(RE-)FRAMING 'THE MONSTER': DE-CONSTRUCTING THE (RE-)PRESENTATION OF SERIAL KILLER AILEEN WUORNOS.

by

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ABSTRACT

“You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view - until you climb into his skin and walk around in it”

This remark by Atticus Finch in “To Kill a Mockingbird” (Lee, 1982) captures the complexity of the human condition, specifically how we can never truly understand a person until we consider how they interpret the world around them, and their place within it. Yet in this thesis, I endeavour to chart the interplay that exists between an individual’s linguistic performance in interaction and the psychological drivers that engender such performances. To date there has been little in the way of academic exploration into determining what frameworks of linguistic interaction, such as facework, can inform us about an individual’s psychology, specifically the field of Personal Construct Theory (PCT), which would facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of human behaviour. Such interplay relates to how speakers and hearers interpret one another, with each individual processing information in their own unique way, and reacting to it according to these intents and motivations. This study aims to investigate the proposed complimentary relationship between linguistic facework, and PCT, to establish a better understanding as to what our linguistic performances inform us about an individual’s psychological profile, particularly their motivations and intent.

Taking the documentary footage of the serial killer Aileen Wuornos, I have constructed a framework which incorporates a complimentary analysis of facework and PCT, to draw conclusions as to what Wuornos’ linguistic behaviour tells us about her own personal value constructs and performative intent. This work contributes significantly to both fields of facework and PCT, as it reveals just how multi-layered the concept of performance in interaction is by addressing questions regarding why people choose to use certain linguistic facework strategies over others, by analysing facework within the scope of PCT. This is something that would otherwise be impossible when analysing these frameworks in isolation from one another.
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Chapter 1

1. An Introduction to the Aileen Wuornos Case

Female serial killers are a unique phenomenon in contemporary society. This thesis will focus on the case of Aileen Wuornos, a sex worker who was found guilty of killing six men and was later executed in Florida. In this opening section, I will be concentrating specifically on current statistics, research, media, documentary coverage and dominant social discourses of female killers, and their potential impact upon sentencing within the criminal justice system. This includes combining the discussion with a consideration of how the outcomes of certain cases can be explained within the larger socio-political frameworks of dominant discourses, with particular reference to the cases of Andrea Yates, Charlene and Gerald Gallego, Gwen Wood and Catherine Graham, before turning my attention to the case of Aileen Wuornos.

I will also be considering how such discourses can be situated and individually constructed using the concepts of facework, self-presentation and impression management, with particular reference to Ervin Goffman's (1955) and Brown and Levinson's (1987) original frameworks. Specifically, I will also examine how these frameworks demonstrate individuals’ use of power and interactional dynamics to claim certain self-images, along with the impact such images have upon their socially perceived sense of 'self'. Facework theory, as it stands, lends considerable revelatory force to an individual’s construction of 'self ' and management of their social image, and how these can be a strategically executed endeavour, enacted by balancing their social and individual motivations to create a coherent self-image and identity, with a sometimes separate projected public face. However such a discussion of linguistic presentation cannot be left in isolation, as current and extensive research (to be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), demonstrates that identity construction and projection
is crucially inter- and intra-dependent on an individual’s personal psychological profile, and on the context (ten Brinke & Porter, 2011). Due to this fact, this thesis will create and adopt a unique framework in which to analyse its data combining the fields of facework with that of George Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Psychology (PCT), in order to develop a richer understanding of the cognitive reasoning involved in facework behaviour, essentially working to comprehensively address what drives the intentions, and what the psychological forces are that motivate individuals in performing facework the way they do in interaction.

Initially, I will be locating such a discussion within the social reality of dominant discourses regarding women's roles, looking specifically at three socio-political theories whose explanatory power assists in shedding further light on the female serial killer, and the ostracised position she occupies within society (Weatherby, Blanch & Jones, 2008).

The fact that media reporting and public response to the unearthing of a serial killer continues to create frenzy and shock (Berrington & Honkatukia, 2002: 50) attests to the phenomena's unique and destabilising effect upon society. This can be evidenced by media and public responses to cases such as Fred and Rosemary West, Harold Shipman and, more recently, with the Soham murderers Ian Huntley and Maxine Carr (Morrissey, 2003). There remains, however, no greater social anomaly than the female serial killer. As Hickey's (2002) comprehensive study demonstrates, over 83% of serial killers are male, and only 17% female, with women tending to work in tandem with another partner or as part of a family unit. In accordance with this, an earlier study by Kelleher and Keheller's (1998) of single female killers identified them as typically mature, careful, deliberate, socially adept and highly organised. Furthermore, their
study found offenders usually attacked victims at home or their place of work, favoured particular weapons and tended towards crimes of a non-sexual nature.

A previous study (Weatherby et al., 2008) also highlights the difficulty in obtaining literature regarding the study of female multiple homicides, identifying that research within the field is jeopardised due to the bias and stereotypical application of media coverage. In support of this, Van Hasselt & Hersen’s (1999) study showed that over the past 20 years there has been a significant increase in crime attributable to women, and when the media and general public learn that a woman has perpetrated multiple homicides, the automatic reaction, according Berrington and Honkatukia, (2002: 50) is one of frenzy. Attempts are then made to quickly pigeon-hole the female murderer within socially accepted stereotypes, in an attempt to explain why she chose to commit this violent act. As I will discuss in Section 1.1, and in the case of Andrea Yates in particular, the public's frenzied reaction to female killers can be viewed as an incredibly dominant social discourse, depriving and occasionally providing female suspects with means of gaining a more lenient sentence, or instead giving the most severe punishment available. This suggests, and is concordant with De Anna Horne’s (2002) argument, that modern society is still defined by patriarchal standards as, when women accused of violent crimes are not presented as weak or passive, they are frequently judged in a far more severe light than 'real' women who occupy traditional careers and/or family roles of mothers, wives, or daughters, and who are subservient to husbands and families, and who are culturally conformable, and are often subject to more lenient sentences than more subversive female characters.
1.1 Dominant Discourses and Violent Women

Discourses which cast the violent woman as 'mad' or 'bad' have a long history, beginning with Cesare Lombroso and William Ferrero attesting in *The Female Offender* (1893 in Flood, 2007) that women's innate inferiority makes them less likely to commit crimes (Flood, 2007). Furthermore, in other research, investigations strongly suggest that women continue to be constrained by narrow gender discourses that delineate them as partners, mothers and gentle, caring nurturers (see Rogers, Davis & Cottam, 2010). These serve to reduce such women to a dependent weak and childlike state, minimising their culpability (and therefore responsibility), by suggesting they are ‘not of sound mind’ and/or pushing them out of society. As Morrissey (2003) highlights, discourses around violent men allow them the agency and ability to make rational, albeit wrong decisions. The violent woman, however, is depicted as subhuman, and not considered to be an agent of her own fate, instead narrating them within the constraints of three dominant discourses: victim, mad or bad.

To illustrate the explanatory power of such discourses, two brief descriptions will be given of the trials of female serial killer Andrea Yates, and the killing duo Gwendoline Wood and Catherine Graham. The focus on these examples is in terms of their representational quality with respect to the large number of Caucasians within the UK population of known serial killers, and the volume of available information regarding the cases. These specific examples have also been chosen to avoid overwhelming the reader with multiple case histories.

Andrea Yates, for example, fitted the stereotype of the perfect white middle class suburban housewife, despite murdering her five young children. During her trial, Yates' legal team consistently projected an image of her as a doting wife and mother,
maintaining that her actions were driven by postnatal depression, characterised by symptoms of acute anxiety, fear and confusion (Weatherby et al., 2008). Convincing the jury that her actions were driven by a disturbed mental state rather than premeditation, she was deemed guilty by reason of insanity, and now receives treatment in a court-appointed hospital. This is despite forensic evidence that demonstrated that each child was drowned systematically, before being laid out, side by side, under a sheet in the bedroom, before first calling her husband, and then 911. This led psychologists to claim that a certain level of control was evident, as opposed to the murderous acts simply being impulsive. Yet, according to some, any psychotic act can have a certain level of control in its operation, despite the person not being entirely in control of their actions (Weatherby et al., 2008).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the case of Gwen Wood and Catherine Graham created an entirely different social and media response, one that clearly highlights the differentiation between what society constitutes as deviant behaviour which is pardonable, and what is unforgivable deviance. In particular, according to Hughes (1945) the status of a deviant (depending on the level of deviance displayed) often proves to be one of the crucial aspects of the case, impacting upon the severity of the sentence given. In the case of Wood and Graham, the issue of homosexuality was that deviant status. Woods was especially demonized for this as, coupled with her lower class and abusive background (Silvio et al., 2006: 253), she was viewed as even more socially unacceptable. Despite both Wood and Graham experiencing emotionally cold childhoods, it was Woods in particular whose background had been further marred by physical and sexual abuse. This included her parents being drug addicts, coupled with her own history of self-harm. In contrast, Graham came from a middle-class home, was well educated, had supportive parents and a seemingly stable upbringing, and her
relationships were mainly heterosexual, rather than homosexual (Silvio et al., 2006: 254).

Graham and Woods established their homosexual relationship in their mid-20s, while working at a nursing home, and went on to systematically suffocate five elderly patients between January and April 1987, supposedly receiving sexual gratification through reliving the murders (although this remained unproven). However, after Woods moved away with a new lover, Graham related the crimes to her ex-husband and, under police questioning, blamed Woods for pressurising her into taking part, and being the person wholly accountable for the killings themselves. By testifying against Woods, Graham was promised an earlier parole hearing and more lenient sentencing, and later became eligible for parole, while Woods received a life sentence with no opportunity for appeal (Davis, 2001).

With this in mind, it is important to note the crucial role the courtroom presents the violent woman, namely as a last chance to assert her femininity. The psychological and societal function of a trial is to re-establish order and make the public feel that any chaos is under control (Ballinger, 1996). If the violent woman can persuade the media, judge and jury that she is a victim, then her subsequent treatment will reflect this much more acceptable discourse (Rodgers et al., 2010). The direct correlation between how closely a woman conforms to gender stereotypes and her subsequent sentencing has been well documented (Filletti, 2001). This is not only exemplified in the different consequences for Graham and Yates, but also in comparison to those who, like Woods, remain unrepentant and claim their right towards agentive individualism in society. As Becker (1963) notes, treating a person as though they are generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy, setting in motion several mechanisms which conspire to shape the person in the image people have of them.
(Becker, 1963). In the first instance (as is the case with Woods, rather than Graham), one tends to be cut off from participation in more conventional groups after being identified as a deviant, even though the specific consequences of the particular deviant activity might never have caused that isolation had there not also been public knowledge and reaction to it (Becker, 1963). For example, while being homosexual and working in care may not impair the ability to work, it is deemed to be ‘undesirable’ for someone in a caring role to have such undesirable traits as being self-mutilating, being from an abusive background, etc. Working in a caring capacity is inevitably evaluated socially, and undesirable traits will impact upon that individual's suitability for employment in this area (Becker, 1963).

When the deviant is caught, they are treated in accordance with the popular diagnosis of why they are that way, and the treatment itself may likewise produce increasing deviant responses. This is evidenced by Berrington and Honkatukia's (2002) study, which attributes the disparity in sentencing leniency to the specific laws of the country, social definitions of crime and varying cultural norms in a cross-cultural meta-analysis of trials regarding homicide and female perpetrators. Their study in particular found strong evidence of the media’s impact on sentencing severity, and public restorative justice methods. With regards to Woods, her violent aggression towards being prosecuted, her lack of remorse, and her contempt for society in general were framed in the public media as a direct consequence of the public reaction to her deviance, rather than a consequence of the inherent qualities of the deviant act. As Lemert (2010) argues, the point is that the treatment of deviants (particularly those who are already psychologically unstable) denies them the ordinary means of carrying on the routines of everyday life open to most people. According to Becker (1963), due to the already-vulnerable state of mind of these ‘deviant’ individuals, out of necessity,
they develop illegitimate routines in order to address their ostracised position. This may involve venting their impotent anger, rage and frustration on an individual, rather than addressing it in a controlled manner on both a social and political plane.

In relation to my examination of the Aileen Wuornos case, I will demonstrate that the investigation of her series of killings focused on her violence, bisexuality and prostitution, thus creating a character with a strong social stigma, and directly opposed to society's accepted views of femininity. As Goffman states:

…we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human... we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively if not unthinkingly reduce her life chances... constructing an ideology to explain (her) inferiority and account for the dangers represented…

(1955: 58).

With the formation of such a stereotype, Wuornos came to be viewed as an evil monster that needed to be executed to ensure she never killed again. This is coupled with her diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder, a condition characterised by an unstable identity, where the individual frequently adopts whatever social construct they feel they need to adopt to feel like cohesive, socially acceptable members of society, regardless of the negative or positive correlations (Davis, 2001). Such a diagnosis may also help to explain the reason why Wuornos changed her plea from self-defence to premeditated murder, as she ingested and adopted the social identity and accountability that society demanded of her, and that was being constructed for her. This also correlates with the argument suggested by Simon and Schuster that:

One will be identified as a deviant first before other identifications are made. The question is raised: what kind of person would break such a rule? The answer given: one who is different from the rest of us, who cannot or will not act as a moral human being and therefore might break other important rules…

(1978: 94).
The deviant identification therefore becomes the controlling and defining one for mainstream society and, depending upon the psychological make-up of the person, the individual too.

On the question of motive, anger has long been seen as a comprehensible motive when men kill, but female anger was, and continues to be, considered problematic and 'deviant' (Rogers, 2010). The challenge of how to exculpate women killing men was partly resolved by the 'Battered Wife Syndrome' (Rogers, 2010). This discourse has reduced or suspended sentences for women, and public narratives about female victimhood have become widespread (Pearson, 1997). However, the syndrome presents women as helpless and childlike. What can be seen as legitimate (although not always legal) responses to physically or psychologically dangerous situations are dismissed, and female defendants are seen to 'respond' rather than take control. Women remain stereotyped as passive, helpless and irrational, which are all considered 'acceptable' female traits (Filetti, 2001; Comack & Brickey, 2007). Indeed such a ‘victim’ discourse threatens to undo what we might wish for the female murderer: her agency. Violent women themselves resist being cast solely as victims and claim agency and control over some, if not all, parts of their lives (Comack & Brickey, 2007; Heimer & Kruttschnitt, 2006).

1.2 Aileen Wuornos

There is perhaps no better case of a 'bad' female offender than Aileen Wuornos (Arrigo & Griffin, 2004). Garnering international media attention from documentary, comedy and film (aptly titled Monster), an image of a socially and sexually deviant prostituting
psychopathic female was constructed by the media, which was then consumed and adopted by mainstream America. This image subsumed her identity, ignored a background marred by abuse, and attributed the crimes to a warped psychopathology, rather than being motivated by more tragic reasons of homicide enacted due to self-defence and repeated victimisation. Throughout Wuornos' trial, a lack of public and courtroom attention is paid to her troubled past, with few articles appearing to detail her early childhood, instead, reporting simply that she was abused by men at an early age (Weatherby et al., 2008). With male serial killers, motivation is typically sought in their childhood (Schmidt, 2005), and responsibility of the killer diminished, and blame shifted to either his parents, family or school. For Wuornos, her abusive and traumatic past was not used to redeem her but rather, as Pearson (2007) noted, used as evidence of the inevitability of her criminality. The media, for example, chose to focus on her masculine, sexual and aggressive tendencies, opting to depict her as a 'cunning calculated killer motivated by greed' (Roger, 2010: 6), and describing her as the female face of evil (Weatherby, 2008), and a sexual predator (Silvio, 2006).

At the age of thirty-three, Aileen Wuornos began to commit her murders, shooting and killing seven men between 1989 and 1990. By representing the problematic figure of a 'predatory prostitute' (Roger, 2010), she was shown to have hitched rides with solitary men, and presented her clients with a patriarchal narrative of the 'damsel in distress', offering 'favours' in return for cash. This enabled society and the media to paint images of such men, as simple unwitting victims, rather than as independent sexual predators themselves, equally capable of breaking the law by soliciting prostitutes (Silvio et al., 2006). Subsequently executed on 9th October 2002, Wuornos had frequently been depicted as a cold-blooded, calculating social outcast, most notably depicted in the Oscar-winning film Monster (2003). Yet popular
narratives of crime and justice need the innocent as much as the guilty, and as such, the portrayals of all the victims as innocents (see Davis, 2001; Silvio et al., 2006; Rodgers et al., 2010) and this ensured Wuornos remained demonised in public opinion. She was positioned as a sexual predator due to her offers of sex, and the fact she left some victims nude, despite there being no evidence of sexual activity on the bodies. Instead, she stole cash, personal belongings and the cars of the men she killed. Finally, with the police closing in, Aileen confessed, whilst claiming the killings were each an act of self-defence, yet 10 years later she changed her plea to that of pre-meditated murder (Davis, 2001).

The image of Aileen Wuornos that dominates the public mind-set is undoubtedly a complex one due to the multi-natured narrative of victim and coldblooded criminal that dominate. However, in order to comprehensively deconstruct the psychology and the multiple representations of Wuornos a cross-disciplinary investigation is necessary. To better understand both the Wuornos story, and establish a solid foundation for conducting an exploratory study into her psychology and linguistic performance, it is important to first consider and analyse the current body of existing knowledge surrounding the concepts of institutionalised discourse types within our culture that dominate how women are treated within society and the criminal justice system. As legal cases involving women can all too often be corrupted by constraining social discourses or ‘framing’ devices designed to compartmentalise each of us into a role where we can be fully demarcated by titles and references in order to be ‘placed’ in society. In the next section I will explore this issue describing how many of the discursive and interactive spaces within our society are dominated by expectations of ‘Activity Types’, namely how social power constrains
the kind of speaking rights we have access to as interlocutor, and the resulting impact of this upon women such as Aileen.

1.3 Activity Types

The concept of social power, who holds it, and how it is used is a widely debated subject spanning many fields of research (Thornborrow, 2002). However, the fact that we exist in a world where many of our interactions take place within a specific context or environment, leaves those contexts open to institutional influence (Thornborrow, 2002; 2). While the definition of 'institutional' discourse varies according to perspective, it has been established as a category of talk which in some way is different from what we might experience as non-institutional, 'conversational' talk (see page 22).

Theorists favouring the view that the construction of an individual's identity is entwined with the discursive roles made available to interlocutors within specific institutional contexts typically find the origins of their argument situated in the sociological tradition of Foucault, Habermas, and Lyotard (Bamberg et al., 2010). This field of thought advocates that discourse is a highly definitive factor in the domination of certain discursive practices, which become the distinguishing features of different discourse communities. Within this discourse perspective, it is assumed that dominant discourse practices circle around, and form the kind of thought systems and ideologies that are necessary for the formation of a consensus that extends into what is taken to be agreed upon, what is held to be aesthetically and ethically of value, and what is taken to be true (Bamberg et al., 2010). Typically in this theoretical framework, individual and institutional identities are perceived as highly constrained by societal norms and traditions governed by the activity set-up interactants find themselves situated within.
Thus, for example, within a Foucauldian approach, it is assumed that it is the engagement in discursive communal practices that form speaking subjects and their worlds (Bamberg et al., 2010). In this theoretical framework, subjects are generally assumed to have some choice in making use of existing patterns that can be found in their culture, but they do not create the practices in which they engage. Rather, practices are imposed upon them by their culture, society or communal norms. Thus, chosen identities stem from already-existing repertoires (Bamberg, 2010) that can arguably be viewed as categories or domains.

In support of this, Jurgen Habermas (1984: 284-288) describes institutionalised talk as an example of strategic discourse, which is distinguished from another kind of talk, 'communicative discourse'. Strategic discourse, he argues, is power-laden and goal-directed, while communicative discourse, in its 'ideal' manifestation is about speakers symmetrically engaging in achieving mutual understanding (Thornborrow, 2002: 2).

As ordinary conversation is the predominant medium of interaction within the social world, there has been a wealth of research (Habermas, 1984; Bamberg, 2010), conducted on talk within institutional settings. According to Drew and Heritage, 1992: 19) institutional interaction involving 'a systematic variation and restriction of activities and their design relative to ordinary conversation', such variations and restrictions include speakers' orientation to particular tasks or goals (an example being a call to the emergency services, or delivery of a medical diagnosis), as well as specialised constraints on what 'one or both participants will treat as allowable contributions to the business at hand' (Drew & Heritage, 1992: 22). These authors also note that there exist specialised inferential frameworks for a given institutional context, which are very much tied to a specific setting, for example, how questions are received and replied to.
within a courtroom or news interview. Drew and Heritage (1992) support this notion, and suggest that the talk that takes place within institutional settings differs from 'non-institutional' conversation in three essential respects:

- it is goal or task orientated;
- it involves constraints on what may count as legitimate contributions to that goal or task;
- it produces particular kinds of inferences in the way speakers interpret, or orient to utterances.

This is equally supported by other studies (see Thornborrow, 2002), which demonstrate similar findings relating to the organisation of talk within and among a range of different settings and groups, from institutionalised talk, which is culturally prescribed, to that which operates within specific contexts such as the media, medical, and legal fields.

In addition to these findings regarding institutional talk, a study by Bucholtz and Hall (2005) demonstrated how such talk can also be used to discursively allocate positions and identities within social groups. In a study of middle class white European girls, for example, Bucholtz and Hall (2005) found that they were able to form discursive identities for themselves, demarcating them as very different kinds of teenagers to other peer group members by their differential use of language. Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) study found that the girls indexed their youth via innovative quotative markers found commonly in the age-group’s popular media, from a self-described nerd who values intelligence and nonconformity, to ‘cool’ students whose exclusive use of the innovative quotative marker signals their consummate trendiness. In the analysis of
the girls' speech, classification along demographic lines of gender, race and class provides part of the picture, but more can be learned by considering other ways in which these girls position themselves and others subjectively and inter-subjectively. Firstly, by viewing the girls as members of a single age cohort, we can recognise the importance of age - specifically youthfulness - as a shared social identity that is expressed via the use of innovative quotative markers, as the advantage of ethnographically-obtained information about these girls' affiliation with contrasting, locally-developed social styles at high school allows us to make sense of their divergent quotative choices. In addition, the scrutiny of the interactional work the speakers are accomplishing reveals how they make negative evaluations of other types of people (and implicitly positively evaluate themselves) through discourse. Such positive and negative social evaluations demonstrate the power macro-level discourses have upon interaction, with individuals considering which linguistic facets to identify themselves with, in order to garner a certain social value (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005: 593).

This connection between institutionalised and 'cultural' macro-discourses, and how people are able to position themselves within interaction, has also extended to the virtual world. For example, Ken Hyland’s (2012) study focuses on the construction of identity using online media such as Facebook, and specifically on academic home pages, which reveals close similarities between the written and spoken media in their use of macro-discourses. This investigation demonstrates that individuals’ self-representations, showing core aspects of identity construction, appear in concord with institutionalised macro-ideologies. This includes identifying oneself as belonging to a particular socially-valued group, by appropriating a certain discourse, taking on its understandings, allegiances and values that membership of that social group (including disciplines) involves (Hyland, 2012). In this way, the macro-level analyses demonstrate
that identity is not necessarily a state of being a particular person, but is the process of assembling, and negotiating roles through interactions with others at the micro-local level. Indeed, there appears strong evidence supporting the power of institutional talk upon interaction, advocating that the subject position is a socially-constructed emergent process, which draws on macro-structured and symbolic discourses. This suggests that individual expertise may be very much dependent upon the context of the interaction.

1.4 Institutional Discourse and the Courtroom

In order to thoroughly deconstruct the context of the courtroom, and understand how the protagonist Wuornos interacts and behaves within it, it is worth discussing the nature of institutional discourse within documentary excerpts and the courtroom contexts themselves.

Criminal hearings do not happen unexpectedly; rather they represent one step in a bureaucratically organised chain of events, all of which impact upon the linguistic interaction of the courtroom (Matoesian, 2001). Along with many other studies, Van Charldorp (2014) demonstrates a characteristic of narratives told within institutional contexts (such as courtrooms, chairing a meeting at a place of work, interviews, etc.) is that they are never offered voluntarily, but are elicited by the professionals via 'request sequences' (Van Charldorp, 2014: 8). Newbury and Johnson (2006), also support this theory, and use the term 'procedure' to denote the series of goal-orientated actions that participants employ to carry out their institutional business. It is worth noting at this point, however, that courtroom questioning within the Anglo-American adversarial system is not necessarily about uncovering the true nature of events, but rather the
construction of a crime narrative or counter-narrative which best ‘fits’ the evidence as presented (Newbury & Johnson. 2006). Procedure thus refers to members' mutually-assumed understandings, and negotiations of who is to do what and when during an interaction. Luchjenbroer's (1993) paper succinctly highlights a number of factors within the judicial setting (relevant to the concept of institutional power relations among interactants) that have consequences on the type and performance of the discourse produced. These findings also reveal the extent to which witnesses' contributions (during the examination and cross-examination phase) are limited by the nature of the questioning probes. According to Luchjenbroer, the process of courtroom discourse is negotiated via two inter-related factors: power relations and the power of interlocutor roles.

Power Relations are specific characteristics related to rules of conduct and the physical layout of the court, which studies have found have a profound impact upon interaction, particularly as to how the court system attributes and maintains the power of its legal professionals (Luchjenbroers, 1993; 1997). This power directly relates to the fact that legal professionals frame the questions and make the demands, but witnesses do not share that right. Witnesses are further disempowered by the requirement that they take a formal declarative 'oath' that their answers will be truthful, with a clear understanding that anything they do not say, which may be later highlighted as crucial to the case, could impose legal sanctions upon them. Furthermore, the court imposes its will upon witnesses, in that they cannot negotiate the nature or topic of the questions directed at them, neither can they leave the scene, and any infringement of these rules will result in sanctions such as 'contempt of court' (Luchjenbroers, 1993; 1997). This is also supported by findings from Olsson (2012), who notes that the questioning procedure is reserved for and dominated primarily by those who form part
of the court system, with the type of questions asked, compelling, requiring, and even demanding a response from the witness. Luchjenbroers (1997: 481) corroborates this by explaining that the kind of questions asked are fundamentally defined as a summons to reply. The speaker compels, requires or demands that the addressee responds, which functions as an elicitation for information, no matter what the topic, or how sensitive or personal it may be. According to Olsson (2012), this in itself acts as an assertion of power, and is corroborated by Locher and Watts (2005), whose earlier work provides us with a theoretical framework describing how social sources of power operate, and how they are reciprocally reproduced in interaction:

a) a sociocultural power base - the court is an institution where disputes are settled formally and this invests power upon the court officials.

b) a legal base of power - in court, there are bodies of law which govern procedures for discovering what the evidence is, and how it may be presented at trial.

c) a linguistic power base – in addition to the above from which attorneys operate, there are also powerful linguistic devices which rest on the method of questioning, and honorific titles attributed to court officials.


Luchjenbroers (1997) notes that the nature of questioning itself shows the extent to which barristers can plan their path of reasoning, with little or no account of how witnesses might respond, which in itself attests to how little scope witnesses have in influencing the barrister’s line of argument. Procedural restrictions imposed upon the nature of witnesses’ answers (his/her contribution to the proceedings) robs witnesses of any power in this scenario, as they are required to give the precise information required, not give more information than is asked for, may only answer what is asked and are prevented from providing unrequested information (Danet, 1980). In accordance with this, Loftus (1975) and Luchjenbroers (1993: 152) found that the predominant styles of question posed to witnesses were Yes/No Questions, Wh- Questions and Declarative
Questions, all of which reveal the 'closed' nature of the contribution witnesses are allowed to make. This lack of control on behalf of the witness also extends to the lack of power they have over topic choice, as they have no say over determining what will be said, or when it will be said (if at all).

Luchjenbroer (1997) finalised her findings by claiming that the courtroom process and dynamic allows the authorities to generalise across contexts, to create a single template to work with, one that hangs upon the mutually-constructed power dichotomy between participants. She relates this design to the need for such institutions to enforce a 'memory management' scheme, where courts are able to maintain a goal-directed focus during discourse, to reinforce the idea of legal constraints upon witnesses, to aid in the ability of jurors to process information, and to understand the series of events leading up to the crime. Yet, as Olsson (2012: 242) highlights in his own study into legal procedures, the type of questions used in cross examination, coupled with the imposed constraints upon witnesses, can also enable lawyers to manipulate the presentation of information in ways that can: (i) significantly alter the truth value of the answers to those questions; (ii) affect the content of the subsequent questions; and (iii) affect the verdict. This is supported by earlier studies by Loftus (1975; 1977) who conducted a similar series of investigations into discursive procedures within the legal setting, and identified the following factors as having an adverse effect upon witness testimonies:

1. the severity of questions affects answers;
2. the choice of an indefinite/definite article can alter the response;
3. implicating false information in a question can lead the witness to report it as a fact;
4. when subjects are exposed to delayed, misleading information they are less confident of their correct responses than their incorrect ones;

5. when people are asked questions in an aggressive, aggravating or active manner, they will report an incident they have witnessed as being noisier and more violent than those asked in a more neutral manner;

6. substantially leading questions encourage (stimulated) jurors to give a guilty verdict, more than neutral questions;

7. when a witness has seen a number of people committing different acts, leading questions make him/her more likely to identify the wrong person as being responsible for a given act.

(Luchjenbroers, 1997: 152).

Yet, while these researchers originally approached these patterns of interaction as somewhat predetermined transactions (consisting of pairs of highly resisting questions followed by compliant responses), developments over the past decade have led to the elaboration of a theoretical framework based on the premise that talk and context (particularly institutional contexts) are collaboratively construed and mutually determining (Gonzales, Muresan, & Wacholder 2011: 392). Accordingly, publications on courtroom discourse have tended to look more towards the dynamics of negotiation during the examination stage (Drew, 1992), specifically in respect to the strategies witnesses/defendants deploy in order to resist coercion, and modify the nature of the transactional exchange (Gnisci & Pontecorvo, 2004: 967). Studies supporting these theories mainly surround how the shift from context to contextualisation work in this regard, and identify within narrative descriptions:

interactions between attorney and witness are much more creative, improvisational, and emergent than... [the] notion of asymmetrical distribution of resources would suggest. Essentially witnesses have the opportunity to change the topic, initiate other topics, comment on evidence, modify duration of turns and interrupt, operating far more negotiative power than has been previously thought.

(Gnisci & Pontecorvo, 2004: 976).
Further research by Johnson (2014) investigates reported speech and quoting in legal discourse and demonstrates how pragmatic uses of the verb *say* are linked to a range of institutional activities: arguing and stance making; doubting and rejecting; time shifting and framing, and which constitute professional activities of shifting and fixing states of knowledge against legal and moral discourses. Construction, acceptance and denial of the ‘verbal’ facts are given “intertextual authority” (Matoesian, 2000) by institutional participants, such as, judges and lawyers. Specifically, Johnson’s (2014) paper highlights that what is said in police stations and in courtrooms by suspects and witnesses involved in civil and criminal offences is socially significant for citizens, in that private and local discourse is made public in being repeated, as it travels from speech event to courtroom, and enters the social consciousness via the media. As evidenced in Wuornos’ own trial and media portrayal, Johnson (2014: 1) demonstrates that “the recording of speech in official recordings makes it possible for witnesses’ words to be quoted, requoted and recontextualised across time and space over the course of an investigation, or in any subsequent trial or legal proceedings”. According to Johnson (2014: 1), when “words are used in court, they become oral evidence that is heard, judged and selectively passed on to the public by the world’s media”. This directly links to how the image of the ‘monster’ has come to denote Aileen Wuornos’ character entirely and reinforces Johnson’s (2014: 2) assertion that “evidence is made through social and institutional processes of saying what is being or has been said by quoting words or recontextualising and sensationalizing images for public dissemination”.

The pragmatics of questioning in legal interaction was found by Archer (2005: 197) to fall into two different categories: information-seeking, and confirmation-seeking. Subsequent to this, Jones (2009), following on from Holt and Johnson (2006),
distinguishes between ‘so-prefaced’ questions, ‘information-seeking’ questions and ‘confirmation-seeking’ questions, in a study which focuses on police interviews with white-British and Afro-Caribbean-British suspects. Within this investigation, it was noted that police were found to ask the white subjects more ‘information-seeking’, ‘so-prefaced’ questions, while the Afro-Caribbean suspects were asked more ‘confirmation-seeking’, ‘so-prefaced’ questions, providing “less scope for the suspect to present their own version” of events, showing the ways in which “topic management” resources enable police interviewers to “formulate a suspect’s narrative as a police version which excludes contextual information provided by the suspect” (Heydon, 2005: 145-46), thereby emphasizing culpability and guilt. Harris (2001: 71) also highlights the power of questioning in the courtroom in a similar manner, specifically as to the way questions can ‘fragment’ the narrative, which privileges the institutional framing of questions, but is highly restrictive in terms of witness response.

Further research into courtroom cross-examination by Holt and Johnson (2010:22, see Johnson, 2014) notes that:

…[the] complexity and power of cross-examination questions is not in their syntax alone. It is the pragmatic force that makes them powerful… these linguistically tactical questions draw their effect from the fact that the talk is designed to ‘make a witness acquiescent’ and make material significant for the jury in terms of ‘displaying evidence’…

In addition to this, Cotterill (2003: 353) draws attention to the asymmetrical “interpersonal dynamics of courtroom interaction” through a series of examples that show witnesses challenging the relevance of the question posed by the lawyer. She shows how witnesses who resist aggressive cross-examination questions do so at some cost, categorizing the speech act as “rebellion”, since the special conversational maxims (Grice, 1975) that apply in court require witnesses to answer questions, not ask them
and to answer them truthfully, but without speculating. Likewise, witnesses need to be responsive, and they cannot remain silent, unless it is self-incriminatory. In Cotterill’s examples, her witnesses are frequently rebuked by judges for flouting the maxims, telling them, *You have to answer the questions that are asked of you* (Cotterill, 2003: 366) or, *I’m afraid you can’t ask questions like that* (Cotterill, 2010: 368). Given the evidence elicited from this kind of research, it is very clear how important questions are within interactional work, at the heart of which is institutional discourse and control (Johnson, 2014).

Another of Johnson’s (2014) examples on the case and trial of the serial killer Dr Harold Shipman, found that the pragmatic effects of metadiscursive sensory verbs (such as ‘see,’ and ‘hear’), and key reporting verbs (such as *told* and *said*) identified that the judge’s recapitulation of the defendant’s words acts to organize, and synthesise the evidence for the jury. Here, the use of the authority of quotation and judicial (re-) organization, to make the jury question the contrasted material, acts to stimulate meaning-making and decision-making. While prior information (interview transcripts, videos etc.) are brought into the criminal trial across time and space from prior police interviews and pre-trial case preparation often within court proceedings (Johnson, 2014), often changes to become spoken and written evidence in the courtroom. Before once again becoming “textual material pertaining as records to the case that travel over time and context within the trial discourse of the prosecution and defence cases, until finally arriving at the judge’s summing-up (Johnson, 2014: 18)”. According to Johnson (2014), this culminating speech event necessarily refers to the defendant’s prior words and the evidence surrounding him, and this is done through quoting speech directly, indirectly and performatively in the judge’s re-enactment of questions and answers from the trial and is an issue particularly pertinent to the Wuornos case. Words spoken
by the defendant in examination and cross-examination during the trial are ‘recontextualised’ (Andrus, 2011; Ehrlich, 2007) by the judge, through the ‘intertextual authority’ of his quotation (Matoesian, 2000). According to Johnson (2014), this means that juries have the right to draw adverse inferences from any testimony given under questioning that was not mentioned during initial police interviews, and therefore, this yields some considerable power in directing their deliberations. This act of reminding the jury of the evidence from both the police interview, and throughout the trial by means of paraphrasing, along with direct and indirect appropriation of the witnesses’ voice, essentially “selects, organizes and transforms the quoted words into a professional monologue, which is inflected with a legal judicial perspective, and one that re-presents evidence in such a way that invites evaluation, opinion and decision-making” in the jury (Johnson, 2014: 18).

Within Johnson’s (2014) investigation into the Shipman case, this issue of intertextual authority is at its most powerful when the judge “animates Shipman by appropriating his voice and synthesizing the facts in order to represent them to the jury (Johnson, 2014: 17)”. In doing so, he uses his judicial authority to shape Shipman’s polyphonic monologue (quoted direct speech) in pursuit of a verdict. When the judge appropriates and ‘animates’ (Goffman, 1979: 173) Shipman’s voice, it “simultaneously merges and is made incongruous by his own voice, in a change of ‘footing’ from author to animator (Johnson, 2014: 17)”, which it embodies to directly address the jury. This means that it is the jury and not Shipman, that become the addressees in this first-person monologue, and was noted to be specifically marked by the key use of second person pronoun ‘you’. This evidence culminates to show what a remarkable resource such intertextual power is for judges, and just how powerful the framing of statements and their contributory shaping force is upon the images of the defendants under scrutiny.
In terms of the position of the defendant and their ability to negotiate, a study by Martinovski (2006) into the use of mitigation techniques within Spanish and English courtrooms found that attorneys’ yes-no questions that required a straightforward answer via an explicit elicitation of affirmation or denial, often evoked a response that acted as both an admission and a denial. In this situation, defendants are found to qualify their actions by including further information regarding the event, or a 'mitigated admission' (Gonzales et al., 2011: 393). In essence, the defendant’s responses are initiated at the beginning, before a list of objections or disclaimers are given, and are presented in a very certain manner as a matter of 'principle'. Thus, the dialogue continues on what Martinovski (2006) calls the 'negotiation line', implicitly destroying single accountability by objecting to the formulation of the attorney’s preceding accusation. Martinovski (2006) also notes that acts of initial admission are typically combined with proleptic moves in the form of justifications, which are theorised to take the following form:

**Admission Answers** - start with a simple confirmation feedback, then a full answer, and continuing with a very long account beginning with an objection (against the attorney’s formulation of the event) or concession, followed by a justification for their actions.

**Argumentation Line** - consists of providing objective reasons, also realised by repeated use of an epistemic modal verb or adverb signifying common knowledge (e.g. statements indicative of concessions and defence moves such as excuses, objections, mitigation of stronger statements and justifications).

Yet, despite defendants having the discursive ability to negotiate displayed meanings and facts, and thus their accountability, other research shows that this is not enough to override the power hierarchy inherent within the institutional environment of the court (Gonzales et al., 2011). According to Gonzales et al (2011), sequential and meta-pragmatic negotiations between courtroom participants formally structure the
production, reception and authority of reported speech. However, they also reveal the inconsistencies across successive representations of discursive events between attorney and witness, which are a natural product of courtroom exchange. Crucially, Gonzales’ paper highlights how much asymmetry is constitutive of the activity type inherent in it, and that it is impossible to have the power relations otherwise balanced. So, despite the ability for witnesses to circulate such utterances within the courtroom, power is still distributed in favour of the attorney presiding over the case. This is firstly demonstrated by the direction of the dialogue, which is always orientated around a hierarchically- and transactionally-bound turn-taking procedure, and finally, it is caught up within the construction of social identity, and the performance of legal knowledge, which indicates where one is positioned within the legal hierarchy of the courtroom. This supports earlier studies by Voloshinov (1986) and Briggs and Bauman (2009), where the attorney is shown to have overriding control over the ability to create transparent relations between factors. This works to minimise the gap between historical admissions from the defendant, and the current reporting context. They are the ones to impose arbitrary interpretive frames on the contextualisation of discourse, and often manage to naturalise such discourse as the truth, thus harnessing the interpretive potential of structural relations by the position they hold.

Within the American courtroom, there exists two alternative modes of procedural interaction. There are those judges who are record-orientated, whereby the notion that the defendant is pleading a particular stance "knowingly, and voluntarily" in line with their constitutional rights, has already been established by court officials, without the presiding judge having to ascertain this. Alternatively, there are procedure-orientated judges, where the official must ascertain this by detailed and liberal questioning of the defendant throughout the trial (an interactive strategy used by the
judge during Wuornos’ case). In reference to American courtroom systems using this latter style, Philips (1998) conducted a series of studies investigating how legal ideologies and power are expressed within interviews and socially-occurring speech in the courtroom context. Specifically, Philips’ studies aimed to understand more thoroughly how speakers create and reinforce power hierarchies inherent within these contexts through their use of language. In relation to the current research, Philips’ findings shed interesting light on the link between discourse, facework and an individual’s personal constructs. As Philips (1998) highlights, it is important that presiding judges obtain social background information relating to the defendant. Indeed, from the cases Philips was involved in recording, she demonstrated that the social identity of the defendant affected the very nature of the ensuing interaction she recorded (1998). The nature of procedure-orientated judge’s governance of court specifically involved them asking social background questions at the beginning of courtroom procedures. When asked why this was the case, Philips was told that such questions provided judges with information that enabled them to tailor the questions to the individual. For example, a defendant’s responses to social background questions would enable judges to determine whether the defendant was ‘able’ at all to plead knowingly and voluntarily, or to determine what was necessary to enable this clear understanding, in line with that person’s constitutional rights. Therefore if a defendant’s years of schooling were low, a judge may use simpler language or go over information more slowly and carefully.

However, as Philips (1998) highlights, within such omissions by defendants there lies a crucial caveat from a more micro-societal viewpoint. For example, if the judge’s agreement-attention to the social backgrounds of defendants is consistent with the values American society attaches to issues such as education, employment and
class, then there may be other conceptions that are covertly understood or interpreted from their revelations. Likewise, this may also result in other perceptions being built of that person. American culture is often quick to explain negatively-evaluated behaviours by reference to an individual’s lack of education or their social class (Philips, 1998). For example, someone’s level of education might be closely related to concepts of class, intelligence, employment, etc.. However, their level of education should not be to blame for negative behaviour, despite the fact that attributions involving education can be understood to function as a ‘code’ for other negative attributions involving criminality, lack of employment, propensity for violence, and drug abuse (Briggs & Bauman, 2009; Philips, 1998). Therefore, when judges make inferences about what it means when a defendant has a particular educational and employment status, they may subconsciously be making judgements about that individual’s other personal characteristics (Philips, 1998: 61). Overall, Philip’s (1998) discoveries demonstrate the inability of judges in this position to be completely impartial. As her findings reflected that their line of questioning displayed an intent (even if not fully realised) to handle the procedure differently each time, in ways influenced by how or what they perceive the characteristics of the defendant to be. While this could be seen as making the questioning more ‘person-centred’, and thus more effective, it also demonstrates that, despite their requirement to maintain an impartial stance professionally, they have the contentious need to operate (to a certain extent) from a personally interpretive stance. Following on from this discussion of context, the next section (section 1.5.1) will identify how such institutionalised and power-laden contexts interact with issues surrounding face and identity.
1.4.1 Situating the Activity Set-Up

In her 2007 paper (see Section 3.3), Spencer-Oatey proposes that, in cognitive terms, face and identity are similar notions in that both relate to the issue of self-image, on three levels: individual, relational and collective constructions of self. According to this, face threat and its loss are only perceived when there is a mismatch between these three levels, specifically when an attribute is claimed/denied (in the case of negatively evaluated attributes) by a speaker, and perceived to be attributed to the speaker by others engaged in the interaction. This can be demonstrated when an attribute an individual claims or denies to have on a personal level is or is not attributed to them by others in social or relational circumstances (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 10). An example of this can be seen in the case this study seeks to look at, with Aileen Wuornos being tried for a series of premeditated murders she claims were acts of self-defence, with the accusation of murder being attributed to her by society, which she denied having committed. Furthermore, Spencer-Oatey (2007) proposes that it is only affectively sensitive attributes that will vary dynamically in interaction, and not always conform to the socially sanctioned ones (or non-sanctioned, in the case of negatively evaluated attributes), exemplified by the fact that Aileen seeks to attest that the accusation of multiple homicide (attributed to her by the prosecution and court), was actually an unfortunate outcome of her defending herself against a series of assaults by her so-called victims. By adopting this view, Spencer-Oatey (2007; 2011) and Culpeper (1996; 2003; 2005; 2011) both leave room for the possibility that individuals may contest one or more socially approved attributes, and instead claim other attributes deemed more important to them. This, however, is all contingent upon that individual’s personal perspective of the context in which the interaction takes place, and is primarily where an individual’s Personal Constructs (Kelly, 1955), motivations and intent behind
linguistic performance can be located by an analysis of what the facework strategies are, that they are using in interaction.

From this it appears that both Spencer-Oatey (2007; 2011) and Culpeper (1996; 2003; 2005; 2011) agree upon the idea that the directionality of influence that operates upon the individual’s use of facework strategies has a circuitous path, with two ideological influences being dominant, namely: the contextual macro influences emanating from society, and the person’s own micro personal constructs and theorizing on the interaction taking place, stating that, as “face entails claims on the evaluation of others, it needs to be analysed as an interactional phenomenon” (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 10).

Therefore for any discussion of face must include an appreciation of how identity performance and context interact, and with this in mind, any discussion of data within this study will also include an appreciation of the three-tiered format favoured by Spencer-Oatey (2007:11-13), namely:

- The multiple positive/ negative attributes that interlocutors may claim (the kinds of value constructs and PCTs a person demonstrates by their use of certain facework strategies);
- The types of analytic frames (activity type and the context of the interactional exchange), needed to analyse such claims;
- The dynamic real-time unfolding of such face claims as the interaction progresses.

What type of activity-set up is taking place, is central towards this study’s ability to accurately interpret the kind of interactional exchange going on between interlocutors. This is specifically related to the kind face claims and negotiation they make, because activity-set ups can often shape participants’ contributions (Culpeper, 2011). Once this is established, we can then begin to construct an understanding of the
facework strategies that are being employed, and are actually taking place within that environment.

The most salient discourse procedures dominating the context of the interaction can be indicated by what ‘group members’ are involved in the exchange. Within the courtroom we can see members of several social groups identifiable from the linguistic features they use, their physical positioning within the courtroom, and (in some cases) their uniform. From lay members of the jury, to the attorneys and Judge; all represent the well-defined power hierarchy that makes up the American justice system, where they stand as representatives of an ideological institution based upon macro-social values of the country.

As a whole, it is apparent that the data unfolding within the courtroom is centred on the concept and pursuit of ‘justice.’ This is apparent from the cultural background of the court, specifically one that endorses the moral values of American western society. According to Luchjenbroers (1993), there are two legal systems in which all the courts of the world can be categorised: the Adversarial (accusatory) system - used in Anglo-American cultures and the Inquisitorial system that is customary in Europe. The data for this paper follows the Adversarial system tradition, which involves a 'contest' between rival parties, with a frequent criticism of the system being that it is primarily concerned creating the most credible story in order to account for the evidence, and not necessarily about revealing the truth. As Brewer and Gardner (1996) describe, the Adversarial system is gladiatorial, where the jury decides who fought the better battle. Such formality also entails a necessary consensus of thought processes, value systems and ideologies between interlocutors which reflect the values held by their culture both aesthetically and ethically, as to what may/ may not be allowed to take place within that setting (positioning within the courtroom, roles, power allocation etc.). Thus, what an
individual may do within this context is highly constrained by societal norms, traditions and what role they are expected to play within the unfolding dialogue (one which has a discourse structure loaded with a specific agendas and intentions).

This issue in turn leads people to expect a certain type of interaction to take place between interlocutors when a dialogue is engendered between individuals in a legislative context. This then forms, according to Searle (1969) skills of ‘discursive communal practices’, for speaking subjects and their worlds. Thornborrow (2002) offers a useful working definition of such institutionalised talk, which according to her research, and that of others (Levinson, 1992; Habermas, 1984) is characterised by four primary features:

I) Talk that has differentiated, prescribed and conventional participant roles or identities whether it takes place in a classroom, TV, Radio Studio or Police interview room.

II) Talk in which there is a structural asymmetrical distribution of turn types between participants, such that speakers with different institutional identities typically occupy different discursive identities; that is, they get different types of turns in which they do different kinds of things (interviewers conventionally ask questions, while interviewees answer them).

III) Talk in which there is also an asymmetrical relationship between participants in terms of speaker rights and obligations. This means certain types of utterances are seen as legitimate for some speakers but not for others (an examining magistrate is expected to ask questions, a defendant is not).

IV) Talk in which the discursive resources and identities available to participants to accomplish specific actions are either weakened or strengthened in relation to their current institutional identities.

Overall, institutional discourse can best be described as talk which sets up positions for people to talk from and restricts some speakers’ access to certain kinds of discursive actions (Van Dijk et al, 2008: 50). The setting in which Aileen finds herself appears to typify this activity set up. This can be reaffirmed by the manner in which Aileen’s case is presented and unwrapped before a jury (who the researcher can only
assume) occupy a 'blank state' of impartiality (Luchjenbroers, 1993), having no prior knowledge of the crime narrative they have yet to hear.

Therefore, the facts as to the events which culminate towards the crime must first be re-told and re-constructed through the verbal transactions taking place between witnesses and legal teams, something which, as Danet (1980) highlights, can only be achieved when the dialogue taking place develops, and ensure a maximally explicit presentation of information is given to the court from which arguments can then be built for prosecuting and defending teams to work on. This aligns with Culpeper's (2002) requirement that, prior to a facework analysis, the minute aspects of the interaction such as context and intent frameworks are examined, before an analysis of the discourse between interlocutors takes place.

Specifically, according to Luchjenbroers (1993), there are three aspects of courtroom discourse that dominate our ideas of what the process of interactional exchange is prescribed to be within the setting. These orientate around what constitute the Rules of Conduct regarding the setting, control and power:

\[\text{…power results directly from the fact that legal professionals frame the questions (and make the demands) but witnesses/interviewee’s do not share that right. The court imposes its will on interviewees, in that they cannot to some extent negotiate the court’s impression of them, or leave the scene [of the interaction]…} \] (Luchjenboers, 1993).

Penman (1987) reinforces this idea, by explaining that courts operate on their own set of rules, that private or intrinsic rules or goals of the interviewee are not tolerated, and any infringement of them may result in 'contempt of court' (Luchjenboers, 1993). Penman (1990) goes on to explain that the rules of conduct follow this pattern:

a) responses must give the precise information required;
b) they must not give more information than is asked for;

c) those under questioning may answer only upon the topic of what is asked of them; they may not provide unrequested information or direct the topic being discussed.

This can be exemplified by the prescriptive line of questioning Judges often use and operate within for certain areas of the trial, which is clearly well planned before the actual discourse commences trial (see section 4.2 for an example of this during Aileen’s Arraignment). The clear and concise manner in which defendants are expected to deliver these appropriate responses reflect the findings of Van Charlardorp’s (2014) study, which highlighted that the key to gaining a clear narrative sequence of events from a defendant is that they are never offered voluntarily but are elicited by a professional via a series of structured ‘request sequences’, or questions with a specific goal of uncovering the exact proceedings of events said to have taken place. The ‘procedure-led’ and goal-orientated sanctions, which participants employ to convey their institutional business, allowably narrow what amount of information defendants are able to contribute, and thus helps define what the limits surrounding ‘acceptable’ levels of factual information are (Wilson & Sperber, 2012). This can be seen in the very professional and transactional direct nature of the questions posed, which work towards establishing foundational knowledge of the client under assessment, such as their economic or educational background. Such subsequent questions are often designed to elicit information to establish the background of the interviewee’s character, and their understanding of the crimes with which they are charged (Luchjenbroer, 1993)

Another issue that is greatly important to reinforcing the power imbalance within the court is the setting, something that Aldridge and Luchjenbroer’s (2007) cited as crucial towards an individual’s interpretation of the nature of roles within such formal interactions, and which specifically for this investigation’s data relates to the
asymmetrical relationships the courtroom context engenders between interlocutors in terms of allocated power, rights and obligations. This appears to be reinforced by the visual layout of the courtroom itself, as is Van Dijk et al.’s (2008) observation on groups, particularly power imbalances resulting from group membership, and the accessibility law professionals have to discourse, actions, movement and processes within the context. This is can be demonstrated by our data's environmental structure, specifically the layout of the furniture, dress code, as well as the aforementioned rules of conduct as Figure 1 demonstrates.

Figure 1. Typical Criminal Court (Juror's Handbook, Florida Department of Justice)

![Layout of Courtroom](image)

Furniture, as well as the formal wig and dress of authority figures (such as the judge and attorneys) clearly demarcates institutional identity, and differentiates from their personal identity. Such outward signs are also used to emphasise power imbalances depersonalizing people to make them unrecognizable public rather than private
individuals, both highlighting in terms of prestige if not (also) mass - i.e. legal professionals and jury (particularly the judge) look down on witnesses. For example, the judge is seated higher and his/her bench is generally of a larger construction. Barristers stand during testimonies; and jurors are seated in tiered rows (where at least the second row looks down) to facilitate the view of court proceedings. Two further factors are those of dress and freedom of movement, as legal professionals and the accused are specifically assigned distinctive clothing (gowns for the prosecutors and defence teams, a wig for the judge, and a prison uniform for the defendant) that mark their roles within the setting. This is in contrast again to the audience and jury members, who do not use scene-specific, elaborate clothing. In addition to the spatial layout of the court (evident from Figure 1) control and power are key issues within the unfolding dialogue between participants, as they add towards the context’s activity-set up.

1.5 Institutional Discourse and Documentary Interview

In this section, another type of mediated interaction will be the focus in order to define how power within less formal institutional settings is organised among participants. As the dataset that this study is based upon relates to the differential interview contexts, it is important to understand the impact specific contexts have upon the nature of the discursive exchanges that take place within them.

Specifically, documentary and media interviews are mediated talk events where the discursive identities of questioner and answerer are partially institutionally inscribed to that of interviewer and interviewee (Thornborrow, 2002; 86). However, unlike the formal setting of the legal system, the structural organisation of this kind of institutional talk makes different kinds of discursive positions available to participants.
Media construed 'talk events' contrast with more socially informal conversational settings for talk, in so far as participants in them very often have publicly and professionally marked status and identity. For example, the professional interviewer is often engaged with a professional interviewee (for example, politician, spokesperson or representative of some social minority), which impacts upon the way the dialogue is shaped and produced (Thornborrow, 2002). Indeed, Turner's (2010) investigation into the typifying factors involved in media interview protocol identifies that the image of interactants holding an informal topical conversation within an interview format relied “... entirely on the spontaneous generation of questions in a natural interaction” (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2003: 239). This is despite the interviewer being an active participant in the interaction, and their stance being quasi-informal/investigative, their questions are still, to some degree, designed to follow a set of predetermined topics and themes, ones which are structured by 'in the moment' experiences, as a means of further clarifying the experiences or scene they are in the process of bearing witness to. As McNamara and Roever (2006) highlight, such an informal conversational approach relies upon the interaction with the participants guiding the interview process. By its very nature, this type of interview can be said to open up far more discursive positions for interactants to speak, precisely because of this lack of formal structure. This provides a certain level of qualitative flexibility within the data gathered (Turner, 2010). Similarly, his approach to the more general interview guide found further evidence of predetermined structures, despite a certain level of flexibility still being available to the composition of questions. Turner (2010) found that using this technique enabled him to interact more with participants in a relaxed and informal manner, where the opportunity to learn more about the in-depth experiences was greater than through more structured interviews. The informality and neutrality of the environment allowed him as an interviewer to
develop a rapport with participants, which enabled him to ask follow-up questions or
more probing questions based on the participant’s responses to previous questions.
According to McNamara, the strength of this interview type is that it allows the
researcher:

... to ensure that the same general areas of information are collected from
each interviewee; providing more of a focus than simple conversational
approaches, but still allowing a degree of freedom and adaptability in
gaining information from them… (2006: 8).

Thus, the interviewer remains the locus of power, without sacrificing the flexibility
precedence based on perceived prompts from the participants.

The organisation of turn-taking in media interviews has been described in the
past by Drew and Heritage (1992) as an institutionally specialised system, where
participants restrict themselves to the production of questions and answers (thereby
sustaining the event as an interview, rather than a discussion). Indeed, it appears to be
a core construct, with interviewees unable to open or close interviews, and they also
remain unable to allocate next turns to speakers. Interviewer questions are often
designed to 'set an agenda', and sometimes lead interviewees to engage in complex
evasive tactics within the constraints of a turn-taking system, where they are positioned
as responders (Thornborrow, 2002: 87). The allocation of turns is predetermined in that
the interviewer goes first, with the interviewee going second. Likewise, the turn types
are also predetermined- as interviewers take the question turn, and interviewees follow
with a response. As Thornborrow (2002) found, in more than twenty-two part
interviews, the interviewer is generally also responsible for speaker selection, so in this
and other ways acts as managers of the talk, thus organising who speaks when. Yet,
unlike the formal environment of the courtroom, interviewees do exert some power
over their ability to nominate themselves as speaker, rather than rely upon an invitation
to take the floor. Commonly, if this is actioned, there will be some explicit reference made to the action, as with the action of the interviewee to close a sequence of questioning, although, as Drew and Heritage (1992: 131) note, this can be heavily dependent upon the social status and power of the interviewee. So within the basic constraints of a more flexible turn-taking system, where the interviewer questions and the interviewee responds, all participants can be seen to exhibit a range of strategies to deal with whatever may occur, within a less formally constrained environment. Once an interviewee takes a response turn, they may exercise the right to 'go on'. For example, in multi-party interviews, or ones where the individual understands their centrality to the narrative under examination by the documentary, they can make explicit requests for the floor, rather than wait for the interview to select them as the next speaker (Thornborrow, 2002; 90). On the other hand, interviewers occupy the role of talk managers, engendering the questions, and managing opening, closing and smooth transitions between speakers, while also having the resources to direct the content of the interview. This is particularly apparent when they highlight issues of negotiated meaning between interactants or formulations, which in such a context play a central role in the sequential management and establishment of 'sense' and the 'gist' of meanings. One of the central defining resources this kind of interview format allows is its use of formulation which can be democratically negotiated between participants. Formulation is defined by Thornborrow (2002: 90) as a particular type of third-turn recipient of information, which has been produced by one speaker and is reiterated by another, and which functions to establish the 'gist', or the 'for-all-practical-purposes definiteness of sense' of what has been said in the previous turn (Drew & Heritage, 1992: 137). As Clayman (2010) highlights, formulation can be used to clarify, refocus or underline prior talk, as well as to cooperate or challenge the interviewee’s statements,
all the while maintaining a ‘neutral stance’. These issues are all pertinent to the field of formal legal discursive practice, as well as those taking place within a less formal setting, and will be shown as particularly relevant for this investigation, as the types of interviews Wuornos is involved in are cross-compared. Specifically, it will examine how people within the differential settings contribute to outlining her character, her crimes, the opposing institutional structures she is both controlled within, and has the ability to contribute to, and finally how these factors ultimately contribute towards the character she has come to be defined as, within the public sphere.

Further studies by Jagtiani (2012:6) into the conduct of political and documentary interviewers demonstrated that the interviewer’s primary position within the interaction is to maintain a formally neutral stance, while interacting with their guests (Clayman, 2002). However, the mandatory requirement for interviewers to produce evaluative statements, complicates their neutrality. As Clayman (1988: 487, see Clayman, 2002) suggests, one such example of this complicated position comes during their attempts to ‘mitigate’ (whereby interviewers produce statements on behalf of others), an evaluative statement. (Clayman, 1988: 487, see Clayman, 2002). When an interviewer produces an evaluative statement and mitigates its strength, they express their own point of view, while appearing to minimise the importance of their opinion. Such techniques were found by recipients of this strategy to allow the interviewer to be interactionally confrontational, while remaining officially neutral. Within this technique, however, interviewers were also provided with the ability to implement argumentative statements in their questions that can actively challenge interviewees’ positions. These evaluative statements were found to be embedded within interrogatives such as ‘can you then... / are you sure... / so are you saying...’, so that each complete turn can be regarded as a question indicating a neutral stance, with
negative interrogatives in particular being evaluated as more partial than others for this
not to be the case (Maynard & Heritage, 2005). Ultimately, the goal of this neutral
stance is to create an unassailable position in a potentially antagonistic interaction, in
line with the traditional interview format where the interviewer is supposed to hold back
explicit personal comments and opinions (Weizman, 2006). Within this need for
neutrality, however, the interviewer must also create an engaging interview. One such
technique available to them as journalists is that of embedding critical comments into
the questions of others (Holly, 1994: 428), where interviewers quote outside sources in
order to confront interviewees with critical statements. Another strategy is that of
'ventriloquizing' (Lauerbach, 2006: 198, see Tannen, 2010), in which interviewers ask
questions enunciated by actors outside the context of the interaction as a means of
maintaining neutrality, with such utterances suggesting attitudes like fear, anxiety or
doubt as a means of eliciting conflict, or to support their own stance. This is
demonstrated when interviewers paraphrase the testimony of other people, and request
that the interviewee contest or agree with the person’s formulation of the event. Such a
strategy acts to position the interviewee in line with a particular stance, rather than
occupying a neutral zone. According to Jagtiani (2012), such a technique can also be
used by interviewers to present their knowledge, and emphasise their reliability to an
audience, to maintain social power (Simon-Vanderbergen, 1996). 'Ventriloquizing' is
also evidenced where, in order to present a public self-image of power and confidence,
the method of quoting others can be used as evidence, or as a means of distancing that
person from a claim. This can be illustrated by paraphrasing witnesses and perhaps
introducing to the viewing audience a witness’ lack of awareness regarding a particular
piece of evidence that they are privy to. Such additions surrounding an interviewee's
statement can be used as a method of dismissing their point of view, or to coerce them
into taking up a definitive position, rather than occupying a predominantly neutral, and ambivalent zone.

While interviewers have the right to manage the introduction and organisation of topics, and interviewees are unable to shift from one topic to another, there are instances within this less formal interview context where interviewees can challenge the normative question and answer format, in order to exert some control over the discourse (Jagtiani, 2012). Interviewees can make effective use of question 'reformulations' to avoid or re-cast some aspects of an interviewer's questions. This can be demonstrated when interviewees make a statement prior to providing the required answer, enabling them to paraphrase the question asked, and reformulate it in an alternative structure which effectively engenders a new meaning to the original question., Clayman's (1993) study noted that, after such a reformulation, interviewees continued talking, with the subsequent talk building on the reformulation of the question, rather than the original question. Another way to exert some control over the direction of the interview is for interviewees to talk about something else prior to answering the interviewer’s question. Greatbach (1986: 443) calls this practice 'pre-answer agenda shifting'. Another practice called 'post-answer agenda shifts' allows interviewees to change the topic after answering an interviewer's question. Both shifts are coordinated and produced in combination with a response, and manage to negotiate, rather than challenge, the turn distribution rights of interviewers, since the interviewees are not seen to speak out of turn (Greatbach, 1986). For example, a defendant in response to being asked whether he was aware that the car he was driving was stolen or not replies:
…I didn’t know it was stolen, but I didn’t even have a cell phone and there wasn’t even a phone where we stopped so it’s not like I could have found out or anythin’… (Greatbach, 1986: 23).

This factor will be particularly relevant when it comes to looking in detail at the procedures and contributions made by Wuornos, her defence team and the prosecution in the courtroom. The formally acceptable procedures of the courtroom will be seen in action, along with the potential ramifications of the digressions when they are crossed.

Interviewees can also control the topic of their talk by ignoring the focus that has been established by a previous question. In other words, the interviewee does not produce an answer, but instead, talks about something else. Generally however, instances where the interviewee takes a turn that is not in response to the interviewer’s question are seen to represent a violation of the normative question-answer sequence, and can be perceived by the audience as an evasive means of avoiding answering (Haworth, 2006). Nevertheless, evasiveness can be an expected characteristic of some interviews, particularly political ones.

Unlike the more formal, power-laden structure of police and courtroom interviews, the documentary interview has a more democratic focus. The interviewer is in the primary position of controlling the dialogue (initiating the questions, etc.), with the interviewee responding. There is also room for exercising reverse control, whereby the recipient of the interviewer's questioning can powerfully negotiate their position by using the interviewer's need for the interaction taking place between the two parties (Johansson, 2006). For example, when interviewees refrain from answering questions (as there is no social or legal obligation for them to do so), the function of informally eliciting information and exercising of control by the interviewer cannot be accomplished (Lord et al., 2008), so participation is achieved interactionally, rather than formally. Such occurrences then require what Locher and Watts (2005) have identified
as a manipulation of expectation frames. Their study, in particular, demonstrates that both interviewers and interviewees alike will manipulate the expectations of others, to subtly frame their interlocutor as not doing what they are formally expected to do, or what is formally acceptable for them to do within the given context of the interaction. The focus of negotiating a democratic participation in the context in order to achieve the goal of information elicitation can also involve open confrontation, as the power between the interviewer and interviewee is contested (Lauerbach, 2003; Johansson, 2006). Interruptions here are regarded as controlling the contributions of other interview participants, while also being utilised in a positive manner, which can constitute a supportive feedback function. A further example can be found in political interviews, where generally interviewers conduct the interaction and manage the introduction of new topics. Yet, sometimes the politician under scrutiny can decide whether they collaborate with their interviewer or not, and can reject the relevance of the interviewer’s topics, instead introducing their own (Becker, 2007; Johansson, 2006). In conclusion, there appear to be several interactional characteristics for the conduct of documentary and media interviews, where the interviewer is supposed to refrain from expressing an explicit personal opinion. The goal of this stance is theorised by researchers to be a way of creating an unchallengeable position in a potentially antagonising interaction (Weizman, 2006). In order to maintain this stance, while also digressing to achieve certain journalistic aims, they may make use of journalistic strategies such as embedding critical comments into the quotations of others (Holly, 1994) or ventriloquizing (Lauerbach, 2006).

There are also instances where interviewees can challenge the institutionalised interview organisation by quoting others; by implying that there is a lack of evidence that can be used to dismiss an opponent's point of view; by playing down the importance
of challenging facts; by being vague and ambiguous, or by being certain and confident, or even by rejecting interviewers' topics in order to introduce their own (Becker, 2005, 2007; Johansson, 2006; Jagtiani, 2012). Furthermore, such interviewees can interrupt the on-going discourse to avoid answering a question, or to oppose interviewers' suggestions (Holly, 1994). Thus, the social status and power of interviewees and the genre-dependent discursive power of interviewers frequently clash, which can lead to interruptions, denial of the response and open confrontation (Lauerbach, 2003; Becker, 2005; Johansson, 2006). Yet it must be remembered that within the media environment, such confrontation between interviewers' questions and interviewees' responses dramatizes the event, and is ultimately another way to entertain the audience (Lauerbach, 2004, 2006; Johansson, 2006; Jagtiani, 2012).

1.6 Facework and Personal Construct Theory: better together than apart?

In order to thoroughly de-construct the representation of Aileen Wuornos from a personal, individual and objective standpoint, any research must draw on how multiple authors, from Wuornos herself to Nick Broomfield and the audience construe her character. To do this, I will be using Nick Broomfield's award-winning documentaries, and addressing the aforementioned fields in a cross-dimensional study involving Psychology and Linguistics, specifically Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and Facework. I will demonstrate how, viewed in conjunction with one another, these fields enable us as an audience to form a more coherent sense of Wuornos' identity, by looking at her background as an individual, how she is framed by the media, and how she performs as an individual in the public sphere. This interdisciplinary stance can afford a more comprehensive understanding of the psychology that drives her linguistic
facework, and performances of 'self-hood', in public and private contexts, since it more comprehensively provides the reasoning, and perhaps even the intention, behind her behaviour and linguistic choices.

Sub-fields within Linguistics have long focussed on the achievement of 'sense of self' in its socio-cultural context, and in doing so, have empirically validated 'discursive interaction' as a key locus via which people can form and construct self-hood. Goffman's (1955) Facework Theory and subsequent revisions have proven to be especially crucial in this regard (Spencer-Oatey, 2002; 2007). Goffman (1967: 5) defined face as the 'image of self', which Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) later revised to 'public self-image', while more recently, discussions of face have invariably agreed that its defining aspect always leads back to the concept of self (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 693). Ting-Toomey (1994: 3) argues that face is an 'identity-boundary issue', and Scollon, Scollon and Wong (1995: 34-36) discuss it in terms of 'the interpersonal identity of individuals in communication' and the 'self as a communicative identity'.

Consistently much linguistic research has firmly aligned identity and facework in its social enactment, but without engaging in a detailed demonstration of how facework construes identity, and how identity is achieved, at least in part, through facework, a concept which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Identity is unarguably a reflection of the various ways in which people understand themselves in relation to others. Tajfel et al. (1986) Social Identity Theory suggests that a person has not one 'self', but rather several different 'selves' that relate to particular situations. For instance, the different social contexts may influence an individual to think, feel and act on the basis of his/her personal, familial or national 'level of self', which may be different from other 'levels of self' (Tajfel & Turner, 1986: 45). According to Hogg and Vanghan (2002) the individual's self-concept is derived from
perceived membership of social groups. In other words, it is an individually-based understanding of what defines the macro-group identity, which is exhibited for others to see. The attitude of people towards methods of communication and identify construction, for example, can themselves sometimes influence a person's choice of language, dialect, type of vocabulary, pronunciation and often their style of writing, which may lead to an intentional modification of the 'self’ which they present in speech or text.

Identity and a person’s concept of their own identity ultimately reside in the individual’s or group’s perception of self in relation to their past and future, and how they want to be viewed and understood in the present (Ige, 2007). According to Pierce (2008), the ability to speak a dominant language is sometimes constrained by the power relations between speakers, and structural inequalities such as gender, race, ethnicity and class, which can limit learners' exposure to that language. Pierce's (2008) investigation shows how far people will go to ensure that they are seen and received as they desire. She offers the example of immigrant women living in Canada who pretended not to understand English in order to retain their prestige as elderly women, a status which attracts considerable respect from their peers in the immigrant community. This is an indication that the identity desired by a person involved in an interaction, and the way in which he or she aspires to be represented, may well impact on the outcome of the conversation. In a situation such as this, the desire for respect led the women to adopt a strategy of feigned ignorance of a language that they recognised in their working lives as powerful in their new-found home, in order to retain a certain prestige among their own community. Such adherence to a specific social norm within the Canadian culture which prefers the English language over speaking a native tongue, demonstrates that in doing so immigrant women are projecting a core personal
construct, which emanates from being a member of a minority group within the country, and is manifested in language. This is one example of how Kelly's (1955) Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and language use are interlinked. Essentially, such evidence demonstrates that people's retention of certain idiosyncratic personal constructs depends and relate primarily to their experiences and understandings (positive or negative) of those similar events they have experienced. Therefore, this understanding and relation to that event impacts heavily upon their interactive performances to that event when they experience it once more in society, with such personal constructs manifesting in their paralinguistic and linguistic interactive behaviours. For example, if someone has had a bad experience with a dog where they were bitten, they may take this experience as a lesson that all/most dogs are dangerous. So, when they come across another dog, they may shy away from contact with it, or actively avoid situations with dogs. Specifically, for this study, the facework strategies individuals adopt in response to certain stimuli can be linked to their core personal constructs of the interactional contexts they find themselves in. In addition to this, and the reason why this study emphasises the importance of viewing facework and PCT in conjunction with one another, is that an individual's PCTs can be detected in language, particularly in terms of how they operationalize it within interaction (facework).

With reference to Pierce’s (2008) investigation, the social ignorance, or what can be seen as a 'personal construct' (if we are to adopt Kelly’s perspective) displayed by the immigrant women in his study is commonly referred to as 'pragmatic transfer' in second language acquisition, rather than relating it to the constructs of that particular culture. This transfer is defined as a speaker's goal-driven aversion to implement accepted language rules. In other words, the speaker continues to implement the rules of Language A, even though they are speaking Language B which has different norms
(Thomas, 1995). Yet, drawing on Kasper’s (1996: 212) definition of pragmatic transfer, this transfer could be intentional or unintentional (Ige, 2007). While it may be true that unintentional transfer is due to ignorance of the acceptable norms of a certain society and its language, intentional transfer failure is motivated by a specific aim. It is a deliberate act embarked upon when making a statement. This can be explained in terms of what Kasper (1996: 211) refers to as 'context external' and 'context internal', where the former refers to sensitivity towards factors such as how interlocutor’s wider background/context, influences the language choices of speakers. Also important are the strategic motivations behind the choice of language (i.e. one speaker may use facework to dominate the other because of greater linguistic skill) and the standardness (what customarily occurs) of the situation. It is possible, for instance, for context-internal (or an individual’s internal personal construct of the situation) to validate their response, irrespective of the context-external status, which suggests the possibility of a defeatist or placatory attitude, expressed in action or speech as a result of internal validation of the situation. Hence, whatever the speaker decides is acceptable to him or her, within their narrower personal culture/background, might prevail over what they know is expected in wider mainstream society. Therefore, personal constructs override adhering to social norms. The intention behind every instance of transfer is especially useful for the kind of research this study conducts. As Ige (2010: 349) suggests, understanding the reason for such linguistic demonstrations may have deeper psychological explanatory power, particularly in relation to Kelly's PCT (1951).

This sense that ‘personal constructs’ are at the core of the agentive subject in their construction of identity has only recently gained attention from researchers, and become apparent in studies involving progressive identity development, specifically within the learning environment. Mills' (2002) study showed that when people move
into a context where the norms and practices are, and have been, different to their own, they may adopt and learn the prevalent norms and values in order to achieve some degree of integration into the new environment, and to allow interaction. This may require changes in perception and in the manner of their communication. However, due to certain core constructs, and the fear of losing one’s identity, individuals may also produce resistance to the norms of the new context (Mills, 2002).

Recent studies in language and literacy once again demonstrate this link between personal constructs and their communication through language. Sterling (2002) and Mills (2002) give an excellent example of this in their documentation of how, over a period of time, teachers’ and students' discursive negotiations of curricular expectations not only reflect their identity development, but are infused with their own individual core personal constructions. This specifically refers to the expectations they have of power relations within the educational setting (with teachers occupying the higher tier of power, and the students the lower tier) and the impact this has upon their attitude towards their reception of education and the environment it takes place in (Handsfield & Crumpler, 2013). Much of this work, as well as research into bilingual education (Leung & Lewkowicz, 2012), has argued for a more micro-level examination of classroom interaction and discourses to understand how macro-instructional practices and interactions contribute to and challenge aspects of students’ identity construction, and the very personal constructs which inform their displayed behaviours.

This relationship between language, identity and personal constructs is also grounded in Bakhtin’s (1981) theory regarding the development of protagonist identities through the novel. He argues that people’s utterances are never autonomous, but are always dialogic, appropriating and re-voicing the words of others, essentially imbibing environmental influences that work towards formulating core personal
constructs that influence our responses and understanding of other environmental stimuli. Bakhtin’s (1981) work suggests that social agents are positioned in certain ways, and articulate particular identities over time depending on their agentive experiences of an extended life-narrative (Bakhtin, 1981:63 cited in Handsfield & Crumpler, 2013: 113). Bakhtin (1981) also advanced the concept of chronotypes (literally ‘space and time’) to describe historically enduring ideological landscapes that 'define perimeters of value' (Munk, 1992), or structure social practices, including language and literacy. Chronotypes become concretised through specific utterances, as interactants bring multiple ‘voices’ to bear in contexts of practice. It is within and across these contexts that ideologies and identities are constructed and negotiated. Thus, while these ideological formations are historically enduring, they are also fluid and dynamic according to the agentive use of them by the subject. Wortham's (2001) examinations of how students’ academic and social identities are constructed over extended timescales (Lemke, 2000) are particularly pertinent to this field, as Wortham (2001) followed individual students over a period of months, with his results suggesting complex semiotic processes at work within classrooms, which function to affirm particular identities for students. Much of the evidence regarding this construction of the agentive self and the self's core personal constructs was garnered though discourse analysis, specifically self-report tools, semi-structured interviews and observations of classroom discourses. However, concurrent with Kelly's (1955) original theory, many of the classroom discourses that were examined over an extended period of time also demonstrated that personal constructs are not necessarily set but, depending upon environmental influence, can be dynamic and moveable. This has been exemplified in Wortham’s (2001) findings, along with those of others (Lutz & Bartlett, 1995), which show how students' social and academic identities are co-constructed, and demonstrate
that “contingent social interactions are the empirical location in which broader theories and individual’s social behaviours exist and get transformed” (Wortham, 2001: 257).

Yet, while it is clearly important to understand how selected events from a large set of data impact upon personal constructs, and contribute to individual agency in interaction (Wortham, 2008: 273), authors have also stressed that it is equally important to explore interactions as they take place across longer timescales. This is now openly acknowledged as a crucial part of how social identities become solidified and recognised, and where there also may exist moments of contingency in which identity trajectories may be disrupted rather than solidified. For this, micro-level analyses are warranted, as Handsfield and Crumpler (2013) have shown in recent research examining discourse and linguistic interaction, that social agents are positioned, equally as they position themselves in multiple ways, even within one event or interactional sequence. This evidence acts as a further demonstration of how personal constructions impact upon individual’s linguistic performances in interaction, and how such interactions can also influence the shape and dynamics of individual’s constructions of events.

In the next chapter, I will be discussing in more detail the theoretical underpinning of Personal Construct Theory in its relation to self-hood and identity construction, and how it can act as the motivator, and facilitator of performed verbal and physical behaviour.
Chapter 2

Psychological Theories: Constructive Alternativism and Personal Construct Theory

2.1 Introduction

The issue of self-hood and identity in psychology has also been a pervasive and core aspect in the field of personality and mental health, particularly regarding findings that relate to grounded theory and practice. However, unlike the area of linguistics which focuses upon the social and discursive aspects of individuals, with very little reference to the internal drivers and motivations of the individuals themselves, psychology adopts a different (yet similarly isolated) perspective and approach to the concept, viewing identity and self-hood as located firmly within the individual. This means that any external contextual influence is essentially maligned, becoming a secondary, rather than an equally important variable to consider. While the common theme running through both fields is that of identity, there is still surprisingly little consideration of the inter-relationship that exists between the individual’s sense of self, as an internally experienced issue, and its public manifestation in facework (with the exception of those investigations conducted by Spencer-Oatey). For example, there may be a mismatch between a person’s own concept of their sense of self and their social enactment of face, and likewise, a person’s sense of self may help inform our understanding, and aid our analysis of face.

In this chapter, I will be exploring these issues by determining the extent to which facework and identity might be brought together via one of the core theories in the developmental psychology approach, in particular Constructive Alternativism (CA),
and specifically Kelly's (1967) Personal Construct Theory (PCT). By focussing upon this area, I hope to demonstrate the crucially important, yet up to now overlooked intra-informative relation each of the three areas has, under this theoretical perspective, in order to gain a holistic and thorough idea of both society's and individuals' construction and representation of the 'self.'

2.2 Constructive Alternativism and Personal Construct Theory

To construct a comprehensive understanding of the theoretical perspective I intend to adopt, and formulate a holistic picture of how self-concept is internally constructed and performed, it is important to provide a detailed account of both Constructive Alternativism (CA), and Personal Construct Theory (PCT). Specifically, it is important to demonstrate how both can be applied from either a purely theoretical position to more grounded ecological practice.

Like other theories, CA is the implementation of a philosophical assumption that the events we face today are subject to as many constructions as we are able to create. This means that even the most mundane occurrences of everyday life might be transformed if we, as individuals, are able to construe them differently (Fransella, 2003).

CA stresses the importance of events, but also looks to the individual in order to propose what the significance of their import shall be. The meaning one ascribes to an event is necessarily anchored in its antecedents and consequences, with its meaning displaying itself to us in the dimension of time. As Fransella (2003: 5) highlights, 'people look to events to confirm their predictions and encourage venturesome constructions'. Yet the same events may also confirm and validate the constructions we
initially anticipate them to hold. For example, a person may fear spiders for the reason that bites from the insect can be fatal. However, the same event may also disconfirm this expectation by resulting in no fatality. The dynamic and exciting aspect of CA is its bearing upon the conduct of man's personal enquiry. According to this particular theory, the criterion of meaningfulness and what can be constituted as true or false rests not upon whether it can be proven, but rather what constructs the individual brings to it, which make it meaningful. Essentially, then, the meaning of an event and the fruitfulness of the canon of logic is wholly based on what the individual ascribes to it:

…whatever the world may be, man can come to grips with it only by placing his own interpretations upon what he sees. While his ingenuity in devising suitable constructions may be limited, it is still he, not the facts that hold the key to the ultimate future. Therefore whatever actions are taken, they have been dictated by no other nature than his own (Fransella, 2003: 4).

The notion that this perspective can be generally applied to a larger population sample, rests upon the ability for it to be more narrowly refined to the individual’s own quest for self-hood via PCT (essentially Kelly's revised version of CA). As the fundamental postulate of PCT rests upon the assumptions of CA, but locates it both internally and externally to the individual’s own self-enquiry, hence, “[a] person's processes (actions) are psychologically channelled by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 1955 in Fransella, 2003: 7).

Kelly refers to the person's life path and subsequent actions within the path as an event or process that elaborates upon the expression and formulation of their personality and thus identity. By selecting terms such as 'processes', along with the notion of 'channelizing', Kelly (1955) highlights and stresses the importance of the theory's concept of the person and life events as an ever-dynamic force, rather than an object subject to external forces. According to Kelly:
…there is no other desire to suggest that we are dealing with anything not already in motion. What is to be explained is the direction of the process, not the transformation of inert states by processes. This then cuts ourselves free of 'stimulus- response' versions of previous 19th century scientific determinism…

(in Fransella, 2003: 8).

Under this perspective, psychological initiative always remains a property innately within the person, never facilitated simply by a variable that is situated in the environment the individual finds themselves in. With neither past nor future events regarded as basic determinants dominating the course of human action, one's way of construing and anticipating them (short and long term range) becomes the basic theme in the human process of living and interacting (Fransella, 2003: 8).

To thoroughly analyse such a perspective, an individual's construction of self-meaning must be taken into consideration, along with social enactments of such meaning/identity in the public as well as private realms of public enquiry. It is important to note that PCT, in this respect, is elaborated upon by eleven corollaries loosely inferred from its basic postulate. From these, certain notions can be reviewed, that fall in-line with personal construct thinking-notions about such matters as hostility and guilt, in other words, issues that impact upon the public enactment of identity, whether intentionally or unconsciously communicated to interlocutors.

For the purpose of this study and, in particular, its aim of exploring the possible links between PCT, identity and facework, I will begin by briefly introducing each of the eleven corollaries. I will then go on to expand upon areas that current linguistic research fails to address because of its differential foci upon language, rather than other aspects of developmental psychology that appreciates variables outside of the linguistic field, such as the influence of environmental stimuli, childhood development and
construction of identity. These include how motivations, interactive influences and personal self-theorising may influence decision-making, and performative behaviour, something I feel might be comprehensively addressed by aspects of Kelly's theory. I believe that such an investigation of facework, in combination with Kelly's theories (and subsequent revisions by Marcia and Waterman), will help to show how and where identity is discursively constructed.

2.3 Personal Construct Corollaries

Kelly's eleven personal construct corollaries are as follows:

1. Construction Corollary: a person anticipates events by applying the result of their previous experience and expecting their replications in the current situation.

2. Individuality Corollary: persons differ from each other in their constructions of events.

3. Organisation Corollary: each person characteristically evolves, for his/her convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal relationships between constructs.

4. Dichotomy Corollary: a person's construction system is composed of a finite number of dichotomous constructs.

5. Choice Corollary: a person chooses for himself that alternative in a dichotomised construct through which he anticipates the greater possibility for the elaboration of his system.

6. Range Corollary: a construct is convenient for the anticipation of a finite range of events only.

7. Experience Corollary: a person's construct system varies as he successively construes the replication of events.

8. Modulation Corollary: the variation in a person's construction system is limited by the permeability of the constructs within whose ranges of convenience the variants lie.
9. Fragmentation Corollary: a person may successively employ a variety of
collection subsystems that are inferentially incompatible with each
other.

10. Commonality Corollary: to the extent that one person employs a
construction of experience, which is similar to, that employed by another,
his processes are psychologically similar to those of the other person.

11. Sociality Corollary: to the extent that one person construes the
construction process of another, he may play a role in a social process
involving the other person.

(Kelly, 1967: 14).

The Individuality Corollary emphasises that no two people concoct identical systems
of construction, as it is a highly personal affair with every construction constituting a
highly idiosyncratic, rather than identical reference point, based on previous personal
experience, even if they may logically be able to form a similar relationship. For Kelly
(1967), this sense of the heterogeneity of each construct opened the door to how more
advanced and flexible systems of thinking and inference are possible for an individual,
in terms of how the individual themselves approaches ideas of self-construct, and also
how events in the external world can rely heavily upon individual imagination and
construct (Fransella, 2003: 9).

The Dichotomy Corollary postulates that a construct is a black-and-white affair,
which is devoid of vague areas. Yet as Kelly (1967) states, this should not be taken to
imply that constructs are categorical or absolutist in their formulations (Fransella,
2003:10). From the philosophical tradition of Constructive Alternativism (CA),
constructs are essences distilled by the mind from available reality, imposed upon
events, not abstracted from them. While they are not symbolic representatives, they are
devised by individuals as a reference axis upon which we may project events in order
to make sense of the social world (Fransella, 2003). A construct from this perspective
is the basic contrast between two groups, to distinguish between elements, then relate,
and communicate them. Yet, while they do not symbolise events, they do enable the individual to cope with them.

To summarise thus far, both corollaries establish constructs as deeply personal, individuated and highly variable attributes, as they are not simply homogeneous essences abstracted from reality and applied invariably to anticipated events, but, instead are highly dependent upon the weight each individual attaches to them according to, and based upon, their own personal self-system (Fransella, 2003). This is further substantiated by the Choice Corollary, which, although it supports this individuated process, also elucidates as to how constructs can develop dynamically through the lifespan, in conjunction with the person to which they are attributed. As Kelly (1967) in Fransella, 2003: 11) highlights, developing the usefulness of a construction system is part and parcel of a system or person, who will make such constructs a core part of daily life. To do so in a valuable manner, one must constantly define and extend such constructs via reflexivity. One refines this system by extension, and by clarifying how its construct components are applied to situations linked to each other. In Kelly's (1967) view, individuals amplify their system by using it to reach out for new fields of application, thereby consolidating their position but, at the same time, extending it. For example, Freeland (2009) gives an excellent definition of reflexivity, stating that it consists of:

..a two-way feedback loop, between participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. People base their decisions not on the actual situation that confronts them, but on their perception or interpretation of the situation. Their decisions make an impact on the situation and changes in the situation are liable to change their perceptions...


It should be noted here that choices are between alternatives expressed in the construct, not between objects divided by the means of the construct, as essentially PCT is to do
with the behaviour of man, not the nature of objects or external stimuli. individuals make decisions that initially affect themselves, which originate from core belief constructs they formulate, and only subsequently affect external variables. Essentially, when one makes a choice, we align ourselves in terms of our constructs, and alternatives are distinguished by these same constructs. We change things only by changing ourselves first (Fransella, 2003: 11). This theme of consolidation and expansion will also arise later in the subsequent discussion of facework, which, in conjunction with PCT emphasises that a core aspect of public and private identity is stringently tied with this process. This is in the sense that one may linguistically approach a situation in a certain manner, before changing those mannerisms when it is seen that they are now operating in a new context. For example, when one is being verbally attacked, where previously this had not been the case, the response may be to become more verbally aggressive or obstructive.

Kelly (1967) maintains that events do not actually repeat themselves, and that the replication discussed is that of situations where the environment an individual is presented with is very similar to one previously experienced. In this case Kelly (1967) argues that the dynamic ability for individuals to expand upon experience is based on the constructions we place on what we expect to happen. In the Experience Corollary, Kelly (1967) highlights that if individual’s constructions are never altered during his/her lifetime, all 'experience' offers is a sequence of parallel events having no psychological impact upon life. In essence, then, “a person's construction system varies as he [or she] successively construes the replications of events” (Kelly, 1967 in Fransella, 2003:12). This suggests that the succession called experience is based on the constructions we place upon what goes on. Yet, if an individual invests themselves the most intimate event of all in the enterprise, the outcome, to the extent that it differs
from their expectations or enlarges upon them, dislodges their prior construction of themself. In recognising the inconsistency between the anticipation and the outcome, he concedes a discrepancy between what he was, and what he is. A succession of such investments and dislodgements, Kelly (1967) emphasises is the constitution of human experience (Fransella, 2003: 12). Yet, if one invests oneself in the enterprise, to the extent that it differs from expectation(s) or enlarges one’s expectation(s), it can dislodge the construct, whereby human experience can redefine constructs in a cycle of “Constructive Revisionism”. This constitutes a cyclical unit of three phases as shown in Figure 2 below:

**Figure 2: Constructive Revisionism**

1. **ANTICIPATION**
2. **INVESTMENT**
   - CONFIRM/ DECONFIRM PERSONAL
3. **ENCOUNTER**

Stated simply, Kelly postulates that human experience is not measured by the number of events, but by the investments made in his/her anticipation and revisions of constructions that follow (Fransella, 2003:12). A key criticism of this view is that the cyclical phase, by which Kelly assumes constructs are redefined, presumes that all those who experience it are 'healthy', and normally-operative individuals, who are open to change and revision of their core belief system. In an ecologically valid context, this does not always occur, as humankind is comprised of a variety of diverse individuals from a wide range of socio-psychological backgrounds, not all of whom are conducive to such change (whether because of a psychological condition or through intent). However, from the perspective of identity formulation, such a (de)confirmation cycle can result in either a positive or negative (re)confirmation expectation to an individual's
salvation or damnation, according to the emotional value the experience involves. This means that a person may be either trapped within constricting narrow constructions, or have the ability to freely and flexibly form new ones in an open and optimistic manner. These are subjects which are further elaborated upon in the Modulation Corollary, and later in the chapter when Wuornos herself is discussed.

While the Experience Corollary suggests that a person can revise constructions on the basis of events and the invested anticipations of them, there are limitations that must be taken into account. Individuals must have a construction system that is sufficiently open to novel events, and will admit the revised construct that emerges at the end of the cycle. As Fransella (2003:13) notes, if the revised construct is left to stand as an isolated axis of reference, it is difficult for the individual to chart only coordinated courses of action that take account of it. From this, it can be suggested that an integral part of experiential functioning and constructive revision is the capacity for constructs to be used as a referent for novel events. This specifically refers to individual’s potential to move on from his/her internalised core constructs, to accept new subordinate constructions which allow for the 'self's' continued progressive developmental trajectory, instead of allowing core constructs to remain static, dominating subsequent behaviours and decision-making processes. Finally, the implications of the Sociality Corollary establish grounds for comprehending the 'role' as a psychological term for a person, and according to Kelly (1967), for the basis of society's understanding of the individual. Kelly (1967) begins by outlining how our development of an understanding of another person must operate on two different levels:

1. Construing others’ behaviour only;
2. Construing the construction process of another, particularly placing a construction upon the way another individual may be thinking, which leads to their subsequent behaviour.

The key aspect of this corollary lies in the difference one makes in the mode of constructing another person. In both formulations, Kelly (1967) focuses the concern not simply on the behaviour of the individual, but also on what personal construction that might be giving the present or future behaviour its form or manifestation (Fransella, 2003: 15). Relating this to the current study, such a view offers an approach to certain puzzling aspects of psychopathy. As Sections 2.3 and 2.4 reveal, for example, this might permit us to understand such socio-emotional issues as guilt and hostility in more intimate terms, connected to an individual's hard-wired personal constructs (in other words, those core constructs by which individuals maintain and define themselves), something which has been previously omitted in recent investigations regarding personality theories (Fransella, 2003: 14). Indeed, to more firmly illustrate how PCT can better inform this study's understanding of identity, and thus its wider implications on socio-linguistic interaction, I will define how psycho-emotional states in the context of Kelly's (1967) corollaries can be informative to the multi-disciplinary approach I intend to use.

2.3.1 Guilt

In the context of the Sociality Corollary, researchers are able to develop a truly psychologically public and private understanding of guilt, away from the traditional mechanistic theories regarding the experience of guilt as wholly derivative of punishment (Fransella, 2003: 17).

From the perspective of PCT, guilt is the sense of having lost one's core role structure, whereby a core structure is one that is maintained as a basic referent of life
itself. To the extent that one's core structure embodies an individual’s role (as social roles have been defined here), also one is then vulnerable to the experience of guilt, if one perceives himself as dislodged from it. To experience guilt is, therefore, to sense that one has lost one’s grasp on the outlook of a fellow individual, or society in general, by following invalid guidelines. This can lead to a perception of extensive excommunication, as one's core role is deeply dis-rooted, especially if one considers that one of man's only possible referents to feelings of security and acceptance is obedience to society (Fransella, 2003). Yet, if core personal constructs are in opposition to society's social practices, this can be a deeply disturbing issue for the individual, which can lead us to turn back to the experience corollary, and to examine its contribution to another puzzling emotional issue that can emanate from guilt and social rejection. In other words, according to Kelly (1967), hostility.

### 2.3.2 Hostility

According to both Kelly (1967) and Fransella (2003), the experience cycle (as previously described in Constructive Revisionism) includes a terminal phase, which embodies an assessment of the construction in terms of which the initial anticipation and behaviour commitment has been cast and made. If outcomes emerging successively from ventures based on the same construction continue to be disconfirmed, it becomes apparent that there is something wrong with the reference axis. The most conducive form of action from this would be for the individual to begin revising the constructs used. However, if a core construct is involved, this can be a major undertaking, as constructs that are in the early revisionary process, rather than core to that individual, are more unstable, and therefore amenable to change. Furthermore, if there is a great deal of importance resting on those constructs, with no other similar ones to refer to
(see Modulation Corollary), individuals may experience additional emotions, which Kelly identifies as emanating from confusion over social rejection or from guilt (Fransella, 2003: 18).

If such core constructions were impermeable, the individual would be unable to arrange any new constructions, and would be confronted by a possible need to extensively revise their system, rather than they would if their construction systems were more open-ended. This scenario can lead to a precarious situation where the individual is faced with a personal chaos as they are forced to reassess their core constructs, as a possible source of these core constructs disconfirmation force individuals to repair the referent axis upon which these constructs have been based. In such a situation, Kelly (see Fransella, 2003: 18) suggests that the individual presented with this situation may look at ways to avoid doing so, by addressing aspects of the validation evidence that has problematized the previous constructions and forcing the circumstances to confirm, rather than disconfirm, their prediction of them. An illustrative example of this can be seen in the political causes of war, whereby a nation whose political philosophy has broken down in practice may precipitate a war to draft support for its outlook. A perfect example of this was the war between Vietnam and the United States in the 1960s (Fransella, 2003). A second (albeit different) example is that of a meek and nervous older woman (viewed as a spinster by society) who, confronted by the fact that it is her public presentation that renders her un-marriageable, may 'prove' the validity of her stance (in social situations) by playing the 'victim-to-be-pitied', to emphasise the validity of her construct (Fransella, 2003: 19). What an understanding of PCT offers to each example described above is a definition of psychological constructs applied in reference to the personal experiences of each individual. Thus, in defining hostility, we are not necessarily dictating an impulse to
destroy, but rather viewing the emotion as a continued effort to extort validation
evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has proven itself a failure,
becoming somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy (Fransella, 2003: 19).

2.4 The Practical Application of PCT

Since CA and PCT were established as theories, further expansion and revision has
occurred, in part because research has sought to practically apply them (Marcia, 1966;
Berzonsky, 1985; Fransella, 2003). This has proven to be a fruitful endeavour,
especially in the sense of expanding upon how an individual's self-theory is constructed
and performed in real-life contexts. In this current section, I will be examining how
Kelly's (1967) theory of personal constructs provides a means of operationalizing the
structural features of an individual's self-theory and also discussing private and public
identity, by elaborating on the later work conducted by Marcia (1966) and Berzonsky
(1985).

Although the expansion of and, in particular, revision to theories results in
changes to the original theory, what has remained consistent, at least in respect to
Marcia’s (1966) and Berzonsky's (1985) work, is Kelly's (1967) original view that
individuals actively construct the reality in which they live (Berzonsky & Neiymer,
attempt to predict, interpret and control events in their lives by constructing theories,
testing hypotheses, and considering evidence, before choosing whether to redefine their
constructions by revising them. Current research has, however, expanded on this view
by demonstrating how internal representations, or cognitive schemata are abstracted or
built, as people attempt to order their experiences into meaningful recurrent patterns of
personal constructs (Berzonsky & Neiymer, 1994: 197). To view this in collaboration with Kelly’s (1967) terminology, an individual’s identity or self-theory is composed of idiosyncratic self-constructs.

According to Berzonsky (1985), the effectiveness of one's self-theory or system of personal constructs can be evaluated in terms of their pragmatic and ecological usefulness, as the physical and social reality within which we, as individuals, function can constrain pragmatic utility (Berzonsky, 1985). An issue which Kelly (1967) highlights can be optimally effective towards the need an individual is occasionally faced with, to revise and reconstruct their identity and self-theory over a period of time. As Berzonsky and Neiymer (1994) illustrate in a developmental study, such an example can be found when adolescents mature physically, form new social situations and individuate from parental figures. However, in the course of later studies, more recent identity research has drawn upon Marcia's (1988) subsequent revision of Kellian (1967) philosophy, where practical applications reveal a core framework and operational system of identity, referred to as status classifications (Berzonsky & Neiymer, 1994: 196). In particular, Marcia (1988) combined Kelly's approach with much of Erikson's (1968) work on identity to make a practically applicable research approach to identity formation as a practical individual endeavour (see Kelly 1967 for further details). Equally, this can be demonstrated in the use of language in bilingual communities. Studies such as Ige’s (2010) and Kasper’s (1996) have shown that speakers in a speech community sometimes intentionally emphasise and foster the linguistic differences they possess in order to distinguish themselves from their peers. This is demonstrated when speakers deliberately assert their identity by speaking and acting differently to their listeners. In such instances, facework (the social value a person effectively claims for themselves in their self-presentation to and interaction with others), and more
specifically their language choice, can be made with the intention of constructing, maintaining and defending group or individual identities, and the personal constructs of a certain minority culture within a multicultural setting. This intentional transfer of conversational features of a specific sub-group into the language of interaction, acts to reinforce loyalty to, and solidarity with a group, its language and its people, denoting the speaker as 'one of them'. An example of this can be found in Ige’s (2010) and Ige and de Kadt’s (2002) studies, which highlights that politeness strategies selected by Zulu students when speaking English show that the majority of the male students intentionally transfer Zulu norms as a show of allegiance to their language and culture. It can therefore be assumed that, whenever group loyalties are perceived to be undermined or threatened, facework can be used to uphold the personal constructs of a specific culture to reinforce the loyalty of a speaker, or indicate their displeasure or disagreement with the issue or situation. Ige’s (2010) findings also highlight how an individual’s and group's personal construction of their identity at the micro-level strongly informs their choice and use of language and linguistic symbols of the macro-level within multilingual and multicultural contexts. Specifically, Ige’s findings demonstrate that the choice of 'self' displayed in these contexts is a highly planned and premeditated strategic choice, using one’s own personal constructions and belief systems to display a preferred, rather than contextually prescribed, sense of self (Ige, 2010: 353).

In the following section, I will be further elaborating upon the details of the revised approaches to Kelly's original PCT theory, drawing on Erikson (1968) and Marcia's (1988) approaches in particular, and discussing how PCT has gone on to transform and assist the development and understanding of identity formulation in psychological research. I will then move on to demonstrate how these contributions can
further inform and explain the enactment of identity in discourse, as well as examine how they address many of the previously overlooked issues underlying identity within the field of linguistics (Marcia, 1988; Fransella, 2003). In particular, it will investigate how Erikson (1968) and Marcia’s (1988) revisions have contributed towards the understanding of identity among non-typical members of the population, specifically those with pre-existing mental health issues which include factors associated with identity disassociation and fragmentation, and, in this study specifically, those issues related to Wuornos’ diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (Arrigo & Griffin, 2004).

2.5 Current Findings and Revisions of PCT

Erikson (1968) has described the identity formation during adolescence as a slow process of ego growth, whereby identifications of childhood are gradually replaced by new configurations which are attributed greater meaning than the smaller experiences that make up the construct the larger configuration depicts (Kroeger et al., 2010). Identify formation begins where the “usefulness of identification ends, arising from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications... in a new configuration, which in turn is dependent on the process by which a society identifies the young individual...” (Erikson, 1968: 159). Like Kelly, in Erikson's view, tentative crystallisations of identity occur during childhood. During adolescence, however, a new form of identity emerges in which these identifications of childhood are sifted, subordinated and altered in order to produce a new identity configuration, or, in the words of Kelly, 'constructions'. Marcia et al (1993) further elaborates upon Erikson's (1968) view of this process by combining the stances of two theoretical approaches;
Erikson's 'Ego Identity Status Model', which has been a popular means of assessing the exploration and commitment dimensions of both his own, and Kelly's (1955) philosophical concepts. In Marcia's (1988) practically delineated research paradigm, identity formation is operationally defined according to two dimensions: exploration and commitment. Here, exploration refers to the degree to which individuals actively examine values, beliefs and goals, moving on to experiment with different social roles, plans and ideologies. Commitment refers to the determined adherence an individual has to a set of convictions, goals and values (Soenens et al., 2005: 430). This idea is closely related to Kelly's original ‘Choice Corollary’, whereby “developing the usefulness of a construction system involves defining and extending it, consolidating the individual's position using the construction, yet (ideally) amplifying the system by extending it to reach out to new fields of application” (Fransella, 2003: 11). Such a system also elaborates upon Erikson's (1968) views of the identity configuration process, defining four different styles by which late adolescents and young adults undertake identity-defining decisions in vocational, ideological and sexual domains (Kroeger et al, 2010).

According to Marcia (1988) these four statuses are operationalized in reality by assessing self-reported commitments and self-exploratory crises:

- Achievers: committed types who have previously engaged in deliberate self-exploration.
- Foreclosures: committed types who have not experienced self-exploratory crises.
- Diffusions: uncommitted types not experiencing self-exploration.

Such identity statuses, according to Marcia (2001), are observable phenomena linked to those underlying processes of ego growth described by Erikson (1968), and
held by Kelly (1955) in his Choice Corollary. In the early initial development process, Marcia (1988) suggests they may either begin with Diffusion, in which no significant identifications are made, or more normatively with Foreclosure, in which tentative identifications with significant childhood figures occur. These early positions are then followed by a time of identity exploration (Moratorium) eventuating in the capacity to make identity-defining commitments, based on thoughtful integration of one’s own interests and orientations with the vocational and ideological offerings of one’s surrounding context (Achievement). After the initial identity is formed, it can be speculated that other naturally-occurring life-cycle events may challenge this identity confirmation and result in an identity reconfiguration process akin to Kelly's own philosophy (Marcia, 1988). Indeed, findings appear to indicate that this paradigm is a valid method for assessing individual differences in identity formation (Marcia, 1988; Berzonsky, 1985). While much research has conceptualised people as using statuses to achieve differential products or outcome variables, such process-orientated interpretation is perfectly viable, according to Berzonsky’s studies (1985: 1990), who demonstrated that statuses are associated with different means of processing, structuring and use of self-relevance.

According to Schenkel and Marcia (1972), Foreclosures were identified as being more intolerant of ambiguity, and possessing more rigid, authoritarian belief structures than any other status system. A later study by Slugoski et al. (1984, see Read et al., 1984), focussing on the extent to which the statuses used complex integrative reasoning when dealing with interpersonal problems, also found that in comparison to the self-reflective statuses (used mainly by Achievers and Moratoriums), Foreclosures and Diffusions had difficulty adopting a self-determined perspective within which they could integrate multiple and conflicting sources of information. This is supported by
Read et al. (1984), in an investigation of interpersonal and attentional style, where researchers identified that Foreclosures demonstrated an impaired ability to integrate and evaluate information from multiple perspectives. Additionally, the experiment also found that Foreclosures and Diffusions focussed their attention so narrowly that they often failed to attend to relevant information. In comparison to this, Achievers and Moratoriums appeared to process greater amounts of information, and reported feeling more self-certain about their ideas (Read et al., 1984). It is also important to note that the data from both studies were elicited from semi-structured interviews and self-report tools. However, this lack of differentiation as to which tool elicited which set of results leaves open the question as to the effectiveness of each tool, specifically how they differed in the kinds of responses they elicited and to what degree. This, in turn, raises the issue of the extent to which identity studies might benefit from linguistic, as well as psychological, attention. These issues will be attended to later in this chapter and also in Chapter Three.

Since differences appear to exist in the way individuals, who are assigned specific hierarchal statuses, process self-relevant information (Berzonsky, 1990) it seems plausible to expect differences in the way people's self-theories are also structured and organised. According to Berzonsky (1990: 365), individuals may, therefore, operate as different types of self-theorist. For example, the information orientated, self-exploratory approach to identity questions would appear to produce a well-differentiated set of theoretical self-constructs. Firm commitments may also be associated with a highly organised and integrated set of self-constructs, utilised in a self-certain fashion, while a diffuse, situation-specific approach might result in a more fragmented, rather than unified self-theory (Berzonsky & Neimeyer, 1988: 197).
Archer's (2011b) paper emphasises the ecological validity and generally superior adaptive significance of the higher identity statuses (Identity Achievement and Moratorium), over the lower identity statuses (Foreclosure and Identity Diffusion) created by Marcia (1988). However, such findings are regarded as nebulous, being established within a particular cultural context: lower middle to upper middle class ethnic majorities within North America, Northern Europe and parts of the British Commonwealth. As Rotheram-Borus' (1987, see Marcia, 1988) study suggests, the same positive aspects for Identity Achievement and Moratorium may not prevail among some ethnic minorities within the same countries. That is, in some cultures a higher degree of social approval may be given to members who remain Foreclosed, or even Diffuse in their society. This has been empirically supported by Valde's (1996) study, which differentiates between open and closed forms of identity achievement among young adults on the basis of a self-actualisation measure. ‘Open’ identity-achieved individuals remained flexible in their identity commitments following initial identity explorations, and scored highly on self-actualisation. This is in contrast to ‘Closed’ identity-achieved individuals who were found to exhibit more extreme closed attitudes and were seen to retreat to earlier commitments, with some instead adopting more rigid approaches to identity choices following their earlier explorations in to less familiar areas (Valde, 1996). Such a movement from achievement or moratorium to foreclosure may reflect a return to an earlier position of safety following initial attempts at identity exploration.

Further research by Kroger and Haslett (1987, see Kroger, 1997), involving a retrospective study of mid-life adults, found that, for women especially, initial attempts at identity exploration either created so much personal anxiety or negative repercussions from partners that a return to foreclosure positions occurred. The authors
did, however, highlight the importance of delineating the particular kinds of personality and situational features that may be associated with identity-status regression. The issue of identity-status regression has also been identified by Kroger (1997), whose findings indicate that different forms of regressive movements may either facilitate or impede progressive change. For example, his findings demonstrate that the regressive movements from achievement to moratorium may be necessary to revitalise initial identity-defining commitments over the course of adult life, but regressive movement from achievement or moratorium to foreclosure may represent a closure to on-going identity development during adult life. An illustrative example could be the experience of trauma following identity exploration and commitment, which may lead to a general identity regression of disorganisation (Kroger, 1997).

Another criticism that can be levelled at Marcia's (1988) methodological approach, and therefore at the ecological validity of results in general, is its questionable use of the identity-status approach with adolescents younger than 16 or 17 (see Archer & Waterman, 1990). These statuses were intended as outcome styles applicable to late adolescents between the ages of 18 to 22 regardless of culture or contextual influence and, although the processes of exploration, extension and commitment are still applicable, it remains unclear as to how say a 16-year-old foreclosure or achiever is the same as a 22-year-old foreclosure or achiever, or how such age perimeters extend to those in their 40s or 50s. In addition, as noted by Rotheram-Borus (see Marcia, 1980: 403), the self-report questionnaire used not only runs the risk of socially-desirable rather than accurate reporting but also might not have assessed validity by the teenagers' identity-developmental positions. Cote and Levine (1988) also highlight that Marcia's (1988) definition of the term 'identity' does not capture the richness of texture of the term as employed by Erikson (1968). According to Waterman (1987: 185), such “a
selective narrowing of the concept when preparing to develop an operational definition of identity for research purposes”, undermines Erikson's (1968) original perspective on the construction of identity in the prologue to *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. Here, Erikson (1968) provides the following descriptive statements and practical aspects to the identity construct: “a normative crisis”, “a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity”, “a common dynamic pattern” and “a unity of personal and cultural identity...” (Waterman, 1987: 186). In providing such a partial catalogue of facets of the identity concept, Erikson attempts to communicate an appreciation of the underlying interrelationships of a myriad of psychodynamic responses to socio-cultural circumstances and influences. In his view, the sense of ego identity comes alive as a means by which to identify and trace crucial themes in the complex tapestries of case and life histories, in much the same way as Kelly (1955) does in his concept of PCT 'personal constructs'. Such an achievement, however, must be acknowledged as of limited use to research psychologists employing a one-dimensional approach to further exploring human identity. While Waterman (1987) argues that Marcia (1980) should not be faulted for selecting only a portion of Erikson’s (1968) and Kelly's (1955) matrix for research scrutiny, it is clearly both a pragmatic and a productive decision. The wisdom of Waterman’s (1987) choice, regarding which aspects to focus on and how, can be questioned, particularly as to whether the construct of identity really has the same meaning within the two theoretical systems, and whether an appreciation of the study of language may aid further study.

In reference to the differing conceptual understanding the two theorists adopt, Marcia (1988) construes identity as a self-structure with an externally-sourced reference point for its consolidation:
…an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organisation of drives, abilities, beliefs and individual history. The better developed this structure is, the more aware individuals appear to be of their own uniqueness and similarity to others and their own strengths and weaknesses in making their way in the world. The less developed this structure is, the more individuals seem to be about their own distinctiveness from others and the more they have to rely on external sources to evaluate themselves…

(1988: 159).

However, Waterman (1987:330) argues that ‘the perspective both Erikson (1968) and Kelly (1955) adopt towards the concepts occupies more of an internally-based source of reference’. Waterman defines identity in terms of:

…having a clearly delineated self-definition comprised of those goals, values and beliefs to which the person is unequivocally committed. These commitments are evolved and redefined over time and are made because the chosen goals, values and beliefs are judged worthy of giving a direction, purpose and meaning to the individual’s life…


Accordingly, Waterman (1987) also states that both definitions are attempts to describe the same referent, but that each theorist has sought to focus on different descriptive elements, and of the different functions the concept serves in human endeavour. For Erikson and Kelly, identity is a subjective and internal sense of wholeness, both conscious and unconscious, comprised of synthesised identifications that represent the person's psycho-social stimulus value both for him or herself and for significant others in the community. The functions of identity that are stressed include inner coherence, continuity over time and self-presentation, with the latter, what this study will argue, providing a crucial link to facework and hence linguistics (see Section 1.7). For Marcia (1980) it is the structure of identity that is salient, particularly with regard to its external functions to organise and harmonise diverse aspects of the person's physical, psychosocial and social being, thereby aiding in achieving both differentiation from
others and solidarity with them. For Waterman, however, the emphasis on the qualities of the contents that comprise the sense of identity itself (e.g. the importance, the personal expressiveness, the investment), with the functions emphasised being purpose and direction in living, should be key defining factors in the concepts approach.

In order to address these discrepancies, Waterman (1987: 604-609) provides a narrative summary of results from a variety of developmental identity-status studies, proposing a series of six hypotheses central to an understanding of identity-status change processes that appear to contribute to a theory of identity-status development. In so doing, he identifies an issue pertinent to the type of investigation this study proposes, due to the correlations it draws between individual’s development, and the formulation of personal constructs to which one can refer, describing:

...identifiable antecedent conditions [which] exist that may serve to facilitate or impede identity development. Such conditions would be the extent of identification with parents, parenting styles, range of identity alternatives available in the given context, availability of role models and the level of success an individual has had in dealing with earlier tasks… (Waterman, 1987: 684).

Both Waterman (1987) and subsequent research has highlighted that the two developmental tasks that must be negotiated during adolescence involve forming a stable sense of identity and establishing a personal sense of autonomy to become self-governing individuals with established clear and integrated personal stances on issues such as ideology, life-goals and relationships (Erikson, 1968; Soenens et al., 2005). However, as findings by Soenens et al. (2005) establish, there are individual differences in the way adolescents approach this process of self-definition. For example, some manage this by actively processing self-relevant information, whereas others are more inclined to adopt the normative expectations of others. In Soenens et al's (2005: 427)
study, which explores the motivational forces that initiate and regulate behaviour, individual's identity exploration and construction, they found strong evidence for the process of psychological individuation and identity formation as proposed in ‘Self-Determination Theory’ (Deci & Ryan, 1995). The theory highlights the differences in behavioural self-regulation and motivational orientations, specifically emphasising the role of three causality orientations, and Berzonsky's (1990) model of Identity Processing Styles. Before describing both sets of constructs in relation to their contribution to the practical implementation of PCT and expanding upon Marcia's (1980) and Waterman's (1987) frameworks. I will, in the next chapter, first provide some background information on the theoretical underpinnings of several theories relating to identity formation and self-presentation, before detailing their contribution to this current investigation.
Image perception and identity are central to an individual's sense of self, particularly within a socio-cultural context, much of which is constructed through discursive interaction. The concept of 'face' in particular has become firmly established as a key concept, not only in pragmatics, but also in anthropology, sociolinguistics, communication studies, sociology, psychology and other related fields (Bargiela-Chappini, 2003). Yet, while it was Goffman (1955) who first introduced the notion of 'face' to Western researchers, it has been Brown and Levinson's (1987) application of 'face' in the context of politeness theory that has dominated much linguistic research to date (Pizziconi, 2003). Before going into the details of the definitions of ‘face’, it is, however, important to firstly establish the ‘Communication Principle’ and the four communication maxims of Paul Grice (1975), whose seminal work on reasoning and implicature, inherent in the communicative act, provides the very foundation on which ‘facework’ has been established. In the following section, I will address Grice’s (1975) contribution, before moving on to a thorough discussion of Goffman's contribution to ‘facework’, and finally examining Brown and Levinson's contribution to the field later in the chapter.

3.1 Grice's (1969; 1975) Conversational Maxims

Understanding how discourse unfolds and how it influences an audience’s perception of someone’s character can be demonstrated by an appreciation of Grice’s (1969; 1975) Cooperative Principle (CP), which seeks to explain the interface between an utterances
linguistic form and its inferred pragmatic meaning. This essentially works towards explaining how we can understand what someone implies, beyond the level of expressed meaning, or what they actually say. Grice’s (1969; 1975) principle maintains that there is a general expectation within interactive communication, that interlocutors will tell the truth, give the necessary amount of information, be relevant and make their utterances understandable.

[…] a rough general principle which participants will be expected to observe, namely: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

(Grice, 1975: 45).

At the foundation of this conversational principle, there are four maxims which Grice assumes are in operation during interaction:

Maxim of Quantity – Make your contribution as informative as required. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Maxim of Quality – Do not say that which you believe to be false, or for which you lack adequate evidence

Maxim of Relation – Be relevant
Maxim of Manner – Avoid obscurity of expression, and ambiguity. Be brief and orderly.

(Grice, 1975: 45-46).

While Grice’s idea of the CP is one of purely linguistic, rather than social cooperation, his ideas fit in well within this study’s discussion of facework, as his theory also includes how a non-observance of these maxims force a hearer to look for implied meaning beyond what is actually said. For example, while we may be linguistically cooperative with the maxims at one or more levels, the omission of one or more maxims force the hearer to look for – or infer – a meaning beyond the stated words. Essentially, in this situation, the speaker generates some meaning beyond the semantic meaning of the word or sentence that is uttered (by hinting or suggesting, rather than stating explicitly), and equally relies on the hearer’s understanding of those hints/suggestions.

What is implicated is always distinct from what is said (Archer et al., 2012: 48), and can be differentially separated into two different categories, namely ‘Conventional’ and ‘Conversational’ implicatures:

Conventional Implicatures – are derived directly from (because of being encoded within) the literal meaning of the words in use, an example being the use of the word ‘but’ which conveys an idea of contrast while words such as ‘therefore’ and ‘so’ can conventionally implicate explanation. (Archer et al., 2012: 49)
Conversational Implicature – must be derived from contextual clues, and according to Grice (1975) - can be one of two types: generalized (which can be held across a variety of contexts) and particularized (which are more context specific i.e. an exaggeration of truth, or hyperbole which refers to an impossibility).

Grice’s (1975: 47) understanding of this inferencing process is built on the assumptions of the CP and its maxims existing as rules of how to behave as interlocutors, suggesting that:

1. Conversation is governed by certain conventions;

2. Hearers tend to assume speakers are conforming to these conventions; and

3. If speakers are not conforming, there will be a reason why (therefore we, as hearers look for implied meaning, or inferences beyond the literal meaning of the worlds employed).

Indeed, Grice’s CP theory leaves room for explaining how conversational implicatures come to be generated when interlocutors may purposefully exploit the maxims regularly in order to communicate additional meanings:

Flouting – whereby the speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim(s) as a means of prompting others to look for additional meaning which is different from, or meaning that is in addition, to the expressed meaning (Grice, 1991: 30).
Violation – constitutes a deliberate attempt by the speaker to ‘mislead’ his/her interlocutor(s) by ignoring a maxim(s) (Grice, 1991: 30).

Opting-out – involves the speaker explicitly indicating his/her unwillingness to cooperate and operationalize the maxim(s) as required (Grice, 1991: 30).

Infringement – constitutes a non-observance on the speaker’s part which is not deliberately intentional, but rather stems from imperfect linguistic performance such as drunkenness, or lack of cognitive awareness of what the context requires linguistically, rather than from any genuine desire to generate a conversational implicature (Thomas, 1995: 74).

Suspension – (although not originally identified by Grice) comes into play when the speech event/activity type is such that some or all of the maxims are not in operation, therefore there is not expectation that they are observed. For example an interrogation, or some sort of formal questioning (Thomas, 1995: 76).

For Grice (1969) the most important component of his CP theory was the Quality maxim, ‘try to make your contribution one that is true – to the extent that other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this particular maxim of Quality is satisfied’. He also, however, acknowledges that his maxim of Relation is problematic, not least due to the fact that:
…[its] formulation conceals a number of problems… about what different kinds of focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on.

(Grice, 1975: 46).

Grice’s (1969; 1975) work on the Cooperative Principle (CP), and its maxims has often been cited as one of the leading developments in communication research (Macagno et al., 2017), and has led to the further development of pragmatics as a separate discipline within linguistics (Hadi, 2013).

However, despite his fundamental contribution to the field of communication research, his theory on the communicative exchange of information has been subject to criticism. Hadi (2013), notes that Grice’s theory is flawed in a number of ways. Firstly, it is too biased towards ‘cooperation’ in its normative interpretation, specifically with the belief that people aim to communicate successfully and effectively within every exchange with the primary aim to solve issues, neglecting times when the purpose is to intentionally miscommunicate. Secondly, his theory is fundamentally asocial, positing an ideal ‘speaker-listener’ in a completely “homogenous speech community” (Chomsky, 1995: 4), therefore, failing to explain how people actually communicate in more sophisticated and even multicultural social contexts. For example, if speaker aim to be accepted within all social settings/ contexts in which they find themselves. Furthermore, Hadi, 2013 argues that Grice’s theory does not account for social context, and only considers the speaker-listener interaction in an ideal context (applying it universally), regardless of social elements such as power, sex, social class and age, it has little explanatory power in real-life.
This critique is also supported by studies such as Lardegaarde (2008), who considered the two types of cooperation related to Gricean theory: social goal-sharing and linguistic goal-sharing, in a study investigating the attitude and behaviour relationships of students interviewed about their future career aspirations. Specifically, the results found that students dialogues are non-cooperative and non-accommodating when engaged in dialogue in this area, and that these were the preferred discourse strategies most commonly used among this demographic. Essentially during interview, students tried to miscommunicate, rather than communicate effectively, leading Lardegaarde (2008) to the belief that social and psychological conditions determine people’s interactions as whether or not to cooperate in conversations. However, it is important to note that this study failed to consider the socio-economic and age of interlocutors (both interviewers and students), which have been found to exacerbate social interactional differentiation between speakers (Hadi, 2013).

Such views on Grice have since led to a number of neo-Gricean perspectives on communication being proposed, from Leech’s (1983) expansionist approach, to Horn’s (1984) reductionist. These two criticisms in particular relate to the fact that some Gricean maxims may be flouted for politeness principles and include the argument for the popular use of indirectness in social settings. Likewise, for some implicatures to be understood and successful, the interlocutor needs to be able to understand and recognize the intended message or, in other words, have a pragmatic awareness which appreciates the customs and niceties of all cultural backgrounds. Unlike Leech (1983), Horn (1984), similar to Grice (1969; 1975), ascribes a privileged status to the Quality maxim, such that it becomes an essential criterion for all implicatures – on the assumption that it is hard to see how any of the other maxims can be satisfied without the Quality maxim being observed (Horn, 1984: 12). Yet, while Horn (1984) agrees with one aspect of
Grice’s (1969) maxims, he chooses to reduce the other maxims to ‘two antithetical principles of pragmatic inference’: the Q Principle and the R Principle (Horn, 1984: 12):

Q Principle – suggests that verbal contributions must be sufficient; say as much as you can with R in mind (Horn, 1984: 13). Condenses the Quantity (make your contribution as informative as required) and Manner (avoid obscurity of expression and ambiguity) maxims.

R Principle – suggest that verbal contributions must be necessary; say no more than [you] must with Q in mind (Horn, 1984: 13). Condenses the Quantity (do not make your contribution more informative than required), Manner (be brief and orderly), and Relation maxims (be relevant).

However, despite these criticisms, Hadi (2013) contends that Grice’s (1969; 1975) original theory remains fundamental and pivotal within the field of pragmatics, something supported by more recent moves by researchers to revise rather than refute the original theory. One of these moves comes from Levinson (1995; 2000), who argued for a revision (and reduction) of the Gricean maxims, specifically refining Grice’s (1975) differentiation between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is conveyed’, by distinguishing three levels of meaning:

1. Entailment: whereby meaning is derived from/ involved with truth relations;

2. Utterance Type-Meaning: where default interpretations are inferred without drawing on contextual clues;

3. Utterance Token-Meaning: in which interpretation is context sensitive

(Levinson, 1995; 2000)
Levinson (2000) has since suggested that Utterance Type-Meaning can be accounted for via three heuristics related to Grice’s (1969; 1975) Quantity and Manner maxims;

Quantity - what is not said
- what is said is stereotypically exemplified

Manner - what is said in an abnormal way, is not normal

Furthermore, he argues that these heuristics in turn, have formed the basis for three neo-Gricean principles, the Q (quantity), I (informativeness), and M (manner) principles

Q- make your contribution as informative as required. With the speaker not saying less than is required, and the hearer understanding that what is not said, is not the case;
I- don’t make your contribution more informative than required. With the speaker not providing more information than is required, and the hearer understanding that what is expressed, is stereotypically exemplified;
M- avoid obscurity of expression. With the speaker avoiding using marked expressions without reason, and the hearer understanding that what is said in an abnormal way, is not normal.

(Levinson, 2000)

Levinson’s (1995; 2000) revisions are prompted by a desire to extend Grice’s (1969; 1975) notion of what is ‘said’ by an individual and understood by a hearer, to allow for a more pragmatic contribution than Grice’s (1969; 1975) original theory proposed.

These neo-Gricean revisions work to address the limitations Hadi (2013) highlights have been levelled at Grice (1969;1975) through the years, which include the lack of
appreciation of socio-economic variables existing within the dynamic of speaker-hearer relations in communication, and that his theory is asocial, and heterogenous in nature.

However, like myself other researchers (Sbisa, 2006; Hadi, 2013; Macagno et al., 2017), contend that such criticism is only viable if the approach to Gricean theory comes from Chomskyan formalistic perspective, rather than a more heuristic and philosophical formalism that Grice originally proposed (see Carston, 2002: 224).

The most persuasive evidence in favour of this view (and pertinent considering the field of study proposed by this investigation), emanates from a recent study into the operationalisation of Grice’s (1969; 1975) maxims within the legal context.

A recent study by Macagno et al (2017), tested this issue of whether or not Gricean theory was better interpreted from a formalistic (adheres prescriptively to the theory) or heuristic perspective (a more general approach to the principle), by examining presumptive reasoning and reasoning from ‘best interpretation’ within the legal context.

By considering a famous case from the United States v. Bronston, they question whether Gricean maxims can be used within the legal context, one which has been often characterised by being highly strategic and uncooperative (Marmor, 2008: 42-44; Cotterill, 2010; Morra, 2016). More precisely, legal discourses are characterised by a specific goal, persuading the judge of the acceptability of a conclusion (Levinson, 1992; Macagno et al., 2017). For this reason, the process of interpreting utterances made by the opposing party (or witnesses) is presumed to be aimed at supporting a view point. They are relying on presumptions that are different from the Gricean maxims, in order to gain some advantage in interpreting a statement in a more favourable way (Marmor, 2014: 44-47).

Macagno et al (2017) uses this famous cross-examination case to highlight their point;
United Stated v. Bronston: Presumption of Evasion

‘Q. D you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?’

‘A. No, Sir’.

‘Q. Have you ever?’

‘A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich’.

The result of this trial demonstrated that the witness actually held a bank account in a Swiss bank, but was found to have testified truthfully, as he had never stated the contrary. The witness in fact only evaded the question; however, they lawyer examining Bronston relied on the prosecutor’s adherence to the maxim of relevance, and gave to the answer an interpretation maximally relevant to the context (Solan, 2002; Shuy, 2011).

According to Macagno et al (2017: 86), this case shed light on two fundamental aspects of Gricean maxims. First, Gricean maxims are heuristic principles (Poggi, 2011), presumptive principles (heuristics) for retrieving what the speaker means (his communicative intention) from what he says. They provide general patterns for accounting for the relationship between a statements literal understanding (conventional meaning) and the propositional and implicated meaning that the speaker intends to convey (Morra, 2016). In this sense, they do not provide an interpretation, but rather account for an interpretation, bringing light reasons to support it (Slocum, 2015: 203-207). Secondly, these conversational heuristics are defeasible (Macagno et al., 2017), in the sense that they are defeated by stronger assumptions concerning the goal of the cooperative activity the interlocutors are carrying out (in this case, the goal of cross-examination is to elicit specific answers, to which the witness shall be considered committed, and avoid evasions). Macagno et al (2017) argues that for this reason, the maxims need to be ordered and analysed together with other types of
variables governing conversation and human behaviour, the foremost being the purpose in which the interlocutors are engaged (Macagno et al., 2017: 86). Considering this statement, and when we consider my own use of Gricean theory and Facework within the legal context, with an added consideration of PCT, the application of Grice appears an empirically robust method to use. Therefore, within this study I will be combining an analysis of data from the linguistic perspective of Penman (1990) and her appreciation of facework, with Grice’s theory of linguistic cooperation (and its corresponding maxims), before moving on to look at how these linguistic performances can be further informed by considering the contribution of PCT (see section 1.5.1), namely via the frameworks of Schwartz and Bardi (2001) and Simon (2004). By utilizing this approach, I hope to provide an insight in terms of which personal constructs individuals are intentionally or unintentionally communicating to the hearer, especially when considering the way non-observance of the maxims can function differently depending on the facework strategies being used at the time.

3.2 Goffman

In order to understand the facework framework and its application in reality, it is first important to establish exactly what these founding fathers of ‘face’ mean when they conceptualise it as a highly social linguistic process. Goffman (1955) defined face as the “positive social value a person effectively claims for himself” for their self-presentation” (1967: 5). It includes the value a person attaches to his/her public image, status and reputation vis-a-vis other people in an interaction, such that the dynamics of face maintenance are determined not only by who and what the individuals hold themselves to be, but also how others respond to their presentation (Goffman, 1967).
For an interaction to proceed smoothly, the parties involved must also allow one another to maintain face (White et al., 2004, see Archer, 2012). As Archer et al (2012) highlight, a less discussed characteristic of Goffman's (1955) concept of face is its dynamism. Goffman (1967) believed face to be:

1) on loan from society;
2) liable to be withdrawn if an individual conducts themselves in a way that is unworthy of it, and hence;
3) realised solely in interaction.

Thus face is a social construct, as much a property of the social interaction as an attribute of the individual, and maintaining it requires the cooperation of others. A key concept of Goffman's (1967) theory concerns the fact that people can, by verbal and non-verbal behaviours, uphold or threaten an individual's face, and thereby accord or deny the positive social value claimed by the individual (White et al., 2004). Face in this respect is very much situated within the specific context-of-utterance, being neither necessarily positive nor negative. Likewise, it is not necessarily the same across all situations, but can change from one context to the next, and equally have more value in some situations than others. Goffman (1967) makes clear three important distinctions to capture the dynamics of the framework in the course of social interaction in terms of threats to face, in other words, Face Threatening Acts (FTAs): Intentional, Accidental and Incidental:

- **Intentional FTAs** - capture those that have been undertaken with deliberate malicious intent, with the direct aim of causing face damage.
- **Accidental FTAs** - occur when the speaker commits an unintentional face-damaging act which they would have avoided if the offensive consequences had been realised.
Incidental FTAs - capture damage which, although unplanned on the part of the speaker, is undertaken in the knowledge that it may have potentially offensive consequences (Archer et al., 2012: 93).

These key distinctions can also be closely related to Berzonsky's (1990) identity styles, whereby an individual utilises certain behaviours to construct, revise or maintain their sense of identity. Specifically, one could link Intentional FTAs to a Diffuse-Avoidant style, whereby individuals react only superficially to situation-specific stimuli, without making any permanent revisions to their core constructs. In terms of Kelly's PCT theory (1955: 12), such a reactionary style can be illustrated in examples of emotional hostility. Aspects of Goffman's (1967) FTAs could also be linked to an Informational or Normative Style, with the former’s emphasis on a high level of decisional vigilance, whereby individuals actively seek out, evaluate and utilise self-relevant information in interactive contexts to ensure interactional harmony between interlocutors (despite accidental facework also involving issues such as faux pas). This is something Berzonsky also identified as linked to deliberate “problem focussed” coping in a study of adolescents and ways of coping with academic stressors (1992: 771). Finally, incidental FTAs can be related to Berzonsky's (1990) Normative or Diffuse-Avoidant style as, while individuals may wish to meet the standards and expectations of significant others, there could possibly be some underlying core constructs that necessitate that individual wishing to face threaten a particular person in order to maintain aspects of their personal constructs. This is an issue once again very much in line with Kelly's (1955) view of the operationalizing of behaviours involved in hostility. Given the direct link established in many studies between face and self-esteem (Pearson et al., 2000; Cupach, 2007), it makes sense that people are motivated to have their face upheld, and feel thwarted when it is threatened, leading to a possible link between
aspects of FTAs and behavioural style, such as those captured by Berzonsky (1990). This also emphasises a point raised by Harris among others (2011:150). She notes that not all FTAs specifically aim to 'damage face', but rather, individuals using them can be seen as engaging in face threatening activities as part of a strategic process, which involves using aggression or FTAs as a “means to some other ends” (Green, 2001: 5). Essentially, this involves the mitigation and preservation of some issue to do with that individual's core construct and a perceived threat to it (Fransella, 2003). This can be referred back to Kelly's (1955) original theory of PCT, whereby individuals do not always seek to revise their constructions, but to preserve them in order to maintain a certain core essence of 'identity'.

From the recipient’s point of view, Goffman emphasises that people respond to face threats with negative emotion ranging from slight discomfort, embarrassment and annoyance to anger and hostility (Goffman, 1967:6). As Cupach (2007) reports, the greater the threat to face, the more intense the emotional response. For example, if someone openly ignored or replied in an offensive manner to another person's greeting, this could engender a further negative emotional response. Goffman (1967) has also emphasised the negative affective reaction to face threats but has described them in terms of their cognitive and behavioural responses. Specifically, a person whose face has been threatened may give the offender a chance to repair the damage, but if none is forthcoming, they have the option of forgiving the offender, maintaining poise, but holding a grudge, or withdrawing from the interaction all together (White et al., 2004: 105).

Many studies have corroborated this theory, most recently Underwood (2011) who highlighted that the facework of older adults (aged 45-70) was motivated by the mitigation of Face Threatening Acts (FTAs), identifying the concept as an interactive,
mutually-beneficial process designed to prevent FTAs and preserve a socially positive image.

To summarise, Goffman (1967) proposes that each individual constructs a performance using physical settings and both verbal and non-verbal behaviours which affect their face. This, in turn, suggests that Goffman (1967) believes that it is the individual who creates meanings in the world, as opposed to following a structure, as he explored the phenomenon of ‘rituals’ and was aware of how society can shape individual performance. In addition to this, Goffman states that “when the individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society” (Goffman, 1990: 45). It is this presentation of the values of society which can have a profound effect on the individual. Goffman argues that the individual “may privately maintain standards of behaviour which he does not personally believe in... because of a lively belief that an unseen audience is present that will punish deviations from these standards” (1990: 87). In this, Goffman acknowledges that a certain element of structure of standards exists that individuals follow, which are prescribed by society's social and moral values. In his later work, Goffman expands on this concept and states that “society establishes the means of categorising persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories” (Goffman, 1990: 11). When an individual does not meet a requisite of one of these categories, then they are viewed as deviant, and thus attributed a 'stigma' (Goffman, 1990: 12). This suggests that a stigma is based on social standards existing outside of the individual. However, Goffman does suggest there is some flexibility in that “rules of social interaction do not produce social order (they do not compel us to act); but rather are a way of exhibiting social order. Rules are subject to individual interpretation...” (Manning, 1992: 10). As Manning
(1992) attests, there is a balance within Goffman's (1967) theories, between the individual and their agency, and prescribed and structured social order. An individual has the flexibility of choice in choosing to follow the rules or not, and still have the chance to go against the rules and have free choice, yet with consequences. This balance has often been negated by critics who tend to associate Goffman with either structuralist or agentive theories. As Goldner (in Manning, 1992) argues, “Goffman's work is rooted in the social action paradigm (structuralist), and lacks an adequate theory of social action or agency which accounts for man's ability to change his environment” (Johnson-Williams, 1986: 358). This is only the case, however, if one tries to link Goffman with either school of thought in a dichotomous fashion. Yet Johnson-Williams (1986) also considers Goffman's stance as that of a symbolic interactionist as, while Goffman incorporates some ideas of structuralists (particularly in his reference to face claiming notions), Johnson-Williams (1986) stresses that it is important to consider that Goffman’s aim was to “indicate the determinativeness and general influence of social orders. These include public order and social establishments on behaviour in everyday life” (Johnson-Williams, 1986: 361). Taking a more interactionist view, it can therefore be seen that Goffman was not trying to demonstrate that social structures control every aspect of everyday life, nor construct individuals as semi-autonomous beings operating within specific structural constraints. Instead, his presentation of self with regards to social and individual face needs highlights how socio-cultural structures in our environments affects how individuals may choose to portray themselves (Hammond, 2009).

Despite this, many of the studies which expand upon Goffman's (1967) original facework framework continue to view it as highly structured and prescriptive. This is particularly true of early work by Brown and Levinson (1987), which attempted to
create a more universal and culturally hegemonous ‘politeness theory’ from the original framework. While being enlightening, by opening alternative aspects to the theory’s application, it can also be heavily critiqued, as it appears to infringe upon the ecologically valid dynamism that individuals demonstrate during human social interactive enterprise.

To date, it has been impossible (when exploring the relationship between the social/individual environment and facework) not to refer to Brown and Levinson’s (1978; 1987) school of facework theory, since their research area has witnessed multiple re-analyses, revisions and critiques. The core notion of their model of ‘face’ comes directly from Goffman (1967), whereby they propose that ‘face’ includes universal features that transcend some cultural and ethnic boundaries. According to Brown and Levinson’s view, every competent adult member of society has and knows each other to have two related face wants labelled by them as ‘Negative’ and ‘Positive’ face:

**Negative Face:** the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e. to have freedom of action and freedom from imposition.

**Positive Face:** the positive, consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self-image can be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants.

Since face is emotionally-invested and depends upon everyone else in order to be maintained, as a consequence of people’s mutual vulnerability, “it is in general in every participant’s best interests to… act in ways that assure the other participants that the agent is heedful of the assumptions concerning face” (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 61). To achieve this, a person identifies certain acts consciously or unconsciously, and is presumed to engage in different acts according to the power/distance/size of the
imposition classified by Brown and Levinson (1987) as face threatening, in order to
determine the most appropriate strategy for carrying out a response. Some acts, also
identified by these authors to be intrinsically threatening to the addressee’s negative or
positive face can be exemplified in an expression of thanks, acceptance of the hearer’s
thanks, or an apology, as they are deemed to threaten the speaker’s negative face. This
is primarily because the speaker is then placed in a position of indebtedness, or
positioned to minimise the hearer’s indebtedness (Yuan, 2010). In the context of the
mutual vulnerability of face, any rational person will seek to employ appropriate
strategies to minimise face-threatening effects, with Brown and Levinson (1987)
suggesting the possible framework (see Figure 3 below), for negotiating these strategic
options in the following section.

Figure 3: Politeness and Face Threat Framework (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 2)

These strategies may be summarised (according to the authors, exhaustively in line with
the downgrading effect of an FTA (Yuan, 2010), with the framework outlining the
available face strategies for a speaker to choose, according to the seriousness of the
FTA. However, as Arundale (2008) discovered, Brown and Levinson’s (1987) concept
of the encoding/decoding models characterises communication only in the weak sense
of encoding something for others to decode, and therefore is a method that will not be used in the process of this study’s analysis.

Spencer-Oatey (2007) identified similar interdependent cognitive terms in 'face' and 'identity', but distinct in that face is only associated with attributes that are effectively sensitive to the claimant. From this perspective it is positively evaluated attributes that the individual wants others to acknowledge (either explicitly or implicitly), and negative attributes that the individual does not want ascribed to them. Spencer-Oatey (2007) notes, in particular, how attributes that are effectively sensitive vary dynamically in interaction and do not always conform to socially-sanctioned ones. For example, her 2011 investigation of self-herocisation (whereby the individual over-emphasises their positive role in an event) and linguistic construction of face among elderly residents in a retirement home highlight that the identification of self with positively evaluated attributes is facilitated by shared norms and values of a group, rather than a part of society closely aligned to them, in providing the foundation for effective interactional facework. In order for face meanings to be established by discursive participants, a shared foundation of cultural norms and values is dynamically negotiated and affirmed through interaction, establishing a 'mini-culture' that frames the conversation (Baxter, 1987, see Arundale, 2008). Spencer-Oatey (2011) refers to this concept as 'foundation work', whereby acquisition of face by strong identification with shared norms and values within the mini culture allows 'heroes' and 'villains' to be assigned personified public-status and evaluative labels, they align themselves with abstract 'hero/villain' roles within their interactively-defined mini-culture, which is when facework emerges. Foundation work, therefore, is the means by which interlocutors negotiate positively- and negatively-evaluated attributes within their mini-
culture, and pursue them through a number of facework strategies or 'multifunctional' resources, which can express one or more facework operations simultaneously.

This multidimensional concept of facework questions Brown and Levinson's original analytical and one-dimensional model of facework as simply mitigating FTAs, and preserving politeness principles (1987). As more recent studies demonstrate (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 211), analyses that focus on face-threat mitigation, particularly within institutional contexts, cannot adequately account for multi-participant interaction. Significantly here, the data highlights the element of context-sensitive environments, and consists of autobiographical narratives, a core function of which is positive self-presentation, something which would therefore impact upon the type of facework strategies participants employed (Davis & Harré, 2001, see Spencer-Oatey, 2007). This finding is reinforced by Spencer-Oatey’s (2007) study which noted that positive self-presentation was not only a key area of autobiographical narratives, but central to the narrative interaction in general. In her 2007 study, Spencer-Oatey identifies that interlocutors conduct facework through conversational narratives, associating themselves with mini-cultures that are positively evaluated as 'self-heroisation' (with this aspect being the motivation for the interaction), rather than with the mitigation of FTAs as previously thought (Spencer-Oatey, 2011). Furthermore, the concept of facework as a set of multi-factional resources is not restricted to any particular set of discourse features, and varies according to interactional context, and the mini-culture in which the facework is conducted. This allows a multidimensional model, which is applicable to various analytical contexts, and which challenges earlier concepts of facework motivated primarily by the mitigation of FTAs, and allows the concept to be seen as a mutually-beneficial, positive and proactive co-constructed process. The strength of Spencer-Oatey's (2011) study is that it re-addresses an
imbalance toward the analysis of relationships of explicit asymmetrical power in the existing literature on facework in older adults’ communication. This captures naturalistic, non-institutionalised, in-group communication and offers an insight into how friendships are socially enacted.

3.3 The Continued Relevance of Facework

Concurrent with Underwood's (2010) assessment of the multifaceted construction of facework, Arundale's (2008) 'Face Constituting Theory' conceptualises human interaction in the strong sense of interactional achievement. By focussing on the associated co-constituting model of communication, Arundale (2008) addressed the question of how participants achieve meaning and actions in talk. In his study, he found individuals to be cognitively autonomous, because meanings are not determinate and, unlike an analyst, the initial speaker cannot know what the second response will be. Essentially they will not know just how their utterance has been interpreted until they interpret the corresponding response. The initial speaker's understanding of the interpretation, therefore, remains provisional, as it has yet to be understood within the frame of their interaction (Schegloff, 1997). It is only upon the other participant's response that the first speaker's provisional understanding of the other individual's interpretation can be confirmed, or whether modification is needed. This, then, becomes 'operative' interpreting, as the individual has evidence of how they have been interpreted within their particular conversation. Maynard and Heritage (2005) argue that this three-position framework comprises the basic 'architecture' of human communication, with the third- and fourth-position utterances being critical, as they are the last structurally-provided positions for initiating the repair of problematic
understandings of first-position utterances. At the point of the third position, both interlocutors' meanings and actions become reciprocally conditional and conjointly co-constructed, as subsequent utterances are 'operative'. This is based on initial turns each forming a sequence of operative interpretations that are thoroughly inter-dependent, and entwined with the other person’s sequence (Arundale, 2008). This breaks away from Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of communication, as the core principles are framed from a participant's (rather than an analyst's) perspective, modelling the procedures and expectations in terms of how individuals produce their own behaviour and interpret that of others as utterances unfold in sequence, explaining how meaning and action are achieved in talk-in-interaction.

This multi-factor framework of facework demonstrates that the intertwining of the individual and social level can be productively framed as a dialectic: two co-existing and opposing elements that each contain aspects of the other in “an on-going dynamic and interactive manner (Raymond, 2003)”. These dialectics are unified essentially because what is individual then presupposes what is social and vice-versa. For example, participant's pursuit of face generates the social agenda, and social interaction is generative of individual's construction of face (Arundale, 2008). Arundale's (2008) study also highlights that separate operative interpretations of participant’s face and utterances exist conjointly with co-constructed face-discourse, which directs the nature of the exchange due to a certain amount of reciprocal conditionality upon which discourse is founded between interlocutors (Arundale, 2008). This concept of facework allows researchers to consider how dialogue may be interpreted outside of the interactional environment, which may add to how the dialogue is interpreted, and thus provides a framework for understanding the face interpreting of others from a
dialectical and individual perspective, but also when one observes interaction without engaging in it (Arundale, 2008).

Patrona's (2006) investigation into televised discussion programmes highlights that face construction within certain contexts are specifically 'goal' orientated within the concept of communicative intentions. Such goals not only shape conversational behaviour in respect to the degree and ways in which claiming and sustaining the floor are achieved, but also within the 'Recipient Design Principle' (Arundale, 2008), whereby higher-level goals can be inferred by the viewer audience on the basis of the programme 'host's' formulations and sequential exchanges with interviewees (Patrona, 2001). Essentially, the discourse has a thematic, pragmatic and organisational strategic structure, particularly relating to the type of questions asked by the host in-line with their questioning role, and in response to the other interlocutor’s statements, all of which are strategically designed to elicit a certain type of response from their viewing audience.

Corroborating this, Patrona's (2001; 2006) studies of TV discussions identifies how goals of communication and face come to life as joint accomplishments of conversationalists, but are also distinctive in forming separate 'faceworks' of interviewer/interviewee before moving towards a generic co-constructed 'face' that informs the viewing audience of the particular agenda in mind. In May's (2005) study of advocates and the notion of truth within the court setting, a similar dichotomy was found to exist, discovering that truth can be established via the contention of council, namely when lawyers set the topic and pursue their goals using follow-up questions as a mean of eliciting information strategically valuable to their case. This can involve employing questions, and floor-claiming mediation techniques that communicate a specific message to the jury - the real addressee - regardless of the witnesses' answers
(Archer, 2011). Equally, the focus and management of framing techniques in televised mediums also refine what viewing audiences construe from discourse exchanges, particularly ones so highly charged, and within such semi-structured environments. In Reynolds and Rendle-Short's (2010) investigation, using naturalistic data from The Jeremy Kyle Show (a confrontational and aggressive social television talk-show), they detail how sequential exchanges work to promote individual facework, and the one-dimensional facework operating specifically for the viewing audience. Indeed, as talk is orderly and organised Reynolds and Rendle-Shorts (2010) study found that participants involved in the conversational exchanges use the spaces prior to the first initiating turn and the second completing action term to indicate any upcoming disagreement with the interpretation of the prior statement (Sacks, 1984; 1992). Such a time lapse between responses appears to demonstrate not only individual face-defending intention, but also supports the idea that the intention of the discussion programme is also to resolve issues and facilitate proactive discussion between interlocutor's one stage, in a confrontational manner for the entertainment of the viewing audience. Such evidence provides strong support for the theory of the multifaceted nature of facework, particularly within a media context, where not only naturalistic data of conversation is accessible, but also the perspective of a 'viewing' audience is garnered via the contextual positioning of viewers as observational participants. In addition, findings also highlight the importance of analysing face, facework and utterance exchanges in immediate sequential context to examine how linguistic, psychological, and framing mechanisms are employed by the individual and the viewer-audience perspectives towards engendering specific multi-directional interpretations of intent (Reynold & Rendle-Short, 2010).
With this in mind, the current study will also be drawing on the research methods favoured by Spencer-Oatey (2002; 2007), among others. The advantage of this approach is its integration of the sociological, psychological and cognitive perspectives of self, and how they contribute to the performance of face. This works to highlight that all three represent different levels of explanation, rather than being inherently contradictory conceptualisations. In order to effectively operationalize this approach, Spencer-Oatey (2007) formulated a framework incorporating work from a variety of fields, specifically Simon's ‘Self-Aspect Model of Identity’ (2004), and the social psychologist Schwartz's ‘Value Constructs’ (1992; Schwartz et al., 2001), models that will be expanded upon later in the chapter. Spencer-Oatey's integrated approach framework is founded upon previous work by Brewer and Gardner (1996: 84), arguing that three different levels of self-hood need to be distinguished: the individual, the interpersonal and the group level. At the individual level, there is the personal self, representing the differentiated individuated concept of self. At the interpersonal level, there is the relational self, representing the self concept derived from connections and role relationships with significant others. Finally, at the group level, there is the collective self, representing the self concept derived from significant group membership (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 5).

Overall, Spencer-Oatey claims that, in cognitive terms, face and identity are similar in that both relate to self-image (including the three levels described above), and both comprise multiple self-aspects or attributes. Face, however, is only associated with attributes that are effectively sensitive to the claimant, essentially those positively-evaluated attributes that the claimants want others to acknowledge (explicitly or implicitly), and with negatively-evaluated attributes the claimant does not want to be ascribed to them (Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 10). Spencer-Oatey (2007) proposes that the
issue of face loss or gain only becomes salient for the individual when there is a mismatch between an attribute claimed (or denied in the case of negatively-evaluated ones) and an attribute perceived as being ascribed by others. This notion is contrary to Goffman's original idea that face is only associated with 'approved social attributes'. In addition, and what constitutes one of the most significant strengths of her approach, is Spencer-Oatey’s contention that attributes that are effectively sensitive will vary dynamically in interaction, not always conforming to socially-sanctioned ones (or non-sanctioned ones in the case of negative-evaluated attributes). This suggests that there exists the possibility that individuals will choose to contest one or more approved attributes and claim others that are more important to them in that particular context. Furthermore (and of particular interest to this study, due to the originality of its contribution to the field), Spencer-Oatey’s idea leaves open the possibility for Kelly's PCT to inform the subject area of facework, as being the psychological reasoning as to why these traits may be more important to a particular individual in that given context, than others within the same space. Facework theory can thus be further informed by reference to this psychological theory, and can expand upon the current knowledge in the linguistic performance of identity.

Spencer-Oatey (2007) maintains that face entails the evaluation of others, and thus needs to be analysed as an interactional phenomenon via real-time verbal exchanges (10). Her framework operates from a three-tiered perspective which analyses:

1. the multiple positive attributes people may claim
2. the types of analytic frames needed to analyse such claims
3. the dynamic real-time unfolding of face claims/appraisals
In order to do this in an integrated way, each level of analysis works from a socio-psychological linguistic reference point in order to elicit the type of different attributes that can become face sensitive, and appear as the most salient frame for analyses within the context (personal, relational, or collective). Initially, this involves appraising the range of strategies (linguistic and non-linguistic) that are used to manage face attack in the dynamic process of interaction. As Spencer-Oatey (2007) notes, people’s claims to face incorporate individually sensitive attributes, relational associations, and collective affiliations, as well as individual’s anticipations and interpretations of the face claims others may make, and what their corresponding response strategy will be.

In relation to the trial and depiction of Aileen Wuornos in Nick Broomfield’s two documentaries, such research seeks to examine how Wuornos herself, Broomfield and the US media attempt to construe her as a character, and ultimately affect the perception of her trial and its outcome. For example, it can be viewed as either a deliberate attempt to persuade the viewing audience of a certain perspective, or a possible outcome, because of the framing devices used. Whatever the agenda, this is a highly important area for this particular study to address, since it questions how such framing devices, if strategically employed, have the effect they do in persuading a viewing audience towards a certain perspective. However, it is important to note that knowing exactly what perspective a viewing audience chooses to adopt is difficult to ascertain, yet what this study can offer instead are possible ways in which the framing used has and does affect the audience.

3.4 Women's Agency and the Concept of 'Face'

An important factor to consider, in light of the above, is how the knowledge and understanding surrounding facework has been used to explore the concept of women's
independent and outspoken agency in society. In particular, I am interested in women’s ability to break out of and resist prescriptive dialogues, that can be perceived as directive of what is considered socially-acceptable feminine behaviour, so that they might independently construct their own identities unhindered by social prejudice or bias (if this is possible). On this topic, Charrad’s (2010) investigation into American and European courtroom data on women's agency across cultures notes how women's voices are often excluded, silenced and marginalised in legal settings. Specifically, she identified social structural problems that infringe women's right to act. These include citizenship (incorporating social class and family circumstance), human rights and socially-constructed gender roles. Charrad’s (2010) findings highlight the 'dualistic' nature of women's agency, as it can be harnessed to both challenge and reproduce dominant norms. Women's voices may occupy a conflicting power-struggle, with channels of communication at different institutional levels defining the life-chances of women, their ability to overcome socially-stereotyped definitions and assert themselves as full and independent citizens of their society. In the case of female homicide, a conflicting discourse is engendered between the individual in their quest for independent recognition, and that of dominant social discourses which marginalise them as sub-human and un-feminine. In Charrad’s (2010) study, she identifies that, particularly when on trial, women are forced to appeal more to their audience and the jury than men usually have to do. This, therefore, has the impact of complicating negotiations between law and dominant social stereotypes that pervade society, by calling upon principles of social justice, and its ethic of recognising the individuals non-judgementally (Charrad, 2010). Women's voices are further shown to engage in this power-struggle with channels of communication at different institutional levels. For instance, Charrad’s (2010) study also demonstrates that women's negotiation of agency
and social stereotypes often defines their sentencing within the judicial system, depending on their ability to overcome socially-stereotyped definitions and their ability to assert themselves as full and independent citizens of their society. A clear example of this can be seen in citizenship which, as Charrad notes, “is a conflictive practice related to power - that is to struggle about who is entitled to say what in defining the common social problems, and deciding how they will be faced” (2010: 518). Citizenship can be seen to raise questions about the boundaries of groups considered to be legitimate members of society; how these boundaries are drawn and by whom; who has the power to define common societal concerns and demands, and finally; who has rights and entitlements. Such questions, Charrad (2010: 519) argues, are important to address if we are to understand whether citizenship functions as an integrative social contract to include women's gender-specific needs, concerns and problems, or as an exclusionary mechanism to leave out women's issues and suppress their voices within power dynamics dominated by men.

Another theme in this area concerns the context for women's voices, whether institutional, national or transnational, since the current trend regarding claims on rights increasingly involves the internalisation of demand-making processes (Charrad, 2010: 519). Indeed, discourse relating to human rights, women's rights, cultural and minority rights appears to rely upon the legitimacy granted to the international organisations which organise them, and often become issues that can be used as bargaining tools for women to make claims. Appeal to several of these discourses complicates the negotiation between the state and women who make claims, not only as women, but also as members of ethnic and religious minorities calling upon principles of social justice. O’Reilly (2015) explicitly illustrates how such discourses can open up multiple avenues for women, specifically citing women activists in Ireland. By linking local
demands for women's rights with international struggles for human rights, feminist advocacy can be seen to move into “local-global spaces” (O’Reilly, 2015: 115), that empower both domestic and international rights movements. In support of this notion, Hamilton's (2010) study investigates social constructions of women's agency in reaction to violence involving men. In each case, it was the expert witness statements (usually male) that were prioritised over the voices of the women themselves. Overall, court transcripts representative of the American courtroom demonstrate that judges referred more to statements by these individuals than the voices of the women themselves, in creating the official stories underlying their criminal behaviour (O’Reilly, 2015; Hamilton, 2010). In turn, Atasoy's (2006) investigation emphasised that women's agency must be conceptualised within the entrenched power hierarchies existing in all societies, as well as those on the micro-levels of family, social class, media and interpersonal relations. Agency, i.e the ability to be an active agent in formulating autonomy and self-realisation, is grounded within dominant norms and institutions, which Atasoy (2006) identifies as being primarily patriarchal in nature. However, he also found that agency itself is a contradictory issue, not only operating within a multifaceted and complex context, but within the limits of existing rules, with women themselves actively adopting dominant norms that systematically reproduce and constrain their options. This can be exemplified in the case of Andrea Yates, whose defence team used aspects of her identity that applied to social ideals of femininity (being a middle class wife and mother of five) to her advantage in gaining a more lenient sentence based upon the idea that she was not deviant, as much as a victim of insanity.
3.5 Linking Facework Strategies to Identity and Self- Presentation

From the former discussions pertaining to the notion of social politics and the concept of individuals' autonomous agency during social interaction, it is important to highlight the role of face and its performance, particularly in relation to its contribution towards the construction of an individual's public and private identity. Discussions of face according to Spencer-Oatey (2007) invariably refer to the concept of self, from Goffman's (1967) perception of it as the image of self to Brown and Levinson's public self-image (1987). Further studies into the individual concept of face argue that it is an identity-bound issue and a feature of self-communicative identity (Scollon & Scollon, 1994). The common theme running through all these concerns is the issue of identity. As yet, there has been very little explicit consideration of the inter-relationship between the two concepts, as to the extent they are similar and different, and as to how the theories of identity inform our understanding and analysis of face (Spencer-Oatey 2007).

Instead, because linguistic research, and the field it represents is primarily interested in language, it has typically focussed on the issue of face in its linguistic construction, rather than adopting a multidisciplinary approach as to how theories within, for example, social psychology regarding identity, can expand our understanding of face and assist in its analysis (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). Campbell et al., (2000) found the notion of identity from a psychological perspective to be a powerful conceptual tool, offering a useful definition of the self as a “multifaceted dynamic construct that operates as a schema controlling the processing of self-relevant
information” (Campbell et al., 2000: 67). Accordingly, Goffman's original (1967) concept of face located the notion as firmly embedded within the flow of interaction, becoming manifest only when individuals make appraisal of the unfolding events and themselves within it. Recent studies have only begun to comprehensively analyse the connections between these issues, with Brewer and Gardner's original (1996) framework arguing that three different levels of self-presentation need to be distinguished before analyses can begin:

- **Individual Level**: the issue of the personal self representing the differentiated, individuated concept of self;
- **Interpersonal Level**: there is the relational self representing the self-concept derived from connections and role relationships with significant others;
- **Group Level**: there is the collective self, the self-concept derived from significant group memberships.

Supporting this, Hecht et al.’s (2005) investigation into the communication of identity postulates that the relational perspective incorporates “identification with him/herself through their relationships with others...” and that “social roles are particularly important in shaping this aspect of identity, in addition a relationship itself is a unit of identity, thus a couple as a unit can establish an identity” (Hecht et al., 2005: 257).

Hecht et al. (2005) have gone on to establish the Communication Theory of Identity (CTI), which draws on the notion that identity is based on social categorisation and shared group membership, as well as the interplay between and among these constructs from the relational to the individual perspective. According to this theory, social identities are formed through the internalisation of social norms and practices, particularly in-group and out-group distinctions. CTI goes on to provide an explanation of the relationship between society and individuals, postulating that identity is based on
roles, other people’s ascriptions and, most importantly, their social constructs and performances corresponding to the former factors (social norms and practises). These are then internalised by individuals, and aid them in the formation of role identities that are then constituted in reference to the relationships they develop with other individuals, the contexts in which they take place and how they are then performed.

This multi-tiered perspective, incorporating the individual, relational and collective, is also supported by Simon (2004), who identifies that all self-aspect, regardless of what perspective is adopted, is both cognitive and social in nature (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). Individuals form cognitive representations of who they are that are relatively stable and enduring. They construct and negotiate their identities through social interaction enacting elements of their personal, relational and collective selves through the process of social interaction, but also negotiate and construct them resulting in an identity developing and emerging through interaction.

The purely cognitive representation element adopts an information-processing model in its approach to understanding behaviour. With input information entering through the senses and then undergoing a number of mental operations (such as coding, storing, retrieving and transforming the data), thus acting as a reasoning mechanism for an individual being able to gain an understanding between between the sensually gained stimulus and what response should then be made by themselves in reaction to the stimulus (Brooks, 1984). In Brooks’ (1984, see Fransella 2003) study of visual and verbal reasoning behaviour, he identifies reasoning as a highly complex, high-level cognitive process which necessitates interaction between many lower-level processes involved in comprehension, representation and manipulation of symbolic information, according to a subject’s personal experiences of stimuli. In the 1984 study, he uses a cognitive approach to establish the concept of the 'Duel Processing Theory', whereby
the process of reasoning involves examining human visual and verbal responses to stimulus. This early study is somewhat concurrent with Personal Construct Theory (Fransella, 2003), which stresses:

...the importance of events looking to man to propose what the character of their import shall be. The meaning we ascribe to an event is anchored in its antecedents and consequences, so for each of us meaning assumes the shape of arguments which lead to predictions, and the only outside check on personal constructions are the events which confirm or de-confirm expectations

(Fransella, 2003: 3-4).

With this in mind, and in relation to the interactional perspective, Schlenker and Pontari (2000) argue that people’s self-presentation concerns (i.e. their concerns about the identity characteristics they wish to convey) are highly dependent upon the construction of past experience, operating in the foreground or background modes but never absent (something that supports Kelly's concept of PCT and its contribution to identity and behaviour). Simon (2004: 66-67) highlights a number of functions of identity which are particularly pertinent to the study of facework:

1. Identity helps provide people with a sense of belonging (via relational and collective self-aspects) and with a sense of distinctiveness (through individual self-aspects).

2. Identity helps people locate themselves in their social world by assisting them to define where they do and do not belong in relation to others. Its helps individuals anchor themselves in their social world by establishing a sense of place.

3. Facets of identity help provide people with self-respect and self-esteem, as people’s own positive evaluations of their self-aspects help build their sense of self-esteem. However self-respect and self-esteem are not simply results of independent reflection, but respectful recognition of relevant others plays a crucial role.
The critical role of previous experience in personal construction of the self is also strongly emphasised within the current literature. For example, Swann et al's (2009) paper discusses how people engage in identity negotiation upon initiating relationships through successive phases of cognition and interaction. This, in turn, helps to form the interpersonal glue that binds people together (Swann et al, 2009: 84), enabling them to establish mutual expectations of one another. This is in congruence with Goffman's (1959, 1961) approach, which asserted that the first order of business in social interaction is establishing a working consensus or agreement regarding the roles each person will assume. Swann et al (2009) has since expanded the formulation, emphasising the tendency for people to maximise interpersonal harmony by gravitating towards social settings that seem likely to offer support for their identities or self-views.

More recent research literature suggests that such self-verification effects are common, with Swann et al (2009) providing considerable evidence of people preferring self-verifying evaluations over non-verifying ones. Swann and Pelham's (2002) study of college students whose room-mates confirm their internalised self-views report stronger intentions to continue living with the room-mate. This was also found to be true of students who view themselves negatively. In addition, Cast and Burke (2002) found married people with positive and negative self-views are more satisfied with spouses who confirm their self-views, while individuals whose spouses disconfirm their positive and negative self-views run an elevated risk of separation and divorce. Moreover, this controlled laboratory study showed that, just as people with positive self-views prefer interaction partners who appraise them positively, people with negative self-views prefer partners who perceive them negatively (Bosson et al., 2010). This is in accordance with Farmer et al., (1996) study, which found that identity construction by the individual can be perceived as a process of self-reflection which
arises as a person moves through time, space and different organisational and institutional environments. This reflexively-constructed identity unfolds in the conscious interaction that can be seen as a step towards the theoretical renewal of identity theory. Like Personal Construct Theory (Fransella, 2003), individual identity is not fixed but, rather, continually socially constructed and subject to contradictions, revision and change throughout the life-span of boundary-crossing individuals (Lindgren & Wahlen, 2001).

In their two-year study, Lindgren and Wahlen (2001) demonstrate how, by empirical research, reflexive narratives can be used to explore different ways of constructing identity. By targeting boundary-crossing individuals, solid empirical foundations were laid regarding the validity of the knowledge we have about identity construction. The use of a narrative approach, as the main medium through which individuals convey their interpretations of reality, broke new ground by combining a multidisciplinary approach based on applying psychological theory, and using verbal interaction to elicit data that supports such theory. While this has facilitated a deeper understanding of identity construction, the linguistic approach it used was not systematic, in the sense of it discussing linguistic features in depth, but rather was one directed towards narrative discourses used to convey autobiographical stories told by individuals. This entailed focussing on how individuals describe their daily lives, particularly examining how different phenomena, meanings and levels of importance were attached to certain concepts. Lindgren and Wahlen’s study highlighted the dynamic and on-going process of identity construction and reconstruction, moving from multi-identity to integrated-identity constructions, thus allowing a single reflexive narrative to be performed in a multifaceted and boundary-less manner, enabling individuals to emancipate themselves from traditions or link themselves back to them (Lindgren &
Wahlen, 2001). However, despite the strength of their study examining narrative discourse in identity construction, Lindgren and Wahlen (2001) have received some criticism due to the lack of focus on 'naturally-occurring' conversation, since it is within everyday conversations with a variety of people from different backgrounds, different levels of power, different social distances, etc., rather than formal organisational talk (interviews, etc.), that identities are evoked, drawn upon and reconstructed. In defence of their approach, and emphasising a key strategy in their study, the authors highlight that such a discursive methodological approach can be seen as a simplification of the diverse ways in which boundary-crossing individuals interface in different contexts. Individuals appear to search for identity in a multifaceted and boundary-less manner, with high expectations for themselves and of other interlocutor’s feedback regarding their character (Lindgren & Wahlen, 2001: 373). Accordingly, contrasting perspectives presented by them demonstrate particular discourses that develop ways of understanding differences and similarities in identity constructions. Furthermore, Lindgren and Wahlen (2001: 375) highlight that identity construction should also be considered a process not without certain contextual and interpersonal constraining factors. As their empirical study shows, people construct and reconstruct identity throughout their lives, moving from multi-identity construction towards integrated construction, and most likely in the opposite direction too. In addition, they suggest that boundary-crossing also means that people can, and do, travel between different discourses, and ways of organising their identities at different periods of their lives (Lindgren & Wahlen, 2001: 375). Such an approach can be seen as both alternative and complementary to traditional approaches to identity construction in working life (such as social concepts such as career or gender), with reflexive identity analysis promoting
a descriptively more accurate understanding of differences in the way of identity reasoning in individuals (Lindgren & Wahlen, 2001: 375).

As Alvesson and Willmott (2002) note, current literature lacks an account of how identity work is undertaken in conversation as individuals seek to lay blame, confirm status and justify themselves. Such a narrow focus potentially risks losing sight of the dynamic way in which organisational talk, and quests for identity interact with contextual activity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002: 60).

Recently there has been a growth in research examining 'identity work' associated with the rising prominence of the view that identity is socially constructed through language, and moulded through the relationships we have with ourselves and others (Ainsworth & Hardy, 2004; Butler, 2005). Findings have allowed us to understand that individual identity faces challenges from changing expectations within the situational context, but also due to changing expectations from others towards ourselves (Lutgen-Sandvik, 2008). Davies and Thomas (2008) found that maintaining a consistent identity can be dependent on how one positions oneself in relation to the audience, by modifying certain identity features or keeping them consistent to sustain a particular self-identity for that audience. Once again, this brings us back to the issue of facework (see Chapter 3), serving to highlight that the term ‘identity’ in its linguistic execution is being used in a range of circumstances involving different rhetorical approaches to achieve particular identity outcomes. One way of conceptualising this is to recognise that identity work involves idealised notions of what an individual wants to be, which is discursive in the sense that the context of the discussion has an interpersonal aspect with each interlocutor having idealised notions of what they require from the other in terms of identity recognition. This entails that identity, much like facework, takes place within the structural arrangements of organisations and within a
multiplicity of societal discourses that affect interactions (McInnes & Corlette, 2012). Such distinctions are exemplified in Down and Revelly's (2009) study, where the supervisor attempts to change his identity through identity work, by implicitly asking those around him to unquestioningly accept a change in their relationship by employing his formal job title and the ensuing organisational discourses open to him due to this title to reposition himself relative to them as a workforce.

In addition to this, Kornberger and Brown (2007) argue that an individual's relation with particular ideas and ideals leads to reflexive questioning and on-going debate concerning how one should think and act in prevailing circumstances. Equally, such identity work was also found to evolve from the discursive resources arising within the social context.

Societal discourses may also directly and indirectly inform identity work and facework (Ainsworth & Hardy, 2004; Ybema et al., 2009). Discourses relating to gender and race, for example, have been identified as resources that help individuals establish themselves as distinctive and valued (Ezzell, 2009), while equally delimiting and defining what can be said and done by an individual (Rumens & Kerfoot, 2009). For example, Davies and Thomas (2008) examined the factors shaping identity positions of police officers, and discovered that the officers concerned drew upon societal and organisational discourse structures that place value upon their work and importance within the community. Equally, they drew upon underlying masculine discourses within their field of work, which prefer measures of practically-implemented effectiveness such as arrests, over discursive questioning. This study clearly defines facework and identity as not solely related to the use of discursive resources to establish valued identity positions, but also as being experienced as tensions between different social duties and rights associated with being a particular type of individual. Ybema et
al (2009) highlight that identity work, particularly in its linguistic manifestation, is associated with the regulation of identity to the extent that one might be constrained as to how one might act or be viewed. For example, within certain social environments, an individual may be required to alter their behaviour depending upon the formality of contextual exchanges (courtroom, job interview, socialising with friends, romantic liaison), the topic being discussed, or if there is any goal-driven intention which requires interactants to modify their behaviour to attain a certain response. This again demonstrates that identity work is equally associated with structural conditions that support and prevail upon individual actors (Ybema et al., 2009).

The resulting identity struggle over who one should be is acknowledged as one that must take place discursively, and on an on-going basis with different audiences (Alvesson and Willmott, 2010), yet less well represented in the literature are the tensions such struggles bring to conversational identity. As Burr (2003) notes in his study of social constructionism, it is not simply the way one describes one's self that may be contested, but that counter-descriptions, drawing on different discursive resources, invoke an array of contradictory duties, rights and obligations to which one is expected to respond. As Butler (2005) found, actors may perceive themselves to be relatively free to choose among various identity positions made available by discourses as they describe what their own, or another’s job entails. Yet, at the other extreme, in being called to account, they might find that the duties being invoked oblige them to speak from a particular subject position. Recent work has also acknowledged that discussions occurring between hierarchical levels can involve subtle and not-so-subtle performances of identity features (such as power, gender, etc.) to open or close dialogue (Thomas et al., 2011). Beyond this, research literature has tended to focus on the role of identity in the reproduction of ideational and discursive issues, rather than the role
being played by social obligations in the conversational positioning of self and other (Clarke, Knights & Jarvis, 2012). As Beech (2008) notes, the second core aspect of identity work is that of the 'interpersonal', which builds on the notion that who an individual 'is' lies in the on-going negotiation of relative self and other identity.

Watson (2006) found that workplace identities are more typically co-constructed, negotiated and contested, through the on-going dialogues that intertwine personal and professional identities with the narrative of the organisations that employ them. This has led Alvesson and Willmott (2002) to conclude that everyday conversational identity work is as likely to involve the confirmation of identities, and attempts to change them by redefining relationships, as it is unrestrained dialogue (Down & Revely, 2009). Garcia and Hardy (2007) found that one way in which dialogue might be closed down is through constructing fixed identity positions, which can be predicated upon the rejection of the values and behaviours associated with that specific identity, as being unchanging and can become entrenched in self-reinforcing and fixed identity positions (Beech, 2008).

To summarise, there appears to exist two aspects of identity work in the present literature:

1) Ideational / discursive identity work: Individuals may perceive themselves to be under varying degrees of obligation to speak from a particular identity position by social obligations implicit to the prevailing interactional context they find themselves within. These can range from instances where actors feel relatively free from obligations, to those where they perceive themselves constrained (McInnes & Corlett, 2012).

2) Interpersonal identity work: Where literature suggests identity work can involve self and other, granting to each different degrees of relational positioning latitude to shape identity positions implied by their relationship (Ybema et al., 2012). Again these range from instances where self-other positioning is relatively free and open to dialogic exploration, to those circumstances when the identity of self and other are relatively constrained.
In spite of the wealth of literature in this area, there remains a question as to how these two aspects contribute to identity work in everyday talk. In this respect it is worthwhile noting the extent of the literature that is predominantly derived from interview-based narrative accounts of the workplace (McInnes & Corlett, 2012). Despite calls for further research into everyday, rather than interview based talk, little attention has been given to 'naturally-occurring' conversation (McInnes & Corlett, 2012), and interactions which take place in an unstructured, and non-socially-laden context, since it is within everyday talk that identities are evoked, drawn upon and reconstructed. Currently, however, with the exception of the work done by Spencer-Oatey, research lacks an account of just 'how' identity work is undertaken in conversation, particularly as to how individuals seek to lay blame, confirm status and justify themselves in the discursive process (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).

That is not to say that the role of identity in organisational talk has not been useful. Llywellyn and Spence's (2009) study illustrates how ordinary activities relating to the job interview process reveals how members orientate themselves to recruitment practice, and include definitions of acceptable conduct and identities. Despite this, the study failed to consider how individuals orient to, or variously draw upon, aspects of identity in interview and recruitment practices. Samra-Frederick's (2004) analytic study of conversation strategies discusses the use of personal pronouns such as I and you, as relational-rhetorical resources to establish an identity through the positioning of self and others, yet notes that there exists a current deficit of grounded identity theory in recent research.

This critique of current research on conversational identity work also highlights its lack of engagement with turn-by-turn negotiations of identity that is prototypical of
organisational talk, and a common feature of facework studies (McInnes & Corlett, 2012). Previous work by Alvesson and Willmott (2002) discovered that discerning, performative, controlling, reconciling, negotiating and confirmatory identity work, in particular, were the most common ways in which people seek to position themselves and others in interaction. Specifically, their transcript of an organisational annual agenda meeting within a company identified common themes dominated certain interactions, which has enabled current research activities to more comprehensively understand the dynamics and creative mechanisms in which ideational, discursive and interpersonal aspects of identity work are variously realised, as individuals seek to establish, maintain, challenge or deny identity positions of self and other (Karreman & Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; McInnes & Corlett, 2012). Karreman and Alvesson and Willmott (2002) study also questions Gergen's (2009) study, as it was noted, upon meeting the participants, that they rarely, if ever, engaged in the free flowing dialogic exploration of identity that previous studies had suggested (McInnes & Corlett, 2012). McInnes and Corlett (2012) also hypothesise that this could be due to the nature of the meeting between participants, as it brought with it assumed identity positions and power relations that informed what was said and done. However, they argue that such underlying factors do not reduce all interaction to one type of conversational identity work. Rather, these were issues that could be considered alongside and in concert with others, salient at a given point in the conversation. Indeed, their findings suggest that while both role and hierarchical position brings power and capacities that enable an actor to undertake certain actions, they also carry with them duties and obligations that are available to the other to support their claims (Burr, 2003). At their most pronounced, McInnes and Corlett (2012) found these obligations can, as performative identity work shows, constrain individuals to speak from a particular position. An example can be
seen when a public official may be forced to defend an official action, without necessarily morally agreeing with it. This can be viewed as evidence of the regularity effects of certain discourses (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). Yet findings have highlighted that the effects of discourses did not necessarily delimit the forms of identity work being undertaken (Clarke et al., 2012). Rather, we see the on-going debates on what discourses might mean for identity construction to be enacted within the realm of interpersonal relations that shape 'self' and 'other' identities (Davies & Thomas, 2008; Kornberger & Brown, 2007).

As much as McInnes and Corlett (2012) found that dialogue was constrained by ideational/discursive matters, the findings also provide evidence of the reliance afforded to it by the interpersonal aspect of identity work. Ezzell's (2009: 128) study found examples of performative identity work in confrontational settings was suggestive of 'defensive othering'. This is something which was engaged in by one group, with the effect of reinforcing the 'rightness' of their identity position by constructing the opposing group as unreasonable and consistently incompetent. While such confrontational meetings never culminated in challenging or undermining identity positions, register less confrontational discussion demonstrated ways in which interactions can open up conversation to considering and negotiating alternative identity positions in a more flexible manner (Ezzell, 2003).

For McInnes and Corlett (2012) this flexibility has more to do with the interrelationship between self and other, between who we are in the situation, and whether or how things get done in the organisation, than mere human tolerance. In their study, they highlight the sense of temporal shift in dialogue between participants, from past to present versions of who one should be and what one should have done, to what needs to happen in the future and, crucially, who was going to do what. These findings
therefore allow us to consider conversational identity work not only as a reflection of interactional circumstances’ (Watson, 2006), but as an on-going process through which organisational practices are linked to the process of negotiation and through which interactants position each other relative to one another, along with the ideational/discursive issues they draw upon as they construct their identities (McInnes & Corlett, 2012). However, despite their research representing important developments for identity literature, in its consideration of positioning as a resource associated with duties, rights and obligations, such issues are also co-constructed in discourse, as interactants position themselves and each other within everyday talk. Illustrative examples of identity work, as in McInnes and Corlett’s (2012) study are limited, as their study was derived from a single meeting within one organisation, therefore limiting the applicability of the results to multifaceted alternate contexts. Furthermore, their paper was also limited to appraising illustrative rather than any other form of identity work, setting aside any potential dynamism that may emerge in less formal interaction. Future research, therefore, needs to consider, and focus on drawing out, different aspects of identity work in order to build a richer, more comprehensive picture of what is happening in interactive circumstances within and outside formal situations. One way in which to do this is by looking at how people strategically manage and negotiate the impressions they make in social interactions via Impression Management techniques. With a specific focus on how identities, concepts of self, and public and private images are communicated, and what variables external to the interaction itself shape the impressions people seek to give to others, to provide a holistic illustration of the social, contextual interactive circumstances, and how the individual strategically negotiates it (McInnes & Corlett, 2012). For the purpose of this study, however, it is important to highlight the work conducted by Penman (1990) and Culpeper (2011), whose concepts
of facework are highly concurrent with the necessity for the field to be viewed in relation to social-psychology, and the dynamic unfolding of self-presentation in the process of interaction. Although Spencer-Oatey's (2007) Rapport Management framework, among others I will be implementing, may seem a practical method to use, there are, however, some limitations in its ecological and empirical validity. Sydow Campbell’s (2005) investigation into medical consultations demonstrates strong evidence towards the idea that the model should not be applied monolithically to one individual involved, but rather to all the participants involved in the interaction (422). This, he argues, would more comprehensively cover all the complex and dynamic phenomena involved in interaction, taking into consideration a multiplicity of variables and factors emanating from a variety of human and contextual sources. Essentially, Spencer-Oatey's (2007) approach only accounts for face from an individual perspective, rather than as a relational phenomenon. This ignores a vast amount of current research (Arundale, 2008; Pizziconi, 2006) which highlights that any evaluation of it requires a comprehensive conceptual framework, integrating interpretive, social, cognitive, cultural, situational and individual factors, to explain why and how the communication unfolds as it does (Arundale, 2008). For Penman (1990) and Culpeper (2011), facework is continually shaped and adapted in the continual creation of meaning, stimulated in on-going and real-time unfolding of discourse during interaction. This has implications not just at the micro-level of the individual, but for the larger macro-networks that the person is operating within (Dominici & Littlejohn, 2006: 17).

For Penman (1990), facework should be understood within a conceptual context, with the nature of the strategies used being dependent upon the frame in which the communication is viewed. Essentially, Penman’s facework framework is situated within a matrix, applying a focus of attention and scope of action upon the scenario:
1) Focus of attention identifies the parts of the system most salient to the speaker at that time, although these can address any level of concern, three in particular are highlighted as the most important:

- **The Person:** facework engaged with the primary aim of affecting self or other (building or threatening a person’s face being the primary goal of interaction).

- **The Relationship:** facework strategies are engaged to affect the relationship on some level (build or maintain it).

- **The System:** facework strategies are aimed at a broader macro-level such as the community, nation or family network.

2) Scope of action takes into consideration the view that interaction takes place at several levels, with responses not simply targeting the other person, or the relationship. But that an individual’s actions may have profound implications for others, and the wider context itself, thus individuals must be aware of this and act accordingly.

(Penman, 1990: 16).

Penman (1990) adopts the view that facework can be achieved without politeness and can equate to strategic aggression (Archer, 2011: 3). Penman’s (1990) model consists of four general facework strategies, each of which differ in respect to their degree of (in)directness, and also the extent to which they reflect contempt or respect:

- **Depreciate (and therefore) Aggravating:** face of self/other is enacted in a direct unambiguous manner.

- **Threatening:** brought about by indirect strategies indicating some degree of contempt or lack of respect.

- **Protecting:** brought about by indirect strategies indicating some degree of respect.

- **Mitigating/Enhancing:** brought about directly by politeness and other strategies that indicate respect.

(Penman, 1990: 21).

Unlike many designs, this framework allows for the strategies to be mutually overlapping and simultaneously operational, to account for occasions when individuals
may have multiple facework goals. While the argument that facework can be aggravating as well as enhancing is a familiar one amongst general impoliteness literature (for example, Bousfield, 2008), Penman's (1990) approach is one of the few that is flexible enough to be applied to the real-time unfolding of events of live data, and can account for the multiple goals that interactants sometimes have.

This highlights the strength of Penman’s approach, as her four strategies mutually overlap, and are simultaneously operational, so they can account for those occasions when an individual(s) may have multiple facework goals. An example of this can be found in the courtroom during cross-examination, where there may be occasions when questions impose both on the other’s negative face by asking for factual information, but also on their positive face, by covertly implying non-cooperation and deceitful behaviour (Penman, 1990: 25). In this situation, witnesses and defendants are often forced to deflect such insinuations, while simultaneously providing the answers to questions set before them. The framework in the table below illustrates the visualisation of the differential means by which these strategies may be undertaken:

**Table 1: Description of Facework Micro-Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Face</th>
<th>Mitigate/Enhance</th>
<th>Protect</th>
<th>Threaten</th>
<th>Aggravate/Depreciate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OTHER Negative</td>
<td>Direct Answer with extension</td>
<td>Direct maximally efficient answer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apologise for infringement.</td>
<td>Open direct question.</td>
<td>Closed direct question.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a systematic framework is particularly useful as the strategy types outlined within the overall facework concept take into consideration factors such as power, distance, culture and context, and are demonstrative of the influence of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) work which Penman (1990) acknowledges, whilst also stating that her aim was to extend their approach. Indeed, the combination of Penman's (1990) and Culpeper's (1996; 2003; 2005; 2011) frameworks (see Section 3.6 onwards) allows for a dual appreciation of facework, working from a focus on the actions of the interlocutors taking part and their individuated roles within that macro- or micro-context. This is where the originality of the current study comes into play, as facework viewed from this perspective lends itself to linking with PCT by allowing the theoretical space to consider the personal psychology behind each of the individual's facework. This begins
from the first initiation of the conversation to the response given to it, as each strategy can align itself to a certain train of intention, thought and motivation behind the linguistic performance (while it is always difficult to link facework to intention, it can be argued that it is possible to do so by looking at self-presentation and impression management). Dependant on the context (and this study's macro-level analyses), this can lead us back to questioning what that particular strategy and performance mean, to and for that individual within that context. Once again, this leads us back to how that individual participates in the macro-level processes that dominate that interactional environment, something that already appears to support a circuitous directionality between the macro- and micro-levels.

Culpeper (1996; 2003) also takes an innovative multi-perspective approach towards face. Like Penman (1990), Culpeper’s early work derives a framework from Brown and Levinson (1987) that considers the speaker, hearer and context, interpreting the strategies as they unfold in the real-time communicative event. In addition, this is supported by Penman (1990), who also takes the view that face can have multiple agendas being both enhancing to and damaging towards the goals of the speaker, and having implication upon how the hearers in that given context perceive what is said. Culpeper’s (1990; 1996) framework explores the possibility of not just an extension to Brown and Levinson's (1987) work, but the existence of a parallel structure (Culpeper et al., 2003: 154). Impoliteness strategies for Culpeper are opposite in terms of orientation to face (i.e. instead of maintaining or enhancing face, they are designed to attack face), with 'hurt' being achieved by:

a) conveying that the addressee is not liked and does not belong (positive aggravation);

b) interfering with the addressee's freedom of action (negative aggravation).
For the purposes of my analysis, I will begin by detailing Culpeper’s (1996; 2003; 2005; 2011) model of impoliteness, as it has evolved, and as it explains the different types of face-attack (which may be observed in the documentary films I will be analysing). This will be pertinent with regards to a discussion of an individual’s intention within the contextual background of the interaction, and can later be expanded upon by considering it in relation to Spencer-Oatey’s (2002) concept of face.

In the next section, and before this discussion commences, it is useful to break down the various processes in which Culpeper’s framework has developed, beginning with his original 1996 model.

3.6 Culpeper (1996) Model of Impoliteness

Culpeper’s (1996) study of impoliteness was one of the first systematic studies to address the way offence can be communicated. Inspired by the politeness strategies of Brown and Levinson (1987), yet with an opposing perspective, he attempted to show how impoliteness could be communicated via a series of linguistic strategies that, if used, could result in damage to a person’s negative or positive face, and damage what Culpeper (1996) differentially named positive and negative ‘impoliteness’.

According to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) original definition, positive politeness was indicative of an approach-based strategy which “...anointed the face of the addressee by indicating that in some respect the speaker (S) wants the hearer's (H) wants… (e.g. by being treated as a member of an in-group, or where their individual personality traits are known and liked)” (70).

As an impoliteness strategy, however, it has the opposite orientation, and can signal intentional damage to the addressee's positive face wants. Culpeper (1996: 357) emphasises this, by listing the following ways such damage can be achieved:
3.6.1 Positive Impoliteness Strategies

Ignore and snub the other - fail to acknowledge the other’s presence.

Exclude the other from an activity.

Disassociate from the other - for example deny association or common ground with the other; avoid sitting together.

Be disinterested, unconcerned, and unsympathetic.

Use inappropriate identity markers - for example use title and surname when a close relationship is had, or a nickname when a distant relationship exists.

Use obscure or secretive language- for example mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target.

Seek disagreement - select a sensitive topic.

Make the other feel uncomfortable - for example, do not avoid silence, joke or use small talk.

Use taboo words - swear or use abusive or profane language.

Call the other names - use derogatory nominations.

In addition to this expansion of Brown and Levinson's (1987: 70) original theory, the notion of negative impoliteness was also constructed, which, rather than orientating towards upholding an addressee's negative face (i.e. the desire that every competent adult member’s actions be unimpeded by others), had its impolite orientation directed towards damaging those wants. According to Culpeper's definition (1996: 385), this could be achieved through the following strategies:

3.6.2 Negative Impoliteness Strategies

Frighten - install a belief that the action detrimental to the other will occur.

Condescend, scorn or ridicule - emphasise your relative power. Be contemptuous. Do not treat others seriously. Belittle the other (e.g. use diminutives).
In addition to the above strategies, Culpeper (1996: 356) also lists the strategies of sarcasm or mock politeness, whereby the face threatening attack is performed with the use of insincerity, or with positive politeness strategies that remain only 'surface realisations', as well as ones which involve the deliberate 'withholding of politeness' (1996: 357). These strategies are particularly offensive if politeness was expected.

However, the subject that has caused the most contention between scholars (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Culpeper 1996) has been the performance of the FTA as bald-on-record (most direct way of saying something), specifically when it is performed with redressive (an apologetic) action, as it is only then that one can get a demonstration of either positive or negative politeness. If the FTA is performed purely bald-on-record, the individual is being very direct, not using any overt politeness marker (without redressive action), although it may not necessarily appear as rude, as in cases of emergency its direct quality can be of benefit to the hearer, or indicate a level of familiarity, for example, an invitation to ‘Come in, sit down, and have a biscuit’, etc.

Such discrepancy can indicate that in some specific circumstances face issues can be disregarded, as in cases of emergency (where directives are imperative towards potentially life-saving actions), and face concerns are thought to be minimal and can be disregarded. These instances can be exemplified by situations in which the offer, request or suggestion is obviously in the hearer's interest, and also in situations where there may be such a social power imbalance (between the speaker and the hearer), that the speaker does not risk losing his own face by damaging that of the hearer (Brown &
Levinson, 1987: 69). Yet, it is important to note that, for these authors, there is no intention on the part of the speaker to offend the hearer. As an impoliteness strategy then, bald-on-record for Culpeper (1996) constitutes a deliberate face threatening attack being “performed in a direct, clear and unambiguous concise way in circumstances where face is neither irrelevant nor minimised” (356).

### 3.7 Culpeper et al.’s (2003) and Culpeper's (2005) Model of Impoliteness

Culpeper et al.’s (2003) study of impoliteness revisited and refined the 1996 framework further, by taking into consideration the notion of impoliteness within a larger sphere. Here, the investigation upheld the definition of the original strategies, yet broadened its horizon by taking into account issues such as intentionality and stress placed on the word of sentence, in order to understand what sort of impact they could have on its communication, interpretation and understanding. As such, Culpeper et al.’s (2003) work laid the foundations for the framework to consider how impoliteness could be communicated, understood and reacted to by a hearer within prolonged stretches of discourse.

These issues of context and prosody were again taken up in Culpeper's later (2005) paper, which considered additional elements alongside the model. This notion of intentionality proved crucial for the expansion of his theory beyond rigid boundaries, as its consideration of the way impoliteness can be deployed creatively via sarcasm, mimicry or implicature (Grice, 1975) moved away from Brown and Levinson's original super-strategies and towards Spencer-Oatey's (2002) more contextually and culturally sensitive model of face.
While the impoliteness strategies remained the same, there came the addition of 'off-record impoliteness', where the face threatening act is performed via means of implicature in a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others. In order to emphasise the importance of intention when engaging in impoliteness, it is worth firstly stating what impoliteness is not. Culpeper's revised definition stands as:

Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face-attack intentionally, or (2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behaviour as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2)

(Culpeper, 2005: 38).

This suggests that impoliteness can be communicated regardless of speaker intention. Yet, as it is now accepted that the addressee is also able to 'construct' behaviour as impolite, it becomes increasingly apparent that speaker intentionality is not the pivotal factor in order for impoliteness to be produced. Instead, it could be argued that impoliteness is a two-way negotiated behaviour, whose uptake relies upon many factors within the social exchange. Indeed, Culpeper's (2005) paper demonstrates that even when the speaker was unintentionally offensive, damage to the addressee's face could still occur, which suggests that it is in fact both the role of the hearer and speaker that are crucial when considering the impoliteness communication and its receipt (i.e. what the speaker intends and what the hearer infers from what the speaker does or does not say). Here, what is key is the construction and perception of impoliteness, as well as the addressee's understanding of what they consider to be impolite, in addition to being able to understand the speaker’s intention within the discourse at that time. This again links to Kelly's (1951) Personal Construct Theory (PCT), as both face and PCT recognise the crucial contribution personal constructions have towards understanding the notion of face and identity within communication. This is something this paper
endeavours to further understand via an examination of how linguistic facework, and an individual’s psychological personal constructs, emerge and/or interact in the process of interaction. Although we do not experience situations in identical ways, or form identical personal constructs from them, we are still able to draw upon shared cultural norms, which we have constructed and acquired socially and culturally.

### 3.8 Culpeper's (2011) Model of Impoliteness

In his latest work on impoliteness, Culpeper (2011) reconsiders the definitional aspects of linguistic offence, with impoliteness now constituting:

… a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts, sustained by expectations, desire and beliefs about social organisation, including how one person or group's identities are mediated by others in interaction. Behaviours are considered impolite when they conflict with how one expects them to be, or how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be. Various factors can exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behaviour to be strongly intentional or not.

(Culpeper, 2011: 23).

What stands out within this redefinition is the crucial role of back-grounding intention, and what it contributes in communicating offence. Within this revision, Culpeper (2011) now states that “an understanding of impoliteness does not depend upon the recognition of intentions”, but rather stands as a possible 'effect' of communication, or risk within it, while also emphasising that “whether one understands a behaviour to be strongly intentional or not” remains important. This then highlights a caveat within the whole concept of impoliteness that has been recognised for some time, suggesting that there is no finite definition of impoliteness. This could always remain the case if we do not begin to expand our investigative ventures towards exploring and somehow
unpicking acts of impoliteness within and through the lens of the whole person. One way of doing this would be to focus upon the individual's personal constructs which make them view, perceive or understand a speaker’s linguistic comment or an interactive dialogue as a whole, as being loaded with some offensive remark.

It must be stressed that such a phenomenon does not simply arise from any one particular strategy or remark, but is highly dependent upon context, and also the way in which some strategies are mixed, operating as multifunctional strategies as articulated by Penman (1990). However, one of the main critical appraisals of Culpeper's (1996) framework has highlighted a caveat relating to its applicability to sequential discourse, particularly as to how it can be applied to the gradual unfolding of discourse in interaction. With this in mind, it would be pertinent to suggest that the framework is viewed and used in conjunction with Penman’s (1990), as her flexible, and dynamic perspective of facework in interaction, and its sequential unfolding would lend much needed flexibility to Culpeper’s strategies, and equally be aided by refining its own fluidity by utilising some of Culpeper's rigidity relating to whether the strategies constitute negative or positive attacks Bousfield, 2008).

3.9 Impression Management: Social Value Framework (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) and Value Constructs (Simon, 2004)

The issue of Impression Management has been consistently identified as an integral part of human social interaction, working on the basis that people desire to give positive/negative impressions of themselves to others by complying with socially-condoned attitudes and values (Bilbow, 1997). Research has established that this can be done in a variety of ways, using linguistic and/or non-verbal behaviours. People generally smile, laugh and orientate themselves in a positive manner at social gatherings
in the hope of being liked (San Hoilen & Fiske, 2012), which includes showing appreciation of that person’s group contributions mentioning accolades and communicating shared group values and attitudes in order to be respected. As Nezlek, Schutz and Sellin’s (2007) study into the first impressions people make upon one another finds, the top two impressions individuals seek to relate is warmth and competence, as people self-reported as valuing these dimensions the most when making judgements about others (Fiske et al., 2007).

Such Impression Management (IM) is a social psychological (rather than specifically linguistic) phenomenon, which has been the subject of a considerable body of research since the term was coined in 1959 by Erving Goffman in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (see Bilbow, 1996; 1997). According to Goffman, IM is a matter of:

the way in which the individual presents himself and his activity to others, the way in which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, and the kind of things he may or may not do while sustaining his performance before them.

(Goffman, 1959: Preface).

The dramaturgical term IM has a core focus on people’s conscious attempts to manage impressions of themselves using various strategies available to them, from material items to their self-presentation, as well as the more refined and tacit reading and complicity towards the values a particular macro-activity set-up may hold (Bilbow, 1996; 1997). In his micro-sociological analyses of social interaction, Goffman (1959) highlighted that IM involves “individuals directly attending to what each other says and does for a particular segment of time”, rather than simply being an unconscious and unplanned process (Giddens, 1991:115). That is to say, for Goffman, IM involves individuals using their physiological and linguistic expressions to make impressions on
their audience, with the implication that the audience will seek to decode these expressions, evaluate and understand them according to, or as prescribed by, the socially acceptable 'norms', the 'activity set-up' or the context they are operating within. For Goffman (1959), however, managing impressions not only involves creating a 'front' but also involves concealment, as both elements highlight situations where the impressions created may not align with socially acceptable 'norms'. The underlying framework of Goffman's theory includes individuals providing information through discursive interaction, and also projecting expressive messages about themselves via physiological behaviours. This includes the ability of individuals to capably monitor others; to evaluate whether they choose to accept or reject the values of others; to align themselves with a group membership, or to prefer their individuality to be salient, and ultimately controlling information about themselves (Smith, 1989). According to Schegloff (1997), a strong emotional driver of Goffman's IM concept is embarrassment, as individuals anticipate potential embarrassment and present the front they believe their audience wishes to see. This is done by formulating and enacting an impression they wish to convey, by controlling their expressiveness, possibly conveying misinformation, and therefore, attempting to control how their audience reacts to the impression expressed through their performance (Atkins et al., 2013). From this perspective, it would appear that IM is a wholly conscious, planned and strategic endeavour. Yet, more recent research has highlighted the view that IM consists of both conscious and unconscious activity. Schlenker and Weigold (1992) state that IM is a matter of those activities whereby “people attempt to regulate [and] control, consciously and sometimes without awareness, the information they present to audiences, particularly information about themselves”. Similarly, Bilbow (1996), in his study of the relationship between spoken discourse and IM in business meetings,
describes IM-related discourse as “those language behaviours, intentional or unintentional, which create and maintain impressions with or without a conscious purpose” (4). IM is also a two-part phenomenon involving:

1) The individual performing in particular ways

2) An audience reacting in a particular way to the individual’s performance.

Bilbow (1996) terms these processes, 'projection' and 'attribution', which can either resonate (in accordance with the impression the speaker believes themselves to be projecting) or be discordant (at odds with the speaker’s preferred image).

In her perspective of face within interaction, Spencer-Oatey (2002) maintains that linguistic politeness should be viewed as just one of the resources available for managing relations, and emphasises that it should be studied within the situated psychosocial context in which it occurs, with investigations into impoliteness conducted separately. This is concurrent with Atkins et al.’s (2013) study, which indicates inadequacies in macro-functional reporting, and has encouraged the development of private disclosure channels and micro-level reporting. Roberts et al. (2006) explore private financial reporting to gauge the extent to which one-to-one meetings shape executive subjectivity, by examining levels of anxiety, preceding preparations, self-disciplinary effects and most importantly “careful construction of the corporate self” (286). His findings indicate that private rather than group reporting forces executives to focus more on constructing an image of what the self 'should' be, in other words, an image of the fulfilment of the executive self in the approving gaze of the investor which may involve a “time consuming investment in theatrical presentation” (Roberts et al., 2006: 284). Roberts et al. (2006) also identifies that events where executives are called into account by their shareholders suggest that accountability shapes identity due to the
way in which it is framed by the context, impacting on the individual’s self-understanding and projection as an accountable subject (Messner, 2009). Such accountability through linguistic manipulation (written or spoken) is also viewed as an individualising process involving “securing the self in others' eyes” (Roberts et al., 2006: 965). Given such findings, Spencer-Oatey (2002) maintains that it is therefore important for pragmatics to consider the fundamental motivational concerns underlying the management of relations.

This is in accordance with Matsumoto's (2008) theory that “what is of primary concern... is not his/her acceptance by others, but rather acknowledgement and maintenance of their relative position... rather than a focus on preservation of an individuals' proper territory governing all social interaction” (405). Supporting this, Mao's (1994) findings highlight that two competing forces shape and motivate our interactional behaviour: the ideal social identity and the ideal individual autonomy. The ideal social identity motivates members of a community to associate themselves with each other, cultivating a sense of homogeneity, while the ideal individual autonomy motivates members to preserve their freedom of action, marking separate and inviolable space (Spencer-Oatey, 2002). Mao (1994) labels the preference for one over the other as 'relative-face orientation,' indicating that the distinction corresponds to the independent and intra-dependent construals of self. However, as Spencer-Oatey (2002) notes, it may be invalid to assume that such dimensions have universal valances, rather that in different circumstances, different options on the continuum may be favoured.

A commonality among early theorists’ definitions of face was the narrow concept of 'self' (Goffman, 1972; Brown & Levinson, 1987) emphasising its individual and personal scope. Later research by Gao (1996), however, relates face closely with 'selfhood' as both a personal and collective concern. Equally, Spencer-Oatey (2000), in a
study of sino-British business meetings, found that during one delegation visit both British and Chinese business people seemed to orientate towards each other in terms of group, rather than the individual needs and concerns, when relationships (particularly face issues) arose during the visit. This has been followed by further study into the controversy relating to the narrow focus on the personal/individual scope of face, as to whether face acts are personally orientated (to speaker and hearer as individual participants), whether it is group orientated (orientated to the speaker and hearer as group representatives), or whether it is a mixture of the two (Spencer-Oatey, 2002: 2007). As Lorenzo-Dus (2009) notes, there is a distinct importance in analysing detailed stretches of talk beyond the speech act level, as her findings demonstrate that rapport and IM are not solely realised through discrete utterances. Rather, they are demonstrated via stretches of discourse during which interactants dynamically produce and interpret any type of (non-)verbal behaviour as transgressive or otherwise, via the norms of appropriateness of the relative context of interaction (Mills, 2002). According to research, it is a common feature of interaction that people strive to appear warm or competent by displaying certain behaviours in interaction that are likely to elicit positive responses, evaluations, and attributions from others (Schlenker & Pontari, 1973), with the top two impressions people seek to relay being warmth and compassion (Nezlek, Schutz & Sellin, 2007), with Peeters and Lieven’s (2006) demonstrating that the warmth dimension reflects traits related to other-profitable intent such as friendliness, communion, morality and trustworthiness, and is a judgement often made before that of competency.

Early research by Goffman (1959) found that people strive to appear warm or competent by displaying certain behaviours that are likely to elicit these attributions from others. In other words, they engage in IM. Furthermore, when people want to
appear warm, they tend to agree, compliment, perform favours and encourage others to talk (Godfrey et al., 1986, see Peeters & Lieven’s, 2006). In a series of studies by Yzerbyte, Keryvn and Judd (2005), findings demonstrated that people form inferences about both warmth and competence even when they have information about only one dimension. In their investigation, participants learned about two fictive groups that differed in warmth and competence (one group was described as high in one dimension, and the other low in the same dimension). Participants also received information about the un-manipulated dimension as well. Specifically, they saw the high-competence group as less warm than the low-competence group, and the high-warmth group as less competent than the low-warmth group. This compensatory effect (Son-Holoienn & Fiske, 2013) also manifests itself in behavioural confirmation in Kervyn et al.’s, (2009, see Son-Holoien & Fiske, 2012) study on two similar fictive high and low warmth or competence groups where, consistent with the compensation effect, participants preferred to ask questions that were low on the un-manipulated dimension to members of the high group, and questions that were high on the un-manipulated dimension to members of the low group. Such findings have led to the establishment of the Stereotype Content Model (Cuddy et al., 2008, see Son-Holoien & Fiske, 2012), whereby some groups are evaluated as uniformly positive or negative on these two dimensions, with majority social groups being characterised by highly ambivalent stereotypes.

Given that findings appear to indicate a trade-off between warmth and competence in impression formation, research also suggests compensation in IM, whereby individuals become overly critical (projecting low warmth) when they want to appear highly competent (Gibson & Oberlander, 2008). Although criticism may signal intelligence, it also entails being unfriendly or disagreeable (San-Holoien & Fiske,
Gibson & Oberlander’s (2008, see Son-Holoien & Fiske, 2013) study provided initial evidence that people act less warmly through hyper-criticism when they want to appear competent. Participants given the goal of appearing smart by having to interact with a doctoral candidate or professor became more critical of the object under discussion. Furthermore, the same group were more likely to choose a discussion topic that fostered disagreement with their interaction partner compared with participants in the control condition. Equally, evidence has shown that people downplay their competence when they want to appear likeable. Leary (1996) found the most common reason to 'play dumb' is to increase one’s desirability and relational value to someone who might be threatened by competence.

While there is a wealth of literature demonstrating how facework can be used by individuals to promote and consolidate group membership, and a sense of belonging (San-Hoilen & Fiske, 2013), strong evidence exists of the concepts used by individuals to assert their individual rights, agency, and singular beliefs that reject macro-societal conventions. Here, the issue of the intentionality of the speaker is brought under scrutiny again, and remains a hotly debated topic within facework literature. Recent work by Archer (2008; 2011; 2015), which develops Goffman's intentional level of face threat, shows that the crucial method of distinguishing impoliteness is the intent of the speaker (S), namely whether it is the primary intent of the speaker to cause face damage (Goffman, 1967), or whether the intent to inflict face damage is not the primary intent (as distinguished from other acts of strategic verbal aggression). This connection between im/politeness and intention has been discussed by Culpeper (2008; 2011) and Terkourafi (2005), where the former in particular has highlighted the shortcomings of classic politeness theories, which "tend to focus on speaker intentions as reconstructed faithfully by the hearer (ignoring the co-construction of meanings in the interactions"
between speaker and hearer), and Terkourafi’s (2005) assertion that it is the perception of intentions, rather than the intentions themselves, which constitutes the crucial factor in the evaluation of a potential face-attack (Culpeper, 2008: 32).

Specifically according to Culpeper (2005: 39), the notion of intention is of central importance to any communicative act, as it helps to exclude any by-products such as accidental and incidental types of face threat. This relates back to Grice's (1989) distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural meaning’. For linguistic utterances to have non-natural meaning they must not be uttered with the deliberate intention of inducing a certain belief, but rather “the utterer must have intended the audience to recognize the intention behind the utterance” (Grice, 1989: 217). Impoliteness has two layers (Culpeper, 2005: 37): the offensive information being expressed by the utterance, and the information that that information is being expressed intentionally (something which can only be inferred through the communicative act itself). A succinct definition is proposed by Tracy and Tracy (1998), when they state that “[w]e define face attacks as communicative acts perceived by members of a social community (and often intended by speakers), to be purposefully offensive” (227). Like Culpeper (2005), Tracy and Tracy refer to Goffman (1967), who relates such face-threats to cases where, “the offending person may appear to have acted maliciously and spitefully with the intention of causing open insult” (1967: 14). I will be raising this point later during my analysis, as it may turn out to be a potential issue for this research, given the nature of the topic, and the highly charged interactional environments the communicative acts take place within.

Indeed, evidence for the use of facework to resist macro-influences, and assert individual agency can be found in the current body of literature. In Haworth's (2006: 752) paper on the interviews of Harold Shipman, she identified 'counter-questions' as
one of many strategies employed by the defendant to resist hierarchal power. Specifically, Shipman challenged the position of the questioning police officer by orientating to the expected format of the transaction, 'requesting permission to speak', while simultaneously breaching the power hierarchy by continuing to speak without acknowledged permission. He also interrupted the officers before they were allowed to complete their subsequent turns, and occasionally forced them into the role of responder by criticising their institutional status as interrogators, while also interrogating them as to the nature of their questions' appropriateness and subsequent relevance to the enquiry. Furthermore, Shipman also used his institutional and professional status to subvert the authority of the officers, particularly when he 'guessed' the question they intended to ask, both correcting and highlighting their apparent lack of knowledge about the laws of prescribing drugs to patients. This culminated in the illustration of his lack of compliance, as it acted to provide information that added to the fluidity and clarity of the exchange, while simultaneously acting to subtly direct the nature of the questioning, thus mitigating the challenges that the questions posed pertaining to his professional conduct. This is further demonstrated in Shipman's pre-empting of the officers’ questions, which acts to both challenge the officers' role as interviewers, by selecting the way the question is asked, but also indicates that such ability to 'pre-empt' demonstrates that he is more than a match for their inadequate police questioning (Drew & Heritage, 1992: 50).

These examples lend considerable support to the idea that, although 'starting positions' within such contexts are fixed, with representatives of the macro-environment in overall control, speakers always have the ability to attempt to resist that control. Shipman, in particular, used his institutional role as a GP to bolster his discursively weaker position, and place himself on more of an equal footing with the
questioners (Haworth, 2006: 755). Such use of his professional affiliation supports Block's (2013: 19) theory of identity inscriptions, which refers to the different subjectivities and subject positions speakers inhabit or have ascribed to them, within particular social, historical, and cultural contexts (Block, 2013). This enables individuals to shape “the way in which the subject presents and represents themself discursively, psychologically, culturally and socially through the use of symbolic systems” (Kramsch, 2009: 10).

This, in turn, is supported by a further theoretical framework, closely linked to Kelly's (1957) PCT, which expands upon the individual agentive reasoning behind the public performance, and an individual’s core belief system. Specifically, Simon's (2004) self-aspect model of identity proposes that a person’s self-concept comprises self-beliefs about their own attributes and characteristics from their personality, ability and physicality to group memberships, and posits four features as key to how individuals consciously and subconsciously perceive, perform and evaluate their self-aspects:

- **Valence**: degree of attraction, negativity, neutrality one feels towards a given self-aspect.
- **Centrality**: extent to which that self-aspects is crucial or a peripheral defining factor to our sense of self.
- **Currency**: refers to time judgements regarding self-aspects (some attributes refer to our present, past and future senses of self).
- **Actuality**: the distinction between ideal and actual characteristics, what we are like in reality and what we strive or think we ought to be.

(Simon, 2004: 7)

Many psychological theories of identity typically distinguish between personal (individual) and social (group/collective) identities, and while certain characteristics
have more 'collective potential' than others (such as sex and ethnicity), Simon (2004) highlights that much of it depends upon how people experience a given self-aspect. This appears succinct with the work from previous studies (San Hoilen & Fiske, 2013), which highlights how different attributes become positively or negatively valued by individuals dependent on the context, and how the dynamics of the interaction vary. In addition, and following the holistic method Spencer-Oatey (2007) used in her seminal paper, Simon's (2004) work can be viewed in correlation with that of Schwartz and Bardi's (2001) work on eliciting cross-cultural value constructs. As they also note, the basic function of social values is to motivate and control the behaviour of group members, with two mechanisms in particular being critical:

1. Social actors (leader, interaction partners, etc.) invoke values to define particular behaviours as socially appropriate to justify their demands on others, and elicit desired behaviours;

2. Values serve as internalised guides for individuals; they relieve the group of the necessity of constant social control. Value transmission, acquisition and internalisation occurs as individuals adapt to the everyday customs, practises, norms and scripts they encounter. Through modelling, reinforcement and explicit verbal teaching, socialisers (un)consciously seeks to instil values that promote group survival and prosperity

(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001: 51)

Based on this theory, Schwartz and Bardi's (2001) investigation refined the description of the social value framework (described in Table 3.9.1 below) as:

[delineating]…desirable, trans-situational goals (value constructs) that vary in importance, and serve as a set of guiding principles in people's lives, which are distinguishable by the type of motivational goals they express

(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001: 4)

Table 2: Social Value Framework (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Construct</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Illustrative Component Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources</td>
<td>Social power, authority, wealth, preservation of public image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards</td>
<td>Success, competence, ambition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself</td>
<td>Self-indulgence, pleasure, enjoyment of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life</td>
<td>Variety, daring, excitement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring</td>
<td>Freedom, independence, curiosity, creativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of people and nature</td>
<td>Equality, harmony, justice, care for the environment, broad-mindedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact</td>
<td>Helpfulness, loyalty, responsibility, forgiveness, honesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self</td>
<td>Humility, respect for tradition, devoutness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to harm or upset others and violate social norms</td>
<td>Obedience, self-discipline, proper behaviour, respect for elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships and self</td>
<td>Health and security for the family and the nation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Their study established a pan-cultural framework of value constructs, which appear to form the baseline of social value endorsement (see above). This resulted in an apparent
consensus regarding the relative importance/unimportance of certain values, and represented a finding which led the authors to question why particular values enjoyed such widespread endorsement, while others were assigned lesser importance. Results demonstrated a strong tendency for individuals to present themselves as graced with certain qualities, particularly those valued by one's own society/group. Overall, the studies by Schwartz and Bardi (1997; 2001) demonstrate that individual differences in the importance attributed to social values reflects their unique needs, temperaments, and social experiences. However, the pan-cultural similarities in the value constructs identified in their studies reflect a shared basis of certain values in human nature, which have an adaptive function for each type of value in maintaining societies (Campbell, Sunaina & Adam 2000). Specifically Schwartz and Bardi’s results identified three requirements necessary for explaining the pan-cultural hierarchy:

1. It is most important to promote and preserve cooperative and supportive relations among members of primary groups. Without such relations, life in the group would be filled with conflict and its survival would be at risk. The critical focus of value transmission is to develop commitment to positive relations, identification with the group and loyalty to its members.

2. Positive relations are insufficient to ensure the survival and prosperity of societies, groups and individual members. However individuals must be motivated to invest the time, physical and intellectual effort needed to perform productive work, solve problems that arise during interaction and generate new ideas and solutions.

3. Some gratification of the self-orientated needs and desires of group members is also critical. Rejecting all expressions of self-orientated desires would produce individual frustration, withdrawal of investment in the group, and refusal to contribute to group goal attainment. Hence it is socially functional to also legitimise self-orientated behaviour to the extent that it does not undermine group goals

(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001: 16).

However, to use this framework as the sole method from which to analyse an individual’s value constructs and their performance in interaction would be to the
detriment of the premise that Spencer-Oatey (2007) has emphasised. Simply put, it would lack the consideration that face sensitive attributes vary from person to person, and therefore, in order to build upon this suggestion, any evaluation should be done in conjunction with Simon’s (2004) Self-Aspect of Identity Model (see Table 3.9.2 below), which analyses each value’s salience, according to what evaluative judgement it has for that particular person, within that specific context. This will be conducted before I move on to consider what Kelly’s (1951) PCT can lead us to conclude regarding why that may be the case (see Chapter 4).

Table 3: Self-Aspect of Identity Model (Simon, 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Evaluative Judgement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>Negative----Neutral----Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>Core----Peripheral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Past----Present----Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actuality</td>
<td>Actual----Ideal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now that a discussion of facework, PCT and the type of evaluative deductions that we make regarding other individual’s language use and performative behaviour in interaction has been conducted, the next chapter will involve a discussion of exactly how I intend to approach this particular study. Specifically, the next chapter will seek to disseminate how the fields of linguistics and psychology can inform each other, and work together to develop a richer understanding of the kind of dynamics that unfold in interaction, and which lead us to the reasoning we conduct regarding decisions on the types of behavioural, and linguistic responses we choose to take each time we are given the choice to take the floor in conversation.
Chapter 4

Methodology

The data chosen for this study is from two documentary films by Nick Broomfield (and co-directed by Joan Churchill), “Life and Death of a Serial Killer” in 1991, and the 2002 film, “Aileen Wuornos: The Selling of a Serial Killer”. The central focus of these films surrounded not only documenting the trial of Aileen Wuornos (including her sentencing and execution), but also chronicled a complete record of her life from her early childhood, to subsequent crimes. Using archive footage of the courtroom trials, early police and private speech events with Aileen herself, the advantage of using this particular data-set was that it provided a readily accessible source of primary footage of the courtroom interaction. In addition, it also enabled me to source an optimally complete behaviour record of Aileen within the court setting, providing this investigation with rich data material from which to look at Aileen’s facework performance, and other paralinguistic variables she employs across the time-period of her trial within the discursive space of the courtroom.

Furthermore, using a series of courtroom interactions has provided a rare opportunity to unpick a regularity in terms of Aileen’s behaviour that (thanks to the dual-analysis of facework and PCT), can be generalised as having internal coherence, rather than being viewed as a series of isolated reactions. This not only provides stronger empirical weight to any resulting evidence regarding the interface between facework and PCT, but also leaves scope for theoretical claims to be made regarding PCT and its contribution to facilitating facework performance.

The data itself provided readily available footage of Aileen’s courtroom interactions, which up until its discovery in Nick Broomfield’s films proved impossible to access.
However, it is important to note that the source of this footage (in its inclusion as part of a series of two documentaries), is likely to have had heavy editorial input applied to it and is an issue of particular importance when we consider how such footage may have been used as part of a wider framing strategy. With this in mind, what became evident during the transcription process was that footage of Aileen during her initial hearing whereby the charge is brought, her witness testimony during the examination stage of the trial, and finally her final statement upon receipt of the verdict, were not complete records of the entire interaction that took place, instead only certain subsections of these interactions were being used by the directors. In addition, any cross-examination by the prosecuting counsel was also omitted from the footage found in Broomfield’s films.

Despite this, Boyle (2005) suggests that what makes the Broomfield films so compelling, and valuable to prospective researchers, is their ability to maintain a certain level of objectivity. While the data of Aileen in court has been heavily edited by the director and thus framed for a viewing audience with a specific message to relay (namely with a heavy bias towards Aileen’s innocence and victimisation by a corrupt justice system), it is one of the few documentaries that focussed on her subjective self, breaking away from the kinds of social and media discourse that can stereotype and confine portrayals of selfhood. Instead by using Aileen’s self-presentation within the court, private speech events with Nick and testimonies from those that knew her, gave the viewing audience a more holistic impression and understanding of the woman herself.

The advantage of studying such films in light of the subject area under investigation is Wuornos’ apparent inability to present herself consistently over any sustained time-period, demonstrating the fluid dynamism of human identity in linguistic performance.
Observing her speech events across the trial period allows not only access to the differing facework and identity performance she presents within the courtroom contexts, but also leads us to the larger question of why this individual’s self-presentation fluctuates to such a noticeable degree. Finally, once this initial issue of what kind of facework Aileen is projecting has been identified, we then move on to the closing phase of the investigation, a second analysis. This secondary analysis addresses the issue of what such facework performances inform us as to what Aileen’s own PCT and value systems are, and which essentially act as the core drivers for her public facework performances. What becomes apparent during the course of Broomfield’s films, and is the catalyst for this study’s selection of the data set, is that there is no definitive Aileen Wuornos story, but one that lies instead within the ‘inter-text’ of court records, news broadcasts and documentary films as well as within Aileen herself (Ward, 2005). This readily accessible form of data offers a truly radical interpretation of Aileen, exposing the difficult, multiple presentations, meandering frustrating discourse and framing strategies surrounding her.

I initially began my analysis of the data by watching Broomfield’s two documentaries (sourced from publicly available DVD’s and totalling three hours of footage), before isolating three state-filmed courtroom excerpts from Nick’s private interviews with Aileen and transcribing them. My approach to the transcript was to use an ‘open’ method (Jenks, 2001:12), whereby I transcribed the talk and interaction as it unfolded in the excerpt, with every feature of the interaction being transcribed in order to fully capture what was seen and heard in the data recording (see Table 3 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Transcript Conventions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transcript Conventions Used</td>
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The aim of transcribing the data using this approach was to approach the interaction with as little analytic prejudice as possible and ensure (when I came to the data analysis), a holistic appreciation of the interaction and narrative, with as little preconception as to what wasn’t or was important in the data was given (Joseph Jenks, 2011: 12). The attention to a higher level of detail afforded by this method, also provides the opportunity for other researchers when retrospectively looking at this investigation once published, to discover potentially important issues and themes that were overlooked by myself as the original transcriber/ researcher, that cannot be afforded by a closed method of transcription whereby data is transcribed according to a set of predetermined investigatory aims.

In addition, I approached the transcription process under the conversation analysis (CA) convention as I wanted to also pay attention to the micro-aspects of talk and interaction, specifically how Aileen projected her speakership, managed turn-taking and conducted and delivered her speech. However, within this, I chose to omit certain elements of CA convention such as annotating the phonetic aspects of speech, and specific time lengths of pauses due to the level of analysis I wished to give to other micro-social aspects of the interaction (such as the paralinguistic features used by interlocutors), that I felt might lend a deeper understanding as to Aileen’s own personal constructions of the scenario that led to her linguistic behaviour.
In order to provide the reader with a sense of context concerning the data selection and transcripts analysed, I will now provide a brief description of the 3 extracts I have used in terms of activity types and participants involved within the context of the American judicial system. Excerpt 1 is a pre-trial motion referred to as an Arraignment in the American legal system. This stage constitutes the first step in a criminal case in which the charges against the defendant are formally read before a judge, which must take place 48 hours after an individual is arrested. The purpose of the arraignment is firstly to protect the defendant’s human rights by formally informing them of the charge(s) against them, advising the defendant of the right to counsel, providing them (if necessary) with a defence team, and finally providing them with a written copy of the accusation. At the arraignment the defendant is required to answer a series of questions regarding their identity and background in an oral affirmation and ‘swearing in’ (Fredrick et al, 2013), before either confirming or disconfirming that they understand the nature of the charges brought against them, and entering a formal plea of guilty, not guilty or no contest. In terms of Activity Type, the dialogue expected in such a scenario is one of a simple closed question/answer binary, whereby the defendant is expected to respond with basic ‘yes/no’ confirmatory or non-confirmatory responses. Excerpt 2 occurs during the main part of the trial, in what is known as the jury trial period, and Examination-in-Chief (Abrams & Beale, 2010). Specifically, Broomfield’s excerpt from this interaction comes during the direct-examination of Aileen by her defence team, whereby she is given the opportunity to present her own version of the facts in a non-challenging manner (Hale, 2004). Whilst cross-examination favours the promotion of leading questions to try and discredit the witness’s version of the truth, direct-examination disallows this practice, because it concentrates on a less hostile approach entitling the witness to put across their version of events for the overhearing jury.
Hypothetically, this is meant to ensure the witness is allowed less restrictive answers and more freedom in which to respond, without being strategically led by the defence barrister building up a contrast. However, it is important to note that these more open-ended questions are still led by the defence lawyer’s chosen questions, and how that in turn occasions the response that they proceed to give (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; O’Barr, 1982). As Miller Ryder and Vigil state, in any questioning procedure regardless of whether it is direct or cross-examination, “is not about a witness testifying... it is about the lawyer eliciting the desired testimony from the witness”, (Miller et al., 2001. p109).

Finally, Excerpt 3 comprises of an excerpt from the final stage of the jury trial, the sentencing reading and post-trial process. After an agreed verdict is reached, the judge notifies the lawyers, defendant and everyone present (including United States Marshalls who are typically present at this stage to protect the judge and prosecutors from any potential harm), of the final sentence. If the defendant is convicted, court protocol (and protection of human rights), dictates that the judge must inform the defendant and their defence team of post-trial motions such as their right to appeal the conviction, motion for a new trial or judgement of acquittal (Fredrick et al, 2013).

Due to the fact that the data selection and access was constrained by its elicitation from a documentary source (to be discussed within the Ethics subsection of this chapter), the analysis of the excerpts was conducted by way of a ‘case study’. The case study approach is widely recognised as particularly useful analytic method when there is a need to obtain an in-depth appreciation of an issue or phenomenon of interest in its natural real-life context (Crowe et al., 2011). For this reason, it was felt that for a truly comprehensive study of the relationship between PCT and facework, and given the data sampled that such a methodology would be best-suited towards an investigation of the kind proposed for this study.
Furthermore, according to Yin (1994) case studies can be used to explain, describe or explore issues in the everyday context in which they occur. These can, for example, help to understand and explain causal links and pathways between two pre-existing phenomena in a ‘naturalistic’ manner (Crowe et al., 2011), in contrast to the experimental designs, which seek to test a specific hypothesis through deliberately manipulating the environment. With this in mind, the case study lends itself well to capturing information on more explanatory ‘how’, ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions. In addition, the method can also offer additional insights into the kinds of relations existing between phenomena, their directionality and how one variable feeds into the other, which in turn can help develop and refine theory and generate a broader analytic understanding of the issues under scrutiny. According to Zainal (2007), through case study methods a researcher is able to go beyond quantitative statistical results and understand the behavioural conditions through the actor’s perspective (Zainal, 2007:1), explaining both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction and analysis of situations under investigation. This study, given its interest in PCT and ultimately the ‘actor’s perspective’, lends itself well to investigating an issue in which a holistic study of an individual’s interactive behaviour within their environment is crucial towards developing a thorough understanding between the relationship between PCT and facework.

In some case studies (such as the one proposed by this study), an in-depth longitudinal examination of a series of short single cases or event are used. The benefits of such an analysis are that a longitudinal study or small data set provides a systematic way of observing events, collecting data, analysing data and reporting findings resulting in a unique way of observing a naturally occurring phenomenon which exists in a set of data (Yin, 1984), and which yields more information about the micro (rather than macro),
level of analysis that data from quantitative studies would otherwise have access to, and is therefore able to explore important factors within results that other analysis types may fail to observe. Another benefit of this approach is the flexibility of the case study, as while the method has been criticised for its inability to generalise scientific results due to the often-small data set it accesses, it atones for this in its ability to be triangulated with other methods of analysis. For example, this study uses a dual-analytic method combining firstly with facework, and secondly with PCT, in order to ensure grounded empirical validity and robustness of results and their further theoretical implications.

Overall, case studies are becoming a more popular method and approach to linguistic research, as researchers are beginning to appreciate more holistic and naturalistic approaches to investigatory studies (Underwood, 2011). Similarly, Tracy and Baratz (1994) have argued that the case study approach, with its data-driven emphasis, is less likely to result in oversimplifications and more likely to produce in depth understanding of the facework strategies operating in a given context (1994:303). Rather than being primarily theory-driven, the investigative procedures are informed by ‘theoretically influenced induction’ (Tracy and Baratz, 1994:294). This approach, I suggest, may avoid some of the methodological weaknesses which tend to accompany quantitative research methodologies. Tannen, in her discussion of the relativity (and hence ambiguity) of linguistic strategies in relation to the establishment of power and solidarity, argues that linguistic form cannot in itself determine the ‘true’ intention or motive of an utterance since factors such as participants’ conversational and interactional styles will inevitably impact on the ‘meaning’ of any linguistic strategy (1993:173). Facework strategies and behaviours should therefore more accurately be defined as ‘a series of evaluative labels that people attach to behaviour, as a result of a
subjective reading of a situation, and response, with the hearer applying a facework evaluative judgment based upon their understanding of that behaviour’s social appropriateness’ (Spencer-Oatey, 2005:96). With this in mind, it is therefore pertinent that a case study is used within this investigation due to the dual process of analysing the facework displayed, and the kind of PCT Aileen demonstrates, as it is important that the two issues are evaluated separately before any possible link between the two issues can be analysed. This may avoid two potential pitfalls: that of the researcher imposing his own interpretation on the interlocutors’ utterances (such as their own personal constructs of the situation), and that of focusing on the face of the hearer (other-directed politeness), to the neglect of that of the speaker (self-directed politeness) (Wood and Kroger, 1994).

4.1 Ethical Considerations within the Documentary Format.

Finally, it has been important to consider the ethical considerations inherent in a study such as this as no investigation can be said to have empirical rigour without discussing the ethical considerations inherent within utilising data from a documentary source. Recent literature on ethics and documentary identified three main ethical issues inherent within the genre; firstly, although documentarians have the right to artistic expression, media critics argue that the rights of participants, or those owning the rights of the footage used ought to be protected in the process of representation. Specifically, Gross, Katz and Ruby (2000) characterise this as a problem of ‘participant consent’, whereby ethics in this case are measured by the degree to which an ‘image maker’ discusses his/her intentions so that participants, or those with ownership rights to the footage used may decide if they are willing to consent to the project based on an informed understanding, thereby avoiding victimisation in the process (Butchard, 2006: 428). Secondly, although documentarians may be free to represent people and events, media
regulators believe that this enterprise must nevertheless remain socially responsible. Characterised as ‘an audience’s right to know’, whether a text/footage is representative of what is claims (Winston, 1988; 2000), it is the ethics of journalism that shape public expectations about integrity, fairness and ‘good taste’ in documentary (Butchard, 2006: 428). Finally, according to Butchard (2006:428-429), most critical theorists today agree that like journalism, documentary as a medium has a powerful influence upon shaping public opinion, an issue that Gross et al (2000), claims is inherent in many visual modes of knowledge production. Indeed Butchard (2006: 428-429), notes that contemporary ethical discourse in this area often serves to destabilise assumptions about the neutrality of the documentary enterprise in its visual representation of phenomena.

With this in mind and from the point of view of these central and related problems it was decided early on that data selection and analysis for this investigation would only take place upon scenes from the documentaries by Nick Broomfield, which could be assured of objectivity, specifically the neutral footage of Aileen in the courtroom; a source devoid of editorial input (with exception to its selection and inclusion in the documentary), and without any omni-present narrative voice. As Butchard (2006: 428-429) emphasises, the issue of truth in documentary is always a matter of perspective, and that truth in the confines of documentary interview, specifically, can be defined as “something in the realm of opinion, which cannot be fully accessed.” Therefore, given the nature of this investigation’s focus upon the role of PCT in human reasoning, understanding and behavioural response, and with the awareness that the researcher themselves cannot be divorced from their own PCT when analysing a phenomenon, it was especially important that the researcher themselves came from an analytic perspective as devoid of exposure to editorial bias as possible. Thus it was decided early on in the investigation to limit the selection of data to only the officially shot courtroom
footage of the trial, rather than include Aileen’s interviews with the director Nick Broomfield. Overall, the length of the data transcribed from the courtroom footage was approximately 30 minutes, with main focus being placed on three specific speech events occurring within the Arraignment, Examination-in-Chief and Final Plea.

Finally, while we have discussed the ethical issues inherent within the documentary medium and Broomfield’s films, such issues also extend to how as the researcher, I have represented Wuornos in particular ways within the public domain. The politics of voice is contentious ethical issue, and current studies have identified that research involving documentary data sources can reciprocate certain social and political ideologies and value systems that problematise their ability to provide a wholly objective analysis. As Skattebul and Newall (2018: 720) highlight, one issue that makes documentary data problematic, is that unlike other data sources the subject sample(s) used are usually not anonymous. Instead, the researcher is “submerged in the lived experience of the subject, connecting with their lives and identities.” As Mitchell (2011) notes, such involvement is a direct result of the ‘filmic devices’ used, which facilitate the ability for viewers to empathise with subjects and even provide a point of personal recognition by making use of ‘the real’.

Such an issue also raises another point of ethics, that of ‘self-care’ of the researching party. As Thynne (2011) highlights, during the research process the researcher becomes an ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ as a professional and independent social-agent. For myself, the analysis of the data required me to objectively reflect on Aileen’s vernal and non-verbal performances in order to better understand the interface between facework, personal construct theory that led to her particular behaviours. However, the ability to remain objects study was complicated by the fact that my understanding of Aileen (as a subject), was contextualised within the meanings generated by the documentary
which risked compromising the inter-subjective relations I developed with her. This inter-subjective relationship was challenging to negotiate on two levels;

1. My professional obligation as a researcher to remain non-judgemental and objective, as I was caught-up as a viewer within the ‘story’ of Aileen the Broomfield films generated;

2. My own positioning as a female who may (nor may not) feel a commitment to Aileen as a fellow female and social agent whose struggles for equality, fair representation and experience of sexual assault may resonate, as well as make for highly emotive viewing.

In order to address these issues, I ensured I sourced a variety of research material covering the case of Aileen, her background, the trial and murders that were unconnected to the documentary coverage in order to gain a broader perspective of Aileen as a character, her background, the trial and murders, both factual and opinion pieces that would enable me to maintain a more neutral analytic stance. Finally, in terms of my own self-care due to the emotive subject-matter and frequent explicit fist-person accounts of sexual assault, I ensured I took time to seek appropriate debriefing, as well as personal and professional support with my supervisory team and family.
Chapter 5
Analysis

5. Introduction to the Analysis

In Chapters 2 and 3, it was suggested that theories relating to PCT and linguistic theories of facework, by themselves, do not go far enough to explain certain individual responses within interaction. This criticism specifically relates to how the current understanding of facework fails to address the issue of how an individual is psychologically motivated to use facework the way they do in interactive circumstances. While some facework researchers may not wish to determine the issue of intentionality within facework literature, the aim of this study is to demonstrate how an appreciation of an area of psychology - specifically PCT - may inform the facework field of linguistics. This would provide an interpretive stance from which to construct a framework for analysis that would allow researchers from both fields to reach a better interpretation as to what the psychological incentives are that drive people’s use of facework, and ultimately performance of identity (see Section 1.7).

The intention of this chapter is initially to analyse how Wuornos’ responses to the questions posed to her are or are not in accordance with Grice’s (1975) CP and maxims, before using these to isolate which facework strategies she is using (see Penman 1990; Culpeper 1996; 2003; 2005; 2011; Spencer-Oatey, 2001; 2002; 2007).

The chapter will then move on to show how, despite Wuornos being aware of social expectations, her motivations are unique to her and used primarily to attain a specific goal. To do this, the investigation will take into consideration what influence the context of the interaction has, upon informing and shaping an interlocutor’s perception of how they 'should' behave according to social ideology (see Sections 1.4 to 1.6 with reference
to Spencer-Oatey, 2001, 2002, 2007). Specifically, it will draw on what such facework strategies show about Wuornos’ personal constructs (see Simon, 2001; Schwartz & Bardi, 2004), and how they drive her selection of facework strategies during each speech event. Finally, this multidisciplinary analysis technique will be used to reach a conclusion regarding the type of identity Wuornos is intending, and perhaps unintentionally communicating to her audience, and why this may be the case.

Now that we have previously established what the expectations the courtroom context demands of its interlocutors (see chapter 4), the actual real-time speech events that take place between Wuornos and the legal representatives can begin to be unpicked. This will specifically relate to how she operationalises the Gricean CP (1989), and its corresponding maxims in the context, and is achieved by cross-comparing it with how they should be being adhered to within the context. This approach will enable this study to gain a richer understanding of what Aileen’s linguistic performances can inform us about the kinds of facework strategies (according to Penman 1990) that are also taking place during her interaction with the judge and attorneys in the court.

5.1 Cultivation of a Positive Self-Image

In this Section, Wuornos’ use of certain facework and linguistic strategies for specific purposes will be explored, for example, how she cultivates a positive self-image by appearing to be cooperatively engaged in a dialogue with her interlocutors. This is done by drawing upon data identified from the courtroom examinations she is subject to (see Appendices), as they demonstrate what her strategically enacted performances reveal about the personal constructs and values she is attempting to align herself with, and in particular, what they might imply with respect to the apparent motivations driving such
performances. To do this, the analysis will discuss Wuornos’ use of the Gricean CP, and its corresponding maxims, in addition to how she uses certain facework strategies (Penman, 1990), in order to understand what they reveal about her PCT (see Chapter 2). However, within this, I will not only be looking at wider ideological social processes inherent within the courtroom (MacKinnon, 1989; Smart, 2003; Kennedy, 2005), but I will also be examining how Aileen utilises language and embodied conduct (multimodal resources) specifically gesture, gaze and postural orientation, as it is well documented by researchers such as Matoesian, (2010), that multimodal resources work together as co-expressive semiotic partners in utterance construction and comprehension. For this study in particular, I wish to see how these resources function in the construction of identity and framing (in the ascription of blame), to more comprehensively understand how language and embodied conduct work to mutually contextualise each other in a reciprocal dialectic which is demonstrative of an individual’s PCT.

The first example of this, is evidenced by her behaviour under questioning in the courtroom. Here we see how Wuornos projects and presents herself as a compliant and non-threatening member of society in order to cultivate a positive self-image with the audience (see Chapter 3 Impression Management). This is initially demonstrated in the Pre-Trial Arraignment where Aileen adheres to the Gricean CP, by providing the necessary amount of information to express her level of meaning, remaining brief, orderly and relevant in her responses to questions, whilst simultaneously flouting the maxim of quantity to emphasise her positive face, and willingness to assist the questioning procedure as much as possible;

**Excerpt 1: Pre-Trial Arraignment**

1. Judge:  
   *Do you understand the nature of the charge?*
2. Aileen: *Ummm huh, yes I do* Sir (nods head, direct eye contact)

3. Judge: *Do you wish to be represented by a council?*

4. Aileen: (Nodding head, direct eye contact with judge) *Yes I do* Sir.

5. Judge: *Can you afford to hire an attorney?*

6. Aileen: (Shaking head from side-to-side, direct eye contact with judge) *No* Sir.

This behaviour is also evident during excerpt 2, the Examination-in-Chief, and Interview 3a, her Final Plea;

**Excerpt 2: Examination-in-Chief:**

1. Attorney: *Could you describe to us Ms. Wuornos, the events of that night?*

2. Aileen: (hands in prayer position on the witness stand table, dressed in white and dark blue suit, crucifix, with make-up and neatly groomed hair) *He put the cord around my neck....* (Licks lips, closes eyes and inhales deeply) and he said... *'Yes you are Bitch...(appears breathless)... he said... you’re going to do everything* (prayer position of hands begins to change to rubbing them, looks up at the ceiling before leaning forward in her seat)..... *I tell you to do.... and if you don't I'll kill you right now and I'll fuck you after* (opens hands in a pleading gesture)... I'd.... (inhales deeply) just like the other sluts I’ve done (kneading her hands intensifies, inhales deeply)... and (gulps and inhales again)... *ummm.... and he said it doesn’t matter to me... your bod...- your body will still be warm for my... huge* (palm of hand raised to chest height) (pleading gesture, smiles and looks down at the floor)... *cock. (inhales deeply)... and.... he said - he was choking me and holding me like* (gestures to demonstrate)... *this... and he said... 'Do you wanna die slut?'... And I. I just nodded 'no' (inhales)... and then he said... are you- are you gonna. listen to everythin' I'm gonna say... and - and have you do?... And I.... I just nodded 'yes'... (opens up hands)... and he told me to - to lay down.... on the ... car seat*...

3. Attorney: *Okay, then what happened next?*

4. Aileen: *Uuuhhh* (inhales deeply looking down rocking back and forth in her seat).... *then he- then he decid... he... began to start.. having...ahhh...* (Gestures with hands, nods her head as if pleading with audience to excuse what she is
about to say)... *anal sex* (breathes out, rocks back and forth in seat)... *Okay*...

(Looks down to the right)...

**Excerpt 3a: Final Plea**

1. Aileen: (Standing to address the court, looks around at bystanders in the courtroom before reading from a sheet) *I have made peace with my Lord and I have asked for forgiveness* (licks lips, looks up at bystanders), *I am sorry that my acts of self-defence ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions, it was them or me* (Looks up at bystanders)...

Such linguistic behaviour threaten and depreciates Aileen’s negative face, while enhancing her positive face in the eyes of the audience, as she appears to willingly accept the topic and direction of the conversation, use appropriate honorific titles for authority figures and impress upon the audience an image of a woman who is content to relinquish control, by submitting to the questioning imposition and procedure.

In addition, it is also interesting to note how Aileen’s non-verbal behaviour reinforces this compliant image, and acts as part of a reciprocal dialectic with her verbal behaviour. In particular, during the Arraignment (excerpts 1, lines 2, 4, and 6) she uses emphatic nodding gestures towards the judge when answering to signal a positive response to his question, or shaking of the head from side-to-side signalling a negative response to give added emphasis to her answers, and therefore by implication an added emphasis to her projection of a positive self-image, by emphasising her desire to assist the court with their quest for answers. This is also demonstrated in excerpt 2, the Examination-in-Chief and excerpt 3a during her Final Plea where her use of direct eye contact with the judge and postural orientation (leaning forward in her seat, standing to address the court), display signs of her engagement with the trial process, an almost
emphatic physical impression that she is trying to be as effectively responsive (and respectful of her environment in the case of her Final Plea), as possible to her interlocutor/ audience.

In regard to how such behaviour culminates in the projection of a positive self-image, we can now move on to Penman’s (1990) concept of face (following on from the concept developed by Brown and Levinson 1978:61), whereby members of society have a public self-image they wish to claim for themselves and to have acknowledged by interlocutors (Penman, 1990). These ‘positive’ face needs express the desire to be appreciated and approved of by others, while ‘negative’ face needs express an individual’s desire to have freedom of action and freedom from imposition.

Furthermore, it is argued by Brown and Levinson (1978: 62) that individuals cooperate and assume each other’s cooperation in maintaining face, as it is in their best interest to do so. They might do this by employing certain politeness strategies (such as those exemplified by Wuornos’ in the transcripts), which involve speakers ‘claiming common ground’, by indicating to the hearer that they share the same specific ‘wants, goals and values’ (Brown & Levinson, 1978: 103). This is demonstrated below in 5.1.1.

**5.1.1 Politeness Strategies that Enhance the Hearer’s Positive Face**

Useful facework strategies Aileen demonstrates to construct this socially approved and non-threatening identity, include the following:

- Speaker notices and attends to the Hearer’s interests, wants, needs and goals
- Speaker exaggerates interest and approval of Hearer
- Speaker uses identity markers (honorifics or impersonal titles)

(Brown & Levinson, 1978:103)
In terms of facework, her Gricean cooperativeness can be seen to facilitate the positive self-presentation she is seeking to cultivate with her audience. Specifically, her tactic of cooperatively providing the necessary linguistically-efficient responses (honorifics, yes/no answers to closed questions, etc.) shows her to be compliant with the need to submit to authority, particularly the imposition made on her ability to speak freely which acts to deprecate her negative face, and is evident during excerpts 1 lines 2 and 4 in particular, where she appears to ardently adhere to appropriate turn-taking procedure and honorifics. Such findings are supported by Goffman’s own insight into the nature of face in society, especially to what he termed ‘rules of conduct’ (1967:48). Here Goffman (1967: 48) describes rules that guide the behaviour of individuals because they are viewed by a community as being moral and just. They affect the perceptions and the actions of an individual in two ways:

Directly, as obligations, establishing how he is morally constrained to conduct himself and indirectly, as expectations, establishing how others are morally bound to act in regard to him

(Goffman, 1967:48-49)

These rules of conduct are entrenched in the individual’s sense of ‘self’. The way people treat each other are often reflections of how they ‘value’ themselves and vice-versa. In order to be a ‘good person,’ one needs to “uphold society’s rules of conduct in one’s behaviour towards others and if the rules are upheld, then the individual has the expectation of being treated respectfully, such that his or her self is accorded value” (Goffman, 1967: 48-49). Such ‘rules of conduct’ are a particular issue for women in the courtroom as Helena Kennedy (2005) highlights that while the justice system may profess to occupy a position of neutral arbiter in its application of justice, practise
“cannot disguise the fact that certain attitudes to women remain unchanged and that women coming before the courts still encounter myths and stereotypes which disfigure the legal process (Kennedy, 2005: 2).” Failing to conform to the gendered image of womanhood could have serious ramifications as to how Aileen is perceived, as Kennedy (2005) notes, a female defendant’s innocence is often “underpinned by… [how well she fits a]… traditional model… [as she needs to conform to a set of criteria regarding]… what is truly female appropriate for the logical requirements of legal decision-making (Kennedy, 2005: 3).” This view is supported by Goffman (1967), who notes that if another person fails to fulfil an obligation required by a society’s rules of conduct, it can very easily be perceived negatively, thereby having face implications for all parties. Consider X failing to say ‘thank you’ to Y after being helped by the latter. Y may interpret this to mean he or she is not worthy of thanking, and/or that X’s self is not held in any esteem by Y. It also reflects badly on Y because it potentially reveals him or her to be a person who violates the rules of conduct and is therefore not worthy of respect in return (Goffman, 1967: 51). This intricate network of responsibilities and expectations are expressed through complementary aspects of interactional behaviour, namely, ‘deference’ and ‘demeanour’ (Goffman, 1967).

Wuornos engages in deferential presentational rituals via her use of Sir in some of her utterances (see, for example: “Yes I do Sir”). One function of such deferential presentation is to express her desire to become an accepted member of the society that the courtroom is seen to represent (Goffman, 1967; Brown & Levinson, 1978; 1987). This study contends, however, that Wuornos is seeking to tactically use such facework and linguistic strategies (which includes Grice’s CP) to symbolically show respect for the ‘ritual self’ (i.e. the ‘self-esteem’) and status of the hearer, who notably stands as the most powerful member of the courtroom, and thus representative of the American
Justice System and its associate values, to cultivate a positive self-image. This hypothesis is supported by examples illustrated during excerpt 2 and in Wuornos’ final statement, where interactions between Wuornos and the judge reveal a cooperative effort (particularly on the part of Wuornos) to pay respect to the other’s ritual self and engender a positive image. Consider a person’s ‘demeanour’, defined by Goffman (1967: 77) as “that element of the individual’s ceremonial behaviour typically conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing, which serves to express to those in his immediate presence that he is person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities”. This is particularly salient for Wuornos as, during excerpt 2, it is interesting to note her change in dress. She changes from a T-shirt and jeans in excerpt 1, to being “dressed in a white and blue suit, wearing a crucifix, make-up and neatly groomed hair”, which is another multimodal resource Aileen uses as an outward symbol of her allegiance to a socially conformable identity as both a female and defendant within the courtroom interaction.

Demonstrations of such ‘good demeanour’ (Goffman, 1967) are designed to signal that the person follows society’s rules of conduct and, hence, might serve to indicate qualities such as dependability and respectability, which serve to reinforce Aileen actively constructing a narrative identity that could be perceived as deserving of leniency. Demeanour can also function as a signal to others that they will not endanger their faces or their physical selves “by presenting themselves as interactants” (Goffman, 1967: 77). Demeanour is the image of an individual’s self that he or she presents to others and is a means by which one’s character is inevitably judged. This well-presented individual possesses the attributes popularly associated with ‘character training’ or ‘socialization’ (Goffman, 1967: 77). Rightly or wrongly, others tend to use such
qualities diagnostically, as evidence of what the actor is generally like at other times and as a performer of other activities (Goffman, 1967:77).

The authorities in the court are looking for good demeanour in their interactions with defendants for this very reason. If a suspect is calm and cooperative, as opposed to agitated and aggressive, then there is a lower risk of physical resistance. In the examples in excerpt 2 and Wuornos’ final statement, the judge is presented with a defendant who appears to be calm, cooperative and compliant, as well as deferential to authority. This behaviour can be illustrated in the data from excerpt 1, which shows how Wuornos unchallengingly responds and complies with the direction of the questioning, with confirmatory/disconfirming answers appropriate for such Yes/No type questions, along with the use of honorific titles to address authority figures. In addition, such behaviour is also evident in excerpts 2 line 2 and in her final statement, whereby she cooperates and supplies answers that provide information from which the jury can begin to understand events surrounding the killings, “He put the cord around my neck… (licks lips, closes eyes and takes a deep breath) and he…”.

In addition to openly accepting and apologizing for her transgressive behaviour, she declares, “I am sorry that my acts of self-defence ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions.” This cooperative behaviour in excerpt 2 is also emphasised by her negative face protection, whereby she initially hedges a cooperative response using elongated pauses during her narrative retelling of events. This implies that her willingness to cooperate with the court and judicial process comes at a personal price due to the distress caused to her when having to relive events through the narrative she is obliged to provide to the court. This display not only adds to the cultivation of the positive impression of a woman who is willing to pay a difficult emotional price to satisfy the needs of the court process, but also reinforces an issue highlighted by Carol
Smart (2003), regarding the patriarchal values underlying the justice system specifically stating that, “by accepting law’s terms in order to challenge law (in this case Aileen’s plea of self-defence during an attempted rape, rather than premeditated murder)… feminism always concedes too much (Smart, 2003: 5)”. By behaving in this manner (appropriating an emotional demeanour, feminine dress etc.), Aileen is using the patriarchal values that underpin the court system, particularly its stereotype of what ideal ‘female’ behaviour is using the performance strategically to foster an image of innocence. Additionally, she also apologizes for transgressing appropriate behavioural expectations within her final statement, and clearly articulates her willingness to accept judicial sentencing with “I am sorry… I am prepared to die if you say it is necessary…”.

Such a display also highlights Smart’s (2003: 5) lamentation that “law must be tackled at its conceptual level, if feminist discourses are to take a firmer root”, which even now in the 21st century appears to be a pertinent issue. Indeed, from a socially evaluative perspective Aileen’s treatment during her trial also raises the larger issue of how women claiming rape are treated within the criminal justice system. By apologising for defending herself against her alleged assault and making great efforts to conform to a socially approved image of femininity she confirms Helena Kennedy’s (2005: 5) observation that “women who seek justice after being raped…[often]… feel that they are the ones on trial,” as she hopes that in the future court culture and cease to blame victims of violation.

In terms of what this behaviour informs us as to Aileen’s personal constructs, Aileen uses her verbal and non-verbal behaviour to be imply that her value constructs exist around the themes of universalism, security, tradition and conformity (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), and are thus positive and fully concordant with society (see Section 3.9). The illustrative component value of these principles can be identified by Wuornos’
initial cooperation in the conversational exchanges taking place, specifically by appearing compliant and cooperative with the judicial process, the provision of answers, and her testimony in court. Furthermore, such conduct implies that she also holds the mutually recognized goal of security, justice and safety of society, as her moral and personal value constructs. Performing in this way also demonstrates the value construct of tradition, respecting and accepting the formal customs that the context or ‘rituals’ (as Goffman calls them) demand of her. This is illustrated by her submission to the rules of this particular verbal exchange, and includes her unchallenged acceptance of using formal titles; acceptance of the direction of the conversation; and her essential willingness to have her personal freedoms restricted. This is particularly evident in the Arraignment (excerpt 1) during the initial conversational exchange she shared with the judge (see page 169 and Appendices for full transcript).

The final value construct Wuornos appears to reflect is conformity, which is evidenced by her restraint of any actions that would harm, upset or violate the expected norms of behaviour, and demonstrated profoundly in her final statement as she announces, “I am sorry that my acts of self-defence ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions.” Such personal constructs are certainly demonstrated at the initial stages of each interactional exchange (and particularly during her final plea). One example of this can be seen in her deprecation of negative face needs; yes/no answers in response to the closed questions posed to her; and her use of appropriate honorific titles to address the judge (excerpt 1). These appear to work towards establishing a belief that this is a woman whose PCT is very much concordant with that of the court and, by implication, highly desired by society, cultivating the impression (given her cooperative and conformable performance), that she is on trial for a crime for which she may plausibly innocent. Indeed, an insightful study by
Bucholtz and Hall (2005:585) in their attempt to synthesize diverse approaches to identity under a single model, defined such performances of value constructs as a direct attempt by the speaker to position the self in relation to how they perceive the status and identity of their interlocutors. With this in mind, it is important to note at this stage just what status and power Aileen’s interlocutors wield within the courtroom that motivate her performance of conformity. Concepts of truth, power and knowledge are central to the assignation of status, particularly within legal institutions and no-where is this more acutely demonstrated than within both the courtroom layout (see page 40) and the type of legal discourse that takes place during the trial period between the judge and defendant. According to Smart (2003), the notion of law is not simply about the implementation of a system, but rather normalisation and control (Smart, 2003: 8). Not only does the legal system operate under a certain procedural format (Arraignment, Examination-in-Chief etc.), but it also lays claims to its own specialised language. This is exemplified by the kind of prescriptive question/answer structures found in the turn-taking in excerpt 1, and reference to technical terms such as ‘right to appeal’ (excerpt 3) thereby setting it apart from other social discourses and identifying itself to a method and structure of power comparable- according to Smart (2003; 9)- to that of a science as (like a science), law claims to have the method to establish the truth of events. Within this, the judge acts as the representative of a system accorded greater weight than any proclamation of guilt or denial made by the defendant. Indeed, as an individual the judge is held (by association) to be a person of wisdom, knowledge and diviner of truth, and is given the ultimate status in their ability to exercise power demonstrated by their right to freely address the court and allow the defendant to speak. This power enables the legal process to translate individual narratives and testimonies into legal relevancies, and make judgements on the scripted or tailored accounts given that fit into
the prescribed ‘question/answer’ discourse formats (and by all intents and purposes, ‘methodologies’), permissible within the courtroom which possibly exclude a great deal that might be relevant to the parties on trial (Smart, 2003: 11), which in the case of Aileen relate to her claim of rape (by the victim) and self-defence rather than murder. In regard to Aileen’s own individual experience (whether as killer or victim), rather than being taken on its own (as it would be in an unformatted naturalistic dialogue), her narrative is instead turned into something the law can digest and process, an issue which is demonstrative of just how much power the legal system (and by association the judge as representative of it) has in the ability to qualify or disqualify ‘truth’. This power reinforces the view of White (1985) who claims that the law perpetuates constitutive rhetoric, specifically the supposedly objective and neutral legal process perpetuates patriarchal myths and the domination of woman, particularly when that women is claiming to be the victim of rape rather than guilty of a crime (see Phillips, 1998). Therefore, it is fully understandable why Aileen is so motivated to perform a socially conformable identity and cooperate to the fullest extent with the process, not simply to foster a favourable self-image, but also secure speaking rights and engender the notion of her plausibility as an upstanding, rather than socially deviant citizen.

In regard to the issue of assuming a positive self-image to reflect socially approved value constructs, Bucholtz and Hall (2005) propose five tenents that underlie how identity may be performed linguistically two of which can be seen in the kind of personal constructs (which up to this point,) Aileen can be seen as aligning herself with.

Firstly, Aileen indexes her identity via the implicatures she creates in her linguistic behaviour that emerge in relation to her other interlocutors’ identity markers, most notably in her use of honorific titles and overt emphasis on ‘yes/ no’ responses (with corresponding multimodal support), which flout the quality maxim during excerpt
1, and signal that she shares the same commitment to truth seeking as the judge. This display of a compliant self-image through her narrative response to questions, is also highlighted by her initial cooperative provision of information and adherence to most parts of the Gricean CP which facilitate positive face and reflect the image of a woman who shares the same interactional goal and personal values of her interlocutor. Supporting this view, an early study by Wish et al. (1980) demonstrated that judges engaged in courtroom dialogue rated defendants whose speech exhibited positive initiatory responses (such as the emphatically positive and double confirmatory responses Aileen demonstrates during the Arraignment in excerpt 1), were rated as possessing positive characteristics. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note how Aileen’s performance of overt cooperative responses occurs typically during the first three initial turn-taking exchanges with court officials within each speech event, something concordant with research that has highlighted that initial conversational exchanges have a crucial impact upon how individuals are perceived by their interactants (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005).

Such behaviour lends further evidence towards the notion that Aileen’s linguistic performances are intentionally motivated to align herself with a positive self-image and identity in the eyes of the court, a view supported by Bucholtz and Hall (2005), who suggest that speakers may choose to perform certain identities in order to align themselves with value constructs they wish to be related to. This view is supported by Schlenker and Pontari (2005), who assert that individuals have concerns about identity characteristics they wish to portray, and such concerns about how their self-presentation is perceived by others is often the central motivation behind their interactive performances. Again, such views are supported by the findings from this study regarding the initial dialogue Aileen has with court officials, as it demonstrates that (for
female defendants in particular) cooperative, conformative and submissive behaviour, correlates with positively perceived personal value constructs, all of which work to cultivate a positive public self-image. The reason I highlight that this issue is particularly pertinent for women in court is due to the wealth of literature that demonstrates that how a female performs gender in this context, has a huge baring on how they are perceived socially. Lakoff’s (1975) early gender-based study proposed that women who use hedges and qualifiers (an issue prevalent in Aileen’s use of language during her narrative retelling of events in the Examination-in-Chief, excerpt 2), are often perceived by hearers as demonstrative of more powerless or feminine speech styles, and often result in positive social impressions (and even more lenient sentencing) than their female counterparts who use more powerful or masculine styles. This was also identified in a study by Berry et al. (1997: 562), who asked judges to rate male and female speakers on positive or negative impressions according to whether speakers were using a feminine or masculine speech style. Although gender was found to have a relatively minor effect on impression, the use of a female register increased ratings of a positive self-impression. Such findings lend considerable evidence to suggest that identities are equally a product of interactional negotiation, and reflective of larger ideological processes as well as being an innate aspect of personal character as Aileen’s behaviour in particular appears to be related to how she perceives the other interlocutor. Specifically, she appears to base her performance upon how they may expect or wish her to behave as an innocent party, how she interprets courtroom environment and the social values it holds, and finally how best it would be to position herself within it to achieve her personal aims. This kind of interactional exchange can therefore lead to individuals invariably reflecting certain kinds of personal values over others, and it can be presumed that based upon this, that a person’s desire to assume a
certain identity primarily relates to how best to cultivate a certain self-image and interpersonal relationship with their conversant. In a final observation we can also position Aileen’s desire to conform to the stereotypical image of the feminine and ‘gendered’ image of womanhood, as a demonstration of how wider social patriarchal ideologies both produce and reproduce dominant discourses around what is “truly female (Kennedy, 2005: 17)”. Aileen’s efforts to consistently construct a conformable and compliant narrative identity to present a positive self-image communicative of an identity synonymous with the same personal value constructs as her society, is directly related to her need to be perceived as plausibly innocent of the crime she is on trial for. This can be interpreted as proof that despite the courtroom supposedly acting as a “neutral arbiter among conflicting interests the law… [is instead] … a tool of dominance and repression (MacKinnon, 1989: 159),” and most importantly representative of the true patriarchal “mind of society” as it “fundamentally moves and shapes the realities of self-expression (MacKinnon, 1989: 159)”. If such state involvement in the understanding and construction of identity and positioning of the self within society has such an impact upon our PCT constructions through life, it implies that our personal constructs and value systems, are not only moulded by our individual experience of society but are indicative of the kind of dominant ideologies we are exposed to as social beings. Essentially, the process of personal value construction is influenced heavily by our lived experience of dominant social ideologies. This, as MacKinnon (1989: 159) states, not only reinforces and reciprocates these dominant ideologies, but acts as a crucial aspect in how we understand, construct and position ‘selfhood’ in society. Such a theory also leads to a larger question, as to whether we (as social beings) can ever truly have independent ownership of our identity or indeed the ability to freely express it.
With this in mind, what adds further evidence towards the notion that Aileen’s narrative constructions of a conformative identity are superficial rather than a reflection of her true selfhood, are revealed as the trial interaction continues. It is only as the discourse progresses during her interaction with the court officials, that we notice the inconsistency of Aileen’s performance of positive face, a consequence of which is that we are left with many competing images of ‘selfhood’ and identity for Aileen, something which will be touched upon presently but explored further in section 5.2. This crucial finding highlights that an element of doubt must be considered when examining Aileen’s previous conformable and submissive behaviour, particularly as to whether it is truly reflective of a genuinely positive self-image and corresponding personal value constructs. Instead of conformability, we frequently witness Aileen displaying highly aggressive, challenging and obstructive behaviour on what appears to be a far more regular basis. Such behavioural performances are highly incongruous with her previous projections of positive face and occur with such regularity they can only be deemed as a pattern of behaviour innate to Aileen’s character, which leads us to the conclusion that these more negative aspects of her identity are a direct reflection of Aileen’s true nature. This ‘alternative’ self is delved into further in section 5.2 as it appears that these unpleasant behaviours manifest primarily when Aileen is challenged by the questioning attorney, most powerfully in the Examination-in-Chief (excerpt 2), as she begins to selectively author and frame her narrative retelling of events leading up to the murders, and when the final guilty verdict it reached in during her sentencing in excerpt 3, all of which undermine her previous attempts to cultivate a positive self-image. The narrative identity Aileen seeks to portray during this retelling of events attempts to identify her as a victim rather than killer and is achieved again by her operationalisation of the Gricean maxims, choice of facework strategy and use of
multimodal resources. Yet her deviant selfhood is revealed within these exchanges as we witness her responses to questions from the attorney during the Arraignment and Examination-in-Chief (excerpts 1 and 2), that risk denigrating the positive self-image and identity of a non-threatening and conformable member of society she is attempting to cultivate within the court. Finally, there is also the issue of how she reacts to a ‘guilty’ rather than ‘innocent’ verdict, and all her attempts to persuade her audience of her positive self-image and character are rejected which will be discussed in section 5.2 below.

5.2. Inconsistencies in the Positive Self-Image/Image Inconsistency

As has been demonstrated in section 5.1, Aileen’s performance of identity within the court shows a clear desire to persuade her audience that she is a conforming and non-threatening member of society by aligning herself with socially approved personal value constructs. Specifically, this is achieved by the deprecation of her own negative face needs and the linguistic operationalisation of the Gricean CP, all of which facilitate the presentation of a positive self-image. Essentially, this works towards presenting herself as a woman who appears to share the same moral and social values as her audience, and is implied by what her linguistic performances suggest about her personal value systems and PCT.

However, this image of Wuornos as a conformative and cooperative individual is inconsistent and often greatly undermined by other demonstrations of challenging and obstructive behaviours. Such performances appear to occur when her carefully controlled and positive self-presentation are challenged by the questioning authorities, or when an issue or topic arises during her narrative reframing of self (and the events leading up to the murders), risks negating the positive self-image she is trying to
convince her audience of. The second key finding this analysis has identified relates to how Aileen seeks to control the kind of information she is obliged to provide to the court, particularly in relation to herself and the events leading to the killings. Specifically, she uses what we will term ‘selective editing,’ to cultivate a positive impression and construct a public identity that would be socially approved of. Aileen achieves this by using facework and linguistic strategies that relate to how she operationalises Gricean maxims, to shape how the audience interprets both her character, personal values and ultimately whether or not she is guilty of the crimes she is accused of.

These findings can be divided into two areas. The first area relates to the kinds of Gricean and facework strategies she employs when personally sensitive topics of discussion arise, which have the potential to undermine the positive self-image she is attempting to portray. The second area relates to how this need for editorial control over her self-image extends to her testimony regarding her narrative retelling (and reframing) of events leading to the murders during excerpt 2, the Examination-in-Chief. During this interaction, she is required to provide a factually grounded and truthful retelling of events leading up to the killings, and it is within this scene in particular that we see Aileen striving (through her own esoteric use of Gricean CP and facework), to cast herself as the victim rather than perpetrator of crime. Indeed, while her narrative of these events often appears in keeping with the principals of the Gricean CP in its provision of information, it is in fact highly evasive concerning crucial facts which are key to facilitating a clear, coherent and most importantly factually viable testimony that can stand up to judicial scrutiny. In the following sections of dialogue taken from the courtroom transcripts (see Appendices), examples of the kind of facework and Gricean cooperation she uses to protect her self-image, challenge and oppose the court are
detailed, and act as demonstrative examples of how she purposefully uses linguistic devices to control and reinforce the positive self-image that is in danger of being undermined.

In the following sections I will go into a more in-depth appraisal of what her procedurally obstructive behaviour, and apparent need for control informs us about Aileen’s personal constructs, and about how these constructs act as the key motivational force behind a carefully constructed and executed impression management.

5.2.1 Face Sensitivity and Image Control

Impression Management (IM) equates to the strategic management of behaviour (and potentially, appearance), in order to influence the perception of others (Goffman, 1959). It may be tactically defensive or assertive, involving excuses or disclaimers to intimidate or self-promote their image (Archer, 2011). Guerrero et al. (2010) identified defensive IM to be mainly associated with ‘corrective facework’ or, as Goffman (1971) refers to it ‘remedial work’, where such tactics are purposefully enacted to limit the loss of positive self-image, or to bolster a self-image when an individual feels it is under threat in some way. During the Arraignment, Wuornos uses aggression, humour and sarcasm as corrective facework to mitigate the threat that the personally sensitive topic of her taboo employment as a prostitute has upon the positive self-image she is attempting to cultivate with her audience;

Excerpt 1: Arraignment.

7. Judge: Do you work?

8. Aileen: (Rapid blinking) No.

9. Judge: Ahhhh...?/
10. Aileen: /Looking around at bystanders in the room) Hahaha 'Do I work? I'm in jail how can I work....?/

11. Judge: Well obviously you’re not working now./

12. Aileen: Oh/

13. Judge: [interrupting Aileen] /what I meant was how long has it been since you last worked?

14. Aileen: Oh... err.... about (laughs to self, looks down at the floor)... err... since about '84 possibly?

15. Judge: Not working for six or seven years (shuffles paperwork).... So how do you - how do you support yourself?

16. Aileen: (closes eyes before blinking rapidly) ... I was - I was a professional call-girl.

Specifically, she treats the judge’s question in line 7 as though it is an attack upon her personal self-image, and her responding FTA (line 10) directed at him, appears to ameliorate the threat by showing poise and competency, by questioning the appropriateness of his original question given her present situation as a prisoner (Guerreo et al., 2010). Particularly, her FTA, aimed at the judge, is a face-saving behaviour, triggered by her perception that she has been undermined and embarrassed, and that he has violated a social norm of polite behaviour by bringing up a personally sensitive topic of conversation (lines 8, 10 and 14). This is evidenced by Wuornos’ sensitivity when she is directly asked if she was employed, and where she uses a flout of Grice’s quantity maxim and paraphrases the judge’s original question (line 10), to create sarcasm and threaten his positive face. Here her combined use of humour and aggression is used for an assertive as well as defensive IM purpose, as both have been
shown to be effective intimidation strategies (Guerreo et al., 2010). For example, Koslowsky and Pindek (2011: 284) found humorous aggression/sarcasm to be particularly effective in situations where intimidation is perceived to be used an attempt to control actions or undermine the confidence of a fellow interlocutor. The tactic was noted by Koslowsky and Pindek (2011) to be especially useful in conveying the intention of undermining the other interactant. Such assertive IM strategies have also been noted to belong to promotional behaviours, be they negative (in the case of Wuornos, for intimidatory purposes), or positive (for boastful purposes). This latter issue can also be seen in excerpt 1, as by asserting her right to speak and questioning the appropriateness of the judge’s comment, she flouts the maxim of quantity which appears to suggest she is also trying to enhance her negative face. This is suggested by the fact that she is promoting her own higher moral ground by accentuating her ability to identify that his question may be somewhat inappropriate given her circumstances as a prisoner. This would also concur with her use of the enhancing linguistic qualifier ‘professional’, to redefine her employment as a ‘call-girl’ to give it a pronounced value and present it in a more face-saving manner. Such a narrative performance of identity can be associated to an issue highlighted by Helena Kennedy (2005), who insists that women within prostitution are often perceived negatively and as “responsible for male concupiscence and carnality”, with the entrenched idea that “prostitutes have it coming to them (Kennedy, 2005: 117).”

Furthermore, Aileen also uses co-occurring multimodal resources during her speaking turns to reinforce her intended attacks, and place added emphasis on her face-saving strategies. In lines 8, 10 and 14 we see Aileen looking round at the other bystanders (Jury, Attorneys and Police Officers/ Guards), tossing her head back and laughing as she mocks the judge. This non-verbal behaviour appears to intimate a high degree of
contempt towards the judge, while simultaneously inviting bystanders within the
courtroom to agree with her assessment, as she directs a form of uncivil attention
towards the judge by questioning the appropriateness of his original question towards
her, while simultaneously directing her comments to the other co-present members of
the court (Matoesian, 2010: 204).

The clearest demonstrations of Aileen’s attempts to control her self-image and
mitigate any threat to it comes most powerfully during excerpt 2, the Examination-in-
Chief and during her Final Plea (excerpt 3a). Both scenes show Aileen using her
opportunity to speak freely and retell her version of events leading to the victim’s death
to cultivate a positive self-image. She attempts to achieve this by protecting her positive
face and framing herself as a victim of abuse and an attempted rape at the hands of her
victim, rather than criminal in order to elicit a sympathetic response from her audience,
thus reinforcing the feminine stereotype of ‘woman-as-victim’. This performance plays
upon the larger patriarchal ideology Smart (2003: 28) claims to be inherent within the
legal system in its perception of women, and most importantly what is supposedly
representative of ‘true’ femininity, a claim supported by Kennedy (2005), who states
that the “core stereotype for women in the courts is that of victim (Kennedy, 2005:
117).”

**Excerpt 2: Examination-in-Chief.**

2. Aileen: (hands in prayer position on the witness stand table, dressed in white
and dark blue suit, crucifix, with make-up and neatly groomed hair)
*He put the cord around my neck....* (Licks lips, closes eyes and inhales
deeply) and he said... *'Yes you are Bitch...(appears breathless)... he said... you’re going to do everything* (prayer position of hands begins
to change to rubbing them, looks up at the ceiling before leaning
forward in her seat).... *I tell you to do.... and if you don't I'll kill you right now and I'll fuck you after* (opens hands in a pleading gesture)... *I'd... (inhales deeply)* *just like the other sluts I’ve done* (kneading her
hands intensifies, inhales deeply)... *and* (gulps and inhales again)... *umm.... and he said it doesn't matter to me... your bod...- your body will still be warm for my... huge* (palm of hand raised to chest height in a
pleading gesture, smiles and looks down at the floor)... **cock.** (inhales deeply)... *and.... he said* - *he was choking me and holding me like (gestures to demonstrate)... this... and he said* - *'Do you wanna die slut?... And I. I just nodded 'no' (inhales)... and then he said... are you-are you gonna. listen to everythin' I'm gonna say... and - and have you do?... And I... I just nodded 'yes'... (opens up hands)... and he told me to - to lay down.... on the ... car seat...*

3. Attorney: **Okay, then what happened next?**

4. Aileen: **Uuuuhhh** (inhales deeply looking down rocking back and forth in her seat).... *then he- then he decid-... he... began to start.. having...ahhh... (Gestures with hands, nods her head as if pleading with audience to excuse what she is about to say)... anal sex (breathes out, rocks back and forth in seat)... **Okay...** (Looks down to the right)... *and.... (Gestures with hands to the audience, closing eyes for a few seconds, inhales)... he's doing this... in.... very violent manner... err (closes eyes gesture back and forth motion with right hand)... movement... and then he... I don't know... he became err.... I don't know. Err... climax... I talk street - I talk street talk talk... so ...I don't know.... if he did that.... and then he violently then took himself out.... and put himself/*

5. Attorney: **What were you saying?/**

6. Aileen: **Back... into my vagina/**

7. Attorney: **And what were you saying to him at that point?**

8. Aileen: *(stares at the speaker and pauses)... No.... I was cryyyving.... my braaaaains out....*

During this scene, we can see how Wuornos uses strategically ambivalent face linguistic strategies (Archer, 2011) and information control (or augmentation, as it will be referred to here) to execute tactical impression management over her self-image. This is particularly evident in the way she narrates her version of events leading up to the murders during her testimony, framing it in a certain way that consistently shows her in a positive light (lines 2 and 4). Using this reframing narrative to construct a positively perceived identity reinforces Kennedy’s (2005) argument regarding how much law subliminally transmits powerful messages which construct and underpin our
social understanding of selfhood and identity in relation to others, particularly for women. Indeed, Aileen’s consistent reliance on reinforcing a highly feminine identity, particularly of ‘woman-as-victim’, not only produces and reproduces a stereotypical image of womanhood and gendered identity, but also demonstrates the pressure the larger patriarchal frameworks operating within the courtroom exerts upon the individual. Within the position of defendant, Aileen appears painfully aware of the performance she must enact if she is to successfully be seen as atoning for “breaching the sacred notions of what is deemed truly female (Kennedy, 2005: 17)”. To do this, Wuornos uses strategically ambivalent facework in which she protects and deprecates her positive face to seek sympathy from her audience, by repositioning herself as the victim of assault, and justifying her actions because of her ordeal. In line 2, Aileen makes powerful lexical choices particularly when paraphrasing the victim’s voice, using boosters and affect attitude markers, which include loaded language, such as accusing her victim of using the word “bitch” (thus, casting him in a negative light), and phrases such as “…a very violent manner” to emphasise the brutality of his alleged attack and her traumatic experience. By including lexical items with powerful semantic properties, Wuornos demonstrates a pragmatic awareness of the semantic impact of her language choices, carefully choosing ones that suit her purpose to justify her claims of self-defence, and reframe herself as the victim, rather than the perpetrator of a crime. This view is supported by Aldridge and Luchjenbroers (2007), who found that when certain lexical items are selected, this places the referent in a certain category and activates associations and understandings that such words and categories have for the hearers. Thus, lexical items reflect the speaker’s understandings or mental representations of whatever is being referred to. To account for the linguistic negotiation she uses, Goffman’s concept of ‘footing’ can be utilized to explain her
strategy. Essentially, the concept refers to “changes in alignment we take up to ourselves and others” (Goffman, 1981: 128), that is, the metapragmatic process through which speakers position themselves relative to one another and to their utterances in the framing of experience. A shift in footing transforms our interpretive frame for the action. To signal who they are, speakers may use linguistic markers to signal what they are doing in the interactional narrative retelling, which for Wuornos can be identified by how she positions herself relative to her victim during her narrative reframing of events. This effectively signals a stance-making gesture, defined as the linguistic “overt expression of a speaker’s attitudes, or feelings concerning the message” (Biber & Finegan, 1988: 1). Such stance-marking is also evident in Wuornos’ use of first- and third-person pronouns (‘I’, and ‘he’) during her narrative account of events. Particularly, speakers have been found to use the pronoun ‘I’ to build relations between speaker and hearer, because the pronouns can align themselves into one group or community that may or may not exist in the real world. Doing this allows Wuornos to build the positive self-image her deprecating facework intends to achieve. Combining speaker and hearer positions into a single entity creates a shared identity, making the hearer feel a personal connection with the speaker, as though they are on the same-side and sharing the same experiences and needs that a first-person account of narrative retelling creates. This in turn, makes Wuornos’ claims of justifiable self-defence a more plausible argument to believe and facilitates her positive face protection in a strategy of persuasive discourse. In addition, her use of the third-person pronoun, particularly as Wuornos uses the tactic of paraphrasing her victim, has also been found to make the testimony speaker-orientated, rather than a negotiated endeavour between the court and the defendant, and results in personally engaging the audience (Kuo, 2002).
In support of the view that Wuornos is being particularly strategic in the way she uses linguistic devices to frame herself, a study by Chaemsaithong (2012) reveals that defence witnesses use testimony rights strategically to provide specific information that supports the goal of advocacy for their argument, which includes constraining and shaping their audience’s understanding of the events leading up to their crime. Essentially, his study demonstrated that social categorization emerges from discursive practices performed within the interactional context, particularly how defendants use the concept of the ‘footing’ (Goffman, 1981) framework stance and engagement with the audience, to construct and negotiate persuasive courtroom accounts in order to align themselves with their audience and establish a relationship with them. Indeed, other criminal linguistic studies into self-positioning in storytelling support these findings (Cotterill, 2003; Matoesian, 2000; Schaffer & Smith, 2004), identifying that defendants who applied their own first-person direct experience as testimony, were more favourably evaluated than defendants who used more objective styles of narrative. Such behaviour can be seen in Wuornos’ own style of narrative authorship, as she uses strategic methods (in a multimodal format), to both justify and deflect blame for the crime she is accused of.

Aileen’s need to ensure the projection of a positive self-image and need to control her narrative and framing in the courtroom becomes more evident as she is required to submit to more detailed questioning during the trial period. This appears to force her to not only use her narrative performances to verbally reframe herself in a consistently positive light, but also leads her to employ more obvious multimodal resources and behaviours that enhance this image. This is particularly salient during line 4 and 2 of the Examination-in-Chief, and during her statement in excerpt 3a, the Final Plea, where during particularly emotive retelling of events, and effectively pleading with the jury
for understanding and leniency in her sentencing we see her visibly licking her lips, closing her eyes, audible aspirations (sighing), rubbing her hands together, and looking up at the ceiling while holding her hands in the prayer position.

**Excerpt 3a: Final Plea**

1. Aileen: (Standing to address the court, looks around at bystanders in the courtroom before reading from a sheet) *I have made peace with my Lord and I have asked for forgiveness* (licks lips, looks up at bystanders), *I am sorry that my acts of self-defence ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions, it was them or me* (Looks up at bystanders). *I am sorry for all the pain my actions have caused. I am prepared to die if you say it is necessary* (inhales deeply, long pause, gulps and looks up from the paper she is reading from to the right of her at her defence team) .... *But I am not afraid to die* (looks around at bystanders) ... *as I have found peace with myself.*

This has the impact of placing added emphasis on emotions which are conveyed not only in her use of language, but through ‘embodied conduct’ (Matoesian, 2012: 204). As we can see from Aileen’s gaze, head, body movements and paralinguistic conduct (audible aspirations), she successfully conveys an emotive stance which not only encodes emotion, but also evaluates the object of that emotion, the event being retold, or the plea being heard (Matoesian, 2012: 204). For example, tilting her head up to look at the ceiling while rubbing and holding her hands together in the prayer position is quite a revealing method of encoding a effect. According to Calbris (2011: 96-98), the head tilt and position of the hands in the prayer position is indicative of futility, vulnerability and self-sacrifice, and is designed to project an emotionally charged performance of emotional distress whereby an individual is forced (in this case), for the sake of the court’s pursuit of justice to submit to questioning and relive a particularly painful and distressing set of events. For Aileen this is her alleged sexual assault at the hands of the victim she is on trial for killing. A poignant example of this is demonstrated in line 2 of the Examination-in-Chief where her speech overlaps with a series of head-
shakes, audible exhaling, closed eyes and postural movements, all of which work to emphasise the level of emotional distress she is experiencing, and construction of a narrative and stylistic discursive identity that would meet the expectations of the patriarchal ideology governing ‘victim’ behaviour, particularly when that victim is female (Matoesian, 2001: 40-41).

5.2.2 Selective Testimony using Deceit and Framing Techniques

Following on from this, Wuornos’ sensitivity over her rights to speak and ultimately how she selectively edits her retelling of events leads to a closer look at how she provides information to the court, again to cultivate a certain self-image and portrayal of events leading up to the murders.

Controlling information can often be labelled as deceit and is frequently used to either make the hearer believe something the speaker knows to be false, or to obstruct their understanding of something altogether (Gupta, 2012: 3). This can be clearly identified in the instances where Wuornos uses her flout of the maxim of quantity to exercise control over the information her audience has access to (Gupta, 2012: 24-26), and to make specific inferences regarding her role, particularly her interaction with the victims leading up to the murders. To identify the strategies Wuornos uses to deceive her audience, it must first be examined how the flout of the quantity maxim facilitates the deceptive process.

The most important contribution to analyses of verbal deception in pragmatics concerns the notion of Grice’s CP, whereby implicature can be generated to imply/suggest one thing, while actually saying something else (Grice, 1989). That is, the intended meaning differs from the literal meaning of the utterance. This is particularly evident in excerpt 2 the Examination-in-Chief, during which Wuornos uses
a highly subjective statement as testimony, paraphrasing her victim’s voice using a strategy whereby she describes in detail ‘what the victim was doing to her’, rather than providing a ‘description of events that evening’, as requested by the attorney. An example of this can be found in her statement in line 2 of excerpt 2, the Examination-in-Chief, where she states:

“He put the cord around my neck.... (licks lips) and he said... 'Yes you are Bitch... (appears breathless) ... he said... you’re going to do everything (prayer position of hands begins to change to rubbing them, looks up at the ceiling) .... I tell you to do.... and if you don't I'll kill you right now and I'll fuck you after (opens hands in a pleading gesture) ... I'd.... (inhales deeply) just like the other sluts I’ve done (kneading her hands intensifies, inhales deeply) ... and (gulps and inhales again)... umm.... and he said…”

Such an utterance in its focus on describing the violence Wuornos was subject to at the hands of her supposed ‘victim’, appears to typify the type of testimony she uses to describe the events leading up to the murder, but crucially omits wider contextual detail regarding issues, such as how she first encountered her victim, and what she was doing there in the first place. Describing the events in such a manner and focusing on the violence she was subjected to, places Wuornos in a passive position as a victim and thus the flouting of the quantity maxim enables Wuornos to further cultivate a positive self-image in the eyes of the audience, as a victim rather than a criminal. This move not only acts to protect her positive face, but again contributes to the construction of a narrative identity of herself as a victim. Such strategic use of language and facework relates to two basic notions of deceit and information control: distortion and concealment. The findings from this study also support the theory established by Gupta et al. (2012: 10), relating to how verbal deception and impression management can be categorized into certain types. According to this theory, Wuornos can be identified as using a combination of abstraction, contrived distraction and augmentation to manage
how her audience interpret the information provided to them to understand the events surrounding the crimes she is accused of, and how her self-image is perceived.

First, the notion of abstraction (Gupta, 2012: 22-24) involves the manner in which the speaker frames their utterance in a way that is sufficiently general, so that it hides the more specific information that the speaker wishes to conceal from the hearer. This can be identified in the way Wuornos omits her own role in the narrative retelling of events that she provides to her audience, “He put the cord around my neck… in a very violent manner”. Essentially, she is choosing to focus upon the violence she was subjected to at the hands of her victim evading the provision of wider contextual information that would create a richer depiction of events and her own agentive role in the victim’s death.

Secondly, Wuornos also uses contrived distraction (Gupta, 2012: 22-24), whereby she responds to the interruption to her narrative by the attorney (in his request for more detailed information), by qualifying her use of taboo language and detracting from the attorney’s attempt to refocus the narrative.

“… he's doing this... in.... very violent manner... and then he... I don't know... he became err.... I don't know. Err... climax... I talk street- I talk street talk y’see... so ...I don't know.... if he did that.... and then he violently then took himself out…”

This contrived detraction is also enabled by the amount of hedging, ellipsis, first person pronoun ‘I’, and qualifying phrase such as “I talk street-talk y’see”, which, not only protects her positive face by defending the appropriateness of her narrative description of events, but acts as a qualifying statement regarding her ability to use non-offensive sexual language to describe her alleged assault. This use of language could be interpreted as another face-saving strategy to add further weight to her construction of a socially-approved narrative identity, as it acts as an openly submissive act where she
acknowledges her own inferior status as a lower-class woman in relation to the judge and court officials. This use of language is also evident of her augmentation as she is adding a gratuitous level of meaning to the literal meaning of her language which flouts the maxim of quantity and creates the implicature that suggests she is someone to be sympathized with for her poor social background. “Y’see I talk street-talk” becomes a strategy by which she explains the reason for her clumsily executed narrative and suggests that it is because of her impoverished background, relating it to an impaired ability to speak appropriately, acting to elicit sympathy from her audience and cultivate the image of a woman to be sympathised with her positive face in the eyes of the court.

Furthermore, Wuornos’ act of positive face protection by using this phrase could also suggest that she wishes to excuse herself from being committed to her narrative’s truth, which is supported by the level of ambivalence her final plea demonstrates, especially in relation to her accountability for the crimes. In the statement, “I am sorry that my acts of self-defence ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions”, she is enhancing her positive face in the eyes of the audience by accepting responsibility for the crimes, and protecting her negative face needs by relating her apology directly to the crime “ending up in court like this” rather from the actual killings she is accused of. This could suggest that she is only willing to apologise for being caught, rather than the criminal acts itself, which again lends further evidence for suggesting that Wuornos’ personal constructs are far from the conventional and socially-motivated ones she often performs (see Section 5.2.3 for further details). In addition, according to Leesfield (2006), final plea arguments include a series of ‘Golden Rules’, that need to be adhered to by both the defendant and the defence team during the final trial session, which relate to ‘playing upon the emotions’ of the jurors and challenging the morality of the sentencing legislation. In the case of Wuornos her
statement could be construed as violating this, as she should not be making any reference to mandatory terms of imprisonment or other extreme potential sentences, since it may cause jurors to acquit defendants on the basis that no sentencing offered by the courts is proportionate to the crime the defendant is on trial for. In addition, her use of prosodic gestures under the ‘Golden Rule’ could be considered as an unnecessary display of emotion, as it places the jury in a position where they are forced to reappraise the court’s sentencing in terms of its accurate provision of fairness and justice for the individuals involved. Wuornos’ use of prosody (the expression of emotional and attitudinal pragmatic-evidenced behaviours) which includes inhaling audibly and deeply, and gulping and engaging in direct eye contact with the jury at the point of her discussion, constitutes a particularly emotive act. By using such prosodic markers she directly expresses her preparation to die if such a verdict is passed, and exemplifies this feeling by stating, “I have made peace with my Lord and I have asked for forgiveness (licks lips), I am sorry that my acts of self-defence ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions, it was them or me. I am sorry for all the pain my actions have caused. I am prepared to die if you say it is necessary…” Furthermore, the fact that she opts to stand when addressing the court and performing her statement is explicitly noted to be inappropriate conduct in the courtroom (Smith, 2001: 385), as the power of these bodily performances in combination with the language she is using and the image it creates, demonstrates from a research perspective, how important it is that in order to fully understand the context of an utterance, we must first see it as one that is multimodal, essentially deriving from the organized interaction between what is said, why it is spoken and how visible bodily movements are synchronised with verbal statements. In reference to the impact this has upon the jury, it acts as a highly emotive tactic which places members in a professionally difficult position, where they may feel
inclined to respond subjectively to what should be an impersonal and objective decision-making process as to the final verdict and the defendant's sentencing, as Wuornos is specifically attempting to protect her positive face by seeking sympathy.

### 5.2.3 FTAs to Safeguard Self-Image

Discourse within the courtroom does not come uncontested, as can be seen within all three of the transcripts taken from the Wuornos trial. In the process of this analysis it has become clear that Aileen’s desire to safeguard the positive self-image she is attempting to convince her audience of is an extremely powerful driving force behind her linguistic and non-verbal behavior, particularly when she is forced to respond to questions or topics that risk denigrating it. This is especially apparent during episodes where her narrative retelling of events is challenged by the judge or attorneys where a simple probing for further information is perceived by Aileen as an FTA upon her public image.

For example, during the arraignment Aileen carries out a sarcastic FTA upon the judge which is generated by her flout of the quality maxim, creating an implicature expressing doubt as to his questions relevance and implicitly casting a negative view upon his professional competency as a judge when the topic moves towards the socially taboo topic of Aileen’s occupation as a prostitute.

7. Judge: Do you work?
8. Aileen: (Rapid blinking) No.
9. Judge: Ahhhh...?/
10. Aileen: /(Looking around at bystanders in the room) Hahaha 'Do I work? I'm in jaaaaail how can I work....?/
In this excerpt, we see Aileen paraphrasing the judge’s original question in line 10 and
threatening his positive face by ridiculing and challenging the rationale of the question,
while simultaneously protecting and enhancing her own negative face needs by hedging
cooperation and attempting to deflect attention from the original topic of conversation,
namely her occupation. While initially Aileen’s comment could be perceived as an
ironic rather than sarcastic comment due to its use of humour and her laughing for
emphatic effect, it instead constitutes a sarcastic FTA due to the attitude with which it
is conveyed and context in which the statement is uttered. While irony and sarcasm
have often been assumed as interchangeable by some (Musolff, 2017: 95), according to
the Oxford English Dictionary 2000 (OED), a stark difference exists between the
definitions in terms of the intention to be either humorous, or to communicate the
intention to be polite or offend. Irony in particular is defined as;

“an expression of meaning regarding a state of affair that seems deliberately to
contrary to what one expects and is often amusing as a result and using language
or statements that normally signify the opposite for emphatic effect.”

OED (2000).

This contrasts with the definition of sarcasm which is defined as;

“The use of irony to mock or convey contempt.”

OED (2000).

Grice (1989: 34) demonstrated that the implicature of sarcasm (as opposed to irony),
was generated by flouting the maxim of quality (truthfulness), as it imposed upon the
hearer two stages of interpretation. The first stage was the recognition of the statement’s
‘categorical falsity’ (Musolff, 2017: 96), or its contextual incongruity which
categorized the statement as contradictory within the circumstances to which it is
intended to relate. This can be seen when Wuornos paraphrases the judge’s original
question, something intended to highlight incongruity between the question in line 7, “Do you work?”, and Wuornos’ imprisoned state. This statement (perhaps inadvertently) serves to highlight the power imbalance between the interlocutors in the context and emphasizes the shared knowledge that a negative state of apathy exists between the speaker and hearer due to their relationship within the context, thus leading to the sarcastic rather than ironic interpretation that Aileen is insulting the judge. This is also supported by Musolff’s (2017) study which explores the relationship between figurative expression and their sarcastic variants. His findings noted that in public discourse, figurative expressions used by one party are often followed up and ‘countered’ (Musolff, 2017: 95) by other participants via sarcastic paraphrasing aimed at denouncing the original version of the statement in order to derive a new contrarian conclusion from it. In the case of Aileen, she uses it to insult and ridicule the judge and question his professional conduct and rationale. Sperber and Wilson’s (1981: 309) earlier study also supports Musolff’s (2017) findings as they highlighted that the implicature generated by the flout of the quality maxim hints at the existence of the reference being inappropriate or irrelevant given the context of its utterance. Sperber and Wilson also designate the use of paraphrasing as being part of “Echoic Mention (1981: 309), a proposition designed to evoke speaker attitude to a participant who uttered the original, rather than a reference to the literal interpretation of what was stated. This is supported by the fact that Wuornos uses what could be an ironic statement in a sarcastic and insulting manner due to the belittling and ridiculing intent that the FTA is designed to impart, not just to insult the judge but also to enhance her own negative face needs and deflect from the topic under public scrutiny as part of a dual edged strategic face-saving device.
In addition to this, Aileen supplements her linguistic behaviour with embodied conduct (gaze, head and body movement), and what Matoesian (2018: 204) calls ‘emotive stance-making’, whereby certain paralinguistic features of human physical behaviour are specifically used to encode emotion and evaluate the object of that emotion. This is exemplified in Aileen’s use of rapid blinking (line 8), when she is responding to the judge’s question as to whether she works and encodes a distinct impression of irritation and incredulity at his question and her need to answer. Furthermore, as this action is a precursor to her FTA upon the judge, it could be argued that encoded within this emotive stance marker, is the initial sign of anger that culminates in her linguistic attack. In addition, structurally it is interesting to note how Aileen utilizes a secondary face-saving tactic after the sarcastic FTA upon the judge proves unsuccessful in deflecting from the topic of her taboo occupation, as while she concedes to providing a response to the original question, she also attempts to frame it as something that can be viewed as socially acceptable by qualifying her occupation as ‘professional’, in what appears to be a final attempt to reduce face-damage and maintain a ‘clean’ and positive self-image.

As identified in Section 5.2.2, Wuornos uses strategically-edited narrative answers to many of the questions posed to her throughout the trials. Strategies which often comply to a certain extent with the Gricean CP, and yet also provide her with the ability to evade the provision of maximally efficient answers that would ensure a grounded and factually robust response. A strong example of this is found during the interaction in the Examination-in-Chief where Aileen shows just how effective this strategy is in allowing her to appear cooperative, while underhandedly achieving her face-saving goal. The excerpt from the data shown below demonstrates how Wuornos continued circumvention of providing a clear and coherent image of events is pursued
by the questioning attorney, and ultimately results in Aileen perceiving an attempt by the attorney to focus upon gaining a sufficient answer to the topic as an FTA upon her self-image, whereby her positive face is threatened, as the attorney attempts to refocus Aileen’s narrative and gain a better understanding of events leading up to the crime.

Excerpt 2: Examination-in-Chief

3. Attorney:  *Okay, then what happened next?*

4. Aileen:  *Uuuhhh (inhales deeply looking down rocking back and forth in her seat)... then he- then he decid-... he... began to start.. having...ahhh... (Gestures with hands, nods her head as if pleading with audience to excuse what she is about to say)... anal sex (breathes out, rocks back and forth in seat)... Okay... (Looks down to the right)... and... (Gestures with hands to the audience, closing eyes for a few seconds, inhales)... he's doing this... in.... very violent manner... err (closes eyes gesture back and forth motion with right hand)... movement... and then he... I don't know... he became err.... I don't know. Err... climax... I talk street - I talk street talk... so ...I don't know.... if he did that.... and then he violently then took himself out.... and put himself/*

5. Attorney:  *What were you saying?/

6. Aileen:  *Back... into my vagina/

7. Attorney:  *But what were you saying to him at that point?*

8. Aileen:  *(stares at the speaker and pauses)... No.... I was cryyyving.... my braaaains out....

9. Attorney:  *Okay... then what happened?*

10. Aileen:  *(looking down holding the side of her head)... all right, so... err....

It is possible from Wuornos’ perspective, that she views the attorney’s question in line 7 as a deliberate challenge to the truth of her narrative retelling of events, as it interrupts her construction of what was happening to her at the time despite the question’s simple stressing of her need to maintain topic and tell the court what she was saying to the victim at that moment in time, rather than focussing on what the victim
was doing to her. Her response to this interruption takes the form of a strategically ambivalent FTA, as the content and literal interpretation of the response (line 8) appears to adhere to the Gricean CP in its provision of a maximally efficient answer. However, its underlying FTA can be understood by the use of hedging, which acts to enhance her own negative face needs, by asserting her right to refuse the redirection the attorney is trying to achieve as demonstrated by her response below, 

“No… I was crrrvyyyyving… my braaaaaaiiiins out”.

This hedging of cooperation is found in the stress, elongated pauses and use of direct, challenging eye contact that she uses during her utterance. The statement itself, in its literal understanding is Gricean cooperative and compliant with the maxims of quantity, relation and manner, yet the implicature of her resisting and refusing to cooperate fully is communicated by the flout of the quality maxim, which creates the FTA. Such intonation, stress and elongated pauses between the discourse markers also force the hearer to look for other meaning beyond what is said, and act to create a distinct impression of her resistance to the redirection that the question in line 7 by the attorney was meant to evoke. Behaving in such a way indicates that Wuornos’ response has a specific intention to appear cooperative at the literal level of the statement’s interpretation, thus further cultivating a positive self-image by submitting to the imposition of answering. However, in addition, it also protects her own negative face needs by asserting her right to retell her recollection of events the way she wishes in a strategically ambivalent move, which both enhances her negative face and deprecates it. Furthermore, there is more than a verbal component to this attitude as Aileen projects a hard stare in conjunction with her utterance to the questioning attorney, creating him as the focus of attention before proceeding with the onset of the negative verbal component “No”, in a delicately ‘synchronised pattern of embodied accusation’
The notion of embodied accusation can be argued here due to the oppositional tone of line 8 being in juxtaposition to her previous compliant demeanour in line 4. Specifically, Aileen meets the request to be more specific in her statement with an oppositional “No”, and places previously held sentiments (regarding the question’s rationale- see the FTA during line 10 excerpt 1), as she simultaneously evaluates the questioner by lengthening her vowels on the following “crying” and “eyes”, adding stress and increased volume on the negative affect marker “No”. This negative affect interacts with a vigorous lateral head-shake to intensify her rejection, resulting in a noticeably marked emphatic stance (Matoesian, 2012: 371).

The strategic nature of this attack is reminiscent of Ting-Toomey’s (2011) work on face negotiation in conflicting situations. According to this theory, individuals managing antagonistic interactions (as found in the courtroom context) can engender multiple perspective stand-points, from which their facework can be interpreted. This relates to Wuornos’ own strategically ambivalent and dual goal stance, where she can be seen to be operating on two levels: a relational level (and, within this, on a group level), and also an individual level. Essentially, Ting-Toomey (2011) proposes that, when an individual experiences a face-threat within a public discourse conflict situation, their experiences of identity-based frustrations (vulnerability, anger, hurt, etc.) would be felt both on a group membership level and on an individual level. She proposes, therefore, that certain conditions to do with the power-distance between interlocutors, the imposition of the perceived issue of conflict, and the violation of the culturally appropriate facework rule concern the valence direction of the ‘face threatening process’ or FTP (Ting-Toomey, 2011: 3). In reference to Wuornos’ position, it can be seen that these conditions relate to the attorney-defendant power imbalance, the imposition upon her negative face needs to self-express, and the fact that
the attorney interrupted Wuornos’ narrative retelling are all salient aspects of the FTP leading up to Wuornos’ response. This response, as has already been identified, is strategically ambivalent and, in relation to Ting-Toomey’s (2011) theory, can be seen to use communication skills which reframe her FTA in a manner which is both about power-balancing between herself and the attorney (on the individual level), and about continuing to foster a positive self-image at the relational (and group) level by providing an efficient answer at the literal level of her response and answering the question posed to her. This behaviour could thus be interpreted as being effective and appropriate according to Ting-Toomey’s (2011) theory, as her behaviours could be argued to be appropriate (given the fact that she responds to and answers the question posed to her), and equally match the expectations generated by the culture. However, the behaviour is also effective in that both communicators achieve a mutually shared meaning and integrative goal-related outcomes, especially since the attorney gets a response which answers the question, and Wuornos addresses the power-imbalance, attack on her speaking rights, and manages the risk posed to the positive self-image she is trying to cultivate by the interruption of her narrative. From this perspective, Wuornos’ strategically ambivalent use of facework demonstrates that (on this level), she is a culturally intelligent communicator (Ting-Toomey, 2011: 7), able to effectively use adaptive communication skills to manage a conflict process appropriately, while effectively integrating divergent interaction goals that exist between herself and her interlocutor.

However, an alternative perspective to this is favoured by Matoesian (2001: 44), who suggests that interruptions such as the one experienced by Aileen by the questioning attorney can never be successfully mitigated by defendants, particularly female defendants. Instead he claims that interruptions of a female defendant’s
speaking rights serve as evidence as to the patriarchal logic and stereotypes of female criminality that pervade the legal system, and assume they have an innate capacity to deceive. Matoesian (2001), claims that this belief intersects with the institutional properties of the adversarial system in the constitution of domination whereby the power to frame narratives belongs to the questioning attorney rather than the defendant. With this in mind, Aileen’s attempt to mitigate the risk posed to her positive self-image by integrating her own goals with that of the attorney is futile, as the attorney could be using his power to dominate speaking rights to highlight Aileen’s lack of clarity, and exploit the significance embodied in it as a resource from which to foster and invite alternative inferences from the jury (Matoesian, 2001: 44). In Aileen’s case, by asking what she was saying to the victim frames her as an active participant, rather than passive victim of violence with a voice and agency all of her own.

The final and most profound situation in which we see Wuornos use FTAs to protect her self-image comes in her Sentencing and Post-Trial hearing (excerpt 3), in her reaction to receiving a guilty verdict from the court. What is important to note during this stage of the proceedings is that by addressing the court, Wuornos is already violating procedural conventions as, according to court protocol, she has no right to speak or address the court. Nevertheless, by addressing the court Wuornos acts to enhance her negative face needs by asserting her rights and refusing direction. By violating the convention of speaking rights, it is clear that once again, Wuornos has perceived the guilty verdict as a face threat, one which represents not just an attack upon her physical liberty, but also as a direct rejection of the positive and innocent self-image she has tried to cultivate during the course of her trial, and is therefore an FTA upon both her positive and negative face. While the reading of the verdict (as with the question posed by the attorney in excerpt 2) may constitute a legitimate face threat to
those under scrutiny, it is important to emphasise that the roles of officials in the
courtroom require and license them to aggravate the face of the defendant. Wuornos’
ignorance of this fact (or simple emotional frustration on receipt of the verdict) makes
her construe what is really a simple procedural factor, as part of the obligations officials
have to fulfil in their professional responsibility, as an intent to communicate a personal
(and by implication relational) sense of spite and malice (Archer, 2017), as shown in
the following extract.

2. Aileen:  (Smiling) Thank you... and err...(raises eyebrows and sneers as she
smiles at the bystanders in the court) I’ll be up in heaven when y’all be
rottin' in hell... (turns to Steve Glazer but states this loudly enough for
all to hear while smiling) I hope he gets raped in the ass someday....
(still smiling, takes a long drink of water from a paper cup while
glaring at the judge)... scum bags of America

3. Judge:  Okay there will be an automatic appeal, (turning to look at Aileen) you
have the right to an appeal... Mr Glazer is that going to be...

4. Aileen:  (Leans forward and states directly into the microphone while glaring at
the judge) May your wife and kids get raped...

In response to the verdict, Wuornos again uses a sarcastic FTA to the judge in
line 2, in what Culpeper (1996: 356-357) deems a “bald-on-record” manner, whereby
the FTA is performed in a direct, clear and unambiguous way. However, while the FTA
certainly constitutes such a direct and concise attack upon the face of the judge, the
insult is initiated in a way using what Taylor (2015: 130) calls a ‘Garden Pathing’
technique. Specifically, Wuornos structures the beginning of her utterance using a
linguistic convention, “Thank you”, which would normally present itself as a socially
recognizable politeness form, understood by a community as displaying gratitude and
often used to enhance the face of others. However, this principle is subverted to convey
mock politeness and an insult, which is generated by the statement’s overall flout of the
quality maxim, since the implicature engendered by the rest of the utterance forces the
hearer to reverse the face evaluation signalled by the initial use of the politeness form,
and to realise its true insincere and malicious intent, “Thank you…and err… I’ll be up in
heaven when y’all be rottin’ in hell”. The ‘Garden Pathing’ referred to by Taylor
(2015:130) relates to how the structural composition of such statements effectively lead
the hearer to expect a form of flattery, before subverting the expectation by the way the
politeness form (or other) is subverted, thus communicating the FTA. In addition, what
makes Wuornos’ FTA a particularly powerful communicator of her anger is also the
increased intensity, and slow tempo she uses when verbalizing her statement. These
variables due to their slow pace and stressed intensity are normally affiliated to
expressions with sincere meanings, rather than FTAs (Woodland & Voyer, 2011: 228),
and used within the context Wuornos chooses to execute them, appear demonstrative
of the true and sincere level of anger and contempt in which she holds the judge. Further
to this, the veracity with which she communicates this FTA is also emphasised by the
content of the rest of the statement as following her use of “Thank you”, where she
commits a series of personal attacks on the judge, “I hope he gets raped…”. Here, her
use of the first-person pronoun and deictic expressions personalize these attacks, and
again emphasise her level of animosity.

Despite such face threats, the judge responds in a highly professional manner and
attempts to placate her wrath and attend to Wuornos’ negative face needs by repeatedly
stating her ability to access resources that may secure the freedom she desires in line 3
in the extract below.

3. Judge:  
   Okay there will be an automatic appeal, (turning to look at Aileen) you
   have the right to an appeal… Mr Glazer is that going to be...

4. Aileen:  
   (Leans forward and states directly into the microphone while glaring at
   the judge) May your wife and kids get raped...

5. Judge:  
   Hh.. Handled by you? Mr. Glazer?/

6. Aileen:  
   (Leans into the microphone) Right in the ass...
7. Judge: *Errr... right I think there's something else that- that needs to be said.../

8. Aileen: (Pointing at herself, and rocking backwards and forwards in her chair) *I know I was raped and (pointing at the judge) you ain't nothin' but a bunch o' scum.../

However, like the reading of the verdict, Wuornos again interprets his statement as an FTA. Such an adverse interpretation of the judge’s offer could again be related to Wuornos’ heightened emotional state, and is reminiscent of Ystma and Gile’s (1997: 259, see Yzerbyt et al., 2008) study which reports that behaviour labelled by some individuals as ‘patronising’ is often viewed as ‘helpful’ by others, during relational discourse interactions, particularly when significant power imbalances exist between interlocutors (as in the courtroom environment). This suggestion is pertinent to Wuornos’ own interpretation of the judge’s statement, as her response is to make her FTAs more personal and graphic during the rest of their interaction.

Throughout the course of excerpt 3, we see Wuornos subjecting the judge to an onslaught of FTAs, namely slurs, insults and linguistic strategies designed to damage his face.

9. Judge: *Therefore these proceeding are now concluded/

10. Aileen: *Putting somebody who was (shouting) RAPED... TO DEATH... (gestures outwards from her body to the courtroom with her right hand)

11. Judge: *and....

12. Courtroom Attendant: *Right could we have some order please/

13. Aileen: (Turns to look at the judge) *Fuck you, mother fucker (struggling with guards she gestures 'flipping the bird' at the Judge as she is escorted out)...

Such behaviour seems to echo Cashman’s (2006) observation that these linguistic strategies not only effectively attack the face of the other, but also strengthen the face threat of the act in general to emphasis the level of disharmony between interlocutors. Indeed, such gratuitous FTAs, such as repeatedly wishing ‘rape’ upon the judge and his
family, referring to him as ‘scum’ (lines 4 and 8), have been noted by Bousfield (2008: 72) to boost and maximise the level of face damage inflicted. If we look particularly at the type of language used by Wuornos to convey this onslaught of FTAs, it echoes the findings of Archer (2017: 88), who found that using slurs and insults with such regularity is a method in which the speaker “emotionally vents”, and acts not just to threaten the face of the other, but is also an effective method by which the speaker is able to impose a negative identity upon the given target. This is demonstrated in Wuornos’ own abusive reference to the judge as ‘scum-bag’ and ‘motherfucker’, linguistic markers which act as uniquely expressive resources within which to convey her subjective feeling and emotion. However, unlike Archer’s (2017) findings on defendants use of swearing and taboo language in court, Wuornos does not limit her FTAs to mere swear words. Instead, her FTAs constitute a mixture of slurs and emotional venting which unlike swear words alone, enable the speaker to paradigmatically associate the target with a loaded-descriptive feature which are designed to signal a plethora of other negative attributes (Archer, 2017: 83). Given the context of Wuornos receiving a guilty verdict, which can be implicitly understood as a social rejection of her innocent plea and the self-image she wished to promote, her mixture of name (calling the judge a ‘scum-bag’), accusations, (‘I was raped and you ain’t nothin’ but a pile of…’), profanity, demonstrated by her ‘flipping the bird’ hand-gesture, and language such as ‘fuck you motherfucker’, act as illocutionary boosters which heighten the negative personal intent intended, leaving those present in no doubt as to Wuornos’ feelings and sense of injustice. With this in mind, it is pertinent to discuss the way Aileen punctuates and reinforces the literal meaning of her statements during this time. Specifically, Aileen uses gesture and posture in a highly organised and mutually elaborate manner to add a richer sense of emotive expression to her literal
meaning. This can be seen in line 10 where she uses a broad sweeping right hand gesture, moving from her central torso outwards towards the judge and jury to convey perceptually salient information, and can be seen to emphasise an image of ‘I’ vs ‘them’. Beginning with herself, as the recipient of the sentence and initial centre point ‘I’, and then motioning outwards towards the courtroom ‘them’ in what Matoesian (2012:372) calls a ‘path and motion-encoding gesture which creates a dynamic image of how far apart ‘I’ and ‘they’ are, and the symbolic chasm that now exists between the identity of the members of the courtroom (and by association the American Justice System and its values), and ‘I’ the guilty, threatening and deviant individual. During this moment, she also utilises one particular gesticulation that acts as part of a language-like system that relies on form-meaning conventions such as emblems or quotable gestures (such as the OK sign for sign language users which convey meaning independently). In this case, the western community specific sign ‘flipping the bird”, is used which on this occasion is co-expressive with her words and obtains a gestalt-like sense of significance when combined with her statement “fuck you motherfucker”. In addition, this final performance of speech-gesture synchronisation can also act as an outward symbol/ sign as to how the user wishes to orient within the community and construct identity. In the case of Aileen, the idiosyncratic hand gesture that generally (although not invariably co-occurs with speech), can be construed as an outward display of defiance, and solidarity with a position on the deviant side and periphery of society. Supporting this, Einstadter and Henry’s (2006: 207) study claims that individuals “are susceptible to identity transformations through their social interactions,” and suggest that once an individual is labelled deviant or criminal, they may internalise this label and act in accordance with the behavioural expectations associated with it. Aileen’s behaviour in this post-trial scene certainly lends evidence supporting this claim, as her
behaviour acts in accordance to what we would expect of someone with an oppositional and stereotypically ‘criminal’ identity. In addition, our own findings also address a limitation within Einstadter and Henry’s (2006) investigation, as up until the time their investigation has been conducted, there had been very little insight as to how such behaviour would manifest in a formal setting such as the courtroom. Their claim also adds a further level to our analysis of the construction and performance of identity within the courtroom, as while we have so-far examined how Aileen independently and agentively constructs her own narrative identity during the trial, it is clear that identity can also be socially negotiated and imparted by society upon the individual, internalised by them and performed. This finding thus leads to a larger issue that questions how independent we are as individuals in the construction and formation of our own unique personalities, value systems and ultimately identity. As our own study (in conjunction with findings from other investigations), demonstrates that to a certain extent, our ability to be independent free-agents from dominant ideologies operating in society, and freely expressive in our identity performance only goes so-far. This can be as we have seen within Aileen’s own behaviour, as while she is able to freely-express herself to some extent within the court, this freedom it has a considerable price upon how she is perceived and much of her behaviour is dominated by the desire to control her public-image and appear to conform with dominant patriarchal ideologies (see MacKinnon, 1989; Smart, 2003; Kennedy, 2005) and stereotypes regarding femininity inherent in the court.

It is also within this final scene that we are made more abundantly aware of the incongruity of Wuornos’ facework performances during the course of her trial, as they oscillate between compliant and cooperative displays and challenging, obstructive and frequently face threatening performances of self. The next section will move on to
analyse just what unstable performances of facework tell us about Wuornos’ personal constructs and values, in order to reveal the motivations and drivers that engender each contrasting performance of self-image.

5.2.4 Personal Constructs: Defining Wuornos’ Facework

In Section 5.1, it was highlighted that an element of doubt must be considered in Wuornos’ performance of conformative and cooperative behaviour, as the cultivation of such a positive self-image, in its enhancement of the positive face of the other and its threat to her own negative face needs, is in sharp contrast to demonstrations of non-cooperative and challenging behaviours during the trials (excerpts 1, 2 and 3), that include a shocking display of anger and FTAs against the judge in the final verdict reading. These behaviours tend to manifest when she is challenged by authority figures requesting further information or discourse topics are introduced to the interaction that threaten the positive self-image Wuornos is attempting to cultivate with her audience. This non-cooperative facework behaviour demonstrates that beneath the surface performance of her facework, there lies a darker side to Wuornos’ personality, one driven by very different value constructs than her superficial performance of face suggests.

Particularly, her obstructive, non-cooperative and FTA facework with the questioning attorney (excerpt 2), and the judge (excerpts 1 and 3) suggest that there exist core PCTs which are very different to those suggested by the positive self-image she performs during her interactions. These darker PCTs surround the value constructs of power and self-direction, with the former defined by a person’s need for social standing, prestige, and control over resources, and the latter by the needs for unimpeded independent thought and action. The illustrative component values of these personal
constructs can be demonstrated by Wuornos’ needs for control over her narrative, particularly her use of evading questions, by avoiding and detracting from certain topic areas that may damage her self-image, and by selective editing of the evidence and self-image she presents to the court (see section 5.2 onwards). Most importantly, within this is the lack of sustainability her positive self-image seems to have when challenged by issues during interaction that threaten her positive self-image. From this evidence, there is a strong suggestion that the personal construct values of power and self-direction are the guiding principles of Wuornos’ facework performances. According to Schlenker and Pontari (2004: 204), these values influence the self-image people try to present to others, while their cognitive underpinnings affect face claims in interaction. In support of the current findings, and by implication, those of Kelly (1967) and Spencer-Oatey (2007), Simon (2004) makes the important point that all such personal value constructs, no matter whether they are construed in terms of individual or relational identities, are both cognitive and social in nature. On the one hand, people form cognitive representations of who they are that are relatively stable. In the case of Wuornos, it is the personal values of power and self-direction which act as the core guiding principles affecting her face claims and sensitivities. Within this, they also appear to be the main motivators behind the superficial positive self-image she tries to cultivate with her audience, essentially with the agenda to attain approval and be seen as the innocent rather than guilty party in the crime. This suggestion is also backed by Simon (2004), who attests that individuals also construct and negotiate their identities through social interaction, using their values to read social situations and perform according to the agenda they wish to achieve.

Supporting the notion that Wuornos’ facework and narrative performance of certain value constructs are disingenuous when seen in the light of the more non-
conformable and obstructive behaviours, is the theory by Spencer-Oatey (2007), which postulates that facework exists on two performative levels. In her 2007 paper, she describes how face and identity involve different levels of performance, two of which concern individual and relational face. Individual face refers to self-definition as a unique individual and can be related to Wuornos’ core value constructs of power and self-definition. On the other hand, relational face refers to the self as a group member and can be indicated by Wuornos’ cultivation of a positive self-image and the value constructs that are connected to this image. This can be evidenced by the current findings, whereby Wuornos’ facework oscillates between two extremes of behaviour, when she conforms at certain points of the interaction, before challenging at the next.

However, while the current findings clearly lend support to Spencer-Oatey’s (2007) theory, they also extend the examination of facework by the further analysis conducted into PCT which, in conjunction with face, provides strong evidence to suggest that PCT also operates on two performative levels. This notion is supported by Kelly’s original (1955) theory, whereby his corollary definitions also imply such a notion (see Section 2.3 for further reading). According to Kelly (1955), and evidenced by the current study’s findings, it appears that Wuornos’ facework (and by implication her performance of PCTs) operates on two levels. Firstly, there is Wuornos’ apparently unsustainable display of a positive self-image which, according to Spencer-Oatey’s (2007) theory, operates on a purely relational level, designed to amalgamate her own personal needs for approval, by adopting socially approved behaviours. This relational tier is in line with Kelly’s sociality and commonality corollary levels of PCT. The superficiality and relational element of these corollaries lies in this definition and related performance. Sociality is described as the extent to which one person construes the construction process of another (such as their desires and wants from the interaction,
and similar to face needs), while commonality shares the same relational frame, and is
defined as the extent to which one person employs a construction of experience, akin
to that employed by another (Kelly. 1967: 14). With this in mind, we can see the
parallels existing between not only face needs and PCT, but also how these interact to
create strategic employment of face strategies, such as those performed by Wuornos in
her cultivation and performance of positive self-image. In contrast to this, her displays
of uncooperative and aggressive behaviours relate to the second tier of Spencer-Oatey’s
theory, the individual. Within this again, Kelly’s (1955) theory aligns well with
Spencer-Oatey’s (2007), as his corollary definition of PCT also takes into consideration
the individual and ‘core’ personal values that motivate and drive interactive
performance. On this individual, and core level, he references the individual and
construction corollary. Kelly (1969) defines ‘individual’ as how people differ from each
other in their constructions of events and defines the construction corollary as the
methods by which a person anticipates and interprets events by applying the result of
their previous experiences in the current situation. In reference to Wuornos, it can be
seen that she uses her PCT to interpret her environment, particularly in reading the
social needs/desires of others (using the sociability and commonality corollaries) to
perform a conformable and positive self-image for her audience. By enacting this image
through her use of strategic facework, designed to cultivate cooperation and conformity,
and reflecting the shared values and norms of her society, she is using her understanding
and reading of the social environment, in conjunction with her own individual and
construction corollaries (power and self-direction) to create the relational performance
of self (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). However, within this there is also a wider socio-cultural
influence at work, one that exists within the operationalisation of the criminal justice
system that not only produces and reproduces patriarchal ideologies (see MacKinnon,
1989; Smart, 2003), but also works to influence and shape both our superficial core and personal constructs, and ultimately narrative performances of identity and understanding of self in society.

In conclusion, this study suggests that a richer understanding of facework is achieved by the use of an interpretive frame from the work of George Kelly (1955) and his PCT, and viewing it in conjunction with literature surrounding feminist theory such as those from MacKinnon (1989), Smart (2003), and Kennedy (2005) adds a richer depth to our understanding of human behaviour, particularly as to how identity and performance are constructed, than current behavioural interpretative frameworks alone would provide. Indeed, by using these perspectives in conjunction with one another the new framework for analysis proposed by the current study, constitutes an original contribution to knowledge as it achieves a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural and psychological motivations that drive an individual’s performance of identity, than the purely linguistic facework framework used in isolation would normally do. This new framework for analysis which incorporates PCT, also allows researchers to isolate the psychological drives and intentions behind face performance, as it reveals how much a primary force, individual’s personal value constructs are on human behaviour, particularly the construction and performance of self-identity both at the individual and relational level.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

The central research goal of this study, was to explore the links between facework and Personal Construct Theory (PCT) to develop a richer understanding as to the motivations and intent that drive public performances of face in interaction. Chapter 1 provided a brief history of the social understanding of ‘violent women,’ and the legacy pertaining to this issue that has ramifications for women on trial or those caught within the process of the justice system. This included looking at cross-cultural case examples, before finally detailing the case and trial of Wuornos. Once Aileen’s history had been provided, the study then moved on to describe ‘Activity Types’, outlining the issues of social/institutional power (particularly in regards to patriarchal ideology), endemic within the courtroom environment and its drastic impact upon interlocutors’ public performances when engaging in dialogue in the court, an issue which is supported by literature (see MacKinnon, 1989; Smart 2003, Kennedy, 2005). These issues and their impact upon public performance of face, linguistic and other multimodal behaviours were then compared and contrasted with finding from recent investigations (see References) into non-institutional discourse. Finally in Chapter 1, previous studies demonstrating the power institutional discourse can have upon case verdicts were detailed, along with stressing the importance of facework in these contexts, which was examined in conjunction with PCT in order to establish a deeper understanding of identity performances in such contexts.

Following on from this, Chapter 2 began by looking at the literature and studies pertaining to the value PCT has in contributing to the field of facework, by focusing on the issue of the extent to which a person’s sense of self in a non-formal environment
differs to that of their social enactment of face in a formal institutional setting, where they are privy to other variable forces which impact upon their sense of identity and ‘selfhood’. Following this, the chapter went on to examine how this may inform their understanding of face and their enactment of facework strategies. This included sections which defined PCT and its personal construct corollaries, and how these are manifested in displays of guilt or hostility in communication. Finally, the chapter examined the practical application of PCT and its subsequent revisions by psychological practitioners in the criminal forensic field.

Chapter 3 moved on to describe the concept of facework, from its original theory by Goffman (1967) to its subsequent revisions by various theorists, before finally settling on and validating the perspective this study chose to follow regarding the framework used by Grice (1969; 1975) and Penman (1990), with input from findings by Spencer-Oatey (2007), who is one of the few theorists who has emphasized the value of examining environmental variables that impact upon the performance of face (and reinforces the possibility of a complementary relationship existing between facework and PCT). Finally, the PCT frameworks of Simon (2004) and Schwartz and Bardi (2001) were briefly introduced. They suggest that an assessment of personal value frameworks can be used to ascertain what may drive human behaviour in interaction, before illustrating that in order for researchers to be able to locate the motivation and drivers behind people’s behaviour, a grounded and practically applicable method for measurement must be established, something which a multidisciplinary methodology combining facework and PCT could engender. Addressing this need stands as this study’s original contribution to knowledge, as the multidisciplinary method of analysis employed in the current study has not only allowed for a better understanding of human behaviour to be established than the two fields of linguistics and psychology have been
able to facilitate to date, but it has also laid the foundation for further research in both fields of study to gain a richer insight into human behaviour.

In Chapter 4, I introduced a discussion of the documentary film genre and introduced the data source for this study. Within this, I explored the nature of selective editing, framing and construction of narrative voice inherent in the genre within the chapter, as well as the difficulties posed when examining the data presented in such documentaries under the forensic linguistic frame of analysis. Specifically, I addressed how directors often have free-reign to edit footage in order to persuade their viewing audience of a certain line of argument, and highlighted that due to the narrative framing techniques they use, it can often be difficult to remain objective when running the footage through a forensic linguistic analysis, hence this study’s focus only on the courtroom footage of Aileen, rather than her one-to-one speech events with the director.

Finally, in Chapter 5, an analysis of Wuornos’ facework performances during her trials was conducted, using a combination of Grice’s CP (1969) and of Penman’s (1990) facework framework, before the chapter moved on to a discussion of what a linguistic analysis, such as this, tells us about Wuornos’ PCT. In this latter stage of the analysis, a combination of Simon’s (2004) and Schwartz and Bardi’s (2001) personal value frameworks were used to discuss what the facework strategies identified indicated about Wuornos’ PCT, particularly what her linguistic behaviour tells us about the primary motivators that engender her choice of facework strategies during her interactions with the judge.

As demonstrated, the main aim of this thesis has been to explore the links existing between facework and an individual’s personal constructs or values, taking into consideration Grice’s CP as part of the data analysis. During the analysis, the study attempted to unpick how the nature and performance of an individual’s facework is
primarily motivated by their own personal PCT, thereby addressing the deficit in current facework literature regarding how personal intention and esoteric cognitive reasonings as to the world around them and themselves within it, are the primary motivators in their selection and use of certain facework strategies during interaction. In addition, being able to demonstrate links between facework and PCT, from the somewhat isolated disciplines they reside in (those of psychology and linguistics), also addresses the deficit in existing PCT literature regarding how an individual’s personal value constructs manifest themselves in communication. This dual focus on extending the existing knowledge in both schools of thought, not only acts as an original contribution to knowledge in both fields, but also provides the disciplines with a scientifically valid and multifaceted framework from which to analyse what have been, until now, elusive issues.

6.1 Original Contribution to Knowledge, Limitations and Potential for Future Research

Within the current body of facework literature, the link between PCT is largely uncharted territory, although there have been forays into the realm of psychology by studies such as Archer’s (2011a), Spencer-Oatey’s (2007) and Penman’s (1990) work on facework frameworks. It has been these authors in particular, who have sought to investigate the intent and motivations that drive an individual’s use of facework in communication. However in order to explain how PCT through facework manifests itself in discursive interaction, this investigation has sought to expand on the current body of knowledge by considering how the fields of psychology and linguistics may intra-inform each other, specifically by considering how individuals operationalize
Grice’s (1989) CP, and what their use of language may reveal when under the microscope of an identity framework analyses such as those proposed by Simon (2004) and Schwartz and Bardi (2001). Such a methodology has been carried out within this study, not only to add more scientific weight to the current linguistic analyses available in the fields of facework and PCT, but also to demonstrate that by integrating a linguistic strategy of data analysis with PCT (specifically within the realm of identity theory), we are afforded a richer interpretation and insight into interactive and communicative behaviour than current literature viewed in isolation, offers. It is the view of the current author, that this multidisciplinary approach, and what constitutes this study’s original contribution to knowledge, was needed, because one of the main issues within facework literature has been the idea of intention, and the ever-elusive question regarding the reasons why a person would choose one facework strategy over another at that particular stage of the interaction. In addition, questions that also arise from this concern what it is about that person’s understanding of themselves, and their role within the dialogue, that makes them behave this way, which is where the value of using a combination of facework and PCT approaches lies.

This theme of understanding people, their intentions and constructions of selfhood has long been a popular topic within academia and mainstream media, and nowhere is this better exemplified by our society’s interest in female serial killers. Aileen Wuornos, possibly the most famous female serial killer of the 20th century, has been the source of various literature, film and topical debates, with Nick Broomfield’s award-winning film, documenting her life, crimes and trial, constituting the most well-regarded footage of the woman herself, revealing in detail her complex and often contradictory character away from the framed discourses (see Section 1.3) she is subject to in other media portrayals. The advantage of using Wuornos as the subject of the
current research is that she is a real rather than fictional character, which, if we take Grimshaw’s (1990) view, makes the “inferences and attributions plausible” (281), as the current research garners data from an “optimally complete behaviour record”. As a result of this, the current thesis provides another original contribution to knowledge that, using the characterization of Wuornos, the analysis has been able to unpick a regularity in terms of her behaviour that (thanks to PCT) can be generalized as having some internal coherence, rather than being viewed as a series of isolated reactions during interaction. Indeed, the current analysis, in terms of its characterization, relation to facework and to PCT, given the models that have been applied to analyse the data, allows for a plausible, scientifically-grounded and informed analysis of the character of Wuornos, as all appearances, actions, and speech accurately reflect those of the woman herself, away from any poetic license or dramatization abundant in other forms of media.

The course of this analysis has shown that the nature of communication is a far more multi-layered concept than would have been anticipated, given the current ideology around the notion that, even if opinions differ, and people choose to be non-cooperative in communication, the fundamental belief in a common goal of communication is to achieve a mutually recognized goal and outcome (Grice, 1989). In this case, and particularly within the courtroom environment, this common goal of communication surrounds the ideology relating to the notion of ‘justice’. Particularly, this relates to how justice is dispensed, how interacting parties and officials within the court environment arrive at and decide upon a fair verdict, and what doing the ‘right’ thing by the parties involved actually means, all as part of a shared activity type. However, what is also clear from Wuornos’ own dialogue with the court is that the notion of justice itself is, in reality, an entirely subjective concept, very different from
the social ideology held by the authorities she interacts with. For Wuornos, justice is primarily driven by her own personal constructs surrounding her independent rights as an agentive individual, rather than being the safeguarding of American society, something very clearly exposed during the analysis, where two very different performative ‘selves’ are on display. Her facework is driven by two core personal values (PCTs), power and self-direction, which influence her performance of self-image, from its cooperative and compliant display, to the challenging and obstructive one.

It has, however, only been through conducting an interdisciplinary study, combining a linguistic analysis of facework and the Gricean CP, with Kelly’s PCT, that has revealed the many layers of performance involved in communication, from the superficial to the core. Without the contribution of a further analysis of linguistic data, using the psychological perspective of PCT, no such richer and more insightful appraisal of linguistic performance could have been achieved.

Necessarily, this thesis has involved a detailed study including a subjective interpretation of the interactions taking place between courtroom officials and Wuornos, which in itself can be seen as a major limitation of the project, due to the paradoxical position I have as an observer, whose own PCTs may influence my interpretation of events and interaction. Similarly, the excerpts studied have been relatively few, and have concentrated on the behaviour of Wuornos, rather than taking into consideration the interaction and dynamics taking place between all interlocutors and attendees involved in the trial. Additionally, the data for this study has been elicited from a documentary, which has its own awareness of the crime and its various media framings (see Section 1.3), and watching the entire documentary during the transcribing process means that my own interpretation of Wuornos herself may have been coloured.
This is inasmuch as I have been conditioned as a social actor myself, in expecting her to be the deviant and manipulative character often framed (see Section 1.3) by much of the public media following her case. An interesting study here would be to show the footage to researchers with no prior understanding of Wuornos and assess their viewer interpretations.

Another limitation is, of course, a cultural one. The character of Wuornos and her framing within Nick Broomfield’s film means that her behaviour is under scrutiny based on American-British norms and values surrounding face and social norms. The same film footage translated and shown in a different country may not elicit a similar interpretation of Wuornos’ face and personal constructs, and given the time restrictions on the current study, it has not been possible to make any cross-cultural conclusions relating to the international generalization of the links between facework performance and how it informs us about individual personal constructs and values. Despite this, it has been demonstrated that a definitive link exists between the two concepts, particularly as to how facework is indicative of individual PCT, with strong evidence to suggest that these constructs are the central drivers for the selection and performance of facework (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis).

Further research focusing on the links between facework and PCT would be useful in two areas. Firstly, given the rise in popularity of reality TV and other such forms of exploitative media which show a disturbing trend towards the idea of voyeurism. Specifically, with conflicting interactional discourse becoming a more acceptable form of public entertainment, future investigation could offer further information regarding human social behaviour particularly as to how conflict situations and audience pressure impact upon facework performance and corresponding PCT. In addition, given that the courtroom inflicts its own dominant ideological force upon self-
presentation (as demonstrated by the findings within this study), a less formal environment where face is connected to social prestige rather than capital punishments, it would be useful to examine what personal constructs are manifest by interlocutors in their use of facework, and what it informs us as to social cultural value systems of the 21st Century. Finally, further implementation of the framework developed by this study would also be fruitful in the field of deception detection (and potentially psychopathology), when applied to the private interview of suspects before and during trial periods, specifically examining how understanding PCT and facework may assist in a better comprehension as to the intent and purposes of individuals who engage in deceitful behaviour.

Using data gathered from the courtroom for this investigation has yielded results that have established a strong link between an individual’s use of facework and PCT. However it has also been a fruitful course of study from a secondary socio-political perspective. While Aileen’s inconsistent identity performance has lent concrete proof towards the existence of public and private performance of identity, it has also acted as evidence supporting MacKinnon’s (1989: 159) claims that “the social systems of our culture act as tools of dominance and repression... [that]… fundamentally shape our realities of self-expression.” Indeed, much of the information gathered as to the nature of performative behaviour (from this investigation as well as others), demonstrates the influence of socio-ideological forces as to our construction of identity and positioning and understanding of selfhood in society, as well as questioning whether we are ever able to freely express our identities as independent agents. Evidence from the study, has demonstrated how Aileen frequently attempts to project a highly feminine self-image using the multimodal resources at her disposal (such as embodied conduct), as well as identifying herself as a vulnerable victim of rape, rather than a prostitute (who
she alleges) was assaulted by a client. While this feminine image is often undermined by outbursts of an underlying secondary identity who is obstructive and challenging, it nevertheless supports Kennedy’s (2005: 2-3) claim that women appearing before the courts “still encounter myths and stereotypes which disfigure the legal process,” as it is clear that Aileen is acutely aware the her ability to attain freedom is based on her ability to convincingly perform a female stereotype. As Kennedy (2005: 3) states, “failing to conform to the gendered image of womanhood could have serious ramifications as “female defendants often find innocence is underpinned by [how well] they fit a traditional model [of] what is truly female.” Adopting a strategically performed identity, reflected in her use of facework and projection of socially approved value constructs, rather than behaviours that are reflective of her true character, Aileen is “accepting law’s terms in order to challenge the law”, and therefore as a woman (according to Smart, 2003), Aileen “is conceding too much.” By performing a highly feminine identity to (possibly attain justice for herself), Aileen is acting as an active agent that produces and reproduces dominant patriarchal ideological values that are in fact disenfranchising her as a female, and most importantly as a female defendant who may or may not be guilty of a crime. Such behaviour, while it has been instructive for this study’s investigation into facework and PCT, has also revealed that the “legal system, far from being a neutral arbiter from which to establish the truth of events (Smart, 2003: 5), is in fact a structure of power designed to normalise and control society.

With this in mind, attention now comes to the impact such power structures hold over individual identity construction, specifically how we as independent and active agents develop our personal constructs of the world and position ourselves within it. What feminist social theory reveals about the results from this investigation is that our
performed identities are not only filtered by our own personal constructs before they are performed, but that these personal constructs are firstly negotiated by the influence of dominant social ideologies. In the case of Aileen, her ability to represent herself as an individual must first be filtered through her social identification as a *female defendant*, with the notion of innocence predicated upon her ability to conform to the expected social standards accorded to her gender. This view is also supported by Connell (1987), whose theory of discourse psychology found that “subjects ‘use’ discourses, and that discourses play themselves out through the actions and inner worlds of individuals who identify themselves through particular meanings, ideas and ideals (Connell, 1987: 32). In other words, one is positioned in discourses both by oneself and also through the operations of power, which echoes a dictum of Marx when he states “people ‘make’ discourse, but not in discursive conditions of their own choosing (Connell, 1987: 32).” This theory therefore suggests that facework performances of identity are not simply filtered by our lived experience as social and individual agents, but rather as lived experiences of individuals experiencing a social life that is dominated by certain ideological and hegemonic frameworks related to issues such as class, gender, race etc. Such frames of reference appear to mould our construction of PCT, acting as experiential filters through which we experience ourselves and society as well as frames to compartmentalise and control us as individuals.

This leads to a final question as to the ramifications of such an Orwellian social theory, as it undermines the notion that we possess the ability to individually construct identity, or whether we will ever be enfranchised enough to freely express it without fear or favour, another original contribution to knowledge worthy of future investigation. However, current PCT literature remains optimistic in its stance on the agentive ability of the person to independently construct meaning and value regarding
themselves and their world, as the danger of viewing PCT from an entirely discourse and ideologically centred social view is that “the scope for personal intervention can appear minimised”, to the extent that “people become the tools of language and social processes, lacking agency (Norton, 2006: 16)”. Instead, Norton (2006: 21), contends that “constructs like discourses create and constrain new experience”, essentially determining what will be perceived as reality by the individual. Constructs can thus be seen as “bringing the phenomena into being (Norton, 2006: 21)”, which suggests that people do make personal discriminations between features of experience, but the categories they use and assign to them, are filtered through discursive, social and ideological criteria. An example of this is provided by Kelly (1955: 693), when he states that “resources for building constructs have always been pre-existent and carry meaning and effects beyond what is consciously intended by an individual’s appropriation of them. An example of this statement can be found when we look at psychological phenomena, as they are not only discursive, but also are connected to meanings and effects which extend beyond the immediate occurrence of the phenomena. To construe oneself as depressed does not give an insight into the ‘true’ condition of one’s psyche; it instead acts to demonstrate an awareness of a resource inscribed within a contemporary discourse of mental illness, which is being used to interpret, enact and ‘bring existence’ to a form of one’s embodied existence (Norton, 2006: 21). However, the contention between these views and the disenfranchising discursive psychological perspective of PCT may be worth further investigation via the framework proposed by this study in its incorporation of facework in order to assess which opinion can be empirically validated, and theoretically grounded. Further study into these conflicting views, particularly under the scope of a facework/PCT framework (as used within this study), would be worthy of future investigation due to its potential to contribute to a
range of fields not simply within psychology and linguistics but sociology and beyond, and therefore deserves greater academic exploration.
**Appendices.**

**3.9.3 Data Transcript**

**Excerpt 1: Arraignment**

1. Judge: *Do you understand the nature of the charge?*

2. Aileen: *Ummm huh, yes I do Sir* (nods head, direct eye contact)

3. Judge: *Do you wish to be represented by a council?*

4. Aileen: *(Nodding head, direct eye contact with judge)* *Yes I do Sir.*

5. Judge: *Can you afford to hire an attorney?*

6. Aileen: *(Shaking head from side-to-side, direct eye contact with judge)* *No Sir.*

7. Judge: *Do you work?*

8. Aileen: *(Rapid blinking)* *No.*

9. Judge: *Ahhhh...?/

10. Aileen: *(Looking around at bystanders in the room)* *Hahaha 'Do I work? I'm in jaaaaaail how can I work....?/

11. Judge: *Well obviously you're not working now,/

12. Aileen: *Oh/

13. Judge: *[interrupting Aileen] 'what I meant was how long has it been since you last worked?*

14. Aileen: *Oh... err.... about (laughs to self, looks down at the floor)... err... since about '84 possibly?*

15. Judge: *Not working for six or seven years (shuffles paperwork).... So how do you - how do you support yourself?*
Excerpt 2: Examination-in-Chief

1. Attorney: Could you describe to us Ms. Wuornos, the events of that night?

2. Aileen: (hands in prayer position on the witness stand table, dressed in white and dark blue suit, crucifix, with make-up and neatly groomed hair) He put the cord around my neck.... (Licks lips, closes eyes and inhales deeply) and he said... 'Yes you are Bitch...(appears breathless)... he said... you’re going to do everything (prayer position of hands begins to change to rubbing them, looks up at the ceiling before leaning forward in her seat).... I tell you to do.... and if you don’t I’ll kill you right now and I’ll fuck you after (opens hands in a pleading gesture)... I'd.... (inhales deeply) just like the other sluts I’ve done (kneading her hands intensifies, inhales deeply)... and (gulps and inhales again)... umm.... and he said it doesn’t matter to me... your bod...- your body will still be warm for my... huge (palm of hand raised to chest height in a pleading gesture, smiles and looks down at the floor)... cock. (inhales deeply)... and.... he said - he was choking me and holding me like
(gestures to demonstrate)... this... and he said... 'Do you wanna die slut?'... And I. I just nodded 'no' (inhal...es) and then he said... are you- are you gonna. listen to everythin' I'm gonna say... and - and have you do?... And I... I just nodded 'yes'... (opens up hands)... and he told me to - to lay down.... on the ... car seat...

3. Attorney:  
**Okay, then what happened next?**

4. Aileen:  
**Uuuhhh** (inhal...es deeply looking down rocking back and forth in her seat)... then he- then he decid-... he... began to start.. having...ahhh... (Gestures with hands, nods her head as if pleading with audience to excuse what she is about to say)... **anal sex** (breathes out, rocks back and forth in seat)... Okay... (Looks down to the right)... and.... (Gestures with hands to the audience, closing eyes for a few seconds, inhal...es)... he's doing this... in.... very violent manner... err (closes eyes gesture back and forth motion with right hand)... movement... and then he... I don't know... he became err.... I don't know. Err... climax... I talk street - I talk street talk talk... so ...I don't know.... if he did that.... and then he violently then took himself out.... and put himself/

5. Attorney:  
**What were you saying?/**

6. Aileen:  
**Back... into my vagina/**

7. Attorney:  
**But what were you saying to him at that point?**

8. Aileen:  
(stares at the speaker and pauses)... **No.... I was cryyyving.... my braaaains out....**

9. Attorney:  
**Okay... then what happened?**

10. Aileen:  
(l...ooking down holding the side of her head)... all right, so... err.... takes Vaseline and.... lifts up my legs... and put what... turns out to be rubbing alcohol in a Vaseline bottle.... and he sticks... some (looks at speaker directly and gestures as to the motion of the victims actions).... up ... up my... rectum area - or whatever.... breathes... and that really hurt real bad, 'cause he tore me up for quite a while... and (begins to cry and looks at the ceiling).... then he put some in my vagina... which really hurt bad.... and then he walked back round to the driver's seat side.... and pulled my nose up like this (demonstrates).... and squirt - started rubbing alcohol down my nose.... and then he said 'and I'm saving your eyes for the grand finale' and he put the Vaseline back on the dash... (breathes out)... and I was really pissed, (stares down at the floor) I was I just didn't care I didn't care, I was a' yellin' at him and everythin' else... (looks up at the attorney) and he was 'a laughin' sayin' that's what he wanted to hear me cryin' and in all that pain... I thought to myself I gotta fight or I'm gonna die... this guy is goin' to play with me and play with me and then he's gonna kill me... he's already says
he's goin' to kill me... he's... he's already says he's killed other girls I gotta fight. I jumped up real fast and I spit in his face, and he said 'your dead bitch your dead', and he was... (gestures) wiping his eyes... and I- I lay down real quick and I grabbed my bag.... and he's... startin' to come for me... when I grab my bag and (motions the drawing of a pistol) drew my - whipped my pistol out toward him (gunshooting gesture)... and he was comin' towards me... with his... his right... arm I believe... and I shot immediately and I think I shot twice as fast (closes eyes for a second) as I could.... (leans back and exhales deeply looking at the attorney)
Excerpt 3a: Final Plea

1. Aileen: (Standing to address the court, looks around at bystanders in the courtroom before reading from a sheet) *I have made peace with my Lord and I have asked for forgiveness* (licks lips, looks up at bystanders), *I am sorry that my acts of self-defense ended up in court like this, but I take full responsibility for my actions, it was them or me* (Looks up at bystanders). *I am sorry for all the pain my actions have caused. I am prepared to die if you say it is necessary* (inhales deeply, long pause, gulps and looks up from the paper she is reading from to the right of her at her defence team).... *But I am not afraid to die* (looks around at bystanders)... *as I have found peace with myself.*

Excerpt 3b: Sentencing and Post-Trial Process

1. Judge: *The court has decided that you.... Aileen Carol Wuornos, be electrocuted until you are dead. And may God have mercy upon your corpse... I sentence you in case number 91 dash 463, to death for the murder of Troy Burrows.... case number 91 dash 304 I sentence you to death for the murder of Charles Humphreys, case number 91 dash 112 Citrus County Case number, I sentence you to death for the murder of David Spears*/

2. Aileen: (Smiling) *Thank you... and err...* (raises eyebrows and sneers as she smiles at the bystanders in the court) *I'll be up in heaven when y'all be rottin' in hell...* (turns to Steve Glazer but states this loudly enough for all to hear while smiling) *I hope he gets raped in the ass someday....* (still smiling, takes a long drink of water from a paper cup while glaring at the judge)... *scum bags of America*

3. Judge: *Okay there will be an automatic appeal, (turning to look at Aileen) you have the right to an appeal... Mr Glazer is that going to be...*

4. Aileen: (Leans forward and states directly into the microphone while glaring at the judge) *May your wife and kids get raped...*

5. Judge: *Hh.. Handled by you? Mr. Glazer?*

6. Aileen: (Leans into the microphone) *Right in the ass...*

7. Judge: *Errr... right I think there's something else that- that needs to be said.../

8. Aileen: (Pointing at herself, and rocking backwards and forwards in her chair) *I know I was raped and* (pointing at the judge) *you ain't nothin' but a bunch o' scum.../

9. Judge: *Therefore these proceeding are now concluded/

10. Aileen: *Putting somebody who was (shouting) RAPED... TO DEATH...* (gestures outwards from her body to the courtroom with her right hand)
11. Judge: and....

12. Courtroom Attendant: Right could we have some order please/

13. Aileen: (Turns to look at the judge) *Fuck you, mother fucker* (struggling with guards she gestures 'the bird' at the Judge as she is escorted out)....
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