Values-Based Practice and Reflective Judgment.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 15
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.0.0177
In this paper, I relate values-based practice (VBP) to clinical judgment more generally. I consider what claim, aside from the fundamental difference of facts and values, lies at the heart of VBP. Rather than, for example, construing values as subjective, I argue that it is more helpful to construe VBP as committed to the uncodifiability of value judgments. It is a form of particularism rather than principlism, but this need not deny the reality of values. Seen in this light, however, VBP is part of a broader conception of clinical judgment that can be compared with Kant’s conception of reflective judgment. This is a useful way of marking similarities between a number of issues raised in philosophy, which can inform a better understanding of clinical judgment.
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