

Decolonisation and the Imperial Cricket Conference, 1947–1965: A Study in Transnational Commonwealth History?

by

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Abstract

The game of cricket is often discussed as an enduring legacy of the British Empire. This dissertation examines the response of the Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC) as the official governing body of ‘international’ men’s cricket to developments related to decolonisation of the British Empire between 1947 and 1965. This was a period of intense political flux and paradigmatic shifts. This study draws on primary sources in the form of records of ICC and MCC meetings and newspaper archives, and a wide-ranging corpus of secondary sources on the history of cricket, history of the Commonwealth and transnational perspectives on history. It is the contention of this dissertation that these cricket archives have hitherto not been exploited as commentary on decolonisation or the Commonwealth.

Due attention is given to familiarising the reader with the political backdrop in the Empire and Commonwealth against which the ICC is studied. Primary source materials are used extensively to reconstruct and scrutinise major ‘off-field’ developments that affected the ICC in this period. This enables the dissertation to bring together the political Commonwealth, the non-governmental Commonwealth and the ICC for a comparative study. Using this synthesis as a framework, it analyses the ICC’s response to decolonisation. The dissertation also introduces literature on transnational perspectives on history and assesses the Commonwealth of Nations—of which the ICC was an important part—from this perspective. The last chapter concludes proceedings by highlighting the contribution of this dissertation to the wider body of historical knowledge.

Based on the evidence, the dissertation finds that cricket’s encounter with decolonisation was unhappy and protracted. The clash of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth, much-chronicled in commentary on the political Commonwealth, was echoed in the world of cricket. The ICC is portrayed as one among a plethora of individuals, institutions and interest groups that participated in the process of decolonisation of the British Empire. Against the backdrop of the demise of the British Empire, the Imperial Cricket Conference could be seen a Commonwealth interest group that, as a transnational site, continuously grappled with conflict arising from lingering (real and imagined) ‘bonds’ of empire and assertion of British soft power on the one hand, and increasing assertion of national identity and rights by member states on the other. One can read the ICC as a microcosm of important debates within the Empire and the Commonwealth in this period. The ICC is a rich repository of information on decolonisation *and* cricket and decolonisation *in* cricket.

In spite of its long association with the Commonwealth, there has been little sustained engagement with cricket in Commonwealth studies. This dissertation attempts to address that gap by probing the historical role of cricket. It also offers fresh institutional and transnational perspectives in contrast to the dominant social history paradigm in the literature on cricket.

Keywords: Commonwealth, Cricket, Decolonisation, Imperial Cricket Conference, Transnational History

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Any errors in fact or judgement are mine.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACB	Australian Board of Control for International Cricket (later, Australian Cricket Board and today, Cricket Australia)
Bart.	Baronet
BCCI	Board of Control for Cricket in India
BCCP	Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan (today, Pakistan Cricket Board)
BCCSL	Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka (previously, Ceylon Cricket Association and today, Sri Lanka Cricket)
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CPU	Commonwealth Press Union (after 1950)
CwI	Commonwealth Institute (after 1958)
EEC	European Economic Community (until 1993)
EPU	Empire Press Union (until 1950)
ICC	Imperial Cricket Conference (later, International Cricket Conference and today, International Cricket Council)
MCC	Marylebone Cricket Club
MP	Member of Parliament
NZCC	New Zealand Cricket Council (today, New Zealand Cricket)
PM	Prime Minister
PMM	Prime Ministers' Meeting
RCS	Royal Commonwealth Society (after 1958)
RCU	Rhodesian Cricket Union
SACA	South African Cricket Association
SACBOC	South African Cricket Board of Control

SASA	South African Sports Association
UCRC	Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (until 1991)
VL	Victoria League
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas
WI	Women's Institute
WICBOC	West Indies Cricket Board of Control
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

Chapter One: ‘Where the British flag went, so too went cricket’¹

The story of the spread of cricket via various foot-soldiers of the British Empire is a well-known one. The game of cricket has a long and eclectic history. Ever since the serious study of sport within the historical discipline was pioneered by historians such as Allen Guttmann and Wray Vamplew in the latter half of the twentieth century, research on various aspects of sport and its development has seen an insatiable growth. Apart from painstaking work on the development of the game on the cricket field, there is now also a rich body of literature on imperial diffusion of cricket and in turn, the appropriation and ‘making’ of sporting cultures in the colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Within its political context, cricket is said to have embodied imperial values, colonial aspiration, nationalism, class and ‘race’. If cricket played in Australia reflected attitudes towards its own national identity and nationalism, immigration, religious differences and racism, administrators in New Zealand treated cricket as a reaffirmation of ties with Britain. On the West Indian islands, historical writing has focused on the adoption of cricket by the plantation elite and various classes of non-white groups, the complex and stratified club cricket structure, entrenched racism in the governance of West Indian cricket and its subsequent era of nationalism and dominance in international cricket. Similarly, South African cricket functioned as a microcosm of South African politics. On cricket in India, studies have looked at the embrace of cricket by various religious communities under British rule, princely patronage and India’s latterly rise as an economic giant in international cricket. English cricket was beset by class (amateur vs professional) and regional divisions, in addition to the ‘imperial values’ attributed to it in public schools. In the country of its origin, cricket was closely linked to the Marylebone Cricket Club (hereafter, MCC). The MCC was established in 1787 as a private men’s club. Cricket, of course, pre-dated the MCC but its arrival on the scene hastened codification of the game. The MCC took charge of the organisation of English cricket from the closing years of the nineteenth century. Thus, whether looking at relations between colonies and England or relations between various communities in each colony,

¹ Brian Stoddart quoted in Dean Allen, ‘South African Cricket and British Imperialism, 1870–1910’ in Dominic Malcolm, Jon Gemmell and Nalin Mehta, eds., *The Changing Face of Cricket: From Imperial to Global*, Routledge (2010), p. 45 (reference 10).

cricket has plenty to offer to students of imperialism². The historiography of cricket over the decades also provides an insight into agency, visibility and invisibility of various groups. The conspicuous absence of Aboriginal and Māori participation in mainstream cricket and early historiography in spite of their adoption of cricket at the height of imperial rule, the growth of cricket among the black population of South Africa, cricket played among ‘lower castes’ in India, are all examples of subaltern cricket. The prolific body of literature on cricket cultures from various disciplinary perspectives is a testament to the versatility of the game.

So when the British Empire faced its demise, how was this most imperial of games affected? This dissertation is an attempt to study the impact of decolonisation of the British Empire on the governance of international men’s cricket. The main concern of the dissertation is the relatively under-studied Imperial Cricket Conference (hereafter, ICC) which served as the organising body of international men’s cricket until 1965.

The establishment of the Imperial Cricket Conference on July 15, 1909, by England (represented by the MCC), Australia (represented by the then Australian Board of Control for International Cricket; hereafter ACB) and South Africa (represented by the South African

² On all of these, see Hilary McD Beckles, *The development of West Indies cricket Vol.1: The Age of Nationalism*, Pluto (1998); Hilary McD Beckles, *The development of West Indies cricket Vol.2: The Age of Globalization*, Pluto (1998); Hilary McD Beckles & Brian Stoddart, eds., *Liberation Cricket: West Indies Cricket Culture*, Manchester University Press (1995); Mihir Bose, *The Magic of Indian Cricket: Cricket and Society in India*, Routledge (2006); Rowland Bowen, *Cricket: A History of Its Growth and Development Throughout the World*, Eyre & Spottiswoode (1970); Jon Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket*, Routledge (2004); Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, Picador (2002); Richard Holt, *Sport and the British*, Oxford University Press (1989); Boria Majumdar, *Lost Histories of Indian Cricket: Battles Off the Pitch*, Routledge (2006); Boria Majumdar, ‘Communalism to Commercialism: Study of Anti-Pentangular Movement’, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 38.7 (Feb. 15-21, 2003), pp. 656-664; J.A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal*, Routledge (1998); Bruce Murray & Christopher Merrett, *Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket*, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press (2004); André Odendaal, *The Story of an African Game: Black Cricketers and the Unmasking of One of Cricket’s Greatest Myths, South Africa, 1850-2003*, David Philip (2003); Dilwyn Porter & Stephen Wagg, eds., *Amateurism in British Sport: It Matters Not who Won Or Lost?*, Routledge (2008); Greg Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket: 1832-1914*, Routledge (2004); Brian Stoddart & Keith Sandiford, eds., *The Imperial Game: Cricket, Culture and Society*, Manchester University Press (1998); Wray Vamplew, ‘Playing with the rules: Influences on the development of regulation in sport’, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 24.7 (2007), pp. 843-871; Stephen Wagg, ed., *Cricket and National Identity in the Postcolonial Age: Following On*, Routledge (2005).

Cricket Association; hereafter, SACA) was driven by political and economic motives³. Following the Anglo-Boer Wars and the suggestion of Abe Bailey of South Africa⁴, the ICC was founded at the height of the British Empire amidst imperial fervour. It was decided that the ICC would oversee and regulate cricket between these three countries. The President and Secretary of the MCC were to be, *ex officio*, Chairman and Secretary of the ICC. Lord's Cricket Ground, the home of the MCC, thus became the headquarters of cricket.

Interaction under the aegis of the ICC was fairly intermittent in the early years. Apart from a largely unsuccessful triangular tournament organised in England between the three countries in 1912 and a meeting in 1921, the activity log of the ICC was quiet. This lull was brought to an end in 1926 when the next round of meetings was held⁵.

The year 1926 was a significant one in which the ICC held multiple meetings. Membership rules, that would later have a significant impact on the shape and nature of the ICC, were introduced. The West Indies, New Zealand and India, who would shortly

³ For more on political and economic motives behind the establishment of the ICC, see Richard Holt, *Sport and the British*, OUP (1989), pp. 184-185; Jon Gemmell, 'The Springboks were not a test side': the foundation of the Imperial Cricket Conference', *Sport in Society*, Vol 14.5 (June 2011), pp. 701-718; Albert Grundlingh, 'From J.J. 'Boerjong' Kotze to Hansie Cronje: Afrikaners and cricket in twentieth-century South Africa—diffusion and representation', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol 28.1 (2011), pp. 98-114.

On its establishment, see document in ICC archives entitled 'Rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference – Adopted by the Imperial Cricket Conference on 28th June, 1950 (Amended 21st July, 1953; 17th July, 1958; and 15th July, 1959)'. See also the ICC website: <http://www.icc-cricket.com/about/62/icc-organisation/history> (last accessed: 08/08/2013): "On 15th June, 1909 representatives of all three countries met at Lord's under the chairmanship of the President of MCC, the Earl of Chesterfield, and agreed to stage a Triangular Test Tournament. A month later, under Lord Harris's chairmanship, a second meeting set the Imperial Cricket Conference on its way, when rules were agreed to control Test cricket between the three nations."

⁴ Sir Abraham 'Abe' Bailey, then President of SACA, was a highly-influential and extremely well-connected South African mining magnate and protégé of Sir Cecil Rhodes. Abe Bailey donned many hats – politician, Randlord, landowner in South Africa and Rhodesia, press baron... He sat in the parliaments of Cape Colony, Transvaal and the Union of South Africa. He sponsored the South African arm of the Round Table movement. He was close to the British colonial establishment in South Africa and the MCC and as a result, was able to moot the idea of an imperial cricket conference for political benefits. He also funded cricket tours to South Africa [Bruce Murray, 'Abe Bailey and the Foundation of the Imperial Cricket Conference', *South African Historical Journal*, Vol 60.3 (2008), pp. 375-376; Gemmell, 'The Springboks were not a test side', op cit., p. 711; Christopher Merret & John Nauright, 'South Africa' in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., op cit., p. 62. See also the above ICC link].

⁵ There were no meetings between 1909 and 1921. (ICC website, op cit.) The triangular tournament had also been proposed by Abe Bailey to consolidate the ICC and the imperial relationship. Gemmell noted that Australian resistance to such a tournament was considered secondary by the MCC and political heavyweights to the political and economic benefits that would accrue from treating South Africa as an equal within the ICC (read: Empire). See Gemmell, 'The Springboks were not a test side', p. 701 & p. 706. According to the ICC website, "The weather that summer was appalling and problems in Australia meant that their major cricketers refused to come. The [triangular] tournament was not a success."

thereafter become full members and tour England to play official test matches, were invited to participate in the meetings of 1926. It was also decided in 1926 that the ICC would thereafter consist of “governing bodies of cricket in countries *within the Empire* to which cricket teams are sent, or which send teams to England”⁶ (emphasis added). These steps—confinement of official cricket to the British Empire and immediate addition of new members from within the Empire to the ICC—made cricket virtually synonymous with the British Empire, and its administrative body, the ICC, with the MCC. The United States of America, which had regularly received teams from England since 1859 and had sent teams to England, was now excluded from official cricket. This decision of the ICC also institutionalised the England-centric nature of cricket. For the next few decades, cricket would largely mean bilateral exchanges between England and the other members.

After the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, and India’s admission to the Commonwealth as a republic, political changes meant that membership of the ICC was linked to membership of the “British Commonwealth”⁷ rather than the Empire.

Jon Gemmell investigated the reasons behind selective incorporation of specific countries into the ICC as members. How did Australia and South Africa come to be founding members of the ICC, superseding the USA, the West Indies and India? The reasons for this go beyond bottom-lines of scorecards and boundaries of the cricket field. As Mike Marqusee pointed out, when South Africa joined England and Australia in 1888-89, cricket was less developed there than in North America “but the compulsions of empire were always uppermost in the minds of the MCC elite, and at that moment the empire was deeply engaged in staking a claim to South Africa, where vast gold deposits had been discovered”⁸. At a time when Australia found itself isolated from Britain with several foreign powers (Germany, Japan) venturing into its backwaters and when South Africa’s economic potential had started

⁶ This meeting was chaired by Lord Harris (ICC website). This is also confirmed by minutes of the MCC meeting held on May 31, 1926 and the membership document in the ICC archives entitled ‘Rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference – Adopted by the Imperial Cricket Conference on 28th June, 1950 (Amended 21st July, 1953; 17th July, 1958; and 15th July, 1959)’. See also successive annual editions from Wisden starting from 1927. The West Indies played its first official test match in 1928, New Zealand in 1929 and India in 1932.

⁷ Minutes of ICC meetings held on July 19, 1948 and June 27-28, 1950 and ‘Rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference...’, op cit. See also annual editions of *Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack* from 1951 onwards.

⁸ Mike Marqusee, ‘The Ambush Clause: Globalisation, Corporate Power and the Governance of World Cricket’, in Stephen Wagg, ed., *Cricket and National Identity in the Postcolonial Age: Following On*, Routledge (2005), p. 256. See also Gemmell, ‘The Springboks were not a test side’, op cit.; Murray, ‘Abe Bailey and the Foundation of the Imperial Cricket Conference’, op cit.

to come to the fore, cricket was used to stake Britain's imperial claim. These political and economic motives, along with 'pride of race', meant that cricket and its embedded imperial ideals could act as a useful bond to consolidate 'the imperial family'. The formation of SACA in 1890 was followed by assumption by the MCC of sole responsibility of English cricket in 1899 (with the first MCC team dispatched to Australia in 1903), and the ACB did the same for Australian cricket in 1905. The next logical step was to create an international body which was duly achieved in the form of the ICC in 1909. The careers of prominent participants—to be discussed in greater detail in due course—highlight the association of cricket with the imperial project⁹. The confinement of cricket to British-administered areas meant that the imperious edicts of the MCC were rarely challenged.

The nature and working of the ICC were summed up by *The Times* in 1960 in these words: "The Imperial Cricket Conference, which can be convened by M.C.C. or on the request of any two of its members, brings together the governing bodies of the seven major cricketing countries within the Commonwealth. Founded in 1909 it discusses matters of common interest and in doing so aims to guide the development of the game along the healthiest lines."¹⁰

As later chapters will discuss, the ICC underwent significant changes in 1965. Thereafter, new 'Associate' and 'Affiliate' members were regularly added to the ICC. If new formats, rules and tournaments were ushered on to the cricket field in the second half of the twentieth century, the question of apartheid South Africa and the Australian media magnate

⁹ For instance, Lord Harris was at the time both *de facto* leader of the MCC and Chairman of Consolidated Goldfields (Gemmill, 'The Springboks were not a test side', p. 706). Roland Bowen noted that "it was an early illustration of the power of South African gold in influencing policies in Britain" (Bowen, op cit., p. 150). It would appear that the subsequent induction of the other members in 1926 was also based on their strategic importance, networks and support within the MCC elite. Writer and journalist Mihir Bose noted that it was on the insistence of former England captain Arthur Gilligan that the Board of Control for Cricket in India was set up by Englishman Grant Govan and his Indian employee A.S. de Mello. The visit by Gilligan's MCC team to India in the winter of 1927 had been financed by the Maharajah of Patiala. Intended primarily at the time to benefit the 'European' population in India, the establishment of a governing body for cricket enabled Gilligan to lobby the ICC on India's behalf (Indian representatives at the 1926 meeting were Englishmen A. Murray Robertson and William Currie). Similarly, the powerful former England captain Pelham 'Plum' Warner, who was born in Trinidad and retained his affection for West Indian cricket, was instrumental in helping the West Indies secure Test status. [See Mihir Bose, op cit., pp. 29-30; Barry Rickson, *Duleepsinhji: A Prince of Cricketers*, Parrs Wood Press (2005), p. 172 and Hilary Beckles, 'Pelham 'Plum' Warner's Project' in *The Development of West Indies Cricket: Vol. I The Age of Nationalism*, pp. 35-68]

¹⁰ *The Times*, Saturday, Jul 09, 1960, p. 7. Pakistan joined England, Australia, South Africa, the West Indies, New Zealand and India in 1952.

Kerry Packer's World Series Cricket, a spectacular paradigm-changing commercial offensive, dominated proceedings off it.

In 1989, the organisation changed its name to 'International Cricket Council'. In the same year, the practice of automatic assumption of ICC chairmanship by the President of the MCC was stopped. It was as late as 1993 that the ICC received its first non-British Chairman in the form of the West Indian great Sir Clyde Walcott. In the same year, the post of Chief Executive Officer was created in lieu of the traditional MCC Secretary. Even if these extremely belated actions signalled a delinking of the governance of international cricket from the MCC, the ICC remained headquartered at Lord's until 2005 when it moved to its own office in Dubai¹¹.

As has been widely documented, since the 1990s, international cricket has seen momentous changes. Ruthless exploitation of the commercial potential of cricket has propelled India to the position of the richest cricket board. The advent of the shortest format—twenty overs cricket followed by the money-spinning 'cricketainment' extravaganza, the Indian Premier League—has been seen as a major defining phase in international cricket. But if international cricket has seen unprecedented geographical expansion and financial growth in the last two decades, the International Cricket Council has also been accused of crippling fecklessness. The ICC continues to be embroiled in controversies related to racial prejudice, thoughtless commercialisation, corruption and match-fixing, illegal betting, threats of terrorism, disparity between cricket boards and players, and the use of technology.

Gerard Holden wrote that "Contemporary world cricket is an arena in which the former imperial centre and a number of postcolonial states compete with each other within a framework of quasi-legal provisions (the Laws of Cricket), associated normative expectations

¹¹ This has not meant a complete break with Lord's.

Separately, in 1997, under a new rotational policy, Jagmohan Dalmiya of India became the first President of the ICC. Policy-making and the steering of the ICC were vested in an executive board comprising representatives of all the Test-playing nations plus three Associate members. Reporting to that board were committees covering cricket, development and finance and marketing (ICC website).

(“The Spirit of Cricket”), and an international/ transnational sporting organisation (the International Cricket Council).¹²

This dissertation seeks to investigate the response of the ICC to decolonisation of the British Empire and attendant political changes in the period between 1947 and 1965. In doing so, it traverses and weaves together a sizeable portion of the history of cricket and of the Commonwealth, both of which concurred significantly in history and geography as a result of the British Empire.

Chapter 2 briefly traces the political evolution of the Commonwealth of Nations. What were the main events that led to the emergence of a ‘British Commonwealth’ and later on, the modern ‘Commonwealth of Nations’? Did constituent governments enjoy an equal, harmonious relationship? Did rhetoric match reality? It goes on to conduct a survey of non-governmental connections within the Commonwealth. Was there more to the Commonwealth than inter-governmental bonds? Cumulatively, this chapter illuminates inter-governmental (political) and non-governmental links within the Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century, though it is by no means an exhaustive or thorough study of either.

Chapters 3 and 4 shift focus to the ICC between 1947 and 1965 by seeking to explore the impact of decolonisation on the ICC. What were the political developments that animated meetings of the ICC? The points of discussion have been thematically divided between these two chapters. Chapter 3 investigates issues that affected all the members of the ICC. What role did the MCC play in the ICC? How did the ICC see itself in the wider Commonwealth scheme of things? How did imperial, racial and class divisions manifest themselves in the ICC in this period?

Chapter 4 steers the discussion towards individual member countries. This chapter studies three of them – New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa. The special attention paid to

¹² Gerard Holden, ‘World Cricket as a Postcolonial International Society: IR Meets the History of Sport’, *Global Society*, Vol. 22.3 (July 2008), p. 337.

these three countries is the result of their unique response to developments in this period as reflected by the ICC archives.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 set the stage for the next two chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 5 begins an analytical synthesis of the political Commonwealth, the non-governmental Commonwealth and the ICC. Were there characteristics that were shared by all three during this period of decolonisation?

Chapter 6 offers the culmination of this analysis. Revisiting its central question, Part I of this chapter asks what conclusions can be drawn about the ICC's response to decolonisation based on the evidence examined in the previous chapters. Part II, very briefly, introduces literature on transnational approaches to history and the history of 'internationalism' before going on to assess the Commonwealth in this context. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to scrutinise the position of the ICC in the Commonwealth vis-à-vis its political and non-governmental counterparts and recognise its place as a member of the vast non-governmental landscape of the Commonwealth; and to introduce the Commonwealth of Nations into discussions on transnational perspectives on history, of which the ICC is a part.

The conclusion in Chapter 7 revisits the evidence and arguments presented in this dissertation, and ends with a discussion of the contribution of the dissertation.

The dissertation employs 'British English' spelling throughout. Every attempt has been made to remain consistent in this regard with the exception of quotations that carry the American variant. The past tense has been preferred when reporting the work of other scholars. Once again, quotations provide the exception.

Almost inevitably, there is a degree of simplification. Chapter 2 frequently refers to 'non-governmental entities'. *Faute de mieux*, the phrase 'non-governmental entities' here is a sweeping capture of the otherwise somewhat incongruous set of societies, movements,

institutions and networks that are brought together in that section as a result of that one common characteristic.

The simple reason behind the decision to use 1947 and 1965 as the start and end points was their importance to cricket, and somewhat coincidentally, the Commonwealth. Chapter 5 provides further elaboration. Although minutes of ICC meetings and contemporary newspaper reports dwelt at length on cricketing matters such as no-balls, umpiring decisions, player conduct and ‘throwing’ by fast bowlers, this dissertation has restricted itself to recurring ‘off-field’ developments. It has not undertaken a detailed study of the aforementioned non-governmental entities, nor has it made its concern the ‘why’s and ‘how’s of the process of decolonisation in each colony. Domestic cricket histories and political histories of various constituent members of the ICC and the Commonwealth are also touched upon only where necessary. The reviews of literature on transnational perspectives and the history of ‘internationalism’ in Chapter 6 are far from exhaustive. On the whole, be it the overall dissertation, research at the MCC or the dig in the newspaper archives, it was decided for the sake of practicability to retain off-field events at the ICC level as the focus of the dissertation. Information revealed by ICC archives set the agenda for discussion. Women’s cricket is conspicuous by its absence in this dissertation. Cricket—especially the ICC—in this period was primarily viewed as a male domain even though national women’s cricket associations had already been established in many countries and an International Women’s Cricket Council was formed in 1958. The MCC, which controlled the ICC, remained a men’s club until 1999.

The dissertation has relied on a core of primary source material bolstered by secondary source material. The main focus being the ICC, this dissertation has used extensive primary sources located in the Marylebone Cricket Club Library and several hundreds of newspaper articles from the archives of *The Times*, *The Guardian* (known as *The Manchester Guardian* until 1959) and its sister publication *The Observer* to study it. ICC material sourced from the MCC Library consisted mainly of minutes of ICC meetings. Some of these materials may have been studied previously, but it is the contention of this dissertation that minutes of meetings between 1947 and 1965 have not been seen as a whole, and certainly not as commentary on decolonisation or Commonwealth studies. Several editions of *Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack* were consulted, as were some MCC committee minutes and cricket

magazines. *The Times* and *The Guardian/The Observer* were selected in anticipation of differences between their editorial positions, and their easy digital availability. Examination of other newspapers and tabloids was precluded by time constraints. The databases of these newspapers were fed “cricket AND imperial AND conference” in ‘advanced’ searches between the date range 1947 and 1965. The search terms were limited to the above to keep the results wieldy. Admittedly, in a microcosmic emulation of the whole dissertation itself, this meant relying on the digital algorithm and studying the big picture (i.e., only those articles and reports in this period in these newspapers that contained *all* three words) rather than separately pursuing every thread discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. (In the same way, while the discussion on hospitality occupies considerable space in Chapter 5, newspaper reports of hospitality to visiting cricket teams cited in the chapter were part of the above yield and not pursued separately.) This research journey has afforded the author the opportunity to reflect on the nature of primary sources used here. Comparisons and contrasts between omissions, silences, style and tone of the official ICC sources on the one hand and the newspaper reports on the other, as well as differences between the interpretation and position of each newspaper are highly enlightening.

Where the ICC records maintained a silence or newspaper reports stopped, secondary sources were used to fill gaps, provide context and address obviously tendentious accounts as far as possible. Chapter 2, a brief, somewhat sweeping, and in many places unavoidably superficial, account of developments and non-governmental links in the British Empire–Commonwealth in the twentieth century is almost entirely based on secondary sources. By contrast, Chapters 3 and 4 are almost entirely based on primary sources. This is so because the ICC is the focal interest of this dissertation. Chapters 5 and 6 rely on both as they weave the ICC and the political and non-governmental Commonwealth together. Throughout, the dissertation is alert to the romanticised and sentimental nature of some of the scholarly publications exhumed from the mid-twentieth century. They have been used purely as windows into such a mind-set. The articles of the Australian Commonwealth scholar Duncan Hall used here, for example, epitomise such a view. Their deployment must not be construed as agreement, acknowledgement or assertion that the characteristics identified by British Commonwealth zealots or that the tropes discussed in Chapter 5 are endorsed by the thesis as authentic or intrinsic Commonwealth values or markers. The thesis, in fact, submits that the Commonwealth, in the first three quarters of the twentieth century, celebrated *real and*

imagined shared attributes, of which the ICC partook. They have only been discussed insofar as they affect the ICC, to highlight then prevalent beliefs and the complex and changing relationship between various parties. The author is also far from oblivious to the fact that not all sources are entirely robust. For instance, the biography of Pelham ‘Plum’ Warner by Laurence Meynell betrays a strong tone of hero-worship and that of George Oswald Browning ‘Gubby’ Allen by E.W. Swanton, the emotional proximity of biographer to subject. Aware of the varied and uneven nature of the primary and secondary sources, due care has been taken to ground observations and conclusions in evidence.

Having established the parameters by pointing out what could not be done, it remains to discuss how this dissertation envisages its contribution. Its central concern is the ICC’s response to decolonisation. In not pursuing micro-histories (domestic cricket and political histories of members or restricting itself to fewer but in-depth coverage of the individual threads in Chapters 3 and 4), this dissertation has sought to provide a macro-historical picture of the ICC as a whole during decolonisation. Such a ‘zooming out’ has also enabled an appreciation of the transnational links within cricket and the wider Commonwealth of Nations. Relatedly, this big-picture approach has facilitated an unprecedented conversation between cricket history, Commonwealth history and the body of work on transnational histories. Of course, if such a conversation is unprecedented, then the focus on macro-history at the expense of micro-histories or a tangible narrower specialisation may run the risk in the eyes of some of making the author appear, to borrow Pierre Yves-Saunier’s words, an “unfocused historian”¹³. The author is of the opinion that the resultant confluence of various strands of history and historiography is worth the risk. A modest start has been made here; more accomplished historians may be able to exploit this intersection further.

¹³ Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*’, *Journal of Modern European History*, Vol 6.2 (Sept 2008), p. 164. Saunier was, of course, attempting to encourage bold ventures into ambitious transnational histories in spite of any appearance of a lack of focus.

Chapter Two: ‘We want no unwilling peoples within our empire’

This chapter aims to provide an accessible snapshot of the British Empire and Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century. Part I will chronicle major developments in the political (inter-governmental) Commonwealth. It starts with a chronological account of major political changes in the three decades after the Second World War (hereafter, WWII). It then takes note of the brief period of resurgence of imperial sentiment after WWII in Britain aided by the older dominions. The chapter then goes back to dwell on the evolution of the ‘British Commonwealth’ into the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. Part II is devoted to a brief survey of non-governmental entities with Empire/Commonwealth-wide interests during this period of political flux.

(I)

2.1 ‘The age of Nehru and Nkrumah’

Antony Hopkins described the “moment of decolonization” as one “recorded by dates and signalled by ceremony: the guard, political as well as military, is changed; anthems are composed; flags are redesigned.”¹

That, of course, is a description of the official handover, invoking images of the pomp and splendour so closely associated with British official ceremonies. But students of decolonisation use the word to mean something more long-term and complex. David McIntyre, in his book *British Decolonization, 1946-97: When, Why and How Did the British*

¹ A.G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, *Past and Present*, Vol. 200 (August 2008), p. 211.

Empire Fall?, provided a summary of the debates surrounding decolonisation as a scholarly concern. For instance, among others, Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis saw decolonisation as “a process, not an event”. To John Hargreaves, it was “the intention to terminate formal political control over specific colonial territories, and to replace it by some new relationship”. For Leonard Senghor, decolonisation was an intellectual process (“the abolition of all prejudice, of all superiority complex in the mind of the colonizer, and also all inferiority complex in the mind of the colonized”)².

The international atmosphere after WWII was a major contributing factor to various post-war changes that would go on to have lasting effects within Britain and the Commonwealth. Britain saw itself as a link between the USA, Europe and the Commonwealth. Following the almost Pyrrhic victory that was WWII, Britain was no longer the most influential political and economic power in the world. On the one hand was the economic might of the USA, and on the other, the communist threat from the Soviet Union. Arrangements of co-operation with the USA were therefore seen as essential for Britain, as were close relations with Western Europe which was itself left in tatters by the war. British leaders scampered to fill this deficit in status and to propel Britain back into leading player status on the international stage. This is where the British Empire and Commonwealth stepped in. The Empire and ‘British Commonwealth’ (as it was referred to until 1949) were viewed as the perfect vehicle to restore Britain’s glory. It was felt among governing circles in Britain that Britain without the Commonwealth “would lose much of its effective influence and flexibility of power”³.

While this ambition for renewed superpower status endured for over a decade after WWII, several changes occurred rapidly, shortly thereafter, to alter the nature and functioning of the ‘British Commonwealth’. Within two years, India left the Empire to become the new dominions of India and Pakistan with Ceylon (renamed Sri Lanka in 1972)

² All from David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946-97: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?*, Palgrave Macmillan (1998), pp. 7-8.

³ Quoted in Anita Inder Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-49’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 20.3 (July 1985), p. 471. See also Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘The ‘New Commonwealth’ 1947-49: A New Zealand perspective on India joining the Commonwealth’, *The Round Table*, Vol 95, no. 385 (July 2006), pp. 441-454; Linda Freeman, Gerald Helleiner & Robert Matthews, ‘The Commonwealth at Stake’, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol 5.1 (1971), pp. 93-112; Kathleen Paul, “‘British Subjects’ and “British Stock”: Labour’s Postwar Imperialism”, *Journal of British Studies*, Vol 34.2 (April 1995), pp. 233-276; A.G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization, op cit., pp. 211-247.

following suit in 1948. All three would later become republics but would remain in the newly-styled ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. Burma gained independence in 1948⁴ but joined Ireland in exiting the British Commonwealth.

The first elected post-war Prime Minister of Britain, Clement Attlee of the Labour Party, declared, “We want no unwilling peoples within our empire.”⁵ This trend also continued under successive Conservative governments. By the year of the Suez crisis which so damaged Britain’s international standing, Sudan had gained independence. This was followed by the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Malaya (Malaysia) in the next year, and then Nigeria, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika (later Tanzania) in the early 1960s. A two-tier format within the Commonwealth was discussed and dismissed prior to 1949, and then again during discussions on the inclusion of Ghana, Gibraltar and Cyprus. Against the wishes of some older members, the admission of Cyprus paved the way for the inclusion of smaller or ‘micro’ states into the Commonwealth on an equal footing with the older and bigger members⁶. The British West Indies attempted an ill-fated federation of ten English-speaking island territories in 1958 which lasted only until 1962. Full independence followed separately for the various component islands. By the end of that decade, the ‘Wind of Change’ in Africa had ensured the independence of twenty-four colonies⁷. By 1971, membership of the Commonwealth had reached thirty-two, going on to forty-five in the next ten years and fifty-four by the turn of the century. It took a mere thirty-three years from the independence and partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 to the independence of Vanuatu and Zimbabwe

⁴ While India and Pakistan were granted dominion status upon independence, Burma was denied the same. Burma left the British Commonwealth in 1948. Although Ceylon was granted dominion status upon independence in 1948, “use of dominion status was avoided by the Colonial Office in the preliminary constitutional instruments” [David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946-97*, op cit., p. 103 onwards; David McIntyre, ‘The Strange Death of Dominion Status’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol 27.2 (1999), pp. 198-199].

⁵ Elisabeth Wallace, ‘The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall’, *International Journal*, Vol. 17 (1961-62), p. 269; Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Commonwealth at the Queen’s Accession’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 29.3 (July 1953), p. 285.

⁶ For discussions on membership and tiers within the Commonwealth, see McIntyre, ‘The Strange Death...’, op cit., pp. 202-206; McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, pp. 11-12, p. 52, pp. 119-120; David McIntyre, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933-59: Precursors of the Tri-Sector Commonwealth’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36.4 (2008), p. 608 (hereafter, ‘UCRCs...’); Anthony Richmond, ‘The Significance of Multi-Racial Commonwealth’, *Phylon* (1940-1956), Vol. 16.4 (4th Qtr., 1955), p. 386; Frank Bongiorno, ‘British to the bootstraps?’, *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 125 (2005), p. 27 & pp. 31-32.

⁷ David McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, pp. 6-7 & pp. 57-58; Elisabeth Wallace, op cit., p. 269; Kathleen Paul, op cit., p. 275; McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, op cit., p. 603; David McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1965’, *International Journal*, Vol 53.4 (Autumn 1998), p. 755.

in 1980⁸. The pace of decolonisation was swift in keeping with the political mood of the mid-twentieth century, and independence appeared to come with automatic membership of the Commonwealth. Within just three decades of the triumphant WWII victory celebrations, the British Empire had taken long irreversible strides towards liquidation.

The Commonwealth Secretariat opened a new chapter in relations between Britain and its former empire. Following a proposal by new members Ghana, Uganda and Trinidad, its establishment in 1965 as an inter-governmental secretariat independent of the British Government and accountable to all members of the Commonwealth was a major landmark and set the tone for the future direction of the Commonwealth. The Canadian Arnold Smith, who was appointed as the first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, strove to reinvent the Commonwealth and distance it from associations with the British Empire. The responsibilities of consultation, co-operation, and information-sharing were now taken over by the Secretariat from Whitehall. The Commonwealth Foundation, which was established separately, worked towards the creation of professional links at non-governmental levels between members of the Commonwealth⁹.

In the 1960s, Britain came in for severe criticism from Afro-Asian Commonwealth members and Canada for its policies on South Africa and Rhodesia. The chasm between Britain and the Commonwealth widened when the British House of Commons on October 28, 1971, voted in favour of Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (hereafter, EEC). As it happened, on that very day, royal assent was given to a new immigration bill that sought to increase restrictions on non-white Commonwealth immigration into Britain.

In 1971, the first newly-styled Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was held in Singapore under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. It was yet another landmark as important treaties were agreed and Pacific Island states attended for the first time.

In McIntyre's words, "[i]f the 1960s had been the decade of agonising about the disengagement-before-bloodshed, about the criteria for membership of the Commonwealth,

⁸ David McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, p. 11.

⁹ David McIntyre, 'UCRCs....', p. 608; McIntyre, 'Canada and the Creation...', op cit., p. 753 & p. 761.

and about whether or not to ‘enter Europe’, the 1970s would be the years when most of the remnants of Empire were discharged and the files closed on the Pacific, the Caribbean, and Southern Africa”¹⁰. By the late 1970s, “the Commonwealth had become a mainly Third World forum”¹¹.

All of the above led to a gradual relinquishment of Britain’s pre-eminent status in Commonwealth relations. The Commonwealth arrangement moved on to what came to be known as the ‘tri-sector Commonwealth’ (more on this in Chapter 6). Harshan Kumarasingham observed that “The Commonwealth [evolved] into an influential organization unique in its ability to foster closer trade, educational, technical, sporting and cultural relations among equal and autonomous members from an organization created from, and in defence of, imperialism and the preservation of a predatory colonial empire.”¹²

Thus had “Milner’s age . . . given way to that of Nehru and Nkrumah”, and “Mandela’s was on the horizon . . . ”¹³

2.2 ‘Confetti of Empire’

In spite of depleted economic resources, pressing political problems in South Asia and elsewhere, the acknowledged need for massive and long-term post-war reconstruction, the need to borrow from the USA and the professed need to rebuild Britain’s weapons capacity, the sights of British leaders of all parties were set on what appeared to them as a logical and necessary part of Britain’s restoration: salvaging and reorganising Britain’s imperial possessions and reclaiming lost glory. The Empire–Commonwealth would aid in this effort and would also deliver political and economic benefits, but in several different ways. In order

¹⁰ David McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, p. 68.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 75.

¹² Kumarasingham, op cit., p. 451.

¹³ A.G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 228.

to project a strong image, Britain would have to be firmly in charge of this group. Politically, it meant repositioning of the remainder of the Empire after 1947. Culturally and socially, the Commonwealth would have to be “demographically strong” and “united under British leadership”¹⁴. Economically, raw materials from the colonies, imperial preferences and the sterling area would act as a “buffer” against the ill-effects of Britain’s wartime debts and desperate need for domestic reconstruction¹⁵. A letter to *The Times* in 1955 spoke of the need for “a Commonwealth of Nations, that if not in name at least in sympathy, remains British”¹⁶.

In her study of Britain’s Nationality Act of 1948 and assisted passages and government incentives to facilitate emigration of white British citizens to Australia, New Zealand and the other dominions, Katherine Paul asked, “Confronted with . . . financial crisis, immediate labor shortage, long-term population decline . . . what government would countenance, let alone encourage, emigration?” before going on to suggest that Prime Minister Attlee’s actions were those of “a government convinced that the long-term benefits of shoring up the Empire/Commonwealth were greater than the short-term costs to Britain’s domestic infrastructure”¹⁷. As plans were afoot to harness the Empire and Commonwealth politically and economically, the Attlee government realised the need for further “innovative weapons”¹⁸ to bolster Britain’s international standing and diffuse ‘Britishness’ to the dominions. These proposals to “strengthen the British world” stemmed from “notions of racial superiority and racial unity that were still central assumptions of the imperial order”¹⁹, a line of thinking “based on a conviction of Britain’s historic and rightful place in the international community and fuelled by a persistent ‘Great Power psychology’”²⁰.

The first successful scaling of Mount Everest in 1953 by a British-led ragtag team of climbers drawn from the Commonwealth coincided with the coronation ceremony of Queen

¹⁴ Kathleen Paul, op cit., p. 234.

¹⁵ Kathleen Paul, p. 234 (quotes); Francine McKenzie, ‘In the National Interest: Dominions’ Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 34.4 (2006), p. 561; Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 224; Bill Schwarz, ‘The only white man in there’: the re-racialisation of England, 1956-1968’, *Race & Class*, Vol. 38 (1996), p. 67.

¹⁶ *The Times*, April 23, 1955, p. 9.

¹⁷ Paul, p. 255.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 236.

¹⁹ Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 217.

²⁰ Francine McKenzie, op cit., p. 553.

Elizabeth II²¹. At this time, on the one hand was acute consciousness among British circles of Britain's slowly waning international influence and on the other hand, a keen desire to prove to themselves and the world that “the traditional values associated with empire”²² and Britain as a power were still relevant. In this context, the success of the Everest expedition was timely succour to believers in *Pax Britannia*. Gordon Stewart found that this event was interpreted by imperialists as displaying evidence of the very “typical English” characteristics that had made Britain a natural world leader at the height of its Empire: “stoicism”, “gentlemanly reserve”, “knack of dealing with ‘native’ races”, organisation and technical preparation, inventiveness, scientific expertise, military conquest, monarchy, manly character, the British Empire as a beacon of liberty, self-government, and economic development . . . ²³ The opportunity to play up the importance of the Everest expedition as a Commonwealth-wide effort was not lost on officials and the press. Sherpa Tenzing Norgay (born in Tibet, raised in Nepal but for twenty years a resident of Darjeeling in Bengal, India), had reached the summit with Edmund Hillary (a New Zealand bee-keeper), in a British expedition led by Colonel John Hunt (a British citizen who had lived in Wales but was born in India and had served in the Calcutta police). Analyses of reactions to this event have revealed how the multiple nationalities of the main members of the expedition team were manipulated and appropriated by politicians and the press in their respective countries and submerged in jingoism to serve their own political purposes. Within Britain, the Everest success was viewed largely as a British-led imperial–Commonwealth one. Col John Hunt observed in a radio interview that “it was only right and proper” that the two men who reached the summit were members of the Commonwealth²⁴.

²¹ The reign of Queen Elizabeth II began in 1952. Her coronation ceremony was held on June 2, 1953. News of the successful conquest of the Everest by the British-led team reached Britain on the coronation eve: June 1, 1953. The duo of Hillary and Tenzing had reached the summit on May 29, 1953. [See Gordon T. Stewart, ‘The British Reaction to the Conquest of Everest’, *Journal of Sport History*, Vol. 7.1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 21-39, and the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/29/newsid_2492000/2492683.stm (last accessed on 10/01/2013)].

²² Stewart, ‘The British Reaction to the Conquest of Everest’, op cit., p. 22.

²³ Ibid., p. 22. It has been noted by chroniclers of this Everest expedition that attempts to conquer the Everest had turned into an international rivalry with numerous attempts made to reach the summit of the Everest prior to 1953. When in political control of South Asia, Britain had used its territorial control of access points to the Everest to its own advantage and thwarted attempts by teams from other European states. See Gordon Stewart, ‘Tenzing’s Two Wrist-watches: The Conquest of Everest and Late Imperial Culture in Britain, 1921-1953’, *Past & Present*, Vol. 149 (November 1995), p. 185.

²⁴ Peter H. Hansen, ‘Confetti of Empire: The Conquest of Everest in Nepal, India, Britain, and New Zealand’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 42.2 (April 2000), p. 322. Also see Gordon Stewart, ‘The British Reaction to the Conquest of Everest’ for similar arguments.

The unexpected coincidence of the Everest and the royal coronation was hailed as propitious in the British press with some terming it the start of a new Elizabethan age. An editorial wrote of the “apt timing of the announcement of this great achievement on the eve of the coronation.” The conservative *Blackwood’s Magazine* summed up the mood when it described the Everest success as “a Coronation gift for Her Majesty and a message to the world that strength and courage lived on in the British stock.”²⁵ Peter Hansen quoted the words of Sir George Middleton, then a British envoy to India, who in an interview much later recalled of the euphoria surrounding the Everest expedition: “It was a curious thing because empires die and go away but it doesn’t happen overnight. There is a lot of confetti lying around still, and the confetti of empire was still very visible in 1953.”²⁶ This ‘Commonwealth partnership’ of Hillary and Tenzing in a British-led expedition had thus fortuitously happened at the very moment Britain was attempting to reframe the Empire as a Commonwealth under its leadership²⁷.

While the desire for international prestige ranked high among the priorities of the British governing elite at this time, the work of Francine Mckenzie and others showed that the dominions were equally complicit in this scheme and whole-heartedly supported it, not merely because of their belief in the importance of the ‘British world’ but also as a means to their own more nationalist ends²⁸. The dominions for their part regarded Britain as “the ultimate source of their identities and Britishness as the basis of their unity”²⁹. Following Francine Mckenzie, A.G. Hopkins concluded that in the first decade after WWII, “a revitalised brand of conservatism held the dominions together to an imperial course”³⁰. Elsewhere in the Empire during this time, South Asia had slipped away, independence

²⁵ Both quotes from Gordon Stewart, ‘The British Reaction to the Conquest of Everest’, p. 22.

²⁶ Hansen, op cit., p. 311.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 324.

²⁸ Francine Mckenzie, op cit., pp. 553-576.

²⁹ Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 221.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 227. Hopkins’s work is part of a relatively recent revival of interest in the history and historiography of the ‘Anglo-World’ [phrased borrowed from title of James Belich’s book *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939*, OUP (2009)] after WWII. Much attention has been devoted to the study of decolonisation in African and Asian colonies in this period. The aim of these scholars is to investigate the relationship that developed between settler countries including the USA, with Britain, their ‘internal decolonisation’ and to provide a corrective to the somewhat solipsistic nature of historiography that developed in those countries after WWII. At various points, this dissertation draws on the work of Antony Hopkins, Francine Mckenzie, Kathleen Paul and Tamson Pietsch. See also Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 31.2 (2003), pp. 1-15.

movements had stirred in Africa and the British Caribbean while Britain attempted to assert control over them in various ways.

By the end of the 1950s, however, this revitalisation drive of Britain and the dominions had started to run out of steam and by the 1960s, the end of dreams of imperial revival was near. The Suez crisis, rapid decolonisation, human and civil rights movements, non-alignment, American anti-imperialism, international migration, the race for one-upmanship during the Cold War, events in Cuba, Algeria, Portugal and its African colonies, Britain's European turn, all contributed to “the shrivelling of the concept, and the reality, of the British world”. Hopkins added that after 1960, “there was very little talk of ‘pride and race’ and less still of the ‘pure fire of imperial patriotism’”³¹. In Britain and the older dominions, by the 1970s, the “nationalist-imperialist” generation of Anglophile leaders born in the 1890s had been replaced. Membership of imperial organisations such as the Victoria League shrank in the 1960s and 1970s. Trade dependence and emigration from Britain to the dominions were no longer favoured by both sides in the same manner as in the immediate post-war period³². Peter Oborne observed that British politicians of the 1950s and 1960s “were caught in a . . . state of conflict—haunted by a legacy of imperial grandeur as they groped gingerly towards a menacing formless world” and that failure to deal with this situation “perhaps froze British policy-making”³³. The oft-quoted words of Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State of the USA, uttered in December 1962, pithily captured the uncertainty: “Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role”³⁴.

³¹ Both quotes from Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 228. Also see McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, pp. 89-94, Paul, p. 275 and Schwarz, p. 69, on the same.

³² Hopkins, pp. 231 & 238.

³³ Peter Oborne, *Basil D’Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy, the Untold Story* (Sphere, 2005), p. 192.

³⁴ See Douglas Brinkley, ‘Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech of December 1962’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 33.3 (1990), pp. 599-608. Britain’s imperial adventures in the 1950s included interventions in Iran, British Guiana (later, Guyana), Kenya, and in the Suez Canal crisis.

See *The Guardian*, ‘MI5 files reveal details of 1953 coup that overthrew British Guiana’s leaders’, Friday 26 August 2011: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/26/mi5-files-coup-british-guiana> (last accessed 10/01/2013).

See Bernard Porter, ‘How did they get away with it?’, *London Review of Books*, Vol. 27.5 (March 2005), pp. 3-6. The latter article reviewed Caroline Elkins’ *Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (Cape, January 2005) and David Anderson’s *Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (Weidenfeld, January 2005). Available at: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n05/bernard-porter/how-did-they-get-away-with-it> (last accessed 10/01/2013).

See information on British complicity in the 1953 Iran coup and ongoing British attempts to prevent its public disclosure in ‘CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup’ in the National Security Archive: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/> (last accessed: 19/08/2013).

2.3 ‘So begins the new “Commonwealth of Nations”: British Empire, to British Commonwealth, to Commonwealth – Emperor, to King, to Head’

“Partly by accident, partly by deliberation”, the British Commonwealth had defied definition³⁵. Canada was the first to attain ‘dominion’ self-governing status in 1867, which distinguished it from the ‘colonies’³⁶. By 1907, the word ‘Empire’ had become increasingly unpopular within Britain and the dominions and many including the British Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman felt ‘Commonwealth’ to be a more “homely, native phrase”³⁷. From around the time of the First World War (hereafter, WWI), ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’ was championed as a title for the self-governing white dominions by staunch advocates of imperial unity such as Lionel Curtis and his colleagues through their Round Table movement and magazine³⁸, and the South African statesman Field-Marshal Jan Smuts, to distinguish them from colonies in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere.

³⁵ A.I. Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-49’, op cit., p. 469. See also see S.R. Mehrotra, ‘On the use of the term ‘commonwealth’’, *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol 2.1 (1963), pp. 1-16.

³⁶ See David McIntyre’s expert tracing of the history of the rise and fall of the label of ‘dominion’ in ‘Strange Death...’, op cit.

³⁷ Quoted in McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, pp. 16-18 and Mehrotra, pp. 8-9.

³⁸ Mehrotra, p. 10. Inspired by Lord Milner, the Round Table movement had been established by Lionel Curtis in London in 1909 to champion imperial unity. “*The Round Table* is the name given to a quarterly review of international, Imperial and Commonwealth affairs which first appeared in November 1910 and which, after a brief demise in the early 1980s, is still published today. Originally the magazine was an offshoot of a Round Table study movement, with branches in Britain, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The purpose of these groups was to discuss Imperial problems and their solutions, using material supplied by the central London group, or “Moot” . . . The Moot preceded both the magazine and the study groups, and created both with the “one and only purpose” . . . of orchestrating a movement “to bring about the closer union of the British Empire”.” [p. 1, Alexander C. May, ‘The Round Table, 1910-66’, PhD Dissertation, St. John’s College, Oxford (January 1995)]

Downloaded from the Oxford University Research Archive: <http://ora.ouls.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ee7ebd01-f085-44e9-917b-98d21a0f4206> (last accessed on 10/01/2013).

Link also available on The Round Table website: <http://www.moot.org.uk/about/history.asp> (last accessed on 10/01/2013).

In the Imperial War Conference resolution in 1917, the dominions were referred to as “autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth”³⁹. The 1917 Resolution, while declaring the autonomy of the component states of the British Commonwealth, did not go into any legal or constitutional specifics. The 1926 Imperial Conference which culminated in the Balfour Declaration of 1926, however, explicitly declared, “They are autonomous communities, within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”, thus awarding the dominions equal footing with Britain. This was reaffirmed and legislatively codified in the Statute of Westminster of 1931⁴⁰. All of these, according to the Australian scholar Duncan Hall⁴¹, were signs of “the coming of age of a family of states”⁴².

References to the British Commonwealth ‘family’ in the mid-twentieth century tended to emphasise the informal and unwritten nature of the relationship. Gwendolen Carter⁴³ wrote in 1949 that historically, “[i]nformal, flexible means of consultation coupled with exchange of information have been sufficient to maintain a relatively close family relationship which could stand the strain of criticism and disagreements because there was so much common

³⁹ McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, pp. 16-18; H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, paper presented at ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 47.4 (December 1953), p. 1002. The 1917 resolution spoke of the dominions as “autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same” (Mehrotra, op cit., pp. 11-12).

⁴⁰ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, pp. 1006-1007 (for wording of the 1926 Balfour Declaration); Mehrotra, p. 12; Singh, p. 470; Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 214; McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, p. 18; Hector Mackenzie, ‘An old dominion and the new commonwealth: Canadian policy on the question of India’s membership, 1947-49’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 27.3 (1999), p. 87; McIntyre, ‘UCRCs....’, p. 599. Some of these historians have pointed out that while the Statute of Westminster of 1931 granted the dominions the right to function as independently as they wished in every sphere, only Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State immediately made use of this right. Australia ignored the Statute until 1942 and New Zealand until 1947. At the time of Indian independence in 1947, apart from Britain, the British Commonwealth consisted of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa (and Newfoundland in a *de jure* capacity).

⁴¹ Hessel Duncan Hall was a highly-reputed and versatile “doyen of a school of constitutional historians”. He was variously an academic historian, a public servant and positioned in the British Embassy in Washington. He was known for his monumental expertise in British Commonwealth relations. See entry on Hessel Duncan Hall in the *Australian Dictionary of Biography* by B.H. Fletcher: <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hall-hessel-duncan-10394> (last accessed on 18/08/2013).

⁴² H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23 (1944-45), p. 599. By the 1940s, members of the British Commonwealth had entered into separate and independent regional defence agreements (Singh, p. 471; McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation...’, op cit., p. 754).

⁴³ Dr Gwendolen Carter was described as “a Canadian academic” among the “leading academic specialists on the Commonwealth of the day” and author of books on the British Commonwealth, who had “spent her 1947-48 study leave visiting all the independent Commonwealth countries . . . ” (David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 598, p. 601 and p. 610).

agreement on fundamentals.”⁴⁴ Duncan Hall stressed that such facets eluded quantification and analyses but that did not render them or the Commonwealth any less of a potent political force. The machinery of the British Commonwealth was not based on constitution or contract and was one that did not conform to the ‘legalese’ of political scientists and lawyers. He identified such informality as “characteristic” of British administrative methods⁴⁵ and added that “[f]luid institutions and processes, like those of the Commonwealth, do not leave much in the way of fossilized remains for the student of their history”⁴⁶. The “nerve-centre” of the Commonwealth was London. Hall and Charles Carrington⁴⁷ described the working of the Commonwealth as one that took place through closed conferences and meetings of heads of government, High Commissioners, parliamentary, committee and “working party” meetings, endless streams of dispatches and telegram, constant visits and exchanges of “key personnel” within the Commonwealth including ministers, members of Parliament, officials, members of the armed forces, all of which inculcated a sense of familiarity, close personal co-operation and team-work within the group⁴⁸. The dominions, although independent states and members of the United Nations, were linked to Britain to varying degrees by ties of the Crown, trade, finance, defence, migration, sentiment, sport and culture⁴⁹.

These glowing remarks on the “crimson thread of kinship”⁵⁰ pertained solely to the British-descended white-majority and settler dominions. In the odes to ‘common culture’, ‘social heritage’ and harmony, much of the writing on the ‘old’ Commonwealth appears to have glossed over dissent within those states: the Aboriginal population in Australia, the

⁴⁴ Gwendolen Carter, ‘Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth’, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 22.4 (1949), p. 367.

⁴⁵ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, pp. 603-604.

⁴⁶ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, p. 1008.

⁴⁷ Charles Carrington succeeded Nicholas Mansergh as Professor of Commonwealth Relations at Chatham House and was one of the “leading academic specialists on the Commonwealth of the day” (David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs....’, p. 598, p. 607 and p. 610).

⁴⁸ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth’, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 99.4 (Aug 30, 1955), p. 253 (“nerve centre”). See also H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, p. 604; H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, pp. 1008-1009 & p. 1014; C.E. Carrington, ‘A New Theory of the Commonwealth’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 31.2 (April 1955), p. 144; Gwendolen Carter, ‘The Commonwealth at the United Nations’, *International Organization*, Vol. 4.2 (May 1950), pp. 258-259 .

⁴⁹ See McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, p. 2 & p. 101; Kumarasingham, op cit., p. 451. Robert Menzies, Australia’s longest-serving Prime Minister from 1939-1941 & later 1949-1966, famously declared himself “British to the bootstraps” [Frank Bongiorno, ‘British to the bootstraps?’, *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 36 no 125 (2005), pp. 18-39; Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 231].

⁵⁰ The phrase ‘crimson thread of kinship’ is attributed to Sir Henry Parkes (1815-1896), the former Chartist and farm labourer from Warwickshire, who became Prime Minister of New South Wales and a leading advocate of federation for the Australian states (Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 221).

Māori in New Zealand, the French-speaking population in Canada, the Afrikaners and blacks in South Africa being some. When some of them did find mention, it was usually a cursory one that brushed these differences away as “minor”⁵¹.

Following their independence in 1947-48, India, Pakistan and Ceylon became the newest dominions to join the British Commonwealth. India’s announcement in late 1947 of its intention to become a republic sparked intense discussions within the British Commonwealth on India’s future. The Crown connection had been considered non-negotiable until then⁵²; however, officials in Britain and Canada concluded that the accommodation of India as a republic in the Commonwealth would be a sensible compromise if it meant South Asia could be secured for the Commonwealth and the West against the communist Soviet Union and China. Their ally in these negotiations was Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India⁵³. It was also hoped that this move would launch Britain and the Commonwealth into the orbit of highly influential international organisations. All this meant that in spite of misgivings expressed by leaders of some dominions, this “most audacious and hazardous enlargement”,⁵⁴ went ahead and the Commonwealth expanded to become a multi-racial group. Ireland, part of the British

⁵¹ Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, p. 1000. Also see Fred Soward, ‘The Commonwealth Countries and World Affairs’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 27.2 (April 1951), pp. 192-203 and the cited works of Gwen Carter for similar assessments. Fred Soward was one of the “leading academic specialists on the Commonwealth of the day” (David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 598, p. 600, p. 610).

⁵² For a discussion on the monarchy as the main astringent in the ‘British Commonwealth’ and evolution of the place of the British monarch in the successor Commonwealth of Nations, see Philip Murphy, ‘Breaking the Bad News: Plans for the Announcement to the Empire of the Death of Elizabeth II and the Proclamation of Her Successor, 1952-67’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 34.1 (2006), pp. 139–154.

⁵³ Kumarasingham, p. 447, p. 449, p. 451. Relatedly, credit for the office of the High Commissioner not withering away after 1947-49 “owed much . . . to Nehru’s reluctance to disrupt Commonwealth unity by appointing ambassadors to member states” [Philip Murphy, ‘The Queen’s Other Realms: The Crown and its Legacy in Australia, Canada and New Zealand’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 37.4 (2009), p. 633]. At a time when India was the only republican member of the Commonwealth, Nehru’s message of recognition and welcome to Queen Elizabeth II as the Head of the Commonwealth helped to avert a fresh constitutional crisis (‘New Head of the Commonwealth’, *The Times*, February 9, 1952, p. 6). See also B.R. Nanda, ‘Nehru and the British’, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30.2 (1996), p. 477. On the contribution of Canada, see Hector Mackenzie, op cit.; David J Ross, ‘Official Canadian attitudes towards the Commonwealth’, *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, Vol. 26.2 (August 1980), p. 189; and Linda Freeman, Gerald Helleiner and Robert Matthews, ‘The Commonwealth at Stake’, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 5.1 (1971), pp. 93–112. On Britain specifically, see Singh, op cit.

⁵⁴ Kumarasingham, p. 443. Also see the cited works of Francine Mckenzie, Singh, Hopkins, Paul, Hector Mackenzie, Frank Bongiorno and others on the 1947-48 Commonwealth enlargement and the 1949 London Declaration.

Commonwealth and guided by the Irish External Relations Act of 1936⁵⁵ in relations with the Commonwealth, had severed its connection with the Commonwealth to become a republic days before the historic 1949 Prime Ministers' Meeting.

Accordingly, the London Declaration, emanating from the Prime Ministers' Meeting on April 27, 1949, made history. King George VI would be the last Emperor of India. The London Declaration laid the foundation of the new Commonwealth. The opening paragraph of the statement used “*British Commonwealth of Nations*” for the last time, and closed by stating its decision to become the “*Commonwealth of Nations*, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress”⁵⁶ (emphasis added). The Commonwealth had, thus, rejected form in favour of substance and made the progression from Empire to British Commonwealth to Commonwealth⁵⁷. The British monarch would be “the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.”⁵⁸

While this historic transformation of the Commonwealth into a more politically-updated organisation is widely credited to the top echelons of power in India and Britain, several historians have argued that the older literature lacks “sufficient appreciation of the fact that ultimately this [1949] was a multilateral rather than a bilateral process and that to achieve its ends Britain needed support from other members of the Commonwealth”⁵⁹. The

⁵⁵ Frank Bongiorno, p. 25 (footnote 38). John Costello, who replaced Eamon de Valera as President of Ireland, repealed the External Relations Act. A mere 8 days separated Ireland's departure to become a republic from India's admission as a republic in the Commonwealth in 1949 (David McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, pp. 112 & 117-118). See also McIntyre, 'The Strange Death...', pp. 200-201.

⁵⁶ Hector Mackenzie, p. 102.

⁵⁷ Lester Pearson's remarks in Hector Mackenzie, p. 86, p. 88 & p. 103 (quoting Pearson as having said after the 1949 London Declaration: “So begins the new “Commonwealth of Nations”: British Empire, to British Commonwealth, to Commonwealth—Emperor, to King, to Head.”).

⁵⁸ H. Duncan Hall, 'The British Commonwealth', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, op cit., p. 255. This arrangement meant that the title of 'Head of the Commonwealth' was vested in the person of the British monarch and not the Crown; consequently, successive monarchs would have to be re-elected Head of the Commonwealth by all member-states at the start of their reign. A minority viewpoint led by David McIntyre holds that the title is vested in the Crown [see David McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg from Down Under’: A New Zealand Perspective’, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39.3 (2001), pp. 98-99; Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 100.414 (2011), pp. 634-635].

⁵⁹ Quote from Hector Mackenzie, p. 84. See recurring references in this chapter to the work of Hector Mackenzie, David Ross, Trevor Lloyd, Linda Freeman et al. for Canada's contribution; Kumarasingham for New Zealand and Peter Fraser's views; Frank Bongiorno and Meg Gurry for Australia.

interesting picture that emerges from these accounts-from-the-dominions is one of an immense amount of diplomatic juggling, extremely careful, tactful and occasionally even selective briefing of the dominions by Britain and perhaps most importantly, the presence of appropriate chief personnel. The work of Hector Mackenzie and Frank Bongiorno suggested that alongside Lester Pearson (and Louis St. Laurent) of Canada, the involvement of Ben Chifley (Prime Minister of Australia) and Daniel Malan (Prime Minister of South Africa) as representatives rather than H.V. Evatt or Robert Menzies of Australia and Jan Smuts of South Africa may have been crucial to the outcome of the 1949 meeting. The latter three were seen as intransigent in their attachment to the Crown and hence less helpful in negotiations with India⁶⁰. King George VI is also reported to have remarked to Lester Pearson that “[h]e had little patience with Menzies’ speech” (that the London Declaration had eroded the substance of the previous unity in the British Empire) and was “somewhat sad that Smuts should have taken the same line”⁶¹. Dr Evatt of the Australian Labor Party, Prime Minister Chifley’s Minister for External Affairs, writing in *The Times*, emphasised the importance of “kingship and kinship” in making the British Commonwealth a “brotherhood of Nations”⁶². The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s response was clear: “kinship and kingship” meant nothing to India. It was the dropping of ‘British’ from Commonwealth that had encouraged India to stay on⁶³.

Allegiance to the Crown was the start of many differences between members of the new Commonwealth of Nations. Indian Prime Minister Nehru ruled out the imposition of defence obligations on members of the Commonwealth that would involve taking sides in the Cold War. Nehru saw the Commonwealth more as a forum to address post-colonial issues arising out of new international political developments: self-determination, equality, bilateral relations, etc. Membership of the Commonwealth also provided India the opportunity to

⁶⁰ See Frank Bongiorno, p. 38. Point also reiterated by Hector Mackenzie, Kumarasingham and others.

⁶¹ Bongiorno, p. 38.

⁶² *The Times*, Saturday, Mar 12, 1949, p. 5.

⁶³ Bongiorno, pp. 28-29. Nomenclature of such Commonwealth institutions was evidently of great importance and was seen as lending or depriving of national prestige. India refused to participate in the 1950 edition of what was then called the ‘British Empire Games’ in protest of the word ‘Empire’. India rejoined in 1954 when the title was changed to ‘British Empire and Commonwealth Games’ [Boria Majumdar & Nalin Mehta, “Mutual Benefit Association”: The Commonwealth, India and Nehruvian Diplomacy’ in *Sellotape Legacy: Delhi & the Commonwealth Games* (Harper Collins India, 2010)]. The Games went from British Empire Games (1930-1950) to British Empire and Commonwealth Games (1954-74) to Commonwealth Games (1978-present).

boost its own international standing and be part of influential Commonwealth bodies such as the Colombo Plan which covered an array of areas from education to medicine and sport. Gwen Carter opined that “for India the Commonwealth relationship is intended to be a halfway house between an impossible aloofness in international affairs and participation in the ‘cold war’ on the Anglo-American side”⁶⁴. To Nehru, most importantly, the Commonwealth was “an association . . . brought together by history which—and this to him was of first importance—gave to India, as to other Asian members of it, equal standing with members of European origin . . . opportunities, not otherwise open to them in quite the same way, of influencing world politics, particularly in respect of Asia”⁶⁵. Epitomising the ‘old’ Commonwealth view, Prime Minister Peter Fraser of New Zealand held that the true purpose of the Commonwealth lay in becoming a force against communism in the Cold War. After the communist take-over of China in 1949, Fraser’s New Zealand was the first to respond to Britain’s call for back-up in defence of Hong Kong. Viewing the Commonwealth as more than just a loosely-linked fraternity, Fraser was alarmed at India’s refusal to submit to defence obligations, its neutral values and republicanism⁶⁶.

Immigration and discriminatory policies in the white dominions were also a major source of tension. Australia had installed its infamous ‘White Australia’ policy since its 1901 federation. This policy was widely criticised, most consistently by India⁶⁷. Australia’s racially discriminatory policies on domestic and international issues were immensely unpopular in India and provoked a great deal of animosity, stoked further by the personal rivalry between Prime Ministers Nehru and Robert Menzies and the irreconcilability of their worldviews. Meg Gurry quoted the veteran Indian journalist Sunanda Datta-Ray that

⁶⁴ Gwen Carter, ‘Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth’, op cit., p. 372. See Hector Mackenzie on India’s resolution not to accept military obligations as part of Commonwealth membership on p. 88; Kumarasingham on Nehru’s views on pp. 448-449.

⁶⁵ Nicholas Mansergh quoted in Harshan Kumarasingham, p. 449.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 443 & p. 448. See also McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg...’, op cit; Fred Soward, op cit., pp. 192-203; Elisabeth Wallace, op cit., pp. 269-288; Duncan Hall, *The American Political Science Review*, op cit., pp. 997-1015 and *Foreign Affairs*, op cit., pp. 594-608.

⁶⁷ The White Australia Policy was officially in place from 1901 until 1972 when it was formally ended by the Gough Whitlam government. The White Australia Policy and India’s criticism of it is discussed in Frank Bongiorno, p. 18 & p. 29; Kathleen Paul, p. 252; David Walker, ‘General Cariappa encounters ‘White Australia’: Australia, India and the commonwealth in the 1950s’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 34.3 (2006), pp. 389-406; Hector Mackenzie, p. 94. See Alex Auletta on the use of the Colombo Plan by the Australian Government to generate goodwill for Australia and counter negative international perceptions of Australia’s racial policies [‘A Retrospective View of the Colombo Plan: Government Policy, Departmental Administration and Overseas Students’, *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, Vol. 22.1 (2000), pp. 50-51 & p. 53].

“Menzies was looked on as South Africa's staunchest champion at Commonwealth gatherings . . . favouring an inner club of the older white dominions, leaving new Asian and African members out in the cold.”⁶⁸ New Zealand also had a whites-only immigration policy⁶⁹. India and Pakistan were at loggerheads with South Africa at the United Nations on the issue of apartheid and the treatment of South Asians in South Africa. Indian diplomats used the 1948-49 negotiations on India and the Commonwealth to demand a gradual softening of Canada’s immigration policy, which also favoured American and French nationals over Asians⁷⁰. In spite of differences on immigration, Canada grew to be an ally of the Afro-Asian bloc in the Commonwealth and at the United Nations on major international political issues. Canada was also Britain’s biggest source of support in the Commonwealth in the appeasement of fiercely-divided opinions. By 1961, racial equality was firmly accepted as a fundamental and organising principle of the Commonwealth. South Africa’s state-enforced apartheid had become the biggest concern of the Commonwealth and there were vociferous demands for action against South Africa. Unhappy with what they derided as insipid and hesitant leadership by Britain and inaction on South Africa and Rhodesia, Asian and the new African members of the Commonwealth threatened boycotts and withdrawals. David Ross, writing on the Canadian approach to South Africa at the United Nations, pointed out that Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada sided with the Afro-Asian bloc. He stressed that Diefenbaker’s approach, unlike that of Britain and the other white Commonwealth members, was not

⁶⁸ Meg Gurry, ‘Leadership and Bilateral Relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 1949-1964’, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 65.4 (Winter, 1992-1993), p. 513. The difficult Menzies-Nehru relationship is also discussed in Peter Mayer & Purnendra Jain, ‘More than Cricket? Multiple Dimensions of Australia’s Relationship with India’, paper presented at the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. Available at: <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/mai/files/2012/07/mayerjain.pdf> (last accessed 16/09/2013). See also Hamish McDonald, ‘India: Beyond the Sea Wall Chronic neglect and Australia-India relations’, *The Asialink Essays* (University of Melbourne), Vol. 4 (June 2009), p. 3.

⁶⁹ Paul, p. 252. Also mentioned in *The Times*, Saturday, Jun 22, 1957, p. 7, in a letter to the Editor by Raymond C. Morris entitled ‘Commonwealth Labour Parties’.

⁷⁰ Hector Mackenzie, p. 84, p. 91, p. 94. A letter to *The Times*, June 9, 1954, p. 7 discussed the “severe post-war restrictions on British West Indian immigration” by Canada and the US. On immigration quotas, Mackenzie noted that “[Sir Girja Bajpai, India’s Secretary for External Affairs] had raised the question of immigration policies in Canada and Australia [with Canada’s High Commissioner to India, John Kearney] in the context of India’s likely attitude to remaining in the Commonwealth in May 1948 and the issue received considerable attention in bilateral discussions throughout 1948 and 1949. Eventually, this pressure led to a token concession of annual immigration quotas for India (150), Pakistan (100) and Ceylon (50).” (p. 109, ref 53) Hector Mackenzie further noted that, “Canada’s immigration policies favoured some foreign nationals (notably American and French) [sic] as prospective immigrants over some Commonwealth citizens (particularly Indians, who were excluded with other Asians)” [sic] (p. 91). A letter to *The Times* on a Commonwealth Labour Parties conference in June 1957 noted that “the differing traditions and policies of the Commonwealth Labour Parties far outweigh any Socialist principles they may appear to hold in common”. The letter pointed out that while the British Labour Party stood for racial equality, its Australian and New Zealand counterparts supported the whites-only immigration policies of their respective countries (*The Times*, June 22, 1957, p. 7).

merely to dissuade Afro-Asian members from leaving but to speak out against apartheid and support South Africa's suspension from the Commonwealth⁷¹. Faced with intense pressure and condemnation, South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd led his country out of the Commonwealth in 1961. In his analysis of the scene in mid-twentieth century Britain itself, Bill Schwarz highlighted four themes: (a) the shrinking of England—the imperial state—as the Empire was gradually lost; (b) moves by Britain towards joining the EEC which were supported by a very tiny top elite in British and the US but opposed by British nationalists; (c) anxiety about increasing Americanisation of British culture; (d) fear and racial tension over mass immigration from the West Indies and the Indian sub-continent⁷².

Resolution of disputes within the Commonwealth was another area where the old clashed with the new. India, a new member, did not hesitate to take intra-Commonwealth disputes to the United Nations – a forum it felt was likely to be more sympathetic and likely

⁷¹ David J. Ross, 'Official Canadian attitudes towards the Commonwealth', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, Vol. 26.2 (1980), p. 186-187 & p. 189 ("Nehru applauded Canada's work in bringing into being a multiracial Commonwealth"). Also see James Hamill, 'South Africa and the Commonwealth part one: the years of acrimony', *Contemporary Review*, July 1995, p. 2 ("Canada, however, under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, was less concerned with Afrikaner sensibilities and wished to see South Africa leave the organisation at the earliest possible date. In Diefenbaker's view, opposition to racial discrimination was the 'foundation stone' upon which the Commonwealth was built. By definition, therefore, there could be no place for any regime extolling the virtues of apartheid."); McIntyre, 'Canada and the Creation...', p. 758 ("Early in 1964, Douglas-Home, and later Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth secretary, visited Ottawa, always the first point of consultation over Commonwealth matters"). The analyses of Meg Gurry and others also suggested that Canadian and British leaders treated Nehru as an ally against communism and considered his approval essential to regional pacts such as ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States). Hamish McDonald noted that the Australian Labor Party under Prime Minister Ben Chifley had reached out to India; however, his successor Robert Menzies saw no such need and there was little consideration of India or Asia in his foreign policy. Unfortunately for these two countries, the long coinciding and powerful reigns of Menzies and Nehru at the helm meant that there was little hope of a thaw (Meg Gurry, op cit., pp. 510-526; Hamish McDonald, op cit., p. 2). See Frank Bongiorno, p. 18 ("...the bilateral relationship was generally harmonious in the years between the transfer of power in India in 1947 and the fall of the Chifley Labor government in Australia late in 1949..."). The common opinion among scholars appears to be that India did not feature in Australia's plans for a long time. Australia, until the late 20th century, saw itself as an Anglophone country unfortunately far removed geographically from the rest of the English-speaking and European world, a "speck of white in an ocean of colour" and "on the outer rim of the white peoples" (Fred Soward, op cit., p. 200), thus missing out on forging closer relations with South Asian members of the Commonwealth. However, Jain & Mayer, op cit., p. 7, argue that the prolonged lukewarm and under-explored relations between India and Australia have largely been India's fault for failing to reciprocate Australia's gestures (pointing to Prime Ministerial visits, including 1951 and 1959 visits by Menzies when Nehru was Prime Minister of India, and myriad visits by his successors that were either unreturned or parsimoniously returned) and for the perception in India that in foreign policy, Australia "is not its own man" (Hamish McDonald, op cit., p. 5). It is, however, suggestive perhaps that the first Indian Prime Ministerial visit to Australia as recorded by Jain & Mayer, that of Morarji Desai for a (what eventually turned out to be a bizarrely eventful) regional CHOGM, took place soon after the dismantling of the White Australia Policy by PM Gough Whitlam.

⁷² Bill Schwarz, op cit, pp. 65-66.

to entrench India's newly-acquired status as an independent state. Gwen Carter, examining attitudes towards resolution of disputes in the new Commonwealth of Nations, wrote that while it prided itself on frank and public airing of differences, the pre-London Declaration British Commonwealth had preferred private discussion and settling of matters 'within the family'. Carter also believed that direct interaction between their respective Prime Ministers at Commonwealth summits offered a unique, personalised and informal opportunity to settle otherwise international diplomatic issues. Commentators such as Carter and Hall also noted the recognition of and deference to relations between Commonwealth members at international fora. In the mid-1940s, Hall noted that messages from the President of the United States and other high-ranking officials, American Congressmen and lawyers were often addressed to the 'British Commonwealth of Nations'. Similarly, writing in 1950, Gwen Carter also highlighted recognition by other countries of "special ties existing between Commonwealth members"⁷³. On the India–Pakistan territorial dispute, following a United Nations report and a Norwegian motion, the Canadian General McNaughton, then presiding over the Security Council, was unanimously asked by the United Nations to hold informal talks with Indian and Pakistani representatives to broker peace, on account of being "closely related to both the parties by the ties of friendship and common interest which prevail in the British Commonwealth of Nations"⁷⁴. The appointee as UN representative in Kashmir in 1950 was Sir Owen Dixon of the Australian Supreme Court.

The British Commonwealth had received innumerable references in familial and filial metaphors. In October 1943, addressing the British Houses of Parliament, the staunch supporter and ally of the British Empire, Jan Smuts of the South African United Party, called the British Commonwealth "[t]his great human experiment in political organization . . ." and confidently predicted a long life ahead of it. Addressing the Canadian Parliament on June 30, 1944, then Prime Minister of New Zealand Peter Fraser pronounced that "[t]he British peoples—and when I say the British peoples I mean all the races under the British flag . . . have raised with their sons, around the Mother Country, a wall of fire, and have forged bonds

⁷³ Gwen Carter, 'The Commonwealth in the United Nations', pp. 249-252 (quote from p. 252); Carter in 'Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth', p. 367; H. Duncan Hall, 'The British Commonwealth as a Great Power', p. 596. Hector Mackenzie, Soward and other scholars mentioned the India–South Africa and India–Pakistan disputes registered with the United Nations.

⁷⁴ Carter, 'The Commonwealth in the United Nations', p. 251.

as light as air, though as strong as steel, bonds that are stronger now than ever before . . . the paradox that the freer we become the closer we are together; the more our constitutional bonds are relaxed the more closely we are held in the bonds of friendship; the greater the extent to which government sovereignty is extended to the various parts of the British Commonwealth and the Empire the more truly one we are in sentiment, in heart and spirit—one in peace as well as in war”⁷⁵. The decade following WWII saw continuation of similar rhetoric to a degree. Nicholas Mansergh wrote in 1953 that in his address to the Canadian Parliament in October 1949, Prime Minister Nehru described the reconciliation between India and Britain as “an outstanding example of the peaceful solution of difficult problems”, to which “the rest of the world might well pay heed”, adding further that Commonwealth membership was “inspired and sustained by the free will of free peoples”⁷⁶. A Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in Ottawa in 1952 saw parliamentarians from across the Commonwealth, including India and Pakistan, reaffirm the familial sentiment⁷⁷. At an Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference (hereafter, UCRC) in 1954, it was reiterated that the Commonwealth was characterised by “dislike of formalization and reliance on spontaneous co-operation” and that it was a “holy mystery . . . [a]ny attempt at rational analysis [of which] might create difficulties, misunderstandings and, perhaps, even perplexities, that were not already there”⁷⁸. However, delight in the romanticised ambiguities of the Commonwealth was rapidly on the wane by the end of that decade. The informal methods of functioning and ‘kinship’ ties of yore would soon be banished as the bulwark of the Commonwealth.

In spite of the emphasis on special ‘family ties’ and informal personal interaction, lines of division between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth members were clearly visible in the resolution of disputes. In the matter of treatment of Indians in South Africa (a dispute involving two members of the Commonwealth), trusteeship of South-West Africa and its apartheid regime at the United Nations, South Africa claimed ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and found support from Britain, Australia and New Zealand who were careful not to antagonise

⁷⁵ Both quotes from H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, op cit., p. 598 (Smuts quote), pp. 598-599 & 601 (Fraser quote).

⁷⁶ Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Commonwealth at the Queen’s Accession’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 29.3 (July 1953), p. 288.

⁷⁷ The first full Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference was held in 1948 after the war (H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, op cit., p. 1011).

⁷⁸ An Australian delegate quoted in David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, op cit., p. 606.

South Africa⁷⁹. Carter phrased it clearly when she wrote: “India, spurred by its vigorous anti-colonialism, and opposition to racial discrimination, spearheaded the attempt to censure South Africa; the older Commonwealth members either opposed the resolutions as being too stringent, or else abstained from voting.” As a result of the unrelenting pursuit by Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth of these issues, the older dominions and Britain faced a conundrum: “These countries have had to choose between the traditional line of refraining from judgment on a fellow member of the Commonwealth, and forthright support of standards of human rights and non-discrimination to which they are committed in their own countries.”⁸⁰

By 1965, members of the Commonwealth did not have much in common. As Trevor Reese, then a lecturer in Commonwealth Studies at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, pointed out, some were authoritarian, others democratic; some belonged to alliances, others were non-aligned; some relished high-level consultations on political matters, others needed the economic and technical aid; some valued defence ties and the containment of communism in the Cold War, others prioritised economic development. There were also divided opinions on critical issues such as South Africa, Kashmir and Southern Rhodesia⁸¹.

If the evolution of the political (inter-governmental) Commonwealth was a complicated and painful process, how did the rest of the picture look?

(II)

⁷⁹ Carter, ‘The Commonwealth in the United Nations’, p. 249, p. 252 & p. 254. See also Anthony H. Richmond, ‘The Significance of Multi-Racial Commonwealth’, op cit., p. 386.

⁸⁰ Both quotes from Carter, ‘The Commonwealth at the United Nations’, p. 253. Also see James Hamill, op cit.

⁸¹ See Trevor Reese, ‘Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 41.3 (July 1965), p. 452.

2.4 'A diverse international cast of actors'

Decolonisation of the British Empire was “a complex and overlapping series of processes, driven by a diverse international cast of actors”⁸². Between 1947 and 1965, the Commonwealth underwent dramatic changes moving from a close-knit ‘white’ and ‘British’ club to a much larger and increasingly discordant multiracial organisation. In 1949, there were eight members in the newly-styled ‘Commonwealth of Nations’; by 1965, there were twenty-one⁸³. The reality of violence, oppression, anti-colonialism, anger, fierce nationalism in many places formed a surreal background to the official language of familiarity, friendliness and harmony that accompanied the new multiracial set-up. If Britain’s role on the world stage shrank dramatically, it also started to experience tension over post-war immigration from the ‘new’ Commonwealth. Simultaneously, efforts were made in Britain to pitch the Commonwealth as an “anaesthetizing rhetoric”, as “a bridge connecting East and West, and an opportunity for dialogue between black and white”⁸⁴. *The Guardian* opined that forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism, Britain’s interest in Europe and immigration of non-English people to Australia and Canada had “erode[d] the common denominators of history and language” and therefore “If the Commonwealth is to survive in a meaningful form it must be given a new impetus, for as a multiracial grouping bridging rich and poor, its preservation is a major British interest”.⁸⁵

The year 1965 saw the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat independent of the Commonwealth Relations Office of the British Government in a move undertaken in response to fears of British domination over the group and to promote equality in status of member-states that had previously formed the British Empire. *The Guardian* saw the

⁸² Anna Bocking-Welch, ‘The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire, 1960-1970’, PhD Dissertation, University of York (September 2012), p. 148. Available at: <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3667/> (last accessed: 28/05/2013).

⁸³ Stuart Mole, ‘“Seminars for statesmen”: the evolution of the Commonwealth summit’, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 93:376 (2004), p. 535.

⁸⁴ Ruth Craggs, ‘The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival: Architecture, Performance and Multiculturalism in Late-Imperial London’, *The London Journal*, Vol. 36.3 (Nov 2011), p. 249.

⁸⁵ *The Guardian*, April 10, 1965, p. 8.

Secretariat as “the key to the future of the Commonwealth”.⁸⁶ The same year also saw the creation of the Commonwealth Foundation⁸⁷.

The role of the former imperial power, Britain, was in a state of flux in relation to its former colonies and dominions, the EEC and the USA. But a reassessment of Britain’s external relationships and status was carried out not simply by Whitehall and Westminster, but also by Britain’s vast army of non-state, quasi-state, non-political, non-governmental individual and group actors who were either affected or spurred into action by decolonisation. While political and economic questions pertaining to the colonies and transfers of political power on the one hand⁸⁸ and debates over the impact of the Empire on domestic everyday life in Britain on the other hand⁸⁹ have both been written about extensively, what happened to those actors who fell somewhere between the two? These included several imperial–Commonwealth societies and movements in Britain, Commonwealth interest groups, women’s groups, businesses, religious networks, humanitarian campaigns and movements, elite non-government networks, education and universities, cultural groups and other comparable organisations⁹⁰. Although based in Britain, their interests spanned the Empire–Commonwealth and were sufficiently affected by decolonisation to trigger introspection and

⁸⁶ *The Guardian*, April 10, 1965, p. 8. See also Trevor Reese, ‘Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth’, op cit., p. 459.

⁸⁷ “The initial remit of the Foundation was concerned with Commonwealth professional associations, although over time this has developed into a wider mission to promote and strengthen civil society in the Commonwealth.” (Mole, op cit., p. 536) See also McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg...’, p. 104.

⁸⁸ Apart from the scholars cited in this dissertation, the works of Peter Cain & Antony Hopkins, John Darwin, John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, Ronald Hyam, William Roger Louis, David Washbrook and many others, the Olympian Oxford and Cambridge histories of the British Empire, the British Documents on the End of Empire project, all variously address political, economic, constitutional and related themes in imperial and colonial history.

⁸⁹ The works of Catherine Hall, John MacKenzie and the *Studies in Imperialism* series, Bill Schwarz, Andrew Thompson, Wendy Webster and many others have sought to study the impact of the Empire on everyday life in Britain. The thrust of such research is to emphasise the mutual impact of ‘colony’ and ‘metropole’.

⁹⁰ This appears to be a growing area of research. Since this dissertation aims to study the Imperial Cricket Conference in this non-governmental context, effort has been made to examine existing literature in this area. Some institutions that lay in more ambiguous spheres or acted as an arm of the state have been left out of this study. For instance, Sarah Stockwell’s current research looks at domestic institutions in Britain such as the Bank of England, the army and the Royal Mint, their withdrawal from newly-independent former colonies and their role in the creation of their counterparts in the new states. Details on <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/history/people/staff/academic/stockwell/index.aspx> (last accessed: 01/07/2013). Philip Murphy has similarly studied intelligence agencies in Britain and the Empire during the period of decolonisation. Intelligence links and the creation of a ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’ were considered useful for inculcating British values, maintaining British influence and the fight to contain communism. Commonwealth Security Conferences were seen as a symbol of Commonwealth co-operation [Philip Murphy, ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: the View from Central Africa 1945–1965’, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 17.3 (2002), p. 132, pp. 141–142, p. 156].

changes in their external outlook. While Whitehall was preoccupied with political transition in the Empire–Commonwealth, how did these non-governmental entities—neither completely inter-governmental initiatives, nor necessarily affecting everyday public life—deal with changes in the roughly twenty-year period between 1947 and 1965?

2.4.1 ‘A wider suite of sites and performances of the Commonwealth’⁹¹

This sub-section will lead a quick tour of some of the entities that populated the non-governmental Empire–Commonwealth space. While not claiming to be an exhaustive survey or a detailed study by any means, it is usefully indicative of the rich variety in the decolonising landscape.

The Royal Commonwealth Society (hereafter, RCS), a learned society and social club based in central London, was perhaps the best known of all such societies during this period. Born as the Royal Colonial Institute in 1868, it became the Royal Empire Society in 1928. In both forms, the organisation campaigned for closer unity and friendship within the British Empire. Primarily a club, it provided accommodation and hospitality, and hosted lectures, receptions, entertainment and debates on the Empire and Commonwealth⁹². Its membership largely comprised colonial administrators, retired officers of colonial civil service and businessmen with interests in the Empire–Commonwealth. Membership, therefore, signalled a connection to or interest in the Empire–Commonwealth⁹³. It is, therefore, no surprise that decolonisation had a tremendous impact on the RCS. Until as late as 1956, non-British members could not be brought into the RCS without prior permission of the Secretary-General. By the 1960s, the atmosphere had undergone a change and the RCS was promoted as a warm, safe and hospitable place for guests from all over the multi-racial Commonwealth. Non-white guests could “eat, drink, meet, and talk without fear of discrimination”⁹⁴. In 1958, the Society changed its name to Royal Commonwealth Society in acknowledgement of the

⁹¹ See Chapter 5.

⁹² Working paper: Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, p. 11.

⁹³ Anna Boking-Welch, *op cit.*, p. 37.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

changing political realities. Working to raise the profile of the rapidly-changing Commonwealth in this period, the RCS was a frequent host and co-ordinator of activities involving the Round Table, the Commonwealth Youth Exchange Council, the Commonwealth Youth Ecology Council, the Council for Education in the Commonwealth, Royal African Society, Voluntary Service Overseas, and had a working relationship with the Victoria League, the Royal Overseas League, and the English-speaking Union⁹⁵. As the senior-most and best-known of the Commonwealth societies, the RCS was conscious of the repositioning of Britain within the Empire–Commonwealth and the wider world. Composed primarily of an older white middle-class male membership, the RCS tried to attract younger and non-white members, particularly students in Britain. Mindful of the changing times, the RCS also worked hard to reinvent itself and move away from any feeling of nostalgia, amnesia or reminiscence about the bygone ‘glory’ days of the Empire and ‘British’ Commonwealth and move towards acquisition of an understanding of and engagement with the ‘new’ Commonwealth⁹⁶. However, this transition within the RCS was not without its share of problems. As Anna Boking-Welch’s PhD research revealed, the RCS walked a tightrope between trying to convey a progressive and modern image of itself and of the ‘new’ Commonwealth and engaging in debates to that end on the one hand, and maintaining a conspicuous silence over the more difficult and controversial aspects of imperialism and decolonisation on the other.

In the taxonomy of actors with imperial–Commonwealth interests, part of the same family as the RCS was the government-funded Commonwealth Institute (hereafter, CwI). The remit of the CwI was to promote the Commonwealth in Britain and to engage the youth in the Commonwealth.

The CwI followed a similar trajectory to that of the RCS. Born as the Imperial Institute in 1887 in South Kensington, the CwI was originally an independent body that passed into government hands in 1902 and thereafter received funding from British, colonial and Commonwealth governments. In the early years, the CwI offered research expertise and

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 72. Though not studied here, the Round Table movement was also a high-profile force in the first half of the twentieth century. See Alexander C. May, ‘The Round Table, 1910–66’, PhD thesis, op cit.

⁹⁶ Boking-Welch, pp. 48–49.

information on various facets of the Empire, acted as a gentleman's club and maintained collections on the Empire along with ceremonial galleries and spaces for educational purposes⁹⁷.

The Commonwealth Institute Act of 1958 led to a name-change from 'Imperial' to 'Commonwealth' in 1958, the same year as the RCS. In 1962, the CwI moved to a new site in Holland Park in London. The CwI's new look and architecture generated much discussion. A new modern look was designed to accompany the new vision of the Commonwealth – modernity, scientific and technological prowess in architecture to complement progressive ideals publicly embraced by Britain and the 'new' Commonwealth. The ambitious Commonwealth Arts Festival hosted in Britain (London, Liverpool, Glasgow and Cardiff) in 1965 complemented this discourse. An article in *The Spectator* said that "Throughout, the guiding principle has been to create a new Commonwealth link. It is this element which has brought broad support from the British end . . . the Festival dangles an opportunity outside the grasp of any international group, short of the UN itself." It warned that "The idea of a group of colourful primitive peoples benevolently watched over and encouraged by big brother White Dominions is out. The Festival must never be seen in terms of Zulu warriors dancing before the Queen."⁹⁸ Ruth Craggs wrote that the re-opening of the Commonwealth Institute in 1962 and the Commonwealth Arts Festival in 1965 cumulatively provided spaces for the Commonwealth to be projected and interpreted in a positive and optimistic light within Britain at a time when anxieties about non-white immigration, miscegenation and decline were on the rise. Equally, these were spaces that facilitated an understanding of non-political dimensions of the Commonwealth through art, culture and people-to-people contact⁹⁹. Ian Hunter, Director-General of the 1965 Commonwealth Arts Festival, believed that the Commonwealth wasn't "really very clearly understood" and so "by building up a link, by creating understanding and by making people of one country at least anxious to understand the arts of another, [this Festival] will be doing a great deal to build up the

⁹⁷ Ruth Craggs, 'The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival....', op cit., p. 250; Boking-Welch, pp. 62-63; Mark Crinson, 'Imperial Story-lands: Architecture and Display at the Imperial and Commonwealth Institutes', *Art History*, Vol. 22.1 (March 1999), p. 102.

⁹⁸ Sheldon Williams, 'Commonwealth Preference', *The Spectator*, April 22, 1965, p. 14. Available at: <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/23rd-april-1965/14/arts-amusements> (last accessed: 23/09/2013).

⁹⁹ Ruth Craggs, 'The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival....', pp. 263-264. See pp. 254-257 for further discussion.

Commonwealth concept”¹⁰⁰. In 1962, the year of the re-opening of the CwI, a new Commonwealth Immigration Act was passed in Britain that appeared to regard non-white immigration from the ‘new’ Commonwealth as a threat, thereby contradicting the positive messages and rhetoric surrounding ‘common citizenship’ and ‘mother country’. Furthermore, if such political moves in Britain undermined initiatives to present a united and optimistic picture of Britain and the Commonwealth, Craggs noted that “[the CwI through its displays and collections] told a neat story of imperial progress towards the Empire’s fulfilment—the Commonwealth—and thus worked to suppress the more difficult realities of imperial rule”¹⁰¹, mirroring the silence over contentious matters observed by the RCS.

A member of the same genus was the Empire Day Movement. ‘Empire Day’ had been founded by Reginald Brabazon, the seventh Earl of Meath in 1904 in an effort to promote imperial education in British schools and eventually, the Empire. It quickly caught popular imagination and remained a fixture in the national calendar for over the next half-century. The event was not a public holiday; it was voluntarily run and hence dependent on the enthusiasm of interested organisations. Support came from overtly imperial-minded organisations such as the National Service League and British Empire Union, and from groups such as the Women’s Institute, as well as the Salvation Army and the Co-operative Movement¹⁰².

Like the RCS and CwI, ‘Empire Day’ found itself under pressure to change its name and outlook. Jim English noted that on December 18, 1958, in response to a planted question from a Conservative Member of Parliament, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced: “I am glad to be able to tell the house that with the concurrence of other Commonwealth Governments and of the Empire Day Movement, it is proposed to change the

¹⁰⁰ Ian Hunter, ‘The Commonwealth Arts Festival’, *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, Vol. 113, No. 5108 (July 1965), p. 606.

¹⁰¹ Ruth Craggs, ‘The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival...’, p. 255. See pp. 249-250 for further discussion. See also Mark Crinson, p. 119. Bills to curtail immigration from the ‘new’ Commonwealth were passed in 1962 and in 1968. The British Nationality Act of 1981 firmly closed the door on them instead favouring those with an historic connection to the UK – a condition that overwhelmingly favoured white immigrants. Elisabeth Wallace, writing about reactions to immigration controls by Britain in relation to the short-lived federation of the West Indies quoted the British Labour MP Sydney Silverman as having said in 1962 that “the Government may disclaim . . . colour prejudice from now until Doomsday, but nobody will believe them.” (Elisabeth Wallace, op cit., p. 282).

¹⁰² Boking-Welch, p. 87.

name of Empire Day forthwith to Commonwealth Day. I'm sure this change will be widely welcomed as representing the general feeling in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries on this matter.”¹⁰³ Thus, in 1958, along with the RCS and CwI, ‘Empire Day’ became ‘Commonwealth Day’ (the Empire Day Movement itself resisted such a name-change until 1965). However, while the RCS and CwI were able to adjust and adapt to the new political conditions to varying degrees, ‘Commonwealth Day’ struggled to shed its gangrenous imperial association. At a time when political debates oscillated between Commonwealth unity and immigration ‘threats’ with a European turn imminent, ‘Commonwealth Day’ in Britain found itself increasingly seen as anachronistic¹⁰⁴.

A fellow member of the genus was the Women’s Institute movement (hereafter, WI) in Britain. Founded in Canada in 1897, the first British WI meeting took place in Anglesey in Wales in 1915. Then concerned mainly with providing ‘countrywomen’ opportunities for involvement in food production and rural communities, the WI grew to become a forum for leisure and self-development and in the inter-war period and drew women from across the social spectrum. By 1961, there were 8,517 WI chapters across Britain. This number rose to 9,051 in 1969, all affiliated to the National Federation of Women’s Institutes¹⁰⁵. On the whole, the WI primarily consisted of white middle-class Conservative-leaning female members and this was reflected in its choice of activities and nature of engagement. The WI is an example of what was seen as a ‘feminine’ form of engagement with the Empire and decolonisation, at a time when imperial politics was considered a male domain. Conforming to these expectations, the WI saw itself as an apolitical organisation devoted to imperial hospitality and philanthropy, albeit also liaising with the other more ‘mainstream’ and political imperial organisations and movements. Boking-Welch noted that until 1969 there was a rule forbidding the discussion of any party political or sectarian matters at WI meetings. And yet, following Ross McKibbin, she noted that such a de-politicisation of social

¹⁰³ Jim English, ‘Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 49.1 (2006), p. 274.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. “After 1947 the Empire Day Movement experienced a rapid decline in both funds and membership as it rapidly became an imperialist relic that had no relevance to the post-war international order.” (p. 274). See also Boking-Welch, pp. 87-88.

¹⁰⁵ Women’s Institute website: <http://www.thewi.org.uk/about-the-wi> (last accessed 01/07/2013). See also Boking-Welch, pp. 83-84.

relationships was, in fact, “deeply political” and represented an “informal Conservative hold on associational life”¹⁰⁶.

Another member of the same family as the WI was the Victoria League (hereafter, VL), “the only predominantly female imperial propaganda society” in Britain in the Edwardian period. Established as a women’s society in 1901, the VL worked to promote imperial sentiment in Britain like the RCS, the CwI and the Empire Day Movement. Though similar to the WI in actively soliciting the participation of women, Eliza Riedi chronicled that while the WI saw itself as apolitical and engaged with what were considered more benign or safely ‘feminine’ spaces in imperial politics, the VL’s leadership used the same guises to boldly and innovatively enter the ‘male domain’ of hard imperial politics and imperial propaganda. According to Riedi, the VL’s activities included philanthropy to war victims, hospitality to colonial visitors, empire education, and the promotion of social reform as an imperial issue¹⁰⁷. In the inter-war years, the VL organised lectures on imperial topics, many of them to branches of the WI, in order to attract newly enfranchised rural women¹⁰⁸. The VL’s main champions were women of privilege who took an interest in high imperial politics. The VL, as Riedi noted, is also an interesting case study in constraints imposed on women’s imperial activism.

Representing the paradigm shift to soft power and forms of influence embraced by the British Government during this period was the Voluntary Service Overseas (hereafter, VSO). VSO was founded by Alec and Mora Dickson in 1958, and sent school-leavers and volunteers to under-developed countries, the vast majority of which were within the Commonwealth. J.M. Lee observed that the VSO appealed to “old-fashioned senses of public service and carried some of the social class connotations of service in the colonies”¹⁰⁹. Alec Dickson was an active member of the RCS and received help and co-operation from RCS branches and the British Council. The RCS and VSO worked closely together, with VSO

¹⁰⁶ Boking-Welch, pp. 84-85.

¹⁰⁷ Eliza Riedi, ‘Women, Gender, and the Promotion of Empire: the Victoria League, 1901-1914’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol 45.3 (September 2002), p. 572 & p. 569; Boking-Welch, p. 106.

¹⁰⁸ Boking-Welch, p. 92.

¹⁰⁹ J.M. Lee, ‘British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946-6’, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 9.1 (1998), p. 125.

returnees serving as RCS speakers. Vitally, as Boking-Welch noted, “VSO formed an important bridge between the educative project of the [Royal Commonwealth] Society . . . and a concrete form of action through which [the young idealists who enlisted] could act out their empowerment”¹¹⁰.

Stepping away from imperial societies, Sarah Stockwell documented the views of The Most Reverend Geoffrey Fisher who was Archbishop of Canterbury from 1945 to 1961, a period when some of the most important changes and debates in British decolonisation took place, particularly in British Africa where the Church of England enjoyed a strong presence and following. With new states and provinces in Africa came the need to devolve Church structures. This process happened during the tenure of Archbishop Fisher who led what Stockwell termed “the Church’s own ‘decolonisation’ project”¹¹¹. As a prominent and public figure privy to the views of European Anglican missionaries ‘on the spot’ in east Africa, their African colleagues, Whitehall and the colonial government in east Africa, Fisher found himself at a uniquely-privileged vantage point. Gradual erosion of his trust in the ability of the British and colonial governments to manage colonial affairs was accompanied by evolution of his position as a voice of the ‘nation’s conscience’ rather than a stooge of the state¹¹². Stockwell’s account illuminated well the dilemma faced by Archbishop Fisher, and the “ambiguities”¹¹³ and “contradictory impulses”¹¹⁴ in his imagination of the role of the Church of England in the process of decolonisation.

Similarly, the impact of decolonisation and changing political circumstances on British businesses is an interesting and pertinent case study. Nicholas White outlined a review of theories on decolonisation and British business interests in the mid-twentieth century. Superseding neo-Marxist perspectives, Cain and Hopkins presented their oft-cited and influential concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ at the start of the 1990s. Their thesis posited a close link between the City of London, Whitehall, Westminster and Threadneedle Street from

¹¹⁰ Boking-Welch, p. 71.

¹¹¹ Sarah Stockwell, “Splendidly Leading the Way?” Archbishop Fisher and Decolonisation in British Colonial Africa’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36.3 (2008), p. 545, p. 546, p. 553.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 545, p. 547, p. 553, p. 557, p. 560.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 555 & p. 560.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 545 & p. 560.

1850 onwards. Immediately after WWII, this ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ alliance concentrated on a brief burst of development in the sterling area. According to this view, the process of dismantling of the British Empire in the 1950s and 1960s largely preserved interests of the City, even as opportunities in North America and Europe were eyed. White quoted that “by moving with the nationalist tide, Britain hoped to benefit from informal ties with the Commonwealth while simultaneously promoting sterling’s [sic] wider, cosmopolitan role”¹¹⁵. According to this viewpoint, during the period under study in this thesis, “the links between the City, the Bank of England, and Westminster were as robust as ever, lubricated by the predominance of Old Etonians in the top echelons of the resurrected ‘gentlemanly order’”¹¹⁶. This concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ caught academic imagination quickly but also came under criticism for exaggerating the role of economic elites and economic objectives at the cost of geostrategic objectives. White’s own argument proffered that business and government leaders did not constitute a harmonious and united elite; there were gradations based on complicated calculations of birth, class and status. Colonial business elites, in contrast to metropolitan political leaders, did not always operate with ease in “charmed” circles, nor was there complete trust between colonial business leaders and civil servants in London. White advocated a more intricate dissection of the degree to which British businesses with colonial interests and British governments in London co-operated with each other in economic and political development of the colonies and the multi-racial Commonwealth, and also the extent of co-operation within their own circles. If, in spite of differences within and between these circles, convergence on policies outweighed divergence, the theory of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ would hold stronger explanatory value¹¹⁷. In spite of the extremely tight nexus between these business leaders and the British media and even the Conservative Party, White pointed out that cordial relations with new governments in the colonies to keep them on-side and anti-communist in the Cold War was a higher priority for Whitehall in the 1960s than protection of British business interests. In turn, nationalist goodwill in the newly-independent colonies was crucial to the maintenance of the import and export exchange controls in the sterling area¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁵ Nicholas J. White, ‘The business and the politics of decolonization: the British experience in the twentieth century’, *Economic History Review*, Vol. LIII.3 (2000), p. 545.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 546.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 544-547 & pp. 558-559 & p. 562-563.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 552-555, 559 (see footnote 78), 561.

The treatment of students coming to Britain from the Commonwealth was seen as an increasingly and peculiarly sensitive issue. As J.M. Lee noted, with former colonies of Britain now becoming independent states, the treatment in Britain of students from those states was an important question in view of the likelihood of their attaining high positions in their home countries in the future. Lee's study of the efforts to improve student facilities between 1945 and 1965 reveal changing views of Britain's role in the world. Until the end of the 1940s, there existed a hands-off approach by the British Government to hospitality to students from colonies. Imperial societies and organisations filled this gap with the Victoria League providing more extensive student facilities than the Royal Empire Society or the Overseas League. In this period, the question of students did not involve discussions on soft power. It was seen less as a pressing matter and more as a means to instill respect for British ways and British values among overseas students through integration. Government costs were indirect, and initiatives were taken by colonies and private organisations. By the 1950s, the USA and USSR loomed before elites in former colonies as alternatives to Britain¹¹⁹. Both British political and educational leaders concurred that in order to be "pro-British", the "successor generation" had to receive "a thoroughly British education"¹²⁰. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the same debate now involved the Commonwealth, "active intervention", educational assistance to newly-independent countries, scholarships, cultural diplomacy, the British Council and British image. As Lee noted, "Imperialism gave way to cooperation, and cultural hegemony to cultural exchange"¹²¹.

If the modern Commonwealth is known for its diverse transnational network of state and non-state actors, it is a phenomenon with older antecedents than is widely assumed. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) is widely accepted as the oldest and largest meetings of heads of government, having in 1971 succeeded the Colonial (1887–

¹¹⁹ J.M. Lee, 'Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status', *Minerva*, Vol. 44 (2006), p. 2, p. 4, p. 5, p. 20, p. 21.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 2. The Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan was instituted in 1959.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 23. On the use of scholarships and educational exchanges to foster talent and as a tool of soft power and diplomacy, see Tamson Pietsch, 'Many Rhodes: travelling scholarships and imperial citizenship in the British academic world, 1880–1940', *History of Education*, Vol. 40.6 (2011), pp. 724-725, and Alex Auleta, 'A Retrospective View of the Colombo Plan: Government Policy, departmental administration and overseas students', op cit., pp. 47–58.

1907) and Imperial Conferences (1911–37) and the Prime Ministers' Meetings (1944–69). David McIntyre shed light on little-discussed unofficial meetings that began in the Cannon Street Hotel in 1869-70 and the Westminster Palace Hotel in 1871 and 1884, pre-dating the Colonial Conferences. Later, between 1933 and 1959, a series of Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences (UCRCs) were held in order to work out the practical implications of consensus reached at the Imperial Conferences and Prime Ministers' Meetings. Described as the 'unofficial shadow of the Imperial Conferences', these UCRCs were organised by Chatham House and its overseas affiliates and were held at roughly five-yearly intervals to discuss the most recent summit. While heads of government met at the latter, the corresponding unofficial meeting saw a gathering of politicians, civil servants, historians, political scientists, lawyers, editors and journalists, businessmen, military men, agriculturalists and trade unionists. A striking feature was the participation of women in these UCRCs. They were officially recorded by historians who were leading specialists of the day on the Commonwealth, some of whom have been studied earlier in this chapter: Arnold Toynbee (1933), Harry Hodson (1938), Richard Frost (1945), Fred Soward (1949), Nicholas Mansergh (1954) and Charles Carrington (1959)¹²².

A proposal for a similar gathering of distinguished and eminent men from the 'new' multi-racial Commonwealth was studied by Philip Murphy. The inspiration for this gathering was the secretive Euro-American Bilderberg group formed in the aftermath of WWII. The group drew its name from the Bilderberg Hotel in the Netherlands which was the venue of its first meeting in May 1954 under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard. The Bilderberg group continues to meet annually with most recent meeting having been held in Britain in June 2013. Since inception, the group has maintained strict secrecy over its discussions to facilitate an open and frank exchange of views, and delegates participate in a private rather than official capacity¹²³. Designed as a guarded, elite group composed of prominent men from the global North, meetings of the Bilderberg group were deliberately selective and devoid of any

¹²² McIntyre, 'UCRCs...', pp. 591-614. See pp. 591 & 598 for participation of women, and p. 597 for historians who were official recorders. See also McIntyre 'Viewing the Iceberg...', p. 100.

¹²³ Philip Murphy, 'By invitation only: Lord Mountbatten, Prince Philip, and the Attempt to Create a Commonwealth 'Bilderberg Group', 1964-66', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 33.2 (2005), pp. 246-247.

‘Third World’ participation in an effort to bring together “like-minded and comparable people”¹²⁴ and owing to prejudices about the nature of the developing world.

Between 1964 and 1966, an attempt was made in the corridors of British power to replicate the Bilderberg Group within the Commonwealth. Inspired perhaps by the example of Prince Bernhard, the Duke of Edinburgh Prince Philip, and his uncle Lord Mountbatten of Burma were at the forefront of this initiative. In the 1964-1965 period, discussions took place between Lord Mountbatten, Prince Philip, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey, and the idea was pitched to Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and his Australian counterpart Robert Menzies. In due course, officials from the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Treasury and the Overseas Development Ministry gathered to simultaneously consider proposals for a Bilderberg-like Commonwealth group and a Commonwealth Foundation¹²⁵.

The thoughts of official circles in Britain, the white dominions and the newly-independent Commonwealth members make for an extremely interesting study. It was widely anticipated in Britain and Canada that such a move could be construed by members of newly-independent states as an attempt by Britain to retain a measure of control or influence. Suspicion would be further fanned by the involvement of top royals, including the Queen’s consort. A survey of Commonwealth leaders revealed some amenable (Trinidad), some hostile (India) and largely lukewarm (Canada, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Uganda) responses. Apart from the anticipated concerns, some Commonwealth leaders worried about the consequences of invitations to their political opponents¹²⁶. Within Britain itself, Murphy noted that a paper on the proposal revealed frustration at the manner in which the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meetings had become “a forum in which British representatives would be ritually harangued”¹²⁷. Consequently, justifying the need for a Bilderberg-esque private and unofficial set-up, the paper argued that: “The same confidential surroundings remove any incentive to make personal propaganda; the danger of interminable speeches for the sake of publicity would not exist in Commonwealth meetings of this

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 261.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 251-253, p. 256, p. 261.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 254, pp. 256-257, p. 259, p. 261.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 254.

type”¹²⁸. Murphy also detected “a feeling of uneasiness” in the minds of the royals Lord Mountbatten and Prince Philip about the manner in which the rapid pace and developments of decolonisation had “disrupted the comfortable structures of the pre-war Commonwealth and handed power to colonial agitators”¹²⁹. These discussions provide a useful picture of the extent of disillusionment among British governing circles with the new Commonwealth, the search for “imaginative”¹³⁰ ways to encourage “genuine dialogue”¹³¹ within the Commonwealth and also restoration of “the atmosphere of an exclusive club”¹³² that had characterised pre-war meetings. Additionally, such a project would provide top British royals with a significant international role in the new Commonwealth set-up as “power-broker[s]”¹³³ akin to that of Prince Bernhard. Negative reactions to their involvement, in turn, point to changing attitudes within the Commonwealth towards British royalty and the imperial/Commonwealth–Crown relationship. Eventually, with the onset of the Rhodesian crisis, the Commonwealth–Bilderberg project died a quiet death though the Commonwealth Foundation and the new Commonwealth Secretariat proceeded further.

Reflecting on the feasibility of such an initiative in the Commonwealth, Murphy wondered if “the essentially non-official ethos of Bilderberg could have been adapted to the needs of the ‘new’ Commonwealth”¹³⁴ in exactly the same manner. Apart from the lack of willingness displayed by Commonwealth leaders to meet their own opposition politicians in such an environment, excessive caution and wariness displayed by British officials weakened the resolve and the lack of non-governmental business or professional elites in a number of new Commonwealth countries would have been a serious drawback and reduced participation mainly to governing circles¹³⁵.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 260.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 261.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid. The Duke of Edinburgh expressed an interest in the Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965 and became Chairman of its Advisory Council (Ian Hunter, ‘The Commonwealth Arts Festival’, op cit., p. 607).

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

This chapter has attempted to provide a brief account of developments involving the inter-governmental (political) Commonwealth and (mostly metropolitan) non-governmental entities with interests in the Empire–Commonwealth. The sentiment that this chapter attempted to capture was well-expressed in 1956 by Vincent Fairfax, Chairman of the Australian Section of the Commonwealth Press Union. Believing the Empire/Commonwealth Press Union (hereafter, EPU or CPU as suitable) delegations and conferences and similar organisations in the Empire–Commonwealth to play “something of an ambassadorial role” in “The Ever Changing Commonwealth”, he urged “The many trade organizations dealing with all or only sections of the Commonwealth [to] accept the responsibility of thinking in terms of a ‘common wealth’ [sic]”¹³⁶. In the following chapters, this dissertation will endeavour to discuss the ICC in a similar light. In what ways did the ICC contribute to the imperial project? Did the ICC see itself as a supporter of strong Commonwealth relations? As the Empire wound down in the mid-twentieth century, how did the ICC adjust to the new political realities in the multi-racial Commonwealth?

¹³⁶ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Jun 21, 1956, p. 11; Denis Cryle, ‘The Press Union at the End of Empire: Anglo-Australian Perspectives, 1946–1965’, *Journalism*, Vol. 12.8 (2011), pp. 1011-1012. Though not examined in this chapter, the Commonwealth Press Union will make appearances in later chapters.

Chapter Three: ‘In consonance with the spirit of the times’? The Imperial Cricket Conference, 1947–1965

How was the Imperial Cricket Conference affected by its encounter with decolonisation of the British Empire? This chapter is the first of two that will attempt to answer that question. Drawing on minutes of ICC meetings held in this period and newspaper coverage of them, both chapters chronicle the main ‘off-field’ issues that engulfed the ICC between 1947 and 1965.

The following chapter provides a rough reconstruction and examination of issues that affected all the members of the ICC. It begins by considering the role of the MCC in the administration of the ICC. Overall, the chapter tries to offer commentary on how the MCC and members of the ICC imagined their places and roles in the Empire and Commonwealth.

3.1 ‘The most venerated institution in the British Empire’

Britain, the ‘mother country’ in the British Empire, was also the birthplace of cricket. Correspondingly, the Marylebone Cricket Club sat at the head of the cricketing hierarchy as the apex body in world cricket. According to James Bradley, establishment of the ICC ensured that “imperial cricket was established on a firm basis and the MCC, which had concentrated all power around the environs of St. John’s Wood, now fulfilled the imperial function to which its prestige as the premier cricket club in the Empire seemed to entitle it”¹. The venerated versatile doyen of English cricket broadcasting, John Arlott, explained in *The Guardian* in 1968 that “[b]y invitation and consent [the MCC] ha[d] remained the law-making body and, through its secretariat and the housing of first the Imperial, and then the

¹ James Bradley, ‘The MCC, society and empire: a portrait of cricket’s ruling body, 1860–1914’, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol 7.1 (1990), p. 20.

International Cricket Conference, the effective coordinating centre of the world game.”² The MCC, thus, derived its combined legislative and executive authority from deference shown to it by other members.

The MCC, also the recognised administrative authority in English cricket until 1968, was a private gentlemen’s club. Such was the weight of the MCC stamp that the labels ‘England team’ and ‘MCC team’ were used interchangeably. In fact, more often than not, the England cricket team was referred to as the ‘MCC team’ in this period³.

In the ICC meeting of 1947, the officially-recognised representative governing bodies of all the member countries were confirmed. It was also accepted that “[i]n case of disputes, MCC will adjudicate or, should they so decide, refer the matter to the ICC”, thus subordinating the ICC to the MCC and investing in the MCC, judicial authority, in addition to the existing legislative and executive powers⁴. This enabled the ICC to remain little more than an extension of the MCC, not least in terms of its officialdom.

The MCC was celebrated as a key institution of the Empire and Commonwealth by its admirers, with a description in *The Times* noting “the high position it now occupies not only here but throughout the Empire and Commonwealth . . . whose influence may be said to be almost world-wide”⁵. James Bradley’s research on the composition of the MCC between 1860 and 1914 revealed that while general membership of the MCC tended to emanate from the upper-middle and professional classes, the committee that governed the club was drawn from aristocratic and upper-middle class circles⁶. The mid-twentieth century studied here

² John Arlott, ‘Ruling Body Changed’, *The Guardian*, May 21, 1968, p. 15.

³ For instance, *The Times*, Wednesday, Jan 16, 1946, pg. 2 noted: “ . . . and in the winters *England*, under the M.C.C., will pay return visits to those countries . . . ” (emphasis added). Minutes of ICC meetings only used the epithet ‘MCC team’.

⁴ Minutes of ICC meeting held on May 19, 1947. [Hereafter, shortened to the format ‘ICC Minutes: (date)’]

⁵ *The Times*, Jun 06, 1946, p. 7 in the obituary of long-time MCC Secretary Sir Francis Lacey: “That Sir Francis played a great and influential part in the building up of M.C.C. to the high position it now occupies not only here but throughout the Empire and Commonwealth will not, I think, be disputed by anyone who has a knowledge of the many ramifications and inner workings of an organisation which boasts some 7,000 members, and whose influence may be said to be almost world-wide.”

⁶ James Bradley, op cit., pp. 8-10. From his study of the MCC between 1860 and 1914, James Bradley concluded that while the pre-1890 generation of MCC administrators evinced no interest in actively taking the game to the Empire, the advent of Lords Harris and Hawke and their Empire-conscious contemporaries saw an active attempt to make cricket and the MCC meaningful cultural agents between Britain and the colonies. The MCC became “the Vatican of cricket, the very powerhouse of the game, controlling and arbitrating for Britain and its Empire”. Although warning against overstating of the role of the MCC in the diffusion of cricket, Bradley conceded that “In the [Empire] it had a symbolical value, and there must be some truth in the statement of the

continued to witness occupation of the MCC committee by members of the “landed aristocracy” and “men of considerable political influence via the Conservative Party”. If, at the time of the Bodyline series in 1932-33, the MCC Committee included names such as “Viscount Lewisham, Lord Hawke, Sir Stanley Jackson, Sir Kynaston Studd, Viscount Bridgeman, Lord Aberdare, Lord Hampden, the Earl of Lucan and Viscount Ullswater”⁷, then in the period under study in this thesis, the MCC boasted as Presidents, the 9th Viscount Cobham, Lord Cornwallis, Earl of Gowrie, Duke of Beaufort, the 10th Viscount Cobham, Earl Alexander of Tunis, Duke of Norfolk, Baronet William Worsley and Lord Nugent (titles as at the time). The MCC embodied the confluence of upper class Conservatives and influential private clubs. Bradley surmised that it may be possible to say that the MCC committee as a whole, particularly its Presidency, grew more Conservative politically⁸. The eminent cricket journalist, E.W. ‘Jim’ Swanton, in his biography of Sir George Oswald Browning ‘Gubby’ Allen, referred to “the cosy atmosphere of the Junior Carlton Club where the [MCC] Committee’s winter business was in those days conducted – and generally concluded conveniently around tea-time”⁹. The Junior Carlton Club, part of the West End scene of politically-influential and well-connected clubs¹⁰, supported the Conservative Party

eminent Lord Harris that it was ‘perhaps the most venerated institution in the British Empire’. Lord Hawke also made the “trite observation” that “the MCC ‘had become the Parliament House of cricket, not only of Great Britain but of overseas Dominions’” (p. 3). Peter Oborne’s study of the MCC of the late 1960s in his biography of Basil D’Oliveira extended the sketch of the MCC. Around the time of the D’Oliveira controversy in 1968 (more in the next chapter), the MCC was composed of approximately 10,000 members. While some members—usually Committee members—were titled grandees, the majority was not and belonged, by then, to the middle-class. To use Oborne’s deft description, “The MCC reeked of authority, dogmatism, petty regulations, the blazer and the old school tie. Women were never admitted to membership even though the Queen was the patron. There were some black members but they tended to be foreign magnates. Very few if any were recent British immigrants from Brixton or northern towns. Public schoolmasters set the tone.” [Peter Oborne, *Basil D’Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy, the Untold Story*, Little, Brown (2005), p. 208]

⁷ Ric Sissons, ‘E. W. Swanton, Gubby Allen. Man of Cricket (Book Review)’, *Sporting Traditions*, Vol. 2, No 1 (November 1985), p. 105. Looking mainly at the period between those studied by Bradley and Oborne, Sissons observed that within a span of approximately fifty years of the Bodyline series of 1932-33, there was “a significant social change within the power structures of English cricket” with titled members in the MCC Committee replaced by the “middle class and men from the City” (pp. 104-105).

⁸ Bradley, p. 9.

⁹ E.W. Swanton, *Gubby Allen: Man of Cricket*, Hutchinson (1985), p. 274. This is also supported by minutes of MCC meetings.

¹⁰ Seth Alexander Thévoz, ‘London Clubs and Victorian Politics’, *History Today*, Volume 63.2 (2013). Available at: <http://www.historytoday.com/seth-alexander-th%C3%A9voz/london-clubs-and-victorian-politics> (last accessed: 01/04/2013). This association with the Junior Carlton may have been a reflection of the MCC’s political leaning. The MCC, though itself not a bespoke political or lobby club, and therefore with no specific political aims of its own, was nevertheless very well-connected. A constant stream of titled and influential members in the 20th century apart, Keith Sandiford also recorded instances going back to the Victorian era. Prince Albert, the Prince Consort, was Patron of the MCC from 1846 until his death in 1861. Later, the Prince of Wales, the future Edward VII, was also Patron of the MCC (and of Surrey County Cricket Club). Titled members of the MCC sat in the House of Lords, some held minor Cabinet posts in the government of the day while many

and was modelled on the older Carlton Club. Apart from Lords Harris and Hawke, several MCC stalwarts such as Sir Pelham Warner and Sir Francis Stanley Jackson were known to be supporters of the Conservative Party¹¹. Highly-placed members of the British upper class and ruling elite of the Empire and Commonwealth in this period including imperial officials (F.S. Jackson), Prime Ministers (Stanley Baldwin, Alec Douglas-Home), members of the British royal family (the Queen was the patron while the Duke of Edinburgh was twice President of the MCC in 1949-50 and 1973-74), City heavyweights (Gubby Allen) were members or regulars, holding positions of responsibility on the MCC Committee¹². Richard Holt also

others held senior positions in the civil service. Sandiford concluded that this would have meant a great deal of influence in British political and daily life. The most interesting episode is that of the Great Central Railway Bill which threatened to cut through Lord's Cricket Ground and was, in 1888, defeated in Parliament as a result of lobbying by influential cricketers and members of the MCC [Keith Sandiford, 'England', in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., *The Imperial Game: Cricket, Culture and Society*, Manchester University Press (1998), pp. 11-13. See also Laurence Meynell, "Plum" Warner (*Cricketing lives series*), Phoenix House (1951), p. 44, for information on the Central Railway Bill story].

¹¹ Dean Allen, 'South African cricket and British imperialism, 1870–1910', in Malcolm, Gemmell, Mehta, eds., *The Changing Face of Cricket: From Imperial to Global*, Routledge (2010), pp. 38-39; Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, Picador (2002), p. 53. Jack Williams, "Fiery Fred": Fred Trueman and cricket celebrity in the 1950s and early 1960s', in Malcolm, et al., p. 84, noted that the MCC was dominated by those with traditional wealth, very similar to those who controlled the Conservative Party. There is a consensus among cricket-writers, scholars and commentators that the twentieth-century power quartet of the MCC consisted of George Robert Canning Harris, 4th Baron Harris (Lord Harris), Martin Bladen Hawke, 7th Baron Hawke of Towton (Lord Hawke), Sir Pelham 'Plum' Warner and Sir George Oswald Browning 'Gubby' Allen, all of whom were supporters of the Conservative Party and believed in 'cricket and empire'. Hand-picked and groomed to succeed each other, they were all aristocratic/upper-middle class amateurs and bestrode 'international' cricket with their towering authority and sacrosanct opinions. (For details, see Peter Oborne, pp. 211-212; Laurence Meynell, p. 11, p. 64; E.W. Swanton, p. 1, p. 3, p. 274, p. 279, p. 280, p. 285, p. 296 & p. 297; James Bradley, op cit.; James Coldham, *Lord Hawke: A Cricketing Biography*, The Crowood Press Ltd (1990), pp. 8-9 & pp. 127-8; Allen in Malcolm, et al., pp. 38-39.)

F.S. Jackson was knighted and appointed Governor of Bengal in 1927. He was Lord Hawke's heir in Yorkshire (Coldham, p. 102, pp. 188-89).

H.D.G. Leveson-Gower, known fondly as 'Shrimp' on account of his diminutive stature was a Surrey man. His main contribution was as an MCC cricket administrator. He was a lifelong friend and confidant of Lord Hawke (Coldham, p. 127). Amusingly, due to trouble with the spelling and pronunciation of his name, one American newspaper in rather bold letters called him "The Hyphenated Worry" and "The Player of the Sanguinary Name" (*Queanbeyan Age*, Tuesday 7 July 1908, p. 4).

¹² See Appendix A for more names and details. The one-year position of President of the MCC largely appears to have been a sort of recognition of the individual's standing in society. The posts of Secretary and Treasurer were the more important long-term ones. As an example, a look at the MCC Committee in the early 1960s is helpful. As is still the norm, each outgoing President of the MCC nominated his successor. In 1962-63, Lord Nugent (Lt-Col The Lord Nugent, Terence Edmund Gascoigne) was President of the MCC and he nominated Gubby Allen as his successor. Gubby Allen, as President in 1963-64 (the 10th Viscount Cobham, President in 1954-55, was Allen's Treasurer that year and Allen's close childhood friend Lord Home was the the Prime Minister of Britain), nominated R.H. Twining as his successor for 1964-65. Long-term Committee member H.S. Altham had retired as Treasurer in 1963 and Viscount Cobham was succeeded in 1964 by Allen, who would hold the post for 12 years. Lord Nugent, Allen and Twining had gone to Australia in the winter of 1962-63 together and combined business with pleasure. In his paean to Allen, his biographer Jim Swanton (himself part of the inner circle) observed, "Gubby would say with Lord Houghton that 'The intimate conversation of important men is the cream of life'" (Swanton, p. 280, p. 284 & p. 293). James Bradley also observed that "[the MCC's] membership was self-perpetuating through the nomination of its own replacements, but it was

observed that the men who oversaw the Empire from Whitehall were also likely to be members of the MCC to which “cricketers all over the world were expected to defer”. The Bodyline crisis of 1932-33 between England and Australia demonstrated that “[c]lose links between the Conservative Party, which dominated the National Government, and the MCC committee ensured that wider imperial considerations would have been well understood.”¹³ A quick examination of representatives sent to ICC meetings at Lord’s by various member boards during this period reveals a list of influential people from around the Commonwealth ranging from royalty and eminent jurists to high-ranking military officials, businessmen and politicians (see Appendix A). The MCC, thus, saw regular assembly and networking of powerbrokers from around the world.

Not surprisingly, meetings of the ICC were always held at Lord’s. In this period, these meetings were held biennially until the late 1950s after which they became annual events. There were some requests for the venue to be rotated among member countries but this issue was quickly settled in favour of Lord’s. In the meeting held in 1955, Pakistan, through its representative Group Capt. M.M.A. Cheema, proposed rotation of meetings and offered Pakistan as a venue¹⁴. Minutes of the 1958 meeting reveal that a similar proposal by India that “meetings of the ICC be held in countries of the members of the ICC by rotation” was withdrawn by the Indian representative, the Maharaj Kumar of Vizianagram (‘Vizzy’). In an ostensible change of mind by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (hereafter, BCCI), Vizzy felt it was appropriate that meetings of the ICC should be held at Lord’s which was regarded as the “headquarters” of cricket¹⁵. Lord’s Cricket Ground, managed by the MCC, is a prime example of a sports venue that has assumed iconic status in the last century, notwithstanding the MCC’s complicity for a long time in the skewed power relations in world

dominated by a limited number of individuals who could and did determine the policy of the MCC” (Bradley, p. 6). A general sense of the recursive and cliquish nature of the well-connected aristocratic and upper class elite that controlled the affairs of the MCC constantly came to the fore throughout the study.

¹³ Both quotes from Richard Holt, *Sport and the British*, OUP (1989), p. 232 & p. 236. Jim Swanton noted that during the 1932 Bodyline Ashes in Australia, one editor declared, “Not merely in the chance of regaining the coveted ‘Ashes’ does the interest of the country lie, but in the knowledge that every time England and Australia meet in friendly rivalry a valuable contribution is made to the all-vital Imperial spirit.” (Swanton, p. 109) And Swanton himself opined, “Who better to sound the traditional notes of Imperial cordiality [than Plum Warner acting as MCC manager on that Bodyline tour]?” (p. 111) At its height, “[t]his [Bodyline Ashes controversy] was now a story of Commonwealth interest going well beyond the confines of cricket, and every newspaper in both countries was full of it.” (p. 128)

¹⁴ ICC minutes: July 14, 1955.

¹⁵ ICC minutes: July 17, 1958.

cricket. Lord's continues to enjoy a near-religious hold on cricketers and cricket followers and inspires deep awe and reverence around the world. It was dubbed the 'Cathedral of Cricket' by Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, former Prime Minister of Australia. Using anthropologist Bernard Cohn's framework, Brian Stoddart explained that just as the "architecture of imperial authority had a profound effect on the colonial condition", so the architecture of cricket around the world has been greatly influenced by Lord's and the MCC. He noted that "the elitist Long Room at Lord's spawned equivalents around the world so that the 'Members' Stand' would become the focus of social, even class envy"¹⁶.

The preponderant presence of the MCC in English and international cricket continued until well into the third quarter of the twentieth century. In 1968, the administration of cricket in England and Wales underwent structural changes. Whereas previously the MCC had been the apex governing body of cricket in England, control was now transferred to a new body called the Cricket Council (or MCC Council). This body consisted of a new Test and County Cricket Board (the most powerful and in charge of first-class cricket), the National Cricket Association (all non-first-class cricket) and MCC nominees (the smallest of the three). John Arlott noted of these historic developments that "the effective government of cricket in England will be changed for the first time since 1788, when the Marylebone Cricket Club, in only the second year of its existence, undertook the revision of the laws of cricket." He explained that out of deference to the MCC's services to the game the new body had been named 'MCC Council'¹⁷. The MCC continued to have a voice in English cricket, though it

¹⁶ Brian Stoddart, 'At the end of the day's play: Reflections on cricket, culture and meaning', in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., *op cit.*, p. 153. It has also been noted that in the early 20th century, "the MCC and its Long Room at Lord's became bastions of class privilege and political conservatism as the clubs attracted the economic and social elite" (Allen in Malcolm, et al. p. 39).

Sir Robert Menzies was a devoted follower of cricket, a firm believer in cricket's ability to promote cultural ties and a warmly-welcomed guest at the MCC. He was also a supporter of the use of cricket as a diplomatic tool in the Commonwealth. Brett Hutchins noted that in 1953, at the request of Sir Hugh Foot, then Governor of Jamaica, Menzies wrote to the Australian Cricket Board to propose a tour, from the point of view of strengthening Commonwealth relations, of the West Indies by the Australian team to celebrate the 300th anniversary of British settlement there. According to Hutchins, even though the ACB was usually reluctant to accept touring invitations outside the Ashes cycle, this tour went ahead (Brett Hutchins, 'Unity, Difference and the 'National Game': Cricket and Australian National Identity' in Stephen Wagg, ed., *Cricket and National Identity in the Postcolonial Age: Following On*, Routledge (2005), pp. 15-16.) Menzies would always try to catch test matches at Lord's when in London for Prime Ministers' Meetings and was a dear friend of Gubby Allen [Swanton, p. xii (Sir Alec Douglas-Home's foreword)] and there was a photograph of Menzies on a side-table of Allen's drawing room (p. 8).

¹⁷ John Arlott, 'Ruling Body Changed', *The Guardian*, May 21, 1968 p. 15. It is likely that the official name of this new set-up was simply 'the Cricket Council' (Swanton's book on Allen and the MCC website use that name). It

was now reduced to a numerical minority. In international cricket, it was only in 1989 that the practice of adoption of MCC officials by the ICC was stopped. As noted earlier, it took longer—until 1993—for the newly-named International Cricket Council to acquire its first non-British Chairman. The MCC continues as an influential presence in English and international cricket today¹⁸, not least because of the near-pilgrimage status enjoyed around the world by Lord's Cricket Ground.

3.2 'A token of the unity': The Imperial Memorial Gallery

Upon resumption of regular administrative activities in the MCC and ICC after WWII in 1946, there were discussions on the recognition and conferral of honorary life membership on Allied war heroes and war-time leaders such as Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, Field Marshall Viscount Wavell and Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten¹⁹.

Chaired by John Lyttelton, the 9th Viscount Cobham, the first post-war ICC meeting was held on January 15, 1946 after a gap of seven years. A list of Commonwealth cricketers who had lost their lives in the war was read out and the meeting paid tribute to them²⁰. In keeping with its assumed mandate to recognise and celebrate the wide reach of cricket in the British Empire and the Commonwealth, the MCC proposed the construction of an Imperial War Memorial Gallery at Lord's to commemorate these Commonwealth cricketers.

is possible that 'MCC Council' was used in a more informal sense and gradually faded away, particularly after reconstitution of the Council a few years after its establishment. This move granted greater representation to the TCCB at the expense of Minor Counties and to a lesser extent, the NCA and the MCC. This reconstitution was poorly received by the old guard of the MCC [Details in Swanton, p. ix (Author's Note) and p. 286].

¹⁸ Interestingly, while the MCC ceded executive authority to the ICC by 1993, it has retained its legislative authority. Gerald Holden noted that, "The ICC does not, however, decide on changes to the laws of the game, which continue to be the responsibility of the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) in London. The MCC describes itself as a "private club with a public function", and is recognised as the "guardian of the Laws"" [Gerard Holden, 'World Cricket as a Postcolonial International Society: IR Meets the History of Sport', *Global Society*, Vol. 22.3 (2008), p. 359]. Dominic Malcolm wrote that "The insertion of a Preamble to the Laws of Cricket on the 'Spirit of the Game' in 2000 can be seen as a symbolic swansong of English influence over the international game" (Dominic Malcolm, 'Malign or benign? English national identities and cricket', in Malcolm, Gemmell, Mehta, eds., p. 189).

¹⁹ Minutes of Emergency Meeting of MCC on Nov 12, 1945; 159th AGM of MCC on Jan 15, 1946 (at the AGM, 11 war leaders made Hon Life members); MCC meeting held on Feb 11, 1946.

²⁰ ICC Minutes: Jan 15, 1946.

Contributions were solicited from member boards of the ICC and from cricket-playing parts of the Empire and Commonwealth²¹.

The Annual General Meeting of the MCC in 1947 discussed the process of re-cataloguing of pictures, books and other items for the Imperial Cricket Memorial Gallery and Reading Room at Lord's. Offers and donations of material and money received by the MCC from Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India and the West Indies were acknowledged²². An MCC meeting on June 12, 1947, reported problems in obtaining a licence to build the Imperial Memorial Gallery – a reflection, perhaps, of the post-war resource scarcity situation. It was reported that talks were being conducted with the Ministry of Works and Secretary of State for Dominions about the licence²³.

In subsequent ICC meetings, MCC representatives provided updates on the Memorial. Minutes of the ICC meeting on July 19, 1948, recorded the MCC's gratitude to members for their gifts and donations even though the Memorial Gallery was still without a licence. In the meeting of July 28, 1952, MCC representative H.S. Altham²⁴ announced that a licence had finally been obtained and that work had begun on the Gallery. Altham once again thanked the various Boards and visitors for their enthusiasm and “in particular he referred to the enthusiasm shown by Mr R.G. Menzies during a recent visit to Lord's”. Stating that all help was welcome and that no individual or Board would be coerced or pressured to contribute, he added, “We hope you as partners and co-trustees of the game's tradition may share our feeling that the service, the sacrifice and above all, the spirit of the great company of cricketers who gave their lives in the two Wars should be thus commemorated”²⁵.

²¹ The first full discussion on the Imperial Memorial Gallery in the ICC took place in the ICC meeting of July 19, 1948. However, the idea for such a memorial had been conceived in 1946 and ICC member boards and cricket associations in the Empire had been notified then, as indicated by discussions in MCC meetings between 1946 and 1948.

²² MCC AGM 1947.

²³ MCC Minutes: June 12, 1947.

²⁴ H.S. Altham was an Oxford cricket blue, public-school teacher, cricket writer and later county cricket administrator. He was part of the inner circle of the MCC, serving as President of MCC (Chairman of ICC) in 1959, and in long-term roles as Secretary and Treasurer [Jack Williams, “The Really Good Professional Captain Has Never Been Seen!': Perceptions of the Amateur/Professional Divide in County Cricket, 1900–1939”, in Dilwyn Porter & Stephen Wagg, eds., *Amateurism in British Sport: It Matters Not who Won Or Lost?*, Routledge (2008), p. 95].

²⁵ ICC Minutes: July 28, 1952. The Memorial was also mentioned in *The Times*, Tuesday, Jul 29, 1952, pg. 3.

In the ICC meeting of July 21, 1953, H.S. Altham notified the gathering of the successful completion of the Imperial Cricket Memorial and its inauguration that year by the Duke of Edinburgh on April 27, 1953. The memorial had been dedicated by the Lord Bishop of London. The ceremony had been attended by all High Commissioners or their representatives, the touring Australian cricket team, well-known cricketers of all countries, many members of the MCC and representatives of county clubs. The Memorial displayed cricket photographs and memorabilia from around the Empire and Commonwealth in honour of the fallen soldiers. Altham urged the ICC representatives to visit it. Karl Nunes, the West Indies representative²⁶ at the 1953 meeting, declared himself very impressed by the Gallery. The MCC had received pictures from Australia, South Africa, the West Indies, New Zealand, Canada, Malaya, Uganda while Ireland, Fiji, Hong Kong and Mauritius had expressed their desire to contribute. Enthusiasm had been shown not just by official members of the ICC, but also by non-official cricket playing parts of the Empire and Commonwealth. The Queen, who was patron of the MCC, had inspected the Gallery a day prior to the ICC meeting that year and had reportedly expressed her satisfaction. Altham believed that the Gallery would become popular with visitors and quickly evolve into a “pilgrimage” for cricket lovers that would serve to familiarise all visitors with the “history and great traditions of the game in all countries where it is played . . . it would also prove a convincing token of the unity which binds those countries together and of which, in the field of cricket, this Imperial Cricket Conference was itself an expression.”²⁷

On July 14, 1955, Altham informed the ICC that in the two years since its opening by the Duke of Edinburgh, the Memorial had garnered much praise and attention from visitors from Britain and abroad. It had attracted “thousands of visitors, a large number from overseas”. The Gallery had acquired pictures from as far and wide as Tasmania, Rhodesia, Philadelphia, Kenya and Madras. He further informed the gathering that “[m]any parties of schoolboys had visited the museum on conducted tours and they and others had derived great

²⁶ R. Karl Nunes, a regular at the ICC, was the first captain of the West Indies in 1928. He was President of the Jamaican Cricket Association and of the West Indies Cricket Board of Control [Swanton, pp. 232-233; Stephen Wagg, ‘Calypso Kings, Dark Destroyers: England–West Indies Test Cricket and the English Press, 1950–1984’, in Stephen Wagg, ed., *op cit.*, p. 186].

²⁷ ICC Minutes: July 21, 1953. See also the website of Lord’s Cricket Ground for a mention of the Gallery: <http://www.lords.org/history/milestones/> (last accessed 12/02/2013).

value thereby in increasing their knowledge of the history and traditions of cricket as it is played throughout the world.”²⁸

According to minutes of the ICC meeting of July 20, 1956, H.S. Altham reported a welcome increase in visits by young people to the Memorial. It had continued to attract huge interest and had received gifts for public display from abroad which had hitherto not been made available for public viewing. Since the 1953 meeting, the MCC had received pictures of the Brabourne Stadium in Bombay, the Kingston Ground in Jamaica and the Albert Park Ground in Suva in the Fiji Islands.

It took several years in the post-WWII resource scarcity situation to procure a licence to build the Imperial Memorial Gallery and the MCC was forced to lobby the government. The process of obtaining a licence for the Gallery was extremely protracted and although proposed in 1946, it was not until 1952 that the licence was finally obtained. Talks were held with the Ministry of Works and the Secretary of State for the Dominions to expedite the process of obtaining a licence. In the ICC meeting of 1948, with the MCC still struggling to get the licence, the then President-Chairman, Colonel Wykeham Stanley Cornwallis, 2nd Baron Cornwallis, pointed out to the assembled representatives of the ICC member boards, the great importance of the Memorial to cricket’s bigger picture. He requested the overseas boards to play their part in lobbying the British government and to emphasise the importance of the Memorial from the Dominion point of view as that was most likely to carry weight with the authorities²⁹. When the licence was finally granted in 1952, the Memorial progressed speedily and was opened in 1953.

The Imperial Cricket Memorial Gallery was intended to house photographs and memorabilia of cricket grounds and cricketers from around the world as an endeavour to display the reach of the game and to provide an understanding of its history and traditions. The Gallery was seen both as a celebration of the bond between the cricket-playing Commonwealth countries and a commemoration of martyred Commonwealth soldiers. The widespread reach of the game of choice of its foot-soldiers also served to provide a snapshot of the widespread reach of the once-mighty British Empire.

²⁸ ICC Minutes: July 14, 1955.

²⁹ ICC Minutes: July 19, 1948.

These initiatives to memorialise martyred cricketers and recognise Allied war heroes through the award of life membership by a private men's club that also ran an imperial–Commonwealth sport were perhaps remarkable in their uniqueness. *Pace* these grand gestures, the title '*Imperial Cricket Memorial*'—in 1953—served as a reminder of the imperial genesis of cricket and of the MCC's, and hence England's, position at the top of the cricket hierarchy.

3.3 'Traditional foes'

England was the birthplace of cricket and its administrator-in-chief. As noted in the wording of the 1926 membership rules, official cricket was seen mainly in terms of bilateral exchanges with England. Tours to and from England were extremely popular. It was in 1946 that other members commenced playing official test cricket against each other on a semi-regular to regular basis. Matches were arranged between India and Australia, and India and the West Indies in 1946, a move that statements in *The Times* and *The Guardian* described as "an innovation"³⁰. In 1948, a test match played between New Zealand and Australia in March 1946 in Wellington was retrospectively recognised by the ICC as official, making it the first-ever official test match between the two neighbours³¹.

As the secretariat of international cricket, the MCC drew up the schedule of tours for all members and this was usually done well in advance. The schedule was then circulated among all the boards and tours were discussed and approved by member boards either via correspondence or in ICC meetings. It was not uncommon for the ICC to finalise arrangements for fifteen years at a time³².

³⁰ *The Times*, Wednesday, Jan 16, 1946, p. 2 & *The Manchester Guardian*, Jan 16, 1946, p. 6, "An innovation will be the introduction of Test matches for the first time between West Indies and India, and also between India and Australia."

³¹ *The Times*, Thursday, Mar 11, 1948, p. 2, recorded that "the New Zealand v. Australia match at Wellington in March, 1946, ranks as a test match – the first between these countries."

³² In 1946, the ICC approved a 6-year schedule "for India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and West Indies to visit the United Kingdom in that order during the next five seasons" with England returning those visits in

These schedules were not without their share of controversy. Australia was England's oldest cricketing rival. South Africa joined them in 1888-89 and ranked next to Australia in precedence³³. Arrangements between England and Australia constituted the *sanctum sanctorum* of ICC tours. A recurring theme in the ICC meetings of the period under study was the preferential treatment given to Australia (and South Africa) by the MCC in its schedules of tours. According to minutes of the 1960 ICC meeting held on July 14-15, England and Australia "had a fixed rota of two tours to the other country in an 8-year cycle and two tours from the other in an 8-year cycle". *The Guardian* also observed that "[s]ince the turn of the century, England had visited Australia every four years except when war intervened". This sequence was broken in the early 1960s with a three-year gap and then a five-year gap, due to scheduling difficulties³⁴. In 1948, *The Guardian* reported that it was "hoped to arrange visits from South Africa and visits to South Africa by M.C.C. teams not less than once in six years."³⁵ Minutes of ICC meetings reveal that the remaining members (including Pakistan after 1952) frequently expressed their desire to visit and host England more often³⁶. These demands were always acknowledged as legitimate by the MCC but were countered by reiteration of the status of Australia and South Africa as "older traditional foes" and "traditionally England's oldest opponents"³⁷. And this status translated into precedence in the schedule of tours.

winter (*The Manchester Guardian*, Jan 16, 1946, p. 6). In 1950, the schedule for 15 years up to 1965 was approved (*The Observer*, Apr 10, 1960, p. 31). In 1960, *The Guardian* reported that the ICC had approved the MCC-drawn up schedule of tours from 1965 to 1978 (*The Guardian*, July 21, 1960, p. 4; also noted in the minutes of the 1960 ICC meeting).

³³ Alan Ross pointed out the MCC's intransigence in the matter of touring arrangements: "In 1960, the Imperial Cricket Conference . . . drew up a programme for England's Test matches, home and away, extending to 1978. In this, the South Africans still rank next to the Australians in precedence, although they are no longer comparable in strength with the West Indies, and although South Africa resigned from the Imperial Cricket Conference after leaving the Commonwealth." (*The Guardian*, June 29, 1963, p. 6)

³⁴ *The Guardian*, July 21, 1960, p. 4.

³⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, Jul 20, 1948, p. 2.

³⁶ Minutes reveal that such requests were made by: New Zealand in 1948; West Indies in 1952 on behalf of India, New Zealand and the West Indies; India unsuccessfully proposed alternatives to the MCC's schedule in 1953 and 1962; India and New Zealand in 1953; in general in 1960; Pakistan and the West Indies in 1962; New Zealand and the West Indies in 1963; India and Pakistan in 1964.

³⁷ The phrase "older traditional foes" appeared in a document from 1948 entitled 'Report of the MCC Selection & Planning Sub-Committee on the Future of International Tours' in the ICC archives; the importance of traditional arrangements was reiterated in the meeting of 1952; the phrase "traditionally England's oldest opponents" appeared in the minutes of the 1960 meeting; "Australia, a founder member and by far our oldest opponent" appeared in 1963. In several of the instances noted in the previous footnote, the minutes showed that whilst declining the demands of the protestors, the MCC always underlined the centrality of Australia and South Africa in its scheme of things.

Australia, like England, always stressed the necessity and importance of upholding their traditional arrangement. No less than the influential figure of Dr. H.V. Evatt—prominent Australian Labor Party leader, judge of the Australian High Court and Minister of External Affairs of Australia between 1941 and 1949—insisted on the uninterrupted maintenance of the traditional England–Australia arrangement under any condition during a discussion on the burden on England cricketers when he attended the ICC meeting in 1938 as Australia's representative³⁸. Subsequent Australian representatives at the ICC forcefully echoed Dr. Evatt's sentiments.

There was also little cricket interaction between Australia and the other members. In the ICC meeting of July 18, 1964, India pointed out that it had not visited Australia since 1946-47 and Pakistan, which became a member in 1952, said it had never visited Australia. New Zealand also faced neglect in cricket by its bigger neighbour. Regular exchanges did not take place between New Zealand and Australia until the early 1970s³⁹.

In 1948, the MCC, which accounted for most of the official international cricket traffic, felt compelled to act to reduce the burden on England cricketers. A report of the ‘MCC Selection and Planning Sub-Committee on the Future of International Tours in 1948’ found that several factors had led to a decline in interest in test cricket among the public and in the emergence of young cricketers in England. It noted that the problem was compounded by an increase in the standard of cricket in receiving countries which meant that only the best English teams deserved to play abroad to “satisfy the hosts and for prestige of international cricket”. The report encouraged other ICC member countries to exchange more visits amongst themselves to ease the burden on England and also firmly asked the West Indies, India and South Africa to bear the full expenses of England’s tours to their countries⁴⁰. Relaying the findings of the report, *The Guardian* wrote that experiences in the West Indies and full employment in winter meant that not all leading members of the England team accepted invitations to tour in winter. The MCC, however, immediately clarified that in spite

³⁸ Dr. H.V. Evatt attended the ICC meeting of 1938 held on June 15, according to the minutes.

³⁹ Australia's reticence towards cricket tours outside the Ashes cycle has been noted earlier in the chapter (footnote 16). Australia did not establish a very regular cricket relationship with India and Pakistan in this period. It also shared a less-than-friendly relationship in cricket with its smaller neighbour, New Zealand, in part for reasons of regional supremacy and in part, because of the lower standard of New Zealand cricket [Richard Cashman, ‘Australia’ and Greg Ryan, ‘New Zealand’ in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., pp. 49-50 & pp. 107-8 respectively].

⁴⁰ ICC archives: ‘Report of the MCC Selection & Planning Sub-Committee on the Future of International Tours’ shared and implemented in the 1948 ICC meeting.

of the need to reduce its international tours, “[i]t is not proposed at present to upset the arrangement by which visits with Australia interchange every four years.” Such was the centrality of the cricketing relationship between England and Australia that the MCC report recommended any gap year arising in England’s schedule be planned such that it fell on the year after a tour to Australia because “in such a year the value of a visit is probably less important from the point of view of rebuilding an England team.” This meant that other ICC members became casualties. Accordingly, in the 1948 ICC meeting, the MCC announced its decision to cancel its 1949-50 tour of India. A.S. de Mello, the Indian representative at the ICC that year, expressed India’s bitter disappointment and warned that it would prove an extremely unpopular decision in India and requested reconsideration of the decision. *The Guardian* reported that the situation had been “sufficiently serious to justify the curtailment of tours”⁴¹.

As requests for a bigger share of the MCC poured in, the MCC resorted to other ways to mollify members of the ICC. In the July 14, 1955 meeting, it offered MCC ‘A’ teams as an alternative to those member countries to which tours by the MCC had been “necessarily few and far between”⁴². This idea was reportedly conceived by Ronald ‘Ronnie’ Aird, long-time Secretary of the MCC (and by extension, of the ICC) as a solution to growing demand. *The Times* explained that “[f]or obvious reasons a fully representative side cannot be sent away each winter and yet it is desirable to show the M.C.C. flag as widely and as often as possible.”⁴³ The ICC Chairman that year, Charles Lyttelton, the 10th Viscount Cobham⁴⁴, invited representatives to consider the possibility of visits from ‘A’ teams. Sir Alan Collymore of the West Indies was the sole ‘non-traditional’ rival to decline the offer citing “existing commitments” of the West Indies Cricket Board of Control (hereafter, WICBOC). The Indian representative, Maharaj Kumar Vijayananda of Vizianagram, revealed that India had invited the MCC ‘A’ team to tour in 1957-58. Arthur Sims of New Zealand welcomed

⁴¹ All quotes from *The Manchester Guardian*, Jul 20, 1948, p. 2.

⁴² ICC Minutes: July 14, 1955. From discussions, it would seem that MCC ‘A’ teams were envisaged as second XIs of England comprising players in their twilight and/or up-and-coming players. What is clear from these records is that on most occasions, the ‘A’ team did not contain established England test players or crowd favourites.

⁴³ *The Times*, Friday, Dec 02, 1955, p. 4.

⁴⁴ The 10th Viscount Cobham, Charles Lyttelton, had captained Worcestershire in the 1930s and followed in the footsteps of his father and grandfather to become President of the MCC in 1954. He was Governor-General of New Zealand from 1957 to 1962 and Treasurer of the MCC in 1963. His mother was South African and he had extensive business interests in South Africa. He would go on to play a central role in the ‘D’Oliveira affair’ of 1968 [Peter Oborne, op cit., pp. 151-152 & Lyttelton’s profile on ESPNcricinfo: <http://www.espnccricinfo.com/england/content/player/16708.html> (last accessed on 08/04/2013)].

the idea of ‘A’ teams and hoped that MCC ‘A’ teams would visit New Zealand in addition to the full-strength MCC teams visiting Australia. He also appealed for the inclusion of two or three well-known players in these teams to draw crowds. Group Capt M.M.A. Cheema of Pakistan echoed Sims’s words and also called for the inclusion of as many amateurs as possible in the MCC ‘A’ team that was to tour Pakistan in the December of 1955. The MCC ‘A’ tours starting in December 1955 with Pakistan were hailed as a “new link in the chain of international tours”⁴⁵. However, Australia was again a prime consideration with R.W.V. Robins, who was present as representative of Australia in this meeting, putting on his MCC hat to point out that the MCC had decided to keep the winter preceding an Australian tour free of top-level cricket so as to rest leading players. With a visit to Australia scheduled for the winter of 1956, it was unlikely that any leading test cricketers would be available for ‘A’ tours in the winter of 1955. (It was noted in the ICC meeting on July 20, 1956, that matches against MCC ‘A’ teams lacking star power forced host countries to field full-strength teams to attract sponsors.)

South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth and consequently, the ICC, marked yet another occasion when the West Indies, Pakistan, India and to an extent, New Zealand, clamoured for a change in the programme of tours. Pakistan and the West Indies argued that as a result of its withdrawal from the ICC, South Africa was not entitled to its regular share of tours to and from England. However, the South African Cricket Association had enjoyed a long and intimate relationship with the MCC, which, along with Australia and also New Zealand, was determined to proceed with cricketing commitments already made to South Africa⁴⁶.

By the start of the 1960s, the West Indies cricket team was a popular opponent and consistently delivered splendid performances. It was popular particularly in England which had a large immigrant Caribbean population. In Australia, the West Indians were given a fond

⁴⁵ *The Times*, Friday, Dec 02, 1955; p. 4

⁴⁶ ICC Minutes: 1961, 1962 and 1963. In what is perhaps an indication of the slow pace of international cricket, infrequent exchanges (particularly visits to England) and the long and tiring nature of cricket tours, in 1964, a full twelve years after its admission to international cricket, Pakistan was described in *The Times* as “the most recent members of the Imperial Cricket Conference, with their reputation still in the making, though they will be none the less welcome for that.” (*The Times*, Wednesday, Apr 04, 1962, p. 3)

farewell by Melbournians at the end of the 1960-1961 test series which included the historic first-ever tied Test match. It was, therefore, widely criticised as a matter of shame by many that the intransigent Australia- and South Africa-centric touring programme of the MCC did not accord due acknowledgement to the new cricketing might of the West Indies.

According to minutes of the ICC meeting of July 17, 1963, the first topic to come up was a request by the West Indies through its representative J. St. F. Dare for increased tours to England and Australia from the West Indies. The success of the previous West Indies tour of Australia, and the “entertaining” cricket series against England that was being played concurrent to the ICC meeting had, according to the West Indies board, amply demonstrated its superior cricket skills. The West Indies board believed that by virtue of its excellent performances and its contribution to the revival of public interest in cricket, the West Indies cricket team had merited more frequent cricket exchanges with England and Australia. Dare pointed out that its next tour of England was scheduled for 1971, by when most of the current side would have retired, thus depriving cricket fans of potentially riveting contests. Underlining again that South Africa was no longer a member, Dare requested a review of the touring schedule. Fixing future tours as far ahead as fifteen years, in his opinion, was counter-productive as the fortunes and form of cricket teams were likely to change in the interim. B.A. Barnett of Australia supported an increase in cricket between the West Indies and Australia but wanted assurance that no change would be made to the detriment of the traditional England–Australia relationship. The MCC refused to give away any part of South Africa’s share of cricket against England and Australia.

Evidently, the assumption of the WICBOC here was that pride of place in the cricket programme of tours was awarded on the basis of merit. Until the rise of the West Indies, the two traditional rivals, England and Australia, had also been the two mightiest teams. Now, WICBOC felt that by dint of its performances, the West Indies team had proven itself and had earned the right to parity with England and Australia. However, as seen above, precedence in the schedule of tours was granted out of consideration for more than mere cricketing might; cherished historical ties and traditional rivalry explained why Australia and South Africa ranked higher.

The writer and journalist Alan Ross of *The Guardian* summed up both the prevalent attitude at Lord’s and the need for change when he launched a characteristically

perspicacious and searing attack on the MCC: “Many people will be keenly disappointed to hear that the West Indies cricket team will not be seen in England again until 1971, and then not again until 1978. The West Indians have given so good an account of themselves in recent years—both here and in Australia, as well as on their own ground—that they now clearly rank as one of the three Great Powers of Cricket – an extraordinary feat for a band of cricketers drawn from so small a population. India, Pakistan, New Zealand, and South Africa now form a perceptible second division. But the arrangements for international tours are still rooted in the original triangle of England, Australia, and South Africa, who had no rival for the third place fifty or sixty years ago. In 1960, the Imperial Cricket Conference . . . drew up a programme for England’s Test matches, home and away, extending to 1978. In this, the South Africans still rank next to the Australians in precedence, although they are no longer comparable in strength with the West Indies, and although South Africa resigned from the Imperial Cricket Conference after leaving the Commonwealth. And the South African team will visit England three times in the next sixteen years, whereas the West Indies will come only twice. The difficulties can be appreciated; arrangements for tours are complicated, and each change involves more changes. But suppose that, at the ICC’s next meeting, the West Indians complained of unfair treatment, on grounds of cricketing status. Would India and Pakistan accept a reply based on historical tradition and administrative convenience? Or would they smell a colour line, lurking behind these polite reasons for maintaining preferential treatment for a country now of the second rank in cricket, and no longer a member of the ICC – not to mention other matters?”⁴⁷

Letters poured in, calling for a fairer deal with England for the West Indies. Sir Christopher Lighton, 8th Baronet, wrote that “[f]ew will deny that the West Indian cricketers, in their last tour of Australia and during their present [1963] tour here, have revitalized cricket, and relieved financial depression . . . The West Indies are the greatest influence in cricket today. Let the Imperial Cricket Conference think again.”⁴⁸ Another letter to *The Times* felt passionately that Sir Christopher Lighton’s letter had voiced “the thoughts of many cricket lovers throughout the world”⁴⁹. From the House of Commons came a letter from the co-Chairman of the British-Caribbean Association, Charles Royle (Baron Royle) and Richard Hornby, echoing similar sentiments: “As co-chairmen of the British-Caribbean

⁴⁷ *The Guardian*, June 29, 1963, p. 6.

⁴⁸ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Saturday, Jun 29, 1963, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 04, 1963, p. 13.

Association, we desire to support the plea made by Sir Christopher Lighton in your columns on Saturday, June 29, that the visits of the Test teams from the West Indies should be more frequent than at present envisaged. It does appear to be ridiculous that this country should not have the opportunity to see these welcome visitors again before the year 1971 and afterwards at only seven year intervals. No side has done more, if as much, to revive our national summer game and all cricket lovers are enthusiastic about the way the West Indians play the game. The presence of so many West Indians in this country is a further argument for more frequent visits of their fellow countrymen; and surely, the M.C.C. and the “Imperial” [sic] Cricket Conference cannot ignore the financial aspects. May we plead that henceforth the visits shall be as frequent as those from Australia? We know that all West Indians in this country are with us in this appeal.”⁵⁰ Another letter, written by John ‘Jock’ Middleton Campbell (later, Baron Campbell of Eskan), emphasising the same points, contributed some very revealing points about the ICC, the state of cricket, its member countries, ‘race’ and politics: “In the last 15 years the West Indies have made the grade as a first class cricket power: must they wonder what more they have to do before this is acknowledged in the international fixture list? . . . The West Indies cricket team is a symbol of a common identity of the different units of the Caribbean; this should be encouraged . . . The West Indies must wonder why we entertain South Africa more frequently when they themselves find it impossible to tour South Africa; indeed, the West Indian teams show the greatest possible mixture of all races playing cricket.” The letter went on to ask sardonically, “would it not seem strange to West Indians if no rearrangement can be made, when, by comparison, it is quite impossible to know who will be President of the United States or whether man will have landed on the moon by 1971?”⁵¹

This groundswell of support, reinforced by the presence of the legendary West Indies captain Frank Worrell⁵² himself at the July 17, 1963 ICC meeting, forced the MCC to

⁵⁰ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Monday, Jul 08, 1963, p. 11.

⁵¹ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 11, 1963, p. 11. In 1950, Jock Campbell, a Fabian socialist, took over as Chairman of Booker, the British sugar company which dominated the sugar industry in Guyana (then, British Guiana). His appointment triggered a number of social reforms on the sugar estates [Hubert Devonish, ‘African and Indian Consciousness at Play: A Study in West Indies Cricket and Nationalism’ in Hilary McD Beckles & Brian Stoddart, eds., *Liberation Cricket: West Indies Cricket Culture*, Manchester University Press (1995), p. 182].

⁵² Sir Frank Worrell (knighted in 1964), a middle-class Barbadian and graduate of the University of the West Indies, was the first black cricketer to captain the West Indies in 1960. He had already captained a Commonwealth side in India during the winter of 1951-2 and had been vice-captain of the national side. Both Frank Worrell’s West Indies cricket team and the political conglomerate that was the West Indies underwent a

reconsider the touring itinerary and usher in a new regime of hosting two visiting teams every other summer in England albeit on shorter and slightly overlapping tours. This satisfied the requests of other ICC members and at the same time appeased those who felt that long tours between mismatched teams made cricket less exciting⁵³. The England–Australia relationship once again remained unscathed with agreement that in their year, the Australians would be the sole visitors⁵⁴. Bowing to popular calls, the West Indies was also awarded sole-visitor status for the immediate future. *The Guardian* reported that Australia would tour in the summer of 1964, followed by New Zealand and South Africa in 1965, the West Indies in 1966 and finally India and Pakistan in 1967⁵⁵.

Dominated by the MCC, the private gentlemen's club-style working of the ICC meant that tours were undertaken on a voluntary basis. Members applied to have their matches recognised by the ICC as official. International cricket was very loosely structured and bilateral series were played on the basis of mutual desire, requests and invitations. There was no compulsion to play against all members⁵⁶. The prevalence of such an atmosphere meant

regime change around that period. Tim Hector's powerful words explain the process of change in West Indies cricket: " . . . a tremendous campaign led by C.L.R. James . . . in which Worrell himself participated, so much so, he was referred to as a 'Cricket Bolshevik', toppled the white leadership in West Indies cricket. This overt racism in West Indies cricket crashed like Stalin's statue in Budapest had done just before [during the brief Hungarian uprising against the USSR in 1956]. With Worrell's ascent to the captaincy West Indies cricket appeared in its own true colours, shorn of racism for the very first time." [Tim Hector (compiled and with editorial commentary by Stephen Wagg) in Stephen Wagg, ed., *op cit.*, p. 165]

⁵³ *The Times*, Tuesday, Aug 25, 1959, p. 4; *The Times*, Thursday, Nov 19, 1959, p. 4; *The Times*, Monday, Jul 09, 1962, p. 4. All carried arguments in favour of matches of shorter duration than a full 5 days when strong teams met weaker ones. Acknowledging that raising all test matches to 5-day status may have been driven by financial reasons, *The Times* regularly lamented that this decision of the ICC meant that "some countries, which would often find it difficult to hold one of the first four places in the county table, now stand in line with Australia. It has, in fact, debased the currency of Test cricket, and removed for good some of the glamour and interest in the championship." (*The Times*, Monday, May 14, 1956, p. 4)

⁵⁴ ICC Minutes: July 17, 1963. *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 18, 1963, p. 4: "In any revised programme Australia's position will remain unchanged. They would continue to come, as they do now, every four years." Denys Rowbotham in *The Guardian*, July 18, 1963, p. 10: "That all members agreed that the most ancient as well as the most challenging battles, those between England and Australia, should be unaffected by new arrangements is surely the mark of [an arrangement of sense and goodwill with no loss of prestige to anyone]."

⁵⁵ Reported by *The Guardian*, February 1, 1964, p. 8, under the headline 'Revolution in Test match cricket'.

⁵⁶ In every meeting, tours were either approved or requested. Some examples:

"The Conference provisionally agreed to note India's application to visit England in 1953." (ICC Minutes: 1947 & *The Times*, Tuesday, May 20, 1947, p. 2)

In 1955, the Indian representative Vizzy informed the gathering that an invitation had been sent to Australia to visit India after the conclusion of Australia's tour of England in 1956. The Australian representative H. Bushby replied that approval had not been confirmed by the ACB (ICC Minutes: July 14, 1955).

"It now remains for India and Pakistan to apply for the fixtures between them next autumn in India, to be

that it was easy for the MCC, Australia and South Africa to put their friendly rivalry ahead of any rotational touring system. This also meant that South Africa was never under any pressure to play against non-white teams. Even under the revised touring regime released by the MCC in 1964, South Africa was paired with New Zealand – a fellow white ICC member. Australia's attitude towards other members has already been noted. It was this arrangement that came to the rescue of South Africa's loyal friends in the ICC on the issue of engaging with apartheid South Africa after 1961. With each member left free to make a decision on cricket ties with South Africa, the ICC was under no pressure to take a stand on the issue of apartheid or put a ban on cricketing ties with South Africa. As the well-known athlete and sports journalist Christopher Brasher explained in *The Observer*, “It must be remembered that the Imperial Cricket Conference has no legislative powers. It may discuss and recommend, but, in the last resort, the rules and conditions under which a Test series is played are a matter for the mutual agreement of the two countries concerned. Thus, relations with South Africa are a matter for the individual conscience.”⁵⁷ In the same vein, reception of initiation of cricket exchanges between other members in 1946 as “an innovation” and that of the 1964 revision as “a revolution” indicated the glacial pace of development of cricket and reluctance of the ICC to expand.

Evidently, there was a hierarchy within the ICC. The cliquish and leisurely nature of the Conference meant that traditional rivalry, historical ties, geography and racial divide were all factors in the inclusion or exclusion of members in groups within the larger group. Subsequent sections will shed further light on these divides.

recognized as Test matches. Similarly Pakistan will ask for their tour of England in 1954 to be recognized as official.” (*The Times*, Tuesday, Jul 29, 1952, p. 3)

This manner of functioning continued well into the 21st century. Until recently, the ICC played a minimal role in organising international cricket. Visits were agreed bilaterally “according to the traditions or whims or political designs of the separate national boards” of the member boards [Mike Marqusee, ‘The Ambush Clause: Globalisation, Corporate Power and the Governance of World Cricket’, in Stephen Wagg, ed., p. 257]. It was not until well into the first decade of the twenty-first century that structure in the form of the Future Tours Programme was introduced.

Interestingly, even the Bodyline controversy of 1932-33, which greatly tested relations between the MCC and ACB, and threatened to harm political relations between the two countries, was treated as a matter to be resolved between the two senior-most members with the ICC playing bystander (*ibid.*).

⁵⁷ *The Observer*, Jul 10, 1960, p. 15. Jim Swanton noted in 1985 that the main responsibility of the ICC was to discuss touring schedules and it had no other mandatory function. The ICC acted as “a forum for the discussion of topical matters” and could recommend courses of action. “The ICC is the focus for suggested amendments in the laws of the game *which are the responsibility of the MCC*, as they have been since the formation of the club in 1787.” (Emphasis added) [E.W. Swanton, p. ix (Author’s Note)]

3.4 'A conference of great importance . . . (and) a spirit of harmony . . . between representatives of the MCC and of the great dominions'

Between 1946 and 1964, in every ICC meeting, there was at least one instance (usually more) of a very senior MCC member, English by birth and nationality, representing another ICC member country. This was most consistently done by influential English MCC figures for Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. The table below records the recurrence of such proxy representation for the period under study.

Year	Name	Nationality	Representing
1946 (This first post-war meeting was an all-proxy one)	G.O. Allen	English (born in Sydney)	Australia
	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	H.D.G. Leveson-Gower	English	South Africa
	Group Capt A.J. Holmes	English	South Africa
	Sir Kenneth Fitze	English (Indian Civil Service)	India
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
	Sir Pelham Warner	English (born in Trinidad)	West Indies
1947	G.O. Allen	English (born in Sydney)	Australia
	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1948	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	Group Capt A.J. Holmes	English	South Africa
	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	Sir Pelham Warner	English (born in Trinidad)	West Indies
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand

1950	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1952	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1953	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	Col R.S. Rait Kerr	English	South Africa
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1955	R.W.V. Robins (present here for Australia but spoke as MCC member also)	English	Australia
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1956	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1958	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
	B.K. Castor	English (born in British Guiana)	West Indies
1959	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	English	South Africa
	B.K. Castor	English (born in British Guiana)	West Indies
1960 (as discussed shortly, the 'throwing' furore meant fewest instances of proxy representation)	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1961	A.H.H. Gilligan	English	New Zealand
1963	R.W.V. Robins	English	Australia
	Charles Lyttelton, 10 th Viscount Cobham	English (family connections to South Africa and New Zealand; Governor-General of New Zealand)	New Zealand

Sir Pelham ‘Plum’ Warner, who was born in Trinidad, represented the West Indies in 1946 and again in 1948. President of WICBOC, R. Karl Nunes regularly appeared on behalf of his board until 1956. In all likelihood, it was his illness and death (condoled in the ICC meetings of 1958 and 1959 respectively and recorded in the minutes) that saw a temporary substitute in 1958 and 1959 in the form of British Guiana-born Surrey and MCC figure, B.K. Castor. What is interesting to note about West Indian representation from the minutes is that attendance of black WICBOC administrators (C.R. Browne in 1948, 1952) appears to have preceded appointment of the first black West Indies captain (Frank Worrell, who first led the West Indies in the 1960-61 tour of Australia).

The minutes show that Sir Kenneth Fitze of the Indian Civil Service represented India in 1946⁵⁸. From 1947, when India became independent, only Indian nationals represented India.

Pakistan, which joined the ICC in 1952 and attended meetings from July 21, 1953, only had Pakistani nationals as representatives at the ICC.

By contrast, the ‘proxies’ who represented Australia, South Africa and New Zealand in this period were English MCC heavyweights. As is obvious from the table, they remained largely unchanged, and continued in their roles on a consistent and regular basis. In fact, former England test player (and brother of another England and MCC stalwart, A.E.R. Gilligan) A.H.H. Gilligan’s long-term representation of New Zealand was rewarded by the New Zealand Cricket Council (hereafter, NZCC) with a life membership in 1963 in recognition of his services to New Zealand cricket. Newspapers reported that A.H.H. Gilligan “has been New Zealand’s delegate to the Imperial Cricket Conference for over 30 years, and arranged the itineraries for the New Zealand tours of Britain in 1931, 1937, 1949, and 1958.”⁵⁹ The one major exception to this cosy proxy arrangement was the tension created between the cricket boards of England, Australia and South Africa by the ‘throwing’

⁵⁸ “A Reuter message from Madras states that Sir Kenneth Fitze, Political Advisor to the Secretary of State for India and a former President of the Central India Cricket Association, has been requested by the Board of Control for Cricket in India to represent them at the Imperial Cricket Conference.” (*The Times*, Friday, Jan 04, 1946, p. 8)

⁵⁹ *The Times*, Saturday, Oct 19, 1963, p. 4; *The Guardian*, October 19, 1963, p. 9. An error in the original report was corrected in *The Times*, Thursday, Oct 24, 1963, p. 6.

controversy in 1960. The matter was deemed serious enough for Australia and South Africa to send top officials of their cricket boards to the ICC meeting in 1960. It was clearly a departure from the norm and the newspapers were quick to spot it⁶⁰.

Such was their influence and seniority that MCC stalwarts such as Gubby Allen (MCC and Australia), Plum Warner (MCC, South Africa and West Indies), Col R.S. Rait Kerr (MCC and South Africa), R.W.V. Robins (Australia and MCC) and the 10th Viscount Cobham (MCC and New Zealand) represented more than one member of the ICC.

It is possible that financial expediency was a factor behind member boards in the white dominions seeking representation at the ICC through a senior MCC proxy. Certainly that would explain the extensive use of their England-settled nationals B.A. Barnett and Arthur Sims by Australia and New Zealand respectively. However, the consistency and regularity with which the same proxy appeared on behalf of the white dominions in this period points to a standing arrangement or understanding between the dominion cricket board and the senior MCC member in question that went beyond mere financial feasibility⁶¹. At the same time, members of the ‘new’ Commonwealth—India, Pakistan and the West Indies (on

⁶⁰ According to Jim Swanton’s account, the 1958-59 England tour of Australia led by Peter May threw up a major crisis when the bowling actions of some Australian bowlers were called into question, in particular those of Ian Meckiff and Gordon Rorke. South African bowler Geoff Griffin had also faced similar questions. The MCC had previously also been concerned about some England bowlers. A high-intensity stand-off ensued between the MCC and the Australian board with close coverage in the press (Swanton, p. 277; *The Times*, Saturday, June 18, 1960, p. 3). Chairman of the Australian board W.J. Dowling was accompanied to the ICC at Lord’s in 1960 by one of the all-time greats of international cricket, the former Australian batting legend Sir Donald Bradman (he would shortly thereafter succeed Dowling as Chairman) who complained that a “frightening war” was being waged against Meckiff and Rorke by the English press (*The Times*, Monday, Jul 25, 1960, p. 4. See also *The Times*, Wednesday, Jun 29, 1960, p. 15).

The Guardian explained that “Australia has usually been represented by proxy, and her delegates for the past few years have been B.A. Barnett, a former Australian wicket-keeper now resident in Britain, and R.W.V. Robins, who managed the M.C.C. team in the West Indies during the winter.” (*The Guardian*, Jun 8, 1960, p. 4) *The Times* added that “In the ordinary way, [the ICC’s] meetings present few problems . . . But as a rule there is nothing sufficiently important to persuade Australia to nominate Sir Donald Bradman as one of their delegates, together with the chairman of their Board of Control, or for West Indies and South Africa to be represented by their highest officials.” (*The Times*, Saturday, Jul 09, 1960, p. 7) This assessment, though true of Australia and partially of South Africa, is erroneous about WICBOC representation.

England-born New Zealand-raised Sir Arthur Sims (cricketer, businessman, philanthropist, financier), another regular New Zealand representative at the ICC, like B.A. Barnett of Australia, was based in England on account of his meat-packing business. He was a lifelong member of the MCC and patron of NZCC. [From his Wisden/ESPNcricinfo obituaries: <http://www.espncricinfo.com/newzealand/content/player/38424.html> (last accessed on 03/04/2013)]

⁶¹ As proven by the NZCC’s recognition of A.H.H. Gilligan. In the ICC meeting of July 21, 1953, on the matter of voting rights, the minutes revealed that Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth had been briefed by SACA: “Lt-Col RT Stanyforth (SA) stated his instructions were to oppose the resolution.”

most occasions)—sent their nationals. Therefore, any financial reasons notwithstanding, that senior MCC figures acted as trusted proxy administrators for the older dominions is perhaps an indication both of the extent of MCC dominance over international cricket administration in this period, and of the close bonds that existed between the cricket boards of England, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. There were literal and perceived metaphorical kinship ties between officials of these boards, between Britain and the white dominions and their inhabitants that happily rendered nationality and identity fluid⁶².

3.5 ‘The principle of equality and brotherhood’: levelling of the playing field?

As founding members, England, Australia and South Africa enjoyed additional voting privileges in the ICC meetings. Rule 8 of the ICC Constitution declared that the three founding members were entitled to two votes each while the other members—the West Indies, New Zealand, India and Pakistan—would have a single vote each.

The first attempt to redress this imbalance (at least in the period under study here) was made by WICBOC in the ICC meeting of June 27-28, 1950, when its representative Karl Nunes demanded “equal footing” for members of the Conference in future “in regard to voting and other matters”. This demand was seconded by A.S. de Mello of India. Arthur Sims of New Zealand stated that the NZCC was satisfied with the present system. R.J.A. Massie and R.W.V. Robins, who were both present for Australia, and Hon Justice J.E. de Villiers and Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth, the two representatives of South Africa, agreed with Sims and spoke in favour of *status quo*. In the ensuing vote, it was decided *nem con* to retain the extant

⁶² James Bradley quoted Lord Harris’s words from 1914: “There has resulted a conference of great importance, from a cricket point of view, between the representatives of the club [MCC] and of the great dominions which have [sic], perhaps strengthened the cricket associations of the latter, and certainly served to introduce a spirit of harmony which cannot but be of advantage to the game.” [James Bradley, ‘The MCC, society and empire: a portrait of cricket’s ruling body, 1860–1914’, op cit., p. 16]

arrangement of two votes each for the MCC, Australia and South Africa and one vote each for the West Indies, New Zealand and India⁶³.

The issue was far from laid to rest though as a persistent WICBOC raised it again in the next ICC meeting on July 28, 1952. W.M. Green (West Indies) said his board wanted to raise questions about voting rights under Rule 8. However, the Chairman William Findlay (member of the inner circle of the MCC and previously long-term Secretary), referred Green to the discussion that had taken place in 1950 and also reminded him that under Rule 7, proper notice was required for a discussion on the matter⁶⁴. For a second time, the West Indians and others were left frustrated.

In 1953, at the ICC meeting on July 21, the West Indies selector and ICC representative J.G. Kelshall, accompanied by R.K. Nunes, proposed the following alteration to Rule 8 of the ICC: “All members of the Conference except Associate members may exercise two votes each at a meeting of the Conference.” They proposed that the Chairman would have a casting vote at his discretion but only if votes were equal on the matter. Sir Arthur Sims (New Zealand) was once again the first to speak out against this proposal. He objected to it with the argument that “he had great regard for the rights of the foundation members of the Conference and his long experience had been that these members had always taken a broad outlook on the affairs of the Conference and the interests of the other members”. Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth (South Africa) also said he had instructions from his Board to oppose the West Indies resolution. Surprisingly, Sunder Kabadi (India) and S. Nazeer Ali (Pakistan) said they had no instructions from their Boards on this matter. With no seconder, this resolution was withdrawn. In view of the fact that India had enthusiastically seconded the West Indies proposal to amend voting rights under Rule 8 of the ICC in 1950, it

⁶³ Matters rarely went to vote; but perhaps rarer still was a split vote, if at all. This case is a good illumination of the working of the ICC: there was clear and obvious disagreement but when the matter went to vote, the minutes recorded that the final resolution was passed “*nem con*”. No split results in a vote were recorded in this period.

⁶⁴ Items for the agenda were invited up to March 1 [ICC archives: ‘Rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference – Adopted by the Imperial Cricket Conference on 28th June, 1950 (Amended 21st July, 1953; 17th July, 1958; and 15th July, 1959)’; and *The Times*, Friday, Jun 02, 1950, p. 5]. As a rule, the MCC quite rigidly imposed this rule and disallowed deviation from its set agenda (e.g., in the above instance and one other instance). However, in 1961, South Africa left the Commonwealth after the ICC agenda for that year had been finalised; but not only was consent procured for a SACA representative to be present as an observer, discussion on the implications of its exit dominated the meeting that year.

is highly surprising that there was no support from India (or Pakistan) for WICBOC in this instance.

The next discussion on the matter of voting rights came in the July 20, 1956 meeting. Raised this time by India (represented by A.S. de Mello and A.N. Ghose), the proposal is worth reproduction in full: “That in consonance with the spirit of the present times and relationship with all cricketing countries that are affiliated and are units of the Imperial Cricket Conference, the BCCI desires that she should be given equal status by being allowed 2 votes along with countries like England, Australia and South Africa. As cricket is essentially a Commonwealth game and since all cricketing nations are governed by the Imperial Cricket Conference, inequality of status for New Zealand, India, Pakistan and the West Indies, which have only 1 vote each, as against Britain, Australia and South Africa having 2 each, goes against the principle of equality and brotherhood. Hence the BCCI feels that all affiliated countries of the Imperial Cricket Conference should be on par with each other by having the same status and uniform representation at the Imperial Cricket Conference from this year onwards.”⁶⁵ Couched in phrases such as “in consonance with the spirit of present times, “equality” and “brotherhood”, this appeal was worded and presented as an opportunity for cricket and the ICC to update its thinking in keeping with changes on the political front. This proposal had the backing of A.T. Naqvi of Pakistan. R.K. Nunes of the West Indies, who had been the first to propose this change in voting rights in 1950, appeared to take a cautious, tactful and wary stance this time. He openly anticipated opposition to this proposal from some “original” members of the Conference. He took the view that seniority in status (read: parity with the ‘foundation members’) would not happen without there being a good case for it. However, he felt that the (praiseworthy) cricket record of the West Indies in the preceding eight years spoke for itself. He considered the on-field success of the West Indies cricket team an indication that the West Indies had attained adulthood in cricket and hence, was deserving of parity in status with England, Australia and South Africa⁶⁶.

⁶⁵ ICC Minutes: July 20, 1956.

⁶⁶ Similar sentiments by the West Indies in 1963 linking strong on-field performances to the right to higher status has already been discussed in the matter of touring schedules. Nationalism, the independence movement and cricket went hand-in-hand in the West Indies. Demands for fairer administration of cricket at home and abroad, on and off the field, were based on confidence derived from strong on-field performances. C.L.R. James’s *Beyond A Boundary* is the pioneering work on the role of cricket in the felling of “the barriers of race, class and empire”. [See recent article on the book in *The Guardian* written by James’s wife, Selma:

Welcoming the “friendly relationship that existed between all countries in the Conference which governed cricket with such acumen and success”, Arthur Sims (New Zealand) repeated his previous stance of opposition to any change noting also that other organisations adopted a similar practice. The existing system appeared satisfactory to Sims as he could not recall any incident in his thirty years’ experience when “any difference of station was felt due to the [existing] conditions of Rule 8”. G.W.A. Chubb of South Africa praised the “admirable” manner in which the seasoned campaigner Karl Nunes had presented the case for the West Indies. However, he supported Arthur Sims in finding this change to the Constitution of the ICC undesirable. W.J. Dowling (Australia) and his Board were opposed to the resolution but Dowling undertook to report the matter fully to his Board. The Chairman, Field Marshal Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis⁶⁷ pronounced himself impressed by the manner in which opinions had been expressed on this matter. He suggested to the representatives present to report this matter to their respective Boards while he undertook to report it to the MCC Committee. Given the division of opinion, he recommended that no action be taken temporarily.

In the next ICC meeting two years later on July 17, 1958, the votes issue was revived and some long-awaited changes were ushered in. The Maharaj Kumar of Vizianagram (India), seconded by B.A. Barnett of Australia, re-submitted India’s proposal of 1956 on changes to Rule 8. In order to reconcile demands for equality with the need felt by the founding members to remain distinguished from the rest, Brig. A.H. Coy (South Africa) proposed the following solution: the “original” members of the Conference—MCC, Australia and South Africa—would be known as “Foundation Members”. The other full-time members would be known simply as “Members”. While both Foundation Members and Members would be entitled to one vote each at a meeting of the Conference and major matters would be decided by a simple majority vote, no new member would be elected or removed and no alterations to rules would be made without the support of at least two Foundation Members.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/02/beyond-a-boundary-broke-cricket-barriers> (last accessed on 05/04/2013)]

⁶⁷ Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, who chaired the ICC in 1956 as President of the MCC was a former Governor-General of Canada. Embodying the much-admired confluence of royalty, military service and amateur sporting ideal, he stepped in when the Duke of Edinburgh was unable to preside over the opening ceremony of the British Empire and Commonwealth Games in Canada in 1954 [Michael Dawson, ‘Acting Global, Thinking Local: ‘Liquid Imperialism’ and the Multiple Meanings of the 1954 British Empire & Commonwealth Games’, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 23.1 (2006), pp. 10-11].

The Chairman would possess a discretionary casting vote. Brig. Coy explained that such an arrangement would adhere to India's resolution and enable cricketing matters to be discussed on an equal basis; at the same time, if radical changes to the rules of the ICC were to be debated, it would require the support of at least two Founding Members. Coy opined that in this manner India's requirements would be met and at the same time "the Founder Members of the Conference shall remain identified". The ICC Chairman and President of the MCC that year, Bernard Marmaduke Fitzalan-Howard, 16th Duke of Norfolk, agreed with the views of Brig. Coy. Once again, Arthur Sims placed on record his opinion that although he was willing to lend his support to these amendments, he saw nothing amiss in the extant system. This new resolution was proposed by South Africa, seconded by India and was passed "*nem con*". The minutes recorded that "It was agreed that each country should have one vote"⁶⁸.

While not granting complete equality of status, this move in 1958 seemingly represented a (welcome and rare) change to the perseverant non-founding members. In the ICC meeting in 1960, the new President of WICBOC and Nunes's successor, J. St. F. Dare, thanked the Conference on behalf of his board for agreeing to bestow "same status and equal voting rights"⁶⁹ on all affiliated countries of the ICC. However, given the distinguishing nomenclature of "Foundation Members"; certain special rights in administration, election and dismissal reserved for this 'old' Commonwealth trio; and later, England, Australia and also New Zealand's defiant relationship with South Africa after its withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the ICC, the existence of two tiers within the ICC was clearly visible.

3.6 'In how many institutions does "imperial" still survive in this sense?'

⁶⁸ ICC Minutes: July 17, 1958.

⁶⁹ ICC Minutes: July 14-15, 1960.

The ICC meeting on June 27-28, 1950 clarified that in spite of the acceptance of India as a republic in the Commonwealth and hence the ICC, it had found no need to change the name of the Imperial Cricket Conference.

At the ICC meeting of July 14, 1955, Maharaj Kumar Sir Vijaya of Vizianagram (India) gave notice that India would move a proposal in the next meeting in 1956 for the name of the organisation to be changed to ‘Commonwealth Cricket Conference’.

At the next meeting on July 20, 1956, A.S. de Mello of India proposed that the name of the ICC be changed “in keeping with present day status of the countries concerned”. Karl Nunes, speaking for the West Indies, agreed and pointed out that a name like ‘Commonwealth Cricket Conference’ would have “greater significance in the world” and “would better express the relationship between the countries”. A.T. Naqvi of Pakistan aligned himself with these views. Once again, the ‘new’ Commonwealth trio of India, Pakistan and the West Indies desired change. And once again, Arthur Sims (New Zealand) opined that there was “no object in changing the name of the Conference unless there was a very good reason for doing so”. He declared himself opposed to such a name change stating that the current name and arrangement had worked satisfactorily ever since 1909. Yet again, G.W.A. Chubb (South Africa) and W.J. Dowling (Australia) agreed with Sims. Given the divided opinion, de Mello requested that rather than a vote, the matter be reconsidered at a future date. It would seem that even in 1956, a full seven years after the ‘new’ Commonwealth of Nations was brought into effect, the ICC remained unable to catch up with the changing political scenario. Not only did cricket continue to declare itself linked to the ‘British Commonwealth’ in its rule-books, but the title of ‘Imperial Cricket Conference’ also continued, prompting *The Guardian* to wonder in 1963, “ . . . in how many institutions does ‘imperial’ still survive in this sense? . . . ”⁷⁰.

It was only in the ICC meeting of July 18, 1964, that the ICC seriously considered the possibility of changing its name. In the meetings of 1963 and 1964, the prospect of new members from outside the Commonwealth was discussed. This would have necessitated a change both in membership rule (Rule 5) and in the name of the organisation. In 1964, Chairman Gubby Allen explained that the new rules proposed that “countries with a

⁷⁰ *The Guardian*, June 29, 1963, p. 6.

governing body for cricket recognised by the Conference should be eligible for Membership; and that the standard of cricket in such a country should decide its category of membership". He added that if these changes were accepted and membership of the Commonwealth was no longer a condition, then the name of the Conference would have to be changed. In the ensuing discussion, it was agreed to re-name the Conference the 'International Cricket Conference'. This was passed and adopted in the ICC meeting of July 15, 1965. The next day, *The Times* announced that "[t]he Imperial Cricket Conference drew their last collective breath at Lord's yesterday". In the meeting that saw R.H. Twining, President of the MCC in the Chair, the ICC moved to change the name of the organisation to 'International Cricket Conference', "a new connotation which means that membership is no longer confined to Commonwealth countries"⁷¹.

In the ICC meeting on July 19, 1961, Pakistan introduced the idea of a junior membership within the ICC. The two Pakistani representatives, M. Husain and M. Saeed, urged the ICC to consider promotion and sponsorship of minor cricket and minor tours between all cricket-playing countries. The Chairman, Sir Hubert Ashton, read out a letter along similar lines from the President of the Burma Cricket Association. The other members supported this and it was decided to entrust Pakistan with the responsibility of drafting a memorandum on this issue for further consideration in the next meeting. *The Times* reported that "Pakistan envisage other countries interested in cricket such as Canada, Ceylon, Malaya, Kenya, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Singapore and Hong Kong joining the scheme." The article added that English minor counties also stood a chance of membership. Subsidies and costs of such additional membership were expected to weigh heavily on the minds of the members since new junior members would, in all likelihood, be unable to pay. However, the article emphasised that the central issue was encouragement to "the world-wide growth of cricket"⁷².

Accordingly, in the next meeting on July 18, 1962, M. Husain of Pakistan submitted a memorandum containing the responses of several countries outside the Commonwealth which had been approached on this issue. H.S. Altham of the MCC expressed sympathy with

⁷¹ *The Times*, Friday, Jul 16, 1965, p. 4.

⁷² *The Times*, Tuesday, Oct 24, 1961, p. 9.

the proposal but pointed out the immense financial burden such a proposal might impose. The MCC already sponsored several minor tours. He therefore recommended zonal organisations rather than a centralised affiliation. It was decided to circulate the memorandum and the MCC's suggestion of zones of control among member Boards of Control for their comments. *The Times* reported that the suggestion for Associate Members had been "well-received" with further discussion expected the following year⁷³.

On July 17, 1963, ICC Chairman Lt-Col Lord Nugent followed it up in the ICC meeting. H.S. Altham of the MCC proposed an Associate Membership for all countries approved by the Members which would be open to countries outside the Commonwealth. These Associate Members would be able to send a representative to ICC meetings, receive minutes and also submit items for the ICC agenda. They would have no voting rights. Present Member countries would have "zones of responsibility" for minor tours and administration of these Associates. However, "as hitherto", the MCC would retain organisational responsibilities. Australia and the West Indies professed themselves sympathetic to the proposal but too busy to contribute to the scheme. The 10th Viscount Cobham, on behalf of New Zealand, was in favour of areas of responsibility in cricket with New Zealand prepared to act on behalf of Fiji. Hon Chief Justice A.R. Cornelius of Pakistan appreciated the MCC's proposal but felt this arrangement would create too much administrative work for the MCC. He preferred new Associate Members being affiliated on a zonal basis alone rather than to the Conference directly. The discussion ended with the MCC choosing to examine this suggestion further. While informing its readers that the specific question of South Africa's membership had not been discussed, *The Times* reported Pakistan's proposal for a "junior section" of the ICC comprising some countries from outside the Commonwealth such as Denmark and Holland with "zone[s] of responsibility" for each major country to "keep a fatherly eye upon emerging cricketing nations". This proposal, which if implemented was hoped would aid in the development in the game, had been assigned for further "study and research" to the MCC⁷⁴. Denys Rowbotham gave his blessing to these changes: "the outlook is bright and arresting. The game's legislators are answering its new challenges."⁷⁵

⁷³ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 19, 1962, p. 3.

⁷⁴ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 18, 1963, p. 4.

⁷⁵ *The Guardian*, July 18, 1963, p. 10.

The next meeting of the ICC was held on July 18, 1964, and was chaired by Gubby Allen, President of the MCC. Since the last meeting, things had evidently moved apace. A draft with the new proposed rules had been circulated to all members prior to the meeting and was discussed at this meeting. R.C. Steele of Australia said that the ACB had not yet considered it. As a result, it was decided to have a final round of discussions in 1965. The questions of throwing open cricket to countries outside the Commonwealth, Associate Membership for such countries and a change in the name of the organisation were left to the 1965 meeting for finalisation and adoption. From the tone of the 1964 meeting, it appeared merely a matter of formality and no opposition to any of these significant changes appeared to have been anticipated⁷⁶. It was decided that nominations for new members would be accepted in the next meeting provided the changes were passed at the start of the meeting. *The Times* reported in 1964 that “the way would be open to countries like South Africa, Denmark, Holland, East Africa, Malaysia, the United States, and Canada to apply for membership.”⁷⁷ After the momentous meeting of 1965, *The Guardian* remarked that “[u]nder the new rules of the ICC, room has now been found for associate members and Ceylon, Fiji, and the United States of America, having applied, were admitted yesterday” but that “South Africa, who automatically ceased membership of the ICC when they left the British Commonwealth, still remain outside the fold . . . So far South Africa have not applied for associate membership although they are eligible.”⁷⁸ *The Times* also explained helpfully that, “To become a full member of the Conference, entitled to play official Test matches, a country must be proposed and seconded, and subsequently approved by a majority of member countries, including the two foundation members, England and Australia . . . Cricketing countries with their own governing bodies, and where the game is firmly established and properly organized, may become associate members.”⁷⁹

Thus, a raft of changes discussed in 1964 was ushered in, in 1965. What had been ‘Imperial’ became the ‘International’ Cricket Conference; the umbilical cord between cricket

⁷⁶ And yet, it was revealed by Jim Swanton in Gubby Allen’s biography, p. 285, that in 1965, Allen had opposed the move to admit Associate members (“Gubby suffered a political defeat at Lord’s when he unsuccessfully opposed the admission of associate members to the ICC”), a stance on which Allen claims he changed his mind later. Unfortunately, minutes of the 1965 meeting are unavailable at Lord’s. No such opposition was mentioned in the newspapers.

⁷⁷ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 16, 1964, p. 5.

⁷⁸ *The Guardian*, July 16, 1965, p. 13. At the time of the ICC meeting in 1965, South Africa was engaged in a Test series in England (Swanton, p. 285).

⁷⁹ *The Times*, Friday, Jul 16, 1965, p. 4.

and the Commonwealth was cut (at least in theory); consequently, for the first time since the rule was instituted in 1926, countries from outside the Commonwealth were officially accepted as Associate Members of the ICC. It would be pertinent here to wonder as to why after a long gap and after having doggedly refused to accede to similar requests from India and the others in the past, the MCC along with Australia and New Zealand had now agreed to these changes. The word ‘Imperial’ had, for close to two decades by 1965, carried the stench of severe decomposition; in fact, in the contemporary political and most of the non-governmental arena, the word was anathema. It may be possible to interpret these changes as enlightened albeit delayed responses at long last; after all, India, Pakistan and the West Indies had been calling for these measures for a long time. However, South Africa was still outside the ICC and these changes would have facilitated South Africa’s return. Since its departure in 1961, some newspapers and correspondents had regularly speculated and anticipated these changes in the Constitution⁸⁰ and ICC members Australia, New Zealand and the MCC had openly favoured constitutional changes to help South Africa. Therefore, based on the evidence here, it is difficult to avoid judging the timing of these changes as canny and expedient.

This chapter teased out characteristics and developments in the ICC that affected or involved all the full-time members of the ICC. The following chapter will continue this examination of the ICC through the case-studies of New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa.

⁸⁰ Examples will be shared in the South Africa section of the next chapter. Some others are listed here: *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 18, 1963, p. 4: “This would include countries interested in cricket who are not members of the Commonwealth . . . In this way, too, South Africa could be brought back as associate members of the Conference.”

Denys Rowbotham, *The Guardian*, July 18, 1963, p. 10: “As well as directly encouraging the junior countries moreover, the constitutional revision necessary in the conference may allow South Africa a position once more in international cricket which politics, for the present, denies them.”

The Times, Friday, Jul 16, 1965, p. 4: “In this way, of course, South Africa can be readmitted to the Conference.”

Chapter Four: ‘The world family of cricket’? The Imperial Cricket Conference, 1947–1965

Picking up where the previous chapter left off, this chapter will study the cases of New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa. Each of the three stood out during the course of archival research as a result of its occupation of a unique position or response to developments in the ICC.

4.1 ‘More English than the English’: the case of New Zealand

New Zealand emerges from the ICC material on this period as an interesting case. Of the ‘old’ Commonwealth members, if Australia and South Africa were “older traditional foes” of the MCC, New Zealand was often the one that lurked in the background as the forgotten friend.

New Zealand toured England but did not receive independent or separate tours from the MCC. MCC teams travelled to New Zealand at the end of their tours of Australia. New Zealand was persistent in requesting additional tours to and from England. Minutes reveal that in the ICC meeting in 1953 held on July 21, “Arthur Sims (NZ) hoped MCC would send a team to New Zealand in the near future even if a weak one”. New Zealand welcomed the launch of MCC ‘A’ tours in 1955 and hoped that “whenever convenient”, such ‘A’ teams would visit New Zealand in addition to the full-strength teams at the end of the MCC’s Australia tours. In the meeting of July 14–15, 1960, during discussions on the touring schedules for the 1965–1978 period, New Zealand representative Sir Arthur Sims expressed concern that the traditional MCC visit to New Zealand after the Australia tour had not been mentioned. Sims was informed by MCC officials that the practice would not always be possible and that it was “subject to negotiation between the two countries concerned” (presumably, up to Australia to grant and for New Zealand to seek leave for MCC cricketers

to visit New Zealand after the Australia tour). At the same time, however, Sims was also assured that absence of any mention of tours to New Zealand in the programme did not preclude them. At this point in the meeting, the Australia representative (Australian board Chairman W.J. Dowling) was once again reassured that the MCC's long-standing arrangement with Australia would not be affected, whatever the outcome of negotiations with New Zealand. Recorded in this manner in the minutes of the 1960 meeting, this reply is a typical example of the slightly roundabout and evasive manner in which the MCC dealt with any queries that touched on its arrangement with Australia. In his study of New Zealand cricket between 1832 and 1914, Greg Ryan wrote that the Australian cricket board was fiercely protective of its cricketing relationship with England and was against any compromise in this regard. Efforts by the New Zealand Cricket Council to secure release of England teams or cricketers at the end of their tour of Australia were therefore rejected on numerous occasions until the mid-twentieth century¹. In 1963, Arthur Sims reiterated New Zealand's demand. The 10th Viscount Cobham, representing New Zealand, explained to the gathering that the career of a New Zealand cricketer tended to be shorter than those from hotter countries and "there might well be lack of continuity of experience among cricketers in New Zealand because of the infrequency of their visits to the UK"².

Cricket administrators in New Zealand tended to prioritise ideals over success. Whereas Australian cricket at all levels was competitive, the NZCC valued 'form' and preservation of British cultural values over attainment of victory in its pursuit of an English cricketing idyll³. The gap between their cricketing standards increased and it was only in 1927—a full fifty years after Australia—that New Zealand sent its first-ever team to the 'mother country' (as seen in the previous chapter, considered an honour and a sign of maturity). Simultaneously, as the England–Australia rivalry in cricket assumed revered proportions, New Zealand became increasingly peripheral to Australia's cricketing needs. New Zealand cricket shared an uncomfortable and often acrimonious relationship with Australia, its bigger and more powerful neighbour. Even though New Zealand was invited to

¹ Greg Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket: 1832-1914*, Routledge (2004), p. 201, p. 227.

² ICC Minutes: July 17, 1963.

³ Greg Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket*, pp. 5-6, p. 219. In fact, the word 'making' in the title of Greg Ryan's book is a reference to the active and deliberate process by which the game was established and developed in that colony to fit specific social and cultural needs which meant playing the game "in a manner more English than the English" (p. 2, p. 6, p. 230). Until the 1970s, "cricket remained . . . bound to a conservative preoccupation with the best amateur virtues of the English game" [Greg Ryan, 'Kiwi or English?: Cricket on the Margins of New Zealand National Identity' in Stephen Wagg, ed., *Cricket and National Identity in the Postcolonial Age: Following On*, Routledge (2005), p. 29].

the ICC in 1926 and began to play Test cricket from 1929, it was only in 1946 that the first (retrospectively recognised) official test match was played between New Zealand and Australia. No Australian team toured New Zealand between 1928 and 1946, and there were only six visits in the forty years following New Zealand's admission to Test cricket. A regular cricketing relationship between Australia and New Zealand was not established until 1973-74⁴. Together, the self-sabotaging tendencies of the cricket administrators of New Zealand and Australia's cold attitude did much to stifle any prospects of growth. In parallel, as the twentieth century progressed, the two countries shared a fitful relationship in the areas of defence and trade⁵. Greg Ryan concluded that New Zealand's attitude resulted in its failure to capitalise on its cricket success of 1949 and to try to secure a regular place in Australia's domestic Sheffield Shield, which would have guaranteed exposure to competitive cricket. Ryan wrote that majority opinion in New Zealand seemed against such a move. The NZCC and the conservative press appeared content to remain in the shadows of England and Australia, reconciled to viewing cricket as a pastime and not as a competitive sport. Despite complaints by visiting teams, not all matches were first-class⁶. [By contrast, Ceylon, a small island country like New Zealand (but did not enjoy the same ease of entry into the ICC) regularly sent teams to India, secured a slice of visits by other teams to the Indian sub-continent and was persistent in its efforts to gain admission to the ICC.] Ryan's study of New Zealand's early cricket tours to England reveals how tones of "tutelage" and "deference" governed New Zealand's attitude. These tours were seen as opportunities for New Zealand to 'learn' and for both countries to strengthen imperial ties via cricket. The New Zealand press extensively covered English county cricket and according to Ryan's study, was sympathetic

⁴ Greg Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket*, op cit., p. 230. As noted in the previous chapter, Australia reserved its cricketing enthusiasm mainly for Ashes contests against England. In 1964, India and Pakistan complained about this in the ICC meeting. New Zealand was treated in the same manner due to both regional one-upmanship and the poor standard of New Zealand cricket. The 1973-74 series between Australia and New Zealand marked the start of a more regular relationship, brought on by several factors including a decline in New Zealand's dependence on Britain, the onset of one-day cricket, etc. (Richard Cashman, 'Australia' and Greg Ryan, 'New Zealand' in Brian Stoddart & Keith Sandiford, eds., *The Imperial Game: Cricket, Culture and Society*, Manchester University Press (1998), pp. 49-50 & pp. 107-8 respectively; Greg Ryan, 'Kiwi or English?: Cricket on the Margins of New Zealand National Identity' and Mike Marqusee 'The Ambush Clause: Globalisation, Corporate Power and the Governance of World Cricket', in Stephen Wagg, ed., op cit., p. 30 & p. 257 respectively).

Relatedly, another interesting point that emerged from the study of the ICC minutes is that whereas all the other members demanded more tours to both England and Australia, New Zealand restricted itself to courting England.

⁵ Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket*, pp. 199-200.

⁶ Ryan in Stephen Wagg, ed., op cit., pp. 32-34.

to England in the Bodyline Ashes series of 1932-33⁷. Simultaneously, on the political front, New Zealand did not adopt the Statute of Westminster of 1931 until 1947⁸. More than two decades later, the *Evening Post* commented thus in 1958 on yet another poor performance by New Zealand against the MCC: “Though it may not have added to New Zealand’s reputation on the cricket field, it has fully maintained the Dominion’s name for good sportsmanship and good fellowship – and that, as it is repeated at public function after public function, is the essence of cricket. Perhaps it is the most important point on which to have succeeded.”⁹ This theme of putting its ‘kinship’, ‘Britishness’ and dominion spirit ahead of its national identity found echoes in another contemporary episode. *The Conquest of Everest*, the official film on the successful 1953 scaling of Mount Everest by the duo of Hillary and Tenzing, opens with the famous summit photograph of Tenzing Norgay holding aloft his ice axe, from which fluttered the flags of Britain, Nepal, India and the United Nations¹⁰. The New Zealand flag for Edmund Hillary, missing from this line-up, was presumably subsumed under the British symbol, playing the part of the loyal British dominion. Furthermore, in Hillary’s absence and without his knowledge, the New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland gratefully accepted knighthood from London on his behalf, an act that did not go down well with the bee-keeper who led a modest lifestyle and was wary of grandiose titles¹¹. In 1956, on Anthony Eden accepting invitations from the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand to visit those countries, *The Times* beamed that the Commonwealth association was most “consciously

⁷ Ryan in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., op cit., pp. 108-9; Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket*, pp. 227-229 (quotes on p. 228); Ryan in Wagg, ed., p. 33.

⁸ Reluctance to embrace any overt constitutional changes that would distance it from Britain may partly have had to do with the favourable financial borrowing rates offered to New Zealand by London’s financial district under the vague impression of New Zealand still somehow being a part of Britain. See Professor Andrew Ladley, review of *The Britannic Vision – Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* by David McIntyre (review no. 1059). Available at: <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1059> (last accessed: 16/09/2013). See also John Singleton, ‘New Zealand, Britain and the Survival of the Ottawa Agreement, 1945–77’, *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, Vol. 43.2 (1997), pp. 168–182 & John Singleton, ‘Anglo-New Zealand Financial Relations, 1945–61’, *Financial History Review*, Vol. 5.2 (Oct 1998), 139–157.

⁹ Ryan in Wagg, ed., p. 33. See also *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 03, 1958, p. 3.

¹⁰ 1953 film by George Lowe, *The Conquest of Everest*: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iLEWa9WgNo> (last accessed 10/01/2013). The original photograph of Tenzing holding aloft his flag-laden ice-axe taken by Hillary on the summit is available at http://imagingeverest.rgs.org/concepts/imaging_everest/-75.html (Royal Geographical Society, Institute of British Geographers & British Council, Nepal, jointly produced an exhibition of images to mark the 50th anniversary of the historic expedition in 2003. Last accessed on 10/01/2013). See also Peter Hansen, ‘Confetti of Empire: The Conquest of Everest in Nepal, India, Britain, and New Zealand’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 42.2 (April 2000), p. 307.

¹¹ Peter Hansen, ‘Confetti of Empire’, p. 327. From Gordon Stewart’s ‘The British Reaction to the Conquest of Everest’, *Journal of Sport History*, Vol. 7.1 (Spring, 1980), p. 39, reference 69: “ . . . the New Zealander, Hillary, could be considered to be a ‘Britisher’ (as indeed he was described by the Prime Minister of New Zealand). *The Times*. June 2, 1953.” [sic]

prized” in those two countries which were “the farthest from the centre”¹². Not reacting well to changes during negotiations in 1949, New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser raised vocal objections to the dilution of the importance of the Crown that would be caused by the admission of republican India¹³. Likewise, his later successor Keith Holyoake was wary of any moves to dissolve the close ties of the ‘British world’ and the unofficial two-tier system in Commonwealth defence and intelligence consultations¹⁴. Therefore, not surprisingly, in spite of the chronic neglect, New Zealand’s attitude towards the MCC, the older dominion members and the extant *status quo* in cricket was almost reverential. Not being a founding member of the ICC, New Zealand was the only ‘old’ Commonwealth member to have a single vote in the ICC from the beginning. From the minutes of ICC meetings and newspaper reports of this period, New Zealand appeared extremely satisfied with this arrangement unlike India, Pakistan and the West Indies. In fact, in spite of being disadvantaged, New Zealand was the first to oppose any move towards equal voting rights, or even changes in the name of the organisation or removal of the privileged position of England, Australia and South Africa. New Zealand was a firm supporter of continued sporting relations with apartheid South Africa¹⁵. In the meeting of July 18, 1962, at the height of impassioned debates on South Africa in the ICC, minutes reveal that the New Zealand representative that year, J.L. Kerr, went so far as to suggest recognition of South Africa’s matches as official until the matter of South Africa’s status in the ICC was resolved.

During this period, New Zealand was consistently represented at the ICC by proxy representatives in the form of the former England test player A.H.H. Gilligan, and on one occasion, Charles Lyttelton, 10th Viscount Cobham who was Governor-General of New Zealand in 1957–1962. The other regular representative on behalf of New Zealand was the England-born and England-based New Zealand businessman and philanthropist, Sir Arthur Sims. If there was any tension between the NZCC and any of the older members, or any

¹² *The Times*, May 17, 1956, p. 11.

¹³ David McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg from Down Under’: A New Zealand Perspective’, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39.3 (2001), p. 98; Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘The ‘New Commonwealth’ 1947-49: A New Zealand perspective on India joining the Commonwealth’, *The Round Table*, Vol 95, no. 385 (July 2006), pp. 441-454.

¹⁴ David McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1965’, *International Journal*, Vol 53.4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 768-769.

¹⁵ Details of New Zealand’s prolonged sporting contact with apartheid South Africa are available in McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg...’, pp. 97-98 & p. 100. See also Sonny Ramphal, ‘How Muldoon let the side down’, *The Times*, August 10, 1981, p. 10.

resentment felt over perceived discrimination in the programme of tours, it was never recorded in the ICC minutes, nor is there anything in the newspapers of the period to suggest any grudges. At most, the minutes reveal persistent but courteous efforts for more MCC visits on the part of New Zealand's representatives¹⁶. In fact, even though New Zealand had more in common with the newer members, it did not become a natural ally of the West Indies, India and Pakistan on any of the proposed changes. On the contrary, New Zealand and the 'new' Commonwealth members found themselves on opposite sides of debates on equal voting rights, sporting relations with apartheid South Africa and changing of the name of the ICC.

4.2 Membership Rules: the cases of India, Pakistan and South Africa

The Constitution of the ICC stipulated that "The Governing Bodies of Cricket in countries within the British Commonwealth [previously, British Empire] having been duly elected, shall be entitled to send not more than two representatives to a meeting of the Conference . . . Foundation Membership, Membership or Associate Membership shall cease [s]hould the Country concerned cease to be a part of the British Commonwealth"¹⁷

Undivided India had been a participant in the ICC since 1926. In August 1947, at the time of independence, India was partitioned into the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan which were both retained in the British Commonwealth. Shortly after independence, India's announcement of its desire to become a republic posed problems for its ICC

¹⁶ The persistent demands for more visits by the MCC and lack of exposure of New Zealand cricketers to top-class cricket, chronicled above, may have been an irritant but if so, were kept low-intensity and/or undocumented. Greg Ryan's study noted one minor episode of awkwardness in the otherwise extremely warm relationship between the MCC and the NZCC. A.C. Maclaren's 1922-23 MCC team was accused of aloofness by the New Zealand press (Greg Ryan, *The Making of New Zealand Cricket*, p. 228). Cricket was of paramount importance in these visits by the MCC to Australia and New Zealand; but they were also seen as reaffirmation of kinship ties and this made social events and hospitality during such tours an important point of business, especially for the NZCC (pp. 221-223).

¹⁷ ICC archives: 'Rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference- Adopted by the Imperial Cricket Conference on 28th June, 1950 (Amended 21st July, 1953; 17th July, 1958; and 15th July, 1959)'.

membership. In the ‘British Commonwealth’ of 1947, such an announcement would have been interpreted as a desire to leave the Commonwealth. Unfortunately for the BCCI, membership rules meant that an exit from the British Commonwealth was an automatic exit from the ICC.

Accordingly, on July 19, 1948, there was a debate in the ICC on India’s future. The Indian representative Anthony S. de Mello was asked to leave the room while the other members discussed the matter. It was unanimously decided to retain India as a member *on a provisional basis* for two years after which the matter would be reviewed. Tours to and from India in this two-year period would rank as official. In other words, India was downgraded from full membership of the ICC to provisional membership whilst negotiations were conducted on its status in the Commonwealth. When India was accepted as a republic in the newly-styled ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ in 1949, on the cricket front, this arrangement paved the way for its retention in the ICC. In the next ICC meeting spread over June 27 and 28, 1950, in view of India’s decision to remain in the Commonwealth and agreement that its standard of cricket had not been adversely affected by the partition, India was restored “*nem con*” to full membership in a proposal tabled by the West Indies and seconded by New Zealand¹⁸.

4.2.1 ‘Some had birthright to the membership; we have won it’: the case of Pakistan

Although created as an independent dominion in 1947 and unlike India, in no immediate hurry to become a republic, Pakistan’s admission to the ICC followed a rocky and protracted path. Minutes of ICC meetings and newspaper reports combine to reveal a great deal of discussion surrounding Pakistan’s membership.

Independent India was seen as the (only) natural successor to the berth in the ICC that had belonged to undivided India before partition in 1947. Pakistan, on the other hand, seen

¹⁸ ICC Minutes: June 17-28, 1950. See also *The Times*, Thursday, Jun 29, 1950, p. 9.

perhaps as the ‘breakaway’ state in the events that transpired in the subcontinent in 1947, did not receive an automatic full or even provisional entry into the ICC in spite of being what most political commentators perceived as a more ‘loyal’ dominion. Pakistan was asked to apply to join the ICC as a new member in compliance with the procedure laid down in the ICC Constitution¹⁹. This triggered the start of a long and acrimonious series of exchanges between the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan (hereafter, BCCP) and the MCC.

In the ICC meeting of July 19, 1948, India was represented by Anthony de Mello and Pankaj Gupta. De Mello explained the division of domestic cricket associations between India and Pakistan: India had retained about twenty affiliated associations but had lost Sind, the North West Frontier Province and West Punjab to Pakistan²⁰. The BCCI had invited Pakistan to send a representative to a recent (presumably, a BCCI) meeting and had acted on behalf of Pakistan in arranging the itinerary for the West Indies tour of 1948-49. The Chairman of the ICC, the Earl of Gowrie (a former Governor-General of Australia), suggested that the BCCI work with the BCCP to form combined cricket teams consisting of representatives from the entire Indian peninsula for Test cricket and tours.

Given the political tensions between India and Pakistan following partition, the problems surrounding the BCCP’s membership to the ICC and the clear contrast between the treatment of the BCCI and the BCCP, this suggestion of the MCC President comes across as highly unrealistic. Incredibly, in the next ICC meeting in 1950, this line of thinking was pursued. Chairman Plum Warner inquired of the Indian representatives in 1950, Anthony de Mello and Z.R. Irani, if the plan to have combined teams from the sub-continent would work. De Mello replied that Pakistan had made it clear that such an arrangement would not be possible.

Meanwhile, outside the ICC, this matter had assumed much bigger proportions than disclosed by the equanimous tones of the ICC minutes. Prior to the 1950 meeting of the ICC, *The Times* reported from Pakistan that “a most unfortunate impression” had been created in that dominion by its failure to secure admission to the ICC in spite of efforts since 1948. The article noted that “there are few signs of willingness to help Pakistan to secure election”. It took a dim view of the “technical and procedural” reasons given by the MCC for the delay

¹⁹ Pakistan would require an existing member of the ICC to propose and another to second its application.

²⁰ There was no mention of East Pakistan (Bangladesh from 1971).

and cautioned that “these have often been couched in terms which could certainly have been more happily phrased when dealing with a new and loyal Dominion of the Commonwealth.” The correspondent sympathised with Pakistan for receiving what he perceived as discriminatory treatment and praised Pakistan for reacting calmly to being asked to apply as a new member. The article explained that “[i]n support of her application, Pakistan has referred to the fact that players from the areas now forming part of Pakistan were prominent in every representative team of the old India. Pakistan has also noted that, since the partition of India, two touring teams of Test match calibre, one from the West Indies, and the Commonwealth touring team last year, have played here, and has suggested that if it is in doubt as to the standards of Pakistani cricket the M.C.C. should seek the opinions of the managers of these teams.” The writer was critical of the fact that the MCC had imposed a moratorium on inclusion of new members citing amendments to membership rules, and that it had tried to justify its attitude by citing rigid bureaucratic procedures for inclusion of items for discussion on the ICC agenda. Unhappily for Pakistan, this was the case even though its application had been submitted before the consideration of these membership rule amendments. This perplexing attitude of the MCC led *The Times*, usually sympathetic to the MCC, to protest in sharp words that “[w]hile these procedural objections may perhaps be valid on strict readings of the rules, it would seem from the evidence available here that the larger issues have escaped the M.C.C. officials, and this can only be regarded as regrettable.”²¹

Such was the impact of this strongly-worded report in *The Times* filed from Karachi that the MCC felt compelled to respond and clarify its position. In its defence, the MCC alluded to the ambiguous position of Pakistan in the ‘British Commonwealth’ and insisted that the MCC “gave the Pakistan board the fullest information in regard to the method of entry for a member, immediately information had been received that the Pakistan board had been constituted. This was in June, 1948. This information was conveyed again in December, 1948, but no reply was received until April, 1950, and up to the present the requirements of the conference rules as regards the proposal and seconding of Pakistan as a proposed new member State have not been completed.”²² The MCC also maintained that contrary to reports, there was no intention of changing the membership procedure.

²¹ *The Times*, Friday, Jun 02, 1950, p. 5. This article by the Pakistan correspondent appeared in the main news section of *The Times* as opposed to the customary sports section, in what may be an indication of the magnitude of the problem and of the perceived diplomatic gaffe of the MCC.

²² *The Times*, Saturday, Jun 03, 1950, p. 3. It is likely that all the talk of ‘new’ membership rules pertained simply to a modification in the existing rules in 1950 when the Indian republic was retained as a full member,

The controversy continued in the ICC meeting in 1950 in which the Secretary of the MCC reviewed correspondence exchanged with Pakistan by the MCC since December 1947. An extract from an article in *The Times of India* dated June 12, 1950, was read out. The article reported that the Vice-President of the BCCP had criticised the MCC's handling of Pakistan's membership in a speech at a public function. The article quoted the BCCP Vice-President as having remarked, "We get the impression that we are not wanted in the world family of cricket". The ensuing discussion of the ICC agreed that the MCC had acted correctly and that the Conference ought not to concern itself with matters "outside the conduct of international cricket". To that effect, the gathered members passed a resolution stating, "[T]his conference approves the action in December 1948 of the MCC acting in its secretarial capacity in apprising Pakistan fully and accurately regarding the rules adopted in 1946 for the admission of new members. In view of the fact that these rules with which Pakistan was fully conversant had not been complied with by the Board, it was not in order for the Conference to consider its eligibility for admission as a new member-country."²³

The Times reported that "[t]he conference agreed that it was desirable to stress its original object. This was the establishment of a purely cricket body of which the primary function has been, and will be, to determine official Test match status of cricket-playing countries in the British Commonwealth on the simple basis of cricket skill."²⁴

This was not received well by the BCCP, the Pakistani authorities and leading Pakistani cricketers. Following the 1950 ICC meeting, *The Times* reported from Karachi on the "disappointment and some resentment" felt in Pakistan at the ICC's decision to defer the matter of Pakistan's membership. The article expressed impatience that "[t]he indefinite postponement of consideration of [Pakistan's] application which was before the conference when it met this week at Lord's, until new rules made at the meeting are finally accepted by the six present member countries, means that at least another year or, since the conference meets irregularly, probably more must elapse before Pakistan can have any hope of becoming

i.e., changing of 'British Empire' in the ICC Constitution to 'British Commonwealth' (even though the 'British' in the latter name had been dropped by the London Declaration of 1949).

²³ ICC Minutes: June 27-28, 1950.

²⁴ *The Times*, Thursday, Jun 29, 1950, p. 9. One might speculate that the constant stress on the purely cricketing remit of the ICC may have been prompted by accusations of politicking hurled at the MCC by the BCCP or other parties.

a member.” The feeling of being deliberately slighted by the ICC/MCC was heightened by the news that in that same meeting, India—which, along with the MCC, was in charge of conducting Pakistan’s membership case—had been elevated to full membership. *The Times* report once again concluded on a solemn note that “[r]egrettable though it may be, action taken on purely cricketing or procedural grounds tends to be interpreted in terms of ‘inferiority’ or ‘unequal treatment.’”²⁵

The furore refused to die down. There appeared to be a general state of confusion over the status of Pakistan’s membership request. A few days later, *The Times* reported that the working committee of the BCCP had expressed “its sense of deep dissatisfaction” with the manner in which Pakistan’s membership had been treated. The statement released by the committee protested that “apart from all other considerations, the Pakistan board, as representing an integral part of the territory previously under the jurisdiction of the board of undivided India, had as good a right as the post-partition Indian board to provisional membership of the conference.” It claimed that it had not received any news of an outright rejection of Pakistan’s application bid or of the new membership rules that had been speculated in the press. Clearly peeved at this protracted and rather opaque handling of its membership, the BCCP working committee took cognisance of what it saw as a very public snub and concluded “that its future course of action must be guided by a full realization of the events which have led to the country being placed in its present invidious and humiliating position.” The reporter in Karachi emphasised once more the depth of feelings aroused by the ICC meeting which had indefinitely postponed Pakistan’s membership whilst advancing India’s membership²⁶.

The strong hints of political overtones to this stand-off derived from newspaper reports and minutes of ICC meetings, the strength of feelings on this matter in Pakistan, the heated tone of the epistolary exchanges between the MCC and the BCCP, sustained and prominent coverage in *The Times*, all indicate that the fracas had escalated to assume undesirable proportions. It was certainly serious enough for the Conservative Member of Parliament and later Monday Club member, John Biggs-Davison, to write to *The Times* to urge the MCC to further clarify its position and alleviate Pakistan’s disappointment: “Three members of the Commonwealth [Britain, Pakistan and India] are involved, and there is no

²⁵ Once again, in the ‘News’ section in *The Times*, Saturday, Jul 01, 1950, p. 3.

²⁶ *The Times*, Friday, Jul 07, 1950, p. 3.

need to add to the misunderstandings between the Republic of India and the Dominion of Pakistan.”²⁷

A few months later, *The Times* reported that the President of the MCC, Sir Pelham Warner, had exchanged letters with a senior member of the BCCP. The report stated that the “friendly tone of Sir Pelham Warner’s letter . . . provid[ed] . . . a marked contrast to several earlier letters from the M.C.C” and had “mollified in some degree” the feelings that had arisen in Pakistan after the last ICC meeting. However, the letters were merely meant to calm the situation and did nothing to indicate advancement of Pakistan’s membership²⁸.

In anticipation of the next ICC meeting in 1952, letters of support for Pakistan poured in to *The Times*. One letter-writer berated the ICC’s refusal to admit Pakistan which had been “a source of national grievance in my country” and hoped that Pakistan’s victory over the MCC team in a recent “Test” match would help expedite its membership²⁹. Since independence, Pakistan had given a commendable account of its cricket in unofficial matches against Test match-calibre teams such as that from the West Indies, Commonwealth XIs and the MCC touring team in November 1951. It was on the basis of Pakistan’s standard of cricket that Pakistan’s first cricket captain, the former Oxford blue Abdul Hafeez Kardar, passionately staked its claim in *The Times*. Kardar held up these strong performances against a statement by the ICC in 1950 that had declared cricket restricted to “Commonwealth countries . . . who had exhibited a high standard of cricket”. He vehemently dismissed claims of biased umpiring in Pakistan, fearing that they would be used to “belittle Pakistan’s victory and also may reflect unfavourably on her application for membership of the I.C.C.” if “allowed to pass unchallenged”. Kardar added that he had “learnt [his] cricket in England, where fair play is an essential factor in the make-up of a first-class cricketer”. He ended with the stirring words, “Some had birth right to the membership: we have won it.”³⁰

It is likely that there was hectic behind-the-scenes activity between the MCC, the BCCP and the BCCI to ensure a rapid denouement to this long and painful saga in the next

²⁷ *The Times*, Monday, Jul 10, 1950, p. 5.

²⁸ *The Times*, Tuesday, Nov 28, 1950, p. 3.

²⁹ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Thursday, Jan 03, 1952, p. 5.

³⁰ Letters to the Editor, *The Times*, Wednesday, Feb 13, 1952, p. 8. Ramachandra Guha described Abdul Hafeez Kardar as “a cricketer who was also an ideologue, and through whose life one can read the coming into being of the nation of Pakistan” (Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, Picador (2002), p. xiii).

meeting. *The Times* reported in March 1952 that India had communicated to the MCC its intention to nominate Pakistan for ICC membership for inclusion in the summer 1952 meeting agenda³¹. In the ICC meeting on July 28, 1952, nomination of Pakistan by India (Pankaj Gupta) was seconded by the MCC (H.S. Altham) on the condition that visiting teams would visit all three countries—India, Pakistan and Ceylon—in turn in the same tour so as to ease their burden (separate teams would be fielded by each country and their tours abroad would also take place separately). This would mean the three boards working in tandem as they had done previously to receive Commonwealth XIs and MCC teams³².

Following its admission, Pakistan embarked on its first official tour abroad in October 1952 to India³³. Pakistan attended meetings of the ICC from 1953. Pakistan's first tour of England was scheduled for the summer of 1954. Simultaneously indicating the constant pressure on late-comer countries to justify their inclusion in the ICC, the continuing high pedestal occupied by the MCC and the by-mutual-desire basis on which cricket in the ICC was conducted, Pakistan's tour of England in 1954 was described in *The Times* as “a great honour for a country so young in cricket history to be invited to tour England and they mean to justify . . . their inclusion in the Imperial Cricket Conference”³⁴. Pakistan's victory over England in a Test match in their very first tour of England was welcomed and celebrated in an editorial in *The Times* as “a happy sequel to the long-delayed admission of Pakistan to the Imperial Cricket Conference . . . Now she has proved her right to belong to the inner circle of the game . . . Now we know that the “Eaglets” who visited us in the past are full grown—and dangerous—birds. The Indian sub-continent now gives us two friendly foes, each worthy of our best. Having learnt in India to greet one of them with “*Jai Hind*”, we are happy to greet the victors of yesterday with “*Pakistan Zindabad*.”³⁵

³¹ *The Times*, Monday, Mar 03, 1952, p. 7.

³² ICC Minutes: July 28, 1952. See also *The Times*, Tuesday, Jul 29, 1952, p. 3. Commonwealth XIs in the 1940s and 1950s consisted of players drawn from various cricket-playing Commonwealth countries and were a novel experiment to promote cricket in South Asia (Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, op cit., p. 323).

³³ “The first national team ever sent abroad by Pakistan arrived at Amritsar to-day to begin a series of matches against Indian sides.” (*The Times*, Friday, Oct 10, 1952, p. 5) Captained by Abdul Hafeez Kardar, Pakistan toured India in 1952 and this visit was reciprocated by India under Vinoo Mankad in 1954. These matches were played in a tense atmosphere with both sides fearful of losses to each other given the weight of political problems between the two neighbours [Kausik Bandyopadhyay, ‘Pakistani Cricket at Crossroads: An Outsider’s Perspective’ in Jon Gemmell & Boria Majumdar, eds., *Cricket, race and the 2007 World Cup*, Routledge (2008), p. 101].

³⁴ *The Times*, Friday, Feb 19, 1954, p. 11.

³⁵ *The Times*, Wednesday, Aug 18, 1954, p. 7.

Once in the ICC, Pakistan was outspoken and bold on issues confronting the ‘new’ Commonwealth in the ICC – equal voting rights, inclusion of new non-Commonwealth members and most importantly, the re-admission of apartheid South Africa after 1961. According to Chris Valiotis, as a response to inequitable power relations, Pakistan infused its cricket with a discourse that brought together Islam, nationalism and ‘Third Worldism’³⁶. The previous chapter and the following sub-section further illustrate Pakistan’s pro-active leadership on issues affecting the ‘new’ Commonwealth members of the ICC.

4.2.2 ‘This cricket game in South Africa has nothing to do with racial policies’: the case of South Africa

³⁶ Chris Valiotis’s analysis is worth reproduction here: “Contemporary Pakistani cricket identity and national cricket culture can be divided into two broad categories: official Pakistani cricket nationalism, and Pakistani cricket nationalism from below. Official Pakistani cricket nationalism is now intertwined with policy objectives of the central government. The political appropriation of cricket has meant that the game has come to underpin the official nationalist discourse of its ruling authorities. As a result, Pakistani cricket at the international level is synonymous with its fierce rivalry with India, its assiduous promotion and support of ‘Third World’ cricket nations, and its advocacy of Muslim assertiveness in the face of unjust criticisms from Western cricket nations . . . In the past twenty years, Pakistan has been proactive in its endorsement and assistance of ‘Third World’ cricket nations such as Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh in their pursuit for ICC Test match status. It also strongly supports the development of the game in Kenya and the Middle-East, where many Pakistanis reside and play cricket, to make cricket more representative internationally. This stance is also considered a means to redress the strong and conspicuous Western orientation of the ICC. Pakistan has long resented England’s monopolistic control of world cricket.” (Chris Valiotis, ‘Cricket in ‘a Nation Imperfectly Imagined’: Identity and Tradition in Postcolonial Pakistan’ in Stephen Wagg, ed., op cit., p. 126.) Writing on Sri Lankan cricket, Michael Roberts noted that “The Sri Lankan cricket authorities sought international test status from the 1960s, usually with the support of Indian or Pakistani officials, especially Abdul Hafeez Kardar.” [Michael Roberts, ‘Landmarks and Threads in the Cricketing Universe of Sri Lanka’, in Jon Gemmell & Boria Majumdar, eds., *Cricket, Race and the 2007 World Cup*, op cit., p. 121.] Cricket grew in mass popularity and received magnanimous support and interest from the Pakistani government. Army generals ran utility companies that employed cricketers. This also meant political interference in the administration of Pakistani cricket, and army generals, very often also in charge of executive authority in the country, often summarily dismissed Board officials (Richard Cashman, ‘The Subcontinent’, in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., op cit., p. 129). From the mid-1950s, civilian and military politicians have been involved in the affairs of the cricket board in Pakistan. Between 1954 and 1963, three of Pakistan’s earliest leaders, Mohammed Ali Bogra, Iskander Mirza and General Muhammad Ayub Khan, became Presidents of the BCCP. This practice was institutionalised when the first BCCP Constitution formed in 1963 recognised the Head of the State as its patron. The earliest cricket administrators, particularly Justice Cornelius, made a conscious effort to involve the government in the affairs of the cricket board in order to validate the status of the game and its governing body in Pakistan as nationally important. It was also useful in generating much-needed resources (Valiotis in Wagg, ed., p. 120).

The ICC-recognised official governing body of cricket in South Africa was the South African Cricket Association (SACA)³⁷. SACA was an important part of English-speaking South Africa with close historical ties to the MCC, the British colonial establishment in South Africa and South African Governments³⁸. SACA functioned as the representative cricket body for South Africa but was exclusively for and by white cricketers. This meant that only white players could represent South Africa in official international cricket. In turn, the South African national team only played against teams with all-white players. From its first official Test match in 1888-89 until the 1970 boycott, South Africa played 172 test matches, all of them solely against the trio of England, Australia and New Zealand. South Africa was re-induced into the ICC in 1991 and in playing its first post-apartheid series against India in 1991, South Africa played its first-ever official match against a non-white team³⁹.

As various historians have shown, non-white groups in South Africa organised themselves as well as they could, from the late 19th century onwards, into a lively and bustling cricket scene of their own in response to the enforced invisibility. Though forcibly segregated, cricket developed around the same time among both the white and non-white communities⁴⁰.

The ICC regularly received correspondence from anti-apartheid activists belonging to the South African Sports Association, the South African United Front (SAUF) and from campaigners and academics in Britain. Newspaper reports show that some of these

³⁷ ICC Minutes: May 19, 1947, confirm this. SACA was formed on April 8, 1890 [André Odendaal, *The Story of an African Game: Black Cricketers and the Unmasking of One of Cricket's Greatest Myths, South Africa, 1850-2003*, David Philip (2003), pp. 73-74].

³⁸ See Odendaal, ibid. & Peter Oborne, *Basil D'Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy, the Untold Story* (Sphere, 2005), p. 15 for more. Abe Bailey's role has already been discussed in Chapter 1. SACA enjoyed a "prosperous" relationship with the MCC. Cricket between South Africa and Australia carried an extra aggressive edge. But South Africa was most warmly-regarded by England and Australia for its hospitality (Oborne, p. 15).

³⁹ Odendaal, p. 10 & pp. 73-74.

⁴⁰ Jon Gemmell, 'South African Cricket: 'The Rainbow Nation Must Have a Rainbow Team' in Jon Gemmell & Boria Majumdar, eds., op cit., pp. 40-42. André Odendaal and Peter Oborne have written detailed accounts of cricket among non-white South Africans. The first representative body for non-white cricketers, the South African Coloured Cricket Board, was formed in 1903. Rising differences led to splintering of the board in the inter-World War period, with each community (African, 'Coloured', Indian & 'Malay') forming its own cricket board. Communal tension and what Odendaal identified as a "more assertive African nationalism" contributed to the split. The 1923 Native Urban Areas Act which led to stricter enforcement of urban segregation played no small part. In the mid-1940s, there was reconciliation and in July 1947, the South African Cricket Board of Control (SACBOC) was formed which in due course once again united the various non-white factions under its banner (Odendaal, p. 88, p. 105, p. 107, p. 155, p. 165; Peter Oborne, p. 22, p. 45).

organisations were in touch with authorities in India, Pakistan and the West Indies. André Odendaal's painstaking work on the development of African cricket in South Africa chronicled that as non-white cooperation increased, strenuous attempts were made to garner international support, in particular, from India, Kenya, Pakistan and the West Indies. A President of the non-racial South African Cricket Board of Control (hereafter, SACBOC), Bob Pavadai, spoke of "our vision of placing the Non-European cricket on an international pedestal"⁴¹. Their correspondence regularly attempted to draw the attention of the MCC and the ICC to the effects of apartheid on South African cricket.

The ICC meeting on July 15, 1959, was the first in which such correspondence was touched upon in the period under study here. South African anti-apartheid activist Dennis Brutus⁴² and his non-racial South African Sports Association (hereafter, SASA) were mentioned albeit in a cursory manner. The minutes recorded that "A Letter from Mr D.A. Brutus, Hon Sec of the South African Sports Association, sending information regarding the nature of the work and scope of his Association, was noted"⁴³. It is probably safe to assume that Brutus's letter notifying the ICC of the existence of non-racial alternatives to SACA would not have been received well by the SACA representative present at that meeting, Arthur Heder Coy, then President of SACA. A SACA giant, he was close to the South African government, and would go on to play a significant role in the 'D'Oliveira Affair' of 1968⁴⁴.

⁴¹ Odendaal, pp. 106-7. Similarly, non-racial bodies in South African rugby sought to establish contact with Māori groups in New Zealand and Fiji. In 1956, SACBOC hosted a historic cricket tour of South Africa by Kenyan Asians and in 1958, embarked on a momentous tour of Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganyika (Odendaal, p. 107, p. 155, p. 165).

⁴² Dennis Brutus, a poet and agitator, was instrumental in launching the non-racial South African Sports Association, an umbrella organisation for non-racial sport in South Africa. Through SASA, Brutus and his associates would lobby international sports organisations for recognition and admission. Brutus was often a target of South African police and intelligence. Brutus was banned from teaching, journalism, attending meetings and eventually, also from leaving his magisterial district. In 1963, while on bail, he attempted to escape to Baden-Baden via Swaziland to contribute to discussions on South Africa's participation in the Olympics. He was, however, betrayed and caught by the dreaded South African secret police. Having narrowly survived bullet injuries, he was sentenced to 18 months' hard labour on Robben Island where he cut stone alongside Nelson Mandela. Brutus eventually succeeded in escaping South Africa in 1966 (Oborne, p. 124).

⁴³ ICC Minutes: July 15, 1959.

⁴⁴ Noted as SACA representative in the ICC minutes & in *The Times*, Friday, Aug 14, 1959, p. 5. Interestingly, in the same meeting, British Guiana-born Englishman B.K. Castor, representing the West Indies in the wake of Karl Nunes's death, submitted to the ICC gathering that Frank Worrell's proposed cricket tour to South Africa was to be a private venture with no connection to the West Indies cricket board. Arthur Coy immediately backed Castor and clarified that SACA had nothing to do with the tour and that it would be considered unofficial by SACA. There had been no prior discussion or recording of such a tour in the official minutes of the ICC. All of this agitation was provoked by a plan conceived by SACBOC for a Frank Worrell-led all-black West Indies team including stalwarts such as Everton Weekes, Gary Sobers, Conrad Hunte, Alf

In the next ICC meeting on July 14-15, 1960, chaired by MCC President H.S. Altham, further correspondence from Dennis Brutus was acknowledged. SACA President G.W.A. Chubb and his would-be successor, R.E. Foster-Bowley, were in attendance. The minutes show that: “A letter from D.A. Brutus, Hon Sec of the South African Sports Association, concerning racial discrimination in sport, was read. It was agreed that the points made in the letter were of a domestic nature between the South African Sports Association and the South African Cricket Association, and it was decided therefore to refer the letter to the South African Cricket Association.”⁴⁵

Encapsulated in those two sentences, the minutes contain only the most perfunctory mention of this matter. It is difficult to deduce whether the contents of Brutus’s letter received any elaborate exchange of views, and whether any of the members disagreed with the stance of the ICC since the minutes do not linger on South Africa, apartheid or SASA for longer than that. What is amply clear, however, is the ICC’s (read: MCC’s) official stance on this issue: SACA was a long-time and established member and its domestic policies would not be commented on, or allowed to affect its cricketing relationship with its traditional

Valentine and Sonny Ramadhin to tour South Africa at the end of 1959 to play against black sides. SACBOC aimed to make several points via this tour: to call attention to the standard of black cricket as well as apartheid, to provide black supporters in South Africa with a chance to see their heroes and to prove to the ICC its ability to organise international tours. C.L.R. James supported the step. It became a major talking point and generated much interest and enthusiasm. In a cynical convenience of sorts, this was acceptable under South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd’s apartheid policy which permitted interaction and ‘separate development’ of people of the same ‘race’, and hence of non-white South Africans with non-white teams from outside. Segregated seating and the usual apartheid conditions were to remain in place for this tour. For these very reasons, the tour was opposed by SASA who saw any such engagement as compliance with apartheid and in this view, they were supported by the West Indies cricket legend Learie Constantine. The Indian Government also called on Worrell and his team to cancel the tour. Verwoerd would be able to present it as a triumph for apartheid, with black teams visiting and playing only against the black population in a parallel segregated universe within South Africa, completely removed from the world of the white population. Eventually, the tour was cancelled following vociferous protests by Dennis Brutus and his associates. Not all non-whites agreed in this instance. According to Oborne, D’Oliveira, among others, was bitterly disappointed, though later both he and Worrell accepted the merit in the argument [See Bruce Murray & Christopher Merrett, *Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket*, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press (2004), pp. 73-74; Oborne, pp. 55-57; Hilary McD Beckles, *The development of West Indies cricket Vol.1: The Age of Nationalism*, Pluto (1998), p. 152; Jon Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket*, Routledge (2004), p. 120]. Oborne noted that cancellation of Worrell’s tour and convincing the Brazilian football team to refuse to play against South Africa were among SASA’s major successes (Oborne, p. 120).

⁴⁵ ICC Minutes: July 14-15, 1960.

rivals⁴⁶. From newspaper reports, however, it is possible to see that not all members of the ICC agreed with this position. Plenty had happened between the 1959 and 1960 meetings to suggest that the passive phrase “it was agreed” probably hid more than it revealed. The Sharpeville massacre occurred in March 1960 before the ICC meeting in July. In April 1960, several months before the ICC meeting, *The Guardian* reported that the BCCP “had proposed to the Imperial Cricket Conference that Test status should be withdrawn from South African representative cricket until the Union revised its apartheid policy in sport. Unofficially. it [sic] is understood that the proposal was made some weeks ago. but [sic] possibly too late for inclusion in the agenda of the next I.C.C. meeting on July 14.”⁴⁷

Even in Britain, outside the impervious sylvan confines of St. John’s Wood, there was plenty of turbulence over the issue of South Africa before the 1960 meeting. The South African cricket team toured England in 1960. South Africa’s arrival was preceded and followed by vocal protests and calls for its boycott, in view of its racist ‘whites-only’ policy in sport. Writing in *The Observer*, Christopher Brasher reported the palpable tension caused by the arrival of the South Africans. Apartheid and racial segregation, South West Africa and

⁴⁶ Peter Oborne narrated an account of England’s 1956-57 tour of South Africa from former England bowler Jim Laker’s autobiography. Laker recounted how Walter Monckton (1st Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, Conservative MP, Conservative Minister of Defence and then President of the MCC), had reminded the departing players of South Africa’s problems and warned them that “colour as a topic of conversation was strictly out”. Laker and team-mate Alan Oakman witnessed first-hand, the treatment of blacks in South Africa, including the hasty and immediate assumption of their culpability in any situation [Oborne, p. 15 (footnote on pp. 90-91: Jim Laker, *Over to Me*)]. Oborne also pointed out that successful accomplishment of the apartheid programme by the South African government simultaneously required precedence of whites and invisibility of South African blacks nationally and internationally. This would not have been possible without the cooperation of sporting bodies such as the MCC-run Imperial Cricket Conference (p. 119). Avery Brundage’s International Olympic Committee, Stanley Rous’s FIFA, the International Athletics Association, were all at this point in collusion with the apartheid regime, recognising only the white governing body in South Africa as its national representative, in spite of attempts by SASA and others (p. 57). A combination of wilful blindness and strenuous efforts by various white South African authorities led to rampant ignorance among whites in South Africa about the intensity and talent of non-white cricket. Jon Gemmell described how books written by white South Africans on cricket would make no mention of black cricket or black life. He provided the example of John Passmore, who would go on to be known as the ‘Godfather of African cricket’ and would confess in 1973 of having had no knowledge of the existence of African cricket until 1969; the ‘D’Oliveira affair’ of 1968 acted as his introduction to ‘Coloured’ cricket. Some whites convinced themselves that Africans simply did not take to cricket (Jon Gemmell, ‘South African Cricket: ‘The Rainbow Nation Must Have a Rainbow Team’ in Gemmell & Majumdar, eds., p. 46). Education, censorship and the army were the weapons of South African whites. As with cricket history, the past and present of the press, school system, courts, Boy Scouts and other arms of white society were all viewed through a whites-only lens. The history of South Africa was taught as the history of the white population (Odendaal, pp. 10-11 & pp. 332-337). Tragically, this belief in cultural/temperamental pre-requisites and innate ability (or lack thereof) among communities to play cricket has been expressed in recent years also. To cite an example, in 2003, former New Zealand captain and well-known cricketer Martin Crowe attempted to suggest that the Māori did not have the temperament for cricket (Jon Gemmell, ‘Introduction: Cricket, Race and the 2007 World Cup’ in Gemmell & Majumdar, eds., p. xv).

⁴⁷ *The Guardian*, Apr 30, 1960, p. 1.

relations with London's financial district were all topical questions that contributed to the febrile atmosphere. Stressing that "The M.C.C. Must Act" in its own way against apartheid, Brasher drew attention to "a non-racial body calling itself the South African Cricket Board of Control and representing 20,000 Coloured cricketers [that] has been formed, and has applied for affiliation to the Imperial Cricket Conference" as an alternative to the whites-only SACA. Brasher called for the cancellation of all future cricket fixtures and ties with South Africa by the MCC until further discussion with other ICC members. At the same time, Brasher was sympathetic to what he saw as the "perplexed" plight of the MCC and the visiting South African cricketers⁴⁸. Terming demonstrations against the South African team "petty", Brasher argued that the cricketers ought not to be punished for apartheid in South Africa since some of them "actively oppose[d] it". He felt that "cricket in South Africa has tried to do what it can to break down the colour bar" and that "[a]t Lord's, then, they believe that cricket can act, in its own small way, as a tiny opening in the citadel of apartheid". Brasher was convinced that enforcers of apartheid could be made to see the error of their ways eventually by keeping communication channels open in this manner and maintained that pushing South Africa out of the Commonwealth would prove a "gratifying but unhelpful" solution⁴⁹. Brasher was, therefore, opposed to the stance taken by England cricketer Rev David Sheppard not to play against the South Africans in 1960. He believed Rev Sheppard could have instead used his influence in the MCC Committee to convince the MCC to commit to an anti-apartheid and anti-racial discrimination policy after the 1960 tour. He also hoped that the Olympics and the New Zealand Rugby Union would go the same way and ended by warning that "if [the MCC] do not take this opportunity then our protest or boycott should be against the M.C.C. . . . South Africa is in for a long and bloody siege."⁵⁰ In May 1960, *The Times* reported that fifty-six senior academics of Oxford University had written an open letter to the Secretary of the Oxford University Cricket Club protesting against the club's decision to play against the visiting exclusively-white South African cricket team⁵¹. Very shortly before the ICC meeting in 1960, a petition reached the MCC from its own members. *The Guardian* reported that MCC members Lord March, heir to the Duke of Richmond, actor Peter Howell, and Jonathan Lewis, secretary of the Capricorn Africa Society, had written to the MCC expressing their bitter regret that "the MCC should have appeared to condone the application

⁴⁸ *The Observer*, Apr 10, 1960, p. 31. See Jon Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket*, p. 120, for more details on the 1960 protests in England.

⁴⁹ *The Observer*, Apr 10, 1960, p. 16.

⁵⁰ *The Observer*, Apr 10, 1960, p. 31.

⁵¹ *The Times*, Tuesday, May 10, 1960, p. 7.

of the principle of apartheid in sport.”⁵² Anthony Steel, Secretary of the Campaign against Racial Discrimination in Sport, was quoted as saying that two attempts by his campaign to secure an audience with the MCC and to request the raising of the issue at the ICC meeting had been acknowledged but had not received an answer⁵³.

Records of the 1959 and 1960 meetings of the ICC noted “correspondence and other business” and “correspondence” respectively without elaborating any further, other than the single mention of Dennis Brutus in each meeting⁵⁴.

The 1960 ICC meeting was crucial for both the South Africa question and the raging controversy over ‘throwing’ by fast bowlers. Both greatly threatened harmonious relations between ICC member boards. The latter prompted the attendance of the legendary Sir Donald Bradman of Australia as representative of his cricket board. Shortly before the Imperial Cricket Conference, Christopher Brasher, striking a less sympathetic tone towards the MCC than that of his earlier article, once again reminded in *The Observer* that “[t]he trap, again, is hypocrisy . . . England’s responsibility, however, is plain; it is simply to make clear that in future our own board of control can have no dealing with anybody that is not fully represented and multi-racial. Public opinion in this country will no longer tolerate anything less, and our prestige and moral leadership depend on the force with which we make our intention known. Moreover, it is one which Australia and New Zealand can disregard only at their own peril.”⁵⁵

Expectedly, there was bitter disappointment in the left-wing press after the 1960 ICC meeting over its inability to take firm action on both the throwing problem and the question of apartheid in South African sport. The versatile writer and journalist Alan Ross, in a devastatingly piercing piece of commentary on the manner of functioning within the ICC,

⁵² *The Guardian*, Jul 5, 1960, p. 11.

⁵³ *The Guardian*, Jul 5, 1960, p. 11.

⁵⁴ *The Times* reported that SASA had sent a cable to the Imperial Cricket Conference *on the eve of its meeting* to exhort it to discuss racial discrimination in South African cricket. In the cable, the Association “urgently” renewed its request of June, 1959, for the conference “to consider racial discrimination in the National Cricket Association in South Africa” (*The Times*, Thursday, Jul 14, 1960, p. 17). An article *earlier in 1960* reported that SASA had written to the ICC to “challenge the right of the Springboks to tour abroad under the title of South Africa’s national team” (*The Guardian* on April 16, 1960, p. 1). All of these indicate that multiple attempts were made by SASA alone in the 1959-1960 period to contact the ICC, alongside the numerous attempts by other activists.

⁵⁵ *The Observer*, Jul 10, 1960, p. 15.

wondered what the ICC had managed to achieve “after its two days of polite and amicable deliberation”, going on to ask, “[y]et could one, with the Australian representatives present, have honestly hoped for anything more final, in respect of key players, about throwing; or, with the South Africans present, a clear resolution about the conference’s views on the abominable principle of racial segregation in cricket?”⁵⁶

On March 15, 1961, South Africa under Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd withdrew from the Commonwealth and became a republic that year on May 31. Ronald Aird, Secretary of the MCC, informed the press that this meant that “there can be no official Test cricket by anyone against South Africa. Countries could continue to play them in unofficial Tests, but we should have to consider the whole matter. It may be that the rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference will have to be re-examined” at the next ICC meeting in July 1961⁵⁷. Despite relinquishing membership of the ICC, South Africa was invited as an observer to the July 19, 1961 ICC meeting. A month before the 1961 conference, R.E. Foster-Bowley, President of SACA, expressed hope that the conference would devise a formula to keep South Africa in the ICC⁵⁸. A press statement issued by the MCC said that “the invitation [to South Africa to attend as observer] had been extended by M.C.C. on behalf of all member countries of the Imperial Cricket Conference”⁵⁹ Before the 1961 meeting, *The Times* reminded its readers that “[m]embership of the Conference is restricted to recognized governing bodies of Commonwealth countries . . . If [South Africa] are to be reinstated as a Test-playing nation, the *rules and designation of the Conference must be revised*” (emphasis added), adding that South Africa’s “status and acceptability . . . as a cricketing nation” were at stake. The article delineated for its readers the grave issues and divides confronting the ICC delegates (“the moral issue of racial discrimination”) with India and Pakistan widely reported as being against apartheid South Africa’s reinstatement; England, Australia and New Zealand being more sympathetic; and the West Indies also expected to oppose South Africa’s reinstatement in deference to the policy of its Government⁶⁰. A year ago, Alan Ross had put it far more bluntly: “India, Pakistan, West Indies are interested parties. M.C.C., Australia and New Zealand are not. It is vital therefore that they take the lead and make the moral issues

⁵⁶ *The Observer*, July 17, 1960, p. 15.

⁵⁷ Reported in the ‘News’ section of *The Times*, Thursday, Mar 16, 1961, p. 13.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, Tuesday, Jun 20, 1961, p. 4.

⁵⁹ *The Times*, Monday, Jul 03, 1961, p. 3.

⁶⁰ *The Times*, Wednesday, Jul 19, 1961, p. 4.

plain.”⁶¹ *The Guardian* reported before the 1961 meeting that moves to change the rules of the ICC to reinstate South Africa had been “neatly anticipated by a group of nonwhite South African political exiles – also cricket players themselves”. This South African United Front had been in touch with cricket authorities in India, Pakistan and the West Indies who had all replied accepting that “South Africa cannot have it both ways” [presumably meaning to say that South Africa could not expect to stay out of the Commonwealth in an effort to stave off pressure and yet continue to play official cricket] and it was certain that “[t]he delegates from these countries are likely to tell the conference at Lord’s that when South Africa is out, she is out.”⁶²

Frank Worrell also wrote in *The Observer* before the 1961 meeting, forcefully arguing that rather than the ICC changing its Constitution to accommodate South Africa, it would be wiser for SACA to change its Constitution to accommodate multi-racial cricket. He pointed out that “[m]ulti-racial cricket has worked in the West Indies, is working in [English] county cricket, and, with the arrival of Hall, Kanhai, and Sobers in Australia this coming winter, will work in Australia, too.” Pithily and shrewdly, he exposed the hypocrisy in the debate: “Most people feel that there should be no politics in cricket, so *South Africa should prove this* by making her cricket multi-racial. I am sure there will be arguments used that in the interests of cricket South Africa should be included. One wonders: *in the interests of whose cricket?*”⁶³ (Emphasis added)

Held on July 19, 1961, the ICC meeting that year turned out to be both a decisive and divisive one in drawing up battle lines. Differences of opinion came to the fore, as did the division between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Commonwealth. Withdrawal from the Commonwealth had forced South Africa—a founding member of the ICC and a member of the inner circle that also included England and Australia—to leave the ICC. Proceedings

⁶¹ *The Observer*, July 16, 1960, p. 15. Two decades later, Sir Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal, then Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, commenting on the heavily-criticised Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand in 1981, would also note that collective action by the Commonwealth (including the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977) “will be assailed, of course, by those who prefer to see [the Commonwealth] less resolute on the question of South Africa” (‘How Muldoon let the side down’, *The Times*, August 5, 1981, p. 10).

⁶² *The Guardian*, July 18, 1961, p. 8; *The Times*, Saturday, Jul 08, 1961, p. 3. The Indian Deputy Defence Minister and President of the Delhi Cricket Association, S. Majithia, confirmed shortly after the ICC’s 1961 meeting that, “South Africa is no longer a member of the Commonwealth and she should not be admitted [to the ICC] so long as she pursues her present apartheid policies. It is not cricket to segregate anyone on the basis of colour of skin alone.” (*The Guardian*, July 21, 1961, p. 4)

⁶³ *The Observer*, July 16, 1961, p. 14.

commenced with both the Chairman Sir Hubert Ashton and Foster-Bowley thanking the other members for their consent to South Africa's presence as an observer. When South Africa's position came up for discussion, Foster-Bowley left the room to facilitate discussion among the other members. Pakistan, which had sent written representations on this issue, was invited to speak first. Muzaffar Husain, speaking on behalf of the BCCP, firmly said that before South Africa's request to remain associated with the ICC could be entertained, South Africa would have to drop its policy of racial exclusivity and "engage in international contests with all other Conference countries irrespective of colour". If that happened, Pakistan would recommend widening of the definition of 'Associate Membership' to accommodate South Africa. (It appears Pakistan here prescribed the requirement to play against non-white ICC members as a matter of priority over the requirement to change the policy of apartheid in its internal team selection for international contests.) Until such time, Pakistan was adamant that it would "strongly oppose" South Africa's admission "in any capacity". M.A. Chidambaram of India seconded Pakistan's views. He observed that although South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth had not altered the situation regarding multi-racial games [within South Africa], an undertaking of the kind proposed by Pakistan would "materially help the general situation".

At this point, Sir Ashton read out "the personal views of Mr Foster-Bowley as stated by him in writing regarding the position of the SACA in relation to inter-racial cricket". The statement is reproduced in full here:

"

1. There is no colour bar in the constitution of the SACA and we have no intention of writing one into it
2. Although there is, in fact, no law prohibiting inter-racial cricket, we as an Association have not officially promoted such games in deference to stated Governmental policy
3. We have considered promoting inter-racial cricket, but have for the time being at any rate decided against them, because we feel that if we do we shall only invite the Government to make these games illegal thereby preventing the unofficial games which presently take place between team [sic] of non-white & white player
4. We would gladly accept invitations to tour India, Pakistan and West Indies. In this connection it must however be realised that we could not invite any of these countries to South Africa because the Government at ministerial level, has stated it will not

allow non-white teams in South Africa to play against white teams and will only permit them play against non-white teams

5. It is not possible to give any undertaking that the SACA will take active steps to remedy the existing position, because to do so would be to involve the Association in politics with we fear, disastrous results. The Association has up to now managed to keep out of politics and in the view of the present Board should continue to do so.

”

The West Indies board was represented by J.B. Stollmeyer. Although he declared himself concerned that South Africa’s withdrawal could lead to the demise of South African cricket, Stollmeyer felt that “an assurance should be given by the SACA that they would direct their efforts towards the playing of multi-racial cricket in South Africa before the WICBOC agreed to their re-admission as a member of the Conference”. He then wondered *if the Conference would “declare itself opposed to apartheid in cricket”*⁶⁴ (emphasis added). Interestingly, this last question received no direct reply in the minutes, nor was it revisited or addressed in the minutes again. Clearly, the ICC (read: the MCC and allies) did not want to take a public stance against apartheid in 1961, standing by their oft-repeated wish to keep ‘politics out of cricket’. (Perhaps the MCC & co. also feared that issuing a statement against apartheid would decrease their chances of bringing SACA back within the ICC given the nationalist fervour in South Africa.) S.G. Webb of Australia “made a plea on behalf of cricket in South Africa”. Desirous of South Africa’s re-induction into the ICC, he saw a change in the Constitution as the only way to do so. However, as neither he nor the other Australian representative E.G. Macmillan had been authorised by the ACB to take any steps towards such a change, he envisaged that the ACB would consider the matter fully in its next meeting. Sir Arthur Sims of New Zealand also opined that “[South Africa’s] presence was in the best interests of the game and that the other countries should do everything possible to bring them back”. Gubby Allen of the MCC interjected with the view that SACA’s statement had

⁶⁴ It is slightly confusing as to what each member of the anti-SACA bloc was demanding here. From the minutes, it appears as though Pakistan—supported by India—wanted an assurance that South Africa would not discriminate between (white and non-white) members of the ICC, and was willing to subordinate to it, its other demand that South Africa rid its domestic team selection policy for international contests of apartheid and discrimination. The West Indian representative Stollmeyer (a white former player) appears to have asked for the latter. Interestingly, Hilary Beckles wrote that the WICBOC was at this stage led by white men, some of whom were indifferent to apartheid in South Africa. As a result, the WICBOC itself was divided on the question of a firm stance on apartheid (Hilary McD Beckles, *The Development of West Indies Cricket: Vol. I The Age of Nationalism*, op cit., p. 151).

clarified that it was “willing and anxious” to play against all the countries in the Conference but “politically this may not be possible for the time being”. He was of the opinion that not re-admitting South Africa would prove counter-productive as it would bolster those who supported apartheid and hurt the people the ICC was trying to help (read: SACA and the English-speaking community). The round of opinions was wrapped up by Pakistan’s categorical re-assertion of its stance with M. Saeed warning that Foster-Bowley’s statement had shown “no change of heart” and that being so, Pakistan would oppose any move to re-admit South Africa.

No consensus was reached in this meeting on the issue of South Africa’s membership under Rule 5 or on revision of the Constitution. A general summary of the views created for public release stayed non-committal on political matters: “It was evident from the views expressed that there was a general desire to help the SACA in the situation in which they found themselves. Nevertheless, before any question of their readmission to the Conference could be considered, it would be necessary to revise the Constitution. Furthermore, it might well be that for other reasons such a proposal might need consideration.” Based on the views documented in the minutes, this statement might strike the reader as an inaccurate representation, since sympathy for SACA was not unanimous. The statement steered clear of any mention of South Africa’s domestic policies and chose to portray a united desire in the ICC to help South Africa. This short press statement put off a final decision on the matter until the next ICC meeting.

Gubby Allen was to go on to play a central role in ‘the D’Oliveira affair’ in 1968. In this meeting in 1961, Allen, representing the MCC, had simply regurgitated SACA’s official line. Both Gubby Allen and Foster-Bowley appeared eager to stress SACA’s helplessness and innocence in the matter of apartheid in sport. And they were not alone. A year ago, *The Times* had proclaimed of the visiting South African cricketers that “[i]n fact, in view of their English background, they probably do not support the[ir] Government”⁶⁵ In 1961, *The Times* advised that keeping South Africa out of the ICC would not be the best way to defeat nationalists (the Afrikaner-comprised National Party)⁶⁶. A later article alluded to the complexity and oppression within South Africa but steered clear of further analysis when it said sympathetically that “South Africa’s position in the framework of Test cricket is trickier still

⁶⁵ *The Times*, Friday, Apr 08, 1960, p. 19.

⁶⁶ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 20, 1961, p. 13.

[to deal with than the question of fairer touring schedules]. Naturally they are keen to be fully reinstated as a cricketing nation, and cricket in South Africa needs every encouragement. It is not a game that appeals very widely to the Afrikaner [sic], and the coloured South African lacks much opportunity to play it”⁶⁷. This left just the English-speaking white population represented by SACA as an able and willing beneficiary of international cricket and also as the object of the writer’s sympathy. Supporters of SACA in the ICC, in the press and Foster-Bowley’s statement itself, all appeared to deflect blame for apartheid in cricket from SACA on to the Afrikaner nationalist government. There was an attempt to create a dichotomy of good white (English) vs bad white (Afrikaner) South Africans. In its attempt to distance itself from the policies of the National Party government and from any culpability in apartheid, SACA attempted to portray itself as a helpless pressured victim of the government alongside the non-white population⁶⁸.

However, the history of racial segregation in South Africa preceded political domination of the National Party. A substantial body of research in this area has exposed this dichotomy as a false one. Murray and Merrett wrote that “it simply was not true that SACA was the helpless victim of the political intervention of the apartheid regime. SACA was at least a willing collaborator with the government in enforcing segregation on the cricket field, and white cricket generally showed no interest in promoting black cricket or in pursuing the notion of non-racial cricket.”⁶⁹ The letter sent by the Oxford academics in May 1960 to

⁶⁷ *The Times*, Wednesday, Jul 17, 1963, p. 4.

⁶⁸ Apportioning of blame to highlight (sole) culpability of Afrikaner nationalists was a recurrent theme. According to Peter Oborne, when the eminent cricket historian Rowland Bowen attacked the MCC’s decision to maintain sporting relations with apartheid South Africa at the Annual General Meeting of the MCC in 1960, “[h]e was heard in icy silence” (Oborne, p. 211). As observed earlier (*The Observer*, Apr 10, 1960, p. 31), Christopher Brasher had also initially granted benefit of doubt to SACA, South African cricketers and the MCC, although he quickly modified his opinion in view of developments. Brasher’s colleague Alan Ross saw through the MCC-SACA position and was scathing in his criticism from the beginning. Denys Rowbotham was the only correspondent at *The Guardian/The Observer* who took a decidedly pro-SACA stance. *The Times* was also quick to distance SACA from apartheid. Similarly, Jim Swanton, as late as 1985, wrote wistfully about “those days of Union [of South Africa] under the Crown, when all races lived at peace . . .” [E.W. Swanton, *Gubby Allen: Man of Cricket*, Hutchinson (1985), p. 95].

⁶⁹ Murray & Merrett, *Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket*, op cit., pp. 82-83. Racial discrimination dated back to the 1890s. The first major controversy arose over the selection of the extremely talented ‘Coloured’ bowler Krom Hendricks in the South African team that was to tour England in 1894. A former England rugby player, William Milton, and Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the English-speaking establishment at Cape, vetoed his inclusion. Through this example and others, Oborne’s research shows that it was in the English-speaking Cape rather than Afrikaner Bloemfontein that racial segregation was more deeply entrenched in the early years. Racial discrimination was, thus, practised by SACA from its initial years [Oborne, pp. 19-20 & p. 207. Also see Jon Gemmell, ‘The Springboks were not a test side’: the foundation of the Imperial Cricket Conference’, *Sport in Society*, Vol 14.5 (June 2011), p. 713]. Not just the Constitution of SACA but also that of the South African Union formed in 1910 contained clauses on colour-bar making racial discrimination

protest against cricket fixtures between the Oxford University Cricket Club and the visiting South Africans, signed by such dignitaries of the academic world as Professor A.J. Ayer, Wykeham Professor of Logic, Sir Isaiah Berlin, Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, and Sir Wilfrid Le Gros Clark, Professor of Anatomy, also saw SACA as a participant in the enforcement of apartheid: “In cricket as in all other sports in the Union of South Africa except table tennis, only a player of pure white descent can represent his country in international sport. This position has been reached not by a decree of the Government but by a voluntary decision of the South African Cricket Association” adding that “it is important to try to make it clear that a lot of people do object to apartheid in order to bring pressure to bear on the Imperial Cricket Conference . . . Possibly the M.C.C. may eventually be induced to take some action.”⁷⁰ The petition by MCC members Lord March, Peter Howell and Jonathan Lewis in 1960 also regretted that “the South African Cricket Association did not see fit to consider for inclusion in the touring side players of non-European stock, and urge[d] the MCC not to support future tours conducted on such a basis.”⁷¹ One telling episode, that made front page news in *The Guardian*, summed up the situation. Prior to team selection for the 1960 England tour, SASA, through its President G.K. Rangasamy and Honorary Secretary Dennis Brutus, had sent a personal letter to each white South African cricketer urging him not to participate “in a trial in which the primary consideration is colour and not merit”, explaining that “[y]ou must be aware that non-white South African players, however outstanding their ability, have been excluded from this trial because of their colour and that every attempt to get them affiliated or considered has been rebuffed by your all-white South African Cricket Association.” There was not a single response from any of the cricketers and in bitter disappointment an official of SASA was forced to conclude, “I am afraid that, by their silence, the Springboks have spoken.” When it

constitutionally embedded by the English-speaking community in both politics and cricket (Oborne, p. 21). André Odendaal noted that the delegation that travelled to London to protest against the discriminatory Constitution of the Union of South Africa in 1909 contained many leaders of non-white South African cricket demonstrating how closely the formation of a national freedom movement was linked to the development of non-white cricket in South Africa (Odendaal, pp. 78-80). Some English-speaking whites may have voiced liberal opinions but they were largely comfortable with the structure. The SACA of its own volition kept blacks out of the first-class Currie Cup from 1890 to 1977 and had memorably protested against the inclusion of the Indian princes K.S. Ranjitsinhji and K.S. Duleepsinhji in the England squad for South Africa in the first half of the 20th century (Odendaal, p. 331. Also see Gemmell, ‘The Springboks were not a test side’, op cit., p. 713). On the other hand, white South African sportspersons like André Odendaal himself (cricket) and Daniel ‘Cheeky’ Watson (rugby union), among others, played in non-racial competitions, forfeiting lucrative careers in white sport in the hope of paving the way for a democratic and liberated South Africa. (Merrett & Nauright, ‘South Africa’, in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., p. 73).

⁷⁰ *The Times*, Tuesday, May 10, 1960, p. 7.

⁷¹ *The Guardian*, Jul 5, 1960, p. 11.

arrived in England in April 1960, it was found that the touring South African squad, with the exception of the manager and the captain, had been “sworn to silence” in relation to the media to keep “cricket out of politics”. Its manager Arthur Dudley Nourse “cheerily” (and seemingly without a hint of irony) told the media, “This cricket game in South Africa has nothing to do with racial policies.”⁷² By contrast, Alan Ross wrote angrily that “that this evasion of human responsibility, in sport most of all, is no longer tolerable” and joined the chorus of voices that called for the removal of the whites-only clause in SACA’s Constitution. All of this suggests that the colour-bar had been a congenital feature of SACA. Ross also persistently highlighted the presence of non-racial alternative bodies to represent South Africa, presciently advising that even if non-white South Africans were immediately granted “the fullest possible opportunities to play where, with and against whom they please . . . [t]hey will not produce Test cricketers in a season, perhaps not in several, but they must be given the facilities and the chance to develop now”⁷³.

Therefore, it would be appropriate to conclude that the “polite and amicable deliberation”⁷⁴ recorded in the minutes of the ICC on South Africa was parsimonious with the truth and its official press statement was disingenuous compared to the storm raging outside its premises. It is difficult to reconstruct a blow-by-blow account of what transpired in the ICC conferences on South Africa. But what is clear is that the above evidence gave the lie to the diaphanous claims of SACA (and the MCC).

Another pattern emerges from this study relating to the ICC’s treatment of correspondence from Brutus, SASA and other anti-apartheid and non-racial organisations that urged it to act against SACA. In the first place, letters sent to SACA directly by these individuals and organisations appealing for non-racial cricket were met with a firm rejection. Letters directed to the ICC regarding SACA and apartheid were deemed a domestic matter by the ICC and handed back to SACA for action – the very organisation they were trying to defeat and one that had already rejected them! Campaigners found themselves trapped in this frustrating loop. This turning of a blind eye by the ICC was based on its oft-stated fallacious reasoning that by doing so, the ICC succeeded in keeping sports and politics apart. This mirrored the stance adopted by sports governing bodies around the world that either wanted

⁷² Reported by the Commonwealth correspondent of *The Guardian*, Apr 16, 1960, p. 1. After this attempt by SASA, it was reported that the houses of SASA officials were raided by security police.

⁷³ *The Observer*, July 16, 1960, p. 15.

⁷⁴ *The Observer*, July 17, 1960, p. 15.

to maintain ties with the apartheid government or wished to avoid any disruption of *status quo*, however unjust and discriminatory⁷⁵.

Yet another reason stated in favour of retention of full cricket ties with South Africa (again, in essence, SACA) was that its exit would adversely affect cricket in all of Africa⁷⁶. However, ICC minutes show that the ICC had received correspondence separately from East Africa whose cricket association wrote to register itself independently⁷⁷. As noted earlier, cricket teams from East Africa and Kenya in particular played cricket with non-racial South African teams under SACBOC. And tellingly, SACBOC's applications to the ICC for membership were repeatedly snubbed⁷⁸. On the other hand however, Rhodesia's cricket was tied closely to that of SACA. After the 1961 ICC meeting, in Bulawayo, L. Walkden, President of the Rhodesian Cricket Union, pronounced Rhodesian cricket fans and the Rhodesian Cricket Union as being “very glad” and “pleased” that the resolution of the South Africa question had been put off (presumably signalling hope to them), adding “We of the Rhodesia Cricket Union, are sticking to South Africa as hard as we can.”⁷⁹

⁷⁵ ‘Keeping politics out of cricket’ was a favourite refrain. In response to the letter of protest from the Oxford academics in 1960, Dr. A.D. Buckingham, senior treasurer of the Oxford University Cricket Club professed opinions similar to those of the MCC and SACA: “Whatever views one may hold over race relations, I cannot see how anything could be gained by the O.U.C.C. refusing to play against these pleasant and sportsmanlike visitors. By playing cricket with them we do not, of course, mean to imply that we either approve or disapprove of the policies of their Government, or even of their cricket association. I am glad that this match is to take place in Oxford for I am hopeful that the playing of this game of cricket may lead to a better spirit of friendship and understanding between ourselves and those in Africa who are confronted with a terribly difficult problem that we are lucky enough not to have here.” (*The Times*, Tuesday, May 10, 1960, p. 7) The ICC spokesman S.C. Griffith was at pains to stress this point after the 1961 ICC meeting when he informed the press that no one could have doubted [the ICC’s] being a gathering of cricketers rather than politicians (*The Times*, Thursday, Jul 20, 1961, p. 4).

⁷⁶ ICC Minutes: July 18, 1962 & July 17, 1963.

⁷⁷ ICC Minutes: July 19, 1961, “The Secretary reported that the East African Cricket Conference had been formed in May 1960 as the governing body of cricket in East Africa. One of the functions of this Conference is to control and regulate official and semi-official tours to and from East Africa. The three territorial bodies represented on the Conference were Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda Cricket Association.”

⁷⁸ Merrett & Nauright in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., p. 68. SACBOC had also applied to play matches against the touring MCC side in 1956-57 but had been turned down. In fact, in January 1962, SACBOC wrote to SACA proposing a merger and sent a copy of the letter to the MCC (Murray & Merrett, *Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket*, p. 82).

⁷⁹ *The Guardian*, July 21, 1961, p. 4; *The Times*, Friday, Jul 21, 1961, p. 4. Cricket was well-established as the summer sport of choice of white Rhodesians. The Rhodesian Cricket Union (RCU) was a member of SACA and Rhodesia played as a ‘province’ in the domestic Currie Cup competition in South Africa. Rhodesian cricketers were also eligible for Springbok caps. As a member of SACA, Rhodesia was granted fixtures against most teams touring the Republic and playing one or two matches in Salisbury or Bulawayo became an established part of a South Africa touring itinerary. From the 1960s onwards, first-class sides from England also visited Rhodesia. Tightening of sanctions and increasing pressure pushed SACA and the RCU closer together. Charles Little wrote that even though the Rhodesian Cricket Union became eligible for Associate membership after 1965, it did not seriously consider an application in deference to its relationship with SACA – a relationship more cherished

The indecision at the end of the 1961 ICC meeting was reported in the papers. Foster-Bowley's written statement to the ICC was not shared with the press; however, S.C. Griffith⁸⁰, speaking to the press to relay the ICC's statement on the meeting, felt free to speculate that "South Africa may yet be admitted into some newly constituted world-wide cricketing body". He made clear that the MCC intended to go ahead with its commitments to South Africa both at home and away⁸¹. On the front page of *The Guardian*, Denys Rowbotham (the only correspondent of *The Guardian/The Observer* found in this study to have taken a stance sympathetic to SACA), reported with relief that New Zealand's tour of South Africa, scheduled for the winter of 1961, was to go ahead albeit with tests tagged as 'unofficial'. Rowbotham interpreted the deferring of a final decision on South Africa until the next ICC meeting as "heartening, if inevitably not decisive news", assuming that "[c]learly this can imply only the willingness of the conference to try to reach at next year's meeting some revision, or approach to a revision, of Rule 5 which will be in the best interests of South Africa and international cricket" and hoped that interim matches involving South Africa would be granted official status retrospectively⁸². Denys Rowbotham was toeing the MCC line on the issue here so it may be possible to conclude that at this point every effort was being made by the MCC, perhaps in cahoots with the like-minded ACB and NZCC, to amend Rule 5. On the other hand, of course, representatives of the BCCI, the BCCP and the WICBOC came armed to ICC meetings with instructions to oppose any such move. An editorial in *The Times* concurred with Rowbotham and saw "a pragmatic argument in favour of changing the rules". Arguing in favour of constitutional change to accommodate South Africa, the writer noted that the ICC "is a Commonwealth body because it so happens that all the main cricketing countries have hitherto been inside the Commonwealth". This claim was patently mendacious; as seen in the previous chapter, there had been a concerted effort to keep the ICC an Empire/Commonwealth-only body. Any claim to the contrary was an attempt to rationalise gerrymandering in international cricket. Although warning against any action that might be construed as condoning apartheid, the editorial was *not* convinced that

than one with the ICC [Charles Little, 'Rebellion, race and Rhodesia: international cricketing relations with Rhodesia during UDI' in Malcolm, Gemmell & Mehta, eds., *The Changing Face of Cricket: From Imperial to Global Game*, Routledge (2010), p. 95].

⁸⁰ Stewart Cathie 'Billy' Griffith, yet another MCC insider, was for a long time an Assistant Secretary under long-time MCC Secretary Ronald Aird. Griffith succeeded Aird as Secretary of the MCC in 1962 and (alongside Gubby Allen as Treasurer) played a central part in the D'Oliveira controversy in 1968.

⁸¹ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 20, 1961, p. 4.

⁸² *The Guardian*, July 20, 1961, p. 1.

“decisions about cricket fixtures should be subordinated to racial considerations” – an extremely audacious statement surely, given the feverish international atmosphere of 1961⁸³.

Criticism of the ICC’s decision to defer a final call on South Africa came flying in from both the left and right of the political spectrum. While critics on the left interpreted it as a cowardly act intended to stall for time (anything less than a resolute ‘no’ was considered a victory for SACA and apartheid), the right believed that the ICC had let down its long-time ally and friendly opponent and had allowed politics to enter purely sporting matters. Much of the English press in South Africa and many white South African cricketers saw it as a blow to South African cricket. In a bewildering statement, the former South African test captain, J.E. Cheetham, angrily retorted that the issue had unfortunately entered “the realms of politics”. “If our sportsmen were to refuse to play against non-white opponents then there would be some justification for such a step. But all our sportsmen have proved they are willing to meet players from any land provided it does not conflict with policies over which they have no say”⁸⁴, perhaps meaning to emphasise that players had no control over apartheid policies, a statement which even if technically accurate, ignored other realities. Alan Ross in *The Observer* asked incredulously of Cheetham’s statement, “Can anyone, in 1961, be so naïve and gullible?” and continued, “Does Mr. Cheetham not realise that it is precisely because such people as himself and, one may add, South African Test cricketers in general, disown responsibility for the policies of their government, that such policies continue? In fact, of course, the majority either acquiesce willingly or lack the courage to oppose.” Ross also expressed surprise at the disappointment among South African circles over the ICC’s indecision since it signalled hope for them and constituted successful resistance to the efforts of India, Pakistan and the West Indies. Ross concluded sombrely that “M.C.C., in this conference, have missed an opportunity”⁸⁵.

In spite of the furore, there was no climbdown by the South African government. On the contrary, in the face of international condemnation and threats of bans, it defiantly intensified its policies. In April 1962, then Minister of Home Affairs, Senator Johannes de Klerk (father of F.W. de Klerk), reiterated that mixed-race sports teams from abroad would

⁸³ Editorial, *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 20, 1961, p. 13.

⁸⁴ *The Times*, Friday, Jul 21, 1961, p. 4.

⁸⁵ *The Observer*, July 23, 1961, p. 15.

not be allowed to enter South Africa and added that “the Government also viewed in an unfavourable light inter-racial contests in neighbouring territories involving South African sportsmen”. What the Government was willing to allow was separate teams drawn from different ‘race’ groups⁸⁶.

In the ICC meeting of July 18, 1962, the minutes reveal that SACA’s membership was the first item on the agenda and once again, opinions were expressed along predictable lines. Chairman Col Sir William Worsley, Bart., opened by saying that in his view, the situation “had not altered materially” but threw the discussion open to other members. H. Bushby of Australia agreed that the situation was exactly the same as a year ago. In view of that, he recommended each country be allowed to decide whether or not to play against South Africa, taking the matter out of the hands of the ICC. J.L. Kerr of New Zealand took it further and suggested that until such time as the issue of South Africa’s membership was resolved, all matches against South Africa be treated as official. Once again, the representative from Pakistan, Muzaffar Husain, spoke out strongly against New Zealand’s proposition. Terming it “dangerous” to bend the Constitution, he warned that it could set a precedent and even lead to the creation of a substitute to the ICC. He favoured strict adherence to the ICC Constitution and felt that the time was not right for South Africa to re-join the ICC and play official cricket. He ended by calling on all delegates to join him in expressing “a fund of goodwill to the SACA”. The Chair then wrapped up the discussion on South Africa by expressing sympathy for South African cricketers and hoping that the situation would be resolved soon to the general advantage of cricket. Stating that the welfare of cricket was the ICC’s biggest priority, he said that “it was, of course, open to any member country of the Conference to visit or receive visits from any other Conference [member] they liked”. While the ICC stand-off on South Africa continued to fester, such a policy of *laissez-faire* in cricket thwarted any effort to isolate South Africa and to put pressure on it. It paved the way for and legitimised bilateral cricket exchanges of England, Australia and New Zealand with South Africa. It also meant that the cricket boards of England, New Zealand and Australia were under no obligation to take a stance against apartheid.

During discussions on the programme of tours in the 1962 meeting, Husain (Pakistan) inquired about the possibility of a revision in the approved schedule of tours since South

⁸⁶ *The Times*, Monday, Apr 02, 1962, p. 9.

Africa was no longer a member. The complaint was that as it stood, the programme, which had been approved before South Africa's exit, favoured South Africa over some of the existing members of the ICC. In view of its departure from the ICC, it was felt that South Africa ought to be entitled to a smaller share of international cricket, if at all. J. St. F. Dare, President of the WICBOC, echoed Husain's views. He also pointed out that South Africa was not permitted to play against half of the ICC member countries⁸⁷. M.A. Chidambaram (India) agreed with the views of Husain and Dare. Bushby (Australia) and Gubby Allen (MCC) took the opposite view once again, and firmly indicated their intention to honour previously-approved exchanges with South Africa. While Bushby reiterated his stance that each member should be allowed to decide for itself, Allen reiterated that reduction in cricket exchanges with South Africa by those who were able to play against it (i.e., the white members) would be harmful to cricket in South Africa and perhaps also to cricket in Africa as a whole. Such a justification of links with South Africa based on largely specious and alarmist fears of a potential demise of cricket in Africa sounds more than a little vacuous when one takes note of the 'by invitation only' exclusive feel of the ICC. Cricket had been played for a long time in East Africa. In fact, as noted earlier, cricket teams from Kenya and East Africa played cricket with black teams from South Africa!⁸⁸

The Times reported that the ICC stand-off on South Africa was a "straight political issue between on the one hand England, Australia and New Zealand and, on the other, West Indies, India, and Pakistan" with the further update that the MCC intended to go ahead with its 1964-65 tour of South Africa and Australia expected to receive South Africa in 1963-64. "In both cases, the Test matches, will, no doubt, be considered as "official" in everything but name."⁸⁹ The last statement only confirmed what was already indicated by the *laissez-faire* stance on South Africa. In spite of expulsion from the ICC, South Africa was not written out of the schedule of tours by the MCC. There was constant pressure from Afro-Asian members

⁸⁷ Though he felt that member countries should receive priority, Dare approved of cricket exchanges between South Africa and ICC members who were able to play against it.

⁸⁸ Tours to and from Kenya and East Asia involving SACBOC in the late 1950s have already been discussed earlier. Peter Oborne noted also that in 1950, hosted by the non-white Western Province Cricket Board of Control, a Kenyan team arrived in South Africa to play against a non-racial non-white team led by Basil D'Oliveira (Oborne, p. 49). D'Oliveira also led a non-racial non-white team to Kenya. In fact, Sir Evelyn Baring (1st Baron Howick of Glendale), then Governor of Kenya, had been expected to take time off battling the Mau Mau to make an appearance at a farewell hosted for D'Oliveira's team at the Governor's residence, though he eventually did not attend (p. 54). See also Murray & Merrett, *Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket*, pp. 54-55.

⁸⁹ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 19, 1962, p. 3.

on the South Africa issue within the ICC, in the Commonwealth and at the United Nations at this time. But with all its ‘acceptable’ (read: white) and loyal rivals—England, Australia and New Zealand—eager to continue cricket with it, little changed for South African cricket in a practical sense at this point other than the superficial tag of ‘unofficial cricket’. In 1964, *The Times* would magnanimously say of South Africa, “We have long forgotten, incidentally, that these technically are not official Test matches, in the sense that South Africa are no longer members of the Imperial Cricket Conference. The distinction is purely academic.”⁹⁰ As before, the official 1962 post-meeting statement released by the ICC repeated unctuously that “all the members wanted to do their best for South African cricket, which might perish if tours were not continued”⁹¹. Denys Rowbotham also continued to peddle the establishment line: “That South Africa still stands outside the conference is regrettable not only for their own cricketers but those who have played against them and will continue to do so. But politics have entered cricket, like it or no, and no easy or swift resolution of present differences will be found.”⁹²

Once again, the ICC’s continued state of indecision came under criticism. New Zealand cricket captain J.R. Reid (who would go on to become a well-known international cricket referee) said that “this was the sort of unrealistic decision that was reached when politics were allowed to interfere with sport.” Reid had led New Zealand in its tour of South Africa in 1961-62, the first series affected by South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Reid proclaimed himself heartened to hear of the Australian board’s decision to treat South Africa’s 1963-64 tour of Australia as official. He felt certain that New Zealand would endorse South Africa’s return tour to New Zealand as “tests without tags”⁹³.

⁹⁰ *The Times*, Monday, Dec 07, 1964, p. 3.

⁹¹ *The Guardian*, July 19, 1962, p. 4.

⁹² *The Guardian*, July 19, 1962, p. 4.

⁹³ *The Times*, Tuesday, Jul 24, 1962, p. 4. As noted earlier, SACA and the apartheid regime’s well-wishers frequently lamented what they saw as introduction of politics in cricket. Australia’s Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, described earlier as a close friend of the conservative MCC Committee, took a similar view. Criticising anti-apartheid campaigners, he spoke out in support of South Africa’s national sovereignty. Menzies recounted in his memoirs that South Africa had been driven out of the Commonwealth against his will and expressed great displeasure that though “The English cricket authorities stood firm against the threats of a noisy minority”, the British Government had intervened to cancel the 1970 Springbok tour of England [Robert Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, Cassell & Company Ltd (1970), p. 283]. Later, the cancellation of the 1971-72 Springbok tour of Australia was a huge disappointment to him. Australian batting legend, Sir Donald Bradman, similarly took a very dim view of the cancellation of the 1971 tour. At that time, he was Chairman of the Australian Cricket Board. He defiantly announced that the cancellation had been caused by security reasons and not political ones. This attitude of considering the South African government’s treatment of its people as a matter of domestic jurisdiction for South Africa and not for cricketers was further maintained when Bradman visited South Africa in 1974 to meet President Vorster to discuss what was deliberately clarified

In contrast to Reid's blistering tone, retired President of SACA, R.E. Foster-Bowley, adopted one of self-pity: "It is in my view wrong that we should be excluded on political grounds, bearing in mind that we were one of the founder nations. We raised no objection to the admission to the conference of those who are now opposed to us nor to their having equal voting status which was recently granted to them."⁹⁴

In the ICC meeting of July 17, 1963, the West Indies representative J. St. F. Dare repeated his request for increased tours to England and Australia from the West Indies, particularly in the light of changes in South Africa's situation. The ICC Chairman and MCC

as solely cricketing matters (Brett Hutchins, 'Unity, Difference and the 'National Game': Cricket and Australian National Identity' in Stephen Wagg, ed., op cit., p. 21). It is noteworthy here that Australia dismantled its own 'White Australia' policy only in the early 1970s.

⁹⁴ *The Times*, Monday, Sep 17, 1962, p. 4. He was succeeded as President of SACA by K. Viljoen, former Test batsman and tour manager.

Similar arguments would be repeated by the political right in 1968 during what came to be known as the 'D'Oliveira affair' involving the MCC, SACA and the South African government of B.J. Vorster. At the centre of the controversy was South Africa-born and raised 'Coloured' cricketer Basil D'Oliveira. Denied the opportunity to play for South Africa on account of his mixed heritage in spite of his enormous talent, D'Oliveira left for England in 1960, helped by the conscientious John Arlott. Starting off with the Central Lancashire League club Middleton, he worked his way to county cricket and then to the England cricket team. His anticipated selection in the England team that was to tour South Africa in 1968 became the talking point (South Africa only permitted teams composed of white players to enter the country). Initially not selected by the MCC (many saw this as deference to the wishes of South Africa), he was eventually picked when one of the selected players, Tom Cartwright, fell injured. The backlash from Prime Minister Vorster was swift. Oborne's book revealed the intense behind-the-scenes negotiations, bribery, appeasement and deceit conducted by the South African government, the MCC, SACA and Anglo-South African conduits. Eventually, coming under intense scrutiny and pressure from the British government and from the British public and commentators, the MCC, having already given a very poor account of itself, called off the tour much against its wishes. One commentator from the right described South Africa as a "younger brother" and accused the MCC of committing "cricketing fratricide". Among others, Wilfred Isaacs, leading benefactor of white South African sport with excellent ties to the MCC (he reportedly wrote to Dennis Brutus of SASA accusing him of being a nuisance), invoked images of the imperial family, experiences alongside British fighter pilots during WWII and the bonds of friendship created during the war. Commentators on the right, in their calls for a mutual internal understanding, nostalgically recalled the exclusion by the MCC of the Indian cricketer K.S. Duleepsinhji from its 1929 team to South Africa in deference to the wishes of the SACA. Ironically, these commentators saw the MCC committee as a weak left-leaning body capitulating to left-wing pressure from within Britain. Research and the evidence here prove otherwise. Incidentally, Conservative MP Lord Monckton, President of the MCC in 1956-57, in turn described the Conservative Cabinet as a group of left-wingers compared to the MCC Committee (the MCC Committee made Macmillan's cabinet appear "a band of pinkos") in *The Guardian* in 1968 (Merret & Nauright in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., p. 72; Jack Williams, "Fiery Fred": Fred Truman and Cricket Celebrity in the 1950s and early 1960s' in Malcolm et al., p. 84. See Oborne, p. 210 on Duleepsinhji). Peter Oborne's book provides detailed exposition of names at the centre of this dismal affair, their complicity and reconstruction of events. The MCC figures at the centre of this heated row were all aforementioned cricketing grandees: MCC Treasurer Gubby Allen, Secretary S.C. 'Billy' Griffith, former British Prime Minister and former President of MCC Lord Alec Douglas-Home, former President of MCC and former Governor-General of New Zealand the 10th Viscount Cobham (and MCC President Arthur Gilligan to slightly lesser extent) and their associates from South African politics, business and the SACA (pp. 148-158, p. 191).

President that year Lt-Col Lord Nugent replied that he was speaking on behalf of all cricket lovers in the UK when he assured the Conference that he would love to see touring teams from all countries more often. However, H.S. Altham (MCC) reminded the gathering of the “fund of goodwill” expressed by the Pakistani delegates for South Africa in the last meeting. He repeated the MCC’s well-known position that curtailment and redistribution of South Africa’s share of cricket would be a “mortal blow” to cricket in South Africa and Africa as a whole, adding that “it is with cricket throughout the world that MCC are above all concerned”. He added further that “England would wish to continue with Australia, a founder member and by far our oldest opponent, on the present rota of visits”⁹⁵. This speech, reaffirming the MCC’s ties with Australia and South Africa, categorically precluded any possibility of immediate alteration of the programme of tours by the MCC.

Hon Chief Justice A.R. Cornelius (Pakistan) supported the inclusion of South Africa in any revised touring programme even though “certain countries would not be invited back”. Frank Worrell was present as a West Indies representative. He approached the complicated, delicate and inter-linked topics of South Africa and revision in the touring schedule cautiously. He supported continuation of cricket ties between the white members and South Africa but on a reduced rota. He recommended scheduling of just one South African tour of England between 1963 and 1970, and advised that in view of the political situation, it would be prudent to defer South Africa’s 1966 visit to avoid any embarrassment⁹⁶.

Reporting on the demand by the West Indies and others for more frequent tours to England (and Australia), *The Times* quoted the official press statement which included a note on South Africa: “The discussion was readily extended to cover other countries and all the representatives were “entirely sympathetic to M.C.C.’s view that nothing should be done

⁹⁵ ICC Minutes: July 17, 1963.

⁹⁶ In what may have been a compromise or a sense of resignation, while South Africa’s readmission and official recognition were vehemently opposed, continued ‘unofficial’ (only in name!) cricket ties of England, Australia and New Zealand with South Africa were easily accepted by the West Indies, Pakistan and India in the early 1960s. This may have been so partly out of deference to historical and traditional ties between them, and partly out of a sense of powerlessness and helplessness to stop these contests. One might even speculate about the existence of an unspoken trade-off on the matter whereby the latter three did not protest these unofficial ties and the former three did not press for a vote on the issue (a vote would have meant a tie with the MCC possessing the casting vote). In the absence of any definitive clues in the minutes of ICC meetings and in the newspapers studied here, the most convincing explanation may well be a simpler one: the aforementioned *laissez-faire* tradition that had governed interaction within the ICC for a long time in the matter of choosing opponents. See Chapter 5, section 4 for more.

which might be detrimental to the welfare of South African cricket”⁹⁷. Denys Rowbotham also reported that “[t]he welfare of cricket as a whole seems to have been the conference’s sustaining consideration. That every representative should urge that nothing be rearranged which might be detrimental to cricket in South Africa was as generous and right headed as Pakistan’s concern for the small cricketing countries.”⁹⁸ Again, judging by the recorded minutes, this statement is an exaggeration but is in keeping with the previously noted tendency of the ICC to gloss over differences in its official statements to the press in spite of the fact that divisions within the ICC were well-known and widely-reported. *The Times* gave further insight into the deep fissures in the ICC when it wrote, “If it were not for politics the problem could at once be overcome; indeed, it still could be, if Mr. J. St. F. Dare, president of the West Indian Board of Control, reflected his country’s official attitude when he said recently that “no one wants to see South African cricket suffer”.”⁹⁹ As discussed in the previous chapter, this was also the year in which the MCC revised its programme of tours. *The Times* remained optimistic about accommodation of South Africa in this new touring regime of weaker members visiting England in pairs every other year to alternate with a strong sole visitor. “Politically there is no reason why South Africans should not play cricket in England simultaneously with Indians and Pakistanis [if paired with them]. If the South Africans offered to do so it would be a gesture in the right direction.” (Eventually, however, South Africa was paired with fellow white-majority member and ally New Zealand for 1965.) The article once again highlighted the two blocs within the ICC on the South Africa issue. It explained that any move “to reconstitute the conference to enable South Africa’s return by calling it ‘International’ as distinct from ‘Imperial’” would most likely be resisted by India, Pakistan and the West Indies, even though “[i]n years gone by India themselves suggested such a title”¹⁰⁰. It also reminded readers that South Africa was scheduled to tour Australia in late 1963 and an MCC team was due in South Africa in the English winter of 1964-65¹⁰¹. In 1964, MCC President Gubby Allen informed ICC representatives that Australia had accepted an invitation from SACA to tour South Africa in 1966-67.

⁹⁷ *The Times*, Thursday, Jul 18, 1963, p. 4.

⁹⁸ *The Guardian*, July 18, 1963, p. 10.

⁹⁹ *The Times*, Wednesday, Jul 17, 1963, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ In fact, as seen in the previous chapter, India had suggested the new title ‘Commonwealth Cricket Conference’ in 1956 which, if implemented, would have done nothing to help South Africa’s inclusion.

¹⁰¹ *The Times*, Wednesday, Jul 17, 1963, p. 4.

Prior to the 1964 ICC meeting, *The Guardian* reported on further efforts by anti-apartheid campaigners. “Mr Ahmed Ibrahim, secretary of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, whose representations led the International Olympics Congress to withdraw South Africa’s invitation to the Tokyo Games”, arrived in London to lobby the MCC (and the English Football Association) to end sporting relations with apartheid South Africa. Ibrahim, who had managed to escape from South Africa to Tanganyika in 1963, was to meet MPs Christopher Chataway and Denis Howell before travelling to India and Pakistan to meet cricket administrators there. Ibrahim told the press, “Now that South African is not in the Commonwealth, I can see no reason why it should continue within the Imperial Cricket Conference. I shall also ask India and Pakistan to refuse to take part in any of the proposed twin-tours if South Africa is paired with them.”¹⁰² The minutes of the ICC meeting of July 18, 1964, do not mention South Africa, even though the issue had only become bigger and hotter. Instead, a slew of constitutional changes were discussed. While the South Africa debate raged on in the background¹⁰³, the stalemate continued within the ICC.

A comparative look of the treatment of the membership of South Africa, Pakistan and India by the ICC yields many points of interest. SACA was an ally and traditional friendly foe of the MCC and the ‘old’ Commonwealth in the ICC. As noted earlier, SACA, from inception, had close links with the British colonial establishment and with the MCC. Commentators noted that “South Africa [SACA] had always occupied a special place in the affections of the [English] cricket establishment”. This fond relationship was complemented by “a pattern of social, political and business relationships” that owed a great deal to lingering imperial bonds. With the MCC batting for SACA, it was obvious that “[t]he imperial old boy network was well and alive in the 1960s”¹⁰⁴. Peter Oborne remarked that

¹⁰² *The Guardian*, February 11, 1964, p. 5.

¹⁰³ Protests continued to greet the South African cricket team in Australia and New Zealand in 1963-64 and in England in 1965. In 1962, three South African players were denied permission to tour Pakistan along with the Commonwealth XI. The ‘Dolly Affair’ meant cancellation of the 1968 tour. The 1969-70 South Africa tour of Australia was its last international tour before the sporting boycott fell in place. (Jon Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket*, p. 120).

¹⁰⁴ All quotes from Merret & Nauright in Stoddart & Sandiford, eds., p. 70. Oborne’s research on the spider-web of relations between influential members of the MCC and South Africa at the time of the D’Oliveira crisis is helpful in getting a sense of the state of affairs in the first half of the 20th century. As noted, South Africa had been as much a political as a cricket inductee into the ICC. Many of the British cricketing grandees developed business as well as sporting interests in the republic. In fact, of the people involved in the D’Oliveira affair alone, Gubby Allen was a leading member of London’s financial district. Arthur Gilligan’s brother Harold Gilligan had extensive business interests in South Africa. Viscount Cobham’s connections have already been

“Balthazar Johannes Vorster’s white South Africa was an important part of the settled, traditional, closed world that the MCC believed it was there to protect.”¹⁰⁵ As such, rules were sought to be bent, broken, changed and expedited in order to retain South Africa, even though, through its departure from the Commonwealth, South Africa had broken the most basic membership stipulation. Pakistan, on the other hand, perhaps justifiably, felt most aggrieved and wronged by the MCC’s extremely rigid and harsh application of membership rules. Not only was Pakistan not seen as a natural successor state of undivided India, but it was also forced to undergo a long humiliating process of pleading submissions and cricket performances to prove its credentials. India fell somewhere in the middle. India’s right to succeed undivided India’s seat at the ICC was not questioned. But the likelihood of departure from the Commonwealth to become a republic was reason enough for the ICC to act promptly against India, in sharp contrast to the South African case, in spite of India’s twenty-year old association with the ICC.

Similarly, in blaming political reasons, in hurling accusations of politicisation of cricket and in courting self-pity, astonishingly, it appears as though it did not occur to vocal supporters of post-withdrawal South Africa, that constitutionally, the ICC was obliged to exclude South Africa. For them, South Africa’s right to play official cricket, whether in or out of the ICC, was indisputable. Strictly speaking, the immediate reason for South Africa’s expulsion was constitutional, not political. The trigger for that constitutional reason, however, was political. That political linking of membership of ‘official’ cricket to membership of the Commonwealth [Empire] had been put in place *by the MCC itself* under Lord Harris in 1926. It was, therefore, a brazen act by the MCC to openly consider revision of the Constitution, not out of concern for its outmodedness, but for an individual member who was in breach of membership rules. In the same vein, while friends of SACA supported changing of the title of the ICC with the sole intention of enabling South Africa’s return, India, Pakistan and the West Indies had called for a name-change much earlier in 1955-56 so as to reflect the

discussed (Oborne, p. 15, p. 191). Politically and economically, it was a comfortable trade-off between the two countries: Britain wanted as much of South Africa’s gold as it could get to strengthen the sterling area reserves and in turn, South Africa needed British capital. Defence ties were of significant importance as were deposits of uranium in the Union. The British Government and its partners also saw South Africa as a useful ally against communism. Most of the City and other financial contacts were hinged on ‘happy personal relations’ [Ritchie Ovendale, ‘The South African Policy of the British Labour Government, 1947-51’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 59.1 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 44-45 & pp. 50-54. See also James Hamill, ‘South Africa and the Commonwealth Part One: The Years of Acrimony’, *Contemporary Review* (July 1995), p. 4].

¹⁰⁵ Oborne, p. 212.

changing political realities. Then, such a change had been found unnecessary by the ‘old’ Commonwealth members.

Relatedly, manipulation by way of language is another aspect worthy of attention. Phrases such as “under Government influence”, “political overtones”, “for political reasons”, “may be briefed to oppose”, “political considerations”, “political grounds”¹⁰⁶ were repeatedly and meaningfully used by cricketers, administrators and cricket correspondents who sympathised with SACA to describe the actions of the non-white ‘new’ Commonwealth members of the ICC. In press conferences and in ICC meetings, friends of SACA in Australia, New Zealand, England and South Africa constantly bemoaned what they saw as introduction of politics into a (supposedly apolitical) sport in thinly-veiled accusations aimed at Pakistan, India and the West Indies. Cumulatively, this served to create a discourse that enabled supporters of SACA to disseminate the belief that newer (tellingly, also non-white) members of the ICC had contaminated and tainted the pristinely apolitical and tranquil world of international cricket with shadowy racial politics, whilst paying scant regard to the politics contained in the prevalent *status quo*, the balance of political power at the ICC and centuries-old racial discrimination in their own countries¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰⁶ There were many such examples. Some have already been discussed in this section (in particular, statements of South African and New Zealand cricketers). Some are highlighted here with added emphasis: *The Times*, Wednesday, Jul 19, 1961, p. 4: “Like India and Pakistan, [the West Indies] representatives may well be under Government influence.”

The Times, Monday, Sep 17, 1962, p. 4: Addressing the annual meeting of the association [Foster-Bowley] said: “It is in my view wrong that we should be excluded on *political grounds*....”

The Times, Wednesday, Jul 17, 1963, p. 4: “Political Overtones To Lord's Conference” was the heading of the article.

The Times, Wednesday, Jul 17, 1963, p. 4: “On the hand are West Indies, India and Pakistan who, *for political reasons*, may be briefed to oppose any such suggestion.”

The Times, Wednesday, Jul 17, 1963, p. 4 : “its annual meeting at Lord’s today, is faced by issues that are influenced by political considerations”

¹⁰⁷ The peerless writer and activist C.L.R. James noted the same tactic in his seminal polemic exposition *Beyond A Boundary* (1963) when he tore apart the dominant code: “According to the code, anger should not intrude into cricket. I understood them well, I had been as foolish in my time. According to the colonial version of the code, you were to show yourself a ‘true sport’ by not making a fuss about the most barefaced discrimination because it wasn’t cricket. Not me any longer. To that I had said, was saying, my final good-bye.” [C.L.R. James, *Beyond A Boundary*, Stanley Paul & Co. (1963), p. 241] Also see Mike Marqusee’s brilliant *Anyone But England: An Outsider Looks at English Cricket*, Aurum Press [2005 (first edition 1994)]. Mike Marqusee, iconoclast extraordinaire of the cricket-writing world, exposed the prevalence of the same attitude towards widespread racism in English cricket in the 1990s. Quoting Marqusee, Nick Miller wrote that cricket authorities in this period adopted a “hear no evil, see no evil” approach to racism. Terming allegations of discrimination and racism in English cricket as simply ‘not cricket’, they preferred to think of incidents as aberrations rather than as part of entrenched attitudes. The publication of an inflammatory article in *Wisden Cricket Monthly* magazine in 1995 questioning the loyalty of non-white and foreign-born England players eventually turned the spotlight on such attitudes (Nick Miller, ‘Clean Bowl Racism? Inner City London and the Politics of Cricket Development’ in Wagg, ed., pp. 234).

Thus, the question of South Africa proves one rich for study since it throws into sharp relief, the attitudes, loyalties and priorities of members of the Imperial Cricket Conference.

4.3 However . . .

It would appear, then, from this disquisition that the period between 1947 and 1965 was witness to significant changes in the ICC. It started with mild requests and supplication in 1947 and turned into vocal calls and vociferous demands by India, Pakistan and the West Indies by 1965 on various issues. In 1947, membership of the ICC was open only to colonies and dominions of the British Empire; the founding trio England, Australia and South Africa enjoyed voting privileges and favours in the touring schedule; the organisation boldly wore its imperial origin in its name; and power remained skewed in favour of the MCC. By 1965, owing to a number of reasons, membership criteria had changed to become more open; voting privileges of the founders had been reduced; the touring schedule had been revised to a great extent; the name of the organisation no longer harked back to bygone days; and even though it was still the pre-eminent presence in the ICC, several other members had started to become more assertive in the ICC meetings and on the cricket field.

However, a note of caution is advisable here lest this be construed as a straightforward linear story of protests and progression. While there did exist a divide along racial lines in the ICC with England, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand on one side and India, Pakistan and the West Indies on the other, neither bloc was homogenous or monolithic. The relationship between England and Australia was considered sacred. South Africa came next in precedence. But this was the white, financially-dominant English-speaking South Africa. Research on this topic has traced the resentment felt among the white Afrikaner community towards what they saw as a quintessentially English and imperial game. It was only around the 1960s and thereafter that Afrikaner interest and participation in cricket increased. By then, it was the politically-dominant group. International pressure had

also served to bring the two white communities closer together¹⁰⁸. Needless to say, the overwhelming non-white majority, which in turn frequently experienced tension between its various groups, was unrepresented at the ICC. Clearly, neither the white nor the non-white population of South Africa was entirely united. South Africa was the only black-majority member of this bloc but it successfully presented a white face. Although New Zealand was a loyal and a rather obsequious supporter of this bloc, it did not enjoy the same privileges or status as the other three. As hinted above, Australia and New Zealand shared a strained relationship, resulting in no regular cricket contact between the neighbours for several decades. New Zealand's standard was considered 'inferior' and in turn, New Zealand preserved amateur values for a long time. Research has also been conducted into the invisibility in cricket of the Aboriginal population in Australia and the Māori in New Zealand¹⁰⁹. On the other side of the fault-line, although united in their submissions to the ICC, political tensions between India and Pakistan made appearances in this period in the form of Pakistan's tense admission process between 1947 and 1952 and build-up of pressure on the two cricket teams when they faced off. Along with South Africa, the West Indies presents the most complex case of all the ICC members. Representatives of the West Indies board supported those from India and Pakistan on major issues in the ICC and led the group in the voting rights campaign. In 1960, the black majority of this collection of islands wrested the right to captaincy on the basis of merit from the stranglehold of the white minority. Black representatives, as pointed out in the previous chapter, had already made appearances on behalf of the WICBOC at the ICC. In 1961, Jeffrey Stollmeyer, a white representative of the WICBOC, was the first to raise the idea of the ICC officially declaring itself opposed to apartheid in cricket. If these developments indicated movement towards greater racial and class harmony in West Indies cricket, there is also much evidence that all was not well within the WICBOC in this period. The late Tim Hector described the West Indies board of the 1950s as "anti-nationalist and representing the powerful planter-merchant class". The road to Worrell's captaincy had been an acrimonious one with "shenanigans . . . performed in the unstated service of racism"¹¹⁰ and tension evidently simmered in the West Indies, in spite of

¹⁰⁸ See Albert Grundlingh, 'From J.J. 'Boerjong' Kotze to Hansie Cronje: Afrikaners and cricket in twentieth-century South Africa – diffusion and representation', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol 28.1 (2011), pp. 98-114; James Hamill, 'South Africa and the Commonwealth Part One: The Years of Acrimony', op cit.; André Odendaal, op cit.; Peter Oborne, op cit.

¹⁰⁹ The first Australian team ever to tour England in 1868 was, in fact, composed of Aboriginal players.

¹¹⁰ Tim Hector (& Stephen Wagg) in Wagg, ed., p. 165. The England cricketer Trevor Bailey, Len Hutton's vice-captain on the 1954 tour of the West Indies, recalled that white West Indians and expatriate Englishmen had told the MCC players that an MCC win was imperative as otherwise the balance of power would be disturbed,

the progressive face presented at the Imperial Cricket Conference meetings. John Hughson wrote that Worrell's ascent to captaincy was part of a slow process of extrication of West Indian cricket from the grip of colonialism rather than a radical break. Given Worrell's background and outlook on cricket, his appointment meant that "ground was given on race, yet not on class"¹¹¹. Michael Roberts described Stollmeyer as a "white Trinidadian who hated black people" and shared this anecdote about Jeffrey Stollmeyer in the context of the West Indies' vote alongside the 'white group' in 1976 to block Sri Lanka's application to become a full member: "This comment comes from a White West Indies cricketer of the Stollmeyer era whom I consulted after Bandula de Silva [of Sri Lanka] referred to Stollmeyer's opposition. The manner in which Stollmeyer vowed to block [black cricketer Kenneth Furlonge]¹¹² from securing a spot in the West Indies squad because he had the temerity to laugh after he had bowled Stollmeyer is now part of Caribbean cricket folklore", hinting perhaps that racial politics in West Indian cricket was not just alive but may have also played a part in undermining Sri Lanka's effort to obtain full test-playing status¹¹³. On the political front, the West Indies Federation, which had appeared as a beacon of hope to the collective West Indian nationalism at the time of formation in 1958, fell apart very shortly thereafter. Jamaica made its exit in 1962. However, even though politically separate, the West Indian islands remained a united entity in cricket¹¹⁴. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were the economic

"or, as a Victorian would have put it, '[it would] make the natives uppity'" (Stephen Wagg, 'Calypso Kings, Dark Destroyers: England-West Indies Test Cricket and the English Press, 1950 to 1984', in Wagg, ed., p. 187).

¹¹¹ John Hughson, *The Making of Sporting Cultures*, Routledge (2009), pp. 74-75.

¹¹² A likely typing error mentions "Furlong".

¹¹³ Michael Roberts, 'Landmarks and threads in the cricketing universe of Sri Lanka', in Jon Gemmell & Boria Majumdar, eds., *Cricket, race and the 2007 World Cup*, p. 121 and p. 129 (reference 46). Ceylon, as it was then called, had already faced rejection of its application for membership to the ICC in 1946 according to the 1946 ICC minutes: "The Secretary read a letter from the Ceylon Cricket Association applying for membership of the ICC. This application was not supported by any representative and it was decided to inform the Ceylon Cricket Association that it was not possible at present to increase the number of countries represented on the Conference and no application could be considered in future unless supported by at least two sponsors." It continued to survive on the radar of the MCC, winning matches during ICC tours to the subcontinent. In the ICC meeting of 1964, according to the minutes, the Indian representative, the Maharaj Gaekwad of Baroda, "speaking on behalf of the Board of Control for Cricket in Ceylon hoped that teams visiting India, would agree to play at least one 3-day match in Ceylon, in order to encourage cricket in that country." In 1965, it was elected an Associate Member alongside Fiji and the USA. After unsuccessful attempts in the 1960s and 1970s (failure resulting from international cricket scandals, internal Sri Lankan board politics and suspected racist motives), Sri Lanka received full test status in 1981 with the help of Pakistan and India. See Michael Roberts, 'Landmarks and Threads in the Cricketing Universe of Sri Lanka', in Gemmell & Majumdar, eds., pp. 121-122 and Marqusee in Wagg, ed., p. 257.

¹¹⁴ Under the title, "Cricket safe, anyway", *The Guardian* reported that "There are so many exasperating and complex problems to be sorted out, now Jamaica is to leave the West Indies Federation, that it must have come as a relief to the two Prime Ministers who have been conferring in London this week to find that at least one of these problems is quite beyond the jurisdiction of either of them. The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Grantley Adams, and the Jamaican leader, Mr Norman Manley, have been informed on the highest, most

powers of the region while West Indian cricket was dominated by Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and British Guiana (later, Guyana). Unity and collective nationalism were fractured by economic inequalities, inter-island rivalry and ethnic tension in the region.

The Imperial Cricket Conference was, thus, plagued by both overt and inconspicuous internecine conflict. The following two chapters will attempt to situate this organisation within a larger Commonwealth context.

authoritative level that one thing they need not try to unscramble is the future of West Indies test cricket. The cricketers decided long ago, and quite properly, that they would not let the politicians or geographers dictate terms to them. The sovereign authority in these matters is the Imperial Cricket Conference and there seems little doubt that when its delegates next assemble they will declare imperially that Jamaicans are perfectly eligible to play in the West Indian test team." (*The Guardian*, October 7, 1961, p. 6) ICC Minutes of 1964 noted that "Mr J.D. Goddard (West Indies) suggested that in Para 2 (a) (i) a country or group of countries should be eligible for election. After a long discussion it was decided to use the phrase "a country or countries associated for cricket purposes".

It is often noted on this matter that cricket and the University of the West Indies are perhaps the only two institutions to use the geo-political expression 'the West Indies'.

Chapter Five: ‘Performance of Good Commonwealth Relations’

So far, this dissertation has reviewed developments in the political Commonwealth, the non-governmental Commonwealth and in the Imperial Cricket Conference in the mid-twentieth century. The aim of this chapter is to juxtapose all three in an attempt to shed further light on the intricacies of the process of decolonisation. Did ‘decolonisation’ entail only a political transfer of power? How did non-governmental players with imperial–Commonwealth interests react and adapt to decolonisation? And how does the ICC fit into all this? This chapter will endeavour to answer these questions.

McIntyre opined that the reason for the relative lack of historical commentary on the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences (UCRCs) owed to the tendency of writers on the Empire–Commonwealth to “[compartmentalise] unofficial endeavours such as cultural, missionary, sporting, philanthropic, educational and even trading activities”. Even the “first generation” of Commonwealth historians, enthusiastic advocates of the ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’ as an organisation (and some of whom attended the UCRCs), largely neglected the unofficial side of things since “in their admiration for the novel network of independent countries working in free association under the Crown, they concentrated on political evolution, constitutional niceties and inter-imperial co-operation”¹. In the last couple of decades, more historical work has debated and concentrated on decolonisation than Commonwealth-as-organisation specifically. Following Nicholas Mansergh, McIntyre concluded that “the Commonwealth in all of the . . . scholarly end-of-empire debates was given short shrift, even though its existence is one of the more consequential by products of decolonisation”².

¹ All quotes from David McIntyre, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933–59: Precursors of the Tri-Sector Commonwealth’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36.4 (2008), pp. 592–593.

² Ibid., p. 595.

The tentacles of the British Empire had stretched out in varied directions and in varied forms, and the societies, organisations, movements and networks briefly surveyed in Chapter 2 were part of a veritable smorgasbord of connections in the Empire and Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century. Regardless of the extent of their influence, size, strength and their eventual success, organisations such as the Imperial Cricket Conference, the Commonwealth Press Union, the Royal Commonwealth Society, the Commonwealth Institute, Victoria League, Women's Institute, Voluntary Service Overseas; institutions like British businesses in the colonies and the Church of England; popular events and related movements such as the Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965 and the Empire Day Movement/‘Commonwealth Day’; unofficial networks like the UCRCs, the Commonwealth-Bilderberg and overseas students, all represent a form of transnational and non-governmental engagement within the Empire and Commonwealth, operating at a level that was neither direct government involvement nor a purely grassroots public involvement. Even if based in Britain, each had interests in the Empire–Commonwealth and each adapted, adjusted and engaged with decolonisation and the political changes.

Based on Chapters 2, 3 and 4, this dissertation argues that the Imperial Cricket Conference should be viewed alongside these non-governmental entities as part of the vast and diverse landscape of non-governmental decolonising institutions. Such a view embraces simultaneous transnational decolonisation projects and believes that collectively, they offer a richer picture of both the impact of decolonisation and the evolution of the Commonwealth. McIntyre’s assertion that “[o]ne of the unique features of the Commonwealth as an international association is the width and depth of its non-political manifestations”³ supports this thesis.

This chapter will compare the political Commonwealth, the non-governmental Commonwealth and the Imperial Cricket Conference in the mid-twentieth century.

³ Ibid., p. 591.

5.1 'A positive narrative of a family of nations'

As noted in Chapter 2, strong advocates of the Commonwealth often subscribed to a British Commonwealth-as-family discourse in the first half of the twentieth century when it was an exclusive white club. While descriptions of the Empire as a ‘community’ or ‘family of countries’ had made appearances in the 1860s and 1870s, the word ‘Commonwealth’ is usually traced to Lord Rosebery’s usage of the word in 1884 when he attempted to assure an Australian audience of its separate identity within the Empire⁴. For admirers of the British Commonwealth like Duncan Hall, who felt passionately about the ‘Britishness’ and Crown connection of this club, their mutual relationship went beyond legalities and drew real strength from “kinship”⁵. In the continuing absence of precise definitions of the British Commonwealth, the recorder of the 1945 UCRC couched its description in the usual phrases: of unifying bonds being more “enduring” and “intangible” than those of mere mutual advantage, of “fundamental moral purposes and appreciation of spiritual values”, of a connection with each other “by forces which were absent from their relationships with other states”⁶. Writing in the mid-1940s, Duncan Hall beamed that “[this] phenomenon was unique since this family is the sole example of its kind on the planet”. While “the basic factors of kinship, psychological bonds and common interests have remained relatively constant”, several legal and constitutional changes had transformed the Empire from “from a single state into a family group of states”⁷.

After WWII, within the political Commonwealth, behind the façade of unity, disagreements abounded on inclusion of newer members, smaller states, the rapidly-changing nature of the Commonwealth and disputes between Commonwealth members. Nevertheless, the familiar rhetoric of ‘family ties’ was maintained during the mid-twentieth century as demonstrated by confident proclamations about the ability of the Empire–Commonwealth to

⁴ Anita Inder Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-49’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 20.3 (July 1985), p. 469; David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946-97: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?* Palgrave Macmillan (1998), pp. 16-18; S.R. Mehrotra, ‘On the use of the term ‘commonwealth’’, *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol 2.1 (1963), p. 3.

⁵ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23 (1944-45), p. 599.

⁶ David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 605. Or what Andrew Ladley described as the form vs fluff debate. See Professor Andrew Ladley, review of *The Britannic Vision – Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* by David McIntyre (review no. 1059). Available at: <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1059> (last accessed: 16/09/2013).

⁷ All quotes from H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth as a Great Power’, p. 599.

evolve to absorb and accept new non-white members as equals. Philip Murphy traced the considerable anxiety provoked within British official circles by the need to ensure a united front of the Commonwealth in the event of the death of the British monarch (who was also Head of the Commonwealth), both out of the need for utmost respect to the institution that lay “[a]t the heart of the British state” and sensitivity towards views of Commonwealth members on the issue⁸. Anna Boking-Welch’s research on the Royal Commonwealth Society showed that while central committees of the Royal Commonwealth Society presented a unanimous front in their celebration of the ‘People’s Commonwealth’ (more in Chapter 6), there was quite a bit of disagreement within the Society, in particular bemoaning of what was seen as excessive Britain-blaming and general ingratitude of new states. Notwithstanding the lachrymose elements, the RCS was anxious to present itself as a progressive society espousing the ideals of the modern Commonwealth ‘family’⁹.

Ruth Craggs observed that postcolonial perspectives have been critical of the ‘modern’ Commonwealth both “as an idea and practice” for propagating “a positive narrative of a family of nations, and in doing so, masking historical violence and continuing inequalities”¹⁰. Following Craggs, Anna Boking-Welch argued that such a familial discourse accompanied by the linguistic shift from ‘Empire’ to ‘Commonwealth’ “did not necessarily represent a parallel shift in discourses, practices or ideas about the association of countries that came under the imperial/commonwealth [sic] umbrella”¹¹.

The discourse surrounding cricket proceeded in the same vein. In an article endorsing a tour of Australia and New Zealand in 1948 by then British MP and future Prime Minister Anthony Eden, *The Times* reminded its readers of the large part “family traditions” had played in the British Commonwealth. Likening the Commonwealth to a family, the article explained that just as families were linked by “blood and birth and inclination” as opposed to “legal ties”, the Commonwealth was held together by “common wish” rather than “any

⁸ Philip Murphy, ‘Breaking the Bad News: Plans for the Announcement to the Empire of the Death of Elizabeth II and the Proclamation of Her Successor, 1952–67’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 34.1 (2006), pp. 139–154 (quote on p. 140).

⁹ Anna Boking-Welch, ‘The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire, 1960–1970’, PhD Dissertation, University of York (September 2012), pp. 56–57. Available at: <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3667/> (last accessed: 28/05/2013).

¹⁰ Ruth Craggs, ‘Commonwealth histories and geographies’ in ‘London Debates 2010: How does Europe in the 21st century address the legacy of colonialism?’, p. 1 (Pamphlet published by School of Advanced Study in 2011 following a ‘London Debates’ workshop on the same held on May 13–15, 2010).

¹¹ Boking-Welch, p. 49.

constitutional links". A "sense of community" was generated by "a friendly intercourse, whether between cricket teams or actors or statesmen"¹². A few years later, in 1956, in an article entitled "Strengthening the Tie", *The Times* once again observed of Australia and New Zealand that "The Commonwealth association—and it is nowhere more consciously prized than in those two countries, the farthest from the centre—has been strengthened in the past by royal tours (and, of course, by the more regular exchange of cricket teams)." [sic]¹³ Similarly, H.S. Altham of the MCC informed the ICC gathering in 1953 that the inauguration of the Imperial Memorial Gallery had been attended by all High Commissioners to Britain or their representatives. He added that the Gallery would be a lesson to all visitors on the history and traditions of cricket and would also "prove a convincing token of the unity which binds those [Commonwealth] countries together and of which, in the field of cricket, this Imperial Cricket Conference was itself an expression"¹⁴. In 1959, Chairman Altham reminded the ICC members that "this was a memorable occasion, being the 50th anniversary of the first meeting of the Conference. He felt that these meetings of the Conference had helped to strengthen the fellowship of the Commonwealth, and to promote the welfare of cricket."¹⁵ Brochures promoting matches of Commonwealth XIs in the 1940s and 1950s in India used similar language: "whatever might be the outcome of the matches, there is no doubt that the tour will result in fostering goodwill and cementing the friendly ties between India and the Commonwealth countries". A Bangalore weekly described cricket as "the invisible cord which binds together the Commonwealth countries"¹⁶.

Cricket was evidently recognised as an important informal link between members of the Empire–Commonwealth. Like the political Commonwealth, the Imperial Cricket Conference was often described in and in turn, used, familial and filial metaphors to describe relations in cricket between Commonwealth members. If the Commonwealth was a family, cricket was firmly a family jewel.

During the stand-off between the MCC and the BCCP over the latter's admission to the ICC, John Biggs-Davison in a letter to *The Times* made an entreaty to the MCC to ensure a speedy resolution to the cricket problem for fear of its impact on political relations in the

¹² *The Times*, Saturday, December 18, 1948, p. 5.

¹³ *The Times*, Thursday, May 17, 1956, p. 11.

¹⁴ ICC Minutes: July 21, 1953.

¹⁵ ICC Minutes: July 15, 1959.

¹⁶ Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, Picador (2002), p. 323.

Commonwealth by noting that “[t]hree members of the Commonwealth are involved, and there is no need to add to the misunderstandings between the Republic of India and the Dominion of Pakistan”¹⁷. Expressing his anger, the Vice-President of the BCCP stated, “We get the impression that we are not wanted in the world family of cricket”¹⁸. All of these statements are couched in a language that suggests estrangement of younger offspring from a parent/family rather than a question of fairness and prestige among equals in a truly international-level professional sports body. In 1954, Pakistan was described as “the latest addition to the family of the Imperial Cricket Conference”¹⁹. At the end of the 1954 tour of England by Pakistan, *The Times* fondly observed that the “Indian sub-continent now gives us two friendly foes, each worthy of our best. Having learnt in India to greet one of them with “Jai Hind”, we are happy to greet the victors of yesterday with “Pakistan Zindabad.””²⁰ In 1960, writing about an imminent ICC meeting, Christopher Brasher wrote in *The Observer*, “This week a more domestic parliament, the Imperial Cricket Conference, meets at Lord’s.”²¹, confirming the common perception of cricket (and hence the ICC) as a British and Commonwealth institution. On the South Africa issue, the advice of *The Observer* to the MCC in 1960 could have just as well been given to Britain and the political Commonwealth: “the M.C.C. should not arrange any future tours. either [sic] in South Africa or in this country, until the whole subject has been discussed *with other members of the Commonwealth* at the next meeting of the Imperial Cricket Conference in July.”²² (Emphasis added)

The viewing of cricket as belonging to the Commonwealth ‘family’, made clear in the membership rule in 1926, was never disputed until the question of junior/associate members prompted a revisit. In 1956, even when India, backed by the West Indies and Pakistan, tabled a resolution to change the name of the *Imperial Cricket Conference*, the proposal suggested “*Commonwealth Cricket Conference*” as the new name, as it “would better express the relationship between the countries”. In the same meeting, the BCCI, once again backed by the BCCP and the WICBOC, pressed the voting equality issue further by pointing out that “cricket is essentially a Commonwealth game” which meant that disparity in voting rights

¹⁷ *The Times*, Monday, July 10, 1950, p. 5.

¹⁸ ICC Minutes: June 27-28, 1950.

¹⁹ *The Times*, Monday, May 03, 1954, p. 10.

²⁰ *The Times*, Wednesday, August 18, 1954, p. 7.

²¹ *The Observer*, July 10, 1960, p. 15.

²² *The Observer*, April 10, 1960, p. 16.

“goes against the principle of equality and brotherhood [now enjoyed by most of these ICC members in the political Commonwealth]”²³. The wording of these proposals is significant as the changes in *status quo* were demanded with a view to achieving a more accurate reflection of the purported equal status shared in the political Commonwealth by these ICC members. At no point did any of the ‘new’ Commonwealth members see the conjoint Commonwealth association as a shackle around international cricket²⁴, indicating perhaps that at least in cricket, these members also viewed internationalism purely through a Commonwealth framework. Attempts to include new non-Commonwealth members in the ICC did not start until the mid-1960s and even then, no higher status than Associate membership was envisaged for them at that point. As seen in Chapter 3, even the change in the name of the organisation to ‘International’ cannot be attributed beyond reasonable doubt to a desire to make the game truly international.

Alongside the family trope, further Commonwealth traits were the search for ‘consensus’, a fondness for unwritten rules, informal personalised interaction and common interests (and attachment to the Crown until 1949), all of which constituted the *sine qua non* of the ‘British world’. According to Duncan Hall, “its unbroken historical continuity, the loyalty of its members to each other, their solidarity on vital matters of common concern, the fluidity of their machinery for dealing with such matters, and their abhorrence of constitutional contracts within the family of the Commonwealth” had provided the British Commonwealth with its uniqueness and ability to function as a group²⁵. The vitality of the pre-1949 Commonwealth had “rested primarily on tradition, common interest, and a common political morality”²⁶. In the first UCRC in 1933, the British Commonwealth was defined as “a loose confederation, whose members are mainly bound by ill-defined and elastic conventional understandings, based on a common allegiance”²⁷. Such a romanticised view of unwritten conventions and informality continued for some time in the period under study.

²³ All quotes from ICC minutes: July 20, 1956.

²⁴ My insinuation here is that whereas Commonwealth counterparts of the ICC studied here scrambled to adhere to the new progressive Commonwealth paradigm, the ICC used the Commonwealth rubric to prolong the old mind-set. While the former lot tried to make a seamless transition from old to new in the service of the modern Commonwealth experiment, in the ICC, the clash between old and new was exposed.

²⁵ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, paper presented at ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 47.4 (December 1953), p. 997.

²⁶ Hector Mackenzie, ‘An old dominion and the new commonwealth: Canadian policy on the question of India’s membership, 1947-49’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 27.3 (1999), p. 87.

²⁷ McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, pp. 604-605.

Even after 1949, the RCS found that the “nexus of Commonwealth connections was . . . strongest when these connections occurred organically and without formal instigation”²⁸.

Once again, the ICC was part of this set-up. Russell Holden quoted from the work of the eminent Australian cricket-writer Gideon Haigh that “[f]or many years the ICC operated on the basis that unspoken codes of behaviour, rather than rules and statutes, were deemed [sic] sufficient in overseeing the game. Even as international cricket expanded . . . ‘its management remained as simple as a post-box and filing cabinet at Lord’s’”²⁹. An article in *The Times* in 1960 opined on the ‘throwing’ issue that it was best to keep the matter simple. Agreeing with the advice of the Australia cricketer Keith Miller, the article was of the view that if there was any doubt at all about a bowling action, it ought to be declared as ‘throwing’. “[R]ather than wrangle with words and look for loopholes”, the article advised selectors and governing bodies to reduce decision-making to that one fundamental principle to simplify matters and went on to declare: “*corruptissima republica plurimae leges*”³⁰ [The more corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws (*Tacitus, Annals*)]. The unstructured private club-like regime that governed cricket exchanges (see Chapter 3, footnote 56), and the existence of the notion of a ‘Spirit of Cricket’ (see Chapter 3, footnote 18)—an intangible, unwritten, organic code of ethical and moral conduct thought to be embedded in the game of cricket and expected of all cricketers in spite of its regular descent into hypocrisy—can be seen in the same light. Then and now in cricket, adherence to unwritten rules or codes rooted in an earlier era tends to be equated in many quarters to higher moral ground.

Such descriptions of informal proximity were accompanied by the need to demonstrate a consensual approach. Ritchie Ovendale noted the observation made by a British Cabinet paper in 1950 that “[t]he Commonwealth partnership relied on the principle of tolerance, and any attempt to secure complete identity of view between all its members

²⁸ Boking-Welch, pp. 73-74. See also J.M. Lee, ‘Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status’, *Minerva*, Vol. 44 (2006), p. 20 and Marc Frey, book review of *The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth* by Krishnan Srinivasan, published on H-Soz-u-Kult for H-Net Reviews (January 2007). Available at: <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=21436> (last accessed: 27/07/2013).

²⁹ Russell Holden, ‘International cricket – the hegemony of commerce, the decline of government interest and the end of morality?’ in Dominic Malcolm, Jon Gemmell and Nalin Mehta, eds., *The Changing Face of Cricket: From Imperial to Global*, Routledge (2010), p. 215.

³⁰ *The Times*, Saturday, July 09, 1960, p. 7.

would ‘break up the association overnight’³¹. Gwen Carter believed that the earlier British Commonwealth had gained strength to survive internal disagreements from the huge area of common interest shared by the various members. Differences were settled privately. There was close consultation but no binding commitments which facilitated frank discussions but did not limit freedom of action. And yet, the nature of ties meant that members rushed to support each other in times of need³². However, in the newly-styled ‘Commonwealth of Nations’, consensus was rather elusive owing to increasingly open and vocal differences as seen in Chapter 2. ‘Informal’ and ‘private’ talks appear to have been a kind of euphemism for avoidance of direct confrontation and delaying of firm decisions on contentious matters, at least in the early years of the ‘new’ Commonwealth. The push for consensus was often a means to delay decisions. Potentially controversial issues were not discussed. Bilateral or informal talks between leaders or officials on the sidelines of summits and retreats were preferred to open discussions on contentious issues. The family trope was roped in to describe this approach as an intra-‘family’ method of problem-solving. It is possible to discern from Anthony Richmond’s work that this undeclared but almost visceral protocol followed at the earlier Imperial Conferences continued for a while in the post-London Declaration Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings. Potentially explosive issues were sometimes avoided or deferred rather than confronted when two or more members of the Commonwealth were in dispute with each other. India and Pakistan vociferously raised their disputes with each other and with South Africa at the United Nations rather than the Commonwealth initially. Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah tactfully avoided broaching the topic of South Africa’s likely opposition to independent Ghana’s equal status in the Commonwealth³³. Gwen Carter explained that “The Commonwealth functions by disregarding the issues which divide its members”³⁴. James Hamill also noted that pursuit of consensus was cherished as a feature of foremost importance at Commonwealth meetings particularly by British Prime Ministers³⁵. This is also borne out by the various detailed

³¹ Ritchie Ovendale, ‘The South African Policy of the British Labour Government, 1947-51’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 59.1 (Winter 1982-83), p. 54.

³² Gwendolen Carter, ‘Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth’, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 22.4 (1949), p. 367.

³³ Anthony Richmond, ‘The Significance of Multi-Racial Commonwealth’, *Phylon* (1940-1956), Vol. 16.4 (4th Qtr., 1955), p. 386.

³⁴ Gwen Carter, ‘The Expanding Commonwealth’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31 (1956-1957), p. 135. See also Trevor Reese, ‘Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 41.3 (July 1965), pp. 461-462.

³⁵ James Hamill, ‘South Africa and the Commonwealth part one: the years of acrimony’, *Contemporary Review* (July 1995), p. 8. See also, David McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 592: “A series of Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences (UCRC) were held between 1933 and 1959 in an endeavour to work out the practical implications of consensus as reached at the Imperial Conferences and later Prime Ministers’ Meetings”. In an indication of

scholarly expositions of the 1947–1949 negotiations on India, and by accounts of later meetings. This arrangement masked deep differences between members of the ‘new’ Commonwealth in the interest of presenting a united Britain-led Commonwealth front, at least in the early years of the new multi-racial setting. For instance, as evident from the previous chapters, a ‘domestic jurisdiction’/*laissez-faire* doctrine prevailed in the case of South Africa in the political Commonwealth in the early years. The group of older members of the Commonwealth evidently closed ranks when one of them was caught in the international spotlight prompting India and the others to take their grievances to the United Nations.

The Commonwealth charter informs readers that even today, there is no voting mechanism in the Commonwealth and that all decisions are made via consensus³⁶. In the UCRCs, “[w]here there was severe disagreement issues were avoided”³⁷. Writing in 2004, Stuart Mole, then Director-General of the Royal Commonwealth Society and former Director of the Secretary-General’s Office in the Commonwealth Secretariat, used former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s description of CHOGMs in the 1970s as “seminars for statesmen” and spoke of the Commonwealth’s unique ability “to construct consensus on difficult issues, to engage in an atmosphere of open-minded informality”³⁸. Craggs also highlighted the manner in which “[t]he [CHOGM] retreats, and the consensus decision-making mechanism, [were/are] held up as evidence of the unique intimate and informal relations that characterize the Commonwealth”³⁹. Boking-Welch’s research showed that the RCS adhered to a similar policy of bi-partisanship and inclusivity which meant that political action was not only “difficult to coordinate among the different views of its membership” but also went against its ‘neutral approach’ to the Commonwealth⁴⁰.

how consensus-brokering often proved to be an unsatisfactory and tedious method of decision-making, Hamill noted that after its withdrawal from the Commonwealth, “it was hoped . . . [in South Africa that South Africa’s economic relationship with Britain] might even flourish now that Britain would no longer feel the strain of seeking to build an artificial consensus between South Africa and its enemies.” (Hamill, p. 4).

³⁶ See official website: “ . . . Affirming that the Commonwealth way is to seek consensus through consultation and the sharing of experience . . . ” Available at: <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-charter> (last accessed 21/09/2013).

³⁷ McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, op cit., p. 607.

³⁸ Stuart Mole, ‘Seminars for statesmen’: the evolution of the Commonwealth summit’, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 93:376 (2004), p. 534.

³⁹ Working paper: Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, p. 16.

⁴⁰ Boking-Welch, p. 69.

In the ICC, in the period under study, it was found that with the exception of the question of equal votes in 1950 which ended in a unanimous result (see Chapter 3), no contentious matter was ever put to vote. When there was a division of opinion, the matter was always returned to individual cricket boards for further consideration. It is possible (though not explicitly mentioned) that this consideration involved behind-the-scenes bilateral or multilateral consultations. Matters were only put to vote after a final discussion which meant that all matters put to vote were passed “*nem con*”. In the important ICC meeting of 1956 which saw discussion on the prickly issues of equal votes and name-change, Chairman Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis “asked that the delegates should report back to their respective Boards while he in turn would consult the MCC Committee. He suggested that as there was a division of opinion, it was preferable to take no action for the time being”⁴¹. As in the political Commonwealth, the ICC followed a *laissez-faire* policy with regard to South Africa. After the lengthy ICC meeting of 1960 which took place against the tempestuous backdrop of protests in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, the subsequent South African tour of England and the divisive ‘throwing’ issue, the press statement issued by the ICC was at pains to stress the “amicable and happy atmosphere”⁴² in which discussions had taken place with the sub-title of the report in *The Times* announcing “Unanimity At Lord’s”. This was a recurrent theme that year and thereafter⁴³. After South Africa’s exit and the consequent heated debates in 1961, not only did the ICC’s press statement continue in the same vein, but as discussed in the previous chapter, it was also eager to present the South Africa issue in a ‘purely cricket’ and apolitical light: “The Imperial Cricket Conference, at their annual meeting at Lord’s yesterday, discussed the matter for some 90 minutes in a friendly atmosphere . . . Mr. Griffith [Assistant Secretary, MCC] stressed that no one could have doubted its being a gathering of cricketers rather than politicians.”⁴⁴ Again, in 1963, *The Times*, under the title “Unanimous Agreement In Good Spirit”, reported thus on the West

⁴¹ ICC Minutes: July 20, 1956.

⁴² *The Times*, Friday, July 15, 1960, p. 5; *The Guardian*, July 15, 1960, p. 20.

⁴³ *The Times*, Saturday, July 16, 1960, p. 3: “And the Conference, having reached their conclusion in a most amicable spirit, expressed the hope that . . .”; *The Guardian*, July 16, 1960, p. 6: “The Conference therefore having reached a unanimous conclusion in a most amicable spirit hope that . . .”; *The Times*, Wednesday, December 07, 1960, p. 18: “Mr. Aird [Secretary of the MCC] praised the efforts of the delegates who attended the Imperial Cricket Conference in the summer . . . He said a great deal of time had been spent on the throwing issue and in view of the sincerity of all those present, the problem would be eliminated soon.”; *The Guardian*, December 7, 1960, p. 4: “Aird praised the efforts of the delegates who attended the Imperial Cricket Conference in the summer. He said: “The frankness and sincerity of everyone really was most impressive, and I would like to stress the debt which cricket owes to these people . . .””

⁴⁴ *The Times*, Thursday, July 20, 1961, p. 4. Billy Griffith succeeded Ronald ‘Ronnie’ Aird as Secretary of the MCC in 1962.

Indies-prompted changes in the ICC touring schedule: “It was agreed, unanimously, and in a good spirit, that the only way of increasing the frequency of tours was for two countries to visit England in the same season.”⁴⁵ On the same issue, under the sub-heading “Sense and goodwill”, Denys Rowbotham of *The Guardian* opined, “The sense and goodwill with which [the decisions] were reached, and the speed with which they are to be acted upon could not well have been happier or more admirable. Coincidence of interest doubtless helped. The wish of the Commonwealth countries for more frequent visits to England . . . ”⁴⁶

If such saccharine pronouncements came thick and fast, so did perceptive pieces of commentary that exposed them. Alan Ross, cutting through the charade in 1960 in an article under the heading “Conference Leaves So Much Unsaid” and sub-heading “Bland Statement”, thundered, “What, precisely, has the Imperial Cricket Conference, after its two days of polite and amicable deliberation, achieved? On the evidence so far provided, it is impossible to say: what has been disclosed offered little more than the reaffirmation of a number of pious intentions . . . ”⁴⁷ In 1963, he pointed to “a colour line, lurking behind these polite reasons for maintaining preferential treatment for a country [South Africa] now of the second rank in cricket”⁴⁸. Another article in *The Guardian* described ICC meetings as “gentlemanly and comfortable gatherings”⁴⁹.

Interestingly, even strong advocates of the Commonwealth within early-to-mid twentieth century academe such as the imperial sentimentalist Keith Hancock and the more pragmatic Nicholas Mansergh, and—based on Mansergh’s article—statesmen such as Lester Pearson of Canada had caught more than a whiff of these oleaginous tendencies. Mansergh, though defending in 1953 that discussions in Commonwealth summits did not lend themselves to interesting communiqué material and that “official reticence is in the interest of Commonwealth co-operation”, also did not shy away from stating that “the best that can be said about communiqués issued after such meetings is that they never shrink from a restatement of the obvious. The worst that can be said of them has been said by Mr Lester Pearson who, in ironic allusion to the communiqué issued after the Colombo Conference of Foreign Ministers [1950], remarked that ‘if, at the time of Magna Carta, a communiqué had

⁴⁵ *The Times*, Thursday, July 18, 1963, p. 4.

⁴⁶ *The Guardian*, July 18, 1963, p. 10.

⁴⁷ *The Observer*, July 17, 1960, p. 15.

⁴⁸ *The Guardian*, June 29, 1963, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *The Guardian*, July 18, 1961, p. 8.

been issued from Runnymede, it would probably have said: “There has been a full and friendly discussion of feudal rights, and the conference decided to make some recommendations to King John”⁵⁰. According to David McIntyre, Prof (later, Sir) Keith Hancock, the self-confessed Lionel Curtis-type imperialist and thorough British Commonwealth person⁵¹, upon completion of his masterpiece on Commonwealth history (*Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*), “decided that there was ‘too much sweetness and light’ in the oft-incanted teleological sequence from Durham Report to Balfour formula and Statute of Westminster seen as ‘a triumphant procession to the finishing post of self-government’”⁵².

The language used to describe both the Commonwealth and cricket in the mid-twentieth century served at once to highlight the supposed proximity between members and to portray states outside the realm as ‘foreign’. This led to the Commonwealth, including cricket, being couched in a discourse of exceptionalism which stressed differences between a Britain-led Commonwealth and the rest of the world. Such exceptionalism had regularly marked descriptions of England as a superior Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; this was extended to cover the white dominions of ‘British stock’ and also later to cover the ‘new’ Commonwealth during the period of decolonisation, albeit less from a racial angle and more from the view-point of being a family with long historical ties⁵³.

An early example of nuanced distinctions can be seen in J.M. Lee’s research on the treatment of overseas students. In 1940, a committee set up by the Colonial Office in Britain under its Parliamentary Under-Secretary, George Hall, found in favour of a non-resident club for overseas students. Lee wrote that while the report was received well, “official (and implicitly, racial) [sic] distinctions between the Dominions, the colonies, and friendly *foreign* countries were working against the argument for a single ‘international student centre’ in London.”⁵⁴ (Emphasis added) Kathleen Paul noted of the assisted passages between Britain

⁵⁰ Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Commonwealth at the Queen’s Accession Queen’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 29.3 (July, 1953), p. 287.

⁵¹ McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 594.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ The official website of the Commonwealth has a video dedicated to the “Commonwealth Family”. Available at: <http://thecommonwealth.org/media/video/commonwealth-family> (last accessed: 21/09/2013).

⁵⁴ J.M. Lee, ‘Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status’, op cit., pp. 7-8.

and the dominions that “The potential settlement of ‘foreign’ migrants in Australia terrified British policy makers”⁵⁵ with ‘foreign’ here denoting non-British white European immigrants. Hector Mackenzie described that around 1948, “in Ottawa, some [Canadian] officials fretted about the increasing emphasis on ‘Commonwealth citizenship’, especially because Canada’s immigration policies favoured some *foreign* nationals (notably American and French) as prospective immigrants over some Commonwealth citizens”⁵⁶ (emphasis added). Anita Inder Singh’s article, focusing on negotiations held over India in 1947–1949 a few years after the Hall committee, noted that in the eyes of British diplomats and prominent figures, retaining a republican India seemed desirable to ensure an atmosphere of goodwill and friendly ties between India and the Commonwealth so India did not become a “foreign state”⁵⁷. When drawing up contingency plans to present a united Commonwealth face in the event of the death of Queen Elizabeth II, Sir Charles Dixon, constitutional advisor to the Colonial Office in the early 1960s, observed with some relief of South Africa’s departure in 1961 that the event had disposed of the need to negotiate with South Africa “since there is no question of inviting representatives of foreign states”⁵⁸. Obviously, there were racial and geographical tiers within the British Empire and later the modern Commonwealth. Nevertheless, as the group expanded to become multi-racial, at least superficially in the light of anti-communist and Cold War concerns, intra-group distinctions were subordinated to the need to present a strong Commonwealth with Britain at the centre. Approaching their study of the modern Commonwealth from constructivist and feminist viewpoints in international relations, Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz saw the grouping as a deliberate attempt to distinguish a British sphere of influence⁵⁹. From his study of the 1954 Empire and Commonwealth Games, Michael Dawson concluded that British identity in the mid-twentieth century had evolved from contrasting British character with an Indian or African ‘other’ to emphasising friendship and brotherhood based on looking back fondly at a ‘shared Commonwealth experience’, a process that played down the very colonialism and attitudes of

⁵⁵ Kathleen Paul, “‘British Subjects’ and ‘British Stock’: Labour’s Postwar Imperialism”, *Journal of British Studies*, Vol 34.2 (April 1995), p. 268.

⁵⁶ Hector Mackenzie, ‘An old dominion and the new commonwealth: Canadian policy on the question of India’s membership, 1947-49’, op cit., p. 91.

⁵⁷ Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-49’, op cit., p. 477.

⁵⁸ Philip Murphy, ‘Breaking the Bad News...’, op cit., p. 148.

⁵⁹ Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, ‘After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8.2 (June 2002), pp. 267–305.

racial superiority that had earlier served as a rallying point⁶⁰. All this meant that in the early years of the ‘new’ Commonwealth of Nations, the group continued to be ostensibly led by Britain with states falling outside this boundary categorised as ‘foreign’. Which is why, in 1953 at the time of the accession of Queen Elizabeth II, Prof Nicholas Mansergh was able to say, “The nature of the Commonwealth, it goes almost without saying, is not easy to understand. Englishmen would be much disappointed if it were, for the incapacity of *foreigners* to comprehend the working of British institutions is for them a source of unfailing satisfaction.”⁶¹ (Emphasis added) Such a discourse, as Jim English noted of the Empire Day Movement, constituted to varying degrees “righteous celebration of what was generally held to be a set of social facts – the primacy and destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race, the virtuous progression of the British empire, and the common bond of an ‘imagined community’ inhabiting a vast and far flung empire”⁶².

Anglo-Saxon sports were an integral part of the image presented to the world⁶³. Needless to say, exceptionalism via cricket was (and often still is!) a source of pleasure. Richard Holt wrote that “No doubt the robustly ethnocentric British sportsman would have been inclined to agree” that “[t]o foreigners, cricket in particular was a uniquely English and imperial thing quite beyond ordinary understanding”⁶⁴. In 1951, Laurence Meynell’s hagiography on the English cricketer and MCC administrator Sir Pelham ‘Plum’ Warner, named Lord’s Cricket Ground, with its revered slope, as one of the “[o]dd institutions” that Englishmen took “so much for granted”⁶⁵. (Speaking in 2009, former British Prime Minister and cricket enthusiast Sir John Major felt that the “intricacies of both [the Commonwealth and cricket] are difficult to explain, but both continue to thrive”, recounting how the eyes of a former American President and a former Russian President “glazed over” when Major

⁶⁰ Michael Dawson, ‘Acting Global, Thinking Local: ‘Liquid Imperialism’ and the Multiple Meanings of the 1954 British Empire & Commonwealth Games’, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 23.1 (2006), pp. 19-20.

⁶¹ Nicholas Mansergh, op cit., p. 277.

⁶² Jim English, ‘Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 49.1 (2006), p. 249.

⁶³ Richard Holt, *Sport and the British*, Oxford University Press (1989), p. 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 1.

⁶⁵ Laurence Meynell, “Plum” Warner (*Cricketing lives series*), Phoenix House (1951), p. 40. See also p. 46.

attempted to explain cricket to them⁶⁶.) Not only was the ICC a ‘world family of cricket’, but many of its leading lights were also transnational “Commonwealth imports”⁶⁷.

Ironically, references to the multi-racial ‘Commonwealth family’ and to the rest of the world as ‘foreign’ (not least, Europe) not only began to chafe by the late 1960s for various reasons, but also presumably began to look indiscreet as Britain turned towards the same *foreign* Europe! By 1965, “[t]he Commonwealth ha[d] the reputation of being a bit of a bore”⁶⁸. To those who had hoped it would be a surrogate for the Empire, it became a “booword”⁶⁹. In an article thought to have prompted Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to suggest a Commonwealth Secretariat in the 1964 Prime Ministers’ Meeting⁷⁰, John Holmes, President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, urged Commonwealth members to “put some meaning into the phrases about consultation” and warned that “The Commonwealth by its existence created expectations which we must continue to fulfil lest we strangle in our own rhetoric”. Pointing to examples of consultations in the Commonwealth that had facilitated the resolution of several crises triggered by decolonisation, he implored senior members such as Australia, Canada, India and Pakistan to share Britain’s responsibility of ensuring greater understanding among Commonwealth members⁷¹. An article in *The Spectator* traced these developments noting that “Since the sunset of Empire, it has been difficult for the majority to switch over from imperial pride to Commonwealth understanding . . . The glamour of that other international complex, the European Economic Community, has also done its share in reducing the glitter of the more bread-and-butter Commonwealth.”⁷²

From all of the above, it is possible to conclude that governmental and non-governmental networks used language to play out an elaborate performance of

⁶⁶ Full transcript of John Major’s speech: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2376.html> (last accessed on 21/09/2013).

⁶⁷ Phrase used by Lord Home of the Hirsel (Alec Douglas-Home) in his foreword to E.W. Swanton, *Gubby Allen: Man of Cricket*, Hutchinson (1985), p. xi.

⁶⁸ *The Guardian*, April 10, 1965, p. 8.

⁶⁹ J.D.B. Miller quoted in Philip Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 100.414 (2011), p. 271.

⁷⁰ David McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1965’, *International Journal*, Vol 53.4 (Autumn 1998), p. 762.

⁷¹ John W. Holmes, ‘The Commonwealth Faces 1964’, *The Times*, Tuesday, Jan 07, 1964, p. 9.

⁷² Sheldon Williams, ‘Commonwealth Preference’, *The Spectator*, April 22, 1965, p. 14. Available at: <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/23rd-april-1965/14/arts-amusements> (last accessed: 23/09/2013).

Commonwealth rituals. In addition to the tropes of propinquity, consensus, tradition and exceptionalism, there was also stress on the manner of expression. Be it the Chairman of the ICC at the end of the 1956 meeting stating that “he was most impressed by the expressions of opinion of the meeting”⁷³ or the MCC/ICC Secretary Ronald Aird sharing in a press statement that “the frankness and sincerity of everyone was most impressive”⁷⁴ or the Pakistani representatives at the ICC expressing a “fund of goodwill”⁷⁵ towards their South African counterparts in the same breath as their immovable opposition to South Africa’s membership in 1961, premium was placed, at least in the early decades of the ‘modern’ Commonwealth, on a performance through verbal expression, nicety and grace that clashed with the harsh reality behind those words.

These traits gradually took a backseat once the family-vision started to dissipate. As Marc Frey’s review of Krishnan Srinivasan’s 2006 book on the Commonwealth noted, “This symbiotic relation, however, only lasted until the early 1960s, when it became clear to Nehru and other Asian members that racist notions had not vanished completely and that even the last imperial sentimentalists in Britain realized that the Commonwealth was no real substitute to the Empire.”⁷⁶ The purpose of the Commonwealth “faded, as the vision of a family of nations with like-minded values collapsed over the issue of South Africa”⁷⁷. Boking-Welch quoted Marcus Power that the use of gendered and generational metaphors (‘mother-country’; “Now we know that the “Eaglets” who visited us in the past are full grown—and dangerous—birds”⁷⁸; “whatever their creed or color, they are brothers today of a common mother”⁷⁹) along with the multi-racial ‘family’ trope gave “the impression of a voluntary union for mutual good whilst at the same time maintaining the notion of hierarchy and placing white Commonwealth nations at the head of the family.”⁸⁰ Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz concurred that the family metaphor was malleable and able to adapt to political needs. In the colonial era, the metaphor of the European ruler was that of a patriarch charged with the responsibility of protecting and civilising dependent peoples. During the era of

⁷³ ICC Minutes: July 20, 1956.

⁷⁴ *The Times*, Wednesday, December 07, 1960, p. 18; *The Guardian*, December 7, 1960, p. 4.

⁷⁵ ICC Minutes: July 18, 1962.

⁷⁶ Marc Frey, *op cit.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *The Times*, Wednesday, August 18, 1954, p. 7, on Pakistan after Pakistan’s strong showing in its first tour of England as an ICC member.

⁷⁹ Michael Dawson, *op cit.*, pp. 9-10.

⁸⁰ Boking-Welch, p. 115.

decolonisation, the metaphor changed to one of a ‘mother country’ with fully grown and independent children⁸¹. Mark Crinson drew on the work of literary theorist and philosopher Roland Barthes to explain official interpretations of the evolution of the Empire and the Commonwealth. Writing in 1958 about Edward Steichen’s landmark photography exhibition ‘The Family of Man’ held in New York in 1955, Barthes described “the ambiguous myth of human ‘community’”. Crinson applied this myth to the Commonwealth Institute’s representation of a Commonwealth family: first, morphological differences between human beings were emphasised (“the image of Babel”); and then “from this pluralism, a type of unity is magically produced: man is born, works, laughs and dies everywhere in the same way”,⁸².

5.2 ‘Old imperial duchessing’

Closely related to the use of linguistic tropes for the maintenance of influence is the use of hospitality as a key Commonwealth ritual. As the work of Ruth Craggs showed, hospitality is a ubiquitous part of diplomatic life. Through a study of post-war Commonwealth relations, Craggs demonstrated that “the idea of hospitality and its material practice and circulation can become a powerful geopolitical performance and ideological trope”⁸³. Hospitality was an important feature of the ‘modern’ Commonwealth and performance of elite Commonwealth geopolitics. The various entities surveyed above dealt with this Empire–Commonwealth hospitality question in various ways. According to Eliza Riedi, the Victoria League which was given renewed impetus by the Boer War, turned its attention to hospitality and education shortly thereafter. There was a widespread feeling among those involved in imperial affairs that the hospitality offered to British visitors in the colonies was not reciprocated adequately in Britain. Riedi wrote that there were fears that “such negligence might have political consequences in an age of rising colonial

⁸¹ Brysk et al., *op cit.*, p. 274.

⁸² Mark Crinson, ‘Imperial Story-lands: Architecture and Display at the Imperial and Commonwealth Institutes’, *Art History*, Vol. 22.1 (March 1999), p. 120.

⁸³ Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in Geopolitics and the Making of Commonwealth Relations’, *op cit.*, p. 2.

nationalism”⁸⁴. Since there was no possibility of financial help from the British government, “the task of ‘imperial hospitality’ devolved upon the ladies of the Victoria League”⁸⁵. The Victoria League had a Ladies’ Empire Club ostensibly for such social purposes. *The Spectator* urged the formation of a corresponding club for men, arguing that “A club, a first-class club . . . to which all good Colonial clubs should be affiliated” would provide a “genuine social meeting-ground of Englishmen and Colonials” to enable the colonial visitor to see that “behind the stolidity of the average Briton there is a real and Imperial brotherhood”⁸⁶. Nicholas White observed of the imperial–Commonwealth businesses that “frequent dinners and receptions were a feature of ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ society”⁸⁷. David McIntyre described that the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences opened with “some ceremony and wide-ranging key-note speeches” with the 1938 (Australia) and 1959 (New Zealand) delegates welcomed by the respective Prime Ministers, and the message of the Prime Minister in the 1954 UCRC (Pakistan) delivered by the Foreign Minister. The London UCRC, held at Chatham House on the eve of victory in 1945 amidst the rubble, ruins and reminders of WWII, saw some of the “grandest socialising”. Chatham House “managed to lay on some of the old imperial ‘duchessing’” in spite of the “occasional noise of an exploding rocket bomb”. McIntyre discovered that the “delegates had a dinner at Claridges, hosted by Lord Kemsley and addressed by Viscount Cranbourne [sic], the secretary of state for Dominions affairs [sic]. A reception at the Dorchester was hosted by the Dominions Office. Each night there were dinners at Chatham House addressed by British political leaders Oliver Lyttleton, Ernest Bevin, Oliver Stanley, Leo Amery and Richard Law, as well as the Dutch, French and Belgian ambassadors. Towards the end, the delegation leaders were received by the King at Buckingham Palace”⁸⁸. Boking-Welch’s research on the RCS, discussed in Chapter 2, showed that the RCS also attached importance to hospitality and tried to create a comfortable space through its bars, restaurants, lectures and receptions for interaction between visitors from Britain and the multi-racial Commonwealth. Craggs also noted that “it became important for the [RCS] to highlight the multiracial, as well as multinational, character of its membership and events” and “[a]lthough relatively few

⁸⁴ Eliza Riedi, ‘Women, Gender, and the Promotion of Empire: the Victoria League, 1901-1914’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol 45.3 (September 2002), p. 582.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 583.

⁸⁷ Nicholas J. White, ‘The business and the politics of decolonization: the British experience in the twentieth century’, *Economic History Review*, Vol. LIII.3 (2000), p. 545.

⁸⁸ All from McIntyre, ‘UCRCs....’, p. 599.

Africans frequented the Society until the end of the 1950s, their presence was vital in the performance of good Commonwealth relations”⁸⁹.

Could the ICC have been far behind? Going further back to the closing years of the nineteenth century, Lord Harris became President of the MCC upon his return from India in 1895 after his stint as Governor of Bombay. James Bradley found that thereafter, Australia and South Africa were incorporated into the MCC’s scheme of things on an equal footing with the English counties. When first-class touring teams from the Empire, in keeping with the long-time custom were invited to dinner at Lord’s, “special guests were now invited, often the Colonial Secretary or someone with imperial interests”⁹⁰. Fast-forward to the peak of decolonisation and Boking-Welch, in her research, came across records of the “1969 Annual General Meeting of the Cambridgeshire branch [of the RCS which] revealed that so much had been spent on a party for the visiting Australian cricket team, in the hope of attracting new members, that it had been impossible to afford much else for the rest of the year.”⁹¹

Cricket, then, was clearly an area of Commonwealth relations in which ‘metropolitan’ politicians, imperial–Commonwealth societies and cricketers intersected in the performance of this elaborate ritual of hospitality and ‘good Commonwealth relations’. Court Circulars in newspaper archives abound with announcements of such events: “British Sportsman’s Club: Luncheon in honour of Indian cricket team, Major-General the Earl of Athlone presiding, Savoy Hotel, 1”⁹²; “Overseas League: Reception to welcome the Indian cricket team, 6-7.30”⁹³; “London Mosque: Reception to the Indian Cricket Team, 63, Melrose Road, 4.30”⁹⁴; “East India Association: Reception to meet the Indian cricket team, Imperial Institute, 4.30”⁹⁵; an Institute of Journalists luncheon for visiting Australian cricket team⁹⁶; the England and Australia teams and members of the ICC presented to the King and Queen at

⁸⁹ Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, op cit., p. 11.

⁹⁰ James Bradley, ‘The MCC, society and empire: a portrait of cricket’s ruling body, 1860–1914’, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol 7.1 (1990), p. 19.

⁹¹ Boking-Welch, pp. 76-77.

⁹² *The Times*, Wednesday, May 01, 1946, p. 5.

⁹³ *The Times*, Thursday, May 02, 1946, p. 5.

⁹⁴ *The Times*, Saturday, May 11, 1946, p. 5.

⁹⁵ *The Times*, Wednesday, June 19, 1946, p. 5.

⁹⁶ *The Times*, Wednesday, April 21, 1948, p. 5.

Lord's during the 1948 Ashes⁹⁷; "Lord Home, Minister for Commonwealth Relations [and future Prime Minister of Britain], entertains the Australian cricket tourists at luncheon at Dorneywood, Buckinghamshire."⁹⁸; Joint Empire Societies (Royal Empire Society, Victoria League, Overseas League, Dominions Fellowships Trust) luncheon for visiting New Zealand cricketers at Victoria League House, Chesham Place⁹⁹. A Court Circular in 1961 announced that "The Joint Commonwealth Societies held a reception last evening at Victoria League House, Chesham Place, S.W., for the members of the Australian cricket test team. The guests were received by Earl de la Warr (chairman, Joint Commonwealth Societies Conference). Those present included: Sir Cuthbert Ackroyd (chairman, Victoria League), Sir Angus Gillan (chairman, Royal Overseas League), Sir John Hobbs, Mr. B.A. Barnett (Australia), Mr. S.C. Griffith (assistant secretary, MCC), Mr. J. Langridge, Mr. R.W.V. Robbins [sic], Mr. H. Sutcliffe, Mr. E.W. Swanton, and cricketers from English counties."¹⁰⁰ Such gestures in England were reciprocated by other members as evidenced by the minutes of the 1964 ICC meeting which read: "Chair [Gubby Allen] thanked [His Highness] Maharaj Gaekwad of Baroda and M.A. Chidambaram [ICC representatives of India] for their generous hospitality at the party they had given the previous evening to the representatives attending this Conference and others."¹⁰¹ E.W. Swanton's biography of Gubby Allen reveals that Allen and his companions benefited from Chidambaram's hospitality in the form of a luncheon in Bombay when they stopped there *en route* to Australia in the winter of 1962-63¹⁰². Hospitality was also considered the high-point of any cricket tour to South Africa (open, of course, only to all-white teams). Colin Cowdrey reportedly described a South African tour as a "safari by Rolls Royce" with "overwhelming hospitality"¹⁰³. Hospitality also played an important role in elevation to test status in some cases, as demonstrated by Sri Lanka's rise from an Associate Member in 1965 to full test-status in 1981. Michael Roberts traced how a combination of international cricket scandals, suspected racism, internal power struggles within the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka (hereafter, BCCSL) and ethnic tension constantly thwarted Sri Lanka's efforts to achieve Test status. Resolving to address this once and for all in 1981, the new BCCSL President Gamini Dissanayake launched a charm

⁹⁷ *The Times*, Tuesday, July 20, 1948, p. 4: "They had tea in the committee room, and members of the Imperial Cricket Conference were presented to them."

⁹⁸ *The Times*, Saturday, July 21, 1956, p. 7.

⁹⁹ *The Times*, Wednesday, April 30, 1958, p. 12.

¹⁰⁰ *The Times*, Wednesday, April 26, 1961, p. 16.

¹⁰¹ ICC Minutes: July 18, 1964.

¹⁰² E.W. Swanton, *op cit.*, p. 280.

¹⁰³ Bruce Murray & Christopher Merrett, *Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket*, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press (2004), p. 59.

offensive. Helpfully, he was extremely well-connected, held political positions and oversaw massive development projects. Roberts wrote that “With the help of a leading Sri Lankan firm, Maharajas, as well as a British company involved in the [Mahaweli Development Board] projects, namely Balfour Beatty, he arranged for a number of impressive functions in London at which ICC and MCC officials were treated royally. Moreover . . . Dissanayake had the social cachet to articulate a strong case when the ICC officials assembled in late July 1981.”¹⁰⁴ Sri Lanka went on to secure Test status in a unanimous vote of the ICC delegates on July 22, 1981. Roberts added further that Joe Solomon, manager of the West Indian squad that toured Sri Lanka in 1979, “was not only impressed by the level of cricket, but also captivated by the conventional forms of homely Sri Lankan hospitality marshalled by the Sri Lankan officials”¹⁰⁵. The corresponding footnote in Roberts’s chapter is also worth reproduction: “At a relaxed gathering for dinner at Bandula de Silva’s home, Solomon noted that he had never experienced such a moment during their extended stay in India (personal communication from Bandula de Silva)” [sic]¹⁰⁶.

Craggs succinctly summed up the argument implied here that “[t]hese examples should be understood as part of a wider suite of sites and performances of Commonwealth hospitality, from tea parties in private homes for Commonwealth students in London, to student hostels, royal tours, youth expeditions and exchanges taking place in this period”¹⁰⁷. Taken together, the linguistic tools discussed in the previous section and hospitality discussed here highlights “the formal, staged and visible performances and the informal practices of hospitality through which the geopolitics of Commonwealth relations were made and maintained”¹⁰⁸ at all levels in the Commonwealth. Craggs added further that “these hospitable occasions are more often mundane, if well provisioned, events at which to underline status and demonstrate connections”¹⁰⁹. They also create an “image of the guests conversing together work[ing] to present a vision of the Commonwealth as polite, welcoming and friendly”¹¹⁰, in spite of irreconcilable differences expressed in private and public. These

¹⁰⁴ Michael Roberts, ‘Landmarks and Threads in the Cricketing Universe of Sri Lanka’, in Jon Gemmell & Boria Majumdar, eds., *Cricket, race and the 2007 World Cup*, Routledge (2008), p. 122. As Roberts noted though, this “devious groundwork” laid to secure Test status must not overshadow achievements of successive Sri Lankan cricket teams in its run-up.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 129 (footnote 51).

¹⁰⁷ Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, p. 10.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

gestures could, therefore, indicate genuine or superficial friendliness, intimacy, familiarity; regardless, “these public displays of welcome, and small, informal, gestures of conviviality [were] important in the construction, negotiation and contestation of geopolitical relations”¹¹¹.

Location was equally important to these ‘performances’. London was the imperial centre and hence in the thick of political, military and economic networks within the Empire. Although they had interests spread over the Empire–Commonwealth, the various imperial–Commonwealth entities discussed at the beginning of this chapter were either run out of or headquartered in London. London was portrayed as a grand cosmopolitan welcoming city that acted as host and epicentre of the Commonwealth.

The ICC was no different. It may be argued that ICC meetings were to the ICC what the Prime Ministers’ Meetings were to the Commonwealth. As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1955 (Pakistan) and in 1958 (India, though withdrawn), suggestions were made towards decentralisation of ICC meetings through a rotation of venues. Pakistan offered itself as a host in 1955. India, after presumably having entered this topic on the agenda for the meeting, withdrew it during the 1958 meeting, conceding Lord’s as the appropriate headquarters in view of its historical status¹¹². In any case, such attempts never really gained strength. The unrelenting proselytisation of Lord’s as the ‘home’ and guardian of cricket, its laws and ‘Spirit’, and the unquestioned deference to its history meant that Lord’s, and hence London, remained the headquarters of the ICC and played a vital ceremonial and political role in its scheme of things.

This fits in well with what Ruth Craggs also observed of London and the political Commonwealth. “Imperial visions of the city produced practices of hospitality and welcome through which the idea of the ‘mother country’ could be sustained.”¹¹³ Equally, hosting of important gatherings is a significant function. According to Craggs, “[h]osting a summit provides chairing rights but also many informal opportunities to direct the discussion, and

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 25.

¹¹² Whether this withdrawal was in lieu of the perceived ‘climb-down’ by England, Australia and South Africa on the voting issue in 1958 is something about which one can only speculate in the absence of more evidence.

¹¹³ Ruth Craggs, ‘The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival: Architecture, Performance and Multiculturalism in Late-Imperial London’, *The London Journal*, Vol. 36.3 (Nov 2011), p. 263.

leisure opportunities, of guests . . . Hosting international conferences allows not only individual politicians, but also countries and cities to perform their own identities to a global public.”¹¹⁴

Thus, the political geography of the ICC and the Commonwealth conveys much information of interest to the historian. Interestingly, while power in cricket remained centred in London for a very long time, the political Commonwealth moved quicker through the creation of new Commonwealth machinery and CHOGMs. Stuart Mole was of the opinion that “It was not size which proved decisive in moving on from the intimate gatherings in Downing Street but a growing feeling that an association of equal nations must be free to meet, at least theoretically, in any part of its domain.”¹¹⁵ The specially-convened Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in Lagos in 1966 was the first to be held outside Britain¹¹⁶. This set in motion a pattern of rotating the CHOGM between the five regions of the Commonwealth, a practice that has since become entrenched in Commonwealth governance. Mole quoted former Commonwealth Secretary-General, Sir Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal that “Nothing would more effectively project the modern Commonwealth as an association of equals than these high-profile gatherings in urban centres across the world. The old Anglocentric Commonwealth had passed into history, replaced by an association with as many centres as peoples.”¹¹⁷ The UCRCs had already begun such a rotation and moved between Canada (1933), Australia (1938), the UK (1945), Canada (1949), Pakistan (1954) and New Zealand (1959)¹¹⁸. The 1961 conference of the Commonwealth Press Union was hosted by India and Pakistan and a follow-up event in 1965 was held in the West Indies. Remarkably, in the 1961 conference held away from Britain and the white dominions for the first time, the CPU acknowledged the complex and multi-racial nature of the Commonwealth and the Anglo-centric nature of some notions previously taken for granted¹¹⁹. It had originally been hoped that the Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965 would be held outside Britain. Director-General Ian Hunter explained that “we wanted it to grow out of the Commonwealth rather than to be imposed upon it”. In the end, after discussions with eminent

¹¹⁴ Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, op cit., p. 24.

¹¹⁵ Mole, p. 535.

¹¹⁶ Britain, in any case, would have been an unpopular choice among Afro-Asian members at this point because of the Rhodesian crisis.

¹¹⁷ Stuart Mole, “Seminars for statesmen...”, op cit., p. 536.

¹¹⁸ McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 597.

¹¹⁹ Denis Cryle, ‘The Press Union at the End of Empire: Anglo-Australian Perspectives, 1946–1965’, *Journalism*, Vol. 12.8 (2011), p. 1009 & pp. 1013-1014.

personalities from the Commonwealth such as Vincent Massey, Indira Gandhi and Robert Menzies, Britain emerged as the venue of choice for practical reasons¹²⁰. *The Spectator* speculated that “The next Commonwealth Arts Festival will be based somewhere else – possibly India.”¹²¹ Not only did the Empire Press Union change its name to Commonwealth Press Union as early as 1950, but there was also according to Denis Cryle, “some evidence that the hierarchical nature of the Press Union itself, traditionally dominated by Britain and its press dynasties, diminished, as its regular conferences and forums became less grandiose, and the changing rhetoric of the Commonwealth shifted diplomacy away from London and the centre of empire towards the periphery, where distant centres like Australia and India assumed renewed importance”¹²².

Evidently, this was not the case in the ICC. It was only in January 1991 that an ICC meeting was held away from England for the first time (in Melbourne)¹²³. However, though rooted in London, the ICC was impacted greatly by developments in the West Indies (felling of the white minority hold over captaincy; the federation and its collapse), South Asia (partition; government policies towards South African cricket) and South Africa (apartheid). Lord’s in London was forced to acknowledge and respond to changes in all of these nodal points in the Empire–Commonwealth. More confusingly for London in general, on the one hand, official hospitality and the idea of a ‘People’s Commonwealth’ were observed as an elaborate ritual and yet on the other hand, the vision of welcome jarred with the increasingly hostile discourse around immigration from the ‘new’ Commonwealth.

5.3 ‘The Mother Country had always held out for decent values’

¹²⁰ Ian Hunter, ‘The Commonwealth Arts Festival’, *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, Vol. 113, No. 5108 (July 1965), p. 607.

¹²¹ Sheldon Williams, ‘Commonwealth Preference’, *The Spectator*, April 22, 1965, p. 14. Available at: <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/23rd-april-1965/14/arts-amusements> (last accessed: 23/09/2013).

¹²² Denis Cryle, op cit., p. 1005.

¹²³ See ICC website: <http://www.icc-cricket.com/about/62/icc-organisation/history> (last accessed: 08/08/2013).

Much of the feeling of moral superiority within England and belief in its imperial ‘responsibility’ stemmed from values attached to English institutions, not least among them being the notion of ‘fair play’. ‘Fair play’ was venerated as an organically English quality and nowhere was (is!) it stressed as much as in discourses surrounding cricket (see previous references to the ‘Spirit of Cricket’).

It is evident from the above sections and discussions in the previous chapters that even though upheld as a pillar of cricket, ‘fair play’ did not exist in the ICC. And yet, so ingrained was this notion of ‘fair play’ and its association with English cricket that non-white ICC representatives, cricketers and even oppressed peoples in the Commonwealth internalised and reproduced this association. This made for an interesting discourse littered with phrases related to ‘fair play’ wherein decisions of the MCC were disputed by members of this group via appeals to the MCC’s unquestioned and unquestionable sense of fair play. A quick example from the Bodyline Ashes series illuminates the indubitable position of England’s ‘fair play’. During that 1932-33 England tour of Australia, the Australian Board’s cable to the MCC with a strong complaint about England’s “unsportsmanlike” behaviour worried England captain Douglas Jardine who dreaded the MCC’s response. Gubby Allen, his team-mate, assured him that “on the contrary, by using the word ‘unsportsmanlike’, the [Australian] Board had played into his hands . . . The MCC would never stand for English sportsmanship being called into question”¹²⁴. As revealed in Michael Dawson’s study of attitudes towards the 1954 Empire and Commonwealth Games, as far away from the world of cricket as Canada, columnist Harold Weir of *The Vancouver Sun* also saw ‘sportsmanship’ (fair play) as a racial trait when he informed his readers that “the conception of sportsmanship [fair play] as a way of life is peculiarly a British conception and one of those many priceless gifts the Empire has given to the world”, adding that “If the British Empire had contributed nothing to the world but this doctrine . . . it would still have retained a benefactor’s place in history” and that the ‘doctrine of sportsmanship’ was “a vital thing because it’s the inner secret of the British Empire, the ability to give as well as take, the will to serve as well as the will to rule”. Weir concluded that it was British sportsmanship that had led to the grant of independence to several colonies of the Empire¹²⁵. Dawson noted that there

¹²⁴ Swanton, p. 128.

¹²⁵ Michael Dawson, pp. 8-9. Some, like Jack Scott of *The Vancouver Sun*, provided the dissenting voice and asked “British Empire Games? What British Empire? The British Empire of the old school tie and the persecution of minorities?” (pp. 11-12).

were some marginalised voices of dissent in the Canadian press but in 1954, like Weir, the predominant official emphasis was also on the imperial connection and family rhetoric.

In his foreword to André Odendaal's *magnum opus* on black South African cricket, Nelson Mandela wrote, "In *Long Walk to Freedom* I recalled the values we were taught as pupils at Healdtown College in the late 1930s. The educated Englishman was our model; what we aspired to be were 'black Englishmen', as we were sometimes derisively called. We were taught—and believe—that the best ideas were English ones. In line with these ideas, sport, particularly cricket, was given high priority."¹²⁶

Such association of 'fair play' with English cricket and England, the imperial ruler (and therein lay the clash), by non-white peoples of the Commonwealth was widespread. After the Krom Hendricks episode in 1894 (see Chapter 4, footnote 69), there was some disbelief "that such treatment was practised in what is a British colony, to British subjects of a respectable standing, who through a fault, or otherwise, of Nature's design, are black"¹²⁷. Odendaal highlighted the work of the sport historian Prof Charles Korr, who, in studying cricket taken up by Robben Island prisoners in South Africa, dissected well the contradiction that lay therein: on the one hand, these revolutionaries were committed to an armed and highly ideological struggle based heavily on anti-colonialist discourses and on the other hand, they assiduously followed the "conservative" language of sport including phrases such as 'fair play'¹²⁸. Peter Oborne's book on Basil D'Oliveira reveals a similar absorption of values. He noted Basil D'Oliveira's father, Lewis D'Oliveira's instructions to his son: "One thing you must never forget is that cricket is a gentleman's game and you must always keep your togs spotless"¹²⁹. Furthermore, "An immaculate appearance was not the only requirement. Another was fair play. Players in the black leagues always walked before being given out."¹³⁰

Odendaal's reference to the work of international anti-apartheid activists Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon is worth reproduction here: "[Archer and Bouillon] whose 1982

¹²⁶ André Odendaal, *The Story of an African Game: Black Cricketers and the Unmasking of One of Cricket's Greatest Myths, South Africa, 1850-2003*, David Philip (2003), p. 5.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 323.

¹²⁹ Peter Oborne, *Basil D'Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy, the Untold Story* (Sphere, 2005), p. 32.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 33.

book on sport and racism was for years a standard work, saw . . . statistics as indicating that the black middle class elite followed white society in ascribing class attributes to sporting activity. “This surprisingly marked preference for cricket is a clear sign of this, for as we have seen cricket was explicitly a ‘gentleman’s game’ with gentlemanly values”. At that stage, they pointed out, sport still “expressed the values of a novel and attractive way of life, which (until the 1940s) held out hopes of assimilation and progress”¹³¹. It was hoped that imperialism would lead to ‘civilisation’, ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ which would be shared by all. Middle-class Africans were closely involved in the administration of cricket and rugby. Club names such as Duke of Wellington and Eccentrics openly displayed the link with the British Empire¹³². Odendaal added that the names ‘Bantu Springboks’ and ‘Coloured Springboks’ as well as their choice of colours and badges in both rugby and cricket proved that black sportspeople were both imitating and aspiring to the Test status enjoyed by white Springbok teams¹³³.

Peter Oborne surmised from such instances that non-white players in South Africa were aware of the unjust and discriminatory nature of the society in which they lived and in response—perhaps, as an escape—they attempted to create a world of fair play on the cricket field. They linked cricket and ‘fair play’ to Lord’s Cricket Ground and the British Empire. Oborne added that “The immediate circumstances under which they lived were arbitrary, brutal and illegal. It was important for the victims to believe that something better existed and many of them found the answer in cricket.”¹³⁴ In the light of the discussions on double-standards and mendacity in cricket in Chapters 3 and 4, and in the above sections, these sentiments appear doubly poignant, not least the immediate sense of betrayal felt by non-white South Africans and captured in the thoughts of a South African of Indian descent, Iqbal Meer, upon hearing about Basil D’Oliveira’s initial exclusion from England’s 1968 touring party to South Africa (see Chapter 4, footnote 94): “We had thought that the Mother Country had always held out for decent values.”¹³⁵

¹³¹ Odendaal, op cit., p. 99.

¹³² Jon Gemmell, ‘South African Cricket: ‘The Rainbow Nation Must Have a Rainbow Team’ in Jon Gemmell & Boria Majumdar, eds., *Cricket, Race and the 2007 World Cup*, op cit., p. 47; Hilary McD Beckles, *The development of West Indies cricket Vol.1: The Age of Nationalism*, Pluto (1998), p. 148.

¹³³ Odendaal, p. 106.

¹³⁴ Oborne, op cit., p. 33.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 218-219.

Pakistan's initial approach to cricket as a newly-independent state also appealed to the MCC's sense of 'fair play'. At the height of the Pakistan admission crisis, during its tour of India in 1951-52, the MCC team played five first-class matches in Pakistan in November 1951. Pakistan performed well but the tour was not without incidents and it appears from some reports that question-marks were sought to be raised in the English press over Pakistan's umpiring standards and 'fair play'. Fearing further delay in Pakistan's admission, the captain, former Oxford blue Abdul Kardar, strongly defended Pakistani cricket with a detailed first-hand account of the controversial moments in an impassioned letter to the editor of the *The Times* in 1952. In establishing his credentials, Kardar said, "Sir, I learnt my cricket in England, where fair play is an essential factor in the make-up of a first-class cricketer."¹³⁶ It is extremely interesting that Kardar sought to establish the impeccability of his integrity by highlighting his cricketing nurture in England. It is difficult to judge from the words alone whether this was a shrewd move by Kardar or indicative of his own belief in England and the MCC's sense of fair play. In the following years, as seen in Chapter 4, Pakistan would often be pitted against the MCC and would go on to spearhead causes dear to the 'new' Commonwealth in the ICC.

New Zealand, the only white-majority 'old' Commonwealth member of the ICC to be placed in a lower tier and disadvantaged by the old voting and scheduling system enforced by the founding trio, nevertheless expressed confidence in the 'fair play' of *all three 'foundation members'*. Speaking out against the West Indies-proposed changes to the voting system in 1953, Arthur Sims professed that 'he had great regard for the rights of the foundation members of the Conference and his long experience had been that these members had always taken a broad outlook on the affairs of the Conference and the interests of the other members and for that reason he was not in favour of any alteration of Rule 8 [voting rights which privileged the trio]'¹³⁷. Defending *status quo* once again in 1956, Arthur Sims declared that "In 30 years' experience he could not remember an occasion when any difference of station was felt due to the conditions of Rule 8". That the NZCC was loyally committed to a regime in the ICC that discriminated against it is a striking observation.

¹³⁶ *The Times*, Wednesday, Feb 13, 1952, p. 8.

¹³⁷ ICC Minutes: July 21, 1953.

In his foreword to a book on West Indian cricket culture, the West Indian cricket legend Sir Vivian Richards—himself no stranger to the importance of the cricket field to postcolonial discourse—described fair play as a principle “deeply rooted within cricket values” which “must be fought for and defended at all times”¹³⁸. From an early West Indies perspective, C.L.R. James’s own words on the MCC are revealing: “Here is a private club which runs big cricket on a truly international scale. No theory of democracy can overcome the fact that Australia, South Africa, the West Indies, New Zealand, India and Pakistan, cricketers the world over, give their ungrudging allegiance to MCC. Furthermore, as a general rule, I am always in favour of public affairs being carried on by organisations of citizens who are not in any way connected with the government (except to get some money out of them every now and then)”¹³⁹ and “For the rest, the membership of a private club which is exercising a public function is always likely to cause dissatisfaction. I pay little attention to it . . . ”¹⁴⁰ And even though Chapter 4 (footnote 107) quoted his dissection of the dominant imperial code which encouraged repression of anger at racial prejudice, James followed those words up with the disclaimer, “I do not bring prejudice to any of the charges. In the campaign I am carrying on against [Gerry] Alexander [who had been appointed] instead of Worrell as captain I shall exhaust every argument before I touch the racial aspect of it”¹⁴¹, thereby unconsciously adhering to the code. Evidently, in this intersecting work on politics and cricket in the West Indies, while the oppressor (imperial ruler England) and its agents (whites dominating West Indian cricket) had been identified, not all of the oppressor’s cultural influences (cricket) and their enforcers (MCC) and values (selective use of ‘fair play’) were rejected. In the eyes of C.L.R. James, then, “[c]learing their way with bat and ball, West Indians at that moment had made a public entry into the comity of nations. Thomas Arnold, Thomas Hughes and the Old Master himself [W.G. Grace] would have recognised Frank Worrell as their boy.”¹⁴² On-field performances in cricket expressed nationalism and political maturity, although some would argue on the terms of the imperial ruler¹⁴³. As noted

¹³⁸ Foreword by Viv Richards in Hilary McD Beckles & Brian Stoddart, eds., *Liberation Cricket: West Indies Cricket Culture*, Manchester University Press (1995), p. vii.

¹³⁹ C.L.R. James, *Beyond A Boundary*, Stanley Paul & Co. (1963), p. 244.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 247.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 261.

¹⁴³ This debate on cultural diffusion of sport, its acceptance, rejection, appropriation, resistance and accommodation throughout the British Empire is an extremely complex area of research, the detailed exploration of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. There is a huge body of research providing viewpoints on the evolution of games and sports in various parts of the British Empire. Apart from the themes mentioned at the start of Chapter 1, see for instance work on the writings of C.L.R. James himself, on Irish

in Chapter 3, the West Indies' representatives at the ICC also presented cases for equal voting rights and touring privileges on the basis of merit, i.e., strong on-field performances¹⁴⁴. This perhaps betrays a belief in the MCC's (and England's) ability to 'play fair' and reward these performances with the deserved raise in status.

John Hughson provided a more nuanced reading of James's *Beyond a Boundary*. Hughson's work unpicked the making of sporting cultures in colonial contexts, i.e., how sporting cultures were made by agents of imperialism and how they were received and 're-made' by colonised peoples. Maintaining that cricket was not merely compliantly consumed by local inhabitants in the Empire, Hughson drew on the works of sport historian Brian Stoddart and the late social critic Tim Hector to apply a Gramscian framework of 'cultural hegemony' to the introduction of cricket in British West Indies by the colonisers from above (cultural imperialism) and consequent challenges through cricket by non-white West Indians to the racial hierarchies and social relations from below (fertilisation of active resistance leading to "a crisis of hegemony")¹⁴⁵. However, the concept of active resistance in the Gramscian model would have required a "cultural uprooting"¹⁴⁶, a rejection, of cricket in a way that would have been unacceptable to C.L.R James. He was a product of the West Indian version of the English public school system. Hughson agreed that "although recognizing the ideological use of cricket by the British, James never rejected its moral code"¹⁴⁷. All that James (and Learie Constantine and Frank Worrell) achieved politically, he "achieved within the 'code' of the game, not in contravention of it"¹⁴⁸. Hughson acknowledged that it was this attitude that has led to James "being accused of writing from the perspective of an English colonial rather than from that of a West Indian of African descent"¹⁴⁹. Furthermore, James made a distinction between the role of cricket in challenging racial oppression and social relations on the one hand, and apolitical performative ("drama") and imaginative ("form" or

cricket, the defeat of the East Yorkshire regiment by the Indian football club Mohun Bagan in 1911, New Zealand and rugby, etc.

¹⁴⁴ ICC Minutes: July 20, 1956: "Mr R.K. Nunes (West Indies) emphasised the difficulty of achieving the status of seniority without first presenting a good case. He anticipated that opposition to the proposal might be raised by the countries which were the original members of the Conference. He felt however that in the case of the West Indies who had now reached their majority, their achievements in the past 8 years justified a claim being made for equal status to Australia, South Africa and England."

¹⁴⁵ John Hughson, *The Making of Sporting Cultures*, Routledge (2009), pp. 72-73.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

“style”) aesthetic aspects of cricket on the other. And yet, James posited that the West Indian cricket ‘style’ was informed by social relations¹⁵⁰.

In spite of the contradictions, Hughson maintained that at the core of James’s public school beliefs was his association of cricket with humanistic values. Following Mark Kingwell, Hughson contended that the above criticism of James missed the point that to James, these humanistic values constituted a successful anti-colonial strategy in themselves. Even though such humanistic values were attributed to cricket by the public school and imperialist discourse in England, they were never followed by the colonisers themselves in their attempts to impose cultural imperialism. By contrast, James’s triumph lay in his identification and adherence to “the unfettered humanistic spirit of the game”¹⁵¹ which in his eyes enabled him to “beat the masters at their own game”¹⁵².

A much smaller-scale instance of subversive use of conservative cricket language was Indian Deputy Defence Minister and President of the Delhi Cricket Association S. Majithia’s comment in 1961 on South Africa, ICC membership and apartheid that “[i]t is not cricket to segregate anyone on the basis of colour of skin alone.”¹⁵³ (Emphasis added) So was the shrewd re-use of the family–equality–brotherhood trope otherwise frequently used by Britain in the political Commonwealth to argue for parity in the ICC, an organisation that saw itself as a card-carrying member of the Commonwealth infrastructure: “As cricket is essentially a Commonwealth game and since all cricketing nations are governed by the Imperial Cricket Conference, inequality of status for New Zealand, India, Pakistan and the West Indies, which have only 1 vote each, as against Britain, Australia and South Africa having 2 each, goes against the principle of equality and brotherhood.”¹⁵⁴

Ultimately, the gestures discussed in this chapter so far—linguistic tropes, hospitality and imperial ‘values’—were, as Ruth Craggs argued, “part of a broader familiarity . . . predicated on [real and imagined] shared language, histories, customs, experiences and

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁵³ *The Times*, Friday, Jul 21, 1961, p. 4; *The Guardian*, July 21, 1961, p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ ICC Minutes: July 20, 1956.

outlooks which were the result of the contours of the former empire”¹⁵⁵. These Commonwealth ‘performances’ were “by no means unproblematic; not only [do they] exclude other places and people who do not share this history, but [they are] based on shared traditions and language which are the result of [coercive] imperial relations”¹⁵⁶. As seen in this section, there was a degree of subversion and questioning of these traditions and tropes. Yet, there was also widespread internalisation and regurgitation, at least in the period studied by this dissertation.

5.4 ‘The essential insolubility of a hierarchical body professing a commitment to equality’

If the unacknowledged use of double-standards was rife in both cricket and the political Commonwealth as seen above, so was an overtly imperceptible double-tier structure.

As noted Chapter 2, a two-tier system within the post-war Commonwealth was first discussed in the late 1940s when the issue of republican India arose. In the 1950s, this debate centred on the imminent independence of the Gold Coast (Ghana), its future status and the precedent for the rest of Africa. In the early 1960s, it was Cyprus (also previously Gibraltar) and equal status to small or ‘micro’ states that sparked discussion¹⁵⁷. The intimate pre-war Colonial and Imperial Conferences and Prime Ministers’ Meetings had earned the group the sobriquet of a ‘club’. This club-like feel was threatened with disruption particularly by newly-independent small states and a question frequently asked by traditionalists was “Were all newly independent ex-dependencies clubbable?”¹⁵⁸ Calls for a formal two-tier division did not attain fruition; however, that did not preclude the existence of an informal one with Britain and the white dominions forming a closer relationship than that shared with the newly-independent non-white members.

¹⁵⁵ Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, op cit., p. 23.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

¹⁵⁷ David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946-97: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?*, Palgrave Macmillan (1998), p. 119.

¹⁵⁸ David McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1965’, *International Journal*, Vol 53.4 (Autumn 1998), p. 754.

Nicholas Mansergh, in 1953, documented differing interpretations of changes within the Commonwealth as a result of the London Declaration of 1949. Peter Fraser, then Prime Minister of New Zealand, in spite of his own reservations attempted to play down differences arising from accommodation of both monarchical and republican members in the new set-up whereas Prof (later, Sir) Kenneth Clinton Wheare, noted Australian scholar of constitutionalism in the British Commonwealth based at Oxford University, opined that the differences would have significant ramifications as there were now two constitutional systems in operation. The latter largely agreed with the observation of Prime Minister Menzies of Australia that “while there is a structural or organic relationship between the monarchical States of the Commonwealth”, the attachment of its republican members was largely for functional reasons¹⁵⁹.

It was oft-noted that historic ties between Britain and the older dominions had resulted in informal and flexible means of working and consultation between Britain and the dominions. Gwen Carter viewed the mutual respect between the members and the practice of sharing of information as the main reasons for the success of the British Commonwealth. A great deal was made of the unwritten and ‘organic’ nature of the bond between Britain and the dominions. The Balfour Report of 1926 which laid down constitutional conventions for the relationship between members of the British Commonwealth appeared to do so grudgingly. Duncan Hall noted that several Commonwealth statesmen saw this as “a misguided attempt . . . to reduce to written terms something which was a matter of the spirit and not of the letter.”¹⁶⁰ The committee that met in Britain on May 31, 1948, to discuss India’s admission to the Commonwealth emphasised that the bonds of the Commonwealth were “intangible and undefinable”¹⁶¹. By contrast, in discussions conducted between 1947 and 1949 on India’s retention in the British Commonwealth, several options were considered that would have involved signing of treaties between Britain and India to guarantee defence and co-operation. Writing in 1985, Anita Inder Singh assessed that this was unusual for an organisation that prided itself on the unwritten and informal nature of its relationships. India (and Pakistan and Ceylon) owed its relationship with the Commonwealth to conquest whereas the older dominions enjoyed “the ‘natural link’ of race, culture, common loyalties

¹⁵⁹ Nicholas Mansergh, *op cit.*, p. 284.

¹⁶⁰ H. Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth: A Symposium’, *op cit.*, p. 1003.

¹⁶¹ McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, *op cit.*, p. 112.

and instincts”, that is, all that *The Economist* said in 1948 “is involved when one people regards another as its own kith and kin”. It was feared that “unless it is put down on paper”, it would be difficult to enforce obligations or conclude any work in a Commonwealth that included the Asian dominions as opposed to the existing arrangement in which “rights and obligations are undefined and are left to the good sense and good feelings of the different Governments”¹⁶². McIntyre wrote that “Frankness [in the ‘old’ Commonwealth] gave way to a certain politeness [in the ‘new’ Commonwealth]”¹⁶³. Hector Mackenzie added that “[n]o statement, however carefully phrased or discreetly qualified” could mask the nested nature of the group, “particularly with respect to the sharing of confidential information”. Mackenzie was clear that in spite of the “obeisance” paid to equality and uniformity in status in the post-1949 Commonwealth of Nations, “bilateral exchanges were still more comprehensive with those Dominions with whom Britain had enjoyed a longer and closer tradition of consultation and co-operation”¹⁶⁴.

Outside the political Commonwealth, early effort of the Victoria League was directed at the white dominions. Riedi wrote that the VL’s “relationship with its colonial ‘sister societies’, the Guild of Loyal Women of South Africa and the Canadian Imperial Order, Daughters of the Empire, demonstrates . . . the primacy of the self-governing dominions in its vision of empire”¹⁶⁵. Boking-Welch noted that the approach of the Women’s Institute (WI) in Britain betrayed a similar attitude towards the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Commonwealth. The WI saw the ‘new’ Commonwealth states as peoples “in need of support and guidance”. By contrast, the ‘old’ Commonwealth was seen as a “source of friendships, ‘Link’ societies, exchanges . . . reciprocal gift giving and social networks of British expatriates and British-descended peoples”. In the WI, “in reality a two-tier conceptualisation of the Commonwealth presided”¹⁶⁶.

Cricket duly followed suit. As seen in Chapter 3, one such divide in the ICC was formed on the basis of tradition and history with England, Australia and South Africa

¹⁶² Singh, op cit., pp. 473-4 (*The Economist*) & 476 (last quote from the British Foreign Office).

¹⁶³ McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation...’, op cit., p. 754.

¹⁶⁴ All quotes from Hector Mackenzie, p. 102. See also McIntyre, ‘Canada and the Creation...’, pp. 754-755 & pp. 758-760.

¹⁶⁵ Eliza Riedi, op cit., p. 569.

¹⁶⁶ All quotes from Boking-Welch, pp. 108-109 (see upto p. 113).

claiming a higher rank over other ‘latecomers’. This resulted in voting and touring privileges. In 1955, *The Guardian* reported the ICC decision that “In future all members of the Imperial Cricket Conference visiting England will play five Test matches in order to bring Edgbaston into the new rota of Test match grounds. This will also bring India, West Indies, New Zealand, and Pakistan into line for the first time with Australia and South Africa.”¹⁶⁷ If this decision felled tiers, albeit for financial reasons, it was lamented from a cricket point of view: “The concern is not for such great matches as those between England, Australia, South Africa, and West Indies. These, by their own right, will never cease to thrill the sporting world . . . the powers that be may have dealt the championship a heavy blow by ruling that in future all members of the Imperial Cricket Conference visiting England will play five-day Test matches. This must have been done largely for financial reasons, and it means that some countries, which would often find it difficult to hold one of the first four places in the [English] county table, now stand in line with Australia. It has, in fact, debased the currency of Test cricket, and removed for good some of the glamour and interest in the championship.”¹⁶⁸ Again, in 1959, after India’s tour of England ended in a comprehensive defeat of India by England, *The Times* hoped that India and England would, in the future, agree to keep test matches between them down to four or even three days each due to their clash being an “inferior series”¹⁶⁹. Defence of cricket ties with South Africa, a member of the top-tier, at the height of anti-apartheid protests were marked by references to the South African cricketers being “pleasant and sportsmanlike visitors”¹⁷⁰ and “long-time friendly opponents”¹⁷¹. Yet again in 1962, *The Times* bemoaned that “It was a bad day . . . when all the countries belonging to the Imperial Cricket Conference were put on a par and allocated five Test matches of five days each.”¹⁷² As in the political Commonwealth, any attempt to formally downgrade or classify members for cricketing reasons was resented by the targeted members, with newspapers carrying reports in 1962 of the BCCI’s opposition to “any move to grade the cricketing nations into A and B classes”. The BCCI President M.A. Chidambaram stated that the BCCI “would speak against any move in this direction at the Imperial Cricket Conference in London”, terming it “unfair” in view of “India’s victory in the

¹⁶⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, November 9, 1955, p. 9.

¹⁶⁸ *The Times*, Monday, May 14, 1956, p. 4.

¹⁶⁹ *The Times*, Tuesday, August 25, 1959, p. 4.

¹⁷⁰ *The Times*, Tuesday, May 10, 1960, p. 7.

¹⁷¹ *The Times*, Thursday, July 20, 1961, p. 13.

¹⁷² *The Times*, Monday, July 09, 1962, p. 4.

series against England earlier this year”¹⁷³. An article in *The Guardian* welcomed the changes of 1964–1965 for removing the privileged position enjoyed by Australia and South Africa in visits to England as “the first rivals of English cricket” over “latecomers, however high the standard of their cricket” and because these changes would “add interest and variety to the summer’s programme”¹⁷⁴.

Such a divide based on history and tradition smoothly merged with divisions based on cricketing strength in the early years when the three founding members were also the three stronger cricket teams. This latter distinction proved untenable once it was obvious that the West Indies had overtaken South Africa and in particular, after South Africa’s exit. A third divide in the ICC took its cue from the racial fault line in the political Commonwealth. This was most obvious during the South Africa discussions and was summed up thus by *The Times*: “This is, to all intents and purposes, a straight political issue between on the one hand England, Australia and New Zealand [and South Africa] and, on the other, West Indies, India, and Pakistan.”¹⁷⁵

Thus, within the political Commonwealth, divides tended to be along the lines of ‘race’ and history (white dominions vs new non-white members), allegiance (monarchist vs republican), size (bigger states vs ‘micro’/small states). Even within these blocs, there were differences complicated by Cold War concerns. Not all divisions were neatly white vs black. Canada’s stance on South Africa has been discussed in Chapter 2. Hector Mackenzie noted that “nebulous statement[s]” could not “resolve the tensions between India and Pakistan, particularly over Kashmir, which had led to an unprecedented war between two members of the Commonwealth”¹⁷⁶. Fred Soward found that officials and leaders in Pakistan were of the view that Commonwealth leaders were rather “dazzled”¹⁷⁷ by Nehru’s personality and India’s size. Hector Mackenzie recorded that privately, leaders of Australia, Ceylon, New Zealand and Pakistan questioned “the real will and intentions of the Government of India to fulfil the unwritten but clearly implied obligations of Commonwealth membership, if India were

¹⁷³ *The Times*, Monday, July 16, 1962, p. 3.

¹⁷⁴ *The Guardian*, February 1, 1964, p. 8.

¹⁷⁵ *The Times*, Thursday, July 19, 1962, p. 3.

¹⁷⁶ Hector Mackenzie, p. 102.

¹⁷⁷ Fred H. Soward, ‘The Commonwealth Countries and World Affairs’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 27.2 (April 1951), p. 194.

admitted to the Commonwealth as a Republic”¹⁷⁸. In the ICC, divides were based on history ('Foundation Members'¹⁷⁹ vs Members), 'race' and politics ('old' vs 'new' Commonwealth) and cricketing might. As discussed in the last section of the previous chapter, the ICC blocs, similarly, were not monolithic or homogenous. Both the political Commonwealth and the ICC retained a club-like atmosphere after WWII. However, the former, despite the efforts of some traditionalists, evolved into a more inclusive organisation. The latter continued to operate as before for the most part in the period under study, headed as it was by a private gentlemen's club.

If such differences were a fact of life within the Commonwealth and the ICC in the era of decolonisation in the mid-twentieth century, so was Britain's position as *primus inter pares*. Nicholas Mansergh believed that by the time of the London Declaration, it had become “otiose” to restate the equality of the statuses of members of the Commonwealth. Equality with one another and with Britain was implied and understood¹⁸⁰. As noted in Chapter 2, equality of status was declared as a feature of the post-1949 Commonwealth. In spite of such a pronouncement, as evidenced by discussions on a common Commonwealth citizenship, assisted passages and need to maintain ‘British stock’ in the dominions, valuing of bilateral relations with Britain over others by each member, discussion of the Everest success, the day-to-day management of Commonwealth affairs by the British Government and Britain's role as elder statesman in Commonwealth affairs, Britain was the centre of the spoked wheel in this period. Other members of the Commonwealth, particularly Anglophone members like Australia, therefore resented Britain's turn towards the EEC and saw it as an act of betrayal

¹⁷⁸ Hector Mackenzie, p. 101; Frank Bongiorno, 'British to the bootstraps?', *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 125 (2005), p. 35; Harshan Kumarasingham, 'The 'New Commonwealth' 1947-49: A New Zealand perspective on India joining the Commonwealth', *The Round Table*, Vol 95, no. 385 (July 2006), pp. 446-447.

¹⁷⁹ In reference to South Africa, the label 'Foundation Member' was also used by Sir Cecil Syers of the Commonwealth Relations Office ("Syers . . . pointed to the danger of doing anything that "would remove a foundation Member of the Commonwealth""") quoted in Ritchie Ovendale, 'The South African Policy of the British Labour Government, 1947-51', *International Affairs*, Vol. 59.1 (Winter 1982-83), p. 52. Sir Robert Menzies, former Prime Minister of Australia, wrote in his memoirs that "South Africa was a foundation member of the British Commonwealth." [Robert Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, Cassell & Company Ltd (1970), p. 283]

¹⁸⁰ Nicholas Mansergh, p. 278.

and abandonment by Britain¹⁸¹. Members of the Commonwealth, particularly the older ones, tended to view their involvement in the Commonwealth largely in terms of their own bilateral relationship with Britain. Britain was the only member which traded with all the other Commonwealth members. In 1961-62, Trevor Lloyd of the University of Toronto pointed out that other members “do not have many specific interests with one another, and the only ground on which they can stand together is maintenance of the *status quo*”¹⁸². Kathleen Paul noted encouragement of this trend particularly by the Attlee administration and wrote that the attorney general, Sir Hartley Shawcross, emphasised Britain’s “special responsibility” as the “historical Motherland” and hoped that Britain would never differentiate between British subjects¹⁸³. Lord High Chancellor Sir William Allen Jowitt (Earl Jowitt) reportedly agreed with Home Secretary James Chuter Ede on the importance of maintaining ‘British subjecthood’ in the entirety of the Commonwealth: “the conception of an all pervading common status, or nationality is not primarily, not mainly, important because of its material advantages. It is if you like, rather mystical. It is the mark of something which differentiates the family from mere friends.”¹⁸⁴ Arguing that “[i]n both cases, the universal subjecthood and common citizenship were designed to maintain subordination within the imperial system and, thus, ironically compromised the very equality that they allegedly heralded”, Paul concluded that “[t]hese contradictions stemmed not just from policy makers’ hypocrisy or short-sightedness, however, but also from the essential insolubility of a hierarchical body professing a commitment to equality”¹⁸⁵. As noted in Chapter 3, this hierarchy was more readily obvious in the ICC. James Bradley noted that historically, sending and receiving of teams was seen by the imperial-minded MCC generation of Lord Harris as an opportunity to reaffirm ties between Britain and the colonies. MCC visits were also seen as providing

¹⁸¹ Trevor Lloyd, ‘The Prime Ministers’ Conference’, *International Journal*, Vol. 17 (1961-1962), p. 426; Trevor Reese, ‘Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth’, op cit., p. 451; David McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg from Down Under’: A New Zealand Perspective’, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39.3 (2001), p. 96.

¹⁸² Trevor Lloyd, ‘The Prime Ministers’ Conference’, p. 426.

¹⁸³ Kathleen Paul, op cit., p. 243.

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in ibid., pp. 242-243.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 250. Trevor Reese and John Holmes also wrote of Britain as the hub of the Commonwealth when they appealed to other senior members to share some of Britain’s responsibilities. At the same time, as Philip Murphy and others have written, Britain was reluctant to include members of the Commonwealth in discussions on Rhodesia [Philip Murphy, ‘By invitation only: Lord Mountbatten, Prince Philip, and the Attempt to Create a Commonwealth ‘Bilderberg Group’, 1964-66’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 33.2 (2005), pp. 245–265]. Murphy also pointed out that in any case the publicly-reiterated idea of ‘equality of status’ in the Commonwealth of Nations was a somewhat paradoxical (if not cynical!) move: in order to maintain an entity that Britain regarded as crucial to its status as a world power, Britain formally gave up the right to lead it (Philip Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, op cit., p. 270).

stimulation to the game in the colonies and setting the standard to which the others aspired¹⁸⁶. The MCC acted as the secretariat of the ICC (incidentally, the British Cabinet Secretary acted as the Secretary-General at imperial and Commonwealth prime ministerial summits until the creation of the Secretariat¹⁸⁷). The MCC was the preferred opponent of other members and can be seen to have ‘spoken for’ the dominions (and colonies until independence) in ICC meetings through proxy representatives. The leadership role assumed by the MCC may have been a reason for the MCC refraining from using its casting vote on South Africa and other divisive issues on which votes were split equally in ICC meetings. As Jon Gemmell observed of similar restraint exercised by the MCC on South Africa in the 1980s in spite of a strong pro-South Africa sentiment within the English cricket establishment, “The answer lies at the essence of all political phenomena: power. It would have jeopardised MCC’s influence within cricket, and Lord’s as the headquarters of the game.”¹⁸⁸ Such instances in the political Commonwealth and the ICC in this period fit in with the distinction made by Duncan Hall between the ‘status’ and ‘stature’ of Britain, in that equality in status was not the same as equality in stature¹⁸⁹. In spite of the proclaimed equality in status in the political Commonwealth, Britain enjoyed a higher stature in the period under study here. In the ICC, the hierarchy was less subtle and there was a desire to fly the British flag as widely as possible while other members constellated around Britain.

5.5 ‘Reforming to conserve’

This chapter has so far traced the substantial congruence between behavioural and attitudinal traits of the Commonwealth and its highlighted subset, the ICC. A final point in support of this argument is a quick discussion of a surprising, if in some places coincidental, congruence in timeline.

¹⁸⁶ James Bradley, *op cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁷ Brysk, et al., *op cit.*, p. 292.

¹⁸⁸ Jon Gemmell, *The Politics of South African Cricket*, Routledge (2004), p. 133.

¹⁸⁹ Discussing the constitutional machinery in the British Commonwealth between 1917 and 1931, it was a passing mention but was an interesting one nevertheless (Duncan Hall, ‘The British Commonwealth of Nations’, *The American Political Science Review*, *op cit.*, p. 1001).

Eliza Riedi noted of the VL that the Boer War “transform[ed] many leading Victoria Leaguers into active imperialists”. The VL gathered momentum immediately after the Boer War in response to the need felt among imperial circles to “Anglicize the former Boer republics and incorporate them as loyal constituents of the British empire”. The early work of the VL, therefore, focused on South Africa and “[i]n part this reflected contemporary imperial priorities, also illustrated by the government-supported campaign to encourage female emigration to South Africa as a means of bolstering British influence”¹⁹⁰. In his PhD dissertation, Alex May, likewise, noted the imperial-South African inspiration behind initiatives related to the Round Table movement. Abe Bailey’s funds played an important role in efforts to unify South Africa and to bring South Africa closer to Britain and the Empire in 1909¹⁹¹. The Empire Press Union was also founded in the same period with its first conference held in 1909. As Chapter 1 pointed out, the ICC, too, could be seen as the result of imperial calculations centred on South Africa and, like the Round Table movement, it was born in 1909 due in large measure to the work of Abe Bailey.

Nationalism in the colonies prompted appeasement via incorporation and co-option, both in the wider Commonwealth and in the ICC. Riedi noted that “like most Edwardian imperial pressure groups, the Victoria League had trouble incorporating India into its vision of empire, which was essentially founded on the ‘white dominions’”. After the emergence of the nationalist India House in Highgate, there was concern over regulation of political and social activities of Indian students in Britain. In 1907, the League was advised by several individuals who felt that “a great deal more could and should be done with Indians coming to this country, either for education or as visitors”¹⁹². Government interest in harnessing the soft power potential in overseas students pointed to a similar strategy. Likewise, Marqusee suggested that emergence of nationalist forces led to the inclusion of colonies in the ICC as a

¹⁹⁰ All quotes from Riedi, p. 573.

¹⁹¹ P. 34, Alexander C. May, ‘The Round Table, 1910-66’, PhD Dissertation, St. John’s College, Oxford (January 1995). Downloaded from the Oxford University Research Archive:

<http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ee7ebd01-f085-44e9-917b-98d21a0f4206> (last accessed on 10/01/2013). Link also available on The Round Table website: <http://www.moot.org.uk/about/history.asp> (last accessed on 10/01/2013).

¹⁹² Both quotes from Riedi, p. 594.

means of incorporation and management¹⁹³, once again introducing cricket into equations of political ‘maturity’. As noted in Chapter 1, a meeting chaired by Lord Harris in 1926 laid down membership rules that would go on to have far-reaching effects on the ICC. On the basis of the evidence at hand, one can only speculate that weakening imperial grip, international competition and rising nationalism resulted in the confinement of cricket to the British Empire in 1926 (excluding the USA), and invitations to the West Indies, New Zealand and India with the intention of full membership. Chapter 2 notes the corresponding importance of the 1926 Balfour Declaration to the oft-quoted whiggish teleology of the political Commonwealth. It appears that, even if a coincidence, 1926 was a significant year in which both the old British Commonwealth and the ICC received explicit definitions and boundaries arguably in attempts to consolidate Britain’s international position. The then Imperial Institute, predecessor of the CwI, duly documented the political transformation in 1926 when it shifted from an ‘index collection’ to an ‘empire story-land’ to reflect the new British Commonwealth of Nations¹⁹⁴.

Subsequently, the 1947–1949 period (India) and 1961 (South Africa) proved to be significant junctures in the political Commonwealth. In response, once again, the Imperial Institute ushered in changes. In 1949, the Institute came under the Ministry of Education, thus making education its sole remit rather than research or commerce. Lord Tweedsmuir led an inquiry into the activities of the Imperial Institute between 1950 and 1952 in relation to the state of British imperialism, advocating a name-change and a shift to a people-based narrative and resulting, consequently, in a ‘Commonwealth story-land’¹⁹⁵. The ICC in both cases took its cue from the political Commonwealth, as evident from the previous chapters.

David McIntyre described 1965 as “the watershed in the evolution of the modern Commonwealth”¹⁹⁶, in reference to the creation that year of the Commonwealth Secretariat. As discussed in Chapter 3, 1965 was also an extremely significant year for the ICC ushering

¹⁹³ Mike Marqusee, ‘The Ambush Clause: Globalisation, Corporate Power and the Governance of World Cricket’, in Stephen Wagg, ed., *Cricket and National Identity in the Postcolonial Age: Following On*, Routledge (2005), p. 257.

¹⁹⁴ All quotes from Mark Crinson, ‘Imperial Story-lands: Architecture and display at the Imperial and Commonwealth Institutes’, op cit., p. 111-113.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁹⁶ McIntyre quoted in Philip Murphy, ‘By invitation only...’, op cit., p. 246.

in a name-change, a membership rule change and admission of non-Commonwealth countries. McIntyre was of the opinion that when it became clear that radical changes would be unavoidable, “virtue was made of necessity”¹⁹⁷ by London and British colonial governments. The same may be said about the governors of cricket, as noted in the discussion on the intention behind what may appear to be belated enlightened changes in 1964–1965. This fits in well with Richard Holt’s observation in 1990 in his acclaimed *Sport and the British* that “Britain’s national summer game remained in the hands of a small group who, in the best Whig traditions, had formed a policy of reforming to conserve”¹⁹⁸, in his analysis of the appointment of the first non-amateur captain of England and the end of the amateur–professional distinction in English cricket.

This chapter has tried to tease out characteristics shared by the ICC with the political and non-governmental Commonwealth. Without endorsing any of the traits or tropes discussed above, using the political and non-governmental Commonwealth as a framework, this chapter probed how the ICC fared in comparison *as a Commonwealth entity* in the mid-twentieth century. The following chapter will close this discussion by scrutinising the ICC’s response to decolonisation further.

¹⁹⁷ McIntyre, *British Decolonization*, p. 9 & p. 119. Trevor Reese wrote that in 1965 that “In this whole arterial approach [of Commonwealth bridges linking east and west with Britain as the keystone] there is an element of deducing incontrovertible virtues from an unavoidable situation” (*‘Keeping Calm about the Commonwealth’*, p. 452).

¹⁹⁸ Holt, p cit., p. 113.

Chapter Six: ‘Two institutions that inter-link and endure’¹: Cricket and the transnational Commonwealth

Part I of this chapter is the culmination of the evidence and discussions presented so far in this dissertation. Part II explores the increasingly influential literature on transnational perspectives in history and historiography. The purpose behind it is to highlight the role of the Commonwealth in the international relations and intellectual history of the twentieth century. The Imperial Cricket Conference was an important transnational presence within the teeming transnational Commonwealth of Nations.

(I)

6.1 ‘Pickled piece of the past’?

The preceding chapter sought to compare the Imperial Cricket Conference with the political Commonwealth and components of the non-governmental Commonwealth. It discerned various common traits and points of congruence between the political and non-political parts of the Commonwealth. Key questions, then, to ask of a study that investigates cricket and the ICC in the period of decolonisation would be: how far did the ICC actively engage with the decolonisation process, if at all? Using the Commonwealth ‘framework’ that emerged in the previous chapter, how can the ICC’s place on the decolonisation landscape be analysed?

From her study of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Anna Boking-Welch concluded that the RCS did not live in denial of decolonisation and loss of Empire; rather, it was “a

¹ Quote re-appears and is explained in Chapter 7.

group of individuals taking a pragmatic interest in the problems raised by decolonization”². There were differences of opinion between RCS members, notable silences over controversial issues, concern over nationalism and its ability to impact the collective future and ‘values’ of the Commonwealth. The RCS was unable to adequately define its own purpose or the necessity of Commonwealth boundaries, underlining a clash between development of a Commonwealth identity on the one hand and fostering of world citizenship on the other³. Nevertheless, Boking-Welch was able to discern three key areas through which the RCS pursued its objectives of progressive Commonwealth engagement during decolonisation: knowledge and education; action; and interaction and sociability⁴. While the RCS actively encouraged political debate, the Commonwealth Institute concentrated on projecting a positive image, spreading knowledge and an understanding of the multi-racial Commonwealth in Britain. This involved the difficult task of keeping up with a constantly-changing Commonwealth. For instance, the South African court in its exhibition was promptly dismantled in 1961 after South Africa’s exit. During decolonisation, the CwI adapted itself to become “an expression of the Commonwealth of today and tomorrow and of the faith which its peoples have in it”⁵. Discussing the Women’s Institute, similarly, Boking-Welch argued that though it would be tempting to see its silence on some important matters as denial or lack of acknowledgement of decolonisation, that would be an inaccurate representation: “This is not to say that the empire was forever on the minds of the WI, or that

² Anna Boking-Welch, ‘The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire, 1960-1970’, PhD Dissertation, University of York (September 2012), p. 50.

Available at: <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3667/> (last accessed: 28/05/2013).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 53.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 62-63. Sadly, the Commonwealth Institute faded away from public consciousness rather quickly after the early 1990s (when, after the end of apartheid and the Cold War, the political Commonwealth itself appeared to many to lose much of its potency). In 1997, the CwI re-opened once again after a year’s closure, this time with emphasis on travel, adventure and exploration. According to Mark Crinson, the 1997 *avatar* was “merely the latest incarnation of an institution that ha[d] always struggled to establish itself in the public imagination”. What had started as an exhibition of objects from the Empire in the nineteenth century morphed into lessons in imperial geography and then a mouthpiece for official models of the Commonwealth ‘family’ and multiculturalism in the mid-twentieth century. The Institute was called upon to respond to frequently-changing short-term ideological needs. Lacking a continuous ideological backdrop, it exposed the contradictions that necessarily accompanied the swift political changes [Mark Crinson, ‘Imperial Story-lands: Architecture and Display at the Imperial and Commonwealth Institutes’, *Art History*, Vol. 22.1 (March 1999), pp. 99-101]. Craggs chronicled that the CwI declined steadily and was closed in 2002 before descending into a custody battle between preservationists, Commonwealth enthusiasts and property developers [Ruth Craggs, ‘Commonwealth histories and geographies’ in ‘London Debates 2010: How does Europe in the 21st century address the legacy of colonialism?’, p. 4 (Pamphlet published by School of Advanced Study in 2011 following a ‘London Debates’ workshop on the same held on May 13-15, 2010); Ruth Craggs, ‘The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival: Architecture, Performance and Multiculturalism in Late-Imperial London’, *The London Journal*, Vol. 36.3 (Nov 2011), pp. 247-268].

they fully engaged with its political, economic or cultural intricacies, but that its existence as a conglomerate of countries permeated and shaped the WI's international work in tangible, meaningful and perhaps unacknowledged ways.”⁶ As seen in Chapter 2, provision of education and the management and harnessing of overseas students was seen as a crucial strategic part of Britain's efforts to maintain influence in the post-war world⁷. David McIntyre observed of the ‘unofficial’ Commonwealth that just as the political Commonwealth “outgrew the ‘club atmosphere’ of the Prime Ministers' Meetings held in Number Ten and Chequers”, so the unofficial and voluntary Commonwealth grew out of the “establishment ethos”⁸. Part of this establishment ethos and club atmosphere was sought to be retained by the non-starter Commonwealth-Bilderberg initiative. Its lack of success could perhaps be seen as rejection of the ethos by the ‘new’ Commonwealth. Furthermore, Murphy surmised that the failure of such a project in the post-war world pointed to Britain's “all too typical” reluctance to financially support Commonwealth-related initiatives in contrast to private organisations in the US that successfully projected American soft power and informal influence. Britain, Murphy concluded, was “poorly placed to play a significant role in the international ‘culture wars’ of the post-war era”⁹.

Sarah Stockwell's analysis of the significance of the Church of England and Archbishop Fisher perhaps most pertinently supports the central thesis of this dissertation. Stockwell posited that while Archbishop Fisher's role and involvement in decolonisation may appear “ornamental” entailing “goodwill visits to different communities”, taking an interest in “royalty and its Commonwealth tours” and enjoying only a “peripheral involvement in celebrations of independence”, the case for greater attention to Fisher and the Church in studies of decolonisation rests on the extent of his personal role and interest in colonial questions, liaison with administrators and politicians, and supervision of the devolution of power to regional structures in regions under Lambeth's jurisdiction (“the church's own

⁶ Boking-Welch, *op cit.*, p. 118.

⁷ See J.M. Lee in Chapter 2 and Boking-Welch, p. 103.

⁸ David McIntyre, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933-59: Precursors of the Tri-Sector Commonwealth’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36.4 (2008), p. 608.

⁹ Both quotes from Philip Murphy, ‘By invitation only: Lord Mountbatten, Prince Philip, and the Attempt to Create a Commonwealth ‘Bilderberg Group’, 1964-66’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 33.2 (2005), p. 262.

‘transfers of power’”)¹⁰. Significantly for the purpose of this dissertation, Stockwell stressed that “*it deserves to be brought into sharper prominence for it yields interesting points of comparison between the ways in which the church sought to adapt its structure to changing political circumstances in the colonial empire and the adjustments made not only by the state but other British institutions operating in the colonies, such as businesses*”¹¹ (emphasis added). As Alex May pointed out, such institutions and entities “emerged from the end of empire committed to the new Commonwealth . . . [which] . . . was a very different world from that in which they had been conceived”¹². On the Church and Fisher’s place in this academic literature, Stockwell further explained that while one must remain wary of viewing the Church through the analytical framework used for political or secular organisations, “*there are intriguing parallels between the disengagement the church undertook and that of the British imperial state and other organisations operating in the colonies*” (emphasis added). Regardless of Fisher’s eventual influence or impact on political or diplomatic questions, Stockwell’s research on Fisher and the Church provides an “*illustration of the extent to which a variety of British individuals, agencies and institutions engaged with the process of British decolonisation*”¹³ (emphasis added). Alex May’s research on the Round Table movement concurred that “[q]uestions of influence are important but not necessarily all-important. Intentions are often more interesting than results; certainly they help to illuminate the thought-processes of previous generations, to whom in some respects we are so close, yet who, in other respects, inhabited a very different world”¹⁴. Of the failed Commonwealth-Bilderberg initiative, Philip Murphy wrote that “Like many imaginative initiatives that never worked, the Commonwealth Bilderberg scheme has almost been entirely forgotten. Yet it deserves at least a brief mention in the history of the development of the Commonwealth since it was the only original idea on Commonwealth organisation to emerge from the Wilson administration of 1964-66.”¹⁵ The information unearthed on the short-lived

¹⁰ All quotes from Sarah Stockwell, ‘Splendidly Leading the Way?’ Archbishop Fisher and Decolonisation in British Colonial Africa’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36.3 (2008), p. 548. See also p. 560.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 549.

¹² Boking-Welch, p. 79.

¹³ Stockwell, p. 560.

¹⁴ P. 24, Alexander C. May, ‘The Round Table, 1910-66’, PhD Dissertation, St. John’s College, Oxford (January 1995). Downloaded from the Oxford University Research Archive:

<http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ee7ebd01-f085-44e9-917b-98d21a0f4206> (last accessed on 10/01/2013). Link also available on The Round Table website: <http://www.moot.org.uk/about/history.asp> (last accessed on 10/01/2013).

¹⁵ Murphy, ‘By invitation only...’, op cit., p. 260 (see also pp. 261-262).

proposal offered insight into the importance of the original Bilderberg group, the Wilson administration, contemporary British attitudes towards the evolving Commonwealth, attitudes of ‘new’ Commonwealth leaders and not least, top British royals.

These guidelines assist in analysing the ICC in the same period and under comparable circumstances. *This dissertation contends that the study of a transnational body such as the Imperial Cricket Conference in the eventful mid-twentieth century could contribute richly to the growing body of research on decolonisation of non-governmental institutions within the Empire and Commonwealth in that period. Against the backdrop of the demise of the British Empire, the ICC could be considered a Commonwealth interest group that, as a transnational site, continuously grappled with conflict arising from lingering (real and imagined) ‘bonds’ of empire and assertion of British soft power on the one hand, and increasing assertion of national identity and rights by member states on the other.*

The ICC, which formed bonds with the Empire–Commonwealth through the game of cricket, may have been closer to the ‘ornamental’ Church of England than Whitehall in its ability to influence events, but it is intention rather than impact that is of utmost interest here. Following J.A. Mangan, John Hughson wrote that cricket emerged as the most prominent sport in the British Empire. Cricket became “the symbol *par excellence* of imperial solidarity and superiority epitomizing a set of consolidatory moral imperatives that both exemplified and explained imperial ambition and achievement” and therefore, “[a]n understanding of cricket is . . . integral to an understanding of the relations of colonialism within the British Empire”¹⁶. One can read the ICC as a microcosm of important debates within the Empire and the Commonwealth in this period. On the one hand, the ICC was seen as a ‘family’ of Commonwealth members facilitating closer ties between them. Membership of the “British Commonwealth” remained mandatory to play official cricket until 1965. On the other hand, the ICC also witnessed effects of changes in the Empire and Commonwealth: India, Pakistan and the West Indies took a strong, collective stance against apartheid and they presented proposals for equal voting rights couched in language that urged the ICC to update its thinking in keeping with changes on the political front. Parallels between developments and the timeline of events in the Empire–Commonwealth and in the ICC between 1947 and 1965 are striking. There was a complicated relationship between members of the ICC, and between

¹⁶ All quotes from John Hughson, *The Making of Sporting Cultures*, Routledge (2009), pp. 71-72.

each member and the ICC, rather than complete acceptance or rejection of traditional ways, particularly in the cases of the ‘new’ Commonwealth members. The feeling of a Commonwealth ‘family’; viewing of cricket as a Commonwealth game; faith in the MCC’s ‘innate’ sense of fair play; consensus and “polite deliberation”; deference to history and tradition, e.g., paramountcy of the England–Australia relationship; references to ‘fluffier’ or ‘mystical’ aspects such as “spiritual headquarters” and “Spirit of Cricket” (which continue to this day)¹⁷, all continued for longer in the ICC than in the political Commonwealth or even other non-governmental Commonwealth counterparts. There appeared to be reluctance to break completely with tradition, however arbitrary or coercive its origin. In short, the inability to make a seamless transition from a ‘British Commonwealth’ to a modern ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ was most readily obvious in the Imperial Cricket Conference (see also Chapter 5, footnote 24).

What is remarkable about the ICC in this period is how long it succeeded in both delaying its acknowledgment of decolonisation and being selective when it did. It could be argued that decolonisation in cricket did not effectively materialise until the early 1990s (see Chapter 1). When it came to adaptation to the changing political realities, at least in public rhetoric, the political Commonwealth led the way. Imperial societies were relatively quick to embrace and discuss change, and to alter their names accordingly. Initiatives such as the Voluntary Service Overseas, the Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965 and the Commonwealth-Bilderberg sought to promote contact and soft power at people-to-people and elite levels, but without any overt ‘imperial-native’ distinction. This suggests a relatively direct confrontation with decolonisation by these entities. The ICC, like the Commonwealth Press Union or the Royal Commonwealth Society, may perhaps be best described as a Commonwealth interest group. Whereas the higher-profile imperial societies mentioned in Chapter 2 changed their names in 1958 (the year in which the older members of the ICC reluctantly yielded some ground on voting rights), the CPU did so much earlier in 1950. Incidentally, established in the 1908-09 period as the Empire Press Union, the CPU had started life around the same time as the ICC and likewise had a British-run and Britain-based central governing executive. Its “energetic [British] founder” Harry Brittain was quick to take

¹⁷ See Lord’s website: <http://www.lords.org/news/2010/apr-2010/mcc-beins-search-for-lords-/> (“Spiritual headquarters”) and <http://www.lords.org/mcc/mcc-spirit-of-cricket/> (“Spirit of Cricket”) [Both last accessed: 21/09/2013]

cognisance of the changing political scenario in the mid-twentieth century and override objections to the name-change by arguing that such changes were “in keeping with the spirit of the times” since members now met “as a series of independent sister nations”¹⁸. In comparing the CPU and the ICC on this specific issue, the main difference that strikes the student of decolonisation is that these changes were supported by the British headquarters of the CPU, unlike in the case of the ICC. No doubt, concerns about the spread of communist propaganda in newer and smaller states via the press played a role but Denis Cryle’s research also suggested that the presence of influential British reform-minded individuals like Harry Brittain and Evert Barger (appointed Secretary-General of the CPU in 1956¹⁹) in the governing executive may have helped to speed up the process in conjunction with delegations from members like India.

Overall, if one concluded that these Empire–Commonwealth entities responded to decolonisation by replacing openly skewed power relations and hierarchies with soft power allied to progressive discourse, could it be argued that the relative insulation of the ICC from political changes owed to its already long-standing soft-power status and the association of cricket with the MCC, an upper class private club? As has been stressed throughout this dissertation, cricket was an early imperial *informal* ‘bond’ and the ICC continued to see itself as such in this period. It is therefore possible that the ICC came under less pressure, than its counterparts discussed in this dissertation, to embrace change. Add to that the belief of ‘old’ Commonwealth members that cricket belonged in the domain of the strictly ‘apolitical’, which was translated to mean continuation of *status quo*. The prolonged use of ‘British Commonwealth’ in the rules; racialised tiers; protracted delays in the granting of ‘equal’ votes; retention of ‘Imperial’ in the title until 1965; long drawn-out debates about South Africa; defiant ‘unofficial’ contact of ‘old’ Commonwealth members with South Africa in spite of the considerable obloquy, all point to an extraordinary resilience and determination to continue in the old vein. Engagement with political decolonisation was forced on the ICC in the form of the India debate in 1948–1950 and South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth in 1961. While other entities switched to informal influence, soft power or embraced

¹⁸ Harry Brittain quoted in Denis Cryle, ‘The Press Union at the End of Empire: Anglo-Australian Perspectives, 1946–1965’, *Journalism*, Vol. 12.8 (2011), p. 1009 (“energetic founder” on p. 1008).

¹⁹ Details of Evert Barger’s appointment to the CPU and his distinguished career with extensive service all over the world including China, South Asia and Europe variously with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), UNESCO and the UN in ‘Commonwealth Press Union New Secretary-General Appointed’, under ‘Official Appointments and Notices’ in *The Times*, Wednesday, Oct 03, 1956, p. 5.

‘internationalism’ with an imperial–Commonwealth framework (more to follow), the ICC was able to function and proceed with acknowledgement of decolonisation on a purely need-to-know basis. The ICC strikes the student of decolonisation as a reluctant participant in decolonisation, and an upholder, as far as was possible, of cricket as a “pickled piece of the past”²⁰. This is not to deny or downplay the importance of the small but constant inroads made by members of the ‘new’ Commonwealth (indeed, ‘international’ cricket would become far more animated from the late 1960s onwards as a result of commercial and political pressure), or overlook the complicity to some degree in this period of ‘new’ Commonwealth members in the longevity of some superannuated traditions of the ICC. What this does prove is that the ICC offers a rich study, both of decolonisation *and* cricket and the excruciatingly slow process of decolonisation *in* cricket.

On the whole, through Chapters 3, 4, 5 and this section, this dissertation has attempted to analyse the conduct of the ICC using the political (inter-government) and non-political (non-government) Commonwealth as a framework. On the basis of its distinctive response to decolonisation, a case has been made for the acceptance and inclusion of the ICC as an organisation of interest to historians of decolonisation and the mid-twentieth century Commonwealth.

(II)

6.2 Commonwealth ‘transcendence’

²⁰ Bill Schwarz, “The only white man in there”: the re-racialisation of England, 1956-1968’, *Race & Class*, Vol. 38.65 (1996), p. 72. Here, Schwarz was quoting from a history of the last moments of Rhodesia authored by Lord Robert Blake.

Transnational perspectives or approaches to the study of history have become increasingly visible and influential. According to Akira Iriye, the contemporary world “is an arena for an increasingly complex interplay of states and non-state actors”²¹. “Methodological nationalism”²² in historiography, owing in large measure to nationalism in the twentieth century meant that history-writing has served as a “handmaiden”²³ to nation-building and national identity. This practice has been criticised as artificial, unsound and limiting, though not completely irrelevant or obsolete.

Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake described transnational approaches as “the study of the ways in which past lives and events have been shaped by processes and relationships that have transcended the borders of nation states. Transnational history seeks to understand ideas, things, people, and practices which have crossed national boundaries . . . many of those enthusiastic about transnational history reach for metaphors of fluidity, as in talk of circulation and flows (of people, discourses, and commodities), alongside metaphors of connection and relationship.”²⁴ Many historians have pointed out that transnational historical literature has older antecedents. In many cases, it is the nature of the subject or topic that lends itself automatically to transnational approaches. International organisations such as the Pan-African Congress or the League of Nations, individual biographies, “imperial histories, and histories of land and maritime exploration, ideas, political movements, migration, voyaging, and environments”²⁵ are all forms of transnational history.

²¹ Akira Iriye, *Global community: the role of international organizations in the making of the contemporary world*, Berkeley: University of California Press (2002), p. vii.

²² Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History’, *Journal of Modern European History*, Vol 6.2 (Sept 2008), p. 161 & p. 169.

²³ Ibid., p. 169. For similar views, see also Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, ‘Introduction’, in Curthoys & Lake, eds., *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective*, ANU E-Press (2005), p. 5; David Thelen, ‘The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History’, *The Journal of American History*, Vol 86.3 [The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue (Dec., 1999)], p. 967.

²⁴ Curthoys and Lake, op cit., pp. 5-6. For more views, see also Ian Tyrrell, ‘What is transnational history?’, excerpt from a paper given at the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*, Paris, in January 2007. Available at: <http://iantyrrell.wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/> (last accessed: May 28, 2013); C.A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol and Patricia Seed, ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, *The American Historical Review*, Vol 111.5 (2006), pp. 1441-1464; Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Going transnational? News from down under: Transnational History Symposium, Canberra, Australian National University, September 2004’, *Historical Social Research*, Vol. 31.2 (2006), pp. 118-131; David Thelen, op. cit., pp. 965-975; Peter Mandler, ‘The New Internationalism’, *History Today*, Vol 62.3 (2012); Matthew Hilton and Rana Mitter, ‘Introduction’, *Past and Present*, Supplement 8 (2013), p. 14.

²⁵ Curthoys & Lake, p. 6.

The journey towards transnational perspectives has been made from different starting points. If historians of the USA such as Akira Iriye, Ian Tyrrell, David Thelen and others led this ‘turn’ around 1990 to overcome the preponderance of American ‘exceptionalism’, a clarion call for fresh approaches went out to historians of traditional (British) imperial history and ‘new imperial history’ from A.G. Hopkins in 1999 and has received an enthusiastic response especially from the latter school in Australia. Historians of Europe have hugely contributed to this body of work (the early French Annales School, *histoire croisée/transfergeschichte*, entangled histories, shared histories, connected histories, history of transfers, etc)²⁶.

What constitutes ‘transnational history’ continues to be discussed, with definitions constantly honed and scholarly boundaries sharpened²⁷. In brief, it could be said that a transnational approach to history is about connecting local and national histories with events and processes elsewhere²⁸. It is an approach that wishes to eschew historiography that views history as neatly confined to borders of a state (‘national history’), or solely as a top-down or West-centric rendition, thereby seeing multiple agents from the global North and South at work simultaneously.

From the point of view of this dissertation, then, how is such a transnational approach relevant to the Commonwealth?

Firstly, the British Empire and the evolving Commonwealth as a transnational conglomerate contributed hugely to ideas of ‘internationalism’ in the first three quarters of

²⁶ Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Learning by Doing.....’, op cit., pp. 161-165 & pp. 177-179. Literature also reviewed and summarised in Jan Rüger, ‘OXO: Or, the Challenges of Transnational History’, *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 40 (2010), pp. 658-659; Curthoys and Lake, pp. 7-10 & pp. 15-17; Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Going transnational?.....’, op cit., pp. 118-131; A.G. Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’, *Past & Present*, Vol. 164 (Aug 1999), pp. 198-243.

²⁷ Discussion in Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Learning by Doing.....’, pp. 162-163. Whether boundary-drawing is a productive or desirable exercise is debatable as there has been similar boundary-drawing for ‘world’ history, ‘global’ history, ‘international’ history, ‘comparative’ history and ‘regional’ history. Warnings against complete dismissal of all national histories as irrelevant, viewing of transnational perspectives as purely benign/celebratory or in terms of a transnational-as-good and national-as-bad dichotomy are important.

²⁸ Ann Curthoys & Joy Damousi, ‘Remembering the 1951 Referendum on the Banning of the Communist Party’, *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 44.1 (2013), p. 1.

the twentieth century. Examination of such ideas of ‘internationalism’ particularly through inter- or non-governmental organisations is a rich and popular area of study²⁹.

Before WWII and in its immediate aftermath, British perspectives on internationalism and international co-operation were strongly informed by Britain’s position as the world’s greatest imperial power. Research in this extremely fascinating area of ‘imperial-internationalism’ has traced a discernible imperial framework to ideas on internationalism within Britain in the early- to mid-twentieth century. Helen McCarthy’s work on the League of Nations Union and internationalism in Britain revealed how imperialism and a ‘Great Power’ mind-set shaped Britain’s “internationalism without tears” and its perception of the League of Nations as “an instrument of a new *Pax Britannica*”³⁰. In his book *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* on the intellectual genesis of the United Nations, Mark Mazower wrote about the influence of British imperial and Commonwealth thought on the ideas of internationalism that informed the formation of the UN (for their intellectual contribution, Mazower selected the South African Jan Smuts; British international relations theorist and a force behind the establishment of the League of Nations, Sir Alfred Zimmern; Jewish refugees in the USA, particularly Raphael Lemkin who coined the word ‘genocide’; and the Indian Jawaharlal Nehru). Harvey Morris noted of Mazower’s central thesis that the “agenda beneath the internationalist rhetoric of 1945 [was] the preservation of empire, specifically Britain’s, and the extension into the postwar era of the big-power compact that had defeated Nazism”³¹. David McIntyre’s *The Britannic Vision – Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48*, much like Mark Mazower’s book, studied the

²⁹ See Akira Iriye’s influential work on the rise of international organisations: Akira Iriye, *Global community*, op cit. See also Akira Iriye, ‘Beyond imperialism: the new internationalism’, *Daedalus*, Vol. 134.2 (Spring 2005), pp. 108-116; Peter Mandler, op cit.; Matthew Hilton and Rana Mitter, op cit., pp. 7-28; Jessica Reinisch, ‘Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA’, *Past and Present*, Supplement 6 (2011), pp. 258-289; Jessica Reinisch, ‘Auntie UNRRA’ at the Crossroads’, *Past and Present*, Supplement 8 (2013), pp. 70-97; Rana Mitter, ‘Imperialism, Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction of Post-war China: UNRRA in China, 1944-7’, *Past and Present*, Supplement 8 (2013), pp. 51-69; Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, ‘New Histories of the United Nations’, *Journal of World History*, Volume 19.3 (September 2008), pp. 251-274.

³⁰ James Hinton, review of *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c.1918-45* by Helen McCarthy, *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol 24.2 (June 2013), pp. 314-315 (both quotes).

³¹ Harvey Morris, review of *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* by Mark Mazower published in *Financial Times* on November 20, 2009: Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/864a873e-d568-11de-81ee-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UbsU5pyd> (last accessed: May 28, 2013); Jan Klabbers’s review of the same in *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol 21.3 (2010).

construction of a (here, ‘Britannic’) vision through the agency of intellectual-political stalwarts. Andrew Ladley, in reviewing McIntyre’s book, highlighted a key question: how did the conceptualisation of the Britannic vision fit into the grander visions of international affairs (the League of Nations, United Nations and the European Union)? McIntyre found a widespread anticipation among members of his cast of historians that the British Commonwealth was a “microcosm” of the “world community of the future”, the “*primum mobile* of the international Commonwealth of the future”³². Responding to a call to replace ‘Empire Day’ with ‘United Nations Day’ in 1946, then Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson declared, “I believe that a child who understands the value of the British Commonwealth will understand all the better the idea of cooperation between the United Nations”³³. After the advent of the London Declaration of 1949 and the accompanying paradigm, Nicholas Mansergh remarked that India and Pakistan had “successfully reconciled their nationalism with Commonwealth membership” and went on to predict that “the strength of the Commonwealth of the future will depend more upon the vigorous national life of its constituent members and less upon the predominant power of one partner, the United Kingdom”³⁴. Robert R. Wilson also applauded the modern Commonwealth’s “internationalism [which] is in contrast to a type of regionalism that might be unduly restrictive”³⁵. Anna Boking-Welch’s doctoral research showed that during the period of decolonisation, the renamed Royal Commonwealth Society, Women’s Institutes, Freedom from Hunger Campaign in Britain, among others (Christian Aid proved an interesting exception in many ways), saw Britain as uniquely placed to understand and promote internationalism due to its experience with the Empire, prompting the question: international

³² See Professor Andrew Ladley, review of *The Britannic Vision – Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48* by David McIntyre (review no. 1059). Available at: <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1059> (last accessed: 16/09/2013).

On a slightly facetious note, the Commonwealth can certainly stake claim to creative precedents in diplomacy. It is perhaps the only high-profile international entity to produce a solution to a diplomatic crisis out of punctuation. The ‘O’Higgins comma’ averted a stalemate in 1926 by turning the problematic ‘Great Britain and Ireland’ into the acceptable ‘Great Britain, Ireland...’.

³³ Jim English, ‘Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 49.1 (2006), p. 274.

³⁴ Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Commonwealth at the Queen’s Accession Queen’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 29.3 (July, 1953), p. 288.

³⁵ Robert R. Wilson, ‘Editorial Comment: Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference of 1964’, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 59.3 (July 1965), p. 573. Robert Renbert Wilson served as a professor of political science at Duke University from 1925 to 1975. He acted as Chair of the Department of Political Science (1934-1948) and Chair of the Commonwealth Studies Center (1959-1966).

humanitarianism or continuation of imperial philanthropy?³⁶ The Empire was recast as a progressive and multi-racial transnational Commonwealth that would serve as an exemplary model in internationalism. One member of the RCS wrote in a letter to the *Commonwealth Journal* that “the national society is too narrow: [sic] the world society is still too large, incoherent, distracted and vague. The Commonwealth is an intermediate and working expression of international citizenship and goodwill.”³⁷ In 1964, while taking stock of the Commonwealth as an organisation, the President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs pointed to its usefulness in drawing up frameworks for technical assistance programmes because “these are personal in application and the element of familiarity in a historical association is important”³⁸. Jordanna Bailkin, from her study of decolonisation and the Voluntary Service Overseas, concluded succinctly that one might “read this era not in terms of a withdrawal from empire, but rather as a reinvestment in a new internationalism in which the former empire played a significant part”³⁹. At the same time, the Commonwealth (and the UN) consisted of newly-independent and highly nationalist former colonies of Britain. Britain’s fading power may have made the Commonwealth association in its constantly-evolving form a necessity for Britain but as a review of Krishnan Srinivasan’s 2006 book on the Commonwealth observed, “the Commonwealth did not only serve British interests—the continuation of the sterling area, the semblance of influence and world power status—, but the interests of the new Asian members as well. The Commonwealth symbolized the acceptance of a status of equality in the international system, it provided development assistance in the form of the Colombo Plan, and it served as a corrective to the ensuing bipolar configuration of the Cold War”⁴⁰. From a constructivist and feminist perspective, Brysk, et al. saw the post-colonial Commonwealth of Nations as a subset of states within the international community of states that, in addition to the general rules of international society, professed to share certain distinguishing values that set it apart as a ‘family’. Not everyone in the organisation participated in the arrangement for the same

³⁶ Boking-Welch, pp. 51-52, p. 92, pp. 100-101, pp. 117-119, p. 164, pp. 186-194, p. 211. Boking-Welch highlighted three configurations of imperial-internationalism: internationalist discourses employed in support of Empire–Commonwealth ties; internationalism conceived as a replacement for the imperialist world order; and a new vocabulary of people-to-people internationalism superimposed over imperial frameworks and habits without much awareness of how the two might interact (p. 191).

³⁷ Ibid., p. 51.

³⁸ John W. Holmes, ‘The Commonwealth Faces 1964’, *The Times*, Tuesday, Jan 07, 1964, p. 9.

³⁹ Bailkin quoted in Boking-Welch, p. 211.

⁴⁰ Marc Frey, book review of *The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth* by Krishnan Srinivasan, published on H-Soz-u-Kult for H-Net Reviews (January 2007). Available at: <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=21436> (last accessed: 27/07/2013).

reason. For the former colonies, there was the lure of economic and technical assistance. For the former imperial power, continuation of a bond from a ‘shared’ past rather than any economic benefit appeared to be the main attraction. Validation from other states in the international community in the form of recognition of the distinctiveness of such a grouping cordoned it off as the sphere of influence of the former imperial power. This gave the former imperial power special rights and prerogatives for providing assistance to, or intervening within, the ‘family’. Tools used by the former imperial power in this arrangement included extensive use of the family rhetoric and related metaphors and heavy emphasis on shared language, sport, cultural exchange, educational ties and religion, ignoring the coercive origin of such ties. In fact, such a post-colonial grouping became a means of perpetuating cultural reproduction through these ties⁴¹ (see Chapter 5). Exploration of this interplay between visions of the national, the imperial and the international; configurations and evolution of internationalism; and presentation of arguably imperial intentions as benevolence and internationalism yield interesting material and is an exciting area for transnational research. In many ways, the Commonwealth of Nations epitomises both a confluence/reconciliation and a clash of the imperial and the international. Explicitly imperial views of internationalism evolved during the period of decolonisation into a more partnership-based internationalism (*to wit*, the multi-racial Commonwealth). This internationalism-via-Commonwealth continued to be seen as Britain’s area of influence in the period studied here, thereby lacing the ‘international’ vision with an imperial framework. This is as true of the Imperial Cricket Conference as of the rest of the Commonwealth.

Secondly, apart from its intellectual contribution discussed above, the Commonwealth as an organisation—inter-governmental and non-governmental—appears to be extremely under-appreciated from a transnational perspective⁴².

⁴¹ Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, ‘After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8.2 (June 2002), pp. 269–271 & p. 274.

⁴² See for instance, the extremely important work on the subject of the rise of international organisations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by Akira Iriye: *Global community: the role of international organizations in the making of the contemporary world*, Berkeley: University of California Press (2002). Whilst tracing the rise of inter-governmental and non-governmental international organisations and their role in shaping international relations in the twentieth century, the Commonwealth, which included both, appears to have been given short shrift with a mere two passing mentions (both on p. 75). This is no doubt the result of factors such as Iriye’s background as a historian of the USA; the (highly commendable) primary aim of his book to de-emphasise the predominant American exceptionalism, state-centric and Cold War-heavy paradigm of

Timothy Shaw and Lucian Ashworth, in a paper in 2010, made a case for the study of the Commonwealth as a school of thought in international relations (IR). (Sir Alfred Zimmern has already been mentioned above in this regard.) They submitted that IR as a separate discipline emerged around the same time as and in parallel to the non-governmental and inter-governmental Commonwealth⁴³. This Commonwealth of Nations formed out of the British Empire, they contended, offers a distinctive transnational Commonwealth School to students of international relations as a countervailing model to US hegemony⁴⁴. The dense transnational network of state and non-state actors, formal and informal contacts forged by the Commonwealth from the global North and South is rich in transnational historical material. In the period under study here, the Commonwealth was treated as “a global society that brought together an eclectic mix of cultures and political systems: a Commonwealth

twentieth century international relations and international history (written, for most part, as the history of ‘Great Powers’); and the enviable length and breadth sweepingly traversed by the book that would have necessarily forced the exclusion of some angles. However, on non-Cold War phenomena such as anti-colonialism, apartheid, even non-alignment in a way, in the turbulent mid-twentieth century years, debates in the UN were mirrored in the Commonwealth as an inter-governmental organisation, of which most of the more vocal and influential UN members were a part. Accounts of the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat are another fascinating window into contemporary attitudes to inter-governmental co-operation. Iriye did pay attention to decolonisation when he said that “Even more than European integration, decolonization and nation building developed with their own momentum” (p. 63). He attributed the persistence of unity, inter-dependence and transnational connections in spite of fragmentation of empires in this period (a phenomenon which should have logically served to do the opposite) to adherence to the UN’s principle of self-determination. One could argue that missing here is an appreciation of the role of the inter-governmental post-colonial ‘families’ maintained by former imperial powers as detailed by this dissertation and Brysk, et al., which played a part in the retention of transnational connections out of soft power concerns (though Cold War concerns also existed). The inter-governmental Commonwealth is obviously a prime example. In addition, Commonwealth co-operation in non-political areas and on non-governmental levels already existed in the twentieth century. If one considered any one of the six themes identified by Iriye for discussion in his book that fostered “global consciousness” (p. 8, p. 11, p. 19, p. 36 and others) and similar humanistic values, it was present in Commonwealth efforts. For instance, in the area of cultural exchange, these values were at the core of the 1965 Commonwealth Arts Festival. Admittedly, the cautionary words of Brysk, et al., and Crinson (invoking Barthes) discussed in this dissertation pointed out that such celebrations could be interpreted in several ways, especially when used by the former imperial state to gloss over the origin of such a post-colonial grouping (above and Chapter 5, footnotes 59, 81, 82). In fact, the ICC has been discussed in related negative light (see Chapter 5, footnote 24). Nevertheless, non-state and people-to-people cultural connections have always been a hallmark of the modern Commonwealth. The American political scientist Margaret Ball found the non-governmental connections to be so extensive as to “defy description” (McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, p. 595). These connections superseded political co-operation in the twenty-first century and have been fortified further. Therefore, from intellectual historical, inter-governmental and ‘People’s Commonwealth’ points of view, the Commonwealth deserves a higher profile in the history of international relations in the twentieth century.

⁴³ Tim Shaw and Lucian Ashworth, ‘Commonwealth perspectives on International Relations’, *International Affairs*, Vol 86.5 (2010), p. 1149.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 1149-1155 & pp. 1160-1162.

‘family’, if not yet ‘civil society’ or ‘third sector’”⁴⁵. Shaw and Ashworth emphasised that where other schools of thought in IR focused on a system of states, a Commonwealth School “would include networks of non-state actors, initially professional associations and civil societies but increasingly private companies as well”⁴⁶. Furthermore, these associations, societies and companies are increasingly located in the global South as well as the original dominions, signalling a decentralisation of power and networks within the Commonwealth, particularly in the twenty-first century. Additionally, the Commonwealth claims to espouse democracy, human rights and good governance⁴⁷. Therefore, a Commonwealth approach or school in IR would be distinguished by “both the transnational informal cooperation of the Commonwealth and the diversity of its intergovernmental membership”⁴⁸. Back in 1964, John Holmes called the Commonwealth an association in which “peoples get along better than governments”⁴⁹. Ruth Craggs agreed that “[e]ven if the ‘modern’ Commonwealth failed to become the internationally important organisation its proponents envisaged in the years after the Second World War, it played an important political, symbolic and visible role, performing the continued relations between Commonwealth countries and people in the mid to late twentieth century.”⁵⁰ Accordingly, Craggs read the Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965 and the Commonwealth Institute in the 1960s as attempts “to intervene in debates about the Commonwealth, and Britain’s relationship to it, in the 1960s” by showcasing “art and culture from non-western traditions, a place for the display of Commonwealth cultures in the public spaces of the capital, and spaces in which London’s multiculturalism could be explained, celebrated, and understood”⁵¹. The other notable feature is that descriptions of the Commonwealth have always been soaked in discourses of ‘exceptionalism’ that claimed to set Britain, the ‘old’ Commonwealth (white dominions) and later, also the ‘new’ Commonwealth (multi-racial) apart from the rest of the world, as discussed in Chapter 5. Boking-Welch also found that be it Christian Aid or the RCS, Commonwealth collaboration was distinguished from the aftermath of other declining empires as both exceptional and

⁴⁵ Shaw & Ashworth, p. 1159.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 1150-1151.

⁴⁷ See official website: <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-charter> (last accessed 21/09/2013). The Singapore Declaration of 1971 and the Harare Declaration of 1991 were key statements in this regard.

⁴⁸ Shaw & Ashworth, p. 1151.

⁴⁹ John W. Holmes, ‘The Commonwealth Faces 1964’, *The Times*, Tuesday, Jan 07, 1964, p. 9.

⁵⁰ Working paper: Ruth Craggs, ‘Hospitality in geopolitics and the making of Commonwealth relations’, p. 3.

⁵¹ Ruth Craggs, ‘The Commonwealth Institute and the Commonwealth Arts Festival: Architecture, Performance and Multiculturalism in Late-Imperial London’, op cit., p. 264.

exemplary, albeit in changing ways⁵². Related to this exceptionalism, as discussed above and elsewhere, is the research of Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz that analysed the post-colonial Commonwealth from the perspective of constructivist and feminist theories of IR. To Brysk, et al., their research on the Commonwealth, like that of Shaw and Ashworth, pushed past the excessive focus in standard IR on realist state- and self-interest-centric schools of thought. (Additionally, their dissection of the employment of the family rhetoric and metaphor is a useful reminder of the cynical uses of some transnational networks and connections, and a caution against unquestioning equation of all transnational connections with cosmopolitan or humanistic approaches.)

The Commonwealth thus evolved from purely political summit- and inter-governmental-level to a conglomerate that included non-governmental facets (driven in no small measure by Cold War concerns and Britain's economic turn to Europe in the mid-twentieth century). In due course were born epithets such as 'People's Commonwealth' and 'tri-sector Commonwealth', to reflect the growing diversity and informal nature of networks. According to McIntyre, the style 'People's Commonwealth' was coined by the Royal Commonwealth Society in the mid-1980s⁵³. The RCS had for long by then used a celebratory trope of 'transcendence' as Boking-Welch found, and propagated key aspects of the idea of 'People's Commonwealth': the Commonwealth as a "means of surmounting barriers of race, ignorance, and prejudice", and the Commonwealth as an organisation sustained by the actions of individuals rather than governments⁵⁴. Stuart Mole added that in Limassol, Cyprus, in 1993, formal recognition was given to "the unofficial or 'people's' Commonwealth, by instituting a system of accrediting non-governmental representatives to the CHOGM"⁵⁵. This led to exchange through youth fora, and in the fields of education, science, business, finance and religion. Growing collaboration between the political, civil society and business elements gave rise to the notion of the 'tri-sector Commonwealth'⁵⁶. Moreover, close attention to the

⁵² Boking-Welch, p. 235.

⁵³ McIntyre, 'UCRCs...', p. 609.

⁵⁴ Boking-Welch, p. 51.

⁵⁵ Stuart Mole, "Seminars for statesmen": the evolution of the Commonwealth summit', *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 93:376 (2004), p. 539.

⁵⁶ McIntyre, 'UCRCs...', p. 591. The American political scientist Margaret Ball used the image of an iceberg to describe the Commonwealth. The visible tip consisted of the Commonwealth Games, the Head of the Commonwealth and CHOGMs. The most hectic activities happened away from public gaze in the 'People's Commonwealth' (civil society) and the corporate Commonwealth (business). See David McIntyre, "Viewing the Iceberg from Down Under": A New Zealand Perspective', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39.3

plight of small states has been a singular feature of the Commonwealth⁵⁷. These features meant that the Commonwealth became distinguished from other international organisations and as a result, “[n]ot only could the Commonwealth claim impeccable credentials as a North–South forum, committed to debating and acting upon the key global issues . . . but its parallel fora, including the NGO centre, were the antithesis of G7 [today, G8] exclusivity”⁵⁸.

This is not to over-emphasise the political weight of the Commonwealth. The versatile historian of the Empire–Commonwealth Nicholas Mansergh, in 1953, disagreed on this with the view of his contemporary, the great IR theorist Hans Morgenthau. At the time of the accession of Queen Elizabeth II, writing on ‘balance of power’, Morgenthau opined that Britain, increasingly devoid of its empire, had fast shrunk to small-power status on the world stage in the Cold War environment. Mansergh deemed “American accent on organized power too pronounced” and asked, “Is it right, is it wise to overlook, as many American writers do, the ill-organized but latent power of the Commonwealth?”⁵⁹ In 1962, almost as a response, Dean Acheson’s famous West Point speech bluntly and mercilessly exposed the case: “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role—that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, a role based on being the head of a ‘commonwealth’ [sic] which has no political structure, or unity, or strength, and enjoys a fragile and precarious economic relationship by means of the Sterling Area and preferences in the British market—this role is about played out. Great Britain, attempting to work alone and to be a broker between the United States and Russia, has seemed to conduct policy as weak as its military power.”⁶⁰ As far as effective and equitable international political relationships go, the Commonwealth in all its guises has perhaps been more a story of clashes and unrealised potential than its

(2001), p. 96.

Relatedly, Murphy also added that the Commonwealth-Bilderberg effort “has to be seen as part of a far broader school of thought within British political circles in the early 1960s, which maintained that the Commonwealth could best be revitalised through cultural and professional exchanges on an organised but unofficial basis” of which, early on, the Commonwealth Foundation “became perhaps the most tangible expression” (Murphy, ‘By invitation only...’, op cit., p. 250).

⁵⁷ See official website: <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-charter> (last accessed 21/09/2013) and McIntyre, ‘Viewing the Iceberg...’, op cit., p. 103.

⁵⁸ Mole, op cit., p. 540. See Philip Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 100.414 (2011), p. 279, for an idea of the extent of inter-governmental and non-governmental Commonwealth ventures.

⁵⁹ Mansergh, op cit., p. 289.

⁶⁰ Douglas Brinkley, ‘Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech of December 1962’, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 33.3 (1990), p. 601.

supporters would have desired, particularly after the end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa in the 1990s. And yet, viewing the Commonwealth only in terms of unrealised political potential or harking back to dubious or outdated commonalities does injustice to the seemingly more modest but very important accomplishments of the Commonwealth in the past half a century⁶¹. Regardless of its political effectiveness, what is argued here is the lack of recognition in some academic quarters of (a) the contribution of the Commonwealth to the intellectual history of the twentieth century; (b) the Commonwealth as an early example of inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations; and (c) the transnational—defined here as people-to-people contact and genuine North–South relationship—connections of the Commonwealth in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. If Shaw and Ashworth highlighted the neglect of the versatile nature of the Commonwealth in the discipline of IR, within historical studies itself, the Commonwealth rather belatedly received attention for its transnational and non-state properties. The nature and indeed the persistence of the Commonwealth during and after decolonisation were seen as a short-lived and insignificant anomaly by sceptics for a long time⁶². While the collective influence, conscientiousness and popularity of the Commonwealth as a political force today is certainly debatable, it cannot be denied that the Commonwealth has adapted well to become and survive as a genuinely transnational organisation. A somewhat forgotten achievement of the Commonwealth is its evolution (though not without problems) from a select club to an all-inclusive group of states as a result of North–South dialogue⁶³.

⁶¹ See Philip Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, p. 279, for an eloquent argument of the same.

⁶² See McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, pp. 594–595, p. 604, p. 606; David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946–97: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?*, Palgrave Macmillan (1998), p. 101 (for a summary of scholarly opinion on the unflattering prospects of the Commonwealth). See also the by-now well-known ‘Patriotism Based on Reality Not on Dreams’, *The Times*, Thursday, April 2, 1964, p. 13 (it is widely believed that the article was authored by Enoch Powell). David McIntyre traced the disappointingly small amount of attention garnered by the Commonwealth *as an organisation* within academe in the last sixty years. There are, of course, exceptions. For titles that do pay attention to both the inter-governmental and non-governmental aspects of the modern Commonwealth, see McIntyre, ‘UCRCs...’, pp. 595–596. (Pages 592–595 cover the work of early twentieth century historians and work on debates on the process of decolonisation.)

⁶³ See Philip Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, p. 280. John Holmes urged further consolidation of this inclusiveness of the Commonwealth when he observed in 1964 that the Commonwealth had “made non-exclusiveness a virtue” (John W. Holmes, ‘The Commonwealth Faces 1964’, *The Times*, Tuesday, Jan 07, 1964, p. 9). In the period under study in this dissertation, as revealed in the brief discussions in Chapter 2 and the note on the Commonwealth Institute above in footnote 5, imperial–Commonwealth entities, like the political Commonwealth itself, attempted to super-impose the multi-racial Commonwealth family discourse without critical acknowledgement or discussion of the terrible realities of British imperial rule. Philip Murphy endorsed Ruth Craggs’s comment that “a Commonwealth open [to] but critical of its imperial heritage” would be more successful in forging connections in view of the imperial

Matthew Hilton and Rana Mitter, following Erez Manela, saw transnational history as more than a “repackaged diplomatic or international historical approach” and endorsed his call to “adopt a broader conception of international society, one that combines attention to state actors with recognition of the role played by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and transnational ‘epistemic communities’ that produce, circulate, and deploy expert knowledge”⁶⁴. No international body lends itself better to such a study than the Commonwealth of Nations.

How does cricket, the central concern of this dissertation, enter this discussion on transnational perspectives and the Commonwealth? Firstly, as seen in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and above, members of the ICC—‘old’ and ‘new’—viewed ‘international’ cricket as being bounded by an Empire–Commonwealth framework. If the name of the organisation founded in 1909 proudly displayed its imperial genesis, then in the year 1926, its status was consolidated by the introduction of imperial boundaries around official cricket. In the period studied here, members constantly referred to cricket as a ‘Commonwealth’ game. Cricket spread via the British Empire but unlike some other sports, was unable to shake off the imperial association. Secondly, literature on transnational histories and empires emphasises the mutual impact of the metropole and the colonies, in particular highlighting transnational contributions of the colonised. The ICC was a site of North–South dialogue and mutual impact in this period. John Hughson similarly concluded from his research into the making of sporting cultures that the cultural impact of colonialism was felt not only by the colonised country but also by the colonising country. Borrowing the concept of “cultural traffic” from Peter Beilharz’s interpretation of the Australian art historian and anthropologist Bernard Smith’s work, Hughson explained that “cultural traffic can refer to the to-and-fro movement of sports people between centre and periphery for such events as test matches and also the residential relocation of players to take up opportunities in, for example, English inter-county

origin of many present-day problems (Philip Murphy, ‘Britain and the Commonwealth: Confronting the Past—Imagining the Future’, p. 280).

⁶⁴ Both quotes from Hilton & Mitter, *op cit.*, p. 14.

cricket and as ‘professionals’ within county Leagues”⁶⁵. Hughson also provided the example of the ‘wing-forward’ formation pioneered by Thomas Rangiwahia Ellison, a prominent player of the Native team in New Zealand at the turn of the twentieth century. The *pakeha* All-Blacks adopted Ellison’s tactic for two decades before it was countered by the use of the eight-man scrum which was codified in 1932. In thus playing an instrumental role in shaping the rules of present-day international rugby, Ellison and his Native team were another early example of Smith’s ‘cultural traffic’ in sport⁶⁶. Similarly, the Indian royal and cricketer, K.S. ‘Ranji’ Ranjitsinhji, who represented England in cricket at the turn of the twentieth century, is widely credited with the invention of the ‘leg glance’, a cricket stroke now part of every cricketer’s repertoire⁶⁷. These examples of cricket and the ICC demonstrate the richness of transnational links between Commonwealth members. *Put simply, the transnational ICC was a crucial subset of the transnational Commonwealth.*

⁶⁵ Hughson, *op cit.*, p. 78.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁶⁷ Rahul Bhattacharya, ‘1877 - 1902: Ranji’s leg-glance’ on ESPN Cricinfo. Available at: http://static.espncriinfo.com/db/NATIONAL/IND/ZONES/TOSHIBAZONE/years_ranji.html (last accessed: 29/07/2013). Ranji, as Bhattacharya noted, was never a flag-bearer for India or Indians.

Chapter Seven: ‘OXO is British: It Is Made in Britain By a British Company With British Capital and British Labour’

“First the hunter, the missionary and the mercenary, next the soldier and the politician, and then the cricketer – that is the history of British colonialism. And of these civilising influences the last may, perhaps, be said to do the least harm”¹. So wrote the historian and cricketer Cecil Headlam.

The game of cricket is perhaps one of the most enduring and visible legacies of the British Empire. This dissertation was an attempt at exploring this “benign”² influence of the British Empire during the period of decolonisation. Men’s cricket was governed in this period by the Imperial Cricket Conference, a body formed at the height of imperial zeal. Chapter 1 introduced the Imperial Cricket Conference and discussed the imperial motives behind its formation. It drew on a variety of secondary sources to reconstruct major developments in the history of the ICC. Chapter 2 aimed to familiarise the reader with the political backdrop against which the dissertation desired to study the ICC. What were the major landmarks attained during the movement from the label of ‘Empire’ to ‘British Commonwealth’ to ‘Commonwealth’? Was the reconciliation of the old with the new a smooth process? Was decolonisation a story of constant decline in imperial sentiment? How did inter-governmental relations within the new multi-racial Commonwealth of Nations compare with the public rhetoric of family and familiarity? The chapter also conducted a brief, somewhat superficial survey of an array of non-governmental societies, movements and associations—deemed comparable or roughly analogous to the ICC—and their response to changes wrought by decolonisation. Chapter 3 shepherded the dissertation towards its central concern, the ICC, between 1947 and 1965. Through a discussion of the role of the MCC within the imperial scheme of things; the construction and projection of the post-war Imperial Memorial Gallery dedicated to martyred cricketers in London, the ‘nerve-centre’ of both cricket and the Empire; hierarchies within the world of imperial–Commonwealth cricket; ‘proxy’ representation by

¹ Oxford historian and member of the travelling cricket side ‘Oxford Authentics’ that toured India in the winter of 1902-03, Cecil Headlam, quoted in Ramachandra Guha, ‘Cricket and Politics in Colonial India’, *Past & Present*, Vol. 161 (Nov 1998), p. 166; Odendaal, p. 32.

² Headlam in Guha, ‘Cricket and Politics in Colonial India’, p. 166.

English MCC members of cricket boards of the ‘old’ Commonwealth; and finally, the changes of 1964-65 which involved the new name ‘International Cricket Conference’ and admission of non-Commonwealth countries as Associates, Chapter 3 shed light on the intricacies of the ICC. Chapter 4 added to this by examining the position of New Zealand, the admission of Pakistan and the exit of South Africa. Together, Chapters 3 and 4 exposed the machinations that occurred in the meetings of the ICC. These chapters also revealed the extent to which cricket was affected by and was forced to respond to political changes related to decolonisation. The clash of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Commonwealth, much-chronicled in commentary on the political Commonwealth, was evidently echoed in the world of cricket. Chapter 5 fused the previous chapters together. It compared various tropes, attributes and characteristics displayed by the political Commonwealth, the non-governmental Commonwealth and the ICC. The drive to present members of the Commonwealth as a consensual family bound by informality and distinguished from the rest of the world; the recruitment of hospitality for the same; diffusion and reception of values such as ‘fair play’ emphasised as ‘an essential factor’ in Britain’s dealings; the presence of unacknowledged hierarchies across the board in the Commonwealth; substantial (if coincidental in some places) congruence in the chronology of landmark developments; and the tendency to ‘make virtue of necessity’ stood out. Using this juxtaposition in Chapter 5 as a framework and drawing on similar research by scholars of imperial and Commonwealth history, Chapter 6 commented on the ICC’s response to decolonisation. It concluded that in comparison to its reasonably comparable non-government counterparts and the political Commonwealth, the ICC was extremely slow to respond to the evolving political realities. Described as an informal institution that linked members of the Empire–Commonwealth, cricket clung to its imperial past for a very long time and unlike the others, did not follow up the ‘family’ rhetoric with any voluntary engagement with decolonisation. Chapter 6 also introduced literature on transnational perspectives in history. Empires, as historians such as Iriye and Hopkins have pointed out, were inherently transnational conglomerates. The Commonwealth of Nations that emerged from the British Empire offers an excellent present-day example of a truly transnational organisation that encompasses the global North and South. The chapter briefly highlighted (a) the contribution of the Commonwealth to the intellectual history of the twentieth century; (b) the Commonwealth as an early example of inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations; and (c) the genuinely transnational—defined here as people-to-people contact and an inter-constitutive North–South relationship—connections of

the Commonwealth in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (whilst staying alert to avoid the feel-good trap to which transnational perspectives can be susceptible).

Reflecting on the parameters and extension of the dissertation, perhaps a further study could explore the roles of individuals involved closely with the ICC. What can we learn about and from the transnational network of powerful individuals from the Commonwealth at the heart of the ICC (see Appendix A)? During this period, the political Commonwealth saw gatherings of nationalist leaders. The Commonwealth Press Union conferences saw editors and media-persons with nationalist leanings and strong opinions. Some CPU members reflected the dynastic tendencies of media ownership in their countries. The CPU conferences and the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences saw greater participation by women as delegates³. How did the profile of ICC representatives sent by member boards to the “gentlemanly comfortable meetings” of the ICC fare in comparison? Relatedly, as with the MCC running the ICC, the CPU’s central governing executive council was British, based in Britain and helmed by powerful British press barons. To Denis Cryle, “[a]t first appearance, the stability of the British-based executive suggested an organization with uninterrupted links to its imperial past.”⁴ The same can be said of the ICC. As an organisation, the CPU was a mix of imperial idealism and self-interest. Interestingly, however, as noted in Chapter 6, reformers and voices from member boards (Australia, Canada, India and early inclusion of smaller members) were much louder and more effective in the CPU than in the ICC. Further, a study could inquire into the relationship between ICC member boards. It could ask whether ICC representatives from the ‘new’ Commonwealth, whilst calling for equality and fairness at the international level, stayed consistently scrupulous in their approach to the management of domestic cricket affairs. If the administration of cricket in Australia, England, New Zealand and South Africa in this period was affected by racial politics, class and power relations, and a mind-set that reeked of an earlier era, the BCCI was beset by intense regional and internal power struggles, the BCCP as noted in Chapter 4 was affected by political and military interference, and the WICBOC

³ Denis Cryle, ‘The Press Union at the End of Empire: Anglo-Australian Perspectives, 1946–1965’, *Journalism*, Vol. 12.8 (2011), p. 1007 & p. 1011; David McIntyre, ‘The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 1933–59: Precursors of the Tri-Sector Commonwealth’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 36.4 (2008), p. 591 & p. 598.

⁴ Denis Cryle, p. 1008.

battled racial, regional, ethnic and class problems. For a more comprehensive study, the researcher might explore government archives alongside those of member cricket boards for a further examination of the interplay between cricket and Commonwealth politics. In-depth studies in the conventional sense might select fewer areas or member countries for study (from among those in Chapters 3 and 4) and attempt to explore them in greater detail.

Such a catholic effort was, of course, beyond the scope of this (or maybe any *one*) dissertation due to time and funding constraints, the intimidating nature of such ambitions, the breadth of scholarly mastery entailed, and last but certainly not least, the scattered location of relevant primary sources. In fact, any transnational project on cricket and/or the Commonwealth such as the one attempted here can be hugely challenging for all these reasons. Historians alluded to this in the mid-twentieth century, when during and after the formal end of the British Empire, imperial–Commonwealth historiography underwent a much-discussed fragmentation. Philip Curtin, writing in *The American Historical Review* in 1959 on ‘The British Empire and Commonwealth in Recent Historiography’, mulled that “Simultaneous presentation of two or more strands of narrative . . . is technically almost impossible; while isolation of one strand for separate presentation does injustice to the complex realities of Imperial [sic] politics. This problem is one shared to some extent by all historical writing, but it is more severe where Imperial ties connected quite distinct societies to one another.”⁵ More recently, Isabel Hofmeyr, in a discussion on transnational histories in 2006, termed this “a difficult methodological conundrum in its own right”⁶. Pierre-Yves Saunier, reporting on a symposium on transnational historiography held at the Australian National University in the same year, reasoned that “developing a transnational perspective also brings about a renewed humbleness, that which comes from the sheer sense that one is never able to assemble all the pieces, to pull all the strings, to build the complete line up of skills that are required. And after all, it is logistical common sense to realize that you won’t be able to have the time, funding and energy to follow all the trails that are traceable from a transnational point of view. Thus, the results of a transnational research may always have to

⁵ Philip D. Curtin, ‘The British Empire and Commonwealth in Recent Historiography’, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 65.1 (October 1959), p. 77.

⁶ C.A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol and Patricia Seed, ‘AHR Conversation: On Transnational History’, *The American Historical Review*, Vol 111.5 (2006), p. 1450.

do with a sense of failure and incompleteness.”⁷ David Thelen offered that “[p]art of the answer lies in strengthening a tradition of collaborative scholarship”⁸.

Gaps in this dissertation were also created by absence or unavailability of information. For instance, on the question of proxy representation in Chapter 3, one assumes the existence of correspondence between cricket boards of the white dominions and their MCC ‘proxy’. However, there is nothing in the meetings to shed light on it directly. Correspondence held at the MCC was unavailable⁹. This necessitated a careful and alert reading of the minutes under study in a bid to discern any available clue on this matter. Representing South Africa in 1953, senior English MCC member Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth’s comment that “his instructions were to oppose the resolution [tabled by Mr. J.G. Kelshall of the West Indies to alter voting rights under Rule 8]”¹⁰ was the only hint of correspondence between a proxy representative and a dominion board (here, the South African Cricket Association). Expanding the hunt for clues, minutes for 1939 revealed that Plum Warner had represented South Africa in that meeting and that he had been asked by SACA to convey their dislike of timeless test matches¹¹. Lack of access to correspondence similarly hampered efforts to study interaction between member boards and the MCC to create ‘consensus’ on voting rights, name of the organisation and even letters received from anti-apartheid campaigners. The agenda for each ICC conference in summer was set at the start of spring¹², thereby allowing time for correspondence. Very disappointingly, minutes of the ICC meeting

⁷ Pierre-Yves Saunier, ‘Going transnational? News from down under: Transnational History Symposium, Canberra, Australian National University, September 2004’, *Historical Social Research*, Vol. 31.2 (2006), pp. 126-127.

⁸ David Thelen, ‘The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History’, *The Journal of American History*, Vol 86.3 [The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue (Dec., 1999)], p. 974.

⁹ An extensive cataloguing process is now underway at the MCC library which, it is hoped, will be of huge help on such questions to future researchers.

¹⁰ ICC Minutes: July 21, 1953.

¹¹ ICC Minutes: June 14, 1939. Timeless test matches were test matches played to a result without a time limit. Earlier that year, the last and longest timeless test had been played between England and South Africa in Durban from March 3 to March 14. *Wisden* editor Norman Preston reported that “When heavy rain prevented any more cricket after tea on the tenth day the South African Board of Control and the two captains went into conference before issuing a statement that the game had been abandoned because the England team had to catch the 8.05 p.m. train that night (Tuesday) from Durban in order to reach Cape Town in time to make the necessary arrangements for their departure on the Athlone Castle on Friday. The date of sailing for England could not be postponed.” [*Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack* report on ESPN Cricinfo. Available at: <http://www.espncriinfo.com/wisdenalmanack/content/story/151863.html> (last accessed 31/07/2013)].

This ICC meeting in 1939 was the last before the WWII hiatus. The next ICC meeting was held in 1946.

¹² The deadline was March 1 according to ICC archives: ‘Rules of the Imperial Cricket Conference – Adopted by the Imperial Cricket Conference on 28th June, 1950 (Amended 21st July, 1953; 17th July, 1958; and 15th July, 1959)’ and *The Times*, Friday, Jun 02, 1950, p. 5.

in 1965, the closing year of this study, were not available and had to be reconstructed from newspaper coverage. As seen earlier, it was a significant year in which the name of the organisation and membership rules underwent changes. Gubby Allen was Chairman of the ICC (and President of the MCC) in the 1964 meeting when these resolutions were readied to be passed in 1965. No real dissent was recorded in 1964 and none was recorded by newspaper reports in 1965. Interestingly, however, as noted in Chapter 3 (footnote 76), E.W. Swanton wrote that “Gubby suffered a political defeat at Lord’s when he unsuccessfully opposed the admission of associate members to the ICC” in 1965¹³.

Nevertheless, this dissertation has portrayed the Imperial Cricket Conference as one among a plethora of individuals, institutions and interest groups that participated in the process of decolonisation of the British Empire. Collectively, they offer a richer picture of both the impact of decolonisation and the evolution of the Commonwealth. Cricket’s encounter with decolonisation was unhappy and protracted. To reiterate the argument stated in Chapter 6: against the backdrop of the demise of the British Empire, the Imperial Cricket Conference could be considered a Commonwealth interest group that, as a transnational site, continuously grappled with conflict arising from lingering (real and imagined) ‘bonds’ of empire and assertion of British soft power on the one hand, and increasing assertion of national identity and rights by member states on the other. One can read the ICC as a microcosm of important debates within the Empire and the Commonwealth in this period. On the one hand, the ICC was seen as a ‘family’ of Commonwealth members facilitating closer ties between them. Membership of the “British Commonwealth” remained mandatory to play official cricket until 1965. On the other hand, the ICC also witnessed effects of changes in the Empire and Commonwealth. The ICC is a rich repository of information on decolonisation and cricket and decolonisation *in* cricket.

Commonwealth statesmen and historians have for long alluded to cricket as a valued Commonwealth ‘bond’, alongside the English language, political institutions and

¹³ E.W. Swanton, *Gubby Allen: Man of Cricket*, Hutchinson (1985), p. 285.

democracy¹⁴. However, there has been little academic engagement with cricket in Commonwealth studies, let alone a sustained study of cricket and decolonisation. John Strachey, a minister in Clement Atlee's post-war Labour government reportedly once remarked that "To know a no ball from a googly and a point of order from a supplementary question is genuinely to have something in common"¹⁵. English cricketer P.A. Gibb, in his diary on the 1953-54 Commonwealth XI cricket tour of India, wrote of the many speeches during high-profile receptions—including one hosted by Prime Minister Nehru—that constantly stressed the goodwill generated by these tours between peoples in the Commonwealth. Gibb recorded that there was plenty of "sanctimonious humbug" and one speaker in the western city of Nagpur even drew a connection between cricket and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹⁶! Politicians from the Commonwealth continue to make such largely perfunctory, hollow and politically-calculated references to cricket. A dinner marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Commonwealth was (tellingly enough) held at Lord's in October 2009. (Incidentally, it was also the centenary of the ICC!) The event brought cricket and the Commonwealth together, prompting the keynote speaker, former Prime Minister of Britain Sir John Major to reflect on these "two institutions that inter-link and endure" and on cricket which "continues to provide the cement that keeps together fifty-three diverse nations of varying size and wealth, across continents and oceans. Often, their interests converge, sometimes they collide, but they all share a common affection for cricket"¹⁷. Conferring membership of the Order of Australia on Indian cricketer Sachin Tendulkar in November 2012, then Prime Minister of Australia Julia Gillard's statement reminded readers that "Cricket is of course a great bond between Australia and India."¹⁸ On his trips to India in July 2010 and February 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron indulged in a spot of casual cricket in well-covered photo-opportunities and wrote in the Indian newspaper *The Hindu*: "We share so much culturally, whether it's watching [the actor]

¹⁴ Often, a common reason for disillusionment with the functioning of the Commonwealth of Nations is the gap between such claims and their actual enforcement.

¹⁵ Michael Dawson, 'Acting Global, Thinking Local: 'Liquid Imperialism' and the Multiple Meanings of the 1954 British Empire & Commonwealth Games', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 23.1 (2006), pp. 4-5.

¹⁶ Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, Picador (2002), pp. 323-324.

¹⁷ Full speech: <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2376.html> (last accessed: 22/07/2013).

¹⁸ Report on the website of the *Sydney Morning Herald* newspaper dated November 7, 2012. Available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/sport/cricket/tendulkar-receives-order-of-australia-20121107-28wxu.html> (last accessed: 09/07/2013).

Shah Rukh Khan, eating the same food or watching cricket.”¹⁹ Cricket, then, is often among the few notable enduring Commonwealth connections sometimes leading it, at once, to appear trite, overworked and cursory. Brian Stoddart wrote of a 1998 Australian parliamentary inquiry that noted a conspicuous and regrettable absence of a meaningful cultural and commercial relationship between Australia and India. The subtitle of the report—‘Commonwealth, Common Language, Cricket and Beyond’—pithily captured the need for engagement to move beyond references to the usual three suspects²⁰. Likewise, many academic works on the Commonwealth and decolonisation make a note of cricket as an important unofficial Commonwealth tie but do not probe the connection further. Marc Frey highlighted that David McIntyre’s chapter ‘Commonwealth Legacy’ in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol 4: The Twentieth Century* informed readers that “the Commonwealth . . . forms the most noticeable part of the Imperial legacy after the English language and cricket”²¹. Shaw and Ashworth noted that “. . . given the cultures of the Commonwealth, sports have always been central, both in intergovernmental contexts such as the Commonwealth Games, which started in 1930, and unofficial ones like cricket and rugby, which are centred on the Commonwealth, though others now play too.”²² Writing in the early 1960s about the collapse of the West Indian Federation, Elisabeth Wallace of the University of Toronto wrote that “West Indianism” was liveliest “[n]ot in attitudes towards federation wherein insular sentiment has usually been dominant, but in a common enthusiasm for cricket and a practical concern for neighbouring islands struck by . . . natural disasters”²³. A West Indian Commission set up to explore prospects of unity and cooperation in the region and chaired by the Guyanese former Commonwealth Secretary-General and former Chancellor of

¹⁹ Article written by David Cameron for *The Hindu* newspaper dated July 27, 2010 during his visit to India. Available at: <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-stronger-wider-deeper-relationship/article537003.ece> (last accessed: 09/07/2013).

²⁰ Brian Stoddart, ‘The Centrality of Cricket in Indo-Australian relations: India, Australia and the ‘Cricket Imaginary’, *International Journal of the History of Sport*, Vol. 25.12 (2008), pp. 1681-1682.

²¹ Marc Frey, book review of *The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth* by Krishnan Srinivasan, published on H-Soz-u-Kult for H-Net Reviews (January 2007). Available at: <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=21436> (last accessed: 27/07/2013). McIntyre also noted that “Cricket and rugby provide more continuous libation, but they are not enjoyed in a Commonwealth context, even if most of the rival teams come from Commonwealth countries” (David McIntyre, “Viewing the Iceberg from Down Under: A New Zealand Perspective”, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, Vol. 39.3 (2001), p. 110).

²² Tim Shaw and Lucian Ashworth, ‘Commonwealth perspectives on International Relations’, *International Affairs*, Vol 86.5 (2010), p. 1162. Interestingly, while non-Commonwealth members have joined the ICC as ‘Associate’ and ‘Affiliate’ members, Test-level cricket continues to be played solely between Commonwealth members as before. The irony (for historians) is that the most deserving and most persistent contender for membership to this current Commonwealth club of Test-playing members today is Ireland!

²³ Elisabeth Wallace, ‘The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall’, *International Journal*, Vol. 17 (1961-62), p. 285.

the Universities of Warwick, the West Indies and Guyana, Sonny Ramphal, delivered its report entitled *Time for Action* in 1992. It devoted a mere three of its 592 pages to cricket. And yet, the report recognised that “In respect of cricket in particular we express our strong belief that, as a tried definer of our common identity, the West Indian cricket team, and the game back home which underlies the team’s immense international success, needs to be cherished . . . ”²⁴ Memories of the role of cricket in the ‘Age of Nationalism’ in the West Indies are still very strong. Writing in 1995, it was no exaggeration for Hilary Beckles to point out: “That cricket constitutes the first and most popular forum in which West Indies human resources were brought together for regional promotion remains a powerful historical fact that cannot be minimised.”²⁵ In 2009, “conscious of the integral role of cricket in fortifying the West Indian sense of identity”, Sir Ramphal agreed to mediate long-running and crippling disputes between the West Indies cricket board and the cricketers²⁶. This dissertation has attempted to address this gap by probing further the historical role of cricket in the Commonwealth at the crucial time of its evolution in the mid-twentieth century.

The other contribution of this dissertation is its institutional study of the ICC, though it is by no means an exhaustive one. Historical studies of cricket have more often than not focused on the Victorian imperial games ethic; a somewhat unavoidable Anglo-centric view of its evolution; or postcolonial-national accounts of its evolution in (former) colonies. The overwhelming majority of academic and non-academic literature on cricket could be classified as social history. This dissertation has introduced fresh institutional and transnational perspectives. And even though the main source of material for this dissertation was a sports body (the MCC), to an extent, this dissertation has answered Jeffrey Hill’s call for a study of sport from a political historical perspective²⁷. This dissertation has used a Commonwealth framework to analyse the ICC during the period of decolonisation and to highlight its transnational nature.

²⁴ Hilary McD Beckles, *The development of West Indies cricket Vol.2: The Age of Globalization*, Pluto (1998), pp. 105-106.

²⁵ Hilary Beckles, ‘Introduction’, in Hilary McD Beckles & Brian Stoddart, eds., *Liberation Cricket: West Indies Cricket Culture*, Manchester University Press (1995), p. 4.

²⁶ Professor Norman Girvan, ‘The Caribbean’s Diplomat: Reflections on the contribution of Sir Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal, Chancellor Emeritus of The UWI’, *The Pelican* (a magazine of the University of the West Indies). Available at: <http://www2.sta.uwi.edu/pelican/features/article3pg3.asp> (last accessed: 10/09/2013).

²⁷ Jeffrey Hill, ‘Introduction: Sport and Politics’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 38.3 Sport and Politics (July 2003), pp. 355-356.

By way of concluding thoughts, on a personal note, bringing together literature on cricket, the Commonwealth and transnational perspectives made for an exciting research journey. The reward for the broad frame of reference maintained in this dissertation was the discovery of unexpected and idiosyncratic intersections in existing research in these three areas: for instance, the popularity of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency in literature on transnational perspectives and ideas of internationalism found echoes in work done on Evert Barger, an UNRRA man who was appointed Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Press Union in 1956 and carried his internationalist ideas to the CPU²⁸; it is an amusing thought that a country as far removed today from cricket as Canada unwittingly played a big part in India staying within the Imperial Cricket Conference through its role in negotiations on India in the 1947–1949 period²⁹; the extremely interesting transnational story of the Anglo-German meat extract OXO came to an end in 1914 when for political reasons the German connection was severed, and to establish OXO’s British credentials, who should it have been re-launched under but cricket’s very own Lord Hawke, a “decidedly English chairman” under whom it was marketed with the slogan ‘OXO is British: It Is Made in Britain By a British Company With British Capital and British Labour’³⁰!

²⁸ See footnotes 19 and 29 in Chapter 6.

²⁹ See Chapter 2 for Canada’s contribution and Chapter 4 for India’s retention in the Commonwealth paving the way for its retention in the ICC in 1950.

³⁰ Jan Rüger, ‘OXO: Or, the Challenges of Transnational History’, *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 40 (2010), p. 658 & p. 663; quotes on p. 662.

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Appendix I: ICC representatives between 1938 and 1964

Date/Year	Country Represented	Names	Author's Notes
June 15, 1938	President of MCC (Chair)	Earl Baldwin of Bewdley	Stanley Baldwin, former PM of Britain
	MCC	Viscount Cobham & Sir Pelham Warner	Cobham – John Lyttelton, 9th Viscount Cobham Treasurer of MCC President of Worcestershire CCC in 1949 (year of death) Father MCC President in 1886 Uncle MCC President in 1898 Son MCC President in 1954 Aide-de-camp to British High Commissioner in South Africa in 1905-08 Tory MP 1910-1916
	Australia	Justice H.V. Evatt & Mr W.H. Jeanes	
	South Africa	Mr W.H. Mars, KC & Mr H.D.G. Leveson-Gower	Leveson-Gower – Henry Dudley Gresham Leveson-Gower England Test selector in 1909 Chairman of selectors in 1924 & 1928-1930 Surrey Treasurer 1926-1928 President of Surrey CCC 1929 Knighted for his services to cricket in 1953 Heavily involved in the Scarborough Festival
	India	Mr A.S. de Mello & Col C.B. Rubie	“Lt-Col CB Rubie” mentioned in the 1946 ICC minutes in the list of Indian ('European') cricketers lost in the war years Played for Sussex, Karachi, Northern India and Europeans (in India)

			Pre-Partition inter-school tournament in Karachi named after him
	New Zealand	Mr A.H.H. Gilligan & Mr L.E.L. Donne	Donne – most likely served in the army Had business interests in London Most likely the son of T.E. Donne, a New Zealand civil servant who worked in the New Zealand High Commission in London
	West Indies	Mr R.H. Mallett	Mallett – Richard Henry Mallett For long, an agent & representative of overseas bodies Managed touring sides to the West Indies Played central role in unification of the 4 main cricketing islands and formation of the WICBOC
June 14, 1939	President of MCC (Chair)	Mr Stanley Christopherson	Longest-serving MCC President/ICC Chairman due to WWII Major figure in the City of London and from 1943-45, temporary chairman of the Midland Bank (now part of HSBC)
	MCC	Viscount Cobham & Col the Hon Sir Stanley Jackson	(Cobham here – John Lyttelton, 9th Viscount Cobham)
	Australia	Dr. R Macdonald	
	South Africa	Sir Pelham Warner & Mr H.D.G. Leveson-Gower	
	West Indies	The Hon F.J. Seaford & Mr J.M. Kidney	
	New Zealand	Mr A. Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	Sims – Arthur Sims Knighted in 1950 for services in medicine and education to the British Commonwealth Noted businessman (based in London), philanthropist and financier
	India	Mr S. Lall & Mr C.P. Johnstone	Johnstone – Conrad Powell Johnstone

			Kent and Madras all-rounder Part of European management of Burmah-Shell oil based in India and major benefactor of Indian cricket and hockey
January 15, 1946	Treasurer of MCC (Chair)	Viscount Cobham	Stanley Christopherson, President – unable to attend (Cobham here – John Lyttelton, 9th Viscount Cobham)
	MCC	Col the Hon Sir Stanley Jackson	Francis Stanley Jackson At various points, Governor of Bengal, Unionist MP and Finance Secretary in War Office Military action in Second Boer War and WWI President of MCC 1921 Chairman of Test Match Selection Committee in 1934 President of Yorkshire County Cricket Club at the time of death in 1947 Business interests Privy Council His ‘fag’ at Harrow was Winston Churchill His father William Lawies Jackson, 1st Baron Allerton PC, was a member of Cabinet in Lord Salisbury’s second Government
	Australia	Mr G.O. Allen & Mr R.W.V. Robins	Robins – Robert Walter Vivian Robins England Test selector from 1946 to 1949 & in 1954 Chairman of the Test selection Committee from 1962 to 1964
	South Africa	Mr H.D.G. Leveson-Gower & Group Capt A.J. Holmes	Holmes – Albert John Holmes Chairman of England’s Test Selection Committee in 1939

			Chairman of the same for 4 years after WWII Royal Air Force (decorated) Manager of MCC team to South Africa in 1938-39 (a country he represented at the ICC) Captain of Sussex Pioneer of mink farming in England
	India	Sir Kenneth Fitze	
	New Zealand	Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	Alfred Herbert Harold Gilligan Brother of a former England captain, A.E.R. Gilligan
	West Indies	Sir Pelham Warner	
May 19, 1947	President of MCC (Chair)	Lord Cornwallis	
	MCC	Sir Pelham Warner & Mr W. Findlay	
	Australia	Mr G.O. Allen & Mr R.W.V. Robins	
	South Africa	Mr S.J. Pitts & Mr A.S. Frames	Pitts – Stephen John Pitts Former President of SACA and Vice-President for over 20 years Frames – Algernon Sidney Frames Secretary-Treasurer of SACA Lifelong member of MCC and Hampshire CCC
	India	Mr A.S. de Mello	Anthony de Mello Founder-Secretary of BCCI Employee of India-based British industrialist and BCCI founder Grant Govan (who headed both the BCCI and the Cricket Club of India) Major figure in the BCCI after WWII
	West Indies	Mr R.K. Nunes	Robert Karl Nunes President of the WICBOC and Jamaican Cricket Association
	New Zealand	Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	

July 19, 1948	President of MCC (Chair)	Earl of Gowrie	Sir Alexander Gore Arkwright Hore-Ruthven, 1st Earl of Gowrie Nicknamed 'Sandie' Extensive military appointments Awarded Victoria Cross for military work in Africa Governor-General of Australia (longest because of the war) Previously, Governor of South Australia and New South Wales Wife Zara Eileen attached to the Red Cross and the Victoria League in Australia Mediator in the Bodyline crisis
	MCC	Capt Lord Cornwallis & Mr. W. Findlay	
	Australia	Mr. K.O.E. Johnson & Mr. R.W.V. Robins	Johnson – Flight Lieutenant Keith Ormond Edley Johnson Manager of the 1948 Australian 'Invincibles' During public relations exercises in London with the Royal Australian Air Force, he was manager of Australian Services XI that played Victory Matches against England in 1945 and which was praised by Evatt in Wisden for its role in restoring post-war cricket RAAF during WWII For 17 years, member of the ACB Made MBE for services to cricket
	South Africa	Group Captain A.J. Holmes & Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	Stanyforth – Ronald Thomas Stanyforth Well-known army and club cricketer Well-regarded as orator, including compliments on a 1927-28 trip from General Smuts of South Africa, a country which Stanyforth would later

			frequently represent at the ICC
	West Indies	Mr. C.R. Browne & Sir Pelham Warner	Browne – Cyril Rutherford Browne Lawyer and accomplished cricketer
	New Zealand	Mr. A. Sims & Mr. A.H.H. Gilligan	
	India	Mr. A.S. de Mello & Mr. P. Gupta	Gupta – Pankaj Gupta Well-known Indian sports administrator
June 27 & June 28, 1950	President of MCC (Chair)	Sir Pelham Warner	
	MCC	Mr. W. Findlay & Mr. E.R.T. Holmes	Holmes – Errol Reginald Thorold Holmes Member of MCC (1949 to 1953) and Surrey cricket committees A highly-regarded Surrey and England cricketer Business interests
	Australia	Mr. R.J.A. Massie & Mr. R.W.V. Robins	Massie – Robert John Allwright Massie Son of a former Australian Test captain All-round athlete During WWI action in Gallipoli, it is said that “he tied a scarlet rag to his right arm so it would be a clear target for the Turkish marksmen and not his bowling arm” though the tactic did not work and war wounds cut his sporting career short
	South Africa	Hon Mr. Justice J.E. de Villiers & Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	
	West Indies	Mr. R.K. Nunes & Mr. F.A.C. Clairmonte	Clairmonte – Frederick Archibald Conrad Clairmonte West Indies selector
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr. A.H.H. Gilligan	
	India	Mr. A.S. de Mello & Mr. Z.R. Irani	Irani – lifelong association with Indian cricket Variously President and Treasurer Irani Trophy in domestic first-class cricket in India named after him

July 28, 1952	President of MCC (Chair)	Mr W. Findlay	William Findlay MCC Secretary 1926–1936 (succeeded by R.S. Rait Kerr) Assistant Secretary of MCC from 1919 (to F.E. Lacey) Secretary of Surrey County Cricket Club 1907 President of Lancashire County Cricket Club 1947–1948
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham	
	Australia	Mr B.A. Barnett	
	South Africa	Mr R.E. Grieveson & Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	Grieveson – Ronald Eustace Grieveson Former South Africa wicket-keeper, perhaps best-remembered for his polished performances in the 1939 timeless Test match between England and South Africa
	West Indies	Mr W.M. Green & Mr C.R. Browne	Green – William Maurice Green British Guiana
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	India	Mr P. Gupta	
July 21, 1953	President of MCC (Chair)	Duke of Beaufort	Henry Hugh Arthur Fitzroy Somerset, 10th Duke of Beaufort Leading figure of equestrian activities and Lord-Lieutenant of Gloucestershire
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham & Sir Pelham Warner	
	Australia	Mr G. Davies & Mr B.A. Barnett	Davies – George Davies Manager of Australia team touring England concurrent to the ICC meeting Vice-President of Victorian Cricket Association Member of ACB from state of Victoria Public servant
	South Africa	Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth & Col R.S. Rait	

		Kerr	
	India	Mr Sunder Kabadi	Correspondent for the <i>Amrita Bazar Patrika</i> and distinguished journalist based in London
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	West Indies	Mr R.K. Nunes & Mr J.G. Kelshall	Kelshall – West Indies selector
	Pakistan	Mr S. Nazeer Ali	Likely a misspelling of S. Nazir Ali Gifted batsman who represented undivided India before 1947, including the inaugural 1932 Test match Later a prominent administrator in Pakistani cricket
July 14, 1955	President of MCC (Chair)	Viscount Cobham	Charles Lyttelton, 10th Viscount Cobham Governor-General of New Zealand 1957–1962 Close family ties to South Africa and New Zealand, and extensive business interests in South Africa Later President of Worcestershire County Cricket Club
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham & Col R.S. Rait Kerr	Rait Kerr – Rowan Scrope Rait Kerr Secretary of M.C.C. from 1936 to 1952 Well-known as a cricketer in India, playing in the Quadrangular Tournament and for the Army Largely responsible for the codifications of the Laws of Cricket, issued in 1939 and 1947 Assisted Altham in his formation of MCC Youth Cricket Association Daughter Diana worked as Curator at Lord's
	Australia	Mr H. Bushby & Mr R.W.V. Robins	Bushby – Charles Harold Bushby Former Chairman of the ACB Lawyer, cricket administrator with interests in politics

	South Africa	Brig A.H. Coy & Mr K.G. Viljoen	Viljoen – Kenneth George Viljoen Former South Africa captain and manager Succeeded Foster-Bowley as President of SACA Recalled that the 1939 timeless Test between England and South Africa (see Chapter 7, footnote 11) was “the only time he needed two haircuts during a match”
	India	Maharaj Kumar Sir Vijaya Ananda of Vizianagram	Nicknamed ‘Vizzy’ BCCI President, administrator, commentator and former India captain
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	West Indies	Sir Allan Collymore	President of Barbados Cricket Association
	Pakistan	Group Capt M.M.A. Cheema	Possibly a selector
July 20, 1956	President of MCC (Chair)	Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis	
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham & Mr G.O. Allen	
	Australia	Mr W.J. Dowling & Mr R.W.V. Robins	Dowling – William Dowling Chairman of ACB
	South Africa	Mr G.W.A. Chubb & Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	Chubb – Geoffrey Walter Ashton Chubb President of SACA
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	West Indies	Mr R.K. Nunes & Mr R.C. Marley	Marley – Robert Cecil Marley Jamaican cricketer
	India	Mr A.S. de Mello & Mr A.N. Ghose	
	Pakistan	Mr A.T. Naqvi	Chairman of BCCP
July 17, 1958	President of MCC (Chair)	Duke of Norfolk	Bernard Marmaduke Fitzalan-Howard, 16th Duke of Norfolk Manager of England team to Australia in 1962-63 President of Sussex County Cricket Club Horse-racing enthusiast
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham & Mr G.O. Allen	
	Australia	Mr B.A. Barnett & Mr R.W.V. Robins	Barnett – Benjamin Arthur Barnett

	South Africa	Brig A.H. Coy & Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	Coy – Arthur Heder Coy SACA President 1953-1955 & 1957-1959
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	West Indies	Mr B.K. Castor	Brian Kenneth Castor
	India	Maharaj Kumar Dr Sir Vijaya of Vizianagram & Wing Cdr K.L. Khanna	
	Pakistan	Sqdn Ldr S.H. Zakaria	
July 15, 1959	President Designate, MCC (Chair)	Mr H.S. Altham	50 th anniversary of ICC
	Australia	Mr B.A. Barnett & Mr R.W.V. Robins	
	South Africa	Brig A.H. Coy & Lt-Col R.T. Stanyforth	
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims	
	West Indies	Mr B.K. Castor	
	India	HH Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda & Mr A.N. Ghose	Ghose – Secretary of BCCI
	Pakistan	Group Capt Salahuddin	
	MCC	Col R.S. Rait Kerr & Mr G.O. Allen	
July 14-15, 1960	President of MCC (Chair)	Mr H.S. Altham	Chair's observation – "more members of Overseas Boards present than ever before"
	MCC	Sir Hubert Ashton & Mr G.O. Allen	
	Australia	Mr W.J. Dowling & Sir Donald Bradman	
	South Africa	Mr G.W.A. Chubb & Mr R.E. Foster Bowley	Foster Bowley – Vice-President of SACA and President the following year
	West Indies	Mr J. St F. Dare & Mr A. Drayton	Dare – John St Felix Dare President of WICBOC British Guiana Drayon – Alec Drayton

			Treasurer of WICBOC British Guiana
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	India	Mr M.A. Chidambaram & HH Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda	<p>Maharaja Fatesinghrao Gaekwad of Baroda Art collector, hunter-turned-conservationist, part-time cricketer and member of the international jet set President of BCCI 1963-64 to 1965-66 and Vice-President from 1959-60 to 1962-63 Managed Indian team to England on several occasions 1959 onwards Headed the Baroda Cricket Association from 1960 Radio commentator and honorary life member of the MCC</p>
	Pakistan	HE Lt-Gen Mohammad Yousuf	
July 19, 1961	President of MCC (Chair)	Sir Hubert Ashton	<p>Business interests Conservative MP for Chelmsford from 1950 to 1964 Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Home Secretary Married to sister of Labour party leader Hugh Gaitskell President of Essex County Cricket Club from 1948</p>
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham & Mr G.O. Allen	<p>Altham – Harry Surtees Altham Treasurer of MCC</p>
	Australia	Mr S.G. Webb & Mr E.G. Macmillan	<p>Macmillan – Ewart Macmillan Chairman of ACB</p>
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr A.H.H. Gilligan	
	India	Mr M.A. Chidambaram & HH The Maharajah of Baroda	<p>Chidambaram - Muttaiya Annamalai Chidambaram</p>

			Industrialist and cricket administrator President and Vice-President of BCCI President of Tamil Nadu Cricket Association
	Pakistan	Mr Muzaffar Husain & Mr Mohammed Saeed	Muzaffar Husain – most likely Muzaffar Hussain, Chairman of BCCP and President of Karachi Cricket Association
	West Indies	Mr J.B. Stollmeyer & Mr E. Scott Johnson	Stollmeyer – Jeffrey Baxter Stollmeyer From wealthy Trinidad plantation family Well-known cricketer and administrator in West Indies cricket Long-time member of WICBOC and Test selector President of WICBOC in 1974 Senator in the Trinidadian Parliament Business interests Shortly before death in 1989, named Australia's first Honorary Consul in Trinidad and Tobago Died during robbery attempt on his house
	By invitation as an observer (South Africa)	Mr R.E. Foster Bowley	President of SACA until 1962
July 18, 1962	President of MCC (Chair)	Col Sir William Worsley, Bart.	President of Yorkshire County Cricket Club and former Yorkshire captain Business interests Daughter married the Duke of Kent in 1961, the year he assumed Presidency of the MCC
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham & Mr G.O. Allen	
	Australia	Mr H. Bushby & Mr B.A. Barnett	
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr J.L. Ken	J.L. Ken – most likely a misspelling of John Lambert Kerr NZCC Chairman
	West Indies	Mr J. St. F. Dare & Dr C.B. Clarke	Clarke – Carlos Bertram Clarke Barbados

	Pakistan	Mr Muzaffar Husain	
	India	Mr M.A. Chidambaram & HH Maharaj Gaekwad of Baroda	
July 17, 1963	President of MCC (Chair)	Lt-Col The Lord Nugent	<p>Terence Edmund Gascoigne Nugent (Tim Nugent) Played a lot of club cricket, much of it for the Household Brigade First MCC President to visit Australia during an MCC tour there President of Surrey County Cricket Club 1966-69 Gave the address at Sir Pelham Warner's memorial service</p>
	MCC	Mr H.S. Altham	
	Australia	Mr B.A. Barnett & Mr R.W.V. Robins	
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Viscount Cobham	Charles Lyttelton, 10th Viscount Cobham
	West Indies	Mr J. St. F. Dare & Mr F.M. Worrell	<p>Worrell – Frank Mortimer Maglinne Worrell First black Test captain of the West Indies Senator of the Upper House of the Jamaican House of Representatives BSc graduate of the University of Manchester Warden of the University College of the West Indies</p>
	Pakistan	Hon Chief Justice A.R. Cornelius & Mr M. Saeed	<p>Cornelius – Alvin Robert Cornelius Supreme Court judge and later, Chief Justice of Pakistan Punjab Cricket Association Punjab nominee alongside nominees of Sind and North West Frontier Province Cricket Associations as first Vice-Presidents of the BCCP</p>
	India	Mr M.A. Chidambaram & HH Maharaj Gaekwad of Baroda	
July 18, 1964	President of MCC (Chair)	Mr G.O. Allen	

	MCC	Mr F.G. Mann & Mr C.G.A. Paris	Mann – Francis George Mann Former captain of England Military action in WWII Variously Secretary, Chairman and President of Middlesex County Cricket Club Chairman of TCCB and Cricket Council President of MCC 1984-85 Business interests (family brewery; “that ready adjunct of both the soldier and the cricketer, namely, beer”) Wife South African Paris – Cecil Gerard Alexander Hampshire County Cricket Club stalwart
	Australia	Mr R.C. Steele & Mr J.A. Ledward	Steele – Treasurer of ACB Ledward – John Allan Ledward Victoria
	New Zealand	Sir Arthur Sims & Mr K.A. Sandford	(K.A. Sandford most likely typing error for K.L. Sandford) Kenneth Leslie Sandford President of NZCC Distinguished lawyer, author and public figure Associated with New Zealand Cricket Board of Control for 15 years
	West Indies	Mr J.D. Goddard	John Douglas Claude Goddard A highly-scrutinised and (politically) controversial former West Indies captain; a predecessor of Worrell
	India	HH Maharaj Gaekwad of Baroda & Mr M.A. Chidambaram	

	Pakistan	Mr S. Fida Hassan	Chairman of BCCP
	By invitation as an observer (India)	Mr M. Chinnaswamy	At various points, President, Vice-President and Secretary of BCCI Presumably present in London for an important cricket function. At the start of the meeting, "Chair thanked HH Maharaj Gaekwad of Baroda & MA Chidambaram for their generous hospitality at the party they had given the previous evening to the representatives attending this Conference & others"

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Notes:

Secretary & Assistant Secretary of MCC present in all meetings.

Author's Notes column to be read in conjunction with notes on some representatives contained within the main body of the dissertation.

Repetition has been avoided. Blanks in the last column may indicate presence of further information within the main body of the dissertation, absence of known achievements as player or administrator or in a very small minority, a complete lack of information.

See existing research of Beckles, Guha, Majumdar, Oborne, Valiotis, Jack Williams and the titles listed in footnote 2 of Chapter 1 for information on some of these administrators in individual countries.

Appendix II: Cricket tours between 1946 and 1965

Year	Tour	Notes
1946	India tour of England: May–September, 1946 (3 tests)	
1946-47	MCC tour of Australia: October 1946–March 1947 (5 tests) MCC tour of New Zealand: March 1947 (1 test) <i>Ceylon Cricket Association tour of India: February, 1947</i>	
1947	South Africa tour of England: April–September, 1947 (5 tests)	
1947-48	India tour of Australia: October 1947–February 1948 (5 tests) MCC tour of West Indies: January–April 1948 (4 tests)	First-ever (Bowen, p. 356: “Despite partition, the team represented undivided India”)
1948	Australia tour of England: April–September, 1948 (5 tests)	
1948-49	West Indies tour of India: October 1948–February 1949 (5 tests) <i>West Indies tour of Pakistan: November 1948</i> <i>West Indies tour of Ceylon: February 1949</i> MCC tour of South Africa: October 1948–March 1949 (5 tests)	First-ever
1949	New Zealand tour of England: April–September, 1949 (4 tests)	
1949-50	Australia tour of South Africa: December 1949–March 1950 (5 tests) <i>Commonwealth tour of India: October 1949–March 1950</i> <i>Commonwealth tour of Ceylon: February 1950</i> <i>Commonwealth XI vs combined Ceylon–India–Pakistan XI: March 1950 (played in Colombo, Ceylon)</i> <i>Ceylon tour of Pakistan: March–April, 1950</i>	First Commonwealth tour of India
1950	West Indies tour of England: May–September, 1950 (4 tests)	
1950-51	MCC tour of Australia: October 1950–February 1951 (5 tests) MCC tour of New Zealand: March 1951 (2 tests) <i>Commonwealth tour of India: October 1950–March 1951</i>	Thirteenth MCC tour of Australia Eighth MCC tour of New Zealand Second Commonwealth tour of India

	<i>Commonwealth tour of Ceylon: February 1951</i> <i>Commonwealth XI vs combined Ceylon–India–Pakistan XI: February 1951 (played in Colombo, Ceylon)</i>	
1951	South Africa tour of England: May–September, 1951 (5 tests) <i>South Africa tour of the Netherlands: September, 1951</i>	
1951-52	MCC tour of India: October 1951–February 1952 (5 tests) <i>MCC tour of Pakistan: November–December, 1951</i> <i>MCC tour of Ceylon: February 1952</i> <i>MCC vs Commonwealth XI: February 1952 (played in Colombo, Ceylon)</i> West Indies tour of Australia: October 1951–January 1952 (5 tests) West Indies tour of New Zealand: February 1952 (2 tests)	Third MCC tour of India Second West Indies tour of Australia
1952	India tour of England: May–September, 1952 (4 tests)	First tour of England by post-partition India A Pakistan Eaglets team (not first-class) also visited England
1952-53	Pakistan tour of India: October–December, 1952 (5 tests) South Africa tour of Australia: October 1952–March 1953 (5 tests) South Africa tour of New Zealand: February–March, 1952 (2 tests) India tour of West Indies: January–April, 1953 (5 tests) <i>Ceylon tour of India: February 1953</i>	First-ever Third South Africa tour of Australia Second South Africa tour of New Zealand First-ever
1953	Australia tour of England: April–September, 1953 (5 tests) <i>MCC tour of the Netherlands: August 1953</i>	
1953-54	New Zealand tour of South Africa: December 1953–February 1954 (5 tests) MCC tour of West Indies: January–April, 1954 (5 tests) <i>New Zealand tour of Australia: March 1954 (state sides; no official tests)</i> <i>Commonwealth tour of India: October 1953–February 1954</i> <i>Fiji tour of New Zealand: February 1954</i> <i>Pakistan Services tour of Ceylon: December 1953–January 1954</i> <i>Madras tour of Ceylon: January–February, 1954</i>	First New Zealand tour of South Africa Seventh MCC tour marked by unpleasantness Gopalan Trophy instituted between the two
1954	Pakistan tour of England: May–September, 1954 (4 tests) <i>Canada tour of England: August 1954 (including one match between Canada and Pakistan)</i>	First-ever

1954-55	MCC tour of Australia: October 1954–March 1955 (5 tests) MCC tour of New Zealand: March 1955 (2 tests) India tour of Pakistan: December 1954–March 1955 [5 tests; first test played in Dacca (later, Dhaka)] <i>Pakistan Services and Bahawalpur Cricket Association tour of India: December 1954</i> Australia tour of West Indies: March–June, 1955 (5 tests)	Fourteenth MCC tour of Australia First-ever First-ever
1955	South Africa tour of England: May–September, 1955 (5 tests)	Eleventh South Africa tour of England
1955-56	New Zealand tour of Pakistan: October–November, 1955 (3 tests; third test played in Dacca) New Zealand tour of India: November 1955–January 1956 (5 tests) West Indies tour of New Zealand: February–March, 1956 (4 tests) <i>MCC 'A' tour of Pakistan: December–March, 1956</i> <i>Ceylon tour of India: October 1955</i>	First-ever First-ever
1956	Australia tour of England: May–September, 1956 (5 tests)	Twenty-second Australian tour of England
1956-57	Australia tour of Pakistan: October 1956 (1 test) Australia tour of India: October–November, 1956 (3 tests) MCC tour of South Africa: December 1956–March 1957 (5 tests) <i>India tour of Ceylon: November 1956</i> <i>Madras tour of Ceylon: April 1957</i> <i>CG Howard XI tour of India: December 1956–January 1957</i> <i>Duke of Norfolk XI tour of Jamaica: March 1957</i>	First-ever First-ever
1957	West Indies tour of England: May–September, 1957 (5 tests)	
1957-58	Australia tour of South Africa: December 1957–March 1958 (5 tests) Pakistan tour of West Indies: January–March, 1958 (5 tests) <i>MCC tour of East Asia</i> <i>Ceylon tour of India: March 1958</i>	First-ever First-ever
1958	New Zealand tour of England: April–September, 1958 (5 tests)	
1958-59	MCC tour of Australia: October 1958–February 1959 (5 tests) MCC tour of New Zealand: February–March, 1959 (2 tests) West Indies tour of India: November 1958–February 1959 (5 tests)	Second West Indies tour of India

	West Indies tour of Pakistan: February–March, 1959 (3 tests) <i>Madras tour of Ceylon: March 1959</i>	Second West Indies tour of Pakistan
1959	India tour of England: April–September, 1959 (5 tests)	
1959-60	Australia tour of Pakistan: November–December, 1959 (3 tests; first test played in Dhaka) Australia tour of India: December 1959–January 1960 (5 tests) England tour of West Indies: January–March, 1960 (5 tests) <i>Ceylon tour of India: January 1960</i>	Second Australia tour of Pakistan Second Australia tour of India
1960	South Africa tour of England: May–September, 1960 (5 tests) <i>HCC (The Hague) tour of England: August 1960</i>	
1960-61	West Indies tour of Australia: October 1960–February 1961 (5 tests) Pakistan tour of India: November 1960–February 1961 (5 tests) <i>Pakistan Eaglets tour of Ceylon: September 1960</i> <i>MCC 'A' tour of New Zealand: December 1960–March 1961</i> <i>Madras tour of Ceylon: March 1961</i>	First test ended in a historic first-ever tie
1961	Australia tour of England: April–September, 1961 (5 tests) <i>South Africa Fezelas tour of England: June–July, 1961</i>	South Africa out of the ICC
1961-62	MCC tour of Pakistan: October 1961–February 1962 (3 tests) MCC tour of India: October 1961–January 1962 (5 tests) <i>MCC tour of Ceylon: February 1962</i> <i>New Zealand tour of South Africa: December 1961–February 1962 (5 tests)</i> India tour of West Indies: February–April, 1962 (5 tests) <i>New Zealand tour of Australia: October 1961–March 1962 (state sides; no official tests)</i> <i>Ceylon tour of India: January 1962</i> <i>International XI tour of India: March–April, 1962</i>	First tour affected by South Africa's withdrawal
1962	Pakistan tour of England: May–September, 1962 (5 tests)	
1962-63	MCC tour of Australia: October 1962–February 1963 (5 tests) MCC tour of New Zealand: February–March, 1963 (3 tests) <i>International Cavaliers tour of South Africa: March–April, 1963</i>	

1963	West Indies tour of England: May–September, 1963 (5 tests) <i>Pakistan Eaglets tour of England: June–July, 1963</i>	
1963-64	<i>South Africa tour of Australia: October 1963–February 1964 (5 tests)</i> <i>South Africa tour of New Zealand: February–March, 1963 (3 tests)</i> MCC tour of India: January–April, 1963 (5 tests) <i>Madras tour of Ceylon: March 1964</i> <i>Commonwealth XI tour of Pakistan: November–December, 1963 (last match played in Dacca)</i> <i>International Cavaliers tour of West Indies: January 1964</i>	
1964	Australia tour of England: April–September, 1964 (5 tests) <i>Netherlands vs Australia: August 1964 (played at The Hague)</i> <i>West Indies XI tour of England: September 1964</i>	
1964-65	Australia tour of India: October 1964 (3 tests) Australia tour of Pakistan: October 1964 (1 test) Pakistan tour of Australia: November 1964–December 1965 (1 test) Pakistan tour of New Zealand: January–February, 1965 (3 tests) New Zealand tour of India: February–March, 1965 (4 tests) New Zealand tour of Pakistan: March–April, 1965 (3 tests) Australia tour of West Indies: February–May, 1965 (5 tests) <i>MCC tour of South Africa: November 1964–February 1965 (5 tests)</i> <i>Pakistan 'A' tour of Ceylon: August 1964</i> <i>Commonwealth tour of India: December 1964</i> <i>Ceylon tour of India: December 1964–January 1965</i>	First-ever First-ever
1965	New Zealand tour of England: May–July 1965 (3 tests; matches also against Scotland in Glasgow, Ireland in Belfast and the Netherlands in Haarlem) <i>South Africa tour of England: June–September, 1965 (3 tests)</i>	

Sources:

ESPN Cricinfo/Wisden online archives: <http://www.espncricinfo.com/ci/engine/series/index.html>) (last accessed: 10/08/2013)

ICC Minutes

Rowland Bowen, ‘Appendix II: Dates in Cricket History, 1851 to 1970’, *Cricket: A History of Its Growth and Development Throughout the World*, Eyre & Spottiswoode (1970)

Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack

Notes:

This table is by no means exhaustive. Tours by official members of the ICC were the main concern. Others such as tours by Commonwealth XIs, Ceylon, etc are also listed as far as possible.

Tours listed in italics denote unofficial matches involving at least one ICC member, including those involving South Africa after 1961.

In all the sources, ‘MCC team’ and ‘England team’ are used interchangeably.

Both ESPNCricinfo and Rowland Bowen have also listed women’s cricket tours in this period. Bowen’s book usefully and painstakingly also chronicled important dates and landmarks, domestic cricket in every official (and minor) country, non-racial cricket in South Africa, and cricket magazines and almanacks in every country. Unofficial teams from South Asia to East Africa, teams from East Africa to other countries, the formation of the East African Cricket Conference and separate cricket associations by its constituent members, teams to and from Rhodesia and SACBOC are all noted.

Bowen, p. 357: BCCP formed on May 1, 1949. (Likely reason why the first-ever Indian team to Australia in 1947-48 represented undivided India.)

Bowen, p. 366: “1961: On becoming a republic and leaving the Commonwealth, South Africa automatically ceased to be a member of the Imperial Cricket Conference as a result of rules of her own choosing.”

Appendix III: Dates of independence

Year	Date	Region (new form)	
1946	March 22	Transjordan (Jordan from 1949)	
1947	August 14	Pakistan	
	August 15	India	
1948	January 4	Burma (Myanmar from 1989)	
	February 9	Ceylon (Sri Lanka from 1972)	
	May 14	Palestine (Israel)	
1951	December 24	Libya	
1956	January 1	Sudan	
1957	March 6	Gold Coast (Ghana)	
	August 31	Malaya (part of Malaysia from 1963)	
1960	June 26	British Somaliland (part of Somalia, July 1)	
	August 10	Cyprus	
	October 1	Nigeria	
1961	April 27	Sierra Leone	
	June 1	Northern Cameroons (as part of Nigeria)	
	June 19	Kuwait	
	October 1	Southern Cameroons (as part of Cameroon)	
	December 9	Tanganyika (Tanzania from 1964)	
1962	January 1	Western Samoa	
	August 6	Jamaica	
	August 31	Trinidad and Tobago	
	October 9	Uganda	
1963	September 16	North Borneo Sarawak Singapore	(As part of Malaysia)
	December 10	Zanzibar (Tanzania from 1964)	
	December 12	Kenya	
1964	July 6	Nyasaland (Malawi)	
	September 21	Malta GC	
	October 24	Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)	
1965	February 18	The Gambia	
	July 26	Maldives	
	August 9	Singapore	
1966	May 26	British Guiana (Guyana)	
	September 30	Bechuanaland (Botswana)	
	October 4	Basutoland (Lesotho)	
	November 30	Barbados	
1967	November 29	Aden (South Yemen)	
1968	February 1	Nauru	
	March 12	Mauritius	
	September 6	Swaziland	

1970	June 4	Tonga
	October 10	Fiji
1971	August 15	Bahrain
	September 3	Qatar
	December 2	United Arab Emirates
	December 16	Bangladesh (seceded from Pakistan)
1973	July 10	The Bahamas
1974	February 7	Grenada
	February 16	Papua New Guinea
1976	June 29	Seychelles
1978	July 7	Solomon Islands
	October 1	Ellice Islands (Tuvalu)
	November 3	Dominica
1979	February 22	St Lucia
	July 12	Gilbert Islands (Kiribati)
	October 27	St Vincent and the Grenadines
1980	April 18	Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)
	July 30	New Hebrides (Vanuatu)
1981	September 21	Belize (called British Honduras until 1973)
	November 1	Antigua and Barbuda
1983	September 19	St Kitts and Nevis
1984	January 1	Brunei Darussalam
1990	March 21	Southwest Africa (Namibia)
1997	July 1	Hong Kong (returned to the People's Republic of China)

Source:

David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946-97: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).