**Chapter 1**

# Population Movements and the Construction of Modern Tradition within Contemporary Taiwan Indigenous Society

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## Introduction

Tradition may be understood as the inter-generational transmission of beliefs and customs from the past to the present. In certain societies, population movement drives social change and affects how narratives of the past are handed down. For the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, migration has been a significant influence on the construction of tradition. That is, it reflects indigenous peoples' socio-economic disadvantage, their vulnerability to natural disasters and their subjection to social and political upheaval. To account for the link among migration, disadvantage and the construction of tradition, this chapter locates these in three historical phases, each discussed under a separate section: first, Pacific expansion – that is, the dispersal of Austronesian speakers approximately 6,000 and 3,000 years ago; second, post- seventeenth century patterns of outsider settlement and colonisation and, third, contemporary society in Taiwan which, given the scope of this volume, pays greater attention to the post-1949 period. The first and second sections provide a context and the current state of the field on indigenous migratory studies. The third section moves onto a substantive discussion of contemporary population movement among Taiwan's Indigenous peoples.

Each of the three phases reveals two competing push and pull factors. First, settlement and colonisation of the island since the sixteenth century has pushed indigenous peoples from their native lands and into less productive regions. Second, indigenous peoples both within and beyond Taiwan proper have been pulled outwards throughout history. In contemporary Taiwan, this pull has tended towards urban areas and has often been involuntary and driven by economic pressures, making it another push factor. This chapter examines how these two forms of population movements have affected narratives around traditional beliefs and customs. In doing so, it argues that migration has had a profound effect on how indigenous peoples construct narrative traditions.

## Pacific Expansion

Insert fig.1 The Austronesian Language Family

In the pre-Columbian world, Austronesian speakers were the most widely dispersed ethnolinguistic population (Bellwood 2009:336). Their languages spread south from Taiwan, through the Philippines, into Indonesia and Malaysia, across the Pacific islands and as far west

as Madagascar. Rather than a single mass-migratory event, this migration was a process; that is, it happened because of different push/pull factors and language convergence over thousands of years. This chapter argues that there were three main causes: population growth, environment, and violent conflict.

Current models of Taiwan's prehistory assume human settlement around 30,000 years ago by Zuozhen Man. The movement of Zuozhen Man, likely via a land bridge, fits other models of human settlement following horizontal movement due to climate similarities and agricultural technological knowhow. The motivation for migration is unclear and these peoples are relatively unknown, appearing only in the archaeological record in the form of chipped-pebble tools, as human remains and in the myths of present indigenous cultures. The first archaeological record, 5,500 years ago, belongs to the Tapenkeng culture and is representative of a Neolithic people; sites of settlement are recorded along the shores of Taiwan, but the earliest site is where the Tainan Science Park is now situated. This site is particularly exceptional since no similar site has been found on what is now the Chinese mainland. This is important because it is commonly accepted that these peoples, or the languages that they spoke, were the forebears of the Austronesian linguistic family and that any proto-Austronesian language can thus be reconstructed to represent the primary diversification of the language among these settlers.

Because early Austronesian has no preserved samples of writing it has proved difficult to reconstruct. The first evidence of writing in any Austronesian language appeared about 670 CE, by which time the Pacific expansion was largely complete. Robert Blust's work has been key to strengthening identifying through a focus on boatbuilding and archaeological findings. The 1,200 languages in the Austronesian language family fall into ten subgroups of 26 languages in total, nine of which are spoken by the indigenous peoples of Taiwan (Blust 2014:314). The tenth subgroup encompasses all the Austronesian languages found outside of Taiwan (Diamond 2000:709). From this, it can be deduced that early diversification occurred on Taiwan itself. Thus, one language group migrated outwards to the other islands and from there to all Austronesian-speaking peoples. The linguistic differences between the languages suggest a 'long pause' between the settlement of the language on Taiwan and its expansion. What is more, there is an additional 'long pause' between the original migratory language and that which now constitutes the Polynesian language family. This is also confirmed by evidence in archaeological finds. Indigenous agricultural settlement of Taiwan and subsequent move to the Philippines took about a thousand years and an additional thousand years for the settlement of West Polynesia and on into East Polynesia, the latter being the greatest geographical spread. Factors accounting for this include two leaps in boat building technology. The first advance was the dugout canoe. This can be seen among the Yami/Tao peoples of Lanyu Island. The second was the double-outrigger sailing vessel, vital for oceanic navigation (Diamond 2005:341). This migration is evident in the linguistic and archaeological data. What is perhaps less clear is the motivation for moving. Without any written documentation, this can only be assessed on three possible factors: population, changes in the environment, and violent conflict.

Since any society has a natural propensity to increase its population, this in turn has led to a natural cycle of abundance and shortage. The process whereby an excessive population stops growing due to a shortage of food and eventual starvation is known as the Malthusian trap. The early outward migration from Taiwan may have been a result of food shortage due to population growth and the degree to which the communities had shifted to agricultural

production and away from gathering (Bellwood 2009:350). In terms of environmental change, the late glacial and postglacial dispersals caused by climate change and sea-level rises affected the migration of these Austronesian-speaking farming communities. Climate change at the end of the last Ice Age accounts for significant diversity in human settlement and increased glaciation drove many hunter-gatherer and settled agricultural communities to new pastures. The impact on land settled by Austronesian speakers is clear, as the land area of Southeast Asia—or Sundaland—was halved and the length of the coastline doubled between 15,000 and 7,000 years ago (Bird et al, 2005). Genetic evidence for this indicates a movement of people from Taiwan, but perhaps on a smaller scale than that argued for by paleolinguists, to Southeast Asia. This discrepancy has led to divisions among scholars. The 'Express Train from Taiwan to Polynesia Model (ETTP)' is, as argued above, the expansion of Austronesian-speaking farming communities. This theory rests on rice-farming communities replacing hunter-gathering communities in the destination islands and spreading language along a strict linguistic tree-like structure from the Asian mainland to the Pacific, with its origins in Taiwan. A lack of congruence, however, occurs close to Wallacea. For geneticists such as Stephen Oppenheimer, the Polynesian markers along the Wallace Line and in New Guinea indicate that the dispersal of populations in this region was ancestral, connected by other, earlier, dispersals via processes of inculturation (Oppenheimer and Richards 2001:178). This argument, known as the 'Slow Boat Hypothesis' questions whether the cultural and technological superiority of these incoming farmers and their resulting higher demographic growth led to the complete replacement of former populations. The genetic evidence suggests that this was not the case. Rather, the high lexical diversity of Austronesian languages within this region is a result of contact with indigenous Papuan-speaking peoples.

This contact inevitably resulted in conflict and violence as different peoples competed for resources. Significant cultural differences coupled with the wide linguistic variation in spite of demographic proximity, is indicative of hostility between specific groups. In Taiwan, for example, all indigenous groups except the Yami/Tao on Lanyu Island practiced headhunting. The practice can be understood as a ritualised form of violence involving sacrifice to a deity (Hoskins 1993: 159 and Thomas et al, 2001: 567). It was often carried out for cosmological balancing, to dishonour an enemy, or as part of an elaborate coming-of-age ritual. Typically, in Taiwan, it was not cannibalistic; though that practice was carried out elsewhere among Austronesian speakers (Rubinstein 2004: 17-18).

Interpersonal violence was largely a product of leadership. This was measured by the ability to support or supress populations that ultimately led to control and social cohesion. Austronesian-speaking populations varied from island to island. Social structures ranged from egalitarian to hierarchical systems that were either matriarchal or patriarchal. Non-sorcery, domestic and sport-related violence within these structures can, according to Younger (2014), be divided into two categories: interpersonal and warfare. Interpersonal violence was dyadic and often targeted at a specific person. It included acts of revenge, assassination, and/or murder. Warfare, however, consisted of armed aggression between political communities or alliances. These could be kin, clan-based, communities, or a variety of these. Raiding was perhaps the most common form of violence among Austronesian peoples and, although it may have had interpersonal motivations, was largely driven by resource push and pull factors. What was not a clear driving force was conquest (Younger 2014:2). Comparative cross-cultural studies on violence among indigenous societies have found that both interpersonal violence and warfare

are correlated to a particular degree of social stratification or political hierarchy (Ross 1985:551). A key factor for voyaging Austronesian-speaking peoples is the Big Man concept of competitive leadership (Sahlin 1963:288). The attainment of Big Man status is embedded within a series of actions that elevate a person above the common majority. This does not imply necessarily that the term Big Man signifies political power. Instead, authority is tacit in a series of actions and influences both within and beyond the immediate group. As the status of Big Man crosses the internal/external sector, authority undergoes qualitative changes (Sahlin 1963:290). Within the faction, the Big Man has true command; outside he has fame and indirect influence. This is particularly important in seafaring communities, as reputation would play an important role in social cohesion and economic exchange. This, in turn, would subsequently form necessary cultural narratives that are embedded within myth making and legend formation—the creation of tradition and custom.

The ancestors of the Polynesians, thus, originated within this 'voyaging corridor' along the Wallace Line. The importance of the development of interconnected long-distance trade, rather than a migration of peoples occurring from a single waystation, means that through processes of intermarriage, cultural exchange, and subsequent language borrowing, the routes of migration along this corridor were not necessarily connected to the original dispersal of peoples from Taiwan. They nevertheless would have come into contact with each other in order to spread linguistic and cultural variation. Maritime gardening and horticulture, therefore, had local origins in this region (Solheim 1996). What is clear from this is that at one end of the debate it seeks to answer an important question in migration theory: origin. At the other end, the debate seeks to address an equally important question: expansion. For Solheim, the answer is simple: boats are the homeland of the Austronesian-speaking peoples. Origin and expansion are two sides of the same coin. The understanding of origin is a process of tradition, while the understanding of expansion—or migration—is a product of the contemporary period. On Taiwan, for the non-seafaring Austronesian-speaking peoples, land-based migration of peoples internally had similar push/pull factors as those discussed above. From the seventeenth century, an additional factor that needs to be taken into consideration in the case of Taiwan is colonisation. This is particularly important given the contested markers of *past* as a charter for Taiwan's postcolonial *present*. Michael Stainton (1999:28) refers to this as 'the politics of Taiwan aboriginal origins'.

## Colonisation

Space does not permit an in-depth analysis of the beginnings of colonisation, nor is it a major question of this study. However, it is important to recognise that the colonial history of Taiwan since the arrival of the Dutch in the seventeenth century has been layered, and different forms of colonisation have had an effect on migration trends and integration and assimilation processes. This in turn has had consequences for indigenous peoples. The first is a hybrid form of colonisation. Coined by Andrade (2005:298), the colonisation of Taiwan is termed 'hybrid' because most settlers were Chinese, but the administration and military structures were Dutch. Shortly after the Dutch arrived in 1624 in present-day Anping, the local Sirayan-speaking people sought to barter and trade with them. This was welcomed by the Dutch, who realised that the villages of the Sirayan-speaking peoples were factionalised and warring (Shepherd 1995:52). Following the massacre of an expeditionary force by the village of Mattau in 1629, the Dutch subjugated and burned the village. In destroying the most powerful village in the

vicinity, the Dutch were able to expand their rule by constructing schools and churches and evangelising indigenous peoples. This brought a Romanised script to the Sirayan language that divided indigenous communities. The trade in deerskin then became a lucrative business and a significant source of local employment for those who had acculturated. Demand had an effect on supply which in turn reduced prosperity and forced many assimilated indigenous peoples to adopt settled farming practices on what had been deer-grazing lands (Andrade 2005:303). This in turn brought a number of indigenous communities into direct competition for suitable land with the more agriculturally skilled Chinese settlers. The Dutch subsequently used these settlers as agents for the collection of taxes and hunting-license fees, which pushed many indigenous communities to migrate away from fertile and game-rich areas, while simultaneously locking some into assimilated farming societies. Allegiance and resistance to the Dutch would not only have enormous consequences on the shape and size of indigeneity but would also significantly affect the sequencing of traditional stories passed down through the generations. This would have repercussions, especially when diametric distinctions were made between indigenous peoples after Taiwan became integrated into the Manchu Empire in 1683.

In much the same way as other settler colonial societies like the United States Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the settler colonial period in Taiwan (1683-1860) functioned via the replacement of indigenous populations with an invasive and violent settler society. Over time, settler communities, such as those mentioned above, would develop a distinct identity that had been shaped by a process of replacement. Such colonisation is different from traditional 'metropole colonisation' in that the settlers stayed as opposed to being sojourning agents in the form of traders, governors, and/or missionaries. This form of colonisation is structural, rather than a single event. It is a persistent, ongoing elimination and subjugation of native populations. In the case of Taiwan, this was characterised by a marked increase in volatile Chinese settlement.

Contemporary classifications of mountain/plain aboriginal groups thus have their roots in this period and their territorialisation has had consequences for indigenous recognition. The almost complete acculturation of the peoples of the Western plains would result in indigenous peoples being rudimentarily classified as either 'raw' or 'cooked' (Teng 2004:122). The reference to the 'raw' peoples of the mountains and the acculturated 'cooked' peoples of the plains enforced a boundary among indigenous peoples. Although boundaries have shifted, the ethnic designation (recognised/unrecognised indigenous groups) that continues to exist in contemporary Taiwanese society is still largely affected by this. According to Teng (2004:123), concepts of 'raw' and 'cooked' capture the complex intersectionality of indigenous ideas about acculturation, political submission, and habitat. I would further argue that this influenced patterns of migration as indigenous peoples sought to remove, or hide, 'raw' labelling.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the semi-colonial condition of the island that followed its inclusion in the British treaty port system would have a long-lasting effect on indigenous culture and the formation of a proto-shared identity through the conversion of indigenous communities to Christianity via missionaries (Alsford 2017). Christianity is practised by 70 per cent of the indigenous population of Taiwan, with most of those belonging to the Presbyterian Church. The influence of the missionary movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both transformed and maintained indigenous integration. It also affected the sense and size of notions of community, which now centred on a church. The church replaced early social functions, but adapted notions of tradition in order to seek continuity and

balance between ideas of indigeneity, economic vitality, and modernisation. The adaptation to notions of modernity and the continued practice of indigenous culture would continue throughout the period and into the metropole coloniality of the Japanese in 1895.

The Japanese colonial government crafted a divide-and-rule policy by pitting indigenous against Chinese. While there may have been one Japanese empire, there was no single Japanese imperial experience. The hard-line position towards the indigenous peoples led to systematic resistance. This was contrasted to the many people in Japan who wished to know more about their empire, thus fuelling a 'civilising project' to document and understand indigenous cultures. What is more, the colonial government wished to consolidate rule over the whole of the island, something the Manchus had not achieved. Ino Kanori, a Japanese ethnologist, was tasked with surveying the whole island, a duty that in turn became the first systematic study of Taiwan's indigenous communities. His research formalised eight groups based on linguistic variation. In many ways, this locked indigenous communities into imagined boundaries that not only prevented forms of indigenous cultural unity, but also imposed forms of collectively among those who had not previously held it. The taxonomy of linguistic boundaries continues to categorise indigenous peoples today and affects how indigenous peoples are recognised. As Japan began its movement into militarism in the 1930s, many traditional structures were replaced. Ideas about improving their status meant many communities sought out education rather than headhunting as an important coming-of-age marker. Many communities were prepared to travel for this. Working with the Japanese meant several families found elite positions within villages and the Japanese in turn encouraged certain traditional customs. Throughout the various colonial periods in Taiwan, there was no single narrative; no unified form of imperialism; and, consequently, no common experience of indigeneity. Instead, the systematic acculturation of indigenous peoples continued in post-war colonisation by the Chinese Nationalists in exile.

The rights of Taiwan's indigenous peoples are firmly woven into the history of the island's post-war period. In particular, during martial law and democratisation—not least because the 1980s and early 1990s brought about lasting gains for indigenous interests. This includes, but is not limited to, changes in nomenclature (*yuanzhumin* 原住民 in place of *shanbao* 山胞), a revival of indigenous personal names, and governmental structural institutions. Yet, in spite of these significant developments, the post-war period brought about new forms of stigmatised identities. Hsieh (1994:407) identifies these in two categories. The first, an external factor, includes a traditional Chinese view of Han vs. non-Han people (hua/yi 華/夷); the mythology of Wu Feng, who had sacrificed himself against the evildoings of indigenous headhunting customs; the stereotyping of indigeneity—akin to orientalism—through the labelling of indigenous peoples as backward, stupid, ugly and drunken. This is then followed by internal factors that include shared historical experiences, such as being conquered 'mountain people'; inferiorisation of traditional norms in loss of sociocultural traditions and situational reactions, such as a feeling of inferiority. Changes in the economic structure of Taiwan—the shift from the agricultural economy of the 1950s to the export-orientated industrial economy in the late 1970s would have a profound effect on cheap labour migration and would spur competition for work from across ethnic groups in Taiwan. This witnessed a change in the average household income of indigenous peoples from NT$3,930 in 1953 to NT$112,668 in 1978 (Hsu and Li 1989:197). From this analysis, it is clear that the industrial sectors by the end of the 1970s were a critical source of indigenous employment and a major

migratory pull factor. The following section will examine this change more carefully by looking at how the development of a contemporary society would influence indigenous peoples.

## Contemporary Society

By the 1960s, clear 'city indigenous communities' had begun to form, and by 1985 these constituted 6.9 per cent of the total indigenous population. Figures for 1991 showed a growth to 14.4 per cent. In 1995, the total urban indigenous population constituted 24.6 per cent, but by 2003 this had jumped to 34.07 per cent, and again to 45 per cent in 2012 (Council of Indigenous Peoples 2013). This remarkable increase from rural 'traditional' communities to urban areas are clear indications of economic push and pull factors.

According to the Council of Indigenous Peoples (2013:5), throughout this period of growth, indigenous communities residing in urban areas remained particularly vulnerable during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 in comparison to their Han counterparts. According to their report, average non-indigenous household income decreased by 0.7 per cent between 2006 and 2010. The figure for indigenous households was triple that amount at 2.4 per cent.

It is clear that the indigenous peoples of Taiwan have faced numerous challenges over the different periods explored in this study and the lack of a common experience of indigeneity signifies that there was no single story. The development of multiple identities (both pan and poly) since the 1990s has, to a certain extent, eroded senses of differing identities. This was perhaps most clear in the Joint Declaration by the Representatives of the Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan serving on the Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee. The declaration, the first of its kind, was written in response to the messages exchanged in the 2019 New Year's Day speeches by General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping and Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen. In the Declaration, twenty representatives from across the island's indigenous groups opened with a direct message to Xi: since he does not know them, he does not know Taiwan. They write:

> We are the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, and we've lived in Taiwan, our motherland, for more than 6,000 years. We are not the so-called 'ethnic minorities' within the Chinese nation […] Taiwan is the sacred land generations of our ancestors lived in and protected with their lives. It doesn't belong to China.

They continue:

> Once called 'barbarians', we are now recognised as the original owners of Taiwan. We the indigenous peoples of Taiwan have pushed this nation forward towards respect for human rights, democracy, and freedom. After thousands of years, we are still here. We have never given up our rightful claim to the sovereignty of Taiwan.

This part of the text is clearly targeted not just at China and Xi Jinping, but also to Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwan. The clarity of the declaration and the efforts made in the translation of the text indicates that that this message of *ownership* is also aimed at an international audience.

The use of the pronoun 'we' is particularly interesting. At the start, it clearly means the indigenous peoples. However, as the text continues it seems coterminous with all ethnic groups on the islands.

> Taiwan is also a nation that we are striving to build together with other peoples who recognise the distinct identity of this land. Taiwan is a nation accommodating diverse peoples trying to understand each other's painful pasts, as well as a nation in which we can tell our own stories in our own languages, loudly […] we do not share the

mono-culturalism, unification, and hegemony promoted by you, Mr. Xi, on behalf of the government of China. It is far from greatness. It is of nothing that we desire. Being humble to the land, respecting other lives, to co-exist with other groups of people in pursuit of common good—these are values that we believe in.

The use of the term 'values' is particularly relevant in that it links directly to Tsai Ing-wen's response that 'Taiwan absolutely will not accept 'one country, two systems.' This is the 'Taiwan consensus'. A consensus that the Indigenous Declaration reiterates:

The national future of Taiwan will be decided by self-determination of the Taiwanese indigenous peoples and all the people who live on our motherland.

What is specifically striking is that when one looks at voting patterns of indigenous peoples a large percentage of that population, and often a deciding factor in local elections, votes for pan-blue parties. The rationale is that they are the 'only' Taiwanese and that all others are Han Chinese and that Taiwan is umbrellaed under this through processes of colonisation and segregation. It could be argued that the historic apology to indigenous peoples made by Tsai in August 2016 and her quarter Paiwan heritage have played a role in the declaration.

That said, the hopes of many indigenous leaders and protestors on a variety of issues, such as the allocation of indigenous names, hunting rights, land rights, and autonomy have not been fully realised since the apology took place. Yet her speech was specific, clearly directed and substantial. In terms of the scope of this particular chapter, how perception, or perceptions, of a 'coloniser' majority filter into discussions made by leaders and activists is important in identifying how contemporary migration—a combination of push/pull factors—signifies ideas of identities (the plural being important here) by indigenous peoples.

The immediate transformation in the modern period is this shift towards recognising a polyethnic sense of self while accepting pan-indigenous identities—a collective sense of indigeneity. An important moment for this was the establishment of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs in 1996 and the incorporation of the Aboriginal Affairs Commission in 1999. Since 2002, this has been known as the Council of Indigenous Peoples and is headed by a minister that is recommended by the Premier and appointed by the President. This puts the Council on par with all other cabinet-level bodies under the Executive Yuan. It was established as a means of serving the island's indigenous populations with the goal of pushing legislation in language revitalisation and supporting autonomous land for indigenous communities. It also grants recognised status to indigenous groups. Since its inception, the Council has granted indigenous status to seven groups with at least thirteen remaining unrecognised, although three of these are recognised at the local government level. The regaining of lost indigenous identity became an important factor in the 2001 Declaration of Taiwan's Plains Indigenous Peoples.

Today, we stand up and speak out, solemnly telling the people and government of Taiwan that we are indigenous peoples and that we have not disappeared! We were forced to conceal ourselves. Under the conditions of national humiliation, our people's flame has continued and become another kind if identity survival in Taiwan society […] From today onward, Taiwan's various indigenous peoples must not be separated from each other.

According to Jolan Hsieh (2018:14-15) indigenous movements have emphasised three demands: (1) name rectification related to individuals, peoples, land, territory, and the use of Romanised script as opposed to Chinese characters; (2) return of land and land rights (3) self-government. The focus on collective rights and the recognition of indigenous identity and values are vital for indigenous activism to survive. What is particularly clear is that values, like tradition, are not fixed and self-evident. Values are relative. Both of the indigenous declarations

discussed above draw on issues of equality as a collective value of all indigenous peoples. It is the sense of a lack of equality that draws them together. The dramatic geographical movement from traditional communities to metropolitan areas has had a significant effect on how indigenous peoples understand and recognise inequality. This inequality is often most felt when people become minorities within specific social structures: education, the labour market, and representation in local and national government. For Taiwan's indigenous peoples this sense of becoming a minority is felt when they migrate to urban centres. The high mobility of indigenous peoples in Taiwanese society has seen many residing in communities on the outskirts of the city. The inability to afford the higher rents of the central districts due to lower income has forced a number of people to reside on illegal riverbanks, forming spatial stratification and thus becoming minority ethnic groups within the city (Fu 2002:60; and Lin et al 2008: 104). Su (2007: 160) argues that this 'chain migration' is an important factor that needs to be considered when discussing the motivation for indigenous peoples entering the cities. It is through chain migration that people receive information and as a consequence they tend to follow similar patterns of migration.

By looking at the percentage of city-dwelling indigenous peoples, it is clear that rural-to-urban migration is considerable. In 1996, 3 per cent of the indigenous population resided in metropolitan districts (Huang and Chang 2010:51-120). By 2002, this had risen to 32.84 per cent and as of December 2018, this number has risen to 47 per cent. The largest source of these migrations is the eastern Hualien-Taitung Corridor, the principle destination being the Taipei-Taoyuan metropolitan areas, Taichung, and Kaohsiung. All three house major industrial hubs where a significant portion of Taiwan's labour-intensive manufacturing takes place (Huang and Liu 2016: 299). This migration from rural indigenous communities to urban areas in search of improved opportunities in employment, education, healthcare and lifestyle is a significant pull factor.

**The Socio-Economic Position of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples**

| | **Based on 2006 data** | **Indigenous** | | | | **Non-Indigenous** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Employment** | Income gap per household p.a. | NT$463,980 | | | | NT$1,064,153 |
| **Education** | College entrance exam among high school graduates | 68.3 | | | | 83.37 |
| **Healthcare** | Life expectancy (male and female/ind/non-ind) *data 2001-2009 | ♂ 64.5<br>♀ 73.4 | | | | ♂ 74.9<br>♀ 81.1 |
| **Lifestyle** | Comparison of major causes of death *per 100,000 and based on 1999 data | | Highland | Lowland | Urban | |
| | | Accidents | 184.0 | 137.3 | 93.6 | 58.9 |
| | | Malignant tumour | 173.4 | 123.1 | 141.6 | 135.3 |
| | | Liver disease | 143.8 | 67.4 | 65.8 | 23.5 |
| | | Stroke | 120.7 | 77.4 | 87.0 | 57.4 |
| | | Heart disease | 90.5 | 78.9 | 93.7 | 51.3 |
| | | Diabetes | 56.8 | 39.7 | 32.1 | 41.0 |
| | | TB | 53.7 | 30.5 | 13.7 | 6.9 |

Based on the findings found by Huang and Liu (2016: 302-304).

Although employment is the major pull factor for indigenous peoples moving to urban centres, there is still a NT$ 600,173 difference in annual household income between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. What is more, in terms of education, fewer indigenous high school graduates are taking the college entrance examination than their non-indigenous counterparts.

The imbalance between being an indigenous person and a non-indigenous person is most notable in life expectancy. The difference between indigenous and non-indigenous males is 10.4 years and for women it is 7.7 years. Urban indigenous peoples are more likely to die from disease of the liver and heart than the non-indigenous people are. For highland indigenous communities this risk is significantly higher.

The consumption of alcohol has undoubtedly contributed to this risk, reinforcing the stereotype of the 'drunken aborigine' that continues to plague other settler societies too. Such othering is not just a product of gazing, but also a factor in indigenous peoples' own identity construction (Hsia 2010). The problem of alcohol consumption is not an exclusively indigenous issue, but a result of settler colonisation. The social and cultural effects of excessive drinking are not that dissimilar to other marginalised peoples, regardless of ethnicity. In fact, alcohol consumption is not rampant, but rather specific to certain indigenous groups (Chen 2014). Its misuse of course contributes to a wide range of issues, health being the most notable. However, social problems such as violence, disorder, family breakdown, child neglect, loss of income, and high rates of incarceration are not endemic to indigenous populations. Yet the normalising of alcohol abuse among indigenous peoples—mainly men—does lead to specific self-fulfilling prophecies, particularly in the mountainous regions. Those residing in metropolitan areas are perhaps more likely to shake off negative stereotyping than their mountain dwelling counterparts.

It is clear that outward migration to urban areas reflects a significant economic pull factor, allowing individuals and families to accumulate capital and invest in future generations. On average, indigenous peoples living in urban areas earn more, receive better education, and enjoy a longer life than those in traditional communities. In many cases, migration is not simply a strategy to improve status. The relocation of whole communities as a result of the environmental change is a significant push factor that affects many indigenous communities in the twenty-first century, as it did more than a millennium ago.

Since most of Taiwan's indigenous peoples inhabit areas that are susceptible to geological and atmospheric disruption, they are the most likely to be affected by natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons. Forced relocation due to environmental pressures has had an enormous impact on loss of material culture and collective memory, affecting the use of space and social structures. The relocation of 45 communities following Typhoon Morakot in 2009, for example, had a profound effect on social cohesion and vulnerability. Despite their best intentions, government and NGO cultural insensitivity harmed indigenous communities even as they tried to relocate them into new housing. Displaced indigenous communities were not consulted on the decision to move. As such, official decisions contravened earlier assurances that the communities would 'leave the disaster, not the village, or leave the village, not the hometown'. Such forced relocation away from traditional areas has meant indigenous groups seeking legitimacy through name rectification, establishing self-government, and the returning of land and obtaining land rights is difficult to achieve in new villages and hometowns that are based in non-indigenous areas. With loss of land and resources and unclear rights as a result of multiple legislative procedures, many communities have chosen to migrate. In such circumstances, communities are less likely to lose cultural awareness since they remain as a collective. However, they are more likely to be unable to fully practise their culture in, for instance, hunting since traditional hunting grounds may have been closed off through layers of government policy.

Settlement and modernisation of indigenous land has resulted in multiple conflicting interests in the remaining land. Such interests centre on the conservation of undisturbed land, the preservation of indigenous heritage, wildlife conservation and over-hunting and the rights of indigenous peoples to practice cultural traditions. Debates around the sustainability of game within available land resources in the context of shifting patterns of indigenous relocation are salient; a clear decline in game has been recorded (Tai et al, 2011:26-27). In this context, it is not always clear whether wildlife conservation and indigenous aspirations are compatible. In 2017, the Wildlife Conservation Act, or *yeshengdongwu baoyu fa* 野生動物保育法, legalised indigenous hunting for food and as part of traditional rituals, so long as it was not for profit. Likewise, the use of firearms is a contentious issue. Gun ownership is illegal in Taiwan, yet the law allows indigenous peoples to exercise traditional hunting practices without modern rifles. This means that hunters can only use antiquated or handmade rifles, making the practice of hunting dangerous (Adam 2018).

The use of antiquated or handmade rifles denies coevality, in that the legislation (written in Chinese) seemingly denies that the dominant Han culture occupies the same time period as the indigenous peoples (Fabian 1983). The use of the terms 'modernity', 'tradition', and 'projects of development' when discussing indigeneity involves a specific kind of nuance that signifies a sense of 'backwardness' that translates into a Han saviour complex, not dissimilar to the self-serving, white saviour labels often associated with Whites in Africa (see: Dooley 2019). It signifies privilege and modernity trickling down to benefit those below. The reality is however that indigenous peoples—not just in Taiwan—already live in the modern world. How indigenous Taiwanese are represented by others and how they identify themselves is a product of the push/pull factors in their migratory history. As people in Taiwan attempt to find a common narrative, a 'nation [that accommodates] diverse peoples trying to understand each other's painful pasts', Taiwan's links to the wider Pacific is becoming an important marker of non-Chineseness.

# Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that in Taiwan indigenous migration is key to complex processes of social, economic and political change and that it has affected how indigenous tradition and narratives are transmitted. The course, causes, and consequences of indigenous migration has been, and continues to be, affected by three main events: initial expansion into the Pacific, multi-layered patterns of colonisation, and contemporary internal movement. Migration has historically been frequent and driven by different push and pull factors within each period. The chapter argues that a flexible maintenance of tradition is key to the survival of indigenous communities.

National histories within settler societies represent the values of those who have commodified the land. Yet, the push and pull factors driving indigenous migration play into the subsequent narrative, defining indigenous tradition, identity, and values by writing their own myths, stories and legends into the dominant narrative. The relationship of settlers to the 'native' other goes on to inform state policy; either through oppression and genocide, or via

inculturation and assimilation. The history of Taiwan is a history of settler colonialism and as such it is founded on a Han-centric state ideology in much the same way that the histories of countries such as Australia, the United States, and Canada are based on the ideology of colonial, European supremacy. Social diversity within such regions is relational; an intrinsic value that maintains multiple cultures. Values, therefore, are an index for the socio-economic and political factors that shape the social group. Shared values are vital for a pluralistic nation to survive. What is more, values are essential for the conservation of cultural heritage.

The modern settler-colonial context is crucial to understanding the history of indigenous migration in Taiwan. European corporate and missionary expansion; the migration of Chinese settlers from Fujian and Guangdong; the incorporation of Taiwan into the Manchu empire and the metropolitan colonisation by the Japanese were all backed militarily by governments armies to expropriate land and resources. The policies of each of these settler-colonial movements drove indigenous migration in two ways. First, they pushed indigenous peoples from fertile land and divided communities as they struggled to maintain traditional values. Second, they pulled indigenous peoples, especially in contemporary Taiwan, towards urban areas. Yet the latter also constitutes a push in that it has been involuntary. That is, it has arisen from land dispossession, lack of employment opportunities and the deterioration of traditional livelihoods.

Taiwan's indigenous peoples have migrated both within and beyond the island for a number of reasons. Historically, this was the result of three factors: population growth; environment; and violent conflict. An increase in official and unofficial violence following Chinese settlement and under Qing and Japanese colonial rule forced many indigenous communities off crucial hunting and farming lands. In contemporary society, these constraints are largely socio-economic with migration to metropolitan areas prompting an indigenous desire to maintain flexible traditions and values that are compatible with multiple identities.

In the present era, for some, there has been a tendency to return to 'ancestral homelands'. Better access (in terms of transportation) and continued personal links to urban societies has meant that the divisions between the two are now much thinner. According to Liao and Li (2000:20) among those who have chosen to 'return' have done so because of rising costs within key metropolitan areas and increasing competition for work with foreign labour. In addition to this, Liao and Li (2000) have argued that many young indigenous people are simply 'coming home' to help rebuild their *buluo* 部落, or indigenous community, for future generations.

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