Turner, Ian David (2011) Freedom From Torture in the "War on Terror": Is it Absolute? Terrorism and Political Violence, 23 (3). pp. 419-437. ISSN 0954-6553
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.549027
Freedom from torture is regarded as “absolute,” meaning that a state cannot infringe the right for purposes which would seem legitimate such as the protection of national security. Indeed, the freedom is viewed as “non-derogable”; that is, infringements are not permitted even in special circumstances such as times of war or public emergency. Is it right, however, with the growth in international terrorism post-9/11, particularly suicide violence, that the freedom should remain without limitation? Perhaps the torture of terror suspects might provide state authorities with intelligence so that acts of atrocity can be averted? To go on and construct a possible argument justifying ill-treatment against a detainee this article questions whether in fact freedom from torture can be categorised as absolute.
|Uncontrolled Keywords (separate with ;):||human rights; terrorism; torture; War on Terror|
|Subjects:||K Law > K Law (General)|
|Schools:||College of Business, Law & Applied Social Studies > Lancashire Law School|
|Deposited By:||Richard D Taylor|
|Deposited On:||02 Apr 2012 10:23|
|Last Modified:||13 Mar 2014 11:05|
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