Herissone-kelly, Peter N (2012) Wrongs, preferences and the selection of children: a critique of Rebecca Bennett's argument against the principle of procreative benefience. Bioethics, 26 (8). pp. 447-454. ISSN 02699702
PDF (Publisher's post-print for classroom teaching and internal training purposes at UCLan)
- Published Version
Restricted to Registered users only
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01870.x
Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation--the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong--is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds that the intuitions of those who adhere to the principle are not genuine moral intuitions, but instead simply give voice to mere (non-moral) preferences.
This paper, while agreeing that Savulescu's principle does not express a genuine moral obligation, takes issue with both of Bennett's theses. It is suggested that the argument for the negative thesis is either weak or question-begging, while there is insufficient reason to suppose the positive thesis true.
|Uncontrolled Keywords (separate with ;):||procreative beneficence; Bennett; Savulescu; intuition; preference; impersonal harm; non-person-affecting wrong|
|Subjects:||Historical & philosophical studies > Philosophy not elsewhere classified|
|Schools:||College of Culture & the Creative Industries > School of Humanities and Social Sciences|
|Deposited By:||Peter N Herissone-Kelly|
|Deposited On:||27 Mar 2012 09:31|
|Last Modified:||22 Oct 2016 13:00|
Downloads per month over past year
Downloads for past 30 days
Repository Staff Only: item control page