s very nature, it inheres within matter and therefore just is matter. In Kant’s *Bewegungslehre*, process figures at odds with this idea, insofar as Kant always only speaks of motion of bodies (ibid., p. 25). The mechanical materialists whom Kant represents consider motion as extrinsic to matter’s existence, as accidentally attributable to matter’s nature. In that this motion

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48 By mechanical materialism I have in mind mathematically oriented materialisms of the early modern period. In relevant compendia, Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), René Descartes (1596-1650), and Isaac Newton (1642-1726/7) are customarily invoked as the most prominent figures of this scientistic tendency of materialist thought (see Wallace, 1977, pp. 300-1). Despite critiques of mechanical materialism arising frequently amidst Bloch’s positive expositions of his own concept of matter, so that it is tempting to designate Bloch’s concept an opus of this confrontation, it is key to stress that Bloch favourably perceives mechanism and does so for the following reason. Following Friedrich Engels, Bloch holds a fundament of materialism to consist in an *immanence* of philosophical explanation, i.e. materialism explains the world from out of the world; it avoids at all costs the postulation of a beyond that is transcendently bereft of matter and nonetheless is that principle by which is employed to explain matter’s very existence (M, p. 169). Thus, mechanism’s truth-content resides in its attempt to explain the world from out of the world. As an approach to the explanation of matter it is correct insofar as it adopts a ‘completely transcendence-free view of the world’ (M, p. 179), it exhibits an ‘urgent will toward an explanation of the world without an alien intervention [fremden Eingriff]’ (M, p. 180). Its defect is only that it explains the world incorrectly (LM, pp. 184 & 187).

49 For detailed but competing accounts of Kant’s doctrine of motion, see Friedman (2013) and Sutherland (2014). It is important to note in passing the following: ‘One of the aims of the Phoronomy is to explain how the composition of motion can be *constructed*, thereby establishing a necessary condition of the application of mathematics to motion.’ (ibid., p. 687; my emphasis) I emphasise “constructed” here for the reason that Kant’s distinction between constitutive (or constructive) and regulative forms of analogy will be crucial for my analogic reading of Bloch’s materialism in the next chapter.
is considered motion of bodies from one place to the next, i.e. movement in space, so then these bodies are conceived already constituted in themselves, above and beyond any motion attributable to them via external causation. As Zammito (1992, p. 189) writes, ‘there were few ideas Kant struggled to keep divided more than life and matter. […] The radical removal of life from matter defined it into impossibility.’ For Bloch transgresses this divide insofar as he views process as immanent to matter’s nature; Bloch’s is an immanent dynamic materialism. Indeed on this point of immanence, Guyer writes that despite its highly scientistic orientation, mechanism inevitably leads to a transcendent idea of the beginning of motion:

[...]he characteristic defect of purely mechanical world-systems [is that while] they can adequately account for the transmission of motions [they] must postulate an extra-mundane first mover in order to account for the origination of motion. (2005, p. 84)

Mechanism fails to explain the world as dynamically originating/producing itself, then, and it is for this reason that I have opted to discuss the mechanistic view of matter: simply because it allows me to gauge the specificity of Bloch’s own conception, both insofar as process constitutes matter’s nature and insofar as the origination of matter is conceived of immanently. Indeed, my decision here itself is immanent to the production of Bloch’s materialism to the extent that Bloch constructs material categories largely in opposition to mechanism’s dead, transcendentally reliant material theory. At the heart of the mechanist conception is, for Bloch, a real stasis,

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50 This important point has an implicit bearing on language. Insofar as process does not inhere in matter by nature, so then mechanism remains caught in the strictures of conventional propositional logic whereby the subject-predicate form holds sway. Here matter remains inertly independent of the
then, an a-historicity unworthy of matter’s dynamism (TE, pp. 230 & 234; M, p. 17; LM, p. 185). As Bloch writes:

[M]atter which is only understood mechanically [is understood as] a clod estranged from history, for which all of its real possibility has already become static reality, in the sense of a beginning frozen to death from birth as it were.

(PHE, p. 237)\(^\text{51}\)

I return to the concept of possibility in due course, for it is central to Bloch’s materialism. For now, two consequences proceed from the intertwinement of matter and process, from the idea that process and matter are one: process-matter. Firstly, in positing process as pertaining to matter’s very nature Bloch’s category tendency underlines matter’s incompleteness. This is attribute of process, such that process is merely one among a number of other qualities that may be in some sense attached to matter, the latter of which remains substantially different from any such attributable qualities. In some sense Bloch avoids this pitfall by his employment of the chiasmus already quoted above. In mechanism’s case, the subject of the proposition, i.e. “matter,” remains ontologically independent of its motion. Motion is merely predicated of the subject (matter), “tacked-on,” as it were. Kant (2004, 480, p. 15) himself speaks of ‘the subject of motion, namely matter’. As Sells (1994, p. 25) writes of this issue: ‘Predications imply that a subject engages in an activity, that there is a “remainder” within the subject that is not that activity itself.’ But if matter itself is process without remainder, then conventional logic falls short of expressing the idea that matter and process are inextricably intertwined. Hegel is aware of this problem. He reads mechanism as positing an external communication of process to matter, as opposed to the position which holds process as spontaneous and self-generative feature of matter: ‘While […] motion is communicated to finite matter from outside, free matter moves spontaneously’, he writes (1970, §264 Zusetz, p. 49). Tellingly, in his 1821/2 lecture “Materie und Bewegung”, Hegel describes this mechanistically construed external cause of matter’s process with a Böhmean descriptor (see fn. 12): ‘In der Mittheilung der Bewegung liegt der Quelle der Bewegung ganz außerhalb dem Bewegten.’ (2012, §216 5-10, p. 258) The Quelle soliciting matter to move Bloch draws into the heart of matter itself. That said, Bloch does not necessarily deny matter’s mechanicity as such, but rather the claim that mechanism speaks of the essence of matter. In certain respects Bloch echoes Leibniz’s (2006, p. 125) train of thought. Although Leibniz himself was ‘convinced that everything in corporeal nature happens mechanically’, he ‘continue[d] to believe that the very principles of mechanics, that is to say, the first laws of motion, have a more sublime origin than those that pure mathematics can provide.’ In other words, matter’s mathematicity and the motion thereby expressed by such mathematicity are merely expressions of a principle more sublime than they. One could say therefore that as a mode of matter, mechanism ought not to be reduced to matter per se.

\(^\text{51}\) Mechanism is a “Medusa-like” treatment of matter (LM, p. 187), it propagates a ‘dead world picture’ (TE, p. 42) and tends toward re-establishing inorganicity at the very heart of matter. Its reduction of matter to static lifelessness is thereby akin to the Freudian conception of the death-drive and, ontologically-stylistically speaking, to pyramidal architecture, whose Eleatic-like pathos of ontological stasis seeks the transformation of vital life over into stone (M, p. 26).
Bloch’s general supposition here: *no process would exist at all if matter were not substantially incomplete in what it is*. The second implication is that tendency signals towards an uptake of the notion that matter is immanently self-causative.\(^{52}\) Thus, the critical upshot is that the category tendency provides speculative-materialist thought with the idea of an *incomplete though self-causative and therefore living materiality*.

[2] If a very curtailed exposition of mechanism’s concept of matter has allowed me to establish the centrality of process for Bloch’s materialism in the sense that *it is of matter’s very nature to be processual*, I now want to pursue the question of the nature of the process so posited, for what is most striking about Bloch’s materialism is the kind of process at work in it. A good sense of the kind of process Bloch has in mind, then, can be garnered from the following key passage:

> Not only movement and such an apparently “anthropomorphic aspect” as *contradiction* (with movement itself as *first contradiction*) are [matter’s] modes of existence, but also such an apparently and so much greater “anthropomorphic aspect” as *anticipation*. (*PHE*, p. 336; my emphasis)

These two further determinations indicate that process-matter is—at one and the same time—a discontinuous process (it is contradictory) and a process futurally directed (it is anticipatory), i.e. *matter is a discontinuous-anticipatory*

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\(^{52}\) This point bears on Bloch’s apparent relation to modern process philosophy. As Hudson writes: ‘modern process philosophy has often been characterised by subjectivism’ and reassertions ‘of the politics of the subject’ (1982, pp. 69-70). In connection with A.N. Whitehead, Fetz also notes that

> The elevation of freedom [through the concept of self-causation] to the status of a fundamental characteristic of every being is a clear expression of the fact that in Whitehead the modern shift towards the subject has attained metaphysical validity (1990, p. 197).
process, an anticipation of contradiction’s overcoming. This idea is actually borne out by the genealogical heritage of the category tendency. The relevant literature notes that Bloch derives Tendenz from Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics, one of the main ontological claims of which is that the most elementary constituents of reality—what he calls “monads”—pass from confused to clear representations of themselves (M, p. 55). As Zeilinger writes:

The root of the concept tendency [...] lies in the old-Greek verb teinein, with the central meaning of “to stretch,” “to tension,” “to expand or extend itself,” “to tend toward something.” This meaning survives in the Latin tendere. Tendere [...] means “inclination,” “striving,” “direction,” “aim or purpose,” “intention,” and is akin to appetitus, conatus, and inclinatio. (2012, p. 555; my translation)

According to Leibniz, the basic constituents of reality undergo a passage (in the form of monads) from confusedness to clarity/transparency; a monad actively appetites for, intends and anticipates a certain self-clarity of itself.53 Crucially, this anticipation for self-clarification cannot be grasped merely anthropologically, rather this intending process must be considered as pertaining to reality itself. One, then, is here dealing with ontology first and foremost. Indeed, Leibniz speaks of anticipation both in the soul and in that which is other than soul: ‘one can say that in the soul, as indeed everywhere, the present is great with the future’ (1970, p. 580).54 This

53 Incidentally, according to Bloch, a red thread tying together the historically wide-ranging concepts of matter is the red thread of enlightenment (cf. Lange, 1908, pp. 4-6). There are, then, progressive political overtones to materialist philosophy in Bloch’s mind (TL, p. 267).

54 This employment of purposivity in order to speak of nature remains present in German philosophy after Leibniz of course. Cf. Hegel’s exposition in the Philosophy of Nature. Having posited gravity as ‘the substantiality of matter’, Hegel speaks of matter’s ‘nisus’, its striving ‘to reach the centre’ (1970, §262 Remark, p. 45); the ‘unity of gravity’, Hegel writes, ‘is only an Ought, a longing, the most
touches perfectly on the category tendency, which for Bloch indicates *process with horizon*, i.e. with future.

Clearly, then, Bloch borrows Leibniz’s idea of confusedness futurally moving toward clarification. There remains, however, a fundamental difference that exists between Bloch and Leibniz on this topic. The difference boils down to the type of flow of this intending process that each thinker respectively proposes. Like with many other of the concepts he actively inherits from the history of philosophy, Bloch puts his own stamp on Leibniz’s idea of tendency. For Leibniz, the abovementioned ‘process of clarification [*Aufklärungsgang*]’ (*M*, p. 54) is reflected on as a smooth, linear process. The ‘first law [*Urgesetz*]’ of Leibniz’s conception of the world, i.e. continuity and pre-established harmony (*lex continui natura non facit saltus* [nature does not make a leap]) (Schneider, 2006b, p. 209) speak to this conception and are indicative of it. The birth of the future from the present is for Leibniz a *continuous passage* of clarification. On the other hand, Bloch conceives of tendency precisely as denoting a process of discontinuous leaps. This incorporation of discontinuity into matter’s processuality turns on the centrality that a certain conception of the future plays in Bloch’s materialism: a future not-yet there, not yet decided. Referring to Leibniz’s (1998, p. 268)

unhappy *nisus* to which matter is eternally condemned.’ (ibid., *Zusatz*) Bloch’s notion of *speculari* appears present:

[Insofar] as matter fixes a centre and strives to reach it, and this centre is a unifying point while matter remains a multiplicity, matter is determined as *coming outside itself* from out of its place. (ibid., §266 *Zusatz*, p. 54; my emphasis)

The Kantian-ring to Hegel’s point here is more evident in the German:

claim that monads ‘have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out’, Bloch writes that ‘figure [Gestalt] is only significant when in itself it has a window that heads towards the path of morning [auf die Strasse Morgen geht].’ (LM, p. 315) To recall Bowles’ reading of Kant that was noted in the Introduction, it becomes clear that, to Bloch’s mind, process-matter denotes a becoming whereby matter steps beyond itself into the new of itself. Thereby tendency indicates matter’s immanent transgression out towards a newness of itself (thus speculari implies novelty); so much so that one could argue process-matter is comparable to an open window open to openness as such. It is in this light that I will speak of process as harbouring within itself an outfall—an ultimate clarification of itself—that is in itself not yet decided—it is this which brings my discussion to the telic element in Bloch’s materialism. For, in light of the above, the internal generativity (the process) of matter, as thought by Bloch, may be described as anti-origin in its basic orientation—not a processuality that heads down and back, but out and beyond. And it is this thoroughly utopian gesture fundamentally that re-configures how teleology is conceived of by Bloch. I return to this issue in §3 of this chapter. First, however, I turn to the topic of “possibility.”

§2.1. POSSIBILITY

Where nothing more can be done or is possible, life stands still. (PHE, p. 224)

At first blush, it is difficult to see where the relationship of materialism to utopia is to be found: ‘At first glance such a connection appears foreclosed.’ (TL, p. 265) The answer to this question, however, lies with the concept of possibility. For the anticipatory, proleptic, yet discontinuous
process which moves to what is not yet and which Bloch calls matter is born of possibility; matter’s process of self-clarification is merely another name for Bloch’s re-formulation of Aristotle’s classical determination of the movement of possibility to actuality.

So far I have sought to show that Bloch’s materialism is, in the first instance, based on a really real in-determination of matter’s what-ness (Bloch’s ontologisation of Kant). It is this fundamental in-determination of its own essence which gives birth to matter’s contradictory, anticipatory process: matter just is a searching after a clarification of itself, a *self*-clarification which is not yet there. At the root of matter’s in-determination is discerned the place of possibility, indeed one finds a unique definition of possibility on Bloch’s part. Insofar as possibility constitutes the key to matter’s utopian dimension, so then possibility, or what Bloch at times calls ‘can-be ([Kannsein](p. 216)’, TE, p. 216), is matter’s principal modality. Bloch sometimes formulates this idea in propositional form: ‘P is assigned to S in the mode of Can-be.’ (PHE, p. 226; see Zimmermann, 2014, p. 62) In other words, the self-clarification sought-for by the insubstantial subject of matter is a predicate bathed in possibility, both in the sense that it is not necessarily attributable to the subject, but also that it itself is a possibility having not yet been realised. It is important to say that Bloch’s re-formulation of possibility is as much peculiar as it is controversial, particularly when placed against Aristotle’s conception of the same notion, as I will show below. Indeed, a brief consideration of Bloch’s inheritance of Aristotelianism—a tradition of thought in which matter is conceived of precisely as *possibility*—is important at this stage, as is highlighting the differences between them (PHE, pp. 207-
At the most fundamental level of philosophical inquiry, Aristotle understands the change of one thing into another as consisting of a process of movement from possibility to actuality. In fact, in a sense, Aristotle’s whole philosophical problematic concerns how best to understand change, and he employs the modalities of possibility (or potentiality) and actuality to achieve this end. Like Bloch, then, Aristotle’s theorisation of matter pivots on a concern with how best to understand a process of becoming to realisation, and it is this point which unquestionably attracted Bloch to Aristotle and to the history of heretic interpretation of the one who knows. Now I will briefly survey the appropriate points of concern on this issue.

[1] That “possibility” might constitute the ground of the world’s appearances is a notion that first entered into philosophical thought with Aristotle. As Bloch writes: ‘Aristotle was the first to recognise possibility in real terms, in the world-stock itself.’ (PHE, p. 235) Bloch carries this recognition forwards, but does so to such a degree that Aristotle would not have followed him.

If for the Pre-Socratics not Zeus but water or other immanent material elements were what the world was said to be made of (TL, pp. 266-7), then Aristotle was the first philosopher to have provided a much more intangible though no less real, immanent substratum by which to think and clarify the world from out of itself—and this substratum was “possibility.” Significantly,

55 Bloch considers Aristotle a ‘process thinker’ (SO, p. 113) and few worthy of mention would seriously contest this characterisation. Gilson (2014, p. 44), for instance, claims that with Aristotle “to be” becomes active, entailing ‘energy and efficacy’; for Adorno (2000, p. 56), relative to Plato Aristotle renders ontological speculation ‘incomparably more dynamic’.
Aristotle anchors his reflections on possibility in his thinking of matter. The coextensivity of process and matter that one finds in Bloch’s corpus is therefore but an echo of this early Aristotelian theorisation in which matter is determined as possibility. As the becoming of possibility towards actuality, matter just is process, then; it is the type of process Aristotle employs as to understand reality’s most fundamental features.

To illustrate this point, I can place two important texts of Aristotle’s into dialogue, as so many thinkers have done before me. In the Physics Aristotle defines matter as ‘the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result, not accidentally.’ (192a1, 30) Possibility’s not persisting accidentally means that the thing in which possibility inheres has within itself, through possibility, ‘the principle of it owns production.’ (192b, 25-30) Unlike mechanical materialism, then, in this tradition of thought matter qua possibility announces a constitutively inhering generativity in the thing itself (possibility lays ‘in the things themselves’, Aristotle says [192b1, 30]). Any thing maintains the capacity to produce from within itself its own becoming other than what it presently is. In the Metaphysics Aristotle instils into this process a good degree of contingency when he writes that

All things that come to be either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capable of both being and not being, and this capacity is the matter in each. (1032a1, 20-25; my emphasis)

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56 As Brentano (1975, p. 27) states, for Aristotle, potential being and matter are ‘coextensive’; Stein (2002, p. 185; emphasis removed) makes much the same point: in Aristotle ‘potency and matter coincide.’
Things have matter, which having is to possess a capacity to realise of oneself/itself that which oneself/itself presently is not; to have matter is to have an incompleteness which, inhering within it, is the possibility of realisation: the capacity of being and not being. Read against the Physics quotation above, the primary substratum in the Aristotelian problematic is none other than possibility. For the substratum from which a thing comes to be and which persists in the thing is matter, which Aristotle defines as the capacity of both being and not being. The cited passages provide traction to the claim that the primary substratum of a thing and of all things, according to Aristotle, is possibility, i.e. matter. Possibility is not simply a real force in the constitution of that which is (possibility is not nothing), but more so the most preeminent ontological modality. At least all this is what Aristotle’s account seems to suggest.

But this turns out in fact not to be Aristotle’s position at all, or at least not his ultimate position. To show why this is so one ought to bear in mind that Aristotle’s formulation of matter/possibility comes in the context of his natural investigations, i.e. his surveys into the domain of the ‘perishable’, into that which comes to be and likewise passes away (192b1). Matter stands as the primary substratum of each thing only within this realm of perishability, but things are different when Aristotle moves his focus from the realm of change to the realm of metaphysical investigation, i.e. to that plane of investigation that, to his lights, concerns truth as the unchanging. Suffice it to say Aristotle’s apparent foregrounding of possibility as the primary substratum of the world gives way to actuality’s pre-eminence, in the sense that, in truth, actuality is the first and most real substratum of all that which is. Now that
which is already realised takes precedence over that which is incomplete and, as such, harbouring within itself the possibility of realisation. As Aristotle writes: ‘there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually’ (1049b1, 25-30; my emphasis); ‘one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover’ (1050b1; my emphasis); ‘actuality is prior to potentiality.’ (1049b1; my emphasis) Brentano’s remark of Aristotle’s theorisation that ‘[p]otential being cannot be defined except with the aid of the concept of actuality, for the latter is prior in both concept and substance’ (1975, p. 29; my emphasis), captures well actuality’s priority for Aristotle here. Furthermore, for the subsequent “leftist” interpretation of Aristotle, this devaluation of possibility is, with Aristotle, articulated in relation to the matter-form dyad: ‘matter exists in a potential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form.’ (1050a1, 15) Given that, to Aristotle’s way of thinking, actuality assumes a priority in relation to possibility, the implication here becomes that form pre-exists matter and that matter’s process (qua possibility) is no more than a flow to a form eternally as what it is.57 For

57 In spite of Aristotle’s desire to avoid a Platonic dualism, form nonetheless is thus ‘dualistically separated from matter’, as Bloch says (PHE, p. 235; see FitzGerald, 1965, p. 73). Now, if it was the virtue of Aristotle’s anti-Platonism to have re-immersed forms in the things as the form-matter composite (Ricoeur, 2013, p. 223), then equally Aristotle’s erring was to have held onto the Platonic notion of form as, in some sense, pre-existing matter, and this right up to the highest form—God’s own. Thus Aristotelian form is form un-engendered: ‘certainly the forms are immanent and no longer transcendent’, it is an ‘immanent quiddity’, as Ricoeur explains; but ‘for all that they are no less entities removed from time’, ‘no less immutable than the Platonic real’ (ibid., pp. 226-7). Pryzwara makes much the same point:

[... ] Aristotle, who rejects the “pure eide” of Platonism in order to focus upon the “forms within matter”, understands these forms ultimately as a kind of “ideal reality” embedded in the pure motion and pure potentiality of “matter”, which, as such, cannot be the object of any philosophy. (2014, p. 469; my emphasis)

As Hogh (2017, p. 3) notes, this longstanding assertion of a dichotomy between matter-form expresses itself in early analytic approaches to language which, on the whole, ‘determine language as an autonomous form’ separated from non-linguistic reality, i.e. nature/matter. This, Hogh suggests, is
Bloch it is precisely this relating of matter to form as incompletion/potentiality/imperfection to an already existent perfection that is the site upon which Aristotle falls foul of the novel idea he had nevertheless audaciously opened up for view.58

Bloch considers possibility not only as a really real concern for philosophy and not just a subsidiary element to a much more preeminent actuality, but in fact as materialism’s first concern, because if matter just is possibility then any materialism worth its salt ought to be a philosophy of possibility. This is just another way of describing Bloch’s philosophical thought. The sticking point for Bloch here is, I think, that new ontological emergences cannot be given space or dignity in a conception like that of Aristotle’s, in which matter qua possibility ultimately is always already grounded on anterior actuality/form (see Fetz, 1990, p. 201). Even if this anterior actuality

the theoretical site upon which analytic, structuralist and post-structuralist interventions converge (ibid).

58 This point is mirrored in Bloch’s employment of the concept of entelechy, first coined by Aristotle in order to comprehend natural metamorphosis. Entelechy denotes a “having the goal in itself” and, as Bloch writes, names ‘the idea [the end] endeavouring to shape itself in matter’, concerning ‘the active principle of realisation ‘contained […] in the appearance’ (TL, p. 409). After criticising Plato’s separation of the Idea (essence) from ‘the flux-content of appearances’ (that is, form from matter), a dualism Bloch perceives as constitutive of the Platonic dialectic, Bloch writes that

Aristotle is the first to teach a mediation between appearance and essence with his concept of the immanently developed form-idea (Entelechy) which actualises itself in appearing. (1983, p. 290)

Goethe is a key figure in the reception of Aristotle’s concept of entelechy in Germany. Goethe’s (1999, p. 38) poem “Unworte. Orphisch” refers to entelechy as the ‘shaped form which develops as it lives [geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt]’ (see also SO, p. 128; LM, p. 149). As Nicholls (2006, p. 185) writes, ‘entelechy is the source of what […] Goethe would later call the Bildungstrieb or formative drive—the locus of the organism, development, unfolding, and formation.’ The snag here is that Aristotle grounds entelechy on the idea of an immutability of species; the “idea” or “end” or “active principle” for which material appearances are shaped is immutable (such is why Aristotle has no conception of evolution) (see Barnes, 1989, pp. 21-2). On the other hand, Bloch refers to entelechy as an open shaping of appearances which he terms ‘incomplete entelechy [unvollendete Entelechie]’ (PHE, p. 223; my emphasis). Bloch’s refunction of entelechy emphasises the incompleteness of the locus of the natural generative process. That which generates is not in itself complete, is not yet what it is—this is precisely why it generates at all: it is ‘a latent goal working from a latent idea of shape.’ (PHE, p. 984) Incomplete entelechy is thus a thoroughly ‘utopian conception’, Bloch says (1983, p. 304).
constitutes an immanent quiddity, its anteriority is suggestive of a quiddity that is already there and established and, as such, unchangeable. Such an anterior actuality as this remains utterly premature (\(M\), p. 145). A reversal of this circumstance is what Bloch really perceives in the world: ‘the ocean of possibility is much greater’ (\(TL\), p. 356).

[2] Bloch finds much inspiration from the history of what he calls the subsequent “left” interpretation of Aristotle.\(^{59}\) A few substantive points on this history are warranted. In the first instance, this leftist tradition pivots on reversing the relation of priority that Aristotle claims is seen to obtain between form-matter/actuality-possibility (\(M\), p. 498), such that the form pair are now held as the preeminent metaphysical substratum (\(PHE\), p. 235).\(^{60}\) Avicenna and Averroës, two ‘pantheistic-materialistic philosophers’ of the Islamic Golden Age, are held by Bloch as thinkers who commence this process of the sublation of transcendent divinity into matter’s active potentiality (\(PHE\), p. 237; \(M\), pp. 481-494; \(TE\), p. 233; \(TL\), p. 411). Indeed their dictum that ‘development is extraction of form from matter [\(Entwicklung ist eductio formarum ex materia\)]’ (\(M\), p. 479) underscores two key shifts in which, for Bloch, the utopian function of materialism breaks through (\(TE\), p. 233).

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\(^{59}\) “Left-Aristotelianism” is a ‘playful anachronism’ concerning parallels Bloch perceives between the bifurcation of Aristotelianism into a conservative Christian-scholastic school, on the one hand, and certain subversive Arabic interpreters, on the one hand; of course, the 19\(^{th}\) century Hegelian split into leftist and rightist tendencies is also at work in this respect (Ely, 1988, p. 100).

\(^{60}\) As Curtius (1979, p. 55-6) notes, obstacles lay in the way of the dissemination and cultivation of this dangerous brand of Aristotelianism; public and private study of the “new Aristotle” was forbidden by the Pope in 1215 AD due its irreconcilability with church dogma. This radical bent has been a permanent feature of materialist thought through the ages.
First, what this shift signals is that form is now considered as fermenting within matter such that matter is in itself understood as a self-forming process. No longer is there required a hypostisation of a form that, as externally and already actually situated above and beyond the travails of process-matter, somehow structures this process. Rather, matter is as it were per-formative of its forms; that is, forms emerge from or are given birth out of matter’s radical possibility (TE, p. 234; LM, p. 173). To employ a term from Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgement*—although Kant still holds onto the binary division of matter and form—one could say that matter of itself possesses a ‘formative power’ (5: 374), that is, matter is a self-forming, self-organising process. Second, and as such, matter is implicitly taken to constitute a forward forming developmental process—and indeed §3 of this chapter considers in some detail the teleological moment in Bloch’s materialism. For once possibility has been set-free from a subordination to an external, already constituted form, process-matter becomes open process; no longer is process-matter directed by an already actualised substratum which ultimately dictates the direction of travel, but nor of course is process-matter on the path of a ‘blind mechanism of nature’ (5: 376), to employ Kant once more. Taken together, these shifts in the Aristotelian problematic, given Bloch by the Arabic masters, constitute the beginnings of what Bloch will call ‘a futural materialism [ein Materialismus nach vorwärts]’ (TE, p. 233). Unshackled from comprehending matter within the purview of regressive tendencies, matter is now grasped—at least in dim outline—as a futurally-directed process of protention.
[3] In some sense, Bloch’s modal theorisation of possibility—to which I now turn—is a culmination of this history but also a novelty to it. I have hinted at Bloch’s admiration for the etymology of “matter,” a word derived from *mater*, meaning “mother.” (*M*, p. 17; *TE*, p. 231) The idea of matter as a womb or a motherly creative force has its roots in Renaissance thought, particularly with Giordano Bruno and Paracelsus, figures Bloch includes in the history leftist Aristotelianism, and as vital points in this history at that (*M*, p. 170). Bloch’s affinity with this tradition is located in his thinking process—matter as a process of birth, creation, of novelty and of spontaneity. He writes that matter is

[…] the fermenting womb of a substance which so to speak first gives birth to itself, i.e. develops, clarifies and qualifies itself. (*LM*, p. 173)

[...] *der gärende Schoss einer Substanz, die sich gleichsam selbst erst gebiert, das heißt entwickelt, verdeutlicht und qualifiziert.*]

An emphatic sense of self-causation, self-creation, and self-clarification is evident here; so much is matter deemed a creative process of radical possibility that it is with Bloch *analogised* as a womb that gives birth to itself.\(^{61}\) To go into more depth on the nature of possibility as Bloch construes it, however, entails giving reasonably close attention to what Schmidt (1978, p. 66) refers to as the ‘Blochian *Moduslehre*’; that is, the twofold modal definition of possibility Bloch provides his readers. This theorisation is most clearly stated in the following passage:

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\(^{61}\) As Siebers writes, the word matter ‘has its place in Bloch’s extended *metaphor of pregnancy*, matter is seen by Bloch as ‘the world-womb, the birthplace of possibility.’ (2014, p. 3)
Matter can be defined in the following way: it is not the mechanical clod, but is—in accordance with the implicit sense of the Aristotelian definition of matter—both that which can become to the possibility of being, that is, what can appear in respectively determined historical-materialist conditions, and that which may become to the possibility of being, that is, the correlate of objective-real-possibility, or pure beingness (TE, p. 233).

Nowhere in this passage is being or full actuality attributed to matter; only two modes of possibility that are mutually implicating. Indeed, mention of full actuality or “pure beingness” Bloch restricts to the very end of the passage (actuality comes at the end, not the beginning—another sign of Bloch’s anti-origin approach). But there is mention of a kind of relative actuality, namely the “respective historical-materialist conditions.” That these are also considered a mode of possibility paints a far from simple theorisation, but I think the point is that these two modes of possibility cannot and do not exist as one beyond the other. Each mode does not exist in such a self-reliant manner that it would be pure unto itself without requiring its counterpart. Rather, each respective mode presupposes the other and as such can be conceived of as two sides of the same coin. The ‘real possible,’ Bloch writes,

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62 My translation of this passage is, as I take it, more in keeping with the spirit of Bloch’s definition than with its letter.
has two sides, a reverse side as it were, on which the measures of the 
respectively Possible are written, and a front side on which the Totum of the 
finally Possible indicates that it is still open. (PHE, p. 206)

In the original definition quoted above, Bloch claims that the modal definition 
he provides is only really the proper explication of an implicit theorisation of 
Aristotle’s. To clarify Bloch’s definition in relation to Aristotle’s I employ the 
terminology Stein develops:

What Aristotle called the relatively non-existing existent is the actual which is 
opened toward further determinations, and what he calls the relatively existing 
non-existent is what is as yet non-actualised and therefore merely possible. 
(2002, p. 186; my emphasis)

Slippage of course pertains between Stein’s and Bloch’s respective 
intentions. Be that as it may, Stein’s elaboration of Aristotle’s position here 
not only clarifies the distinction between Bloch’s two modes of possibility, it 
also helps to illuminate their interwovenness.63 The upshot: the first mode 
Bloch conceives of as “that which can become to the possibility of being 
[Nach-Möglichkeit-Seiende]” concerns a “relatively non-existing existent,” i.e. 
an existent that while possessing degrees of actuality does not, however, 
constitute a condition of complete actuality in itself. While, for example, 
according to Marx, the capitalist mode of production exists, it cannot be 
taken as complete in itself for the reason it harbours within itself the 
conditions of possibility for radical transformation over into another social 
form, i.e. socialism. On the other hand, Bloch’s second mode of possibility,

63 Bloch sees the distinction along the lines of natura naturans and natura naturata (TE, p. 234; LM, p. 173). A distinction between the products of a creative matter and that creative material productivity itself: product-production. “Product” and “production” do not, however, occupy ontologically separable realms. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is important here (see Bowie, 2003, pp. 74-5).
“that which may become to the possibility of being [In-Möglichkeit-Seiende (Sein)],” concerns “the relatively existing non-existent,” i.e. the ultimate and full realisation of possibility as such. As Bloch writes, all non-existing existents have their common path in the ultimate possibility that itself is non-existent, or not-yet existent:

[…] but all these forms are only themselves form-relations, interweaving in a universal process. And this process is determined through the universal orientation to a Unum, Verum, Bonum of the goal. (SO, p. 466)

[…aber alle diese Gestalten sind selber nur dialektische Gestalt-Beziehungen, verschlungen in einem universalen Prozeß. Und dieser Prozeß ist determiniert durch die universale Ausrichtung auf ein Unum, Verum, Bonum des Ziels.]

No concrete example of course can be given of this mode; it remains outstanding, extraterritorial and thus incommunicable: the not-yet what-ness for which there is becoming at all. Employing Weiss’ (1958, p. 35) term it could be argued that non-existent existents, as conceived of above, all together share a ‘common possibility’, the latter of which Bloch divides into two outcomes: first, the possibility of the All (pure beingness), second, the possibility of the Nothing (the latter of which Bloch does not mention in the passage above, but which indicates the contingency of the nature of process-matter’s ultimate outfall). Indeed, such division highlights just how seriously Bloch takes the category of possibility to be of the world, for it signals the extent to which a consummation of the ultimate possibility of is held open: it could become or not become. This as of yet undecided, ultimate possibility is, for Bloch, ‘the unresolved utopian tension constantly undermining everything shaped.’ (SU, p. 228) What undermines the already-
become shaped-ness of matter is that which allows matter to open out towards a newness of itself. Matter’s shroudedness in incompletion, its core shapelessness, derives from the undecidedness of its ultimate possibility \((SU, \text{p. 192})\). As Bloch writes, because of this, its core incompletion, matter has not yet exhausted what it can become, and it is this claim that is the point of entry into utopian materialism:

The womb of matter is not yet exhausted with hitherto becomeness; the most important forms of existence of its history and of its nature still stand in the latency of real possibility. \((M, \text{p. 524})\)

\[\text{Der Schoß der Materie ist mit dem bisher wirklich Gewordenen noch nicht erschöpft; die wichtigsten Daseinsformen ihrer Geschichte und Natur stehen noch in der Latenz realer Möglichkeit}\.\]

The category tendency thus speaks to Bloch’s notion that the world’s essence is an urging to creative forms, i.e. a driving process towards forms novel to hitherto achieved becomeness:

Tendency is the energetic of matter in action, driving forth in all its already attained forms towards \textit{exodus forms}, towards the tendentially implied of the entelechially intended end as is not yet become, but which is \textit{utopistically latent}. \(\text{Bloch, translated by Moir, 2013a, p. 134; my emphasis}\)

\[4\] Bloch’s notion of “Front” crystallises this conception of matter as a process towards what is not yet. In a sense, the notion of the Front concerns that state or moment or condition \textit{between} the two modes of possibility that I have commented on above. Indeed, when Bloch writes that ‘deeply ingrained habits of thinking cling to a world without Front’ \(\text{PHE, p. 5}\), he is
merely claiming that previous concepts of matter relinquish the real openness of matter’s what-ness. To cling to a world without Front is not only to cling to a world without possibility but to cling to a world without that undecided ultimate possibility, that which in its in-existence tensions already become shapedness. This ultimate possibility is the very pathos of Bloch’s thought, its guiding star, and thus Bloch’s philosophical thought thinks on the Front of already become existents. The “relatively existing non-existent,” this cognate for utopia (utopia is not nothing, it exists as an absence of completeness), is, as Schmidt (1978, p. 305) writes, the threshold-condition [Schwebezustand] of conditionedness [Bedingtheit] as such, the borderline of material shapedness. To stand within this threshold-condition is, for Bloch, to stand on the Front of the world process.

A front indeed implies a border or a limit and is of course often a term associated with warfare (Geoghegan, 1996, p. 36), e.g. all was quiet on the Western Front. In this sense, what lies on the other side of the front is an undecided territory between oneself and one’s enemy. Within the confines of war, then, a frontline is that which demarcates a no man’s land between and over which two warring factions vie for victory. Bloch, however, perceives the Front not as that which lies between oneself and one’s enemy but as that “limit space” of really real, worldly undecidedness. It is a “space” that is a really real “no man’s [Niemand] land”—not only is no human being yet to be found there, but it does not even exist as an already constituted space.64

This space of experimental probing not only translates into, for example,

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64 Thus, Bloch rejects mechanism’s suggestion that matter’s motion merely consists of a change of place, a suggestion that presupposes the simultaneity of all possible space and time. This point feeds into Bloch’s concept of “non-contemporaneity [Ungleichzeitigkeit],” of which I cannot treat here.
anthropological speculation, in the sense that it could be said that, for Bloch, the human being is that already become form of possibility most open to openness as such, that the human being evinces the most intense bordering upon a tensioning of real incompleteness; the notion in question here of a condition of radical undecidedness assumes, for Bloch, a much more expansive ontological register: it implies a threshold-condition within the real itself. Thus the real itself, i.e. matter, is an Odysseus-like ‘homecoming [Heimkehr]’ towards an ‘un-determined X’ (PA, p. 72); Odysseus—‘no-one [Niemand]’—and ‘no where [Nirgendwo]’—utopia—are one and the same (PA, p. 73).

A good sense of what this being on the Front of process-matter is like can be found in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (a very important text for Bloch). In the Preface Hegel writes:

> Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth—there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born—so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world. (1998, p. 50)
To stand on the Front of the material world-process is, for Bloch, to live and act and create and commence and speak on and in the foremost edge of futural time with the aim of real realisation: ‘the ontological truth in process becomes visible on the front of realisation’, as Siebers articulates this idea (2012d, p. 163):

*The being that conditions consciousness, and the consciousness that processes being, is understood ultimately only out of that and in that from which and towards which it tends.* Essential being is not Been-ness; on the contrary: the essential being of the world lies itself on the Front. (*PHE*, p. 18)

§3. LATENCY

What's the point of it all? (*TL*, p. 314)

*wozu das alles?*

Through the category tendency Bloch invites his readers to view matter as a process possessing Front; that is, tendency for Bloch denotes a process of unfinished development angled into a region of real undecidedness—ultimately Bloch is no determinist. Whilst this open processuality will be an important idea to set to work when eventually I arrive at my reading of the syntactic figure of anacoluthon (Chapter III), which denotes a break in the flow of syntax and will be read as probing, experimental linguisticality, I need to consider a second moment of Bloch’s materialism; that of purposiveness, or teleology, and ask how the openness and purposiveness of process are related.
If Bloch’s view of matter sees it as open process it is crucial to emphasise that real process—ontological process—is possible for Bloch only in a reality conceived of as incomplete and yet directed in it incompleteness, that is, directed in its processuality. Bloch’s categorisation of matter as process therefore conceives of this process not merely as Heraclitean becoming, as becoming without the possibility of termination, but instead, as Gross (1972, p. 122; my emphasis) observes, as ‘in process of becoming itself, of achieving its own structure and proper form.’ Process seeks a kind of completion of itself and it is this dimension of a directedness towards completion, towards a proper form of itself, that enables one to speak of a teleological moment (from the Greek telos) in Bloch’s materialism. To speak of purpose (Zweck) or purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) is inevitably to place oneself in ‘the historical metaphysical problematic of purposive causality, or teleology,’ says Moder (2017, p. 275), ‘such as it is known in Thomas Aquinas and other Aristotelian traditions.’ A theory of language derived from Bloch’s materialism must tarry with the nature of this goal-quality of process-matter and, indeed, the manner in which it differs from the above mentioned tradition. This will be my concern immediately below.

To do this I will consider in just what way ‘the flow of the real’ is teleological for Bloch (PHE, p. 222). Below I will expound Bloch’s considered concept of a utopian teleology, without, however, glossing over its difficulties or indeed its ambiguities. My aim is to sketch a model of this form of teleology so as then in later chapters to conceptualise language within its general theoretical framework. To fulfil this task I refer to Aristotle and to Kant along the way, and to the example of musical improvisation; Aristotle and Kant because
their respective concepts of teleology are perhaps the most influential in the Western philosophical tradition, therefore these may act as a benchmark against which to measure Bloch; musical improvisation because it offers an example by which to render more palpable what remains a very difficult moment of Blochian materialism, a moment sometimes bordering on the obscure, if not the questionable. Indeed, it is my estimation that the nature of purposiveness claimed of process stands as the most difficult, yet significant, moment of Bloch’s materialism, because it invites readers of teleology to rethink the categories and dilemmas of teleological explanation and overcome them dialectically, as it were.

What follows consists of three points. First, I provide a descriptive account of Bloch’s teleology. Second, I consider how this account fares with customary teleological explanation as found in Aristotle’s work. This will involve highlighting the problematic nature of Blochian teleology. Finally, I will try to render concrete what a utopian form of teleology, such as Bloch forwards, amounts to by turning to the example of musical improvisation, relating this to Bloch’s category of “latency.”

[1] As I have alluded to above, there can be no question that teleology features in Bloch’s materialism, the problem is simply one of its precise nature or form. Münster (1982, p. 18), a longstanding commentator of Bloch’s materialism, speaks of a ‘goal quality’ inscribed in tendency’s flow: there is in that flow a teleological directedness endogenous to its process such that a questioning dimension that asks “Whereto?” can be said to structure it and be part of it. Against this backdrop, Bloch enlists such terms as impetus (Anstoß), drive (Trieb), hunger, need (Bedürfnis) and longing...
(Sehnsucht) to cast matter in his specific processual view of the world. All these terms of course clearly connote a sought-for goal or purpose and suggest that matter lacks something (Nicht-Habens) and that matter longs to transcend and overcome this lack (EM, p. 73). Within this context, Bloch recurrently reminds his readers that in process-matter’s productivity there is present an invariant of direction: ‘things have been thought as process and so precisely as purposive’; ‘[i]n each process is direction’ (LM, p. 366); ‘[t]here would not be any process at all if there were not something that should not be so.’ (Bloch, 1988, p. 17) Bloch extends this perspective of a persistent orientation to the broadest of philosophical terms:

[T]he world is full of propensity towards something, tendency towards something, latency of something, and this something means fulfilment of the intending. (PHE, p. 18; my emphasis)

Before I give an account of the precise nature of this purposive process, it is important to differentiate the teleological process conceptualised by Bloch from that provided by Kant. I feel this is necessary to do so for the reason that Kant’s account of teleology has been influential to understandings of teleological explanation, and so from the outset I would like to highlight the point that Bloch’s teleology operates in an entirely different register from Kant’s. This point relates back to an earlier thesis of mine, namely: Bloch ontologises Kantianism.

In the First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant (2000) writes that ‘a formal purposiveness’ is simply what human beings ‘assume’ to be there working in nature as a whole but that laying behind this assumption
is a complete lack of theoretical proof, such lack of proof itself being impossible to overturn, says Kant, given the human mind’s limited architectonic, of which Kant had expounded in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In accordance with this starting point Kant then claims that natural purposiveness cannot be posited ‘in the object at all,’ but must be done so ‘strictly in the subject’ alone (20:216). This amounts to saying that natural purposiveness does not and cannot stand as an ‘objective concept of nature’ but is ‘derived merely from the subjective relation of nature to a faculty of the mind’, namely the faculty of judgement (20:218). To paraphrase Kant here, teleology is not ‘a property of the object outside me, but merely a kind of representation in me’ (5: 365). This thesis is born of Kant’s desire to establish the legitimacy of human freedom, however threadbare, against the efficient causality of natural science. This in turn relates to Whistler’s valuation of Kant’s philosophy of nature as an ethicisation of nature. In Kant the human being and its freedom becomes the measure of all things. If nature is said to harbour an end towards which it ‘specifies itself in accordance with a certain principle (or idea of system)’ (20:215), as Kant puts it, then, in the first instance, not only is such a specification-towards-an-end a process inexorably leading to the human being as the ultimate form of free life as such (5: 380)—‘that nature must be conceived of as an arena for the realisation of our moral ends’ (Guyer, 2005, p. 353; see also p. 171), but, in the second instance, just such an end is said to be no more than an anthropocentric, practically useful projection onto an unknowable nature in itself (ibid, p. 281), i.e. this projection cannot be objectively proven but rather is merely a practical ideal, the latter a consequence of an internal need of the human being to search for and find systematicity in the world to which it
belongs. Thus, as Varela & Weber (2002, p. 98) say, Kant reduces teleology as a classically dogmatic metaphysical position to a sort of ‘methodological fiction’—a ‘teleonomy’, that is, an apparent but impossibly provable purposiveness.

It is significant to outline Kant’s position here for the reason that Bloch completely does away with the premises of its heritage. That is, Bloch does away with Kant’s agnostic “as if-ness,” insofar as he decisively re-poses goal-directedness as objectively belonging to process-matter—as Weber & Varela write, here teleology is envisioned as a ‘real mode of being.’ (ibid, p. 111) The question of how Bloch provides satisfactory arguments to overcome the limits of experience which Kant had set-up as an insurmountable hurdle to knowing whether nature is truly purposive does not concern me here. As I stated in the Introduction, my aim in this study is not to argue for the plausibility of Bloch’s arguments but merely to extend his concepts into the realm of philosophy of language, and in so doing breaking new ground in Bloch-studies itself. For now then it is important to highlight that Bloch is working not with a subjective but an objective notion of teleology. Having established this important difference I can now turn to the precise nature of purposive process as conceived by Bloch.

I have stated above that, to Bloch’s mind, the material-process harbours an intention of fulfilment. Here is where hope is said to emerge from its process, for it is claimed to be directed towards a possible fulfilment. Insofar as for Bloch process-matter is a process of possibility, so then process must be for some type of goal or end or, properly speaking, process must be for some actuality; and this, Bloch insists, is matter’s ‘most important truth’ (PHE, p. [86])
1374). Within this general theoretical framework Bloch will then suggest that process-matter possesses within itself a cohering ‘intention-for-meaning [Bedeutungs-Intention]’ or ‘intention-for-realisation’ [Verwirklichungs-Intention]’ (ibid., p. 121), but that such meaning or such realisation is not pre-determined from the outset but must itself undergo a process of determination. Bloch will at times speak of this indeterminate outfall of the intending as “home [Heimat]” but also more familiar philosophically as essence (“What-ness,” or quidditas). More interestingly, Bloch relates the realisation of what is intended/intending by/in process-matter with a category of perennial philosophical standing, namely—that of the highest good:

In the goal which is being striven for it is the one necessity of, to use an outmoded expression, the highest good, which pacifies the unrest of the need and striving, that for which it would not be necessary to struggle if it were already available. This kind of totality, the non-existing all, not the existing whole, is the goal of the dialectical movement that holds it together, exactly as need is its impulse and motor. (1983, p. 303; my emphasis)

It is important to note here that I am not concerned with a Blochian concept of the highest good per se; rather, to reiterate a point I made earlier, it is my aim to grasp as best I can the precise nature of the purposiveness of process which Bloch considers leads to the possibility of fulfilment in the highest good, the latter of which, to paraphrase Guyer (2005, p. 326), is that which purposive process is subsumed under as a ‘single ultimate principle.’ That said, it is of course the case that the one cannot be dissociated from the other, such that in truth path and goal are necessarily interlaced in Bloch’s philosophical thought: the nature of totality as not yet surely effects
the nature of process, whilst, with this in mind, process organises totality through itself. Despite this nuance I think I am justified in drawing an analytical distinction of focus, at least provisionally here. For now, it is correct to say that Bloch equates the something process is for with the “non-existing all” employed in the above passage. And if the highest good must in Bloch’s mind relate to totality, then Bloch’s notion of the highest good turns on the position which states that it is not yet there. For it is the absence of totality’s availability which announces the need for process in the first place. The question of what sort of purposive process is at play here has to recognise its answer as hinging on how totality’s being not-yet effects an understanding of teleological process. To muster a response to this question and to begin to see the difficulties involved requires rehearsing a customarily understood notion of teleological process.

[2] For a classically conceived notion of teleology one can turn to Aristotle. Aristotle’s approach to the question of teleology is customary in the sense that it is underpinned by the view that the idea of a whole towards which particular things strive is antecedent to such movement towards it—note here that this echoes Aristotle’s prioritisation of actuality. To hold otherwise, namely, to say that the end towards which process tends is not yet, is a manifest antinomy—for what is a purpose if it is not determined (and thus in some sense actualised) prior to a striving towards it (see Guyer, 2005, p. 329)? This problematic which emerges from Bloch’s notion of a totality not-yet in being can be brought into clearer view by turning to Aristotle’s medieval interpreters, who usually translate the idea of teleology as ‘final cause [causa finalis]’ (Tuominen et al., 2014, p. 5). Feser (2014, p.
160; my emphasis) notes that much of Scholastic metaphysics, heavily indebted to Aristotelianism, perceived a potency as ‘always a potency for some actuality’, and thus a potency always ‘points beyond itself to an end or a range of ends’ and, as such, understanding potencies entails understanding ends, fulfilments, or what I term outfalls. Now, as I have hoped to indicate in passing above, it is unquestionably the case that Bloch wants to grasp matter qua a process of possibility in terms of ends, but Bloch seems to rely too heavily on a notion of pure potentiality, which in itself has no pre-determined actuality to direct its movement. One of Aristotle’s most famous readers, Aquinas, captures the real nub of the philosophical stakes at play here when he asserts that ‘an end or a goal, […] this is the starting point of causal action, the cause of causality itself’ (ST, 5.2; my emphasis).

As Aquinas lucidly conveys the point: a final cause is located precisely at the beginning of a process insofar as it will be the cause of any beginnings of process as such—it is that end which lends to a beginning its reason for being a beginning and thus is rightfully coined by Aquinas the cause of causes (causa causarum).65 This is why the final cause is ‘first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution or activity.’ (Wallace, 1977, p. 105) As Aristotle writes:

65 This makes teleological arguments notoriously circular, as Fugate makes clear by drawing on the circle shape itself:

[For] consider that a circle be formed by the joining of the two ends of a line. Such joining evidently does not consist in the placing of the two ends next to one another, because then the beginning and the end would remain two different points, and thus there would have to be at least one point between them, and thus no circle. If we are to transform a line into a true circle, then this can only be by taking the two most distant points and identifying them as the very same point. (2014, pp. 104-5)

Bloch, however, proposes a dotted ‘circle-symbol [Kreissymbol]’ as alternative to what he designates as the closed ‘circle of circles’ of Hegelian becoming, wherein the teleological process is so conceived as to foreclose the radically new from occurring (SO, pp. 445-9). Bloch’s dotted circle-symbol illustrates that ‘matter does not have its Totum in the horizon of the past’ but ‘the future.’ (SO, p. 410)
That for the sake of which is an end such that it is not for the sake of something else, but that for whose sake everything else is; so that if there is to be some such final term, it will not be unlimited, but if there is no such term, then there will be no for the sake of which. But those who endorse an unlimited series, forgetting this, destroy the nature of the good. Yet no one would try to do anything if they were not going to come to a limit. Nor would there be any reason [i.e. rational order] in reality. For whatever has reason always acts for the sake of something, and this is a limit. For the end is a limit. (Quoted in Johnson, 2005, p. 82)

Like Bloch, Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* extends this teleological principle to the whole of nature insofar as, for Aristotle, the highest good is that limit which constitutes ‘the end of all generation and change’ (938a1, 30); that is, “end” both in the sense of the limit which terminates generation and change and that for which generation and change are what they are. One can thus infer that the highest good is the ultimate limit of all possibility for Aristotle and therefore is the highest mode of actuality. To a large extent this is precisely the case with Bloch. But there are two stark differences spanning the two thinkers’ approaches on the score of teleology. Firstly, for Bloch, the end of process does not come at the beginning, as with Aristotle’s customary approach to teleology, but the *beginning at the end*. In other words, teleological explanation is employed in such a way that the totality for which particular things tend and strive cannot precede such tending and striving—the final cause really does come *at the end*. This first point places the purported teleological dimension of Bloch’s materialism in a bind insofar as, despite this radical refunction of teleology, Bloch still wants to maintain the idea that process has a teleological bearing from the outset, and as such, in
keeping with tradition, Bloch still affirms an end’s status as the cause of causes:

To find it, to find the right thing, for which it is worthy to live, to be organised, and to have time: that is why we go, why we cut new, metaphysically constitutive paths, summon what is not, build into the blue, and build ourselves into the blue, and there seek the true, the real, where the merely factual disappears—incipit vita nova. (SU, p. 3; my emphasis)

But it was already said that the goal of process is what sets off the process in the first place; even if this goal is an idea, it remains actualised in that state. The trouble is that Bloch insists the goal is not only not known, but not yet ontologically determined. Does Bloch not therefore propagate a goalless teleology or at least one that is utterly blind? Secondly, and contrary to Aristotle, Bloch dichotomises the actuality towards which the process of possibility can tend towards. On the one hand Bloch speaks of The All as a possible outfall of process, whilst on the other he speaks of The Nothing (admittedly not an actuality but the very termination and impossibility of any actuality whatsoever). This second difference between the two thinkers of teleology is problematic for Bloch insofar as he locates the end of process on the site of a possibility. But it is precisely this move which is contrary to the very logic of teleology for the reason that if a proper possibility of the process of matter is that a nothingness befall it, then nothingness cannot be said to constitute a state of actuality. This problem relates to Bloch’s very concept of the positive possibility mentioned above, The All, which Bloch has also termed the non-existing goal. I have established so far that whilst need, hunger, and longing are those states which constitute the driving force of the
flow of process-matter, what holds this process together and directs it is a “non-existing” goal—the “non-existing all,” i.e. it is a type of totality not yet in its very being. But here resides the ambivalence of the teleological moment in Bloch’s materialism. If as Lord (2011, p. 82) puts it, teleological explanation presupposes that ‘the idea of the whole causes the parts’, i.e. the final cause is the cause of all particulars, then Bloch has apparently jeopardised the grounds upon which teleological explanation stands by asserting that totality is not yet. And yet Bloch does not relinquish the conviction of an end-limit to process-matter and thus, it can be argued, at least in principle, he does not do away with the idea of a highest good: ‘The genuine utopian will is definitely not endless striving’, he writes (PHE, p. 16; my emphasis).66 If as Brentano (1975, p. 29; my emphasis) writes, ‘[p]otential being cannot be defined except with the aid of the concept of actuality’, then Bloch is here working with a utopic notion of actuality. Bloch’s materialism creates categories with which to think about the world as an immanently developing whole, but this whole does not pre-exist its development, and insofar as this is the case so then teleology is dis-related

66 Bloch equates endless striving with an utter lack of direction:

Homogenous flow as becoming without terminations shows itself everywhere as ideological residue, as a mere restless changing of itself for the sake of change, each change thereby losing its value. (EM, p. 152)

[Der homogene Fluß als Werden ohne Anhalten zeigt selber überall ideologischen Rückstand eines ruhelosen Sichveränderns bloß um des Veränderns willen, in dem jede Veränderung ihren Wert verliert.]

Bloch therefore battles against not only static, but processual ontologies devoid of direction (Richtung), i.e. processuality without arrival, realisation, or outfall. Bloch’s protestations against process philosopher Henri Bergson serve to highlight this point. Bergson posits process without the prospect of finality (see PHE, pp. 140 & 201; Hudson, 1982, p. 72) and thus ‘opposes the process-idea directed towards a goal’, eliminating ‘any and every trace of the onward, the Where To and openly pursuable goal’ (PHE, pp. 140-1). Conceptions of homogenous process as one witnesses them in Bergson are, for Bloch then, myopic to the really new (the Novum) insofar as they posit sheer repetitiveness of change without any true break or rupture. In a pure processuality there can be no true transgressing of limits into what is new (into finality). This is why Bloch speaks of the ‘future-character’ of matter (M, p. 254).
from what has been perceived to be its necessary rootedness in an antecedent actuality—in an ‘entelechy of fate’ as Bloch terms it (LM, p. 290).

Turning to the category Bloch employs in order to think this peculiar teleological moment—this purposive process of possibility towards a utopic actuality—can help in my task of grasping this teleological process. “Latency [Latenz]” Bloch broadly defines as ‘the existence in tendency of the not-yet being goal-contents [das Dasein des noch nicht seienenden Zielinhalts in der Tendenz].’ (LM, p. 352) Tendency denotes a striving towards something; latency, which ‘comes from latere,’ meaning “‘being hidden [versteckt sein],” “being concealed [verborgen sein],” “having not yet emerged [noch nicht herausgetreten sein]” (LM, p. 352), concerns the nature of that for which tendency strives. If tendency’s latent goal is no more than a totality which has nowhere (ou-topia) yet entered into being, then that which process strives and hungers for is what has nowhere yet appeared in process; and thus process strives for ‘the reality of tomorrow’—process strives for the new (LM, p. 352). Indeed, Bloch thinks the Ultimum not merely with the Novum but as the Novum, and it is perhaps his mistake to have held onto the category of “latency” to convey this point, for what is latent tends to be already there, however dimly. Nevertheless, the point is that the process that tends towards totality would thus be, to Bloch’s mind, a process which leaps out and over into something new. This will be an important notion when I come to my reading of anacoluthon, which means a break in syntactical flow, or, more literally, a “not following” on the plane of syntax. Process does not follow (a pre-conceived route, as it were), but leads towards what has not yet been. And here is the sticking point, for if process-matter is structured or so
held together by a final cause the finality of which precisely is open in itself—the cause of causality consists of an openness to novelty, thereby it cannot be limited in any simple sense, for the goal possesses a ‘frontier characteristic’ (LE, p. 131)—then it would appear that this utopian form of teleology abrogates certain basic features of customary teleological explanation. Insofar as Bloch’s materialism locates matter’s final actuality (final cause) within the modality of possibility—in accordance with Aristotle’s definition of possibility cited earlier, this utopian conception of teleology would amount to saying that process-matter’s limit, i.e. its stopping-point, is no more than a possibility—so then there is little basis, it seems, for Bloch to be convinced that there is any sign of teleology within the flow of process-matter. The upshot is that the latency of tendency fundamentally concerns a final cause which has, as it were, fallen ‘out of changelessness into movement’, ‘out of the sphere of identity’ ‘into the river of the world fire.’ (Bloch, 1983, p. 300) It is for this reason of indeterminacy of the final cause that the highest good, as a possible ultimate outfall of process, thus becomes ‘an objectively-real real problem.’ (PHE, p. 1324) As Bloch writes:

[T]hat which is meant by the highest good, formerly called God, then the kingdom of God, and which is finally the realm of freedom, constitutes not only the purpose-ideal of human history but also the metaphysical latency problem of nature. (PHE, p. 1324)

Insofar as the totality for which process-matter searches is constitutively not-yet; to paraphrase Guyer (2005, p. 12), insofar as this totality ‘is not antecedently given’ to the need, antecedent to the longing for it, so then there is a reflective freedom in the composition of processual realisation as
conceived by Bloch. It could even be said that, in the world of Bloch’s philosophy, teleology is inherently inductive as opposed to deductive (this if one considers this statement not merely epistemologically, but bears in mind that the final cause is realised through its effects: it is not that the human mind goes from effect to cause, but that the real itself goes from its effect to cause, this in the peculiar manner that this cause is not-yet in existence). Indeed, the new cannot appear in a world conceived of as a cycle recurring to itself, to paraphrase Przywara (2014, p. 136) in his expression of Aristotle’s teleological notion of entelechy. Bloch remains Aristotelian insofar as he designates his materialism ‘immanent teleology’ (M, p. 447); the teleological moment of Bloch’s materialism is underlined by a rejection of any and every transcendent preordination of process-matter’s outfall, as seen to an extent with Aristotle. But Bloch argues that a materialisation of this immanent form of teleology would, in the first instance, consist of process’s desideratum being itself not yet constituted. Instead, what is desired is really reflectively sought. It is for this reason that the teleological moment of Bloch’s materialism opens up for view the notion of a utopic final cause: teleology which is open purposiveness.

Even so, as Przywara highlights, however open this type of process might be, it must harbour within itself an a priori of the end: ‘Every “it is assumed that” already implies an antecedent theory, which affects the order of the experiment and thus constitutes at least a negative a priori.’ (Przywara, 2014, p. 137) Siebers foregrounds this dimension in Bloch’s work. The Ultimum of the process is that which always is ultimately aimed at and as such stands as a limit category whose function is to act ‘as a (negative)
measure for the critique of existence’ (Siebers, 2012f, pp. 583-4). Its nature of a limit is what leads Siebers to speak of the *Ultimum* as the ‘extraterritorial’, ‘eschatological dimension’ of all human and extra-human realisation. It is in this sense that the category *Ultimum* both does and does not align with Aristotle’s notion of an ultimate limit as the end towards which all generation and change tend towards. To deal with Bloch’s severance from Aristotelianism: what makes the *Ultimum* an “extraterritorial, eschatological dimension” is that it is the as of yet ‘unavailable fundamental goal’ of process (*PHE*, p. 1375). One is thus in a strange position with Bloch’s thought, for here one has the idea that that which guides the process of actualisation is not-yet. If classical teleology’s “thither towards form” is from the first only really a “hither from the idea” (Przywara, 2014, p. 139), so Bloch’s really is “thither towards a form which is not-yet,” even if what is “hither from” in the classical conceptualisation remains that which is always *intended* from the start. I return to these points in Chapter II when I properly turn to the metaphysics underpinning Bloch’s materialism.

For now, the main point of contention with Bloch’s notion of an open teleological process, namely a goal-directed process in which the goal is not yet decided upon or even in existence, is precisely the objection of how such a process can even be considered teleological in the first place, that is, a *directed* process amidst an infinite ocean of possibilities. The objection’s point of departure would not be, then, whether Bloch conceives of teleology in a subjective Kantian register, as ‘an artifact of our own judgment’ (Guyer, 2005, p. 300), or indeed an objective, real register—clearly Bloch’s corpus commends the latter, and in so doing Bloch echoes a growing line of
research in the philosophy of biology which deems teleology a ‘primordial tendency of matter manifest in the form of organisms’ (Web & Varela, 2002, p. 114). Rather, the nub of the issue lies in whether processuality, as a radical openness, can, in its openness, be directed in one way as opposed to another. But to my mind this point of contention is problematic only if one sticks to those customary conceptions of teleology—those which precisely Bloch attempts to step beyond and leave behind. Bloch’s suggestion of a radically open material process in which there exists such a creative self-production of the still fermenting core of matter need not be considered a process of mere groping in the abyss of indefinite possibilities. Why if Bloch relinquishes the position of a pre-determined end does he face the charge of being unable to adequately attend to the notion of directedness as such? One of the principal objections that can be levelled at Bloch concerns the feasibility of an open teleological process. I have shown that Bloch both wants to avoid a closed-ness of the goal insofar as he rejects pre-determination, and yet simultaneously Bloch maintains the importance of directionality, an idea which in itself presupposes a determination of destination, however slight. Indeed the problem is thus: how can direction be preserved in a radically open process? My response to this potential objection is that process for Bloch is directed to the new, to novelty. Thus, direction and openness need not be thought as incompatible. Process is directed towards a goal that is not yet in itself. This is what makes the process open. What makes the process directional is therefore also what makes the process open, for process is directed to the really new, which is its goal: the nowhere yet existent totality of being. As Bloch writes:
At the very beginning Thomas More designated utopia as a place, an island in the distant South Seas. This designation underwent changes so that it left space and entered time. Indeed, the utopians, especially those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, transposed the wishland more into the future. In other words, there is a transformation of the topos from space into time. With Thomas More the wishland was still ready, on a distant island, but I am not there. On the other hand, when it is transposed into the future, not only am I not there, but utopia itself is also not with itself. This island does not even exist. But it is not something like nonsense or absolute fancy; rather it is something not yet in the sense of a possibility; that it could be there if only we could do something for it. Not only if we travel there, but in that we travel there does the island of utopia arise out of the sea of the possible—utopia, but with new contents. (Bloch, 1988, p. 3)

One way to concretise this form of utopian teleology, a counter model to tradition, in which the goal is determined through a movement towards it, is to turn to a musical example. In fact, this would be apt given Bloch’s intense fascination for this form of artistic production, which for him is the utopian art form kat’exochen: Bloch would like ‘to allot to music primacy in what is otherwise unsayable’ (SU, p. 163). The spontaneous and open teleological composition of totality at work in Bloch’s materialism can be demonstrated more specifically with the example of musical improvisation. When, for instance, jazz musicians, as parts of the live musical composition, come together to “jam” they aim to produce a sonic expression of life and existence that nowhere yet has entered into being. This is shown by the fact that whilst musicians in an improvised setting collectively seek a common goal by specifying their production of sound toward a certain wholeness,
they cannot describe, either with words or prior musical notation, this goal of wholeness, but can only achieve its realisation in their very playing. The process of jamming is open then, and yet remains determined in its process by a sort of purposiveness: no musician really knows where they will go and what they will hear, but they do seek something and this is what makes their process of playing a directed process. It is directed process towards the new. Hegel touches on this Blochian idea of a spontaneous development of totality, insofar as totality’s being not yet renders its developmental process an open developmental process of realisation, even if one adds the caveat that Bloch, like many other major theorists of the previous century, considers Hegel still abides by a sort of Aristotelian prioritisation of actuality or sameness, or ossified repetition:

The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself. (Hegel, 1977b, p. 11)

Moder (2017, pp. 286 & 288) touches on the notion which Hegel dimly offers as a post-critical account of teleology but which, I claim, only Bloch sees to the end, namely: that ‘the substance itself is transformed by the accident’; as such substance can ‘radically transform itself.’ In other words, for Bloch, the substance of totality (that is, matter’s potential completion, its outfall) only arrives inasmuch as through experimental probing, through its accidental turnings and thus through its openness to being imprinted by those accidents. Only through this spontaneous becoming does process-matter
achieve its goal of completion. If every act limits the virtual infinity of potentiality, and if in the beginning substance just is potentiality and nothing but pure potentiality ecstatically constituted, so then it can be said that substance’s actuality is arrived at both contingently and necessarily. Matter’s substance is a *dotted circle*: in its directedness towards realisation process-matter is open to the new and not then, as traditionally the circle has symbolised, a process enclosed in a self-sufficient completeness (see Przywara, 2014, p. 145). And this is precisely the reason why I turned to the example of improvisation. Jazz improvisation is a musical form of a dotted circle, i.e. an open teleological process. It can be said that, as experimentally probing a jamming session is a “*dotted reflective flow*”—that is, a flow which, whilst lacking a *actual constitutive end* (Kant was half-right, for no such end presently exists), does not for that lack a *real reflective tendency towards an end*. Following Muyumba’s (2009, p. 135) work in jazz improvisation, it can be said that in being a process of improvisation matter ‘leads to new realities’; improvisation touches on the Novum. Matter’s process is thus ontological improvisation towards totality, it is a process of *ontological creative directedness*. Its process is one of creating totality *without foresight*: improvised. Bloch’s utopian form of teleology thus allows a sensitivity to be developed which sees openness and directedness not as mutually exclusive and incompatible, but as one and the same.

[3] I have shown a ‘driving tendency’ and an ‘entelechial latency’ as central categories of Bloch’s materialism (*M*, p. 474). How the two categories relate specifically, however, has not yet been broached. This requires a response. What, then, is the nature of their relation? Whilst devoting
sustained attention to this question oversteps the limits available to me here, I have nonetheless already intimated that the relation of tendency and latency must be understood *dialectically*. A brief consideration of the dialectic in Bloch’s materialism is thus called-for. In that Hegel is key for Bloch in this regard, turning to Hegel’s conception of dialectic will be helpful in grasping the singularity of the tendency-latency relation so crucial to Bloch’s materialism.

The first point to note here is that Hegel conceives of dialectic as the true method of reality itself; dialectic is held as the precise manner in which reality tends towards completeness, or absolution. This is another way of saying that, in Hegel's (1991, p. 1; my emphasis) mind, dialectic is ‘the only method that is *identical with the content.*’ Hegel regards dialectical method as real as the content it treats of (ibid., p. 2) and is therefore immanent method. Dialectical method is such that it allows ‘the matter itself to hold sway over us’ (ibid., p. 55); it ‘tie[s] thought down, lead[s] it to the matter, and maintain[s] it there.’ (ibid., p. 5) So attuned is the dialectical method to that which it treats that it can be considered only as ‘real-dialectic’, as Bloch says (SO, p. 64). Nor can the dialectical method be considered a *tertium quid*, a third term, interjecting itself between tendency and latency. Rather, the dialectical method, according to both Hegel and Bloch, constitutes the living rhythm of each pole’s becoming. According to Bloch, and following Hegel, tendency and latency relate dialectically, such that their relation is a real relation. This real relation is underpinned by three causal conceptions, conceptions inextricably dialectical in kind: (1) interaction (*Wechselwirkung*); (2) contradiction; and (3) a utopian *Agens* (*LM*, pp. 345-49). In what follows,
I shall deal with the first two, as to an extent the latter has already been dealt with in the section on tendency and latency: the *utopian Agens* is the realising element in matter.

[a] In the first instance, the dialectical nature of tendency and latency’s relation means that each of the categories possesses mutual causal efficaciousness, such that neither stands as hierarchically dominant in relation to its opposite; moreover, each contains a potency for imparting change upon its opposite, and *vice versa*. This flows from the Hegelian dialectic, which is above all else a radical theory of movement defined precisely by the interaction (and contradiction) of subject and object (*SO*, pp. 36 & 65; Adorno, 2000, p. 81). What this essentially means, in the first instance, is neither subject nor object are pure unto themselves but instead gain their inner constitutions through the play of their outward, living interaction. And so it is with tendency and latency: no tendency without latency, no latency without tendency; process directing the nature of outfall, outfall the nature of process, such that each pole influences, imparts, changes and transforms its related opposite in the becoming of totality. As Adorno (2001, p. 163) writes of subject and object: ‘these two elements do not oppose each other in a static, inflexible manner,’ but mutually influence and in turn are mutually influenced, each pole imbuing its opposite with itself, interpenetrating, and thereby giving voice to a unity—and difference—of subject and object (see Ollman, 1976, p. 55). Of course, as I have shown in the case of Bloch’s conception of totality, the unity of tendency and latency is not-yet, but always ever again intended: ‘the totality of the non-existing All’ is the dialectic’s ‘*cohering goaf*, Bloch writes (*SO*, p. 512)
[b] In the second instance, as a dialectical relation, tendency and latency's interaction consists of events of negation, interruption, and thus discontinuity (important for my reading of anacoluthon in Chapter III); in sum, their interactive relation is constituted in large measure by contradiction. Like Hegel, Bloch holds this as, to some extent, dialectic's key contribution to philosophical thought. As the following passage makes clear, contradiction and the negation it entails is a facet of dialectic woven into the idea of an incomplete subject-object identity:

[D]ialectic as the logic of process reflects in the whole history of its concept this provocative and history-making claim: there is still no identity. Because no object is complete within itself and without otherness, conflict is the father of things. (1983, p. 293)

When Bloch (ibid., p. 295) is discussing the contradiction dialectic involves, so then he has in mind 'real contradiction, contradiction as constitution of the object'. A good sense of the place of negation in dialectical becoming is visible in the following Hegel-passage, in which negation is aligned with discontent and inadequacy:

[T]he Idea displays itself in each sphere so far as it can within the finitude of that sphere, just as each drop of water provides an image of the sun, and secondly, that the Notion, through its dialectic, breaks through the limitation of

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67 As Hegel writes:

It is [...] one of the basic prejudices of previous logic and of ordinary thought that contradiction is not as essential and immanent a determination as identity. But in fact, if order of precedence were an issue, and the two determinations were to be held separate, it would be the principle of contradiction that should be taken as the more profound and the more essential. For in contrast to it, identity is only the determination of simple immediacy, of inert being, whereas contradiction is the root of all movement and life; it is only in so far as something has contradiction within it that it moves, is possessed of instinct and activity. (2010, pp. 381-2)
this sphere, since it cannot rest content with an inadequate element, and necessarily passes over into a higher stage. (1970, §252 Zusatz; my emphasis)

This passage is almost echoed by Bloch, but the emphasis is laid on the incompleteness of the goal of dialectical becoming:

Dialectic itself, in the world made by humans, is subject-object relation, nothing other; dialectic is working subjectivity, time and again overhauling, and striving to blast open already become objectivisation and objectivity. Ultimately, finding itself and its work inadequately objectified, the needy subject is always the driver of historically occurring contradictions. The needy subject is the intensive motor, is the consequence of the inadequacy of the attained form of existence at any one time, whose revolutionary gait, conflicting the contradiction of the matter itself, activates, from the inadequacy, the Totum of its content. For if unfulfilled need is the impetus and motor of dialectical-material movement, so then is—on the ground of the same absent content—the totality of the non-existing All its cohering goal. (SO, p. 512)

Interruption is born of inadequacy, of limitation, of negativity at the heart of identity, the latter of which is always intended as the goal of dialectical process. Negation, an intertexture to the interactive causality of tendency and latency, involves explosive leaps. As Bloch writes:

Each half-fulfilled or inadequate already become movement-form, each historical society, contains in its womb the bearer of further, greater need, developing capacity, that wants to be fulfilled. Need, as the active capacity, contradicts the old forms of existence, becoming explosive, containing the call to the future, to the next approaching contradiction, a relatively sublated stage. That is the source of rupturing tendency in the dialectic, a source out of need (SO, p. 138).

As Harris notes (1986, p. xvi), a key feature of Hegelian dialectic is the process by which categories are brought before their own nullity (or

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68 Socrates' dia-logical approach to wisdom and definition is perhaps the inception of dialectical thought. Dialectical is the Socratic beginning of wisdom: "I know that I do not know," that is, I know that I have a not-having. The felt inadequacy of this contradiction drives forth for a solution (SO, pp. 126-8).
inadequacy) in the face of the absolute. A similar process is seen in Bloch’s materialist dialectic. What makes of this materialist dialectic a utopian dialectic, however, is that inadequacy can only be measured against an absolute that is not-yet in existence (an existing non-existent). And so the inadequacy of each material-form dawns only in the face of a complete subject-object identity that itself is—not-yet. This point brings me to what can perhaps be considered as the foremost objection that Bloch aims at Hegelian dialectic. Bloch’s recurrent complaint turns on what he perceives as the utter disregard Hegelian dialectic pays to truly new, i.e. the Novum, the logic of which I will now briefly consider.

If the absolute is that end to which all moments of dialectical becoming move towards, then its conception as consisting of “an already being there” precludes genuine novelty from this process. For Bloch, however, process-matter’s dialectic is contradictory, discontinuous, really real anticipative, spontaneous becoming, in that reality is the becoming to an as yet incomplete totality, an outfall, which, as such, cannot pre-exist its process of arrival. Given this is the case for Bloch, given that the outfall of process does not pre-exist process but is found forming in and through process, so then the outfall would be a novelty in process, would be something that has not yet occurred in the history of becoming. Thus the Novum and totality are tightly bound up together to Bloch’s mind. As Siebers writes:

Genuine novelties in history—revolution, new behavioural patterns, experiences of transgressing limits, thought itself as transgression—are all actualisations of the intention to totality (2012a, p. 414; my emphasis).
CHAPTER CONCLUSION

I have expounded the basic architectonic structure of Bloch’s concept of matter. To further elucidate this materialism I have drawn on the philosophical genealogies of the categories that structure it. I have contended that the starting point of Bloch’s materialism may be viewed as an ontologisation of Kant’s Copernican turn, by which I mean, for Bloch, the incomprehensibility of matter’s essence or core does not reside on the epistemological side alone—as it does with Kant—but is the ontological basis of matter’s really real incompleteness. My next step was to consider the two categories that make up Bloch’s ontologisation of Kant, namely tendency and latency. These terms denote, respectively, both the processuality of matter and its purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit). I have argued that, taken together, Bloch conceives of matter as an anticipatory, contradictory process; which is another way of saying that matter is a discontinuous process with direction. The categories of tendency and latency essentially grasp these two related moments of matter, in which incompleteness, process, development, direction, and anticipation all constitutes the decisive features of Bloch’s materialism from which one can then build one’s speculation on language.
CHAPTER TWO
ANALOGY

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter I, I provided an analysis of the compositional structure of Bloch’s utopian materialism—essential for any attempt to think the materiality of language within its horizon. My claim in the above was that Bloch’s materialism views matter as a discontinuous, teleologically open process. What this analysis does not take into account, however, is an appreciation of the movement of transcending (note, not transcendence) that is vital to Bloch’s way of thinking about matter. Thus, my reading of Bloch’s materialism in Chapter I operates on an all too immanent plane, or, better put, does not give heed to the transcending (Überschreiten) which is key to understanding Bloch’s materialism.

To get a handle on the place of a transcending process in Bloch’s materialism requires inquiring into this materialism’s guiding metaphysics. Indeed, it is not controversial to say that Bloch’s matter-categories tend towards a meta-physical outlook insofar as together they coalesce into a fundamental reflection on the question of being (Holz, 1975, p. 126). My aim in this chapter then is to provide a response to the question of what kind of metaphysics underpins Blochian materialism? What is this materialism’s

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69 Indeed, Hermann-Sinai and Tegtmeyer (2012, p. 9) speak quite freely of Bloch’s ‘metaphysical materialism’, and Susman (1992, p. 22) famously described Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia as marking a ‘new German metaphysics’.
metaphysical sens? This question is significant to pose because it brings one face to face with what Puntel (2011, p. 159) terms ‘the ontological domain’ proper, that is, ‘the ultimate subject matter’ of (Bloch’s) philosophy.

Under review here then is the nature of the relation between process and that for which process strives, and this relation is marked by a movement of transcending for Bloch (not transcendence). Against this qualification of my inquiry, then, below I will argue that here the nature of relation between process and its goal consists of an analogic relation. This thesis opens me up to the metaphysical doctrine of the analogy of being, otherwise known as analogia entis. My claim will be that Bloch’s materialism is an original retrieval of the analogy of being doctrine; it is a utopian experimentation in the fundamental logic of that doctrine. Bloch’s open, teleologically directed materialism sets out a new direction for the analogy of being doctrine precisely by developing an eschatological analogy of being, in which what is traditionally viewed as a static permanence of the relation between process and outfall is now deemed “sublatable” over into a dynamic relation that itself can be overcome (it is a capacity, a possibility, of the material process for this permanent relation to be transcended).

70 The French sens denotes both “sense” and “meaning,” but also “direction.” Here, I am concerned with what this direction consists of at the most fundamental level.

71 This claim of the analogical nature of Bloch’s materialism is not entirely given by Bloch’s corpus; my reading draws on an implicature. For this reason my reading certainly can claim originality: analogy’s significance remains un-thought in extant Bloch-scholarship and, to some degree, by Bloch himself, despite, as I will show below, his evident intimations towards the doctrine. Equally, for the same reason, my thesis is difficult to substantiate. It fails to constitute an entirely surefooted interpretative step. Nonetheless, the benefit of reading Bloch’s materialism through the prism of the analogy of being problematic is that doing so allows me to cast light on what all things—including language as an object of speculative inquiry—communicate with in the horizon of Bloch’s philosophical thought, i.e. a transcending movement to what is not-yet.
To make my case I will have to sketch a number of key conjunctures in analogy’s history, beyond what I take as Bloch’s own eschatological-materialist rendition of it, so as to bring to the fore the doctrine’s principal features. This means considering the following: (i) analogy’s ancient Greek beginnings, (ii) its medieval Christian expression, and (iii) its modern forms of appearance. Once again, by briefly reviewing these moments of analogy’s history (not analogy’s history) one comes to a makeshift measure by which to gauge the specificity of what for me is Bloch’s original retrieval of analogic metaphysics. 72

But insofar as analogia entis itself is but one response to the question of being (to the problematic of metaphysics), so then it is necessary to preface my review of analogia entis by tracing three other related lines of inquiry: (1) the nature of metaphysics as a science; (2) Bloch’s critique of metaphysics; and, (3) Bloch’s (re-)construction of metaphysics over into an ontology of not-yet being. By treading these three steps an entrance into analogia entis will be all the more smoother.

§1. METAPHYSICS

In the Introduction of this study I claimed that philosophy has re-awakened to its speculative mandate. Philosophy has arisen from its anti-metaphysical slumber, from what Puntel (2011, p. 8) terms ‘a dogma postmodernisticum antimetaphysicum’, to re-establish itself with ‘the inescapable metaphysical foundation of human reality’ (Coates, 2002, p. 4). Partly my aim in the

72 Bloch gave his Leipzig philosophy students a piece of advice prior to their commencing a course on the history of philosophy: ‘We are not historians’, Bloch says, ‘What interests us is the history of philosophy.’ (1985d, p. 31)
Introduction was to show that the renewal of metaphysics which is marking contemporary philosophical debate provides an opening through which alternative approaches to philosophising language can be charted. In turn, I contended that Ernst Bloch is a thinker who offers just one such alternative way to proceed in speculating on the materiality of language.

This is certainly all to the good, but the question of what precisely metaphysics is raises its head. It is certainly beyond the scope of my study to delve into the rich and varied history of metaphysical speculation, the tapestry of debates, conflicts, and headways to be found there, and to provide a resounding response to this question. That said, I am able briefly to shed light on the vocation of metaphysics, very broadly construed, and by laying this vocation out in clear sight I will then be able to consider Bloch’s critique of metaphysical thought as such, and, thereby, the specificity of the analogy of being as a particular response to the guiding concern of metaphysics.

[1] The guiding concern of metaphysics is traditionally the question of being, namely: what is being or what is it to be?, the locus classicus of its philosophical formulation belonging to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The nature of this question is given by the very title of Aristotle’s work. Indeed, the Greek “meta-physics” originates from a bibliographical designation, inasmuch as these Aristotelian writings were assigned this name due to their chronologically follow on from Aristotle’s physical investigations (they are the writings whose concern is “above” or “beyond” that which is physical). However, in terms of their subject-matter, Aristotle’s metaphysical writings are first in investigative rank insofar as the task of metaphysical speculation
is to discern the grounds and causes of the physical world as such (that which is beyond the physical is thus seen as that which gives birth to and sustains the physical). To borrow from a thinker of the previous century who was most concerned to reignite the embers of the question of being, Heidegger writes of this question that it is thus ‘the most originary’ (2000, p. 2) and, as such, ‘the darkest of all.’ (1990, p. 23) Bloch concurs: the germ and kernel of all questioning is the ‘dark Am and Is’; the question of being is therefore ‘the question of questions’ (EM, p. 245). In a significant passage of the Spirit of Utopia Bloch conveys not only the centrality of this question for his philosophical thought, but its fundamental enigmatic quality:

It is questioning in itself, an inmost, deepest amazement, which often moves toward nothing, and yet quiets the flux of what was just lived; lets one reflect oneself into oneself such that what is most deeply meant for us appears there, regards itself strangely. A drop falls and there it is; a hut, the child cries, an old woman in the hut, outside wind, heath, an evening in autumn, and there it is again, exactly, the same; or we read how the dreaming Dmitri Karamazov is astonished that the peasant always says “a wee one,” and we suspect that it could be found here; “Little rat, rustle as long as you like; / Oh, if there were only a crumb!” and upon hearing this small, harsh, strange line from Goethe’s Wedding Song we sense that in this direction lies the unsayable, what the boy left lying there as he came out of the mountain, “Don’t forget the best thing of all!” the old man told him, but no one could ever have come across something so inconspicuous, deeply hidden, uncanny within the concept. (SU, p. 193)

What I would like to highlight at this point is the link Bloch establishes in this passage between the question of being and the unsayable, and his embedding the emergence of this question and its concomitant relation to
the unsayable within the occurrences of everyday human life and experience, i.e. the rain falling, a human inhabitancy, the sound of a child, an autumnal setting of the Sun, etc. It is during these moments in which the daily occurrences of human life and the natural environments in which they take place are gripped by their own surplus of meaning that first pricks metaphysical questioning: an inkling emerges from this wonder that there is something *more* to the empirical. But the unsayability not only of a response to the question of being, but, for Bloch, *of* the question of being itself, leads to a paradoxical style of communicating these sudden confrontations with the question of being, these sudden moments of *rupture* in which the familiar turns over into the unfamiliar: ‘The simplest word is already much too much for it, the most sublime word much too little again’; so much so that ‘[i]f one nonetheless would like to designate here somewhat, one should consider that what has just been said must be crossed out each time, so that nothing can solidify.’ (*SU*, pp. 193 & 194). As I will show shortly, this move on Bloch’s part, in which metaphysical questioning relates to an un-congealing of speech (and one can imagine, that which one speaks of), sets out to establish a symbiosis of ideology critique and the question of being.

For now, I can render clearer the point Bloch is making and better bring into view the vocation of metaphysics by turning to the recognised philosopher of being Étienne Gilson (1950, p. 17), who has remarked that often a human life is lived by that which has been chosen to be *forgotten*. Against this remark, the metaphysician seeks to counter this tendency of forgetfulness by rekindling a recognition of the uncanny fact of being as *such*—‘the overpowering enigma of existence!’ (*SU*, p. 172), as Bloch says—which
often times becomes all too veiled by hasty concerns with the empiricities of life. ‘We are all merely empirical in three quarters of what we do’, as Leibniz (1998, p. 271) said, and without a recognition of this surplus of the empirical and of what we are, a surplus which nonetheless sustains the empirical and what we are, ‘humans collapse into themselves, without a path or a goal beyond the quotidian.’ (SU, 167) This being-tied to ‘the stockpile of […] the merely become of existence [Vorhandenseins]’ (PA, p. 149) thus to Bloch’s mind and perhaps to the minds of metaphysicians with him, quashes the ability for a movement of transcending (incurvatio in se ipsum)—the movement of transcending being long related to metaphysics. This surplus of the physical-empirical as that which unites all physical-empirical individualities in a commonness of being is, as Heidegger (1990, p. 21) says, that ‘disturbing’, ‘obscure and hidden’ feature of existence that metaphysical speculation aims to recuperate a remembrance of and investigate it as best it can: ‘Being is common to all the sciences. But it is for metaphysics to treat of it in its commonness.’ (Blanchette, 2003, p. 117) Bloch’s manner of treating this commonness of being is just peculiar to say the least.

§1.1. BLOCH’S CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS

[B]eing minus horizons. (M, p. 468)

As I will hope to show below, there is much of the vocation of metaphysics that speaks to Bloch’s agenda, particularly the movement of transcending already mentioned and to which I will come to shortly. However, to Bloch’s lights metaphysics’ mandate as remembering the commonness of being betrays an error that is present in the historical
manifestations of its programme, an error consisting of a deep-seated and persistent forgetfulness of its own in which, contrary to the path of metaphysical criticism charted by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*, it not so much *forgets being* (Heidegger, 1990, p. 21) as the real openness of *being to-come*. As Bloch writes in the opening pages of *The Principle of Hope*: 'In his first attempt at a Latin grammar, M. Terentius Varro is said to have forgotten the future tense; philosophically, it has not been adequately considered to this day.' (*PHE*, p. 6) Bloch’s principal criticism is thus that a notion of being as closed because already fulfilled pervades all hitherto metaphysical directions of thought, even Heidegger’s to some extent, although a comparative study on this topic between Bloch and Heidegger would be interesting.73 In any case, Bloch’s materialism is an attempt to put the question of being on a new basis, precisely one upon which being can be thought as *what is new*. Thus the forgetfulness of metaphysics equates to a forgetfulness of, and thus a hermetic isolation from, the real openness of being as such. Recall at this point that for Bloch possibility (not actuality) constitutes the larger part of what is. In holding this position he ostensibly throws out of speculation the sustaining hypostatisation of most if not of all classical metaphysics, namely: a present completeness of (the) being (of beings), upon which classical metaphysics is firmly established. Bloch’s critique of *this* illusion of metaphysics, the illusion of an already fulfilled being as there in constant reserve, as it were, is, on my reading, certainly influenced by Bloch’s allegiance to Marxism, even if in no wise can Bloch be

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73 Fredric Jameson notes that while somewhat reminiscent of Heidegger’s question of being (“Why is there something rather than nothing”), Bloch’s approach rejects Heidegger’s formulation:

[F]or [Bloch] being is precisely incomplete, in process, not yet altogether there: what astounds is therefore not so much being itself, but rather the latency of being-to-come at work, the signs and foreshadowings of future being. (1974, p. 123)
said to have shown a simplified form of fidelity to the Marxism of his time. Bloch’s rootedness in the radical philosophy of Marx is of significance, however, because as a tradition of thought Marxism generally rejects metaphysics as mere ideology and thus as a perpetuation of false consciousness. So much so that the very idea of a *Marxian metaphysics* induces somewhat of a paroxysm for thought. The truth is that Bloch’s thought incorporates metaphysics and ideology critique to such an extent that they become almost synonymous, but this of course has repercussions for his conception of being. To take a closer look at this problematic one can turn to Siebers’ work, which articulates these two motives in Bloch’s materialism to the effect that they are rendered compatible, but only in a form of *tensioning*. As Siebers writes:

> Two contrasting motives are at work in [...] Bloch. One is the intention to dispel illusions and ideologies that chain and oppress humanity—[...], the other is the intention to show the anticipatory, transcending dimension in consciousness and reality, which gives depth, meaning and direction but which is not open to the clear, rational analysis that is at our disposal in the critique of ideology. For Bloch, these two motivations require and reinforce each other and form two aspects of the same thing: philosophical truth. (2012g, p. 27)

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74 Schmidt is the one to have described Bloch as the last metaphysician of Marxism (1978, p. 62), and with some grounds for doing so. Schmidt’s curious claim, however, strikes one as paradoxical when read in the context of Marxism’s general critique of metaphysics, as provided by Engels’ (1934, p. 45; see also Adorno, 2004, p. 361) juxtaposition of ‘the old Procrustean bed of metaphysics’ against ‘dialectical thought’ (metaphysics here is viewed as static thinking). Bloch’s friend Lukács, however, spoke of his surprise and admiration when learning of Bloch’s ability to speak the ‘mother tongue’ of the ‘old philosophers.’ (TL, p. 374; see Gluck, 1985, p. 160) ‘Lukács would emphasise the human’, ‘while my business’ Bloch says, ‘was the edifice, the landscape, the system of nature, in another sense the renaissance of Aristotle, Thomas and Hegel.’ (TL, p. 373) For a discussion of this new ontological path in Marxist thought, see Preve (1988).
This appeal to the compatibility-in-tension of materialist ideology-critique and metaphysical speculation (this transcending dimension in consciousness and reality which, importantly, does not rely on mere inference) produces a novel perspective on the question of being. For it opens human beings up not only to their own ontological incompleteness, but also to the metaphysical incompleteness of the commonness of being they necessarily share with all else that is in existence and which, via ideology, is glossed over with veils of posited actuality (ibid., p. 39). It is this incompleteness or general lack of being that lends a pervading impetus to overcome any and all pretensions of completion—all contrived offerings of arrival—as well as that which, simultaneously, provides the space to enter into what is new. This is the transcending moment of Bloch’s metaphysics, and it is not by chance that Siebers describes metaphysical speculation as consisting of a transcending movement—Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308) had deemed metaphysics ‘the transcending science, because it is concerned with the transcendental.’ (1987, p. 2)75

[1] Bloch’s contention is as follows: to presuppose the being of beings as already established upon an ‘all too prematurely fulfilled objectivism’ (SU, p. 65), inevitably sets metaphysical knowledge on a path of return to what has been; for if the being of beings already is then what is most fundamental to beings—namely their underlying beingness—cannot be otherwise, and

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75 In the Introduction I outlined how Kant sought to limit any pretensions to access the transcendental, turning philosophical thought over in so doing into a transcendentalism. But if the coincidence of speculation and critique is possible in a fruitful way, then the possibility of a metaphysics which in its very disposition critiques the transcendental of being (and thus being itself) without, however, disregarding the importance of the transcendental as such, is opened up. The transcendental of being remain the ultimate intention of critique, and thus themselves turn over into anticipatory structures.
thus such beings are as they always will be. It is no coincidence, then, that Bloch consistently criticises Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis, which holds that truth is located in the past and that what is required to come to truth is a re-membering. But this metaphysical tradition sanctions an erasure of possibility and thus an expunction of process and futurity from any understanding of the being of beings. Thus metaphysics has been grounded upon a radical forgetfulness of the utopian horizon of being, a ‘discarded cornerstone within [...] metaphysical perspective.’ (SU, p. 193) It has consisted of a fundamental orientation to the past and as such its knowledge is thoroughly epistrophic (epistrophe) insofar as it constitutes a “(re)turning” or “reversal.” Unable to fathom any real notion of ontological futurity, metaphysical speculation does away with real ontological process (Bloch’s “tendency”) and genuine ontological arrival and novelty (Bloch’s “Ultimum” and “Novum”). ‘Beingness’, as Bloch summarises this metaphysical dispensation, ‘simply coincides with Been-ness’ (PHE, p. 8). Against this backdrop it can be said that Bloch’s metaphysical materialism is based on an utter reversal of this logic of been-ness:

The Not-Yet-Become, although it fulfils the meaning of all men and the horizon of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a concept.

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76 As Jay (1984, p. 183) notes: ‘Rather than basing his ontology and epistemology on a variant of Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis, or recollection, Bloch chose the religious concept of eschatology instead.’

77 A prime example of this backward logic is Aristotle’s definition of essence: essence, the essence of being as the what-ness of beings (their beingness), is “what-it-was-to-be-that-thing” (see Lawson-Tancred, 2004, p. lvii). In other words, the what-ness of being (what is being? what is it to be?) is given a regressive inflection as what it was to be.
This blossoming field of questions lies almost *speechless* in previous philosophy. (*PHE*, p. 6; my emphasis)\(^{78}\)

The Not-Yet-Become is not some one thing among others, but the *being* of beings. Does this mean that beings in truth are not or rather that an indeterminacy is found at the heart of the real itself (the non-identity of the real itself)? Bloch’s ‘We do not even really know what absolutely just “is” or even who we “are”’ (*SU*, p. 199) is, contra Kant then, a radical not-having insofar as it is a really not-having being. ‘[T]rue being, as *ontós on,*’ of which the metaphysicians of old spoke and upon which they heavily relied, ‘is not yet.’ (*TE*, p. 223)\(^{79}\)

It is important to state at this stage that the “not-yet” of Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being signifies an expectation, or better, an anticipation. Thus, Bloch does not completely rid his ontology of the fulfilledness of being that was the premature basis of all hitherto metaphysical speculation. Indeed, in a passage I will make use of to verify my analogic reading of Bloch’s materialism, he writes:

*World-history is itself an experiment*, a real tendency in the world toward a possible Justice. Such history therefore understands itself as an operative probing, as real-probing to a still *outstanding* exemplum. To an omega of exemplum, just as it was intended every time in the philosophical anticipations

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78 Bloch’s talk here of such dynamics as “breaking through as a word” and such states as “lying speechless” is not coincidental. As I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter III, if, as Holz (1978, p. 112) claims, philosophy is the discovery of the Un-thought [*Ungedachten*] and the Un-said [*Ungesagten*], then Bloch’s philosophy produces a strange reflexivity here. For it thinks and speaks something new, namely, that the *new is integral to the being of beings.*

79 Not-yet-being is the ontological real problem of the world itself, and is ‘consequently a real problem of the highest objective manner.’ (*TE*, p. 226).
of true being (*ontós on*, substance, complete identity of appearance and essence). (*TE*, p. 117)


What this passage makes evident is that Bloch’s strategy is other than an outright rejection of metaphysics, even if he himself recognises the category of not-yet being is nothing short of an ‘indecent’ gesture to tradition (*TE*, p. 222). Instead, Bloch takes ontology’s intention very seriously, but only as an intention of the real itself; indeed Bloch doubts the overriding sincerity of ontology as it stands, if, that is, ontology is simply that science which deals with the fullness of being as already upon its thinker. As a new thinker of the question of being responding to a new conjuncture, however, Bloch retrieves the tradition (amidst its abjuration) and teaches it the identification of its object of inquiry (the being of beings) *with utopia*, i.e. with what is not-yet in being but which is nonetheless what is always really *intended*. Thus, while an ontological incompleteness of matter is at the very heart of Bloch’s materialist metaphysics, ontological *fulfilment* does not assume a total redundancy, for the fullness of being retains its esteem as an ultimate ontological desire (otherwise known as the *Ultimum*). Thus Bloch’s truly ‘is a philosophy of desire’ (Siebers, 2013a, p. 65), and the metaphysical structuration of this desire is one of ‘activity and hope’ (*M*, p. 545), for it
reconceives the already achieved and fulfilled being of classical metaphysics as not-yet there but as a real intention in the real itself (see Christen, 1979, pp. 145-7). 'So the Archē is not itself archaic, to the contrary', Bloch writes (TE, p. 215)

§1.2. NOT-YET BEING

What then? I am. But I do not yet have myself. (EM, p. 11)

[Wie also? Ich bin. Aber ich habe mich noch nicht.]

There are a number of further observations that can be made on the basis of Bloch’s significant alteration of ontological thought. It is important to spend some more time on this because all of the matter-categories discussed in Chapter I find their common touching point in Bloch’s overarching category of ‘not-yet being’ (TE, p. 212), the latter constituting the red thread tying together the complex assemblage of questions that Bloch’s philosophy concerns itself with (Siebers, 2012b, pp. 403 & 406), and thus is that category which supports the step of the present chapter, which takes as key a metaphysical reading of Bloch’s materialism. It is also important to clarify this category if not because it has no philosophical forerunner prior to Bloch and announces an irreversible departure from classical metaphysics (ibid., p. 404). Thus it is worthy of thought in its own right.

It is good to begin by posing the question of whether Bloch’s ontology of ‘not-yet being’ (TE, p. 212) permits a treatment as ontology, in the Greek
sense of ontōs on or “full being.” For in posing this question of whether there can be a science of what is not-yet one is led to inquire into what an ontology of not-yet being even means. One can certainly imagine that the whole ontological pursuit is being revised here. As Gilson writes: ‘The slightest alteration in [the comprehension of abstract ideas] never fails to bring about a corresponding alteration in the whole series of their consequences.’ (2014, p. 6) What sort consequences, then, follow from Bloch’s pen for ontology?

[1] One can begin to respond to this question by noting that, to Aristotle’s mind, the essence of a thing is “what-it-was-to-be-that-thing.” Here the definition of thing (which always allies to ontology) proceeds according to a backward logic, the very same trajectory of thought that occupies the more recent articulation of being by Puntel’s (2011, p. 91) structural-systematic approach, which, in aiming for maximal or ‘ultimate intelligibility’ of being is committed to the same presupposition as Aristotle, namely: that being as such as a fullness of being already exists. In the case of the what-ness of being, Bloch’s thesis that essence is not yet clearly then inserts a fundamental undecidedness into the definition (and thus the intelligibility) of what a thing is. For now one cannot rely on the what-has-gone-before-of-a-thing to define that thing. Bloch’s dramatic move is of course to extend this undecidedness into the very ontological constitution of beings, such that what a particular thing actually is is thus indeterminate (note that this indeterminacy is not simply on the side of subjectivity, but constitutes a really

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80 Here Bloch ‘envision a specific ontology without being, before being itself can be found’ (Boldyrev, 2014, p. 10). ‘Bloch’s arguments depend absolutely on a […] logic whose potential is as yet unrealised in any presently-existing system of thought’, as Norris (1989, p. 313) writes.
real indeterminateness of the thing itself). The kind of consequences that follow from this radical refunctioning can be found in a very rich passage:

Things become intelligible only when thought of as moving, when determined as passage, not as solid facts. Determination is ambiguous. It can include determination from something and determination to something. The copula in judgement intends both, but as determination from something (definitio) it is only formal and not yet material. It describes the thoughts, the concept of the matter with its attributes and its circumference, but not yet the object itself with its properties and its essence. Determination to something (destinatio) moves with the passage of matter, conforming to its objective directedness. Hence, in accordance with material directedness a concrete definition is each time also destinatory. (LM, pp. 361-2)


To refer back to my discussion of Bloch's utopian form of teleology, it can be said in light of this passage above that, like musical improvisation, process-matter is a concrete definition of itself; that is, it is destinatory. Indeed, if there were doubt, Bloch perceives this undecidedness as not merely

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imbuing any given individual thing, but rather more so as being the (hitherto discarded) cornerstone of being as such: ‘There are utopian borders not only for respective individual beings, but also for the whole of present being and of essence’, he writes (TE, p. 102). Bloch’s utopian ontology, a ‘forward directed [nach vorn], incomplete metaphysics’ (M, p. 448) thus equates to a destinatory concept of the being of beings. And it is this determination of Bloch’s materialism that first opens the door to conceiving of it as an eschatological form of analogia entis.

[2] Bloch’s ontological position can be made more concrete, however, by turning to his speculations on anthropology. Whilst Bloch’s anthropological speculations remain incomprehensible without the underpinning conception of being sketched above, nonetheless, they allow for a concrete perspective out onto the ontology of not-yet being, and for that reason I briefly turn to them. With this in mind, Bloch writes of human culture:

The present multiverse of human cultures is itself an expression that the Humanum still stands in the process of becoming conscious of its freedom and selfhood, that the Humanum is therefore not yet found but has doubtlessly been searched for and experimented with everywhere (TE, p. 129).

[Das geschehende und vorliegende Multiversum der Kulturen ist ja selber ein Ausdruck dafür, daß das Humanum noch im Prozeß des Bewußtseins seiner Freiheit und Selbstheit steht, also noch nicht gefunden, wohl aber überall gesucht und experimentiert worden ist]

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81 Bloch also expresses this idea with a simple yet rich and heretical propositional form: ‘S is not yet P’ (SO, p. 37). As Bloch writes, the ‘Subject […] has not yet attained its adequate contents-predicate, is not yet fully testified [ausgesagt], objectivised,’ not yet ‘manifest.’ (ibid.) At play here is kind of real predicative searching, a predicative-process, of which, significantly, Bloch’s philosophy itself cannot be exempted from (see Zimmermann, 2001, pp. 91-2).
Bloch’s point here is that all past and present human culture (languages, customs, etc.) stand together as experimental attempts (predicates, as it were) at defining the ultimate what-ness of the human being, which ultimate what-ness itself remains undetermined. This ultimate Humanum, as Bloch terms it, remains in the process of its own becoming (recall Bloch’s open teleology), and is improvisation, is open, to paraphrase Betz, ‘to the metaphysical possibility of failure.’ (2014, p. 109) There is a concept of individuation at play here, in which the variety of contemporary and non-contemporary human culture represents a band of thus far inadequate experimental expressions of what is ultimately searched for, namely: the not-yet Humanum for which cultures are born and for which they strive. That which individuates in Bloch’s system of thought is thus a “not-yet”: multisversum = a “turning into many” from the not. In this context Thompson (2012, p. 131) makes the important point that the traditional anthropological question of “What is the human being?” turns out to be posed incorrectly in the light of Bloch’s philosophy, for really the question ought to be “What is the human being becoming?” This shift translates over precisely into ontology: all beings individuate from that which is not-yet as their ultimate end goal. This process of searching at the level of human culture is just itself (albeit with its own uniqueness to be sure) a mode of the broader process of being itself: ‘The basic form of the proposition “S is not yet P” expresses both the process of knowledge as well as the process of being’, as Siebers writes (2013a, p. 64). Bloch thus both distinguishes and in turn relates the destinatory searching of being and of human culture:
This inceptive Not and what it searches for grows exacting in us humans, like nowhere else. We are transcending ourselves but so too is everything in our compass. \( (EM, \text{p. 172}) \)

\[\text{Diese anfangende Nicht und was es sucht, kommt in uns Menschen hoch, wie nirgends sonst. Wir sind uns selber übersteigend, aber auch alles in unserem Umkreis.}]\]

The “Not” and what it searches for does not begin with human beings, but, that said, the ‘tempo of a becoming-other’ (ibid.) grows to such an intense degree with the coming of human beings that they may be considered that mode of not-yet being that stands on the Front of this searching process: the human, ‘surely a leap \([\text{Sprung}]\) like no other’ (ibid., p. 173). And so the process of matter cannot be reduced to the process of human searching for essence, for the latter searching is an expression of the process of matter:

History is […] a polyrhythmic construction, and not only the social production of a still obscure social human being, it is also the artistic, religious, metaphysical production of the \text{transcendental mystery} of human beings, a \text{new} depth-relation to being. \( (PA, \text{p. 618}; \text{my emphasis})^{82} \)

\(^{82}\text{Emmanuel Levinas (2000, p. 98) thus, to my mind, incorrectly interprets Bloch as enacting an absolute ethical structuration of ontology. For Levinas, Bloch’s ontological speculations harbour ‘meaning only as subordinated to man’s liberation’, inasmuch as only a ‘concern for the human dimension’ ‘commands all intelligibility’ (ibid.). In sum, Bloch is interpreted here as employing ‘the language of being and ontology only for purposes of the liberation of human suffering (ibid., p. 103)—the emphasis here comes down solely on the dimension of ideology critique which certainly is present in Bloch’s thought, as I have shown. The Levinasian thesis that the ontology of not-yet being consists of a complete reduction of being to the ethical order is, I think, much too one-sided, and in fact commits the error of mistaking a product (or a mode) of process for the process itself. What is missing here is the clear question-answer dialectic that Bloch claims obtains between the human being and nature, between subject-object, between existence and essence. While it is somewhat true, as Kolakowski (2005, p. 1144) writes, that Bloch ‘sought to erect a metaphysical foundation for practical life in the world and not merely for contemplation’, the question that imposes itself and which complicates Levinas’ thesis is: what philosophical substance would this practical-ethical orientation have were Bloch to at root disbelieve its true metaphysical underpinning? Bloch is not a relativist, but a speculative philosopher concerned, to paraphrase Coates (2002, p. 4) once more, with ‘the inescapable metaphysical foundation of human reality’. If Bloch’s ontology has a radical ethical impetus, which certainly it does, the ethical conception at play in it cannot be confined to the human} \[\]
Die Geschichte ist [...] ein polyrhymisches Gebilde, und nicht nur die soziale Gewinnung des noch verdeckten gesellschaftlichen Menschen, sondern auch die künstlerische, religiöse, metaphysische Gewinnung des geheimen transzendentalen Menschen ist ein Denken des Seins, einer neuen Tiefenbeziehung des Seins.

[4] Let me turn more focus towards the “not” of “not-yet being.” The terminus a quo of Bloch’s philosophy (its initial impulse) is a not-having oneself. It is Bloch’s distinctive point of departure, and most if not all of the opening lines of his texts play to the motif of what can be called this, his utopian-centric starting point. Indeed Bloch often times is found articulating an interiority that does not know itself, is placed too near to itself to see or speak itself, such that a no-place occupies it:

I am by myself.

That I move, that I speak: is not there. (SU, p. 7)

The short opening paragraph to the first section of The Spirit of Utopia (titled “The Self-Encounter”) is the foremost intuition of Bloch’s philosophy. An incognito lies at the very heart of the subject but it wants to become cogito to itself: ‘I want to occupy myself’ (ibid.). The telic moment of this not-having is sphere alone. ‘This open ontology’, Bloch says, calls for [fordert]—that is, leads to—an open anthropology just as much as it ‘calls for an open cosmology’ (TE, p. 299; my emphasis). Bloch thus produces an ‘ethico-cosmic perspective’ (LM, p. 364) in that neither does he humanise the cosmos (he does not stand for an ethicisation of nature) nor does he mechanistically set the cosmos over against the affairs of human life.

83 Christen (1979, p. 12) notes that the relation of being to having is crucial to understanding Bloch’s metaphysical materialism and that it is derived from the mystic’s experience ‘of the disunity of being.’ This mystical experience is metaphysically charged, alienating, and is found expressed by Bloch aphoristically whereby while the I to some extent is, it does not have itself. An alienation pervades Bloch’s speculation.
again visible here: ‘We almost begin with nothing. That drives us to want to feel *more.*’ (*M*, p. 21; my emphasis) ‘Only as searching, intending, do we *begin to be.*’ (ibid., p. 24; my emphasis) The beginning of any being for Bloch thus seems to be a searching, precisely a searching to overcome what is fundamentally missing. But once more this incognito or lack of being is not confined merely to the human being, but derives, to Bloch’s way of thinking, from the incognito of reality itself: ‘the Not-Yet-Conscious *in man* belongs *completely* to the Not-Yet-Become […] in the world.’ (*PHE*, p. 13; my emphasis) It can therefore be said that incognito is the first impression of being itself.\(^{84}\) What befalls our nearest nearness befalls the whole of being as such; or better, what befalls being befalls our nearest nearness:

The self’s intuition of itself […] is only a problem at all because until the hour of the process, the “world-process,” the rotational and objectivational process *kat exochen*, no placing-oneself-before-oneself, no revolving-oneself-beyond oneself, encountering-oneself, no more total reflecting of any lived moment had succeeded; no concentration of mere partial consciousness into being-identical-to-oneself, achieved being as such. (*SU*, p. 200)

The inability to see oneself devoid of any contrived mirroring has its substrate in an incomplete process. One could thus say that being cannot

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\(^{84}\) Would this not mean that Bloch’s materialism assumes the character of an idealism—if, that is, idealism is that thought-mode which posits the identity of thought and being: ‘An idealistic equating of thought with being’, as Bloch defines idealism (*LM*, p. 95); or, following Przywara’s (2014, p. 471) definition, idealism being a style of philosophy which lacks the resistancy of the real because ‘human beings and the world are brought into accord with one another, indeed into a coherence of each in the other’? Bloch’s idealism could then be said to lie in his conjoining being and thought in an incognito: thought and being interpenetrate precisely on the site of this not-knowing, not-seeing oneself, not-speaking oneself. Is this not, then, a Parmenidean “thinking is the same as what is thought” at the heart of Blochianism? But this potential charge is complicated when one takes account of the fact that the being-thought univocity seemingly posited by Bloch here lies precisely *in an incognito* (in non-identity). While the idea of incognito does not necessarily lead to the idea of non-identity, Bloch overcomes this logical problem by asserting a *really real* incognito: an ontologically inflected incognito.
cut loose from itself to see itself, and this condition generates process and novelty, for there is a desire to do precisely this: to see and speak and have oneself in that way.

[5] A fundamental question ought to arise at this point. Namely: if being is not-yet then how can “it” even be spoken of? But not-yet being is not the same as nothing: ‘Utopia is not nothing’ (TL, p. 335). It is just as misguided to maintain that Bloch’s philosophy is based on an unqualified sense of “not,” that is, on absolute nothingness, as it is to claim his ontology is a simple ethicisation. There is an unequivocalness on this issue, and, pertinently, in the context of language: ‘But one cannot speak of nothing, of beings that are not [Über Nichts, über Nichtseielendes kann man doch nicht reden].’ (Bloch, 1985d, p. 160) A strict dissociation is clear enough:

Nothingness is not identical with the Not. The Not exists in the darkness of the lived moment: that something "is not" means something is not yet there, not yet brought out, not yet materialised. The Nothing, however, is the frustration of all emergence; the condition in which all human activity, everything which happens in the world, is frustrated, comes to a standstill, like that of entropy in astronomy (Bloch, quoted in Thompson, 2013b, p. 87).

On the basis of the above important distinction between “not” and “nothing,” the category not-yet appears to echo the notion of “relative nonbeing,” a notion closely associated with Thomism. Its meaning: nonbeing in a qualified sense (for the Thomists, nonbeing is relative to an effect’s degree of

85 This form of negative proposition, a litotes ("nicht nichts," "not nothing") Przywara terms a “negative reductive formality,” and is, he says, the basic expression of the principle of non-contradiction, a principle which ought not to be equated with identity. To know of a contradiction one has to have some idea of that which is not contradictory, even if this contradictory-free thing or position be ghostlike in its existence.
remoteness from divine perfection; this remoteness for Thomism is the principle of the plurality of beings and thus in a sense represents an ontologically productive principle [Wippel, 2000, pp. 72-3, & 181-3]). The claim that with not-yet and relative non-being one encounters the same idea gains traction by way of Bloch’s suggestion that not-ness is itself a determinate form of having: the having of a remoteness from completion, or better, the having of an incompleteness. Bloch articulates this point dialectically, such that the relation between having and not-having is porous:

Had the searcher totally nothing, then he would not be able to search. That, what is missing, the Not-had, is in him equally present as the Had, otherwise he would not be capable of being sublated into Not-having. (TL, p. 406)

[Hätte der Suchende gar nichts, dann könnte er nicht danach suchen. Das, was fehlt, das Nichtgehabte, ist in ihm zugleich anwesend als Gehabtes, sonst könnte es gar nicht als Nicht-Haben aufgehoben werden.]

In the following section I focus on this relation in more detail.

§ 1.3. THAT-WHAT

appearance—essence […] clearly shows a utopian pole. (PHE, p. 15)

The dynamic relation between not-having and having Bloch also construes as the relation between That and What, traditionally philosophically conceptualised as the relation between existence and essence. In fact, the relation between That and What is utopian ontology’s

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86 Bloch’s ontology is therefore in a sense traditional or open to comparison with tradition. As Lakebrink (1955, p. 29) writes, 'Essence and existence are, according to the teaching of old metaphysics, constitutive parts by which being [das Seiende] is articulated [gliedert]'; or, in Przywara's...
most fundamental category. As such, this relation ought to have a strong bearing on any Blochian philosophy of language. Recall that for Avanessian’s (2016, p. 199; my emphasis) speculative-materialist approach, language is said to ‘always already’ contain ‘an ontological thesis’: ‘the world that language mediates is made up of relations, not of objects.’ But in light of the passage to follow it seems that, for Bloch, what language mediates and what is mediated in language is ultimately a world made of a relation (singular). Bloch writes:

But that between That [existence] and What [essence] there can obtain a relation at all: this relation itself is the most fundamental category and all other categories merely perform it, all others are only the continued opening that out of the That emanate Something-multiplicity through a road network. (EM, p. 71; my emphasis)

[Daß aber zwischen Daß und Was überhaupt bezogen werden kann: diese Beziehung ist selber die Grundkategorie, und alle anderen führen sie nur aus, alle anderen sind nur die fortgeführte Lichtung der aus dem Daß entspringenden Etwas-Vielheit durch ein Wegnetz.]

[1] Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being, and so the very problem of utopia, relies for its articulation on the composition of essence and existence and, importantly, on how it exactly conceives of this composition. In my view, Bloch’s ontology hinges on a real distinction between existence and essence and the dynamic, generative tension that is born of this real distinction (in my reading in Chapter III, anacoluthon is a linguistic expression of this distinction in tension). As Bloch writes:

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(2014, p. 475) terms, which expand the relation’s significance, ‘the distinction between “essentia” and “existentia” […] stands at the centre of ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy.’
The Hunger of the That drives ever after a clearer and more distinct revelation of itself, but in this innermost being of immanence clarity and before all else distinctness still find no coverage and fulfilment. Herein lies the process-tension from the quodditas [i.e. existence] to the quidditas [i.e. essence] (EM, p. 240).

Now, if the purest expression of Bloch’s utopian ontology, as I think he claims, is just this real distinction between existence (That) and essence (What), and indeed if it is crucial to Bloch’s very conception of the real that the concomitant dynamic tension between existence and essence, that is, this ontological relation as dis-relation, marks what is most fundamental to matter, then it is precisely on the point of this relation as dis-relation that utopian ontology bears an affinity with analogic metaphysics. I say this because a real distinction between existence and essence is equally vital for analogia entis (at least for the Thomist kind [see Maritain, 1987, p. 67 and also §2.1 of the present chapter]). A first step is thus furnished toward a discussion of analogy and utopia, and perhaps even analogy as utopia.

The point to focus on for now, however, is that Bloch does not abandon this traditional composition, but his formulation certainly differs so sharply from all previous formulations that one can really speak here of a radical innovation, as does Siebers (2012e, pp. 165-6). What offsets Bloch from tradition is, I contend, the productiveness or creativity he posits of the That-
What relation; that is, of That’s searching for its What-ness. And it is on this difference, I claim, that Bloch’s analogic metaphysics is radically innovative, and, moreover, as I show in Chapter III, what differentiates Bloch’s construal of the figure of anacoluthon from such other thinkers as Adorno.

[2] To get a handle on this one has to be mindful that for Bloch the question of that there is a relation between that something is and what it is, is an inconstructable question; in other words, it is a question that cannot be formulated but nonetheless constitutes the central question (not merely for philosophy but ontologically, that is, for the world itself). From what has so far been said, it ought to be at least vaguely clear, I think, why this fundamental philosophical question is inconstructable. This is because what the question would seek to “construct” (the What of the That) is not yet. That said, in my view, it is the inconstructability of this question of that there is a relation between existence and essence that inculcates ontological productivity and ontological creativity. For Bloch, that there is a relation between existence and essence is incommunicable. Importantly, however, Bloch’s utopian ontology is based on the notion that incommunicability is communicable, but only precisely as incommunicability. The question of how to communicate an incommunicability is also at the heart of analogic metaphysics, which I will come to later on, particularly when I discuss the analogy of being as conceived by Erich Przywara.

To clarify this relation between incommunicability and communicability, one can turn to an intriguing passage in which Bloch writes the following: ‘The incommunicability [Das Verschlossene] of That-ness is as it were the original generation [Urzeugung] of false consciousness’ (LM, p. 220). I think this
passage can be read in two ways. First, it might suggest the idea that if and when incommunicability goes uncommunicated what transpires is a condition of the inertness and frozenness that Bloch claims characterises the mechanistic conception of matter; that is, what arises is a sort of false consciousness whereby the product is mistaken for the process. If and when incommunicability is not communicated (when the inconstructible relation is not undergoing attempts at being constructed) one sees the dynamic between That and What solidify. This will have important implications for language, discussed in Chapter III. But the passage can also suggest that the incommunicability of the relation in question itself has a fundamentum in re; that is, an objective foundation in existence. In other words, incommunicability is ontologically productive or generative. Productive or generative of what? Precisely what-ness, however inadequate. Bloch writes: ‘In Indian philosophy one finds the prodigious sentence: Not-knowing is the ground for the appearance of this world [Das Nichtwissen ist der Grund für die Erscheinung dieser Welt].’ While Bloch notes that the original intention of this thought is ‘flight from the world [Weltflucht]’, it is, he says, nonetheless ‘the formula for inadequate appearance (concreteness) and its ground.’ (LM, p. 220) In other words, incommunicability, inconstructibility, incognito, incompleteness, a not-having, all cognates: this, according to Bloch, is the source of communications, of appearances, of phenomenality. The non-identity of the That-ness of existence is thus the productive source of ontological expression, or creation. So the process of existence—existence qua process—is a productive expressionism of ontological inadequateness:

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87 It is little wonder why Bloch style of written expression is so vital to his philosophy. Bloch’s philosophy itself can be interpreted as a performance of the essence-existence relation, and as such has a fundamentum in re; that is, an objective foundation in existence. Bloch’s philosophy is a performance of the “that there is a relation at all.”
‘All being is still constructed around the Not, which suffers of hunger’ (SO, p. 511); ‘all being is still built around the Not, which admittedly it cannot bear’ (ibid., p. 514); ‘the centre in itself is still night, incognito, ferment, around which everyone, everything, and every work is still built.’ (SU, p. 173)

“Not having” is Bloch’s categorisation of existence, or what he calls elsewhere as a cognate, the ‘That [Daβ]’ (LM, p. 255). That-ness stands as a categorial determination of what is a pre-categorial state of being (LM, p. 256). This is because existence is poverty and hollowness of being (of what-ness, essence), existence is non-possession and non-determination of being, and thus it is incommunicable: the ‘completely empty Daβ’ (LM, p. 255). But this poverty of not-having oneself instils dynamism (communicability) into Bloch’s concept of matter; it is what makes of existence an open questioning and searching (existence is an exitus, indeed an exodus):

the That is intending, tensioning, driving, addiction; gives itself as intensive, namely as drive, hunger, need, longing, but also as a question which not only intends what it asks for, but also in the end intends itself. (LM, p. 256; my emphasis)

[So ist das Daβ meinend, spannend, stachelnd, treibend, Sucht; so gibt es sich als intensive, nämlich als Trieb, Hunger, Bedürfnis, Sehnsucht, auch als Frage, die nicht nur das meint, wonach sie fragt, sondern letztthin sich selber meint.] 

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88 Reinicke (1974, p. iv) and Siebers (2012e, p. 165) consider Bloch’s position as notably following an Eckhartian, Böhmean, and Schellingian tradition of metaphysical speculation, which construes the ontological ground of beings as a dynamic non-ground, a ground devoid of its own grounding, an “Ungrund.”
[3] Bloch thinks the essence of existence as a *Novum*: ‘the What itself—in the still pending expression of its contents—is ultimately the Novum.’ (*LM*, p. 256) The That’s What will be a *Novum*: ‘the essence of the world lies on the Front.’ (*TE*, p. 275) Thus, if the That ultimately intends a having of itself, this having would amount to something new. In a reading of the utopian dimension in German Idealism, Chepurin (2015, p. 339) describes a similar thought when he speaks of the ‘the revolutionary production of newness from the in-itself.’ The That produces from within itself its What, which would be a *Novum*. Indeed, in Chapter III I argue that anacoluthic language expresses the incompleteness of matter’s process—process-matter’s unfinishedness.

Bloch’s conception of the composition of existence and essence relies on an apophatic element. Essence is known and ontologically occurs by way of what that essence is *not*—*ex negatива*, by negation. As Siebers notes, Bloch’s conception of essence here is plainly rooted in the tradition of negative theology (Siebers names Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite in this regard), that is, a doctrine for which ‘God cannot be described directly, but only indirectly’ (2012b, p. 405). The suggestion here being that the ontology of not-yet being proceeds or is structured along similar lines as the apophatic description of God.\(^89\) This brings my discussion to analogy. Indeed, I think it is possible to subsume, or better to illuminate Bloch’s matter-categories through recourse to analogic metaphysics.

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\(^89\) While intimating the close relation of this facet of Bloch’s ontology to analogy Siebers does not however explicitly state the case. The apophasis of divine naming is invariably built from theo-logically inclined analogic speculations.
§2. THE ANALOGY OF BEING

Reading Bloch’s ontology as analogic metaphysics faces significant difficulty from the outset. Notwithstanding analogy’s polysemy,\(^9^0\) the difficulty in question lies in not one of analogy’s historico-theoretical variations (as I outline these variations below) compliments Bloch’s ontology or adheres to the latter’s basic tenets. The saving grace here will be drawn from analogy’s history itself: it is the openness of *analogia* which allows for the innovative experimentations that one finds clearly marking its philosophical-historical movement.\(^9^1\) As Whistler has drawn attention to, the experimental permeates analogic metaphysics: ‘Each theory of analogy is singular.’ (2013b, p. 241) So much is this the case that it would be erroneous to explain how Bloch’s analogic ontology could depart from “traditional” analogic metaphysics. That said, Bloch’s metaphysics is singular, and to get a sense of what is singular in Bloch’s innovation in analogic metaphysics requires that I turn to consider versions of analogy’s appearance prior to Bloch’s own. It is sufficient to restrict my survey to three cornerstones:\(^9^2\)

1) Aristotle, commonly viewed as the progenitor of analogy as a metaphysical concept, inherited from ancient mathematical thought-forms;

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\(^9^0\) “Analogy” has undergone transformations as it passed through the history of philosophy and is indeed a concept that cannot even be confined to philosophy. Both White (2010, p. 6) and Hochschild (2010, p. xvii) have drawn attention to this variation in the interpretation of *analogia*, as has Pannenberg (2007, p. 5), who describes analogy as ‘an old conflictual question’.

\(^9^1\) Such openness is demonstrated by analogy’s transcendence of disciplinary boundaries. Areas as diverse as semantics and linguistics (Anttila & Brewer, 1977), music, architecture, astronomy, and the physical sciences all draw on the concept of analogy to one degree or another (Hochschild, 2010, p. 9; Blanchette, 2003, p. 117).

\(^9^2\) The intention here cannot be ‘to venture into the boundless territory of […] the *analogia entis*’, as Umberto Eco (2014, p. 160) has formulated the travails of researching this topic; analogy can lead toward a *Sisyphusarbeit*. Rather the aim is to lend sufficient background to the concept so the implications of Bloch’s refunctioning can be better discerned.
(2) Thomas Aquinas, who is said to place the concept of analogy into the curial worldview of a decidedly Catholic metaphysics (*philosophia christiana*);

(3) Erich Przywara, who reformulates Aquinas in light of and in opposition to the trajectory of modern philosophy, from Descartes to Hegel to Heidegger.

The Protestant theologian Karl Barth’s objection to analogy will also be briefly attended to.

§2.1. ARISTOTLE-AQUINAS-PRZYWARA

[1] Analogy’s inception is with Pythagorean mathematics. “*Analogia*” is key to Pythagoreanism’s metaphysical principle “all is number,” something Bloch does not draw attention to in a lecture he gave on Pythagoreanism (1985d, pp. 49-61). However, Bloch is well aware of Pythagoreanism’s passion for mathematics and of how their love for theorising musical harmony blends with mathematicity to produce an *ordered* metaphysical outlook which can be said to permeate any standard understanding of what analogic metaphysics entails (ibid., p. 52-54; see White, 2010, pp. 11-12; Lyttkens, 1952, pp. 15-6). Music is perceived by Pythagoras and his followers as expressive of the cosmically expansive and mathematically ordered reality in which the human being finds herself (see Horovitz, 1979, pp. 7-8).93 This interpenetration of music, speculative-systematic-ordered metaphysics, and analogy is significant precisely because it contradicts my

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93 As an aside, while Bloch writes elsewhere that ‘the mathematically oriented natural science of the modern era is born from Pythagoreanism’ he also suggests that this birth only arises from ‘out of half of Pythagoreanism.’ (1985d, pp. 59 & 61) Bloch then states that ‘the Pythagoreans are not yet simply at an end’ but might in fact yet harbour the possibility of a mathesis of quality, as opposed quantity (ibid., p. 61). My hunch is that a mathesis of quality might well entail a reappraisal of analogy along the lines I set-out below. As far I know, only Schneider (2016) has attempted to develop Bloch’s idea of a new mathesis.

[138]
thesis that Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being is a form of analogic metaphysics.\textsuperscript{94} If Bloch’s ontology is a new and experimental form of analogic metaphysics then analogy’s antique alliance with order/harmony will have to be incidental to analogy, for top-to-bottom order ill-fits the nature of process at the heart of Bloch’s materialism (see \textit{M}, pp. 27-8).\textsuperscript{95}

Pythagoreanism’s notion of \textit{analogia} designates a quantifiable proportion between four terms (A:B::C:D), otherwise known as an analogy of proportionality. An example of this would be: 6 is to 3 as 4 is to 2 (6:3::4:2). What one has here are two sets of terms between which there exists a quantified and thus calculable proportion of magnitudes. Importantly, if the values of A, B, and C are already given, the value of the final term is more or less inferable.\textsuperscript{96} In the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} Kant draws attention to precisely this tenet of the analogy of proportionality, except he terms it “constitutive analogy.” In so doing Kant relates analogy to teleology, for he had already distinguished constitutive from reflective modes of teleological causality. In the light of my discussion in Chapter I and indeed against the backdrop of the previous section of this chapter, clearly the case is that the constitutive form of analogy is incompatible with Bloch’s materialism: ‘There

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{94} The Pythagorean and the Blochian stances admit of the indelible interpenetration of music and the question of being. While Pythagoreanism’s formalist aesthetics rests on the idea of music’s supposed articulation of being’s enduring mathematical order and unity, concordance and univocity—the “singing harmony” of Pythagoras’s mathematical world’ (Przywara, 2014, p. 471). Blochian aesthetics rests on the idea that music is the utopian art-form \textit{par excellence}, in that great music is said to express best being’s not-yetness (\textit{TL}, pp. 183-4): ‘and so we want to allot to music primacy in what is otherwise unsayable’ (\textit{SU}, p. 163) (for a discussion of the differences between Pythagoreanism and Bloch on the issue of music, see Norris [1989, pp. 329-41]).

  \item \textsuperscript{95} Leibniz’s employment of analogy signals its enduring connection with metaphysical doctrines of inherent cosmic harmony and universal order. As Rescher (1991, p. 38) writes, Leibniz is ‘\textit{par excellence} the philosopher of cosmic harmony’.

  \item \textsuperscript{96} Euclid summarises this as: “Ratio is a mutual relation of two magnitudes of the same kind to one another in respect of quantity” (quoted White, 2010, p. 58).
\end{itemize}
is no number that may calculate the future’s circumference’, Bloch writes (PA, p. 131). The “final term” of process, the end-goal, cannot be inferred from any preceding series, for the Ultimum will be the Novum, and the Novum cannot be measured by what has gone before. To go back to Kant: it is of crucial significance for my reading of Bloch’s utopian ontology that Kant contrasts this form of constitutive analogy with a regulative form. Regulative analogy, says Kant, presents a very different analogical form in which the final term is missing, thus providing a “mark” which not only illuminates an a priori knowledge of a lack, but a space for experimentation within that lack: A:B::C:X. Contrasting the two forms of analogy, Kant writes that

In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulas which express the equality of two quantitative relations, and are always constitutive; so that if three terms of the proportion are given, the fourth is likewise given, that is, can be constructed. But in philosophy the analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relationships; and from three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge only of the relation to a fourth, not of the fourth member itself. The relation yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth member in experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected. An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception. It does not tell us how mere perception or empirical intuition in general itself comes about. It is not a principle constitutive of the objects, that is, of the appearances, but only regulative. (B222-B223)

I will not enter into detail on Kant’s rather complex views concerning analogy here; Kant is not a thinker who features in my narrative of analogia's
odyssey through philosophy. However, Callanan’s formulation of the intention behind Kant’s employment of analogy is useful in the sense that it highlights just how much the analogic problematic coincides with a sort of openness which only a decidedly apophatic element can gives rise to. In the context of the distinction Kant makes above, Callanan writes that

For Kant, [...] an analogy is a principle which functions to combine appearances in a specific manner, relating non-given appearances to given ones, and warranting an inference regarding the existence, if not the characteristic features, of that former non-given appearance. (2008, p. 764).

The regulative operation in Kant is, with Bloch’s ontology, inscribed into the real itself. It is the non-given appearance of true being as such that is the combining force of appearances and thus of phenomenality. In truth, it is precisely this process of movement into a really real openness that the combining force of the appearances of the different form of analogy under review. Indeed, this gesture is already found in the constitutive form of

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97 For focused work on analogy in Kant’s philosophy, see Whistler (2013b) and Callanan (2008).

98 One can see an analogy at play between, on the one hand, constitutive analogy and the fugue, and, on the other, regulative analogy and the sonata. ‘Mathematics’, Bloch claims,

is the model for every uniform system and hence also the model for the fugue, as being a uniform system in miniature. In every case, the inferences are seemingly contained in the initial principle. They can be elicited, predicted, calculated from it, in accordance with a totally rational idea of relationships [i.e., Kant’s notion of a constitutive analogy!] which shows the theme of the fugue to be purely contrapuntal in nature and oriented towards its complete contrapuntal expansion. The epoch of mathematical construction and the great rational systems was also the heyday of the fugue (1985a, p. 186).

In contrast,

whereas the fugue seemed at least to go on obeying its initial law, like “calculation”, Beethoven’s sonata themes are purely signs of a dynamic condition, seeds of a process which grows primarily out of antithesis. And he himself commands the main theme’s triumph in the reprise only as the supreme element within the qualifying process. Therefore mathematics has at any rate no relation to the sonata, that impulsive, dramatic, discontinuous excess of tension, that pure art of time and direction with its productive leaps in the development or travelling. (ibid.)
Pythagorean analogy, which was shook to its foundations by the decisive discovery of *incommensurable* magnitudes (White, 2010, pp. 12-13)—an early sign of the inconstructable X. It was exactly this discovery of an immeasurable surplus that allowed the concept of analogy to undergo an exploration in its *philosophical* valence (ibid, p. 14). Plato and Aristotle were the first to take up the mantle and explore this new territory: in Aristotle’s *metaphysical* refunctioning of analogy, analogy is ‘employed creatively […] in order to express ontological similitudes between diverse beings or states of being.’ (White, 2011a, p. 4) This metaphysical extrapolation is what enabled Aristotle to group together ‘as falling under a single concept, completely heterogeneous entities.’ (White, 2010, pp. 59-60) It allowed for that searching for a missing term.

At the heart of why Aristotle would want to do this is his desire to overcome the ‘pre-Socratic dialectic’ of being and becoming, bequeathed to philosophy by Parmenides and Heraclitus, whose diametrically opposed positions of “all is rest” and “all is flux” commonly present unsatisfactory explanations of reality’s essence (Betz, 2014, pp. 31-4). For if, on the one hand, all is rest, so then process is to be considered illusion, albeit that, to the contrary, it seems to be the case that process is indeed a proper feature of reality. To suppose, however, that all is flux is equally mistaken, for this position discounts the reality of stability. But to reject such a possibility amounts to rejecting the very grounds for being able even to recognise flux: for to register a coming to be and a passing away as having taken place requires a perduring something (X?) upon or through which one can recognise change at all. Insofar as each of these positions cannot be credible unto themselves,
so then their combined purchase enabled Aristotle to pursue a middle course. The result was analogic metaphysics (see Wippel, 2000, p. 77).99 Thinking matter’s becoming in relation to being, or to an arrival or outfall (being), is of course vital to Bloch’s whole philosophy (see Chapter I).

What then is for Aristotle this perduring something underpinning flux? Aristotle names it substance: the substratum of all coming to be and passing away. Already Aristotle’s difference with Bloch on this score becomes evident. Recall that for Bloch substance must be grasped as process. Nevertheless, contra the abovementioned constitutive form of analogy, otherwise known as the analogy of proportionality, this Aristotelian form of analogy, entwined with his substance metaphysics, has been coined the analogy of attribution (*analogia attributionis*). As Jüngel writes:

> If, in the analogy of proportionality, A relates to B as C to D, then in the analogy of attribution, B, C, and D all relate in varying ways to A, on the basis of which they are commonly named. (1983, p. 270)

This shift can be concretised by drawing on the famous example of “to be healthy” in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. While only truly spoken of with reference to an organism (e.g. only a man can be healthy in the first instance), one can speak nonetheless of food and the coloration of urine as “being healthy;” that is, as signs of health, but it is only the man that is or is not healthy, and so the being of the health as found in food and urine respectively can find meaning or sense only by relating back to the primary health of the organism. Food is not healthy in itself but for the one who eats it. The

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99 Significant for the possibility of a leftist (that is, materialist) form of analogy is Alain de Libera’s claim that the founding text of analogy is not Aristotle, in fact Avicenna’s *Metaphysics* (see Aertsen, 2012, p. 97).
meaning of health in the organism is thus, as Heidegger (1995, p. 33) writes, "that upon which the other meanings are hinged and secured and that through which the other meanings can be (understood and) said." Heidegger describes this analogy of attribution thus as a ‘mode of unity’ (ibid., p. 34) insofar as it enables the manifoldness of beings or states of being to have one common centre, one guiding and sustaining meaning or, better, one sustaining sens (direction/sense), since substance is ultimately unthinkable and unsayable without that which relies on it (again, the apophatic element of analogy rises to the fore). For Aristotle, then, the being of beings (or states of being) is known only by analogy (Rocca, 2004, pp. 80-4; Hütter, 2011, p. 220; Wippel, 2000, pp. 80-1).

[2] Analogy is a perennial concept of Western culture and its theological metamorphosis appears once Western thought shifts from pagan to Judeo-Christian socio-cultural sensibilities; from a rootedness in Athens to a rootedness in Jerusalem. The first theological articulation of analogy is with the Neoplatonist Proclus Diadochus and the Christian Platonist (pseudo-) Dionysius the Areopagite i.e., the corpus dionysiacum (see Mondin, 1963, p. 3; Schäfer, 2006, pp. 8-9; Aertsen, 2012, pp. 101-107). Shifting from a rootedness in Aristotelian substance these new analogical formulations conceive a divine being as the primum analogatum, and insofar that they do what now becomes central is the immanent (or creation) and the transcendent (God as Creator) (Lyttkens, 1952, pp. 61-2). But retained in this theological shift is the notion of a continuity of the likeness of cause to

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100 It is more accurate to describe analogy as a perennial concept of human culture per se. See Zilberman's Analogy in Indian and Western Philosophical Thought (2006): 'the entire canon of philosophical literature is based almost exclusively on analogies, examples, “paradigms” and incomplete induction (which resembles analogies very much).’ (ibid. p. 45)
effect (ibid., p. 79). This Neoplatonic tendency is formative for later developments in medieval Christian theology (Lyttkens, 1952, p. 188), notably Thomas Aquinas.\(^{101}\)

Thomas is a thinker of particular interest because under his aegis analogy undergoes the colouration of ‘an emphatically “Christian” concept’ (Przywara, 2014, p. 260; Maritain, 1959, p. 420; Caputo, 1982, p. 142).\(^ {102}\) Of what does this consist? Thomas produces a systematic doctrine of analogy in view of such questions as the problem of the precise metaphysical relation obtaining between Creator and creation and the possibility and nature of divine naming; both related enterprises in that predication is based upon the true nature of being. For Thomas, analogy ultimately ensures three metaphysical-theological positions, all of which carry over into his meditations on divine naming: (1) God’s utter transcendence—dissimilarity—from creation; (2) God’s utter immanence to creation (He is creation’s cause and support); and (3) creation’s ontological integrity, i.e. creatures have free will (Mondin, 1963, p. 53). Hütter describes the crucial shift involved:

[…] the central metaphysical challenge is not anymore the reduction to unity of multiple meanings of being by way of substance but the reduction of diverse beings to unity in relation to God. (2011, p. 224)

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\(^{101}\) Like Aristotle Thomas did not write a separate treatise on analogy (Hütter, 2011, p. 213; Hochschild, 2010, p. xiv)

\(^{102}\) Despite the centrality this concept to Thomas’s theological system, Bloch does not mention analogy in his Leipzig lecture on Thomas; although covered in the lecture are a certain number of categories central to Thomas’s analogical conception of being, i.e. his theory of knowledge, his conception of sin, his graded theory of reality. In fact, mention of analogy only arises in Bloch’s lecture when in an attempt to convey the key motive of Thomas’s thought, Bloch constructs an analogy between the “summa-intention” of Thomas’s theology and the value-ordered compositions of Giotto di Bondone (1266-1337) (1985e, p. 42).
[3] Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being is incompatible with Thomas’ theologic analogy.\textsuperscript{103} To see why this does not militate against my reading I want at this stage to turn to a 20\textsuperscript{th} century theologian: the Jesuit, Erich Przywara. Przywara’s analogic metaphysics shares numerous points of accord with Bloch’s own ontology of not-yet being:\textsuperscript{104} the most important being, I think, Przywara’s (2014, p. 124) dynamic construal of the essence-existence couplet, so crucial to his formulation of a ‘creaturely metaphysics.’\textsuperscript{105} The importance to Bloch’s materialism of this metaphysical distinction between existence and essence has already been sketched above.

In the Preface to \textit{Analogia Entis}, Przywara (ibid, p. xx) asserts that the impetus of the work is ‘the question of the distinction between essence and existence—\textit{Sosein und Dasein}’. His reflections lead him to garb analogy in the notion of ‘essence in-and-beyond existence’, indicating ‘the direction of a dynamic solution’ (ibid.). This axiom, which is the very archon of Przywara’s

\textsuperscript{103} While Anna Lesznai, a member of Bloch’s intellectual circle around Lukács, wrote that Bloch “is a young man […] who is so Talmudic that he verges on Catholicism” (Quoted in Gluck, 1985, p. 160), Bloch claims that he parted ways with his intellectual friend Alfred Döblin (a German poet) due to the latter’s ‘neo-Catholicism.’ (Quoted in Landmann, 1975, p. 166)

\textsuperscript{104} The lack of real dialogue between Bloch (1885-1977) and Przywara (1889-1972) is an intriguing 20\textsuperscript{th} century non-occurrence. That each thinker was remotely aware of the other’s existence is proven by Przywara’s (1963) brief review of \textit{Das Prinzip Hoffnung}, and by Bloch’s cursory remarks of his counterpart in the \textit{Heritage of Our Times}. But that Przywara’s (2014, p. xxi) ‘vibrant connections’ with Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger (cf. Betz, 2014, pp. 1, 14, 17, 24) failed to lead to a more substantial engagement with Bloch’s philosophy is somewhat surprising. Equally curious is Bloch’s sustained readings of religious thought-forms failed to meet with a man esteemed to have been the greatest German Catholic theologian of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Betz, 2014, pp. 4 & 9); and this even more so given Bloch’s ample enough commentary on Karl Barth, Przywara’s Protestant interlocutor.

\textsuperscript{105} Przywara was of course certainly no materialist, and in fact was heavily critical of Hegelian inspired materialisms. Przywara could well have seen Bloch’s materialism as a turn within ‘the fundamentally noetic phenomenology of Hegel, in which all content (those of nature, man, history, and religion) appear as reduced to an inner dialectic of the one noesis of “Spirit”;’ except that ‘Spirit proves to be nothing but the Ur-dialectic of matter and the material (which is to say that it leads to a “phenomenology of matter,” in contrast to Hegel’s noetic “phenomenology of Spirit”’ (2014, pp. 467 & 465).
metaphysics, connotes an existence pointing within itself beyond itself (ibid., pp. 432-3). The formula both dervies from and seeks to further draw-out the full implications of the real distinction of essence and existence found in Thomism:

The essence of the creature is precisely not identical to its existence. Rather, essence and existence are related in the creature in such a way that the essence of the creature is never fully given, i.e., never identical or reducible to its existence, but is always on the horizon of its existence as something to be attained. (Betz, 2014, p. 63).

This is the point of intersection with Bloch’s ontology, albeit the nature of transcendence within this structure of essence in-and-beyond existence is radically different for each thinker.106 That said, Bloch too garbs his theorisation of the human being in similar transitive terms: ‘We live and glance ourselves in transcendental movement [über uns hinaus]. That makes us human’ (PA, p. 116). In the case of Przywara, the point is that what any created thing is, is always beyond that it is, and this entails a transcendental movement. Once again, Bloch shares a very similar sentiment: ‘Only that can be in existence if it relates toward something more than it already is, if it is searching [Nur das kann da sein, das auf mehr, als es schon ist, sich versuchend bezieht].’ (EM, p. 70) For Przywara, it does not belong to the essence of the creature to exist and thus its essence will always be ‘that to which it is underway’ (Betz, 2014, p. 63). But if this “being ever underway,” if this ‘dynamic, never fixed relation of difference between

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106 Hart’s (2011, p. 396) contention that Przywara’s is an ‘antimetaphysical ontology’ is an interesting assessment in that it discloses in general terms the precise ground upon which Bloch’s ontology of not-yet and Przywarian metaphysics meet: precisely on the score of a radically open ontology. Just what each thinker’s open ontology is open to is, however, the site of their real difference.
essence and existence’ (ibid., p. 66) is not to be subsumed in its own infinite becoming, it must necessarily—Przywara asserts—come up against ‘the One of whom it is an image’ (ibid., p. 63, fn. 168)—namely, the perfectly complete “Is” of God. As Przywara writes:

To posit a “self-enclosed creatureliness” [...] is arbitrarily to freeze a “transition” into a fixed “state.” “Essence in-and-beyond existence” is an “ultimate quality”—one that, in itself, is “a transcending relation because it is transcended.” In arriving at creatureliness as a quality, one also arrives at createdness as a relation. All that remains is an either-or: either the absolutisations of the immanent poles of the creaturely [...] or the absolute beyond-and-in them. (2014, p. 159)

Creaturely flux as emerging from the rupture of essence and existence is taken to necessarily relate it to a transcendent Other. The immanent transcending form of creaturely being is said to point beyond itself toward a profounder analogy: the theological analogy between God and creation. What Przywara makes clear here is that analogia entis is at root a metaphysics of relation (recall, as an aside, that relation is for Bloch the Ur-category). What type of relationality is proposed? For Przywara the relation in question is ‘a relation of mutual alterity’ (2014, p. 231). No positive speech exists that could adequately speak of this relation. As Nikulin writes: ‘Analogue knowledge stresses the relational, not the substantial aspect, so that an entity [...] is known not as such, but only in its relation to something else.’ (2002, p. 8; my emphasis) The “ultimate” relation between God and creature’ (Przywara, 2014, pp. xxi-ii) is such that it is of a radically apophatic kind: an ever greater dissimilarity always intercedes between God and his
creation over and above any similarity that might arise, such that the creature cannot know of God as He is in Himself, rather, the creature can only—to paraphrase Bloch here—be content with ‘deep and brief glimpses into otherness.’ (PHE, p. 22) What reflection on the relation between God and creation discloses, argues Przywara, is precisely the emphaticness of a dis-relation at the core of creaturely being. The creature is related to such an alterity that relation is a word and a category and indeed an ontological constitution that is stretched to its very limit: it turns over on itself into dis-relation. For Bloch, a having is present in not-having, so then for Przywara: ‘At its peak, the positivum of “relation” reveals itself as the negativum of “alterity.”’ (2014, pp. 231). Przywara often expresses this analogical relation as a rhythmic oscillation between, on the one hand, that of an “in-(theologia positiva),” and a “beyond-(theologia negativa),” ever more eminent, on the other. And this is just what is meant by: essence-in-and-beyond-existence. It is an articulation of the Fourth Lateran Council’s 1215 AD proclamation: “One cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature, however great, without being compelled to note an ever greater dissimilarity between them.” (Quoted in Przywara, 2014, p. 234) In sum, what is at play here in Przywara’s concept of analogy is a rhythmic oscillation between positive (kataphatic) and negative (apophatic) theology. The apophatic dimension, with unbending necessity, bears the preponderant ascription: ‘With a wise silence’, Pseudo Dionysius writes, ‘we do honour to the inexpressible.’ (1987, 589B)\(^\text{107}\) Indeed, religious life for Przywara is the life lived-out of and brought home to the primacy of the apophatic:

\(^{107}\) The two most significant terms of negative theology are *aphairesis* (Latin: *remotion/abstractio*) and
For conscious and voluntarily lived-out religion is [...] a “consciousness of being,” the conscious and voluntarily lived-out “being” of religion as the being of the “interval between Creator and creature,” which is none other than the “analogy of ever greater dissimilarity within every similarity, however great.” In this sense, “analogy”—as the essence of objective religion—is the formal law of “religious experience” between the living God and the living human being. That is to say, with absolute rigor: there is no “revelation” (understood as a “religious experience coming from God”) and no “mysticism” (understood as a “religious experience arising in man”) in which the experience of the “ever greater dissimilarity” within “every similarity, however great” (in “likeness and “image” and “word,” etc.), would not be what is ultimate and highest. (Przywara, 2014, p. 424)

It is always the interceding of a silence—for silence best represents and is the finest representative of the unsayable—into language that brings the creature closest to (saying) God. But, as I show in the next section, this silence is only reached through an outpouring of language.

[4] The most notable theological objection to analogia entis is the Protestant theologian Karl Barth (Rocca, 2004, pp. 93-102; Johnson, 1982,...
Heidegger and Deleuze adopt critical attitudes to analogy, but these do not concern me here. At the root of Barth’s objections are doubts as to whether analogy is truly compatible with the utterly new of Christian revelation. Thus his stance toward analogy is borne up by questions surrounding the place of the *Novum*. Can analogy really be open to the new? Barth does not think so, and he charges analogy with rationalising the rupturing new of revelation under the order of a human concept, and, ultimately, under the order of a metaphysics that at root must posit a form of univocity between God and creation in order to gain traction. Analogy reduces ‘the sheer *novum* of revelation’ (Hart, 2011, p. 395) to a theory or a concept, and thus belittles the real rupturing excess of revelation’s otherness in relation to reason’s continuity. Analogy is thus said to be an ‘invention of the Antichrist’ (Barth, [108]

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108 Giles Deleuze, whose philosophical vocation according to Patton (2010, pp. 185-210) is an overtly utopian one, rejects *analogia entis* and does so on the basis of an attempt to overcome a blindness to real difference:

> In effect, difference [...] recovers an effectively real concept only to the extent that it designates catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in the series of resemblances or impassable fissures between the analogical structures. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 44)

Thus, the implication is that analogy represents a philosophical model unable to appreciate a real metaphysics of difference. Deleuze juxtaposes discontinuity, impassable fissures and “catastrophes” on the one hand, against “resemblances” propagated by “the analogical structures.” In sum, for Deleuze, analogy crucifies difference (ibid., p. 174). But then Deleuze says something curious:

> That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle *become*; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical. (ibid., p. 50)

Here is described *in nuce* the utopian analogy of being, or at least what could be intended by it, in which the One or the univocity relating differences (or the Many) to itself is One that is precisely *noch nicht*. In being a univocity that is not-yet, it is demanded, precisely, that identity be understood as *becoming*. I cannot explore this connection between Bloch and Deleuze any further, but Bloch’s notion of ‘a *fraternitas* even without a father’ (*SU*, p. 212) hints at where the dialogue could lay.
In truth, Barth’s rejection of analogy is based on his ‘suspicion of natural theology’, on his distrust ‘of any openness whatsoever of the creature to God’ (Betz, 2006, p. 4 & 7). As Barth (1936, p. 41-4) writes, an innate ‘anthropological prius to faith’ does not exist because God is ‘the fundamental transcendence of all human possibilities’; analogy’s enclosing God in a ‘continuously present and objective relation’ with creation must therefore be humbled by the reality of ‘no synthesis’ whatsoever, ‘no mediation’, as Ward (1995, p. 23) writes (incidentally, this is the site upon which I think Adorno’s deployment of the *Bilderverbot* echoes Barthian dogmatics, a point also made by Brittain [2010, p. 9]). As Bloch writes of Barthian dogmatics, in its deepest intention it advances ‘the reality of God’ as placed ‘outside of each correspondence with human possibility.’ (SO, p. 330; cf. *PHE*, p. 1194) However, Bloch equally discerns in Barth a utopian surplus:

however untenable the alienation with which it operated, Barth’s system did manage to achieve distance, heteronomy, transcendence. It did rediscover with its *Deus absconditus* the problem of the incognito [...]. And, with that, *Deus absconditus* becomes a recognisable pointer to *homo absconditus*. (*ACE*, p. 39)

Another feature of Barth’s rejection of analogy is an apparent incompatibility with dialectic. Indeed Pannenberg, a student of Barth’s, likewise rejects

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109 This charge echoes Luther’s first construal of papal universal authority as the devil’s doing in *Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* (MacCulloch, 2003, p. 128). It is by no means accidental that Luther objected to what he saw as the corrupting presence of Aristotelianism in such supposed rationalisations of faith.
analogy on the grounds that, in his eyes, analogy necessarily posits a 
univocity of God and creation.\textsuperscript{110} As Johnson writes of this:

analogy inevitably functions within a world characterised mainly by order and 
continuity, even homogeneity, or its power of inference would not be grounded. 
(1982, pp. 687)

This is evidently incompatible with Bloch’s notion of materialist interruption, 
3) analogy presupposes continuity between what should be held as radical 
alterities. For Pannenberg (2007, pp. 14 & 24) analogy just is the supposition 
that without even the smallest degree of identity between creation and God, 
no analogy can occur. If it is true that a radical inhospitality for the truly new 
(or truly other) is inherent to the doctrine of analogy, as Pannenberg 
believes, then it becomes difficult to frame Bloch’s concept of matter within 
analogia entis without sacrificing a vital tenet of his materialism: A 
‘transcendere into the Novum’ is crucial to Bloch’s utopian materialism (\textit{PHE}, 
p. 298). But Pannenberg’s criticisms of \textit{analogia entis} become markedly 
softer in tone:

It cannot be a matter of contention whether or not reasoning may or may not 
have a share in the knowledge of God, but only whether in a \textit{historically open reality} knowledge of God can be brought to a conclusion by reasoning. 
(Quoted in Johnson, 1982, p. 689; my emphasis)

As Johnson formulates Pannenberg’s line of questioning here:

\textsuperscript{110} Another of Barth’s students, Jüngel, on the other hand, rejecting \textit{analogia} all the same, does so for 
the opposite reason: Analogy propagates God’s utter inscrutability (the fallacy of equivocation), such 
that the stronger swing of apophasis leads inevitably toward an equivocal agnosticism (see Hütter, 
Analogy is related to the consciousness of the ontological givenness of the past and/or present; but can it survive and contribute to a world view whose originating insight is the *ontological priority of future* and the critical transformation of all existing reality in light of that future? (ibid., pp. 699-90; my emphasis)

The answer to this question could be affirmative if and only if one’s conception of *analogia entis* enters into Bloch’s materialist metaphysics of not-yet being. Only then is *analogia entis* based on an ontology in which futurity is the greatest region of being. It is curious that Johnson reiterates

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111 It is interesting to note Pannenberg has himself stressed Bloch’s general importance, but only that he may help channel Bloch’s findings toward a theological renewal:

Christian theology at some time will perhaps be indebted to Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope if it again finds the courage to deal with its central category: the general concept of eschatology. Of crucial importance in this matter is the prospect toward a future which is to be understood as temporal. Bloch has taught us to understand anew the overwhelming significance of a future which is still open, and of the hope which anticipates this future, for the life and thought of mankind and moreover for the ontological peculiarity of all reality. (1968, p. 268)

112 It is of significance that in a discussion of Aquinas’ response to whether creatures can be considered like God, Betz (2014, pp. 41) writes: ‘Thomas argues that indeed they [creatures] can [be considered like God]’, and does so with  

a fascinating conjunction of the protological and the eschatological, both the familiar verse from Genesis 1:26, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” and the verse from 1 John 3:2, “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him.” [1 John 3:2, this eschatological, and not theological uncovering of the face, is quoted by Bloch in *SU*, p. 216.]

In the footnote Betz (ibid., pp. 41-2 fn. 116) remarks:

What makes Thomas’s conjunction fascinating is that, given the *différence* between a protological and an eschatological “likeness,” the “likeness” of Genesis 1:26 could be understood as a *proleptic likeness*, that is, as a *promise*, which is to be effected historically through Christ and his Spirit [...], and which awaits the eschatological realisation of 1 John 3:2 […]. Unfortunately, Thomas does not discuss the relation between the protological and the eschatological here, *even though the whole question of the analogy of being would seem to turn on it*. For the question is not whether there is an analogy of being—Scripture clearly commends it. The question is one of whether the analogy is to be affirmed already as a matter of protology (in spite of the subsequent reality of sin) as a terminus a quo (which not even the reality of sin can destroy), or whether the analogy is only to be affirmed eschatologically, as a terminus ad quern […]. (my emphasis)

So even the Catholic form harbours within itself questions akin to those which concern Bloch. But again, while this meditation opens the door to a futurally-directed analogy, a “theo-backward-logic” is
the distinction between harmony and discontinuity by juxtaposing analogy and dialectics:

For those of an analogical imagination, the central clue to the whole of reality is found pre-eminently in the symbol of Incarnation: the gracious gift of God to the world in that event that makes possible the perennial discovery of some order, some harmony, in reality. Those of a dialectical imagination find the central symbol to be focused in the resurrection of the Crucified: the reversal of norms through the power of God in that event that opens up the possibility of overturning present disorder and of expecting the genuinely new. (1982, p. 691)

The question arises as to whether analogy’s “imagination of order” and dialectic’s “imagination of the rupturing-new” (the Novum) are resolvable. That thought over the two imaginations might strike out on a new path is perfectly possible, for they are found together at work in Bloch’s materialist metaphysics.

§2.2. Excursus. ANALOGY & LANGUAGE

Following the treatment of analogy’s conceptual becoming a word is needed on how Przywara’s analogic metaphysics informs a theory of or an approach to language. Turning to the broad sweep of a Przywarian

in play nonetheless, for the image the creature is promised is already there, fully worked-out. Despite the real future orientations of religion (SO, p. 344), not only is God the figure of an utter transcendence, but such transcendence is always thoroughly recoiled back into a past (religion—meaning a “binding back” to the origin. ‘When all things began, the Word already was.’ (John, 1:1) As Przywara himself writes:

Whether the word “religio” is derived, as by Cicero, from “re-legere” (understood as a “reading one’s way back”) or, as Lactantius and Augustine, from “re-ligare” (understood as a “binding back”), in either interpretation it is a “return ever again” to an origin (2014, p. 413).
“theolinguistics” (a theory of language theologically conditioned) provides a bridge between reading Bloch’s materialism as a form of analogic ontology and—what is the whole intent of this study—extending Bloch’s materialism over into a speculative appraisal of language. Showing how analogic metaphysics translates into a theory of language will enable me in Chapter III to better chart how Bloch’s materialism as a materialism of an urge to creative forms, mediated by a utopian analogy as the objective phantasy, itself translates into a theory of language.

[1] Przywara’s theolinguistics is born of his analogic doctrine sketched above. In translating Przywara’s original German prose Betz and Hart have drawn attention to Przywara’s language partaking in the same “essence in-and-beyond existence” that is said to mark the very nature of creaturely reality and that reality’s relation to its transcendent source: ‘for Przywara, the rhythm of analogy that defines creaturely being eo ipso defines the nature of language itself’ (2014, pp. xv-xvi, fn. 10). The consequence of this is that language necessarily harbours the rhythmic-oscillation between similarity and dissimilarity that Przywara has expressed as an axiomatic of analogic metaphysics; as such, it is God who is the motor of this generativity. In short, analogic speech (ultimately of God) is rendered incompatible with a stable economy of representation, for that which is spoken of, in that the path to its dark mystery is analogically poised, cannot be subjected to stability of speech that would, as it were, “have” that which is spoken of (Betz, 2014, p. 82). Such stability would necessarily presuppose a univocity between signifier and signified (ibid.), it would annul what Pickstock (1998, p. 7) elsewhere has termed ‘doxological distance.’ This analogy precludes. In
Przywara’s theolinguistics doxological distance is preserved because his language of God keeps in step with the rhythmic tension of similitude and ever greater, unsurpassable dissimilitude (via negationis) that is crucial to his analogic conception. In a rare statement of the place of language in his philosophical theology, Przywara writes:

If being in itself is analogical […], this necessarily applies to thought and language as well. But this means that both thought and language are an “ever-transcending” movement [ein “je über hinaus”]. There is no such thing as possessive saturation in a concept or a formula. Rather, one can only make every thought and word transparent “beyond itself,” which is to say that I think and speak in a “transcendental dynamic” way: always beyond every concept and every word in ever renewed movement (Quoted in Betz & Bentley Hart, 2014, p. xvi, fn. 10; my emphasis).

For my purposes, the important point here is that by speaking in such a way Przywara opens up for view language’s almost inexperiential generativity and creativity. From its basis in analogic metaphysics, the essence of Przywarian theolinguistics is of a transgressing transcendental dynamic, in which words are made transparent only by their entering into renewed movement. This “transcendental dynamic” style¹¹³ is necessary to Przywara because it is attuned to the purpose of analogical predication:

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¹¹³ Following Bloch’s ontologic-aesthetic assessment of Gothic architecture, one could claim that Przywarian theolinguistics maintains a ‘style of transcendence [Transzendenzstil]’ (TE, p. 327).
What is transcendental goes beyond the categorial order of the genera and *ipso facto* transgresses the domain of univocal predication. “Analogical” unity [is] the mark of transcendentality. (Aertsen, 2012, p. 393)

Ventis encapsulates well the motive behind the apophasis of the transcendental, in which, as Przywara has said, transparency is only achieved in the word moving beyond itself in ever renewed movement:

> the true value of maintaining an apophatic asymmetry [...] lies in the difference it makes on our perception of ourselves and the world, of the inside and as well the outside universes; for, in distinguishing an entity’s *being* from its *being known* [...] we shield it from reason’s reductive advances. [...] we allow beings to unconditionally manifest themselves in ways other than those expected of them. (Ventis, 2015, pp. 141-2)

What is key here is that the “ever greater [transcendental] dissimilarity” of God from creaturely being, thought, and language does not nourish a despairing acceptance of incapability, but encourages creative linguistic usage, rule breaking even. This circumstance schools a speaking that would move off into wider horizons—as long as human language does not mislead itself on its ultimate incapability of being able to speak God in Himself:

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114 If utopia is a *transcendens*, then to speak of it requires the same linguistic movement as that propagated by the Jesuit Przywara: a “*je über hinaus.*” Przywara’s speaking “beyond in ever renewed movement”—this *theo*linguistics couched in a “transcendental dynamic”—is put on a new basis: a linguistics of utopia.

115 Note that Ventis is making a distinction between “being” and “being known”, such that “being” is already fully constituted and it is only the human being’s thought and speech of this “being” which is “asymmetrical” with that which is spoken of (the “being”). Again, for Bloch this is an unwarranted hypostatisation. It is much more radical—that is, the human can expect much more radical revelations of novelty on the part of objects—if the ontological constitution of such objects is *noch nicht*, that is, not entirely constituted, manifested, or brought out.
In the case of everyday reality (whether physical, mental, real, or imaginary), one can locate the thing and speak about it as a composite of matter and form, accidents and substance, potency and act, genus and species, or form and esse. God transcends this sort of description. If God is the sort of reality Christians believe God to be, that is to say, if God is the beginning and end of all things, then logically and grammatically God does not fit into any of these categories. But since such categories are the only tools available in our language and grammar for thinking about anything at all, God included, asserting God’s reality requires purposively breaking the rule in a way that indirectly displays what cannot be directly described. (Masson, 2015, p. 532)

As Ventis writes: ‘Christian apophaticism does not condemn Christians to absolute silence, as if the limitations of language mandated the resignation from any and all theological endeavour.’ (2015, p. 143) To bring the point back to Przywara. What all this means is that, in accordance with Thomas Aquinas’ position contra the univocity of being, in attempting to speak of God one is attempting to express that which ‘transcend[s] the Porphyrian order of the predicables.’ (Aertsen, 2012, p. 398) There is a radical disproportionality between what one can speak and that which is to be spoken of. Be that as it may, the choice is not between silence or nonsense, and here my comments in the Introduction regarding Wittgenstein can be recalled. If God transcends beyond every being, then speech of Him must in some sense enact the same transgressing movement, it must be language transcending, going beyond itself in ever renewed movement. What language tries to express totally exceeds the capacity for expression given grammatical and syntactical norms. Przywara’s solution to this paradox is to establish a constantly renewed movement of linguistic transcendence. But this is just
analogy; it is just “essence in-and-beyond existence” within language itself. The movement of language is this “in-and-beyond” rhythm. Ward articulates the theological stakes of this theorisation of language: there must be construed, he writes, an ‘immanent presence in language of transcendent meaning’, ‘a transcendental Logos, a Word beyond and yet discerned within words.’ (1995, pp. 32 & 77) This transcendent meaning is that which always and ever exceeds creaturely representation and yet is the abundant source, the “for-the-sake-of-which” of human’s speech at all. As Dante writes in the *Paradiso*:

He who turned his compass
at the limit of the world, and within it
distinguished so much that is hidden and manifest,
could not impress his worth on the whole
universe in any way that did not leave
his Word in infinite excess (Quoted in Franke, 2012, p. 101).

[2] This notion of divine un-representability being productive of novel use of language in order, precisely, to touch upon this ultimate un-representability, brings me back to Karl Barth for a brief note. Much of Barth’s *Church Dogmatics* constitutes a sustained reflection on language (1936, p. 5)—this not surprising given the importance placed on the preached word in Protestant denominations. Barth employs an image to convey the purport of his reflections on the difference between the Word of God and the word of man, that is, the Word that is un-representable for man, and the word that ever seeks to try to speak that divine Word, respectively.
Echoing what I have already said above, Barth claims that human language contains within itself the ‘prodigious index finger’ of John the Baptist, best depicted, according to Barth’s judgement, by Matthias Grünewald’s *Crucifixion, the Isenheim Altarpiece* circa. 1514. Grünewald’s construal of the event in fine paints captures the theological significance of John’s presence for the problem of divine naming. Pointing beyond himself to Christ, John is said to symbolise the very purpose of Christian attestation (and thus Christian proclamation): ‘can anyone point away from himself more impressively and completely?’ (ibid., pp. 126-7) Barth’s point here is that John negates himself by pointing beyond himself, that he ceases to be in the very act of indicating. John’s pointing beyond himself to the folly of the cross embodies the very principle of analogy as it is construed in its theological form.116 Each attempt to express God’s Word—a necessary endeavour it seems—can only ever, Barth claims, point beyond itself to that Word, ‘it only points to that’ (ibid., p. 160). Williams rehearses the same claim:

Obscurity of the words of revelation is one of the things that anchors us in our temporal condition […]. A language which *indefinitely postpones fulfilment* […] is appropriate to the Christian discipline of spiritual homelessness, to the character of the believing life as pilgrimage. (1989, pp. 142-3; my emphasis)

This ‘final non-representable end of desire’ (ibid., p. 143) of language is what structures Przywara’s analogic style: ‘The unbridgeable distance between the eternal res and all earthly representation opens up through this “anti-representation” in the cross’ (ibid., p. 144).

116 ‘What Christ and the apostolic tradition teach […] is not so much a clear and direct understanding of all signs, as much as the fact that “signs are signs” and, as such, they point to something else.’ (Lombardi, 2007, p. 31)
Bloch clearly rejected the direction of these types of claims when he writes of Barth: ‘The divine can only ever be present now as the impenetrable frontier of man’s being, thought and speech’ (ACE, p. 32). There is too much limitation operating at the core of these claims for Bloch, too much restriction on a radical openness. And, to be sure, this point stands as the foremost difference between what I consider to be Bloch’s utopian analogia entis, and the analogia entis as it exists in its Christian dispensation. But, as I have already shown through a discussion of the That-What relation, it is clear that Bloch maintains certain key features of Christian analogic thought: ‘No-thing means [meint] itself as it is, how it already has been set forth [gesetzt] and expressed [geäussert].’ (LM, p. 373) Everything means itself, for Bloch, in relation to what it is not-yet, and more still, in relation to its ultimate beingness. In what follows, I will sketch the lineaments of what can be termed a utopian analogia entis.117

§3. A UTOPIAN ANALOGON

Here I would like to provide a positive account of the kind of analogia entis that must underpin Bloch’s metaphysical materialism if, as I claim, this materialism can indeed be read as a form of the theory of the analogy of being. To ease my line of thought toward this direction, I will briefly consider features of an eschatological analogia entis, that is, this form’s compatibility and incompatibility with the tenets of Bloch’s ontology, thereby gauging what

117 Taking into account that the German meinen can mean both “to mean” and “to intend,” and therefore is close to the Latin intentio, the crux of what Przywara means (intends) when he says he speaks in a transcendental dynamic way becomes clear. The idea there is transcendental dynamic in things (in being itself) is expressed in this passage by Bloch. For Bloch, what this transcendental dynamic reaches out towards is the Ungesagten, the ‘unsaid’ (LM, p. 374). What is always meant (intended) is the unspoken.
a Blochian version of *analogia entis* might look like. In sum: while I claim that an analogy of being that is informed by the futural power of an eschaton fails to adequately express a Blochian version of *analogia entis*, it does, however, open us up to a more future-inclined form of *analogia entis*. It thus helps to foreground the singularity of the Blochian form of *analogia entis*.

[1] An eschatological form of the analogy of being is, then, one in which the *relation* between process and outfall (*Mündung*) (or, in theistic terms, creation and God’s fullness of being) is revealed only at the point of a future arrival. Thus in this form of the analogy of being, the relation between creation and God is not yet present, but is promised. The passage of John 3:2 is usually turned to as an expression in support of this form of *analogia entis*. In speaking of Thomas Aquinas’ response to the question whether creatures can be considered to be *like* God, Betz (2014, p. 41), for instance, writes that ‘Thomas argues that indeed they can [be considered like God]’, and does so via

a fascinating conjunction of the protological and the eschatological, both the familiar verse from Genesis 1:26, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” and the verse from 1 John 3:2, “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him.”

Betz then remarks that:

What makes Thomas’s conjunction fascinating is that, given the *différance* between a protological and an eschatological “likeness,” the “likeness” of Genesis 1:26 could be understood as a *proleptic likeness*, that is, as a *promise*, which is to be effected historically through Christ and his Spirit [...]
and which awaits the eschatological realisation of 1 John 3:2 [...] (ibid, pp. 41-2, fn. 116).

In light of this eschatological shift in key, Betz then writes that:

Unfortunately, Thomas does not discuss the relation between the protological and the eschatological here, even though the whole question of the analogy of being would seem to turn on it. For the question is not whether there is an analogy of being—Scripture clearly commends it. The question is one of whether the analogy is to be affirmed already as a matter of protology (in spite of the subsequent reality of sin) as a terminus a quo (which not even the reality of sin can destroy), or whether the analogy is only to be affirmed eschatologically, as a terminus ad quem [...]. (ibid., pp. 42 fn. 116)

There is thus some scope to warrant the suggestion that Bloch’s metaphysical materialism touches on the general tenor of this eschatological form of *analogia entis*. The *analogia entis* of Bloch’s materialism could take the shape of an *eschatological relational ontology*, somewhat mirroring the relation of likeness said to obtain between God and creation as promise (*terminus ad quem*). This would seem to be so for two principal reasons. In the first case, it is clear that the eschatological form’s prolepsis resonates with the guiding Novum of Bloch’s materialism; in both thought-figures, what arrives is *something radically new*, this ontological novelty constituting an ontological invariant of direction of process/creation’s constant becoming. In the second case, the promise of a relation of likeness between God and creation is said to be “effected historically,” that is, the relation *comes into being*; it is clear that this feature somewhat coincides with the spontaneous becoming that is front and centre of the Blochian approach to teleology, as

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outlined in Chapter I. But to shore up the basis of these two cases it is not without importance to mention that a red thread which runs through works such as the early *The Spirit of Utopia* and the late *Atheism in Christianity*, is the distinction Bloch tends to make between theological and eschatological strands of Christianity, the latter of which is influential to Bloch’s philosophical thought through and through (*SU*, p. 217). Indeed to Bloch’s mind, the problem with theology has been that its house always stands as already made in its completeness; it is thus ‘as if it lay only in man’s blindness not to see it, only in the weakness of his flesh not to enter.’ (*PHE*, p. 302) But I have shown above that Bloch ontologises whatever, say, in Kantianism, was merely an epistemic lack. Contrary to this present fulfilledness of theology, then, an eschatological form of *analogia entis* at least possesses the merit—from a Blochian perspective—of living in a kind of “not-yetness,” and so it somewhat tempers the premature objectivism anathema to Bloch’s materialism.

Nevertheless, Bloch’s philosophy constitutes a kind of Promethean emancipation of the mystery of being, whereby precisely the mystery of being is wrought from its previous encompassment in theism—mystery is thus made immanent with Bloch. And so, as I will briefly show below, a reliance on an eschatological as opposed to a theological tendency in Christianity ought only to act as a kind of springboard that propels Bloch over into his own utopian mode of thought, much as I have been using this form of *analogia entis* myself in order to gauge the specificity of Bloch’s own form. This is because eschatology itself is still premised on theism and
theology. In sum, utopian analogy is not reducible to theologico-eschatological analogy.

Despite his obvious atheism several notable theologians have found Bloch’s work helpful for renewing their own projects in theological speculation, sometimes missing in the process the whole purport of Bloch’s employment of theologically-inclined concepts, such as analogy (Bloch was no theologian). As Siebers (2013a, p. 66) writes, Bloch uses theological concepts ‘stripped of [their] theistic nature,’ such that a-theistic theological speculation acts as a ‘mediator that connects [philosophy] to the layers of the real it tries to understand and articulate.’ As Bloch himself writes, what drives this process of theological stripping as a principle is a sublation of the place of God, an act which of course theologians would find totally unacceptable:

\[\text{Genuine materialism, dialectical materialism, cancels out precisely the transcendence and reality of every god-hypostasis, but without removing that which is intended by ens perfectissimum (PHE, p. 1200; my emphasis).}\]

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^118 ‘Ernst Bloch as theologian—that is a provocative theme for us, for him himself, for his friends and enemies.’ (Moltmann, 1978, p. 71)

^119 Bloch’s materialism is ‘a critique of religion and, at the same time, a salvaging of religion’s core.’ (Siebers, 2013b, p. 202) It could be said: utopian dialectical materialism does not destroy theological analogy, but presupposes and perfects it (cf. Thompson, 2009, p. x). On Habermas’ assessment, however, Bloch is so much theological baggage:

Without initially having any theological intention, the reason that becomes aware of its limitations thus transcends itself in the direction of something else. This can take the form of a mystical fusion with a consciousness that embraces the universe; it may be the despairing hope that a redeeming message will occur in history; or it may take the shape of a solidarity with those who are oppressed and insulted, which presses forward in order to hasten on the coming of the messianic salvation. These anonymous gods of the post-Hegelian metaphysics—the encompassing consciousness, the event from time immemorial, the nonalienated society—are an easy prey for theology. There is no difficulty in deciphering them as pseudonyms of the Trinity of the personal God who communicates his own self. (Ratzinger & Habermas, 2006, pp. 40-1)
Thus, even an analogy of being based on eschatology is insufficient in capturing what is unique about *analogia entis* in the context of Bloch’s materialism. For Bloch, ‘a new *mysterium*’ (*PHE*, p. 1198) must pervade the space of what has traditionally been the *ens perfectissimum*, that is, now a ‘real mystery’ (*LM*, p. 363) that is mysterious *to itself* must come to be the beginning and the guiding light of all that which is. The grip of a ‘Caesar-like concept of God’ (*ACE*, p. 107) must be loosened, the ‘church Aristotelianism’ (*M*, pp. 502-7) of *analogia entis* must be sublated over into a utopian image of the analogy of being, a “left Aristotelian” *analogia entis*, perhaps, in which the ever-greater beyond-ness of the *ens perfectissimum* is grasped *immanently* and so precisely as *not-yet*. In sum, while the eschaton merely postpones the (be-)coming of an inevitable theistic dissimilarity between the constant becoming of creaturehood and the outfall of God’s fullness of being, and thus is found still operating within an horizon of thought that cannot get past an insurmountable *relation* of likeness, Bloch begins to create a sensitivity to a relation to something not-yet which, in arriving, sublates all relation whatsoever. Thus, whilst eschatology remains reliant on relation, utopia relies on consummation; whilst eschatology speaks of a coming event, utopia speaks of an event of *overcoming*. Ultimately the *eschaton* fails to provide the proper parameters in terms of which Bloch’s ontology must be understood, for eschatology remains tied to theism.

What this brief consideration of the eschatological form’s compatibility and incapability brings sharply into focus is the singularity of the form of analogy that would underpin Bloch’s materialism. As it turns out, if one refers to certain commentators on the doctrine of analogy of being, then singularity
is a proper expression of analogy’s essence. As Whistler (2013b, pp. 241-3; my emphasis) points out: analogy ‘has been a concept with which to experiment and to innovate’ (experimentation marks the history of this concept, as I have hoped to show above); as such, one’s concept of analogy cannot be confined to tradition: ‘there is not one stable form […], but a plurality of irreducible experiments in analogic ontology.’ Montagnes, an authority on the concept, also highlights this point: ‘Each doctrine of analogy is a manifestation of a certain conception of being, of causality, of participation, of the unity of beings in being.’ (2004, p. 10; my emphasis) That Bloch’s utopian analogia entis cannot be found overlapping with previous analogy doctrines need not jeopardise my thesis, then. The point is to best articulate what is going on with analogy in the context of Blochian utopianism.

[2] This becomes clear by turning to the only explicit place in Bloch’s corpus where the analogy of being is explicitly mentioned. It is interesting that the only indication that Bloch’s materialism might constitute a new form of analogic metaphysics is to be found at a moment at which Bloch is discussing features of the dialectic. This speaks to the originality of analogy in Bloch’s thought precisely because in its fundamental characteristics dialectics has long been thought contrary to the theoretical imagination of analogia entis (see Lakebrink, 1955). Whilst analogy bespeaks order and harmony, the dialectical imagination is premised on discontinuity and rupture. Thus once again Bloch is found breaking with tradition, weaving dialectic with analogia entis, rupture with order, but an order that is not yet present, not yet in being. Specifically, he does this by enlisting analogy so as
to ensure that a directedness imbues the dialectical interpenetration and contradictory becoming of subject-object. An order that is not-yet guides dialectical becoming. As Bloch writes:

[subject-object] reveal themselves as dialectically woven moments of an *analogia entis*, that is, of a not-yet completely manifested, first symbolic (but real-symbolic) appearing of being (*SO*, p. 296).

[Von dieser Durchdringung, als einer, die gerade nicht den Stoff über die Form, das Objekt über das Subjekt in der Sache überwiegen läßt, sondern beide als dialektisch verwobene Momente einer analogia entis zeigt, das ist, eines noch nicht ganz manifestierten, erst symbolisch (aber real-symbolisch) erscheinenden Seins]

Recall that this passage echoes another one I employed earlier so as to support the feasibility of a utopian teleology: ‘This kind of totality [i.e. the not-yet fullness of being] […] is the goal of the dialectical movement that holds it together’ (Bloch, 1983, p. 303; my emphasis). Strangely, then, what orders the dialectical process of matter is a fullness of being of this process which itself is not-yet. But this ordering principle is precisely a lack of order, for it speaks of a fundamental gap or lack at the very heart of being, and so could be said to be an-arthic. But this with the proviso that matter’s an-arthic process longs for a “coming-in-order”, as Bloch (1988, p. 11) writes.

There are other moments in the corpus which indicate analogy’s importance, but these instances require more interpretative work than I undertake here. Bloch’s theorisation of allegory and symbol, for example, counts among these instances: ‘Every “As [Wiel]”, writes Bloch, ‘bends the Unfamiliar together, making it close.’ (*LM*, p. 383) A reading of Bloch’s theorisation of allegory-symbol would have to draw on the importance of German Romanticism’s employment of analogy, which Bloch himself traces back to mystical thinkers, principally Jakob Böhme (*LM*, p. 385). One also thinks of the forefront role analogy plays in the minds of such thinkers as Novalis (his ‘magic wand of analogy’ [*LM*, p. 385]) and also Goethe, whose reliance on analogy for *Naturphilosophie* is well documented: ‘Both, language as well as material content of such production, contain the constant interaction between sealedness and Aurora rising.’ (*PHE*, p. 992)
On this basis we can say: the dialectic needs analogy to hold its movement together (to direct it), while analogy needs dialectic if it is not to succumb to the temptation of theism and thus to the eternalisation of a gap between being and becoming. By employing dialectical language together with a reference to the *analogia entis*, Bloch completely overturns the notion that a fullness of being be presently existing.\(^{121}\)

[3] There is another, less explicit indication of the presence of analogy in Bloch’s philosophy than the one given above, but this implicit appeal to analogy actually serves to concretise the utopian form of its expression outlined above.

In *The Spirit of Utopia* Bloch writes that philosophy must now ‘let Kant burn through Hegel’ (*SU*, p. 187). The imperative laid-out here implicitly stages Bloch’s discovery of an ontology of not-yet being through the terms of two philosophers over whom much ink has been spilt. More specifically, the imperative indicates a tension of opposition that Bloch sees between the two German philosophers, a tension turning on the *Sein und Sollen* problematic (what is and what ought to be). It is a tension over which, as Bloch says, two

\(^{121}\) My reading differs from Thompson’s (2015, p. 53; 2013b), for whom Bloch’s is chiefly a “materialist metaphysics of contingency.” Thompson employs, however, a number of analogies to express his reading of Bloch’s ontology. Whether this is coincidental to an articulation of this ontology is not something that concerns me here, but it is an interesting facet of Thompson’s explication. For Holz (1978, p. 120), comparisons, metaphors and analogies are integral to Bloch’s explication of his ontology. Unlike my reading, Holz does not, however, think to draw the conclusion that Bloch’s ontology relies on an analogic conception of reality. In any case, in my view Thompson overstates the centrality of contingency in Bloch’s metaphysics. In doing so Thompson neglects (*nota bene*, does not utterly disregard) “the one thing necessary” (the *unum necessarium*) that, for Bloch, is said to guide process-matter (Bloch is against ‘the ideology of unlimited [ubegrenzter] possibilities’ [1985e, p. 79]). If there is a “one thing necessary” at the heart of the ontology of not-yet being, then such a necessary thing would be difficult to square with Thompson’s interpretation of this ontology as one of utter contingency. On the other hand, this “necessary element” also appears equally difficult to square with an ontology of radical openness, as Bloch claims his ontology to be based on. But it does not logically follow from there being a “one thing necessary” that the content of this “one thing” be necessarily determined one way or another; what is necessary is that this one thing ultimately, at some point, be determined.
philosophical schools of thought ‘conflict’ but ‘between which one may not simply choose.’ (SU, p. 185) Here Bloch asks for the power of “both” (Kant must burn through Hegel), but through such “burning” there is produced the surplus power of an “and…”—something new is fashioned for thought here, a mode of thought that obviously is ‘neither strictly Hegelian nor recognisably Kantian’, as Blechman (2008, p. 182) writes. The first moment (namely Kant) must come back into the second moment (Hegel) without, however, a simple return to the first. Once again, something new must enter into thought and being.122

In order to fully grasp what Bloch means by this imperative I need to outline what Bloch likes and dislikes in the respective philosophies of Kant and Hegel on the problematic of Sein und Sollen. Firstly, to begin on the side of Kant, Bloch’s imperative signals a rejection of mere Kantian regulative approximation to the fullness of being, and thus in a sense opens up the possibility of breaking through analogy’s logic of ever greater dissimilarity, as conceived of by Przywara (PHE, p. 168). At the same time, Bloch’s imperative signals a surplus in Kant in that Kant’s transcendental ego knows ‘how to postulate morally beyond a bad existent’, because in this approximation (although infinite) there flashes hope for a future in which the gap is closed, and in this hope there springs a rejection of what is, of what is presently given (ibid., p. 147), namely: the givenness of merely a relation to the fullness of being that can only ever be approximated asymptotically. In sum, while Kant is seen to eternalise the gap between what is and what

122 This echoes Aristotle’s construal of the Heraclitean (equivocal) and Parmenidean (univocal) schools of thought, and the middle course he seeks to strike out between them, which, as was shown, is the very invention of philosophical analogy. Indeed, one can say per analogiam: As Aristotle’s philosophy is to Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’, so Bloch’s is to Kant’s and Hegel’s.
ought to be the case, he is at least attuned to the fact that there is a gap. But the will to transgress this state of affairs springs up and, whilst intensely felt by Kant, whilst intensely spoken, it nevertheless amounts to a “desire without hope,” as Dante translated the theologians’ “poena damni” (Lombardi, 2007, p. 11). It is a desire without hope because Kantian ontology is based on an endless progress towards what ought to be the case: not a likeness, but an identity, an ultimate arrival, which for Kant remains forever beyond reach at an abyssal distance, forever receding into the horizon of being. The striving ‘only always approximates the infinitely remote goal’, as Bloch writes (PA, p. 375). Kant’s virtue thus turns over into his weakness. He practises ‘the art of talking about what we have not yet experienced’ (PHE, p. 24) even if he talks about it to end all talk about it. Bloch seeks to hold onto Kant’s recognition of the gap and of what the gap promises, and indeed to hold fast to that striving to realise the gap’s closure, to fulfil the promise. But one must rid herself of the notion that this gap, in truth, can never be overhauled.

Hegel, on the other hand, is, like Bloch, averse to the goal’s ‘remotion [Entfernte]’ (SO, p. 446). Hegel too, like Bloch, philosophically struggles against the Kantian conception of a dualism between existence (Dasein) and being-for-itself (Fürsichsein), between what is and what ought to be so. To Hegel’s mind the Kantian subject is left ‘starving [Hungerleiderei]’, for what would be its ‘good and proper meal [einer tüchtigen Mahlzeit]’—the Ought for which it craves—is situated in the unreachable domain of the ‘eternally non-present [ewig ungegenwärtig]’ (SO, pp. 446-7). Not without a hint of interest for the earlier discussion of Karl Barth’s opposition to the analogia
entis, Bloch designates this bad infinite hunger a strictly Protestant form of desire (‘the bad infinite of Protestantism’ [SO, p. 448]), which in the very act of recognising a surplus to what is ‘eliminates the surplus’ (SO, p. 447) as utterly unattainable.123

In light of all of this, it would seem that if the choice be between Kant and Hegel that Hegel is the better option. And yet, while Kant eliminates the surplus of what has not yet come to be by rendering its attainability—its realisation—a strict impossibility, by rendering the tension between the “is” and “ought” irrevocable (PA, p. 28), Hegel, Bloch argues, eliminates the “ought” in another, equally unacceptable way. Despite Hegel’s antipathy toward a ‘melancholic’ Kantianism honouring its own incapacity to attain the ultimate “What” (object) of its desire (‘a desire to believe but an inability to’ [SU, p. 173]), his proposed resolution is equally suspect (SO, p. 446). The remotion of being, of existence, from the “ought,” the “What,” as ontologised in Kant (rendered a priori and thereby fixed), in Hegel no longer takes on the colouring of pure absence but is rather levelled to pure presence: to ‘the perfect Now.’ (SU, p. 179) ‘Hegel,’ writes Bloch, ‘with great correctness, goes against the perennial Ought, but with the effect that there is generally no more unrealised [Unverwirklichtes] left and therefore no future.’ (SO, p. 446) Hegel discards the bad infinite of Kantian striving, and this in effect discards the impossibility of a real future arrival. But Hegel’s impatience

123 ‘Insofar as it is the ideological reflex of the early capitalist economy, Protestantism premiers only an infinite striving’ (PA, p. 370); ‘above all Protestantism harbours a distrust of human striving and an aversion to the end, to the arrival of striving, authorising only an infinite approximation to the ideal.’ (PA, p. 28). For a more subtle discussion of the ‘confessional-political background’ to Kant’s philosophy, see Hildebrandt (2007, pp. 477-8): ‘The description of Kant as the philosopher of Protestantism has a long tradition.’ See also Adorno (2001, pp. 71-3), who makes a similar argument as does Bloch concerning the tight relation between Protestant theology and infinite striving as a type of anti-utopian tendency of thought; the danger that the not-yetness of the reality of reason is suspended into an infinite task.
pushes too far, so that no longer is there a need nor demand for striving, no longer is there any incompleteness to transgress. For Hegel the good and proper meal has been cooked, is served up, and simply awaits its recognition:

Hegel’s theory that everything rational is already real concludes a premature and total truce with the world, but Kant’s only approximative infinity of reason, practical reason in particular, makes of the world an ocean without a shore (SU, p. 178).

In sum, Kant recognises the gap but posits its overcoming as an impossibility—there is too much beyond; Hegel recognises the possibility of overcoming the gap, but only in its having already been achieved—thus there is too little beyond. The conflict between Kant’s equivocity (eternalised incompleteness) and Hegel’s univocity (premature completion) must lead out toward something new. It is precisely in this context that the metaphysical significance of the need for Kant to burn through Hegel takes its cue: to think a recognition of the gap whilst holding open the possibility of its overcoming. This task, to my mind, is what Bloch’s appeal to an ontology interwoven with dialectics and analogy is meant to respond to. Bloch does not absolutise the gap between process and outfall, i.e., he does not insist solely on a Kantian equivocity, on an empty regulative approximation toward the final term (“X”). Nor does he posit a complete identification between process and outfall, i.e. he does not stand upon a Hegelian univocity, but he does nevertheless maintain the Hegelian possibility of arrival. ‘So it seems necessary at this point to let Kant’—the yearning will of a striving amidst the not-yet—burn
through Hegel’ (SU, p. 187)—the objective possibility of arrival: ‘Die Fähigkeit zur Ankunft’ (SO, p. 448).

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have sought to provide an original reading of the fundamental structure of Bloch’s materialism. If, as I have argued in Chapter I, this open structure, born of the tendency-latency dialectic, can be seen as “Incompleteness - Process - (the possibility of an) Outfall,” then immediately above I have considered the relation of incompleteness/process to outfall as an analogic relation to a fullness of being which, following the core insight of Bloch’s ontology, is not-yet. To discern what this meant, I analysed some key moments in the history of analogy’s appearance so as to gauge the singularity of a Blochian form of analogia entis. I found that, despite the incompatibility of Bloch’s materialism with features of traditional forms of analogy, whether it be mathematicity or a sustaining theism, Bloch’s materialism can profitably be read as a new, experimental form of analogic metaphysics, in which the unity of process of matter is given, not by what was already there, but by what is not yet: the new and totality are thought as one and the same. I sought to concretise this reading by turning to Bloch’s novel appropriation of Kant and Hegel, in which, contra any type of syncretism, Bloch combines the two philosophers to create a new perspective on the process of rupture and order. In Bloch’s utopian form of materialism, the dialectical process of matter is sustained by the presence of an absence, namely the absence of totality as such, an absence for which, as the goal or fulcrum of matter’s journey, is in the process of being overcome. Bloch shows, then, that dialectics and the analogia entis need not
be severed at the hip but are, or can be, consubstantial, and gives to us a fuller awareness of the importance of the future as an ontological reality.
INTRODUCTION

The word matter originated from mater, meaning a fruitful world-womb experimenting with forms, figures, shapes of existence (*M*, p. 17).

I began this study by asking what it would be to speculate on language’s materiality within the context of Bloch’s utopian form of materialism. My aim was thus not to produce an independently compelling materialistic ontology of language that would claim for itself pride of place among others, for that would somewhat contravene the openness that lies at the heart of Bloch’s understanding of matter. Rather, my aim was to understand what the utopian materiality of language might consist in within the philosophical perspective that Bloch affords us. My questioning arises from, firstly, the return to speculative-materialist modes of thought that philosophy is currently undergoing, and, secondly, the ongoing reluctance on the part of this return of the speculative to investigate language’s materiality. I also noted, however, that despite this reluctance, or better, because of it, two noteworthy responses to this conjuncture exist. These are worth rehearsing once again, for they serve as foils through which to begin to outline my utopian reading of the figure of anacoluthon, a figure I read as a linguistic expression of the main themes of Bloch’s materialism and, therefore, of matter itself—this at least in the context of Bloch’s philosophy.
On the one hand, Avanesian’s (2016) response to the conjuncture I have very briefly outlined above takes the following course: language’s realist-materialist dimension lies in its being open to a realism of relations (plural). In light of the fundamental compositional structure of Bloch’s materialism, however, I threw into question whether language’s realist-materialist dimension might not lie in its being not merely open to a realism of relation (singular), but expressive of that relation, namely: the relation between incompleteness (openness) and outfall (possible realisation). This relation of process to a possible fulfilment places the emphasis on something new coming into the light of day: ‘a realism that does not realise anything’ is redundant according to Bloch (LE, p. 98). Reading the figure of anacoluthon will help me to chart this movement on the plane of language.

On the other hand, Whistler’s (2010) response takes an in itself inexperiential generativity as what is key to any speculative-materialist appraisal of language. I have outlined why Bloch’s philosophical outlook is very sympathetic to this type of departure point insofar as, for Bloch and Schelling alike, one ought not mistake matter’s process of producing from what that process produces. Like Schelling, Bloch places the philosophical concern on the former: ‘Productivity is the switch box for a reality travelling toward itself’ (LE, p. 98). However, at the same time, I suggested that, at root, Whistler’s Schellingian approach is incompatible with Bloch’s form of speculation, for the temporal direction of its process tends toward the geological (i.e. it resonates with protology). In contrast to this down and back form of speculation, Bloch provides, I suggest, an alternative approach in which to construe this inexperiential generativity, namely: as one of out and
Bloch’s ontological broadening and deepening of the importance of what has not yet been will have repercussions for a materialist appraisal of language after all, and it could be said that my study is an attempt to articulate this on the plane of language. To paraphrase Bloch, then, despite the merits of both Avanessian’s and Whistler’s respective responses, each of their perspectives is ‘deficient in utopian thought and lack[s] an adequately prospective view.’ (LE, p. 55; my emphasis) With the help of Bloch’s philosophy it is possible to contribute to addressing this deficiency.

In order to bring to light what is at the root of this prospective view I have sought, in the previous two chapters and somewhat systematically, to disclose the sense behind Bloch’s assertion which he made very early on in the course of his philosophical career, namely: that ‘the world is gay spirit and urge to creative forms’ (Chapter I) and (Chapter II) that ‘the Thing in Itself is the objective phantasy.’ (PA, p. 5) In its “complete” form, then (for Bloch’s is an “open system”), I have argued that Blochian materialism essentially consists of a dialectic that is mediated by an ontological not-yetness, i.e. what I have termed a utopian analogon. Now that the utopian substrate or the poetic correlate of Bloch’s philosophical thought has been laid-out as I see it, my concluding step below will be to open language up to the ‘blossoming field of questions’ (PHE, p. 6) which Bloch’s materialism presents to us. This will be done in three stages.

Firstly, in §1 I will chart the direction that Bloch’s materialism points to vis-à-vis materialist speculation on language, i.e. the sort of questioning it provokes; second, in §2, I will argue that the rhetorical figure of anacoluthon constitutes a concrete beginning for such speculative investigation into
language in the context of Bloch’s philosophy; and finally, in §3 I will substantiate the utopian cadence of language I spoke of at the beginning of this study by interpreting anacoluthon through the prism of my reading of Blochian materialism. In sum, I interpret anacoluthon’s syntactic discontinuity as expressive of utopian matter’s open intending for consummation. That is, anacoluthon expresses both the incompleteness of the fullness of being, and a real intending towards it.

§1. LANGUAGE AS UTOPIAN MATTER

In this section I will set-out what I see as the general speculative direction that Bloch’s materialism provides for contemporary reflection on language. Doing this will help to refine the types of questions that I will then ask in the context of attempting to grasp the figure of anacoluthon as expressive of utopian matter’s open intending for consummation. From the findings of the previous two chapters, then, I think that a number of points may be made:

[1] In view of Chapters I and II, the nature of language must, I think, in the context of Bloch’s philosophy, be derived from the open logic of utopian substance. This entails that language must be seen as a *mode* or a *moment* of forward-directed process-matter. I explained in Chapter I that, according to Bloch, no mode of matter is solid in itself but is a ‘figure of tension’ or a mode ‘of tendency’ in the process of becoming to an outfall that is in itself not-yet (*PA*, p. 259). Thus it can be said that the manner of being of language is as *one still moving mode of matter, a qualitative mode (a moment) of the open process of utopian substance*. As Bloch writes with reference to poetry: ‘The substance that finally can be adequate to poetry is
not merely mechanical, space filling matter, but that which blossoms forth historically, as a realisation of the possible.' (LE, p. 113)

One of the benefits of this approach to the materiality of language is its non-essentialism: the nature of language, the nature of its materiality, it not fixed as one thing or another, but remains open and augmentative of new forms of linguistic existence (indeed, I will read the figure of anacoluthon as that linguistic site ‘where meaning’s former context is split open’ [LE, p. 100]). Of course, it could be objected that a Blochian speculative-materialist account of language presupposes that language constitutes a mode of matter’s Erlösungssehnsucht (longing for redemption), and that, insofar as this is the case, so then this approach is essentialist on the site that language must become, at some point, essential in itself. In other words, it might be argued that the essentialism of Blochian materialism lies in its presupposition that some kind of essence is reached in the end. This would then reflect itself in the Blochian determination of language’s materiality. That said, the eventual determination of essence remains open, as does the goal-directed performance of musicians in the mode of improvisation.

To my mind, then, it is the case that, for Bloch, a utopian logic imbues both being and thought (LM, p. 451). And language must be defined by the same prospective logic. As an object of speculation, language therefore undergoes a similar re-conception as do being and thought under Bloch’s pen, such that language expresses the compositional structure of the ontology of not-yet being: Incompleteness → Process → (possibility of an) Outfall. The figure of anacoluthon will enable me to articulate the real presence of this open structure in that mode of utopian matter that Bloch calls language.
The types of questions that emerge from this backdrop would be of the sort: how can Bloch’s underlying notion that ‘the horizon of the future […] gives reality its real dimension’ (PHE, p. 285; emphasis removed) be brought to bear on a materialist conception of language? Where can ‘a day break, a movement forwards’ (Bloch, 1980, p. 48; emphasis removed) be discerned in language, and how would this be connected to the kind of concept of matter that Bloch proposes? If, as I have argued, Bloch’s materialist metaphysics can be said to rise in the West and set in the East; that is, rise with the aporetics of an ontological incognito and set—as a possibility—in the dawning ‘Is’ as final union with itself, then how does language harbour this process of possible outfall? I have already explained that determinations of utopian substance are produced or generated in and through a processual searching and finding the What of the That; that matter itself, as Bloch understands it, is an open process of searching for its own essence (‘[t]he whole of being’, Bloch writes, ‘is an inquiry into its own meaning’ [LE, p. 98]). I also noted how this process, as one of searching for a fulfilment that is not yet given in itself, necessarily entails exodus forms; that is, it entails the creation of forms that have nowhere yet been brought forth into existence. Another question would therefore be: are, and if so, in what way, are exodus forms discernible in language? In other words, in what way is language a process of searching for its own non-given essence? These are questions that Blochian materialism provokes within the philosophy of language, and they are questions which that materialism also provides answers for.124

124 These types of questions arise from the unavoidable problem of how best to lend precision to the notion that language’s quiddity—to recall the That-What relation—is precisely a searching for its quiddity. This is an important task to fulfil, because, despite Bloch asserting that ‘being is no universal gravy’ (TE, p. 285), the charge of monism has been directed at Bloch’s philosophy.
To conclude these preparatory remarks, I would like to return to the Introduction of this study and reiterate the whole purpose of my investigation; doing so in the light of the journey taken so far will help to reconfirm what is at stake in this final stage. Recall that my broad aim is congruent with Avanessian’s (2016, p. 204) intention to theorise, in the context of Bloch’s materialism, a ‘realist or materialist linguistics’, in which language is seen as expressive of ontology. My claim here is that, in the horizon of Bloch’s materialism, language becomes shaped by that of which it is a part, namely, the ontological composition of matter, and that, as such, language expresses this ontological constitution. As a consequence of this, language’s being of matter shapes language according to matter’s becoming to what it is. Such is language’s ontological correlate, is what language is expressive of. It is this—to borrow Avanessian’s terms—that is the ‘ontological thesis’ that language ‘always already’ contains: in the case of Bloch’s philosophy, an immanent utopian knowledge of transcending in the real to what has not-yet become (ibid., p. 199).125

For just as there is nothing between heaven and earth that cannot be taken over by the psychoanalyst and given a sexual interpretation, so too there is nothing which cannot be regarded as a Blochian trace, and this indiscriminate use of everything comes close to meaning nothing. (Adorno, 1992, p. 210)

It is not without significance, however, that Adorno reproaches Bloch for the abundance of utopian traces that the latter witnesses in the world—I believe anacoluthon is as good a departure point as any for thinking the materialism of language within Bloch’s philosophy precisely because, much like analogy, anacoluthon itself is a trace in Bloch’s corpus. In my mind, Adorno’s charge can only be countered by employing precisely the method Adorno is suspicious of. If Bloch’s materialism does consist of a monist account of matter, then, as I have hope to outline throughout this thesis, it must count as an open monism.

This is admittedly not an entirely original observation of Bloch’s philosophy on my part. Holz (1965), for example, follows a similar line of inquiry, arguing that Bloch’s metaphysical materialism shows how linguistic-temporal modalities have an objective basis in reality:

Language implicitly arises from precisely the presuppositions that are developed by the ontology of not-yet being: out of the nuance [Abstufung] of being according to grades
In this chapter, I develop these insights by showing that speculation on anacoluthon (speculation in Bloch’s sense of the word) can help to show that ‘the capacities and mechanisms [sic] of language can capture its realist ontological dimension.’ (ibid., p. 200) And I will do so by exploring the materialism of language neither in the sign nor in the propositional form, both of which could be said to constitute products of linguistic productivity, but rather via syntax (or better, a break or rupture of syntactical normality), which could be claimed to constitute the process of linguistic productivity. But why begin with, and just what is, anacoluthon?126

§2. Anacoluthon as Starting Point

It is important to reiterate that much as Bloch does not possess a self-standing aesthetic theory (Jung, 2012, p. 670), so he does not provide his

of reality, out of the presence of “Not” in being, out of the anticipation for the future in the present. (ibid., p. 117)

However, Holz repeats a common feature of Bloch-scholarship in his neglect of the figure of anacoluthon as it is present in Bloch’s corpus.

126 The consequences of Bloch’s ontology could be explored for semiotics. For example, in following the broad epistrophic tendency of classical metaphysics, Peirce (1998) envisages the sign’s basic function as one of re-presenting an absent object. By virtue of Bloch’s materialism, Peirce’s theory of the sign and of referentiality would require fundamental modification, in that its semiosis is tied to what Bloch terms elsewhere ‘an archaising recourse’ to retrospection (EM, p. 158). In accord with Bloch’s materialism, a utopian-semiotics would base itself on, perhaps, “pro-spection” (in the sense of the Latin prōspectus, “outlook-ing”—recall Bloch’s approach to speculation, referring to its original root rather than to the later link to mirroring, “speculari”). What this would mean is that the referentiality of the sign is not a “not-any-more” but a “not-yet” (see Kübler [1975, p. 273]). The sign’s temporal direction (Zeitrichtung) is no longer seen as a harking back, but as a harkening forwards to what has not-yet been (destinatory, day break). A Blochian semiosis would be a semiosis of anticipation as opposed to one of re-collection. One could also explore the implications of Bloch’s ontology for re-configuring logical-grammatical and/or subject-predicate construction(s). It has been suggested that the conventional subject-predicate construction is coextensive with substance metaphysics (see White, 2014), and thus precisely the type of metaphysics Bloch is contrary to. Siebers has somewhat treated of this direction of travel, placing particular emphasis on Bloch’s category of the Novum:

We have to somewhat qualify the normal pattern of substance and quality, and hence also the normal pattern of the S-P structures of propositions, to articulate this point, which bears structural resemblances to the speculative proposition in Hegel as a unity of opposites. The new does not lie outside of the entity as in a synthetic proposition, nor does it lie inside the concept as in an analytic proposition (Leibniz), for it is the new of that entity, and yet it is “really” new—it means for the entity, a moving beyond. (2013a, p. 66; see EM, pp. 39 & 41, where Bloch himself touches on this idea).
readers with an explicitly self-standing philosophy of language. What this entails is that, whilst of course staying as close to the corpus as possible (the materialist principle that one must explain the world from out of the world must be applied to the text in this instance), speculation on language in and through Bloch’s materialism must be exploratory; much like the principle of montage outlined in the Introduction, Bloch’s corpus here becomes ‘a kind of laboratory, an open experimental space’ (HT, p. 226) for the materialist philosopher of language. So much is this the case that my endeavour here could mirror the process of utopian teleology as outlined in Chapter I: the figure of anacoluthon is immanent to the open, intending logic of Blochian materialism. Experimentally probing Bloch’s corpus in the hope of arriving at, if not a definitive answer to my study-question, then an answer that brings something new to current debates.

In this spirit I will do two things in the present section. I will [1] outline my reasoning for taking-up anacoluthon as a starting point, which consists of two related points: (a) anacoluthon’s lack of reception in extant Bloch-scholarship and (b) the fact that—as already mentioned—this figure is a trace in Bloch’s corpus itself. Having established the merits of proceeding in this way I will [2] get to grips with what anacoluthon as a syntactical figure broadly signifies. From that stage on I will be able to outline, in the context of Bloch’s materialism, in what anacoluthon’s materiality consists.

§2.1. ANACOLUTHON AS TRACE

[1a] My intention here is to establish the merits of beginning with the figure of anacoluthon for the task of discerning the materiality of language in the
context of Blochian materialism. To do this, I will begin by considering the figure as a trace that is immanent to Bloch’s corpus.

Anacoluthon can be described as a Blochian trace, first, because little of substantive treatment of the figure has been undertaken in the relevant Bloch-scholarship. Those few who have treated of the figure in Bloch’s corpus stand as unworked-out intimations which therefore more or less follow Steiner’s lead (see Introduction) in the sense that, while they touch on the truth of the matter, they fail to systematically unfold the line of thought at play. Three instances of this exist in the relevant literature: Richter’s (2010), Witschel’s (1978), and Landmann’s (1965). I shall briefly survey them. Richter, for instance, suggests that anacoluthon may be related to ‘Bloch’s understanding of non-self-identity, both in the aesthetic and the materialist utopian sense’ (2010, p. 110; my emphasis). While this assessment is certainly correct it is not developed at all. Richter does not systematically explain why or how anacoluthon relates to the incognito that is the starting point of Bloch’s philosophy. I meet this task below by detailing how anacoluthon relates to matter as pre-categorial That-ness. The second case is that of Witschel’s. Witschel (1978, p. 103) also posits a confluence of utopian matter and anacoluthon, suggesting that anacoluthon ‘reflects [widerspiegelt] the reality of which it speaks. But once more the connection is stated only in the manner of a passing comment and merely repeats what—as I show below—Bloch says of the figure: again, the topic remains undeveloped. I meet this task below by showing that anacoluthon does not merely reflect, but expresses, that is, exemplifies the compositional structure of Bloch’s materialism. Finally, there is the much more interesting case of
Landmann’s (1965) remarks on the topic of anacoluthon’s relation to Bloch’s ontology are in fact recollections of a lecture Bloch gave on the subject in Berlin in 1964. In that lecture, anacoluthon is associated with ‘spontaneous language’, with the ‘liveliness of speech’, and it is suggested that ‘reality always breaks through our logically smooth image of it’ (ibid, p. 354). But following the apparent rule, Landmann takes up the same general position as the two commentators above; he fails to move beyond what has already been said concerning the inextricable relation between anacoluthon and Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being. A systematic account is missed. Fulfilling this task is my intention below.\footnote{This logic of neglecting anacoluthon also goes the other way. What I mean by this is that while some commentators have insightfully treated of language in Bloch’s philosophy, they have failed to bring to bear anacoluthon’s importance to the whole topic. I have already, in the Introduction to this study, mentioned Steiner as a representative of this sort of omission, as too is Holz (1965) mentioned only a moment ago. Another, more recent example is Siebers’ comparative analysis of Bloch’s literary work Traces and Johann-Peter Hebel’s The Treasure Chest (1811). In his analysis, Siebers (2013b, p. 190-1) not only intimates the utopian directedness of language, speaking of the ‘utopian core’ and the ‘utopian horizon’ ‘necessary to human communication’, he also recognises that this temporal, anticipatory, prospective horizon of language emerges from and is only comprehensible within the structure of Bloch’s materialism (ibid., p. 204). What Siebers does not do, however, is incorporate into his discussion the centrality of anacoluthon.}

[1b] Anacoluthon is, however, a trace for a much more immanent reason than the one outlined above, for it is a trace in Bloch’s corpus itself. Together with Landmann’s recollections of the lecture mentioned above, which, incidentally, is itself a type of trace (for no text of the actual lecture exists), the only explicit presence of anacoluthon in Bloch’s corpus is a single essay (situated in the Literary Essays). Beyond this and the abovementioned lecture no explicit evocation of anacoluthon appears in Bloch’s texts. In itself this helps to explain why anacoluthon has been given
such scant treatment in Bloch-scholarship: Bloch *himself* gave it little regard (it seems).¹²⁸

But it is precisely this, its inconspicuousness, which warrants us to treat of anacoluthon with real seriousness. Although the rhetorical figure occupies a seemingly marginal place in Bloch’s corpus it could in fact count for much more *because* of its marginality. The importance of that which is marginal and inconspicuous for Bloch’s thought becomes clear by turning to a composition of the parabolic text *Traces* (*Spuren*), a text which, as Boella (2012, p. 510) notes, Bloch chose to open his collected works with. In that composition Bloch gives a piece of advice: ‘One should observe precisely the little things, go after them. What is slight and odd often leads the furthest.’ (*T*, p. 5) The adage bespeaks a realism not of ‘reproductive naturalism’ (that is, mere mirroring), but *concentration* (*PHE*, p. 216). In other words, Bloch invites his readers to practice a *Spurenlesen*—a reading of traces. In and through concentration for inconspicuous traces one finds the incidental though ‘ineffable’ details where hope begins to blossom and, without guarantee, finds its confirmation (*PHE*, p. 302).

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¹²⁸ Incidentally, anacoluthon is not only an inconspicuousness residing both in Bloch’s corpus and in commentary on Bloch; anacoluthon is also a neglected figure within the field of rhetoric to which it traditionally belongs. Indication of its omission in this regard is exhibited in the index of rhetorical terms given in Vickers’ otherwise comprehensive study *In Defence of Rhetoric* (2002). As Sanders’ (2014, p. 490) exception to this rule of omission notes, the reason behind anacoluthon’s universal neglect presumably lies in the fact that neither Donatus nor Priscian nor Quintilian treated of it. Naturally those rhetoricians who followed the masters did not think to either. In this context, there is something vaguely consequential when Bloch writes: ‘In his first attempt at a Latin grammar, M. Terentius Varro is said to have forgotten the future tense; philosophically, it has still not been adequately considered to this day.’ (*PHE*, p. 6) Indeed, perhaps fondness for the strictures of grammar in itself precipitates against the future tense: that is, against anacoluthon?
What was that? Something moved! And it moved in its own way. An impression that will not let us come to rest over what we heard. An impression on the surface of life, so that it tears, perhaps. *(T, p. 6; my emphasis)*

This imperative for concentration, for an eye to the inconspicuous, can be practiced, in immanent fashion, on Bloch’s corpus itself (one should explain the philosophy from out of the philosophy). In this light, the figure of anacoluthon becomes an exemplary node by which to approach the materiality of language within a utopian horizon of speculation such as Bloch’s philosophy affords us. By observing and going after what is slight and odd one can “go the furthest.”

**§2.2. PRELIMINARY DEFINITION**

[2] Having established two important reasons for deploying the figure of anacoluthon for present purposes, reasons that are immanent to Bloch’s philosophy, I now want to get a firmer grip on just what the figure of anacoluthon is, or rather, what the figure does to the “normal” operations of language. To get an initial bearing on this, I can turn to Sanders’ (2014) exceptional commentary on the figure:

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129 ‘Concentration as realism’ *(PH, p. 249; emphasis removed)*. Much could be said of this move, not least that it is but an echo: “‘Attentiveness [Aufmerksamkeit], Malebranche had said, “is the natural prayer of the soul”.’ *(SO, p. 41; emphasis removed)*. Walter Benjamin also relies on a “detective-style” approach in his attempt to unearth the truth-content of everyday phenomena, a “micrology” as it were, one capable of discerning the “splinters of messianic time” scattered about the present. In an overarching register, all this recalls Bloch’s remarks concerning the Christian pathos of going after the mystery of smallness: ‘Classical love was eros towards the beautiful, the brilliant, Christian love turns instead not merely to the oppressed and the lost but to the inconspicuous among them.’ *(PHE, p. 1261)*

130 Incidentally, the editor of the book in which Sanders’ singular commentary appears is a one-time student of Bloch’s, Gert Ueding, a prominent figure behind the revival of rhetoric in the German academy.
Anacoluthon qualifies as a grammatical-rhetorical technical term for a linguistic “derailment in construction [Konstruktionsentgleisung]” or, if one wants to avoid a negative valuation, an “inconsistent syntax [Satzbau]”. (ibid., p. 485)\textsuperscript{131}

Anacoluthon, Sanders says, represents a “non-consistent mode of expression [nicht folgerichtige Ausdrucksweise]” (ibid.). Indeed, this sense of “not following” or of a “lacking of sequence” essentially corresponds to the etymological derivation of the notion from the Greek \(\alpha\) “not” and the adjective \(\alphaκόλουθον\) (akolouthos), “accompanying [begleitend],” “corresponding [entsprechend],” “following [folgend]” (ibid.).

Thus, anacoluthon’s ‘chief form [Hauptform]’ is a “not-accompanying,” a “non-corresponding,”\textsuperscript{132} a “not-following,” or more simply a ‘shift in construction [Konstruktionswechsel]’ in the flow of a sentence (ibid., p. 487). The German “ein Satzbruch” (a term coined by Eduard Engel) denotes the same sense albeit perhaps with more intensity. “\textit{Ein Bruch}”: “a violation,” “a breach,” “an infringement,” “a flaw,” “a failure,” “a rupture,” “a fracture,” “a breakage, break, breaking(-off),” “a disruption,” “a crack,” “a discontinuity,” “a parting.” All these senses are corroborated by a number of other commentators’ definitions of the figure. Newmark (2012, p. 93; my emphasis), for example, defines anacoluthon as an instance in which ‘one syntactical pattern, one grammatical construction’ is discontinued ‘by another before the first [pattern] is allowed to complete itself.’ Anacoluthon

\textsuperscript{131} All translations of Sanders are my own.

\textsuperscript{132} Recall that “correspondence” and “proportionality” are words inextricably tied to analogy, the latter of which, of course, has been shown to relate to such notions as “orderedness” and “harmony.” But such determinations of analogy are unfounded in doctrines such as Przywara’s, for whom analogia entis is at root an expression of a relation of alterity between God and creation.
therefore touches on the notion of incompleteness: ‘a deviation, a rupture or a break within an overall movement that could otherwise be integrated into one system of meaning.’ (ibid.; my emphasis) As another example, Richter (2000, p. 110; my emphasis) also defines anacoluthon as ‘what has no logical following in the syntax of a sentence’; it is a breaking ‘out of the scheme of sequential speech or writing to mark a point where the linearity of a discourse and its logic breaks down.’ Here the point is considered not as objectively augmentative of a new beginning (this is where I think Bloch places his emphasis), but rather as an objective breakdown (this is, I think, where Adorno places the emphasis [see my analysis of Adorno below]).

This distinction highlights the productivity at the heart of the apophatic moment in Bloch’s materialism: for the not-yetness of being renders speech, not so much silent, as creative and productive of the new.)

In sum, an anacoluthon can be said to signify the following kinds of determinations: it is a point (perhaps a starting point), it lacks any clear logic (it is an evident illogicality), it is a deviation, a rupture, a break; it marks an incompletion, it is unsystematic, it is non-linear, it seemingly spurns the almost naturally integrative movement of a sentence.

In light of my

133 Of the three forms of anacoluthia reviewed by Sanders (2014, p. 486), prolepsis (Latin: *anticipatio*) is as significant as is the more literal *Satzbruch* (the final form being the particle). In its most essential character prolepsis is ‘anticipation [Vorwegnahme]’—often used as a strategy with which to pre-empt and forestall potential objections of one’s interlocutor in debate (ibid.). In my reading below, anacoluthon connotes an anticipatory, proleptic cadence in language: it is anticipatory language, or better, it is anticipatoriness in language.

134 Indeed, Sanders (2014, p. 487) stresses that the *Satzbruch* not be understood as a ‘termination [Satzabbruch], but as an ‘interruption [Satzunterbruch]. Anacoluthia are thus not complete terminations, but turning points in speech, the disruption of syntactical order, precisely in order to find something new.

135 Bloch, however, tempers any easy conflation of anacoluthon with irrationality:
findings in Chapters I and II it is unmistakable that anacoluthon significantly resonates with and echoes certain tenets of Bloch’s materialism, particularly that of incompleteness (not-having). I will expand on this claim in §3 below. The final point to make for now, one which I will return to, is that what is perhaps most curious about anacoluthon is its character of being a syntactic figure that marks an upheaval of syntactical normalcy: it constitutes some kind of border figure, and thus is open to being read as a Frontal figure, in the sense of Bloch’s category of the Front. The Greek derivation of syn-tax, as σύν- “together” and ταξις “an ordering,” highlights that anacoluthon is not necessarily a syntactic figure that is anti-syntactic, but neither is it strictly speaking syntactic. But in recalling the following passage we are reminded that, in the context of Bloch’s thought, rupture and order do not constitute mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather, insofar as order is that which is not yet, rupture is the proper manner of the becoming of order:

In the goal which is being striven for it is the one necessity of, to use an outmoded expression, the highest good, which pacifies the unrest of the need and striving, that for which it would not be necessary to struggle if it were already available. This kind of totality, the non-existing all, not the existing whole, is the goal of the dialectical movement that holds it together, exactly as need is its impulse and motor. (Bloch, 1983, p. 303)

My guiding question in this chapter concerns the ontologically immanent knowledge given in and through anacoluthon (in the context of Bloch’s

The pattern of living speech that flows and flourishes as such, and that still sounds within lettered speech, is not inimical to reason; rather, it constitutes its own—or even more, the actual—music of reason. (LE, p. 501)

Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to inquire into the musicality of the figure of anacoluthon, although doing so seems crucial to developing a reading of the figure which sees it as expressive of Bloch’s utopian teleology.
materialism), i.e. what does anacoluthon’s existence reveal of language’s materiality? My response will be that anacoluthon’s existence reveals, linguistically, the intending for a fullness of being that in itself is not yet.\footnote{This sort of question would certainly appear strange to analytically-inclined philosophers of language. As Davidson (2001, p. 223) writes: ‘Questions of reference do not arise in syntax, much less get settled.’ But anacoluthon is not strictly speaking syntax as the rupture of it. Hillis Miller provides leverage to go one step further and say that anacoluthon is the non-phenomenal, generative force of language:

The rhythmical emphases of an oral sentence, like the marks of punctuation in a piece of written language, are \textit{without semantic meaning in themselves}. A dash is \textit{without referential significance}. You do not \textit{enunciate it} when you read the sentence aloud. The rhythm of a spoken sentence does not alter the semantic content of the words taken separately. Such elements indicate joints, hinges, articulations, spaces, or pauses, the nonsignifying and \textit{nonphenomenal} syntactic aspects of language without which language could not make sense. (1990, p. 110; my emphasis)

Anacoluthon’s disruption of syntactical flow can be read, in the context of Blochian materialism, as a linguistic expression of the non-existence of ontological totality (\textit{ontōs on}), but also the real, open intending towards it. Hillis Miller inadvertently touches on this when he writes that ‘interruption, like marks of punctuation, at once have nothing to do with signification and everything to do with it.’ (ibid.) This interpenetration of nothingness and being found dynamically crystallised in the figure of anacoluthon is exampled none more so than in Hegel’s opening to his \textit{Logic}. A number of commentators have drawn attention to the fact that Hegel opens his \textit{Logic} with an anacoluthon (Simoniti, 2015; Adorno, 1993):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Being, pure being}—without further determination. (Hegel, 2010, p. 59)
\end{quote}

For Simoniti (2015, p. 858), Hegel’s ‘non-predicative anacoluthon’ does not assert anything, but simply intends and means; it evokes a ‘form of recess, leap, or even event.’}
§2.3. ADORNO-STEINER-MIESZKOWSKI

I am not, however, concerned with reading Hegel on the topic of anacoluthon here, but rather three other thinkers to have considered, to varying degrees, the importance of anacoluthon. The findings I will draw from these three considerations will then allow me to map out more precisely the way in which anacoluthon can be understood as expressive of matter from a Blochian standpoint. As the title of this subsection makes clear, the three interpretations in question are [1] Adorno’s (1992), [2] Steiner’s (1965) and [3] Mieszkowski’s (2009).

[1] Adorno’s (1992, p. 138) analysis of a ‘paratactic method’ touches on anacoluthon as a figure that is radically opposed to synthesis, and therefore the figure is deeply related to Adorno’s guiding project of a metaphysics of non-identity: a negative dialectic.\(^{137}\) Whilst I do not go into any depth on Adorno’s philosophical intentions in what follows, I will draw attention both to the diacritical differences and the consanguinity between Adorno and Bloch on the site of their respective readings of anacoluthon.\(^{138}\)

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\(^{137}\) Adorno speaks of his ‘desire to dissociate from fetishisation of the positive’, claiming that a ‘negative dialectic as critique means above all criticism of precisely this claim to identity’, a claim towards which Adorno has ‘always felt a violent apathy’ (2008, pp. 18 & 20-1). Adorno’s negative dialectics makes a virtue of what Buck-Morss (1977, p. 47) describes as a rejection of Hegelian teleology. It is radically opposed to the smooth teleological unfolding of freedom and truth and places its bets on the breaks and gaps of the present, moving markedly closer to anacoluthon as a principle of philosophising. As Buck-Morss writes: ‘History [for Adorno] formed “no structural whole.” Instead it was “discontinuous,” unfolding within a multiplicity of divisions of human praxis through a dialectical process which was open-ended.’ (ibid.)

\(^{138}\) For a treatment of the relationship between Bloch and Adorno, see Claussen’s *Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius* (2008). I cannot pursue in full detail the differences between utopian dialectics and its negative counterpart (what Adorno calls a “logic of disintegration” [2008, p. 69]). For a cursory treatment of this topic, see Münster (1986).
Adorno’s treatment of anacoluthon develops from his reading of Hölderlin’s late hymnic work, the ‘paratactical language’ of which Adorno sees as an objective expression of the ‘consciousness of non-identity’ (ibid., pp. 136-41). For Adorno, parataxis, which, as Bloch also suggests of anacoluthon, is said to verge on the ‘music-like’, consists of ‘artificial disturbances that evade the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax.’ (ibid., p. 131) In Adorno’s eyes, the truth content of Hölderlin’s stylistic technique is its ‘anticlassicistic’ ‘rebellion against harmony’ (ibid, p. 133), in which or through which a ‘disintegrative moment’ reveals ‘the unattainability of the linguistic ideal’ (ibid., p. 137; my emphasis). Adorno (ibid., p. 142-4) associates the paratactic—to paraphrase Bloch, this antithesis to ‘classicist calm’ and ‘classicist solidification’ (HT, pp. 199 & 200)—with the anacoluthic in that anacoluthon is a rupture through which identity, i.e. synthesis of subject-object, the very ‘watchword of Idealism’, is cast aside.

Of course, all this is very reminiscent of Bloch’s ontological incognito: I am. But I do not have myself. But even if there were a sign that Adorno’s reading is at one with the real incognito that is Bloch’s philosophy’s starting point, then Adorno’s speaking of a complete casting aside of identity opens up an unbridgeable difference between him and Bloch. While Adorno is fully conscious that existence nowhere has its essence, he seems to foreclose the intention toward and the possibility of attaining essence, of arriving at a fullness of being. This is a contentious claim, of course, but one nonetheless corroborated by the German original of Adorno’s essay on Hölderlin, in

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139 It is thus no surprise that Adorno employs paratactic composition to convey his philosophical content (see Richter, 2000, p. 99).
which Adorno (1974, p. 480) claims that the ‘fragmentary [fragmentarischen] character’ of Hölderlin’s paratactic hymns perhaps marks a ‘constitutive inability to be complete [konstitutiv unvollendbar].’ Strangely, in another text, Adorno imputes precisely this constitutive inability to complete to Bloch’s style itself. Like Hölderlin’s language, which ‘manifests remoteness, separation of subject and object’ (Adorno, 1992, p. 128), so the

[...] breaks in [Bloch’s] speech are an echo of a historical moment that compels a philosophy of subject-object to admit the continuing breach between subject and object. (ibid., p. 211)

But how far must this admittance go? Adorno’s emphasis on a constitutive incompleteness, on an unsettling hiatus cut to the measure of an a priori (Adorno’s “historical conjuncture” notwithstanding), serves as the leading difference between his and what I take as Bloch’s own reading of anacoluthon. If Adorno’s parataxis-reading instils in thought and language and being itself the inescapability of antinomies (1974, p. 480), if it stands as an outstripping of the drive for identity as a very principle (ibid., p. 482), then the irredeemable as such is brought up to philosophical form in and by Adorno, and is thereby seen no more than to mirror a Kantian infinite striving: only Kant’s dislocation burns and flourishes here, there is too little possibility of arrival, not enough Hegel into the mix. But Bloch’s uptake of the figure is much more speculative insofar as it harbours a utopian cataphatic element, namely: the genuine possibility of real arrival.140
Indeed, as I will show in more detail in the following section, Bloch’s position is subtly but fundamentally different from Adorno’s, something Bloch is well aware of when writing to Adorno the following important comment: ‘It is true that the utopian conscience […] has remained alive, quite explicitly, in your rich and successful writings. But the snag [is] the abandonment of the great line, the unum necessarium’ (quoted in Claussen, 2008, p. 272). The figure of the tear is in Adorno not linked as such to the possibility of an opening to redemption, to the overcoming of that abyss which separates the becoming of subject-object from the fullness of being for which they become at all. On balance, then, Adorno knows of the incompleteness but shuns the ineradicable invariant of direction in Bloch’s dislocatory style of expressionism. This is all the more remarkable insofar as Adorno in fact knew of this goal-quality permeating all of Bloch’s writings:

Behind every word stands his resolve to break through the solid barrier which ever since Kant common sense has inserted between consciousness and things-in-themselves. (1992, p. 206; my emphasis)

While Bloch’s expression is born of the “enduring gap” between subject and object, indeed of the incompleteness of the subject in itself and of the object likewise, so it also speaks of a necessary pathos to overcome non-identity. To paraphrase Bloch, ‘the dreaming surplus pours […] out of all “words” here’ and the main thing makes its presence felt (HT, p. 226).

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similarity between anacoluthon and parabasis stems from the fact that both figures interrupt the expectations of a given grammatical or rhetorical movement. As digression […] parabasis clearly involves the interruption of a discourse. (ibid.)
[2] To illuminate this more cataphatic, exploratory dimension of anacoluthon requires turning away from Adorno. In the Introduction I noted that my study is in a sense a systematic footnote to Steiner’s unworked-out intuition concerning the potentiality that Bloch’s philosophy harbours for speculating on language anew. And indeed, Steiner’s intuition allows for an approach to be taken on anacoluthon that is markedly different from that of Adorno’s aniconic reading. Steiner does this, I will argue, by considering anacoluthon’s rupture as intimately related to novelty of expression. In the context of Bloch’s materialism, this will allow me to cement the relation I have made between the figure of anacoluthon and the Blochian categories of *Novum* and *Ultimum* (recall that, in Chapter II, I showed how, to Bloch’s way of thought, existence’s arrival at essence would be no more than arrival at a *Novum*).

Steiner (1965, p. 341) does not actually refer to anacoluthon but to what he calls the ‘Pythagorean genre’ (recall analogy’s Pythagorean inception). Nevertheless, I claim that anacoluthon is the very logic of this genre as Steiner conceives it. This can easily be seen when one notes that, in Steiner’s estimation, Bloch is the ‘foremost living writer’ of the “Pythagorean genre” because he has ‘broken the generically ponderous, clotted norms of German syntax’, and in so doing has given a ‘unique voice’ to an ‘an unprecedented need’ (ibid., p. 342; my emphasis). Immediately, then, the disruption of syntactical norms constitutes Steiner’s understanding of the “Pythagorean genre,” and this breaking through syntactical normalcy is said to be born of *need*. Now, the notion of the *Novum* comes into play at this point when Steiner suggests that Bloch’s stylistics represent a kind of
**aubade-prose (Tagelied)**, i.e. considered within the horizon of Bloch’s materialism, the need that gives birth to syntactical breaks is the need for totality and totality would be a *Novum*. Steiner does not say this himself. What he does clearly show, however, is that, above and beyond Adorno’s relating anacoluthon’s intent to a paratactic expression of non-identity, the “Pythagorean genre” in fact announces the eruption of an intent for *new modes of expression*. It constitutes a linguistic opening into the new, the site of the parturition of new forms of speech. Through Steiner’s contribution one is able to tease out that feature of anacoluthon that is not simply bounded to non-identity.

This reading can be rendered more concretely by considering in more detail Steiner’s characterisation of the “Pythagorean genre.” Steiner’s discussion of this genre is prefigured with a claim that, as a literary mode of expression, the novel now constitutes an inadequate expressive form in the present socio-historical conjuncture. The novel is declared relatively bankrupt. Born of this *inadequacy* are new expressive-forms, tentative, but real:

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141 Derived from the Latin *albus*, “aubade” denotes the overwhelming whiteness or clarity of dawn and is rooted in the old Occitan form of the *alba*: ‘Traditionally *aubade* is a joyful poem that celebrates the coming of morning’ (Anon, 2013, p. 1). As Fryatt writes:

> The category of the dawn song or poem is vast: they are found in almost all cultures and have been composed since the earliest times. Perhaps originally religious, dawn poems are also associated in most of these cultures with secular eroticism (2012, p. 200).

But an ambiguity of the aubade is ever present. As Rowe (2011, p. 171) notes, the aubade does not simply convey the positivity of a ‘joyful dawn song’ in the troubadour tradition; in fact, in much of the poetic tradition the emergence of a new day announces the need for lovers to part—the aubade can thus also be understood as a cursing of the dawn. This is taken further with Philip Larkin’s poem “Aubade” (published in 1977), which itself is a reflection on death, and thus in a sense emphasises entropy (no dawn shall dawn again). The different interpretations of anacoluthon provided by Bloch and Adorno are, I would suggest, therefore woven into the very history of the *alba* form, and in fact, the claim that Bloch’s whole philosophy (and its conception of reality) is a dawn song is not too far off the mark. Indeed, Bloch frequently expresses the drive to utopia with the Latin *ex oriente lux* (“light from the East”). As Bloch quotes Hebel: “The Orient, where our faith, our fruit tree, and our blood reside.” (*LE*, p. 154)
Our culture has seen the rise and decay of the verse epic and of “high drama”; it has seen the retreat of poetry from a central mnemonic or argumentative function in society; it is at present witnessing the decline of the novel from essential purpose. But there are other possibilities of form, other shapes of expression dimly at work. In the disorder of our affairs [...] new modes of statement, new grammars or poetics for insight, are becoming visible. They are tentative and isolated. But they exist like those packets of radiant energy around which matter is said to gather in turbulent space. (ibid., 336)

Steiner holds the likes of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Karl Kraus and Walter Benjamin as belonging to these tentative explorations in expressiveness, in which old expressive forms shine in the light of their own inadequacy (again, the apophatic moment). But the ‘common factor in these works’, Steiner writes, is

the reaching out of language toward new relations (what we call logic), and in a wider sense toward a new syntax by which to tempt reality into the momentary but living order of words. (ibid.; my emphasis)

And, in their striving ‘toward new potentialities’ (ibid., p. 338) these nascent forms of expression are said to ‘modify, by the very fact of their existence, our sense of how meaning may be communicated.’ (ibid., p. 336) Bloch himself is privy to this new tendency in literary and philosophical expression: the ‘great cultural works [...] expose “meaning” to its own utopian content’, a process in which ‘meaning’s former context is split open’ (LE, pp. 110 & 100).

Steiner, however, fails to question why all this takes place. No doubt Steiner hints at a response when he writes that new expressive forms “tempt reality
into the momentary but living order of words,” but just why does language need to reach out to discover new relations and new syntaxes? Just why are nascent forms of expression arising at all? What is the principal mode through which this need for new expression announces itself? Steiner comes close again but misses the importance of anacoluthon, and indeed the ontological composition of reality that is the condition of existence of anacoluthon and the “Pythagorean genre”:

Wherever it reaches out toward the limits of expressive form, literature comes to the shore of silence. There is nothing mystical in this. Only the realisation that the poet and philosopher, by investing language with the utmost precision and illumination, are made aware, and make the reader aware, of other dimensions which cannot be circumscribed in words. (1965, p. 341; my emphasis)

[3] Mieszkowski’s (2009) insights into anacoluthon neither mention Bloch nor materialism but they do inadvertently illuminate the fact that the figure is a prime candidate for the logic of what Steiner calls the “Pythagorean genre.” By showing that anacoluthon’s very existence reveals something essential about language itself—that it is ‘a window onto an essential feature of signification’ (ibid., p. 649)—Mieszkowski helps me to show that anacoluthon just is a figure of language’s reaching out towards the new, and that this reaching out toward the new is inextricable from language’s ontological correlate: not-yet being.

The first important point of Mieszkowski’s analysis is that anacoluthon’s intrinsic belonging to language is usually denied if it is not compositionally utilised as a rhetorical effect by a Shakespeare or a Cicero a consilio (that is,
intentionally, as opposed to a casu: accidentally). That is, it is commonly
deemed an imperfection of speech, as opposed to an orderly flow that,
perhaps the idea is implicit here, corresponds to an orderly world (ibid., p.
649). Sanders (2014, p. 487) also points to anacoluthon’s negative valuation
in this respect. Anacoluthon’s “disruption [Störung] of syntactical texture”, its
“improper transformation of sentence construction”, its “transgression
[Verstoß] of the written norm” are conventionally held to be conditioned by a
“sloppy way of speaking”, by “excitation”, “forgetfulness”, or by “disjointed
thought”, by “spontaneous speech that is reducible to intellectual
deficiencies” or simply by one’s “losing the thread of a complex sentence-
formation [Satzbildung]” (ibid.). As I will outline in the following section, this
spontaneity of speech is precisely what Bloch values in the figure of
anacoluthon, and indeed what he values in writers such as Hebel, whose
‘every word occurs […] as if spoken’, such that ‘Hebel’s voice is one of the
least affected by the print medium.’ (LE, pp. 146-7)\(^{142}\)

The point for now is that anacoluthon is seen as an impropriety that
infiltrates speech from the outside and is as such reducible to psychological
or emotional interferences in the otherwise proper workings of language: it

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\(^{142}\) As Bloch writes contra grammaticalness:

There is a good German that is good when it expresses what it has to say. Grammatical transgressions can of course be allowed. Nevertheless, language can be
good and great German insofar as grammatical mistakes are also necessary, because
language has been ruptured until it was suitable and pliant enough to communicate
what for usual grammar, for the usual, undialectical things, is incommunicable. (1985c,
p. 14; my emphasis)

[Es gibt ein gutes Deutsch, das gut ist, wenn es das ausdrückt, was es zu sagen hat. Grammatische Verstöße kann es natürlich geben. Trotzdem kann die Sprache gutes
und großes Deutsch sein, indem die grammatikalischen Fehler auch notwendig sind, weil die Sprache gebrochen worden ist, bis sie dazu tauglich, schmiegsam genug war, das auszudrücken, was in der üblichen Grammatik, die für übliche, undialektische
Gegenstände taugt, nicht auszudrücken ist.]
does not strike at an essential feature of language as such: ‘Language breaks down, but the fault is said to lie with the speaker rather than with language itself.’ (Mieszkowski, 2009, p. 649) Anacoluthic rupture is therefore conventionally considered non-representative of the essence of language: *neither is it taken to say anything of importance on the score of the nature of linguistic beings nor of referentiality, nor of the ontological composition of the reality in which linguistic beings speak and communicate.*

However, Mieszkowski’s contribution to our understanding of anacoluthon lies not so much in the above than in the attention he draws to what, in my mind, constitutes the material generativity at the heart of the figure. As he writes, the figure of anacoluthon lies ‘[a]t the border of figuration and disfiguration’ (ibid, p. 653). He explains, anacoluthon is

both super-figural—the *extension of creativity* in language use to *transformations* in the rules of syntax and grammar themselves—and sub-figural, almost too deviant to register as a coherent representational gesture. As a figure for the difference between a *departure* from literal language and a mistake, anacoluthon is at once *the figure of figures and a figure for the dissolution of figure,* the collapse of sustained comparisons between figurative and literal instances of language that allows for figuration to emerge in the first place. (pp. 652; my emphasis)

This passage crystallises the contention that the figure of anacoluthon constitutes not merely a *material figure* of linguistic generativity, but material linguistic generativity as such, insofar as it is the site of both figuration and of disfiguration. In the context of Bloch’s materialism, however, one might better put it: re-figuration, in the sense of *new*-figuration. Derrida (2002, p.
167) also touches upon anacoluthon’s speculativeness in this regard: ‘Doubtless more than a figure of rhetoric, despite appearances, it signals in any case toward the beyond of rhetoric within rhetoric. Beyond grammar within grammar.’ The closest Mieszkowski comes to touching on this much more extensive reading of the figure of anacoluthon is, however, through his reappraisal of Kant’s concept of “self-affection” in light of his insights. Anacoluthon qua language’s “self-affection” is ‘the dynamic in virtue of which language becomes what it is by relating to itself as something that it has not yet become.’ (ibid., p. 654; my emphasis) But again, Bloch’s reading of Kant enacts an ontologisation of the latter’s findings. This translates into the following crucial claim: anacoluthon is not merely a subjective or aesthetic category; its upsetting the fabric of syntactical movement expresses reality because ‘reality itself is undergoing upheaval and breaking apart.’ (LE, p. 503; emphasis removed)

§3. BLOCH’S ANACOLUTHON

The world was not built by schoolteachers, neither its poetry nor its forming-transforming forces that provide the basis for a poetry of universal style. (LE, p. 116)

The sole essay in which the figure of anacoluthon is theorised by Bloch, “Spoken and Written Syntax: Anacoluthon” (LE, p. 497-504), broadly conveys anacoluthon as a figure of speech that depicts or re-presents process-matter’s dialectical transitivity (LE, p. 503). This could be a cause of confusion for Bloch’s reader. For, strictly speaking, this is not the kind of language one should be employing when speaking of anacoluthon in the
context of Bloch's materialism; it seems to be terminology that can only paint the figure of anacoluthon as somehow separate from matter. But as I have shown in Chapter I, according to the very immanentism of Blochian materialism, no such thing as being beyond process-matter can be possible; apart from, that is, the non-place of utopia itself, which is said to be in some sense extraterritorial to process. Other than this extraterritoriality, which can be said to be that which sets process off in the first place insofar as it is the final cause of process, no such “beyond matter” is feasible in the context of Bloch’s philosophy. Whilst in what follows I will not be concerned to elaborate on Bloch’s own style vis-à-vis to its anacoluthic prose, I do want to read Bloch at his word, as it were, by considering anacoluthon as an immanent expression of his metaphysical materialism, and not as a style of speaking which depicts, reflects, or merely mirrors matter’s becoming. Anacoluthon does not depict matter: it is matter in its generativity.143

143 As Richter (2000, p. 107) points out, ‘the specific role that style and language play in [Bloch’s] oeuvre has not received the attention that it deserves.’ This is true, but such an undertaking, while potentially really striking at the immanent tendency of Bloch’s materialism, remains beyond the scope of this chapter. My approach is different. I want to read anacoluthon in light of Bloch’s concepts, showing thereby that this figure should count, in the context of that materialism, as a linguistic expression of matter’s becoming to its own essence. I have already commented on the prevailing view among Bloch’s intellectual circle that philosophy had to succumb to a new mandate so that it might renew its vision, its expression and articulation of reality (see Gluck 1985, pp. 143-73). Geoghegen intimates how Bloch’s searching for new forms of philosophical expression relates to the interruptive power of anacoluthon, in that

[alongside [the] highly technical, quasi-scholastic categorical distinctions [of his metaphysical materialism], Bloch introduces what for him was the aesthetic cutting edge of modernity, Expressionism—in the form of an oblique, staccato prose style. This was also deemed to befit a metaphysics which had broken with the static systems of the past. (1996, p. 30; my emphasis)

Indeed, it is well to mention that Bloch’s utopian metaphysics was itself anacoluthic with regard to the history of philosophy, namely: it broke with longstanding presuppositions regarding conceptions of being in order to break out into the new (see PHE, p. 6). This point bears on Holz’s (1975, p. 38) claim, made in the context of Bloch’s materialism, that each philosophy has sought or seeks to formulate its own categories in an attempt to articulate what is beyond expression—beyond expression because novel to the word. ‘Adequate care to the matter’, Holz thus says, ‘requires [philosophy’s] own linguistic reproduction.’ (ibid., p. 43) In sum, style is integral to philosophical content which itself in turn is integral to the matter itself, to matter’s flow into the new: ‘how you say what you say is to a great
My intention, then, is to creatively extend Bloch’s materialism to a speculative appraisal of language’s materiality. The task consists of illuminating as clearly as possible the figure of anacoluthon as expressive of the compositional structure of Bloch’s metaphysical materialism. I will do this in two subsections, the first of which deals with anacoluthon as expressive of That-ness, the second, as expressive of an intending for What-ness. Naturally, in light of the previous two chapters, these two moments are inextricable in Blochian materialism.

§3.1. THAT-NESS

The extent to which the figure of anacoluthon is expressive of That-ness can be gauged, in the first instance, by the very terms by which Bloch frames his discussion of the figure. Bloch’s anacoluthon essay is clearly based on the distinction he makes between classical and utopian metaphysics. Referring to anacoluthon, Bloch speaks of its expressing ‘a different state of mobility than that of the all too settled condition that subsists behind the past perfect of eternal letters.’ (LE, p. 504) The “past perfect” is of course that tense which expresses a past completed or extent what you say.’ (Webb, 1991, p. vii) On this point Bense (1978, p. 71) counsels Bloch’s readers to heed the difference ‘between the informative and the communicative significance’ of Bloch’s sentences. In fact, read in light of Adorno’s remarks below, it can be suggested that philosophy renews its expression each time it returns to its speculative mandate, for it does things to language, and does not merely tell us what language is:

I believe that without speculation there is no such thing as depth. The fact that in its absence philosophy really does degenerate into mere description may well seem quite plausible to you. This speculative surplus that goes beyond whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the element of freedom in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom, because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also represents happiness of thought. It is the element of freedom because it is the point at which the expressive need of the subject breaks through the conventional and canalized ideas in which he moves, and asserts himself. And this breakthrough of the limits set on expression from within together with the smashing of the façade of life in which one happens to find oneself—these two elements may well be the same thing. (Adorno, 2008, pp. 107-8)
perfected action. In other words, what is evoked here in Bloch’s framing of anacoluthon is the critique of classical metaphysics that underpins his own ontology as a principle. There is a dimension of language that is not reliant on an epistrophic orientation, an orientation in which what is being said is complete, finished and so perfected prior to the saying of it. One can imagine, at least at this stage, then, that anacoluthon constitutes a more free-flowing, experimentalist form of language. This gives reason to think the figure is expressive of That-ness, of searching, directed ontological incompletion (see Holz, 1975, pp. 44-5). Below I will outline in specific terms how this is the case.\[144\]

[1] In the first instance, my reading of anacoluthon in the context of Bloch’s materialism thus views the figure as expressive of ontological incognito, or ontological incompletion.\[145\] Indeed, by drawing on comments that Bloch makes elsewhere in his corpus, there is good reason to believe that anacoluthic interruption is expressive of the open That-ness that is the starting point of Bloch’s metaphysical materialism:

\[144\] Insofar as Aristotle bases his metaphysics on the anteriority of actuality, as opposed to possibility, so Bloch bases his discussion of anacoluthon on the anteriority of the spoken word:

The fact is, oral and written modalities have existed for different lengths of time. Speaking, storytelling, even singing appeared much earlier than writing; and even after its invention, writing was utilised as a record of oral storytelling. (LE, p. 497)

’W’riting is a late development,’ Bloch writes (LE, p. 498) This might constitute a strange move on Bloch’s part. For, throughout this study I have shown that Bloch’s prospective, anticipative form of speculation is fundamentally opposed to explanatory arguments drawn from a logic of past-ness. And yet, paradoxically, here is Bloch giving precedence to spoken over written language on the basis that the former is said to have arrived first. In the first instance, then, the fissure disjoining the spoken word and the word ‘as mediated by written signs’ is said to lie in the obvious temporal anteriority of oral-acoustic culture (LE, p. 498). My reading of the figure of anacoluthon does not, however, necessarily rely on this controversial position. My purpose here is not spoken language’s temporal anteriority, but anacoluthon’s expressiveness of Blochian materialism.

\[145\] This is perhaps why Bloch (1971, p. 160) defends the Expressionist avant-garde; its ‘Ausdrucksform’ is said to be of the human incognito and its search for proper content, an outfall.
It is at all times the immediate Am of the That that is throbbing beneath everything, that expresses itself in these utterances, that unfolds itself in these expressions. Only because this ground is not yet certain, is still speechless, does it come to voice, does it attempt to say and clarify itself. (LM, p. 208; my emphasis)

What this passage also indicates is the complementarity of the apophatic and the cataphatic in Bloch's conception of the not-yetness of being, and indeed the possibility that the figure of anacoluthon crystallises this complementarity within itself. As Bloch writes, the figure of anacoluthon 'best captures the difference between spoken and written syntax. For living speech always begins anew and breaks up along the way.' (LE, p. 502; my emphasis) To refer this back to the discussion found in Chapter II, one could read this process as itself expressive of the utopian analogy of being, in the which the anacoluthic break expresses not an epistemic lack on the side of the human to express the transcendent divinity, but rather the real's encountering its own incompleteness. Thus, the figure of anacoluthon can be read as an expression of the ‘dark-open’ (PA, p. 72) of Blochian materialism—as opposed to what could be called the “dark-closedness” of Przywarian theolinguistics. This claim, in turn, can be made more fruitful by placing it in the context of contemporary debates in speculative materialism. Indeed, among a number of thinkers connected to the speculative turn, the

[208]
apophatic, the cataphatic and the relation thereof structures the manner in which the real is to be grasped. As one of these thinkers, Barber articulates it thus:

What is compelling about the speculative turn, when viewed in relation to the question of how immanence is named, is its ability both to critique the human pretension to delimit access to the real and to affirm the capacity to name the real through an encounter with that which exceeds the pre-existing articulations. (2012, p. 144)

The Blochian That-What relation is vaguely present here. But from this observation Barber goes on to stake out a kind of analogical mid-point between an apophaticism and a cataphaticism otherwise respectively pure unto themselves. And it is this that speaks to Bloch. Such a mid-point, which would best serve to grasp the dynamic naming of what is nameless, namely language’s ontological correlate of not-yet being, would be

positioned neither in terms of the kataphatic (which would repress the enigmatic character of the real) nor in terms of the apophatic (which would abandon the real to the simply beyond). (ibid., p. 145)

Moreover, what is at stake in such a conception, Barber continues, is ‘a real that is simultaneously non-manifest […] and non-inaccessible.’ (ibid) My contention is that Bloch’s form of speculative materialism speaks precisely to this way of conceiving the real. But Bloch adds something important that is otherwise missing from Barber’s account, which still assumes that the real is folded-up there, even if non-manifest. Bloch adds a way of grasping this real that is non-manifest but yet also non-inaccessible, and he does so by seeing

[209]
the real itself as not-yet, but whose “being” is possible. Non-manifestation is what indicates the real’s not-yetness. Non-inaccessibility is what indicates the real’s possibility of coming into being; and it is my claim that anacoluthon is a figure of language which puts us in touch with this structure. What opens up for view when one begins to see Barber’s formulation within the horizon of Bloch’s materialism, is a utopian form of witnessing the dynamic relation between the apophatic and the cataphatic. The drive to express, or to externalise, is born of the surd of the incommunicable. But this incommunicable surd, unlike some religious/theological tendencies, does not reduce the voice to silence, but exhorts it to creativity. The claim that apophasis is integral to understanding language’s materiality within the context of Blochian materialism is thus based on how this materialism conceives of the fullness of being:

If one […] would like to designate here somewhat, one should consider that what has just been said must be crossed out each time, so that nothing can solidify. (SU, p. 194)

But this is the case because of Bloch’s concept of the fullness of being as not-yet. As Bloch writes, what intends

does not know the Intended-for [Gemeinte] positively as what it is, but negatively as what it is not. In such a way that it can be said after all, with things and solutions supplied: “that was not meant.” (PA, p. 75)

[kennt es das Gemeinte nicht positiv in dem, was es ist, so doch negative, in dem, was es nicht ist. Derart daß immerhin gesagt werden kann, bei Dingen oder Lösungen, die sich anbieten: das war nicht gemeint.]
Thus the apophatic is re-structured in the light of the not-yetness of being:

[…] again and again, diagonally through every meaning, there appears the one, the unnamed, unnameable, **spiritualistically confounding** the order, just as the true Gnostic Basilides said about precisely the "concept" and the "order" of the primordial word itself, quite destructively: “What is called inexpressible, is not inexpressible, but is only called so; but that of which we speak is not even inexpressible"; which denies, then, already in principle, that the ontic symbol-contents ultimately are shaped like a representation, a world, or that they are fit for hierarchy. (SU, pp. 194-5)

Bloch’s opposition to solidification, an opposition not without its echo in Adorno’s extreme aniconism (and the extent to which this aspect of Bloch’s thought was inspirational for Adorno himself is open), lies precisely in the open That-ness of being, of the not-yetness of a fullness of being. It is not in the name of a self-abasement that one unsays what has been said. Rather, the inadequacy of what has been said, the knowing that what has been said “does not follow” (anacoluthon), compels the finding of another way. Without this searching and finding there would be no language, no human history, indeed no nature nor reality, according to Bloch.

[3] This notion of living speech that immanently goes beyond itself also plays itself out in Bloch’s conception of narration, the latter being an underlying theme of Bloch’s anacoluthon-essay. A narrative-style of language truly attuned to the reality from which it speaks, a reality incomplete but driving toward realisation, that is, a reality thus far free of an ‘incestualised continuity’ (PA, p. 491), would be a narrative-style possessing an anacoluthic leap at its very heart. Echoing the recollections of Hegel
lecturing in Berlin, for Bloch, a narrative form of continuity exudes falseness. In the *Spirit of Utopia*, leading up to Bloch’s imperative that Kant must burn through Hegel, Bloch critiques Hegel’s penchant for systematising, his ‘leaplessly mediated [eINES sprunglos vermittelten]’ (*GUe*, p. 281) form of philosophising:

At first, of course, we lose ourselves completely here; nothing about us is answered or resolved. Whether we suffer, whether we can be blessed, whether we are immortal as individual, existing human beings—the concept does not care. For the philosopher is on the way toward no longer being human; he leaves the worst of us and proudly departs an existence that so little affects the interests of abstraction. But the trouble with existence, as Kierkegaard says, is just that those who exist find existence endlessly interesting. It is easy to discern thereby whether a man tested by life is speaking, or a Münchhausen. Who only tells a story—say, “We left Peking and got to Canton; on the fourteenth we were in Canton”—is simply changing locations, not himself, and so the continuous form of narrative is in order [der verändert nur den Ort, nicht sich selbst und daher ist die unveränderte Form des Erzählens in Ordnung]. (*SU*, p. 180; *GUe*, 277)

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146 As Adorno quotes H.G. Hotho:

Eloquence that flows along smoothly presupposes that the speaker is finished with the subject inside and out and has it by heart, and formal skill has the ability to glide on garrulously and most graciously in what is half-baked and superficial. This man, however, had to raise up the most powerful thoughts from the deepest grounds of things, and if they were to have a living effect then, although they had been pondered and worked over years before and ever again, they had to regenerate themselves in him in an every living present. (1993, p. 120)

147 As I mentioned, this passage is located in the section of the *Spirit of Utopia* in which Bloch tells his reader that Kant must burn through Hegel. The point at work here plays to the crux of the difference of theoretical perspective between Bloch and Lukács on the question of Expressionism. The conception of reality underlying Lukács’ critique of Expressionism is a ‘continuous [ununterbrochene] “totality”’ in which ‘the subjective factor has no place’; an ‘objectively-closed concept of reality’ without ‘interruption.’ (Bloch, 1971, pp. 157-8)
The continuous form of narrative is a lie (a Münchhausen). Truthful speech is speaking discontinuously; only within anacoluthic narrative is one being changed, is one changing oneself in the process of narration (it is speaking speculatively, from within the process headed toward a not-yet determined outfall, it is not speaking as a detached observer). That the unity of subject and object is to be found in the not-yet manifestation of being leads to Bloch’s re-articulation of how the real is to be expressed truthfully: ‘the passage of matter is not only an imaging [or depicting] [abbildendes], but a shaping-forth [Fortbildendes].’ (EM, p. 55) Bloch plays on the German verb fortbilden here, meaning “to continue education,” but also literally “to shape forth” or “to shape forward.” The notion of fortbilden, as Bloch employs it, is I believe an attempt to chart a course between what for him are two equally unacceptable paths. On the one hand, Bloch (1994, p. 383) aims to escape analytical philosophy’s arid approach to language. The ‘Sprachkritiker’ utterly do away with the poetic, musical, and mystical elements of language, Bloch claims, and are satisfied instead to treat language as merely an instrument of knowledge (ibid., p. 384). Equally, however, Bloch is opposed to the ‘Sprachmythologie’ of the Romantics (and the tradition from which they stem), who enact a ‘metaphysicalisation [Metaphysizierung] of language’ (ibid., p. 387), such that the word is magically congruent with the world’s content, indeed on a cosmic-scale.

148 Indeed, as Landmann recognises, this point relates to Bloch’s opposition to the arid materialism of the mathematical sciences and their general mode of expression:

The logical mastering [gebändigte] style [of these sciences] corresponds to the faith in a perfect, complete and harmonious world. Its perfection reflects itself in the closedness [Geschlossenheit], in the unbroken beginning [Aufgehen], in the smoothness [Ebenheit] of its expression. But for Ernst Bloch […] there is still work and ferment in all things, which are undetermined, un-concluded potentiality (1965, p. 345; my translation).
Neither such ‘worship of language [Sprachverehrung]’ nor such ‘contempt of language [Sprachverachtung]’ will do for Bloch (ibid., p. 387). What is most curious of all about this middle course is that Bloch designates the “Sprachkritiker” as subjective idealists, while he dubs the Romantics as objective idealists (ibid., pp. 387-8). Thus the answer to the aporia is once more: Kant must burn through Hegel. Truthful syntax is thus syntax ‘that runs ahead of itself, retreats, shifts the emphasis, reemphasises, and otherwise communicates by means of discontinuity.’ (LE, p. 503) As Bloch writes:

The authentic mode of narration intended here cannot be objectified in itself, nor can it stand forth as a purely autonomous form, capable of serving as a counterforce against rational poetics (however much it has always burst through the limits of that poetics, whenever the latter has devolved to artificiality à la Gottsched). But otherwise, the well-conserved viva vox is the conditio sine qua non of every poetry that has not become an end in itself, and resounds throughout the art—not least as an anacoluthon within an ever so magisterially closed system. (LE, p. 502)

Anacoluthon is the site of figuration and disfiguration, it is expressive of the open That-ness of Blochian materialism. Like material generativity itself, the figure cannot be objectified nor made into a purely autonomous form, for the figure constitutes the site of the generativity of expressive form as such: searching That-ness. Anacoluthon can thus be read as the expression of the non-existence of ontological totality. From the vantage of Bloch’s materialism, anacoluthon’s “it does not follow” stands as a “lack of

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149 What is identical between language and matter is their shaping forth, and thus their identity is found in non-identity: there would be no need for shaping-forth if matter or being were already complete. Depiction as fortbilden, Bloch says, is ‘the simplest form of the bridge between Percipere and Esse’ (EM, p. 55).
togetherness and succession,” and marks a point—a starting point of openness—in syntax through which language comes up against its own unfinished state, a condition of un-enclosedness expressive of the figure’s ontological correlate. As Bloch writes: the ‘open That is the productive driving in all things’ (SO, p. 363).

§3.2. WHAT-NESS

A sentence has wishes as an event.—Gertrude Stein (1973, p. 18)

If, as I read the figure, anacoluthon points to a mode of ‘open expression’ (PA, p. 122) that finds its correlate in an ontology of not-yet being, then, in the context of Blochian materialism, the figure must constitute the threshold of linguistic conditionedness as such, and therefore it lies at ‘the threshold of expression [der Schwelle der Äußerung]’ (LM, p. 256), at the border between what has become and what is not yet. As I have suggested above in my discussion of Steiner’s comments regarding the “Pythagorean genre,” the figure of anacoluthon touches on a linguistic expression of that point at which something new steht nun vor der Tür (“stands at the door”). In other words, the figure touches on What-ness, and ‘ultimately the What itself is […] the Novum.’ (LM, p. 256)

Indeed, if Bloch stands in the Heraclitean heritage, then his refunctioning of it, his novel contribution of its outlook, it is to have held on to the notion that ‘the river is strongly oriented to the still outstanding outfall [Mündung].’ (EM, p. 30) Discontinuous process harbours an invariant of direction, an unum necessarium. But as I have shown throughout this study, particularly in
Chapter II, the outfall into which process-matter invariantly intends, the analogon, is also an intending in itself:

There is precisely in the interruptions, concrete montages, appropriately utopian indeterminacies of open-systematic thought always an *Invariant of direction*, straight through all cross-connections and in particular all through the Open itself. (*EM*, p. 30)

[Es gibt genau in den Unterbrechungen, konkreten Montagen, utopiegemäßen Unausgemachtheiten des offenen Systemdenkens allemal eine Invariante der Richtung gerade durch alle Querverbindungen und besonders durch das Offene selber hindurch.]\(^{150}\)

If one may read anacoluthic events as expressive of the ontological incompleteness of material That-ness that is the starting point of Bloch’s philosophy, then one may read the figure simultaneously as expressive of the ‘nameless *a priori*’ (*SU*, p. 192), that is, the brewing, fermenting analogon. Indeed, the very structure of Bloch’s materialism, as I have outlined it in the previous chapters, commends this position.

A dawning, an inner brightening, trouble, darkness, creaking ice, an awakening, a hearing nearing itself, a condition and concept, ready, against

\(^{150}\) As Bloch writes elsewhere:

Each predication in history is and remains in reference to and reliant upon a process of constant amendment, of a widening, of sublation through process. The still unpredicated in the subject of predication […], the inadequateness of the subjects to each previously exhibited predicate is the true motor of the real dialectic and of the dialectical concept (ibid.).

[So bleibt jede Aussage in Geschichte und ist, wie auf Prozesse bezogen, auf dauernde Berichtigung, auf Erweiterung, auf Aufhebung durch Prozesse angewiesen. Das noch Unprädiizierte im Subjekt der Aussage […]; die Unangemessenheit der Subjekte zu jedem bisher herausgestellten Prädikat ist der wahre Motor der realen Dialektik und des dialektischen Begriffs]
the darkness of the lived moment, the nameless a priori brewing in us, near us, before us, in all of being-in-existence in itself, finally to kindle the sharp, identical light, to open the gate of looking in one’s own direction. (ibid.)

So anacoluthon ought not to signal interruption for interruption’s sake, a condition of constant transgression: the starting point is not pointless. Anacoluthic syntax ought not to be tied to a ‘boundless analogy [uferlosen Analogie]’ sent hither and thither (PA, p. 125). Anacoluthic interruptions are rather moments at which syntax points beyond itself to something new, to the aurora of a still unknown end in the unfinished utopic process: anacoluthon opens out to the not-yet existent speculative totality. Thus it harbours a Wohin and Wozu. The figure of anacoluthon’s interruption of the normal flow of syntax creates a linguistic space in which experimentation of What-ness discloses itself. As Bloch writes of Bertolt Brecht’s employment of the figure:

[I]t is precisely the interruption of the scene in Brecht’s experimental theatre that creates a space for spoken anacoluthon: a space of suspension, of probing, of deliberation, according to a different state of mobility than that of the all too settled condition that subsists behind the past perfect of eternal letters. (LE, p. 504)

In sum, while for Adorno the fragmentary character of paratactic method exclaims a constitutive incompleteness, from the perspective Bloch affords, anacoluthon harbours a surplus over which it cannot be subjected merely to a constitutive—that is, irredeemable—non-identity. Behind anacoluthic interruption is the intention to consummate, to reach a terminus ad quem. To paraphrase Bloch, ‘freer movement and expressive need dwell here’ (SU, p. [217]
The openness of expression that anacoluthon creates the conditions for is thus expressive of ‘the wonder at the front of immediacy [das Staunen an der Unmittelbarkeits-front]’ (PA, p. 147), it is the ‘experience of Front [Fronterlebnis]’ (PA, p. 147) on the plane of language. Indeed, if anacoluthic language is expressive of the darkness of the “That” of existence, then the ‘advancing intention [das fortschreitende Meinen]’ of linguistic production (TL, p. 75) expresses the desire for the Ultimum—‘a Lösewort’ (PA, p. 214), the ‘fundamental concept [Grundbegriff] of utopian philosophy.’ (PA, p. 214)

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have sought to read the rhetorical figure of anacoluthon in light of Bloch’s materialism. I have argued that anacoluthon, in its interruption of syntactical flow, is an expression of the ontological composition of Bloch’s materialism. What this amounts to is the following. My claim has been to suggest that anacoluthon exhibits one linguistic instance in which utopian materiality, as conceived of by Bloch, is a real presence in the life of language. Not only have I claimed that anacoluthon is a linguistic expression of material That-ness, that is, of real material generativity; I have also attempted to read this figure as constituting a real intending toward not-yet totality: an expression of material intending to What-ness. Thus it is a speculative figure of speech, that is, speculative in Bloch’s sense of the term: it is a figure of speech that speaks outward toward a not-yet absoluteness. And thus, once more. Thus it can be said to constitute an exodus form of speech.
CONCLUSION

Neither has this study intended to make Bloch’s arguments philosophically plausible nor has it intended to prove that what I see as Bloch’s provision in philosophy of language constitutes a cogent theory. I have merely tried to show how the materialism of language can be thought within the horizon of Bloch’s corpus. In this final stage of the study, then, I will present my overall conclusions, drawing-out whatever original contribution to knowledge my thesis may well provide. I will clarify, moreover, the foregoing such that a number of possible paths of future research may become dimly visible—this will involve lending attention to the limitations and relatedly the unanswered questions of my study.

In sum, then, my conclusion yields four points; while in points 1-3 I restate the findings produced thus far, in point 4 I will comment on a number of issues revolving around the question of future research, with particular focus on the political. Needless to say, there remains much to explore in Bloch’s underappreciated philosophy, as does much remain to be achieved for developing further the notion of a speculative-materialist philosophy of language. Nonetheless, I think focus on the political would in itself be a fruitful close to the study, not least because it helps shine a light on another inadequacy marking not only my study, but the speculative turn itself: its apparent a-politicality.
At the beginning of this study I drew attention to two noticeable limitations marking contemporary Continental philosophy. The broad backdrop of these limitations can be described as a new blossoming of speculative-materialist modes of thought, the chief purpose of which is a desire to re-confer upon philosophy the great themes of speculation, i.e. such lines of questioning as what constitutes the ultimate nature of reality. Members of the turn—and they are many, both in number and in the directions they pursue—broadly agree that their common purpose is to overcome the restrictions on theoretical thought laid-down by Kant’s critique of pure reason. In fact, the philosophers of this new turn take Kant more seriously than Kant himself; the latter writes that there can be no ‘appearance without anything that appears.’ (B xxvii) What for Kant is wholly unknowable is that which concerns living philosophers most of all: the thing in itself.

My entry point into this context was, as I have said, two limitations. The first limitation of this newfound concern with speculation is the exclusion of Ernst Bloch from counting as a relevant figure in the discussions and debates that have thus far shaped what speculation is considered to be, and how this impacts upon one’s understanding reality, or ontology. I have noted how this neglect for Bloch’s work is particularly peculiar given that Bloch was one of the few figures of Continental philosophy during the past century to have called for and practiced just such a renewal of speculation; thus, long before the contemporary turn had come to pass. The silence surrounding Bloch’s corpus, I argued, ought to be overturned for the much more substantive reason that contemporary forms of speculation, upon entering into dialogue...
with Bloch, might enrich their perspectives through learning of Bloch’s utopian thematic. If speculative philosophy is at root an intention towards totality, then Bloch’s conception of totality as not-yet and thus at present non-existent could, I held, inform new insights into the nature of speculative-materialist thought, and, subsequently, apprise a new understanding of and approach to language’s speculative materiality. This latter point brought me to the second limitation of the contemporary philosophical conjuncture.

Indeed, on the other hand, I noted how, even though it constitutes a conscious counterpoint to the linguistic turn’s long dominant form of language-scepticism, speculative materialism—considered as a broad movement—has shown a distinct lack of interest in taking up reflection on the topic of language’s materiality. While this reluctance was partially understandable (given the long drawn-out dominance of linguistic monism), it certainly was neither ultimately tolerable nor sustainable given speculation’s aim of thinking absolutely. *For what would it be to think absolutely without the slightest mind for that through which one commonly communicates this thinking?* In this assessment I was broadly in agreement with two contemporary thinkers (Avanessian [2016] and Whistler [2010]) whose unique responses to this predicament—albeit different responses, both with regard to each other and with regard to what I have provided through my reading of Ernst Bloch and anacoluthon—acted as foils for the manner in which I proceeded to answer my study-question. I set much stall by them, then, and the upshot of my brief analyses of their contributions was as follows.
While, on the one hand, I argued for Avanessian’s correctness in his considering relations as ontologically prior to objects, and, moreover, in his holding language’s materiality to consist in *being open to such relations*, I invested much in the contention that, placed within the horizon of Bloch’s speculative-materialist thought, this fruitful conception can actually be reduced to the precedence of a single relation: *the relation between incompleteness and realisation* (more commonly expressed philosophically as existence and essence, but also articulated by Bloch as the fundamental relation between That-ness and What-ness). This then also allowed me concomitantly to think language’s materiality as inherently involving the processuality that is born of the becoming from incompleteness to realisation (or consummation). Indeed, on the other hand, Whistler’s response to the neglect contemporary speculation lends to reflection on language’s materiality (or language’s “naturality”) allowed me to think and identify *the significance of processuality for a speculative-materialist reflection on the materialism of language*. However, it was a key contention of mine that Whistler’s form of speculation, relying as it does on Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie*, is fundamentally contrary to the whole purport of Bloch’s own form of speculation. The issue boiled down to the temporal direction of each respective form, and so, I think, the temporal direction of processuality. That is to say, whilst Whistler directed his attention to the past, in that he conceptualised the generativity of linguistic products back to geological formation, Bloch’s form of speculation is futurally directed: *anticipative speculation*. A guiding motif of Bloch’s whole philosophy is precisely an attempt to break free of a type of philosophical thought that would give privilege to what has been (*Gewesenheit*), as opposed to what is yet to
come (in fact, Bloch deems this logic of past-ness as definitive of much if not most of the history of philosophy). Against the background of these limitations to the speculative-materialist turn, and to be sure in light of Avanessian and Whistler’s fruitful responses to this lack of research, I suggested that the moment was appropriately ripe for a study that would seek to explore the materialism of language as that materiality could be thought of within Bloch’s philosophy. This, then, was my broad starting point. I went on to ask:

Inasmuch as it can be claimed that the underlying perspective of Ernst Bloch’s materialism is the view that sees the world’s essence as ‘gay spirit’ and ‘urge to creative forms’, and which holds, moreover, that the Kantian Thing in Itself constitutes an ‘objective phantasy’ (ibid.), how then […] can the materiality of language be speculated on within Bloch’s utopian philosophical framework? (p. 7 of this study)

So as to provide a focused response to this question, I opted to read the figure of anacoluthon both as it appears in Bloch’s corpus and as one can creatively extend its significance through conceptual resources provided for by Bloch himself. My thesis was as follows. Insofar as anacoluthon’s logic overlaps with the fundamental compositional structure of Bloch’s materialism, so then it constitutes a linguistic expression of utopian materiality as conceived by Bloch. I contend that to have shown this to be the case is where one finds my original contribution to philosophical knowledge. Below I will summarise the steps I made in this study that allowed me to reach this conclusion.
In Chapter I, I sought to get to grips with the building blocks of Bloch’s utopian materialism, i.e. its main categories. The categories of tendency (shorthand for process) and of latency (shorthand for realisation) are key to my understanding of that materialism. Moreover, these categories, I suggested, are incomprehensible without consideration of their dialectical interaction. Indeed, the real dialectical interaction between process and realisation of process renders the end for which process becomes at all an *immanent end*. The telic element in Bloch’s materialism is therefore seen as itself in the process of becoming what it is. This constitutes a distinctively Blochian approach to teleology.

However, my intent was to properly specify the nature of this teleological process as conceptualised by Bloch. Again, my findings showed that Bloch grasps process neither as linear motion (as, in accordance with the mechanists, mere change of place), nor as repetitive movement (process is said to become in that which is not-yet, and therefore the category of *Novum* is crucial to Bloch’s understanding of matter as a really real creative processuality). Rather, process is contradictory (discontinuous); in fact, for Bloch, process is *born of* contradiction (in Bloch’s parlance, process is born of a *not-having*). Nevertheless, process as Bloch reasons it is not merely discontinuous, instead there remains a further determination of process as Bloch sees it, one anticipatory in its essence (to Bloch’s mind, there is an *invariant of direction* at work in process-matter).

Together these findings suggest that, in the context of Bloch’s materialism, language’s materiality must consist of, I argued, a discontinuous, anticipatory process. In its most rudimentary expression Bloch’s materialism
consists of a process that bears within itself the real possibility of what I have termed an *outfall*. Such, on my reading, is the basic composition of Bloch’s materialism. It is this ontological composition with which language must express: *Not-Having → Process → (possibility of an) Outfall*. To my mind, anacoluthon is a linguistic expression of this composition, which Bloch otherwise calls the ontology of not-yet being. In other words, within the horizon of Bloch’s philosophy, the *materiality of language resides in its expression of the That-What relation*. Bloch writes:

But *that* between That [existence] and What [essence] there can obtain a relation at all: this relation itself is *the most fundamental category* and all other categories merely *perform it* (*EM*, p. 71; my emphasis).

*[Daß aber zwischen Daß und Was überhaupt bezogen werden kann: diese Beziehung ist selber die Grundkategorie, und alle anderen führen sie nur aus…]*

The figure of anacoluthon is a figure of speech that embodies within itself this That-What expression.

[3] Having clarified the basic structure of Bloch’s materialism, my next step was to suggest that my reading in Chapter I was more or less self-evident to Bloch’s corpus and that, consequently, a more expansive interpretation was required so as to discern the metaphysical orientation of this materialism (its intention towards a totality that is not-yet). I was not content merely to commentate on Bloch’s materialism but sought instead to provide an independent and original account of its most fundamental purport. I considered this a necessary undertaking because the nature of
process-matter, as Bloch conceives of it in its anticipatory, discontinuous composition, transcends, from a place of immanence, that which is already given. Thus, *mutatis mutandis*, the processuality that is central to Bloch’s materialism must be considered a metaphysical, speculative process (when Bloch says that to think is to transgress, what is at stake here is a consideration of transgression as a cornerstone of being itself). In this light, the task was one of considering the proper nature of this metaphysically-directed processuality, a task I undertook in Chapter II.

The task was one of how best to grasp the end for which process becomes, and of how this end feeds into the nature of the process. In order to properly crystallise the for-the-sake-of-which of process, I investigated the metaphysical purport of Bloch’s materialism; I asked, What is this materialism’s metaphysical *sens*? The discontinuous, anticipatory nature of Bloch’s understanding of process-matter maintains within itself, I suggested, the possibility of an outfall into absoluteness. And I read the relation between process and this possible outfall as consisting of an experimental form of analogic metaphysics. Although explicit evidence for this reading is rather scanty in accordance with what is available in the corpus, I took it as a fruitful way to read Bloch’s conception of matter’s dialectical becoming, for the reason that dialectical becoming is in itself unending, whilst Bloch always entertains the possibility that this becoming is directed to or communicates with a common meaning or end, albeit that this common end is not-yet in existence. When Bloch claims that the subject-object relation is woven with an *analogia entis* of not-yet being, I interpreted this as Bloch’s take on how best to understand the Thing in Itself as the objective phantasy. Considering
the latter notion as an analogon that is radically eschatological in kind gave me a reasonably solid footing with which to think the occurrence of not-yet being within language. Admittedly, it is the case that much remains to be done to fully substantiate this reading. To my mind, particularly deserving of attention is the true compatibility between dialectic, whose imagination of thought is breaks and negation, and analogy, whose imagination is one of order. This compatibility was not fully answered-for in my study, but I consider a mode of thought that thinks the two together would be a mode of thought that helps clarify the novelty of Bloch’s metaphysics.

[4] My final point bears on the question of possible future directions in research. As I have mentioned on numerous occasions throughout the study, the topic of the relation between materialism and language as that relation can be understood in the context of Bloch’s philosophy, is a topic which finds itself at its inception. I have chosen to focus on the figure of anacoluthon in order to tease out the sort of implications Bloch’s materialism harbours for a contemporary understanding of language and of human beings as linguistic beings. But Bloch’s corpus offers a number of directions not limited to anacoluthon alone, even if, as I claim is the case, anacoluthon is central to Bloch’s understanding language’s materiality. In conjunction with anacoluthon’s importance on this score one could also pursue a number of lines of inquiry which, while I may well have touched on their significance during my study, I was nonetheless unable to devote space to their consideration. To end my conclusion and to end my study, I will focus on just one of these potential lines of inquiry, namely: politics.
[a] Politics. One of the entry points for my study was Avanessian and Whistler’s respective attempts to overcome the lack of attention given to the materiality of language in the new turn toward philosophical speculation. Whistler’s response to this problem assumes an added significance in light of the political. His response is important in this context because, informed as it is by Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, it is based on a fundamental rejection of Kant’s “ethicisation” of nature, and, as a logical consequence of this, an apparent rejection of the validity of the political as a pressing concern for contemporary speculation. Kant’s considering nature only as nature is in its appearances (that is, ultimately, in its being for the human being alone), must be set aside for a concern for how nature is in itself, that is, for the inexperiential generativity that is nature’s very core essence. Such is Whistler’s starting point for his speculative reflection on language. Of course, the difficult position which emerges from this hyper-naturalist stance is to then see language in a rather a-political inflection. While I have noted at various points in this study Bloch’s sympathy for the type of speculative consideration of nature that Whistler pursues here, the point is that the political is a central subject-matter for Bloch—its represents the real openness of the Humanum as such—and therefore cannot easily be swept to one side (doing so necessarily incurs, it seems to me, certain retrograde consequences, in the sense that the a-politicisation of the political usually carries with it oppressive tendencies). In other words, a speculative-materialist account of language’s materiality ought to consider the way in which the political comes to bear on that materiality, without, however, falling into the ethicising trap that Whistler is right to want to avoid. The issue of whether this problem becomes less acute if the form of speculation guiding
reflection is oriented not to the past but, with Bloch, to the future, remains an open question, but, I think, this may well be where the nub of the matter lies. An intimation of the direction of this line of research can be partly provided by turning to a recent attempt at a Marxist philosophy of language.

Indeed, given Bloch’s leftist allegiances, it seems suitable to touch on this issue with an eye to Marxism. I have already noted that Schelling’s conception of natura naturans and natura naturata takes on a markedly political inflection under Bloch’s pen, and that, relatedly, Habermas has dubbed Bloch a “Marxist Schelling.” To my mind, this set of circumstances can translate into the following line of questioning: to what extent is the inexperiential generativity of linguistic products driven by communistic ends? A French thinker who has recently contributed a Marxist philosophy of language, Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2006), poses a similar question, without, however, remotely being concerned with the sorts of questions that are at stake in my study here. With Habermas as his foil Lecercle speaks of a ‘messianic hope for communism in language’ (ibid., p. 63):

Thinking with Habermas and, at the same time, thinking against him—i.e. regarding him as a major philosopher—subjects him to the same fate as Marx inflicted on Hegel […]: standing him back on his feet. And to do this is literally to operate an inversion on his philosophy: to consider it not as a first philosophy, bearer of myth of origins, but as a last philosophy, expression of an eschatological hope. For Habermas’s ethics of discussion can be criticised for betraying the facts, but the eminently desirable character of its realisation cannot be denied. […] what Habermas proposes to us is linguistic communism: not the fundamental structure of interlocution, but an idea of reason (ibid., p. 57).
It must be said, this line of questioning resonates not only with Bloch’s materialism, but with the findings of my study: my reading of the figure of anacoluthon as expressive of utopian materiality can be considered last philosophy in the philosophy of language. For I have read anacoluthon as expressive of a material generativity that is founded on a utopian hope.
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