EXTREMISM IN SECURE FORENSIC SETTINGS: THE ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITIES FOR RADICALISATION

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire

May 2023

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ABSTRACT

The PhD aimed to further the understanding regarding radicalisation in forensic populations with complex mental health issues and propose a conceptual model supporting psychological formulations. Currently, the role of mental health issues in the radicalisation process is not well understood (Al-Attar, 2020) and forensic populations appear understudied (e.g., Mulcahy et al., 2013). An initial systematic literature review exploring factors relevant to radicalisation yielded 63 publications, which were subjected to a quality appraisal and a thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006). All studies assumed a universal pathway towards extremist violence and confirmed a social emphasis (e.g., Sageman, 2008). The analysis resulted in eight themes: (1) attitudes and justifications; (2) criminogenic indicators; (3) social influences; (4) mental health issues; (5) aversive events and circumstances; (6) impaired functioning; (7) inconsistencies in sociodemographic characteristics; and (8) content of cognitions. The findings highlight the diverse influences on the radicalisation process.

However, only one study was found investigating radicalisation in forensic populations (Trujillo et al., 2009). Additionally, a lack of consensus regarding terrorism definition was observed. Hence, study one explored radicalisation influences specifically on the forensic patient group. A Delphi survey was conducted with 27 experts over three rounds. As expected, participants agreed on a terrorism definition that replicated the findings by Schmid (2011). While target type, goals, and forms of violence were the same, experts' feedback framed terrorism as group-based violence. This encapsulates any form of violence which is committed in reference to a group, for example, extreme forms of activism or hate crime. As such, study one reiterated the findings by Cook et al. (2013). All subsequent studies will summarise extremist violence under group-based violence. Furthermore, study one elicited four categories of factors: (1) environmental/contextual factors; (2) criminal needs; (3) individual factors; (4)

and protective factors. Especially criminal needs yielded limited consensus, which included constructs used in threat assessment instruments like capability (e.g., VERA-2R, Pressman & Flockton, 2012; TRAP-18, Meloy & Gill, 2016). Participants seemed less familiar with those approaches. Furthermore, they did not offer any offence motivation for group-based violence. In turn, the lack of agreement regarding mental health issues was expected due to limited research (e.g., Gill & Corner, 2017; Al-Attar, 2020). Overall, the experts emphasised social influences and group dynamics as important, reiterating but also expanding on the previous findings.

Study two aimed to explore those factors in the lived experiences of a radicalised forensic patient sample. Furthermore, it sought to find influences not yet represented in the research, for example, offence motivation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with five forensic psychiatric patients. A discourse analysis (DA; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) of all verbatim transcripts yielded four common narratives that could be related to prevalent discourse strategies (i.e., the way interviewees conveyed meaning). Interviewees framed their involvement in group-based violence as means to survival, while explicitly stating that external circumstances, for example, the 'enemy's presence', had led to violence. Additionally, interviewees balanced narratives emphasising their importance with claims of their own innocence. Common discourse strategies were normalising and trivialising violence, confirming that participants would frequently use justifications. In this context, findings reiterated the questionable role of ideology (e.g., Borum, 2012). Participants appeared to emphasise pragmatic goals like survival and did not demonstrate ideological conviction. Their presentation aligned with the predicted emphasis on group processes and social interactions. Participants focused on in- vs. out-group differences by contrasting humanising narratives with attempts to demonise the enemy. This replicated findings from the community, for example,

by Abdalla et al. (2021) regarding the utilisation of dehumanising language in the context of extremism. As expected, no clear findings about the role of mental health issues could be found (Al-Attar, 2020), likely due to the lack of awareness regarding those issues in this population. However, the suggested overlap of general violence risk factors with factors relevant to group-based violence could not be confirmed (e.g., Dhumad et al., 2020).

This overlap was explored in study three. Here, a group-based violence sample was compared to individuals that had committed violence alone without radicalisation indication, both samples being part of the forensic patient population. Across 74 patient files no significant differences in any risk factors were yielded, replicating Dhumad et al. (2020). However, social themes appeared to elicit limited significant correlations when comparing groups. This included peer relationships, the need for belonging, and social withdrawal as a mental health relapse indicator. Furthermore, in line with predictions, all sub-groups of the group-based violence sample were successfully differentiated from each other. Lastly, a Smallest Space Analysis (SSA; Lingoes, 1973) was conducted to develop new clusters describing forms of group-based violence. The three observed clusters were Injustice Collector, Social Offender, and Dominance Seeker. They displayed conceptual overlap with three of the four personality patterns of the Dark Tetrad (e.g., Međedović & Petrović, 2015), namely Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy.

The current research results in a conceptual model called the *Eco-System of Extremist Violence* (ES-EV). The ES-EV's goal is the support of assessments and care pathway planning for forensic patients likely to engage in extremist violence. The studies indicated that ideology holds an ambivalent role, hence, being conceptualised as means for justification and target selection. The most important influences on radicalisation appeared to be social factors. Hence,

those aspects are central facets of the model like the meaning subscribed to group membership. Findings suggested that these are impacted by personality styles that warrant further research. Other factors, like mental health issues, can either be conceptualised as risk or protective factors. Together with other contributing factors, based on the systematic literature review, they present optional influences contributing to the patient's likelihood of engaging in group-based violence. The ES-EV is explicitly preliminary, requiring future validation to explore its utility in understanding the radicalisation of forensic patients with complex mental health issues.

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CHAPTER ONE
SETTING THE SCENE

Terrorism has attracted increased research attention since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States (Silke, 2008). While terrorist incidents are viewed as rare, they present significant impacts on civilian life and subsequent security management (Horgan, 2017). More than 250 terrorism definitions exist (Schmid, 2011) demonstrating a lack of agreement. However, Schmid (2012) established experts' consensus, with central features being political and/or ideological violence committed by individuals or groups, often targeting civilians, and aiming to elicit political change. Meanwhile, radicalisation appears less contested than the terrorism definition (Schmid, 2013).

Radicalisation is universally understood as a non-pathological pathway of mental escalation towards extremism, including but not restricted to extremist violence (Schmid, 2013; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018; Vergani et al., 2020). Several systematic literature reviews highlight the extensive knowledge about the multitude of factors influencing the radicalisation process (King & Taylor, 2011; Borum, 2012b; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Young & Findley, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). This included, amongst other influences, grievances (e.g., Osborne & Capellan, 2017) and the presence of extremist peers (e.g., Schils & Verhage, 2017). Thus, radicalisation is conceptualised as socialisation, an inherently interpersonal process (e.g., Borum, 2012b). The extensive knowledge yielded several assessment approaches that support the understanding of radicalised individuals (e.g., VERA-2R, Pressman & Flockton, 2012; TRAP-18, Meloy & Gill, 2016).

However, two aspects appear increasingly contested. This includes ideology, which is understood as propaganda (Vergani et al., 2020) or justification (Borum, 2012a) endorsing terrorism. Not only has research post-9/11 overemphasised Islamist ideology (Vergani et al., 2020), but its contribution to radicalisation yields inconclusive results (Borum, 2012a). As its function is not fully understood, more research is required (Patel & Hussain, 2019). The other feature of radicalisation questioned in current research is the distinctiveness of the risk factors compared to other forms of violence. Empirical evidence suggests that radicalisation shares psychosocial factors with homicide offenders, including early misconduct in childhood (Dhumad et al., 2020). The lack of distinction also relates to hate crimes (e.g., Mills, et al., 2017), activism (e.g., Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde, 2014), mass shootings (e.g., Capellan & Gomez, 2018), and organised crime in general (e.g., Makarenko, 2004).

While these two concepts warrant further exploration, mental health issues appear wholly understudied in the context of radicalisation (e.g., Al-Attar, 2020). This is likely due to the recent shift in research, as historically terrorism was viewed as a result of pathological dynamics (Gill & Corner, 2017). As part of this, scholars searched for terrorist profiles that would summarise extremism as a distinct syndrome (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). However, these endeavours appeared unsuccessful (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006), leading to psychopathology being conceptualised as a contributing factor instead (e.g., Vergani et al., 2020). A systematic literature review investigated the link between any form of psychopathology with extremism and found 25 studies (Trimbur et al. 2021). No significant relationships could be observed, which Trimbur et al. (2021) attributed to the high number of poor-quality studies. In contrast, findings by Silke et al. (2021) found stress and burnout to facilitate the reintegration of radicalised individuals into society.

The lack of conclusive findings appears detrimental especially when attempting to understand the radicalisation of forensic patients. These populations are settled within prisons or forensic psychiatric hospitals and often present with complex mental health issues (Forrester et al., 2018). Additionally, Völlm et al. (2018) found a considerable number of patients remain in British forensic care (23.5% in high-secure and 18.1% in medium-secure care) and found high comorbidity among the reasons. Based on these findings, it is reasonable to assume also high levels of other risk factors in this patient group. However, Forrester et al. (2018) emphasise that research is limited about forensic populations; a notion shared by Al-Attar (2020). This severely impacts the level of understanding of radicalised individuals in such groups (Schulten et al., 2019; Al-Attar, 2020; Logan & Sellers, 2021). For example, Scaracella et al. (2016) view it as a central task to apply the previously mentioned risk assessment to forensic units, aiding the formulation of those radicalisation dynamics.

Hence, the role of mental health issues in radicalisation, as well as the assumed overlap of risk factors with general violence, must be further explored. The goal of this PhD is a conceptual model addressing these aspects and supporting the assessment and care pathway planning of radicalised forensic patients. All these aspects are more fully introduced in the following three chapters; introducing the terminology surrounding terrorism; central theories and models explaining the radicalisation process; and the assessments capturing and formulating those dynamics. The fifth chapter will conclude the introduction, presenting the research aim and predictions.

CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

2.1   Structure of the chapter

Before exploring radicalisation, the overarching terminology must be clarified. This chapter will define *terrorism*. Varying historical contexts and their competing understanding of this term will be presented. Furthermore, terrorism will be contrasted with other politically expressive behaviour (e.g., forms of activism and/or protest) that can be potentially violent, as well as other group-based violence. Additionally, several forms of terrorism will be illustrated. The chapter will conclude with an outline of the unique challenges for this research area and a definition this thesis will build on.

2.2   A brief history of terrorism

Law (2016) identifies the Assyrians (approx. 647 BCE) as the first to employ psychological warfare to intimidate and terrorise their opponents. This was referred to as *terrere*, a Latin term that loosely translates to 'frightening', the supposed origin for the modern word terrorism (Stowasser et al., 1980). Later, *terrorisme* was used by the French in the late 18th century to describe the revolutionists' raise against the monarchy (e.g., Law, 2016). However, the first use of the term comparable to nowadays understanding was during the so-called 'anarchist wave' (Rapoport, 2004, p. 52), in the late 19th century, which made its way from Russia through Balkan and Europe, before spreading across the globe. This wave entailed a significant rise in the assassination of political leaders and—for the first time in human history—a coordinated, technology-supported communication amongst members of the movement. In their historical analysis, Rapoport (2004) proposes three other waves, following the early revolutionists, which inform the current understanding of terrorism, as follows.

Post-colonial/anti-colonial wave. Following the political unrest in Europe caused by World War II, different parties felt it was their opportunity to govern in a self-determined manner (Kaplan, 2016; Rapoport, 2004), like the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The goal was the reunification of Ireland and independence from the British government by employing retaliation and sectarian warfare (e.g., Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007). This wave established the image of terrorists as freedom fighters garnering first-time public support after the negative associations linked to the term terrorist (Kaplan, 2016). Furthermore, this was the first time in which relatively small groups of fighters could successfully destabilise entire governments (Shughart, 2006).

New Left wave. Triggered by the Vietnam War, this new terrorist movement was resenting American politics (Rapoport, 2004). One of the most prolific organisations born out of German student movements was the Red Army Faction aka Baader-Meinhof Gang (e.g., Wright, 1991). Unique features of this wave included the kidnapping of political figures (Shughart, 2006), large scale international coordination due to new technology, and public impression management via media outlets (Kaplan, 2016).

Religious wave. This wave is viewed as a reaction to political dissatisfaction, utilising religion as empowerment, and originating predominantly in the Middle East, India, and Pakistan (Rapoport, 2004; Kaplan, 2016). One of the wave's movements was the *Jihad*, violently seeking to bring Islam to non-believers (Peters, 2005). Its central event was the 9/11 attacks committed by the Al-Quaeda organisation (Powell, 2011). This iteration of terrorism lasted longer than previous waves, with new organisations like Islamic State continuously emerging (Kaplan, 2016).

Not all terrorist organisations fit neatly into that Rapoport's (2004) conceptualisation (Kaplan, 2016). For example, the recent rise of right-wing terrorism might warrant a *fifth wave*, which would have a more ethnic and nationalistic focus (Kaplan, 2010; Rapoport, 2021). This notion is supported by Ebner (2021), who asked leading counterterrorism experts to predict extremism developments for 2025. The co-occurrence of nationalistic terrorism and religiously motivated terrorism is described as one of the key characteristics of the coming years.

Rapoport's (2004) historical conceptualisation is not without criticism. For example, Parker and Sitter (2016) propose *strains* instead of waves ("[...] Nationalism, Socialism, Religious Extremism and Exclusion.", p. 199) that have a similar periodical origin and co-existed throughout history. Their reasoning is twofold: Terrorist organisations learn from each other, for example, by employing similar training or combat strategies, and they often have a shared past with overlapping ideologies. It appears that nearly all strains can be mapped onto Rapoport's waves (2004), except the *Exclusion* strain. This kind of terrorism seeks to exclude certain social groups like minorities from their country; this is often racially motivated (Parker & Sitter, 2016). Similarly, to Kaplan's proposition of an additional ethno-nationalistic wave (2010), Parker and Sitter (2016) outline terrorist organisations like the Ku Klux Klan or offenders like Anders Behring Breivik as part of that type of movement.

Terrorism and who is identified as a terrorist have shifted significantly throughout history and are difficult to neatly conceptualise (Parker & Sitter, 2016). The term depends on the political discourse of several social institutions in any cultural climate and historical context. Additionally, it serves as an example of how a scholar's theoretical lens can influence what is portrayed as terrorism. While Rapoport (2004) is focusing on the

organisations' ideology and their operative strategies as a unit of analysis, Parker and Sitter (2016) exclusively define terrorism as politically motivated violence against civilians. The impact of these social influences on the terminology is outlined next.

2.3   The term terrorism as a social construct

Terrorism as a construct is considered controversial (Weinberg et al., 2004) because it is often used in a politicised way in public and scientific debates. Thus, it is regarded as ambiguous (Horgan, 2005). This includes issues about whom to consider a terrorist—for example, whether to include state-sponsored agents in the definition (e.g., Horgan, 2005; Lynch, 2017). In Western countries, terrorism is mainly associated by the public with those of the Muslim faith, even before 9/11 (Hase, 2021; Whidden, 2000). This form of Islamophobia and racism is described by Corbin (2017) as state-sponsored propaganda, highlighting the fluidity of the term terrorism and its dependency on a society's value system. The lack of consensus has resulted in hundreds of different definitions (Schmid, 2011). Schmid (2011) attributes this to the term's dependency on socio-political context, cultural values, and legislation. Other factors could be the perceived righteousness of the terrorist organisation's cause and individual proximity to possible terrorism targets (Heskin, 1985). Hence, the international consensus regarding terrorism is limited, with the number of reported terrorist incidents varying across countries (Friedland, 1992). Friedland (1992) concluded the fluctuation was due to different working definitions. The next section will explore some of the current conceptualisations.

2.4   General themes with the definition

There is a plethora of definitions, each with varying degrees of different meanings (Schmid, 2011). Schmid (2011) summarised the key features of these conceptualisations. They include political motivation, public acts of violence, the symbolic character of the

offences, and a high likelihood of collateral damage. However, which aspects are necessary to form a coherent definition is not agreed upon. One of the reasons is the term's entry into the political rhetoric, often to demonise political opponents (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004). Hence, terrorists rarely identify themselves as such, instead framing their perceived enemy as terrorists. Or as Hoffman (1998) puts it, the term itself is used in a derogatory way by all parties, making it more difficult for scholars of various political backgrounds and cultural contexts to find consensus. Authors like Heskin (1985) tried early on to opt for an alternative term to circumvent the pejorative use of terrorism, instead calling it *political violence*. However, they argued that did not solve the confusion and only expanded the meaning to acts that might be deemed acceptable by the public.

According to Horgan (2005, p. 1), the broadest definition of terrorism that nearly all scholars can agree upon is:

> "[...] the use or threat of use of violence as a means of attempting to achieve some sort of effect within a political context."

However, this does not reflect the reality of how the term is used generally (Horgan, 2005), because this description would include any kind of government that engages in war; a notion most states would disagree with (Horgan, 2005). Instead, terrorism often describes an individual or a group of individuals attacking representatives of an established authority. This absolution of governments is not shared by all scholars. For example, Moghaddam (2007) explicitly includes official members of governments as possible terrorists. But even Horgan (2005) acknowledges that the broadest definition is impractical because it could just become a device of value judgements, instead of scientifically outlining a theoretical concept.

Finding a universal definition becomes even more challenging given the diversity of those labelled a terrorist (Horgan, 2014). Such individuals can be male, female, adults or children. They can employ different kinds of warfare tactics, for example, hijacking, bombing, or mass shootings. And they can have various motivations. This diversity is not only limited to the comparison between terrorist organisations but can also be found within one group over time, that adapts to new challenges and develops new strategies (Horgan, 2017). The struggle for consensus is so widespread that many scholars are reportedly "sick and tired" (Schmid, 2011, p. 42) of it, instead proposing to just accept the subjective nature and resulting ambiguity of the term. However, agreeing on a definition is not merely an academic exercise (Ganor, 2002). As terrorism is found globally, a shared understanding of the terminology must be a priority to successfully coordinate international efforts.

Schmid (2012) consequently attempted to provide a working definition that experts could agree upon. They surveyed 90 academics and professionals in three rounds to establish consensus. The consultation with these experts resulted in the following definition (Schmid, 2012, p. 158):

> "Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties [...]."

Here, terrorism is defined as (1) a violent method that can elicit a fearful response, (2) is politically motivated, (3) is considered illegal, (4) directly targeting civilians, and (4)

intending to address and/or influence indirectly those in power (e.g., politicians). Schmid (2012, p. 158) specifies that it is referred to terrorism in the context of "(i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by the state- and non-state actors [...]". State-sponsored agents are explicitly included as possible terrorists. Furthermore, the immediate victims are rarely the ultimate targets, because terrorist violence is usually part of a larger campaign that seeks to influence a political process. This definition has not found its way into the general discourse yet. To gain a deeper understanding of the concept, terrorism will be contrasted with other related constructs in the following section.

2.5 Concepts related to terrorism

Several other forms of political and/or violent behaviour are often mentioned in conjunction with terrorism: hate crimes (e.g., Mills, et al., 2017), activism (e.g., Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde, 2014), mass shootings (e.g., Capellan & Gomez, 2018), and organised crime in general (e.g., Makarenko, 2004). Hence, every term will be briefly defined, compared, and contrasted with terrorism.

Hate crimes. Defined as every offence motivated by the target's (presumed) membership to a racial or religious group, or because of their perceived gender, disability, or sexual orientation (Sullaway, 2004). The offender's prejudice against members of such groups is a key aspect of the definition (Sullaway, 2004). These attitudes can be linked to the offender's political views (Hall, 2013), making hate crime a potential form of political violence. Mills et al. (2017) found similarities between hate crime and terrorism in their systematic literature review. For example, both target individuals due to their membership to a certain group, both are ideologically motivated, and both hold communicative power.

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The latter means that both can intend to send a message beyond the immediate target to the rest of the victim's group or even a wider audience (e.g., that individuals perceived as different do not belong). An example of this blurring between hate crime and terrorism is the white supremacist organisation Ku Klux Klan (Atkins, 2006). However, there are also several distinctive features between the two concepts (Mills et al., (2017). For example, hate crimes are often less planned, likely to be committed by intoxicated youth as a form of thrill-seeking behaviour, and they lack the publicity efforts that are characteristic of terrorist attacks (Mills et al., 2017). The lack of public impression management could cause a lower arrest rate when compared to terrorist attacks (Mill et al., 2017). Deloughery et al. (2012, p. 665) summarise hate crimes as "downward offences"— meaning they are more likely committed by members of a society's majority against members of a marginalised group. In contrast, terrorists are more commonly from lower social backgrounds or present the minority in the society in which they commit an attack (Deloughery et al., 2012).

Besides commonalities and differences, the two offence types (i.e., terrorism and hate crime) also impact one another (Mills et al., 2017). The exact nature of this effect is still unclear but Mills et al.'s (2017) review of US county incident data suggested that a rise in one type of extremist offence also results in other extremist crimes. Different theoretical links are discussed. For example, Michael (2003) frames hate crimes as an offence leading to terrorism, specifically for right-wing extremism. It is hypothesised that more and more individuals fit their idea of an enemy, expanding from minorities to government targets (Michael, 2003), further supported by Freilich et al. (2015). Alternatively, hate crimes could be a form of retaliation against the perceived increase in terrorism. Several authors, as summarised by Mills et al. (2017), support this idea, showing significant increases in hate crime rates after terrorist incidents. Both concepts

appear to be part of a complex dynamic and both form political violence; however, the literature also suggests that both should be treated as distinct constructs.

Activism and ecoterrorism. Activism is defined as a form of political engagement voicing one's grievance about perceived injustice within society (Pruyt & Kwakkel, 2014). They note that this form of political engagement has been in increased counterterrorism focus, in recent years. For example, the Dutch government classifies some forms of animal rights activists as equally dangerous as the more common terrorist organisations (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2009). In addition, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) referred to the environmental activism groups, Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF), as *ecoterrorism* in a congressional hearing (Lewis, 2004). The term is nearly exclusively used in the US context (Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde, 2014). Supporters of the notion state that radical environmental and animal rights movements pose one of the biggest security threats within the US accounting for a significant number of violent incidents (e.g., Simone Jr et al., 2008).

However, the validity of such a claim is widely understudied and discussed critically (Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde, 2014). Equating activism and related civil disobedience with terrorism in legislation would arguably be suppression (Vanderheiden, 2005; Amster, 2006), subsequently preventing political change (Neumann, 2013). In fact, Carson et al. (2012) found no empirical evidence that would justify this comparison. The common modus operandi for activism incidents registered in the Global Terrorism Database were offences against properties. This was corroborated by interviews with 25 activists (Carson et al., 2012). Nearly all interviewees disapproved of the use of violence, as it would harm their agenda, placing violent offenders on the fringes of such movements (Carson et al., 2012).

Mass shooting. One of the most common definitions is the *four-fatality minimum* (e.g., Duwe, 2007), classifying an incident as a mass shooting/murder when four or more individuals were killed at one event. The predominant research focus is the US, likely because it has 31% of all global mass shooters (Lankford, 2016). While in the previous 40 years offender profiles remained unchanged (Capellan & Gomez, 2018), with the unifying feature being depression, psychosis, or emotional strain, amongst other diagnoses (Bowers et al., 2010), lately mass shooters appear more well-adjusted and motivated by extremist ideology (Capellan & Gomez, 2018). In fact, Hunter et al. (2021) observed a considerable overlap between mass shooters and terrorists in 39% of their sample of 105 offenders, including (a) ideological motivation; (b) wanting to reach an audience; (c) no financial motivation; and (c) offenders perceiving an enemy.

Similarly, Osborne and Capellan (2017) included *ideological shooters* in their typology of so-called *active shooters* (i.e., individuals who commit mass shootings). Other types are the *autogenic shooter*, who commit 'motiveless' offences that are reflective of their psychological issues (Osborne & Capellan, 2017, p. 9), and *victim-specific shooters*, motivated by a personal vendetta. Ideological shooters appear motivated by grievance and choose their victims based on their occupation, race, or because they indirectly represent their perceived political enemy (Osborne & Capellan, 2017). Hence, this sub-section presents a considerable overlap with terrorists (Lankford, 2013; Capellan, 2015), making it necessary to consider mass shooters in counterterrorism.

Organised Crime. A subsection of organised crime blurs the borders to terrorist organisations, referred to as *crime-terror-nexus* (e.g., Makarenko, 2004; Cook et al., 2013). The spectrum can range from criminal networks collaborating with terrorist

movements or terrorist organisations employing other criminal activities to fund their endeavours (Makarenko, 2004), for example through drug trafficking (Steinitz, 1985), human trafficking, slavery, forced prostitution (e.g., Ahram, 2019; Avdan & Omelicheva, 2021), or money laundering (Teichmann, 2020).

While some argue that this fluidity leaves the crime-terror-nexus ambiguous and impractical (Ruggiero, 2019), others hypothesise that individuals can move between those groups (e.g., Basra & Neumann, 2016). Their analysis of 79 case files of Islamists suggested that offenders often displayed a history of criminal behaviour before joining a terrorist organisation. Basra and Neumann (2016) concluded that the individuals had lost their inhibition for violence first, making them more susceptible to recruitment efforts, especially during detainments in prisons.

Overall, it becomes apparent that the term terrorism is ambiguous and overlaps with other acts of politically motivated or organised violence. There is arguably a lack of research that systematically and empirically establishes consensus regarding these categories, with studies often utilising correlational designs. However, the ever-changing nature of terrorism makes it challenging to remain up to date with continuous developments. For example, the involuntary celibate (Incel) movement emerging in 2014 represents a new overlap between mass shootings and hate crimes (Hoffmann et al., 2020). The violent attacks by men blaming women and genetic determinism for their lack of sex and success in life exhibit an increasing militant motivation like right-wing movements (Hoffmann et al., 2020). This also hints towards an overlap of individual offenders and wider terrorist organisations, as discussed in the next section.

2.6 A brief overview of different forms of terrorist engagement

Terrorism does not present as a discrete construct, but a continuously shifting concept comprised of several groups of heterogeneous individuals (Horgan, 2005). As such, they defy an easy summary (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). Hence, the following overview of possible terrorist types only represents a subsection of the discourse. Thus, only the most discussed offender categories (Marsden & Schmid, 2011) are discussed.

Terrorist cells. Arguably in the most common terrorist structure, the main organisation is split into sub-groups with varying levels of leadership dependency (Jackson, 2012). This prevents infiltration (Jackson, 2012) while allowing for flexible information- and resource-sharing (Harris-Hogan, 2013). Furthermore, an increased number of cells allows for more efficient recruitment in several locations (Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012), likely because face-to-face recruitment is more effective (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Nevertheless, emerging anecdotal evidence hints towards similar radicalisation potential in online groups (Ebner, 2021).

Lone actor. In contrast, this represents individuals committing terrorist attacks by themselves (e.g., Spaaij, 2010), with an increase in these offences having been observed in the early 2000s (Pitcavage, 2015). Previously called *lone wolf*, the term is now viewed as academically inappropriate (Baker & Roy, 2015), as it can be misleading and romanticising (Schuurman et al, 2018). The category lacks consensus (e.g., Marlatt, 2016) because it is unclear whether individuals must act by themselves or are on the fringes of a terrorist organisation (Hewitt, 2002).

No matter the definition, two broad perspectives can be distinguished. Some scholars view lone actors as socially isolated with severe mental health issues, while others view

them as part of a wider network strategically employed by dispatchers (Simi, 2010). Others hypothesise that terrorist organisations intentionally exploit individuals with mental health issues, often referred to as 'leaderless resistance', common within white supremacist groups (Simi, 2010). Connected to this is the notion that individuals radicalise themselves[1], meaning they immerse themselves in an extremist belief system and prepare for an attack independently from a group (Spaaij, 2010). Hence, they become arguably more difficult to be detected, which associates this offence type with an increased security risk.

Other unifying traits include the use of firearms and the rare commitment of several attacks, according to an analysis of US incidents (Pitcavage, 2015). This links lone actors to mass shootings (e.g., Capellan & Gomez, 2018). The ambiguity might also relate to the lack of high-quality research, with studies tending to remain on a descriptive level (Danzell et al., 2016; Corner et al., 2016).

Suicide terrorists. This form of terrorism is commonly associated with guerrilla[2] warfare tactics and religious extremist movements, using individuals that have bombs attached to themselves, to attack government targets that would not be accessible with conventional strategies (e.g., Berman & Laitin, 2005). Lankford (2014) summarised the current debate around this type of terrorist and the question of whether suicide terrorists are suicidal or rather indoctrinated individuals. The author proposed the following typology:

- *Conventional*: Such terrorists exhibit the same psychological distress and have similar crisis events in their past as other individuals with suicidal

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[1] Discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
[2] The term is associated with an extensive historical background, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. It describes an unregulated warfare by fractionalised groups not affiliated with any governing body (Berman & Laitin, 2005).

ideations. Terrorist organisations could recruit such individuals to exploit their vulnerabilities for the organisation's cause. Suicidal ideation could also be caused or facilitated by the distressing organisational environment.

- *Coerced*: These individuals fear the consequences—whether communicated through explicit threats or implied in the group's ideology—if they do not commit the attack. For example, the well-being of their family could be at risk. Others join the 'fight', realising too late that they do not want to die for the cause, but have no means to escape.

- *Escapist*: A fraction of suicide terrorists appear to choose death not due to suicidal ideation, but because of the fear of falling into the hands of their enemies. Hence, suicide is perceived as the only viable option to escape.

- *Indirect*: It is hypothesised that some are not aware of their suicidality. Instead, they disguise their tendencies as particularly risk- or thrill-seeking behaviour in the name of the organisation.

However, others refute the notion of suicidality entirely (Webber et al., 2017), instead identifying expected gain or perceived loss of personal significance as motivation. Overall, it remains unclear whether suicide terrorists constitute a distinct category.

Cyber terrorism. There is no agreement among practitioners on what constitutes terrorism online (Talihärm, 2010). In the broadest sense, this term is applied to any terrorist activity that utilises online technology (Talihärm, 2010). More narrowly, it refers to terrorist activity targeting computer-based systems (Talihärm, 2010; Patel, 2021). However, out of 118 survey participants, most policymakers ($N = 61\%$) and researchers ($N = 57\%$) that a clear definition had not been established yet (Jarvis & Macdonald, 2015). Wells et al. (2016) attribute the need for a resolution to scholars' possible lack of education regarding

new technology. Ebner (2021) views online terrorism in all its facets as a central pillar of the new wave of terrorism, presenting anecdotal evidence across the ideological spectrum that cyberspace is used as a recruitment and warfare tool. It remains to be seen whether cyberterrorism warrants its label, or whether it is only terrorism in a new format.

Female terrorists. This understudied 'group' arguably does not warrant its category, as there can be female suicide terrorists, female lone actors, etc. (Jacques & Taylor, 2009). They recognise the female experience and their role within terrorist organisations could be inherently different from their male counterparts. Jacques and Taylor's (2009) review of 51 publications yielded limited empirical evidence, with a focus on feminist theories. Some frame female terrorists as patriarchist victims coerced into terrorist activity (Berko & Erez, 2006). However, this notion might reinforce cultural stereotypes (Jacques & Taylor, 2009) and is refuted by gender-specific exit programs that address needs exclusive to women (e.g., Gielen, 2018; Schmidt, 2018). They recognise that the uncritical acceptance of stereotypes (e.g., viewing women as powerless) can exaggerate the perceived passivity of female terrorists (Gielen, 2018).

Overall, the central question is whether the terrorist types presented here are unique and distinct or represent altering expressions of the same concept. All categories present similarities (Horgan, 2005), but the awareness of terrorists fitting into multiple roles is an important insight for counterterrorism investigations (Marsden & Schmid, 2011). These typologies must be used with caution, as they could otherwise result in a reductionistic view (Rae, 2012). The general lack of concrete terminology impacts the work of practitioners, and it poses a challenge to research itself, as outlined in the next section.

2.7   The terminology's ambiguity and its impact on the research field

The lack of consensus regarding central terminology has been established in this chapter. As a result, the findings are often not generalisable, the debate remains confusing and similar constructs are not easily distinguishable. For example, it is dependent on the author which violent incident is labelled a mass shooting or lone actor attack. Hence, the same data set can often be analysed in multiple ways.

Additional challenges for counterterrorism research are identified. One of the most notable problems is access to representative, primary data (Sageman, 2014). Due to issues around national security, case files of terrorist offenders are not readily available. The amount of data is further limited by the *base rate problem*, namely where individual information is overemphasised in comparison to the actual much lower occurrence rate of a phenomenon (e.g., Elwood, 1993). This weighs especially heavily in counterterrorism, where contrary to the public's belief, terrorist attacks are rare, so the pool of data is smaller than in other fields of research. Therefore, researchers must opt for fragmentary information that can be biased (e.g., media reports may disproportionately amplify certain aspects of a case), find proxy measures (e.g., extremist websites), or rely on convenience samples (Sageman, 2014). The use of substitute outcomes, for example, measuring the rate of extremist online content, instead of using terrorist violence as outcome measurement, increases the confusing diversity of findings (Sageman, 2014). This is amplified by the lack of shared definitions (Sageman, 2014). In addition, the use of opportunity samples, as opposed to systematic sampling, makes it impossible to assess whether findings can be generalised to the wider terrorist population. Due to a lack of data, authors must use other, less reliable opportunities, often relying on single case studies (Young & Findley, 2011). This has become the dominant approach to research within this field. However, this not only results in a limited explanatory value but also

adds to the confusion surrounding terrorism definition. It appears authors can commonly re-formulate the term to fit their case study, consequently adding to the diversity of the terminology. Furthermore, some authors do not explicitly include any definition or fail to disclose their data source (Silke, 2001). Throughout the years, criticism persisted that reliable insights into counterterrorism research are rare (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001; Horgan, 2017).

Horgan (2017) attributes this to a lack of scholars involved in the area. It appears that only a small group of researchers are consistently contributing to this specific field (e.g., Gill, 2015; Silke, 2001; Sageman, 2014) with arguably limited perspectives. Especially psychological content appears limited, often addressing only victims of terrorists instead of terrorists (Horgan, 2017). For example, stress reactions to 9/11 are one of the largest areas in psychological terrorism research (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2017). Horgan (2017) further emphasises that there needs to be more interdisciplinary research and intradisciplinary collaboration among psychological scholars. Youngman (2020) proposes terrorism studies as its discipline to encourage academic ownership of those issues. Overall, the varying perspectives are hoped to encapsulate the heterogenous offender type appropriately.

Throughout this chapter, it becomes clear that the ambiguity around the term terrorism is causing several issues, potentially hindering the scientific community to progress towards a deeper understanding of terrorists. Hence, colleagues are urged, at minimum, to make their terrorism definition explicit (e.g., Schmid, 2011). Additionally, Horgan (2005) emphasises that scholars should utilise established frameworks, instead of adding new conceptualisations in an unsystematic manner. The introduction of more hypotheses regarding different terrorism facets without building on previous ideas could

subsequently add to the existing confusion. In line with these recommendations, the current thesis will be explicitly based on the definition provided by (Schmid, 2012, p. 158):

> "Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties [...]."

The conceptualisation is chosen because it represents the only example of a terrorism definition that multiple researchers in the field could appear to broadly agree with, based on Schmid's (2011) utilisation of focus groups. Following this description, someone involved in terrorism is defined as an individual who employs violence to achieve certain political goals by intentionally causing fear in their victims and wider target population. The shared assumption in research is that an individual fitting this description must undergo a certain *process* to become involved (e.g., Horgan, 2005). The following chapter will present an overview of the discussed processes, referred to as radicalisation.

CHAPTER THREE
RADICALISATION AND ITS PATHWAYS

3.1 Structure of the chapter

This chapter will define *radicalisation* before outlining several perspectives regarding the process, which appear to be dominating the research field. Then, various theories and proposed models will be presented, discussing potential mechanisms, and contributing factors underlying the radicalisation process. The chapter will conclude with a critical reflection on the state of research in this area, outlining gaps in knowledge and opportunities for future research.

3.2 Radicalisation as the driver of terrorism

Similarly, to the ambiguity of the term terrorism, radicalisation is equally debated in the literature (e.g., Neumann, 2013; Borum 2011, 2012a). Sedgwick (2010) states in their historical analysis of the term that the understanding of radicalisation is highly dependent on the political context within which it is discussed (e.g., the radicalisation definition in the security context is vastly different to the conceptualisation in the foreign-policy context). Some governments across the world provide working definitions to conceptualise radicalisation, presenting with slight variations among them (Borum, 2012a):

The UK defines terrorism as follows (U.K. Home Office, 2011, p. 36):
"The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups."

Meanwhile, Canada presents the following conceptualisation (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009, p. 1):

"[...] the process by which individuals—usually young people—are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism."

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) distinguishes between general radicalisation, radicalisation resulting in violent behaviour, and the violent behaviour itself (Alava et al., 2017). This mirrors the current literature; while there is a general agreement that radicalisation can be understood as a process with an endpoint, it is debated whether an act of terrorism is always the inevitable outcome (e.g., Mandel, 2009). Several scholars, for example Neumann (2013) or Vidino (2010), distinguish between two types of possible radicalisation outcomes: extremist's ideas or beliefs, also sometimes referred to as "cognitive radicalisation" (Vidino, 2010, p. 1), and extremist violent actions. However, these two aspects are not only believed to be possible endpoints in the development process but are also considered to be impacting each other during the radicalisation process (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

Extremist ideas and actions can be broadly mapped onto the two most dominant psychological perspectives (Kruglanski & Fishmann, 2006). The first, historically older, approach is the *syndrome*-perspective. It understands terrorism as one distinct psychological construct analogue to psychiatry linking certain psychopathology to one diagnosis. This implies that terrorists can be identified and understood purely on their

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unique psychological characteristics and trajectories. Hence, aspects like personality traits, and motivation, but also their ideas and beliefs, could be summarised in profiles and linked to root causes (Kruglanski & Fishmann, 2006). However, several reviews demonstrate that the previous 30 years of research have failed to produce any valid profiles (Horgan, 2003a; McCauley, 2004; & Victoroff, 2005), leading Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) to conclude that the syndrome-perspective has failed. This was further supported by later research (e.g., Horgan, 2008; Vidino, 2010; Borum, 2011, 2012a) finding that extremist belief systems are misleading research prevention efforts, because they are observable in most radical individuals who never become violent. They are only one of many possible pathways leading to involvement in terrorism.

Alternatives focus on group dynamics and socialisation (Victoroff, 2005; Horgan, 2008); specifically, the influences and actions present in the initial phase of becoming involved in a terrorist group (Horgan, 2008). This could guide research to explore concrete factors, namely the radicalised individual's decisions and the social and organisational context (Taylor & Horgan, 2006). These ideas are part of the second psychological approach, the *tool*-perspective (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). Rather than viewing terrorism as an expression of psychological features, it is defined as a form of violent action that can be potentially employed by anyone. Or, in other words, terrorists are considered a psychologically heterogeneous group that does not share one common profile, but all show similar behaviour, utilising terrorism as a tool in their ideological agenda. As a result, this perspective emphasises goal-directed behaviour more and the sociological context, which incentivises such behaviour (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

While Neumann (2013) agrees with the conceptualisation of radicalisation as a process or pathway, they refute the argument that the beliefs of an extremist should be disregarded

and replaced by a focus on sociological contexts as too simplistic. Neumann (2013) argues that Horgan (2008) and Borum (2011) create an artificial divide between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation; the former reflects the extremist ideology, while the latter refers to the act of extremist violence. These two aspects must arguably be studied in relation to each other (Neumann, 2013). Though, Kruglanski and Fishman (2006), and subsequently Horgan (2008) and Borum (2011), never argued that beliefs should be entirely ignored. Instead, Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) re-conceptualised the psychological features of terrorists, shifting from single root causes to the concept of contributing factors. Thus, extremist beliefs, amongst others, may only become relevant under certain circumstances. Kruglanski and Fisherman (2006) argue that these circumstances must be the focus of research, given that concentrating on single causes has not elicited any significant insight.

The current debate and resulting definition are briefly summarised. Scholars agree that radicalisation can be understood as a process, which can result in extremist beliefs, extremist actions, or both. This is best understood by focusing on group socialisation and surrounding circumstances. The recent shift originated from the unsuccessful quest to find universal profiles or root causes. Instead, individuals' psychological factors must be framed as contributing factors to the aforementioned processes, not as driving factors. No single factor therefore can explain radicalisation, making a need for multifaceted models important. The following section will outline some of those conceptualisations, to provide further context to the scientific debate about radicalisation.

3.3   Theories and models of radicalisation

Several theories and models have been proposed to explain and predict radicalisation (e.g., Borum, 2012b). The lack of a unified research focus and limited shared terrorism

typology results in a multitude of hypothetical models (e.g., Young & Findley, 2011).

They often lack a validated empirical basis, hence, being difficult to compare (e.g., Young

& Findley, 2011; Borum, 2012b). Consequently, an exhaustive summary of all

radicalisation models is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, to prevent bias, the

following section will only outline psychological theories that have been the focus of

several central literature reviews[3] (King & Taylor, 2011; Borum, 2012b; Nasser-Eddine

et al., 2011; Young & Findley, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). Furthermore, they

have informed later theoretical developments (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; McCauley &

Moskalenko, 2017).

The five central conceptualisations presented in all reviews are: *Federal Bureau of*
*Investigation Model (*Borum, 2003), *Theory of Joining Extremist Groups* (Wiktorowicz,
2004), *Staircase to Terrorism* (Moghaddam, 2005), *New York Police Department Model*
of Jihadisation (Silber et al., 2007), and *Four Prongs Model* (Sageman, 2008). King and

Taylor (2011) justify their model selection as focused on multi-faceted conceptualisations

that aim to explain the entirety of the radicalisation process. They appear cautious to only

include theories that represent distinct approaches to the subject, without referencing the

other models. Furthermore, the five conceptualisations are considered highly relevant for

practical application in counterterrorism (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; McCauley &

Moskalenko, 2017). Therefore, they are described as distinct "milestones" (McCauley &

Moskalenko, 2017, p. 3). The theories are presented, here, in the order of their

publication. However, Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism (2005; 2006) is presented as

the first out of those five, as it is viewed as a framework, which subsumes a variety of

other theories (e.g., Borum, 2012b). Therefore, it is considered an appropriate first

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[3] At the point of writing this chapter, those four mentioned reviews shared 3,811 citations, according to
GoogleScholar.

orientation for the reader for all other theories. After the overview of all five conceptualisations, criticism and solutions to shortcomings are presented.

The Staircase to Terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005, 2006) is based on the author's own experiences, studies with convicted terrorists in prison, qualitative biographical research, and general research on group dynamics (Moghaddam, 2005, 2006). An advancement is proposed along six consecutive steps mirroring the escalation towards engagement in terrorism (e.g., an act of political violence). Each step represents the individual's narrowing focus on violence, making alternative goal-directed behaviour less likely.

In step one, individuals progress onwards, if they deem their current material and social conditions as unsatisfying. This relates to the *Relative Deprivation Theory* (Gurr, 1970), in which the relative perception of material and other forms of deprivation is framed as injustice or betrayal, as opposed to absolute deprivation. Gurr (1970) suggested this inequality is a cause of crime. Next, the individual assesses their potential to address this dissatisfaction through societal changes. This potential is linked theoretically to self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), meaning an individual's belief in their capacity to achieve goals. When this confidence is threatened, a complex interplay of world views and awareness of own mortality can result in anxiety, as suggested by the *Terror Management Theory* (TMT; Greenberg et al., 1986; Cohen et al., 2004). While Greenberg et al. (1986) referred to general management strategies addressing anxiety, Cohen et al. (2004) found that extremist violence itself can be a response to the threatened confidence. This behavioural outcome is linked in the Staircase to Terrorism to Crenshaw's *Rational Choice Theory* (1992). The theory suggests individuals use rationality to maximise their preferred outcome in their own self-interest. Applied to terrorism, it means that extremist violence becomes a justifiable cost to address the initial dissatisfaction (Moghaddam,

2005, 2006), but only if individuals blame others for their perceived injustice. Moghaddam (2005, 2006) references Freud's *displaced aggression* in the third step (e.g., explained in Hurry et al., 1976)[4].

Steps four and five can be summarised together, as they introduce the terrorist organisation (face-to-face or online) to the model progression. The individual refutes society's moral values and aligns themselves with the group's norms to justify violence. This refers to *selective moral disengagement* (Bandura, 1990), which postulates a cognitive restructuring of morally commonly reprehended behaviour into morally justifiable action. Linked to this, Moghaddam (2005, 2006) postulated an increased *in-vs. out-group thinking*, deepening the divide between group members and the perceived enemy. This results in step six, where group training reduces the final inhibitions for killing. Here, individuals emotionally distance themselves from their future victims (i.e., decreasing empathy for victims), referred to as *psychological distancing*.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Model (Borum, 2003). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is using a similar, yet more concise model than the Staircase to Terrorism model (King & Taylor, 2011). The Federal Bureau of Investigation Model presents a hypothetical pathway with four stages concluding in extremist violence (Borum, 2003). Unlike Moghaddam's model (2005, 2006), this earlier work does not mention moral disengagement, or the preparation required for an attack. Nearly all other aspects are addressed by Borum (2003), from the initial experience of injustice (Phase one) and social comparison (Phase two), over to the shifted blame (Phase three), to the legitimisation of violence by using stereotypes about members of the out-group (Phase

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[4] Displaced aggression occurs as a reaction to an aversive external impulse (e.g., Hurry et al., 1976). The individual is prevented from acting aggressively towards this impulse and, thus, directs their aggression to a substitute target.

four). However, this model appears less elaborate in its presentation (King & Taylor, 2011), solely mentioning the phases but not referencing any possible connected theories (unlike Moghaddam, 2005, 2006).

New York Police Department Model of Jihadisation (Silber et al., 2007). Considered more practical than the previous outline of radicalisation (Borum, 2012b), this model is a four-phase conceptualisation by the Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD, in conjunction with Silber et al., 2007). The model is informed by an arguably small empirical base with eight terrorist cases and two extremist groups. Its application is limited to members of the Jihadist movement, a sub-branch of Islamist extremism seeking to violently establish a literal translation of the Quran as law. The NYPD Model of Jihadisation is comprised of four sequential steps, but, unlike previous models, it is not expected that radicalised individuals complete each phase.

The starting point is the so-called *Pre-Radicalisation*, in which individuals lead "ordinary" lives before they become radicalised (Silber et al., 2007, p. 6). Through association with sub-cultures opposed to society's values, individuals continue to the second phase. During this *self-identification*, individuals abandon their old identity and orientate themselves towards a Jihadist ideology, often seeking out other extremists. Silber et al. (2007, p. 6) assumed that a "cognitive opening" (i.e., a form of crisis) is necessary to facilitate this change. Building on the initial exposure, the next step is *indoctrination*, where ideological conviction is strengthened. Lastly, radicalised individuals prepare for a terrorist attack via active training in phase four, *Jihadisation*. The NYPD conceptualisation of Jihadist radicalisation is arguably simplistic, for example, assuming all individuals endorsing extremist ideology will commit extremist violence.

Theory of Joining Extremist Groups (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Unlike the previous model, this theory does not include the initial pre-radicalisation phase. The conceptualisation hinges on a case study of the UK-based Al-Muhajiroun group (i.e., an extremist group promoting an Islamist revolution in Europe). Thus, it is arguably even more limited in its empirical foundation. Comparable to the other models, Wiktorowicz (2004) proposed a transformation of the individual towards a group-related and ideologically informed identity. The first stage is termed *cognitive opening*, representing the individual's reception to new ideas due to a personal crisis (i.e., a distressing life event; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Due to this, the individuals could enter stage two, *seeking religion*. Those new views are incorporated into their own belief system in the subsequent stage, called *frame alignment*. It is hypothesised that direct contact with extremist individuals can help facilitate this process. Hence, the last stage is referred to as *socialisation and joining*. This includes the forming of group identity and leaving former worldviews behind.

Four Prongs Model (Sageman, 2008). This theory describes an interplay of factors leading to extremist violence. The model first outlines three crucial cognitive aspects, which can reinforce each other; *Moral outrage,* which describes a strong emotional reaction to perceiving a political event as a moral violation. This is interpreted in the context of an *ideological frame* (e.g., whom to blame for the event), but only if it *resonates with personal experiences*. In other words, the individual views their own struggle as political by experiencing it as linked to world events. All these factors are further increased via interplay with the situational factor *mobilisation through networks* (e.g., the validation and amplification of extremist attitudes through like-minded individuals; Sageman, 2008). As such, the Four Prongs Model is a type of *Social*

Movement Theory (e.g., Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011), proposing that extremist organisations mirror general social movements in their quest for societal change.

When reviewing commonalities and discrepancies between all models listed here, it became apparent that relative deprivation was frequently mentioned (King & Taylor, 2011). For example, Borum (2003) and Moghaddam (2005, 2006) incorporated this explicitly in their conceptualisations, while Sageman (2008) referred indirectly to the factor via the term *personal resonance*. The other factor shared among some of the models, including the NYPD model (Silber et al., 2007), the Four Prongs Model (Sageman, 2008), and the Theory of Joining Extremist Groups (Wiktorowicz, 2004), is identity crises (King & Taylor, 2011). This involves a general dissatisfaction with the status quo or personal grievances, for example, caused by discrimination, social isolation, or uncertainty. This reiterates the *frustration-aggression* (FA) hypothesis (e.g., Friedland, 1992,) suggesting that the obstruction of goal-obtainment is frustrating and leads to aggression. However, these links only appear to apply to vulnerable individuals who lack prosocial coping strategies (e.g., Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018; Vergani et al., 2020). Schmid (2013) refines the FA hypothesis, proposing that grievances present extremist groups with an opportunity to exploit vulnerable individuals.

While all five conceptualisations are concentrating on practical application, they appear often limited regarding their supporting empirical evidence (Sinai, 2010). In addition, they seem to overemphasise the role of ideology, specifically Islamist ideology, which has been a research focus since the 9/11 attacks (Vergani et al., 2020). In fact, the role of ideology in the radicalisation process appears unclear, as it is not present in all terrorist offences (Borum, 2012a). Hence, it is excluded from British government guidance

making the existence of a clearly defined ideology no longer necessary for the indication of preventative interventions (Patel & Hussain, 2019).

Instead, Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) suggests, in their systematic literature review, that ideology serves as a post-hoc justification for violence. This notion is also reflected in recent guideline changes by the British Home Office regarding their preventative work; the latest policies do not explicitly state or require a clearly defined ideology anymore (Patel & Hussain, 2019). Meanwhile, Schmid (2013) understands ideology as a legitimisation for violence in offence planning, and Vergani et al. (2020) frame this as a central factor enticing individuals to engage with 'like-minded' individuals. The debate is likely facilitated by the inconsistent ideology definition (Ackermann & Burnham, 2021) and the lack of empirical evidence (e.g., Vergani et al., 2020).

Every previously mentioned review (King & Taylor, 2011; Borum, 2012b; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Young & Findley, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) caution that all these conceptualisations are primarily hypothetical. For example, there is no empirical evidence supporting the necessity for the exact order of phases or steps for any of the sequential models (King & Taylor, 2011; Borum, 2012b). Additionally, some theories, like Relative Deprivation Theory, Rational Choice Theory, TMT, and Moral Disengagement, which were framed as central in Moghaddam's model (2005, 2006), were only empirically linked to general forms of violence, criminality, and activism (Lygre et al., 2011). Lygre et al. (2011) also concluded that the Staircase to Terrorism in its entirety was too complex to be falsified, making it unsuitable for empirical exploration.

Overall, the field has been criticised as not emphasising the importance of data-informed approaches. Young and Findley (2011) arrived at this judgement after reviewing articles

from nine of the most popular political journals published since 1980. Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011) describe the research quality as poor, for example, due to a lack of primary sources or critical reflection. Furthermore, none of the proposed models explains the exact mechanism that causes frustrated or grieving individuals to join extremist movements (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). This is attributed to the domineering retrograde research strategy, namely, forming pathway narratives from convicted terrorists. They propose more empirical evidence is required to predict explicitly specified outcomes.

In addition, the current research must address an understudied facet of the radicalisation process, which is mental illness. Gill and Corner (2017) attribute the lack of progress to competing perspectives. First, it appears that researchers utilised a linear and too simplistic approach, framing all terrorists as suffering from psychopathology. The early stages of counterterrorism research in the 1980s were dominated by the idea that all terrorists must be psychopaths[5]. This notion originated from pop culture influences, for example, the public discussion around German students who turned to leftist terrorism in the 1970s (Gill & Corner, 2017). It is speculated that pathologising the terrorists aided the public to rationalise the attacks (Gill & Corner, 2017; Victoroff, 2005). In the 1990s, research shifted its exploration to personality facets. Yet again, the empirical insight was only limited. Indeed, Victoroff (2005, pp. 33-34) concluded in their review that previous research had been "... overwhelmingly subjective, speculative, and in many cases, derived from 1920s-era psychoanalytic hypotheses that are not amenable to testing.".

These conclusions were wrongfully generalised from psychopathy and personality facets to all kinds of mental disorders (Gill & Corner, 2017). This led to the notion that mental

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[5] Here, only indirectly defined by Gill and Corner (2017; referencing Victoroff, 2005) as individuals who are remorseless, exhibit antisocial behaviour and appear to have low levels of self-control.

health issues had no impact on the radicalisation process. For example, that the prevalence of mental disorders in the terrorist population was comparable to the public (Horgan, 2003b; Silke, 2003) led some scholars to class terrorists as "normal" (Gill & Corner, 2017, p. 9), based on the information available at the time. This was seemingly reiterated by simple correlational explanations that sought to find common terrorist profiles.

More recently, this methodology has been superseded by integral approaches exploring radicalisation along a pathway (e.g., Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Gill & Corner, 2017). In this new perspective, mental health issues play a varied role in radicalisation, with not every mental disorder constituting a risk factor for extremist violence (Al-Attar, 2020). Al-Attar (2020) hypothesises that the contribution of mental health issues to the risk is often indirectly via complex interactions with social and ideological factors. They reiterate Gill and Corner's (2017) criticism, stating that research around the link between mental disorders and terrorism remains in its infancy. Similar debates are held regarding the impact of neurodivergence and learning disabilities on the radicalisation process. For example, Autism Spectrum Disorder, a developmental disability impacting on the way individuals communicate in social situations, amongst other features, is discussed to serve as a vulnerability for radicalisation in some individuals (Faccini & Allely, 2017; Walter et al., 2021).

In addition, the development of a conceptual model will have to pay special attention to understudied areas, such as protective factors (Gill & Corner, 2017). As with several theories mentioned in the five presented models, factors mitigating the risk of radicalisation appear to overlap considerably with factors protective of general violence (Lösel et al., 2018). In their review of 17 studies, Lösel et al. (2018) found self-control, pro-social parenting, and employment as relevant protective factors, amongst others, with

most only substantiated by one empirical study. Only condemnation of extremist violence and adopting mainstream society's norms appeared to be specific to the risk of violent radicalisation (Lösel et al., 2018). In both cases, research linking those aspects to extremist violence is only preliminary. This rejection could be supported by catalysts for rehabilitation, as summarised by Silke et al. (2021) in their *Phoenix* model. The model was developed based on a systematic literature review and categorises protective factors relevant to successful reintegration into society (Silke et al., 2021). These categories include influences on the individual (e.g., pro-social peers), influences relating to the individual's psyche (e.g., disillusionment), and the time and space prisons can offer for rehabilitation efforts. However, authors have emphasised the preliminary nature of these findings (Gill & Corner, 2017; Lösel et al., 2018; Silke et al., 2021).

It becomes apparent that radicalisation is summarised by numerous theories varying in outlook and quality. Thus, the next section will present a model that arguably addresses some of the shortcomings discussed with regards to the previous five models.

3.4 The Significance Quest Theory

The *Significance Quest Theory* by Kruglanski et al. (2014) builds on the insight yielded by the previously discussed models. Here, the central motivating feature of the radicalisation process is the gain or restoration of the individual's feeling of significance, sometimes after an actual or perceived loss of significance. This can either originate at an individual or social level (i.e., political and/or economic instability in society serves to threat the significance of a group). Proposed triggers are humiliation and discrimination. However, individuals can also strive for significance without an initial sense of loss, due to feelings of entitlement. This establishes the goal for the individual to identify the means to restore or gain significance, the *significance quest*. At that point, ideology will interject,

providing a framework with which to interpret events, leading to the fulfilment of the 'quest'. In other words, it helps identify sources to blame for the current situation and provides justification for violence as a means to establish significance again. Kruglanski et al. (2014) incorporate previous considerations about ideology and its questionable role in radicalisation, explicitly stating that ideology is only providing the stage to become involved in terrorism but is not in itself considered a driving force of radicalisation. Rather, it presents a shared reality with like-minded individuals, through which they can identify means to reach their goals. The authors propose that the more prevalent the quest for significance is within an individual, the more influence the ideology will have on their judgement; hence, non-violent alternative goals, values and means become less feasible to an individual. This process is not restricted to the individual level, with Kruglanski et al. (2014) viewing the surrounding network of like-minded people as equally important because they recruit new individuals to their ideology and amplify the need for significance and violent action. Kruglanski et al. (2014) do not specify the order in which the individual becomes exposed to the factors. This accounts for the wide diversity of instances that radicalisation is occurring.

The Significance Quest Theory is also based on several empirical studies (e.g., Kruglanski & Orehek, 2011; Kruglanski et al., 2012), and has been further developed by Webber and Kruglanski (2017). These authors broke the theory down into its three core aspects; *Need for significance*; *Narrative*; and *Network*—calling it the *3N Approach*. This appeared to make it easier for other scholars to address the single components of the models in their studies. For example, across six survey rounds, Jasko et al. (2019) first found that gaining personal significance was a driving force for Polish activists and extremists (N = 2,461). Then, the social context was confirmed to moderate the relationship between personal significance and extremist violence across several cultural

settings (Sri Lanka, $N = 335$; Morocco $N = 260$; and Indonesia, $N = 713$). Likewise, Dhumad et al. (2020) identified the 3Ns in semi-structured surveys, comparing convicted terrorists ($N = 160$) and convicted murderers ($N = 65$), with a community control group ($N = 88$). They concluded that some of the items derived from the general criminal behaviour literature were also applicable to the theory by Webber and Kruglanski (2017). Thus, items representing crises, such as poverty, could relate to the need to regain significance, items representing justifications of terrorism could relate to narrative elements, and items representing terrorist affiliation could represent the network factors (Dhumad et al., 2020). However, violent offenders generally exhibited a high overlap with the terrorist group regarding their risk factors, questioning the predictive value of the conceptualisation (Dhumad et al., 2020).

While this theory appears to be empirically well substantiated, its practical application has yet to be tested. The first findings of a clinical trial with Sir Lankan extremist offenders ($N = 490$) suggested that the 3Ns successfully aided rehabilitation efforts (Webber et al., 2018). The governmental rehabilitation centres utilised psychological support (e.g., creative writing and contact with pro-social role models), as well as educational and vocational rehabilitation. After one year, Webber et al. (2018) surveyed the participants regarding their endorsement of extremism, attitudes towards de-radicalisation efforts, and perceived loss of significance. They concluded that gaining a sense of personal significance successfully counteracted extremist attitudes, a finding that was further confirmed after a follow-up period in the community ($N = 179$; Webber et al., 2018).

3.5   Shortcomings and opportunities in radicalisation research

The outlined models illustrate that a substantial number of considerations remain on a hypothetical level, often substantiated by only anecdotal evidence (King & Taylor, 2011). This led Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) to conclude that external validity (i.e., the generalisability of findings) had improved in the field, while the internal validity (i.e., the conclusion of causal relationships) remained poor. It is accepted that numerous other models exist, which are either encapsulating terrorism on a more general level or which focus on specific mechanisms that can also be summarised under already existing theories (King & Taylor, 2011), described in this chapter.

The variety of approaches resulted in Vergani et al. (2020) summarising 148 articles regarding the empirical evidence of behavioural and cognitive radicalisation in broad categories, which could be part of any model. *Push factors* include influences that drive individuals towards extremist violence. The review highlights relative deprivation and social group (i.e., the effects of being part of a social group, such as discrimination or experiencing injustice) as major influences that result in individuals seeking out violence. *Pull factors* make affiliation with extremist groups and/or movements attractive. Empirically well-substantiated influences are propaganda, which fosters engagement through moral disengagement and dehumanisation of the enemy, as well as peer pressure (Vergani et al., 2020). Lastly, *personal factors* represent individual influences likely making them vulnerable to radicalisation. Vergani et al. (2020) list mental health and cognitions as important influences, mirroring considerations by Al-Attar (2020) regarding the indirect influence of mental illnesses on the development of extremist violence. Vergani et al. (2020) also include sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., young age and male gender) as contributors to radicalisation.

Push, pull, and personal factors are not as distinct as presented here, with Vergani et al. (2020) acknowledging that these features of the radicalisation process can impact each other. The exact mechanisms are not specified, but it becomes evident that the findings reiterate aspects that have been also discussed in the models presented earlier in this chapter. The categories by Vergani et al. (2020) do not replace the need for a more theoretical understanding, with many links between factors remaining as speculative (King & Taylor, 2011). Furthermore, these factors are seemingly not exclusive to extremist violence (Smith, 2018; Dhumad et al., 2020; Gill et al., 2021). For example, Dhumad et al. (2020) compared convicted terrorists ($N = 160$) with convicted murderers ($N = 65$) and a community control group with no criminal history ($N = 88$) and found mostly no differences in risk factors between the two violent groups. However, Hart et al. (2017) found preliminary evidence that summarising radicalisation under group-based violence would yield additional insight. The term was originated by Cook et al. (2013) and links the influences fostering violence to group membership, including, for example, gang violence or hate crime. However, research into this conceptualisation remains preliminary.

Nevertheless, scholars agree that the radicalisation process can be viewed as a gradual (Schmid, 2013; Vergani et al., 2020), often iterative process (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018), where an individual exhibits distinct patterns of mental escalation towards extremism. This process is viewed as non-pathological (Schmid, 2013; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018), instead representing a maladaptive response to extreme situational factors. Despite the assumed universal pathway, empirical evidence appears to consistently highlight radicalised individuals as a heterogenous group, cautioning simplifying conceptualisations (e.g., Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018).

As previously mentioned, it appears that one of the only models captured in the current chapter was able to tackle some of this criticism, via receiving some empirical exploration, namely the Significance Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Even these authors acknowledge that "Understanding radicalization is not the same as actually preventing or reversing it [...]" (Kruglanski et al., 2014, p.90), emphasising that more work is necessary for a practical application of their model. The next chapter will provide a critical overview of assessment approaches as a practical example of applying such understanding.

CHAPTER FOUR
ASSESSING EXTREMISTS: ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS

4.1   Structure of the chapter

After summarising and reviewing the debate regarding terrorism and radicalisation, this chapter explores the practical application of this understanding in the form of assessments. They allow identification of individuals likely to become radicalised, prevention of extremist violence, and/or planning of care pathways for extremist offenders (e.g., Pressmann, 2009; Borum, 2015). Thus, the here discussed assessments represent an integral part in yielding understanding about the radicalisation process. First, overarching concepts and terms will be defined before several reviews are summarised presenting currently used assessment instruments. The overview will collate their advantages and limits, as well as the varying contexts for which they were designed. Lastly, shortcomings and areas for improvement are presented that will build the basis for the ensuing studies.

4.2   Defining risk assessment in the context of extremism

In the forensic psychology literature, *risk* is commonly defined as the likelihood of certain antisocial behaviour occurring (e.g., physical, or sexual violence; Singh, 2012). Assessing this likelihood usually aims to predict and understand these risks better and subsequently develop interventions for management and rehabilitation (e.g., Pressman, 2009). While general risk is often referring to reoffending (i.e., recidivism; Pressman, 2009), Borum (2015) views the primary task of risk assessments in counterterrorism as aiding prevention. Therefore, assessments must allow the early identification of extremists. As such, its goals overlap with threat assessments. However, threat assessment is a more dynamic and often continuous approach to establishing the level of threat an individual

or group is posing at any given point in time (e.g., Borum et al., 1999). Other functions of risk assessments in the context of counterterrorism are (Borum, 2015): Accounting for a variety of offences (e.g., threats, kidnapping, or violence spreading over several modus operandi); limiting potential harm; and the application of assessment findings to several different contexts, including the community, online, or in prison settings. Overall, risk assessments in counterterrorism are characterised by continuously shifting definitions and concepts, often within a politicised debate (Sarma, 2017), and having limited access to data due to security issues (Ward & Beech, 2015). However, the care pathway planning appears absent from the outlined goals.

Nevertheless, the risk assessment of extremist violence echoes similar debates to the risk assessment approaches in other areas (e.g., Pressman, 2009; Hart & Logan, 2011; Logan & Lloyd, 2019). Risk assessment approaches can be placed into three overarching categories: (1) unstructured clinical judgement; (2) actuarial approaches; and (3) Structured Professional Judgement (SPJ). The first approach type is usually not supported by any form of assessment instruments, as it represents unstructured intuitive conclusions by clinicians. Clinical judgement is often used in circumstances where there is insufficient empirical evidence (Logan & Lloyd, 2019). Such assessment approach is seen as not meeting quality standards, such as expectations for good inter-rater reliability (Pressman, 2009). Instead, it invites biases and mistakes (Logan & Lloyd, 2019).

Opposed to this are actuarial approaches, which represent assessment instruments that utilise statistically established links between empirically substantiated factors and risk. They exclude any form of individual judgement. Arguably, such approaches address several shortcomings of unstructured clinical judgement (e.g., Hart & Logan, 2011). However, counterterrorism research remains in its infancy (Pressman, 2009), meaning

that it is too early to predict extremist violence through a pre-defined group of factors as normally adopted within actuarial instruments. As a result, the SPJ is the preferred approach (e.g., Logan & Lloyd, 2019) and is currently considered as best practice (Dean & Pettet, 2017). This category subsumes assessment instruments that include general guidelines, providing assessors with overviews of important aspects to consider, while allowing for individual judgements, such as case prioritisation. The result is a detailed approach allowing for psychological formulations of factors and how their interplay is contributing to the specific risk (e.g., Dean & Pettet, 2017).

Factors that are the focus of the SPJ are referred to as *risk factors* (e.g., Borum, 2015). Other terms, sometimes used specifically in the counterterrorism literature, are *items* or *indicators* (Dean & Pettet, 2017). These factors have been shown empirically to be statistically linked to a certain type of antisocial behaviour (e.g., Kraemer et al., 1997). As these findings are based on statistics gathered at a group-level, they represent generalisations about a certain population that might not account for individual cases (Borum, 2015). Hence, these risk factors are not always causally linked to the risk they try to predict, but are merely correlational (Kraemer et al., 1997). For that matter, risk factors should not just be predictive, but they also must hold a certain potency (Kraemer et al., 1997). In other words, the risk factor must be specific and therefore capable of distinguishing between offender populations. However, Borum (2015, p. 65) argues that for an offence type like terrorism, which is infrequent and includes a wide variety of antisocial behaviour, such requirements might be an "insurmountable challenge".

Nevertheless, effective risk assessment approaches must be transparent, reliable, and evidence based (Jore & Nja, 2010) to provide structured guidance (Borum, 2015). Mullins (2010) extends these suggestions by applying the *Risk-Need-Responsivity* model (RNR)

first introduced by Andrews et al. (1990) to the terrorism context. The RNR is a principle that guides service delivery to reduce risk. As such, the risk principle refers to the notion that the amount and/or intensity of treatment should be proportional to the offender's risk. The need principle emphasises that every treatment should address the offender's needs, while the responsivity principle states that effective interventions are to be tailored to the offender's capabilities (Andrews et al.1990). From that Mullins (2010) derived that risk assessments exploring extremist violence must be repeated and acknowledge influences that can impact an individual's responsivity, instead of merely depicting factors relevant in extremism.

In addition, assessments should be dynamic (e.g., including shorter screening tool versions), time specific (i.e., suggesting a time frame for which the assessed risk level is valid for), outline factors that can be expanded upon with therapeutic interventions (i.e., *protective factors* which protect against risk), and those that model risk (Roberts & Horgan, 2008). The latter relates to the common practice to provide formulations, as a result of the assessment that logically links different factors to each other, as well as the risk, to inform therapeutic approaches and management (Roberts & Horgan, 2008).

After establishing a theoretical foundation for risk assessments, as well as the specific requirements for their application in counterterrorism, the next section will present a critical overview of the common instruments.

4.3   Available risk assessment instruments and their empirical support

Two questions arise from considerations of best practice: (1) What risk assessment instruments are commonly used currently?; and (2) To what extent do those instruments meet the previously discussed requirements? Therefore, the most discussed risk

assessment instruments[6] (see Dean & Pettet, 2017; Logan & Lloyd, 2019; Lloyd, 2019; Lynch, 2017; Pressman, 2009) are reviewed in this section. It must be acknowledged that this is only a small subsection of all available instruments. For example, Scarcella et al. (2016) found in their systematic review of 37 peer-reviewed articles 30 different instruments, noting a lack of consensus and clarity in the field. However, for the sake of brevity, the four risk assessments most used (Scarcella et al., 2016) will be focused on.

Historically, the first instrument is the *Violent Extremism Risk Assessment 2nd edition* (VERA-2R; Pressman & Flockton, 2012; Pressman et al., 2016). It was developed based on findings of literature reviews and expert input, allowing assessors to review individuals on six domains: (1) beliefs, attitudes, and ideology; (2) social context and intention; (3) history, action, and capacity; (4) commitment and motivation; (5) protective/risk mitigating factors; and (6) demographics (e.g., offence history). The 34 items under each domain are rated on a 3-point Likert-scale indicating their presence as low, medium, or high. All findings are then summarised in a final risk judgement—also indicated as low, medium, or high—regarding the individual's risk of either reoffending or committing an extremist offence.

The VERA-2R has demonstrated good applicability, when applied to five case studies, leading Beardsley and Beech (2013) that all factors are relevant. However, at the time of writing, no other empirical validation studies are available for this instrument. The instrument's utility for identifying and understanding individuals in the pre-offence phase has yet to be established (Logan & Lloyd, 2019). Nevertheless, the VERA-2R is a

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[6] At the time of writing these are all available empirical reviews comparing risk assessments in counterterrorism, with 231 citations on GoogleScholar.

comprehensive list of indicators (Lloyd, 2019), thus, requiring a considerable amount of classified data (Herzog-Evans, 2018).

Instead, Herzog-Evans (2018) favoured the *Extremism Risk Guidance-22+* (ERG-22+; Lloyd & Dean, 2015). This recidivism instrument for the English and Welsh prison context requires less classified information than the VERA-2R and is the first risk assessment in counterterrorism to include psychopathology (Herzog-Evans, 2018). The 22 items address three areas: (1) engagement with extremist ideology; (2) intent to participate in an extremist group and/or movement; and (3) capability to commit an extremist offence (e.g., due to training). Instead of one final risk rating, each area is summarised regarding its contribution or mitigation to the risk of reoffending.

Comparable to the VERA-2R, the empirical validation of this instrument is limited at the time of writing. The only publicly available evaluation is the pilot study by Webster et al. (2010), as the ERG-22+ is only licensed for the prison system (Lloyd, 2019). Interviews with stakeholders and case studies in British prisons formed the basis of Webster et al.'s (2010) recommendations that led to the development of the ERG-22+. Further academic peer review is likely limited due to security concerns by the developers preventing them from making the item construction explicit (Lynch, 2017). Knudsen (2020) concluded in their theoretical review of the application of the VERA-2R and the ERG-22+ that both instruments lack conceptual clarity, making their utility in counterterrorism questionable.

Beyond the prison context, the *Terrorist Radicalisation Assessment Protocol* (TRAP-18; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy et al., 2015) is commonly used (e.g., Logan & Lloyd, 2019). This approach represents a diversion from the other instruments listed, as it is viewed as a threat assessment instrument. As such, its application is more dynamic than risk

assessment tools and focuses on the threat that lone actors are posing in the community. Assessors rate 18 items regarding their presence as either absent, insufficiently observable, or present across two separate sets of indicators: (1) eight proximal warning behaviours that directly relate to the immediate steps before an offence (e.g., offence planning, making concrete threats); and (2) ten distal characteristics that summarise underlying psychologically relevant aspects of the individual (e.g., their endorsement of a specific ideology, focusing on grievance or perceived injustice). The TRAP-18 does not arrive at a final risk rating. Instead, the instrument is meant to structure information. First validation studies are promising, for example, a German case study (Boeckler et al., 2015) and the statistical comparison of 33 North American terrorists with 23 non-attackers (Goodwill & Meloy, 2019) demonstrated the items were functionally relevant and observable exclusively in the terrorist samples.

A wider focus is also featured in the *Multi-Level Guidelines* (MLG; Cook et al., 2013). The MLG is not an instrument but a framework, often discussed in conjunction with the other presented approaches (e.g., Lynch, 2017; Lloyd, 2019). Instead of extremist violence, it reflects on the risk of group-based violence[7]. The departure from the sole focus on terrorism is justified by the overlap of extremist violence with general violence, for example, as discussed in the context of organised crime in Chapter Two as crime-terror-nexus (Cook et al., 2013; Cook, 2014). The information is collected with 20 items in four areas: (1) individual factors such as individual's cognitions or mental health problems; (2) individual-group factors, such as in- vs. out-group thinking); (3) group factors including organisational structure and leadership; and (4) group-societal factors, such as, how the group is positioning itself against mainstream culture. Each area is

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[7] Cook et al. (2013) include terrorism, honour-based violence, anti-government movements, organised crimes, and gang involvement in this definition of group-based violence.

reviewed regarding the presence of factors and their relevance to the risk of violence. The MLG encourages the explicit development of risk scenarios (i.e., formulating likely future risky events that could appear under certain circumstances), and case management planning.

An evaluation of the MLG using practitioners' feedback ($N = 46$) yielded positive results, including good confidence ratings and good face validity (Cook, 2014). Subsequent expert feedback resulted in an exclusion of four items, reportedly improving interrater reliability to excellent on an item level, and good regarding future violence (Hart et al., 2017). Both Hart et al. (2017) and Vargen (2019) noted in their validations of the MLG considerable overlap to the risk assessment for general violence *Historical Clinical and Risk Management- 20* by Douglas et al. (HCR-20; 2013). Despite cases from the group-violence sample also being highlighted on the HCR-20, not every individual identified by the HCR-20 as high risk for general violence would also be recognised as at risk of group-based violence (Hart et al., 2017).

Overall, it becomes apparent that assessment instruments considered thus far contain similar factors. These include, for example, group involvement and ideological conviction. However, those similarities should not be overemphasised as all approaches are explicitly based on the same literature (Dean & Pettet, 2017). It is assumed that this replicates shortcomings, as the literature lacks, for example, a shared terrorism definition, thus, making it unclear what outcome variables the assessments focus on (Lynch, 2017). Instead, the approaches have no unified focus, assessing radicalisation, authoritarianism, fundamentalism, or terrorism interchangeably (Scarcella et al., 2016). Hence, they are unlikely to reliably distinguish between violent radicalised and non-violent radicalised individuals (Lynch, 2017). Due to this and the lack of empirical evidence, no assessment

instrument appears to be viewed as superior (Scarcella et al., 2016; Logan & Lloyd, 2019). Another common issue is the lack of transparency (Scarcella et al., 2016), as more than half of the 30 reviewed publications did not explicitly report the item development or psychometric qualities. Where the indexes were included, they were generally poor and not comparable to risk assessments of general violence (Scarcella et al., 2016).

An aspect that appeared often entirely omitted was, again, mental health issues. The instruments were not developed with a psychiatric population in mind, making their application in secure forensic settings challenging. This is in line with recent reviews (Schulten et al., 2019; Al-Attar, 2020) highlighting a lack of empirical evidence related to the link between mental illness and radicalisation. In sum, it is evident that the empirical basis for assessing the risk of extremist violence is unclear and in need of improvement (e.g., Scarcella et al., 2016). Hence, the next section outlines recommendations from the literature.

4.4   Recommendations to improve understanding yielded by assessments

Recommendations fall into two categories: (1) general improvements at an organisational level, such as how to conduct research or how risk assessments should be utilised clinically; and (2) recommendations on a content level, such as the factors that must be considered in a risk assessment regarding radicalisation and/or extremist violence. General improvements include multidisciplinary teams, collaboration with stakeholders, transparency, and standardisation (Scarcella et al., 2016). The latter could be achieved by applying standards from general and sexual violence assessment to the counterterrorism context (Roberts & Horgan, 2008). This includes the dynamic, repeated assessment of factors specific to the risk of radicalisation. It should model the risk to reduce harm (Roberts & Horgan, 2008). However, Van der Heide et al. (2019) warn that

standardisation should not negatively impact an instrument's utility. Instead, they advocate for appropriate supervision, the utilisation of multiple assessment approaches, and explicit goal setting. The latter could include direct actions, such as violence, recruitment, or funding (Borum, 2015). All of this resonates the SJP approach, which represents a case-by-case application suited to account for heterogeneity in the terrorist population.

On a content level, Borum (2015) suggests clustering risk assessments, as opposed to itemising extremist violence. This includes a transparent structure, for example, analysing behavioural history, motivational factors, and vulnerability factors. A behavioural history analysis should be conducted, including the identification of past critical incidents that reasonably suggest a trajectory towards terrorism (Borum, 2015). Next, the assessor establishes motivational factors (i.e., emotions, beliefs, situational, and social factors). This also includes protective factors mitigating radicalisation (Borum, 2015). Lastly, vulnerability factors are identified, to determine influences that make the individual more likely receptive to extremism. This guidance (Borum, 2015) presents a clear expectation for what risk assessment instruments must achieve in counterterrorism to be in line with comparable assessment forms in other fields.

Considering the previous sections, it becomes apparent that each of the listed risk assessment instruments fulfils some of the recommendations outlined by the authors (e.g., Borum, 2015; Van der Heide, 2019). However, none of the tools capture complex forensic mental health issues (e.g., Al-Attar, 2020). While the instruments are utilised successfully in the community and in prisons, their applications likely encounter challenges in forensic psychiatric settings. This is explored in the following section.

4.5 Reflections on the use of extremist risk assessments for forensic mental health populations

Many of the aforementioned assessments are utilised in a wide variety of academic and professional contexts. They are also integral in prisons and forensic mental health hospitals to inform risk management and interventions (Scaracella et al., 2016). These settings come with environmental challenges and population-related challenges. The former includes, for example, the joint confinement of prisoners with radicalised individuals (Trujillo et al., 2009; Mulcahy et al., 2013) This leads Mulcahy et al. (2013) to advocate for detainment via highly specialised experts, including high levels of monitoring to combat radicalisation. However, they also acknowledge that this area is understudied, describing prisons as "breeding grounds for radicalisation and terrorism" (Mulcahy et al., 2013, p. 4). The need for more research is further highlighted by Silke et al.'s (2021) opposing findings. Based on their systematic literature review they conceptualised detainment as an opportunity for reflection independent from extremist influences (e.g., extremist groups, online extremism, etc.; Silke et al., 2021). It is arguably unclear how any of the mentioned risk assessment instruments should account for the potential environmental contribution to the radicalisation pathway.

The second set of challenges relates to the population within forensic services, in particular their complex needs in forensic mental health hospitals (e.g., Völlm et al., 2018). An overview of 401 forensic patients in England highlighted the limited insight into the complex presentation of mental health issues and risk factors in this population. No guidance exists supporting the formulation of the factors in the context of radicalisation to those with severe mental health challenges (Al-Attar, 2020). The absence is observable in all discussed instruments (namely, VERA-2R, ERG-22+, MLG, and TRAP-18), lacking any suggestions on how to incorporate mental illness in a risk

formulation (Logan & Sellers, 2021). This is likely due to the lack of conclusive findings, as demonstrated by a systematic literature review (N = 25 studies) exploring the link between psychopathology and extremist violence (Trimbur et al., 2021).

Hence, Logan and Sellers (2021) encourage mental health practitioners to adhere even stricter to assessment standards. This includes, for example, the conceptualisation of risk, the purpose of assessment such as care planning, continuous monitoring, and the clear intent of the individual, instead of the mere presence of ideology (Logan & Sellers, 2021). Similarly, Al-Attar (2020) cautions against a reductionistic view and emphasises the importance of flexible and differentiating care pathways based on the individual's presentation. The duty of care should arguably be prioritised over the prevention of extremist violence (Logan & Sellers, 2021).

The chapter has presented a variety of well-established assessment tools aiding the understanding of radicalisation. However, it was also demonstrated that they cannot be readily applied to complex forensic populations. Radicalisation trajectories appear understudied in this patient type and support for psychological formulations aiding care pathway planning is not available. A need for guidance has been identified, with careful and transparent exploration necessary. The rationale for this endeavour and the outline of this project is part of the following section.

CHAPTER FIVE
ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

5.1   Structure of the chapter

The previous chapters outlined the current state of counterterrorism research, including attention to the importance of assessments. Here, the gaps in the literature are summarised once more and linked to the current thesis. Attention is directed towards the lack of consensus regarding central terminology and the multitude of concepts discussed as relevant for radicalisation. First, research aims and the methodology addressing these goals will be presented together with predictions.

5.2   Aims and predictions

The thesis' overarching goal is the development of a conceptual model that supports the formulation of the radicalisation process of complex forensic populations, which accounts for how this can be assessed. As emphasised in prior chapters, the counterterrorism discourse lacks clarity in several aspects, including a consensus on definitions (e.g., Weinberg et al., 2004; Horgan, 2005), consistent use of concepts and terminology (Schmid, 2011), comparable outcome prediction (e.g., Mandel, 2009), and theoretical scope (Parker & Sitter, 2016). However, there is consensus on radicalisation being a process comprised of several factors that draw from the presence of extremist peers and available ideology (e.g., Borum, 2012.)

While several systematic overviews exist (e.g., Schmid, 2013; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018; Lösel et al., 2018; Vergani et al., 2020; Trimbur et al., 2021) most lack critical reflection regarding prevalent findings, including a lack of quality appraisal (e.g., Scarcella et al., 2016) and attention to mental health. Hence, this thesis will address this by systematically

reviewing the current literature capturing factors influencing radicalisation on an individual level, including capturing complex forensic populations.

Systematic literature review of the empirical support for factors relevant to radicalisation in complex forensic populations

Aims:

1. To capture factors currently considered to influence the risk of radicalisation.

2. To assesses the empirical quality of the relevant factors.

3. To identify theoretical radicalisation models that could be applied to forensic mental health populations.

Predictions

It is expected that

1. A multitude of competing concepts will be highlighted (King & Taylor, 2011), with most of the research focused on group processes (e.g., Sageman, 2008) and the role of ideology (Patel & Hussain, 2019). However, the latter will yield inconclusive findings (e.g., Borum, 2015).

2. There will be limited insight about radicalisation in forensic mental health populations (Al-Attar, 2020; Trimbur et al., 2021).

3. Studies exploring sociodemographic profiles will present contradictory findings (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). Similarly, risk factors for radicalisation will yield inconclusive findings, overlapping considerably with risk factors for general violence (e.g., Dhumad et al., 2020).

4. There will be limited considerations of mental health issues and protective factors (e.g., Gill & Corner, 2017).

The previous chapters highlighted the lack of consensus regarding terrorism definition (e.g., Schmid, 2011). Hence, scholars are encouraged to present an explicit working definition (Schmid, 2011). In contrast, radicalisation is universally understood, framed as a psychosocial escalation towards extremism (e.g., Borum, 2012). Here, research focuses on factors relevant to that process, including the relevance for forensic patient populations. They often present with complex mental health issues that require more empirical exploration (e.g., Al-Attar, 2020). This, and the limited understanding of protective factors (Lösel et al., 2018), could arguably impact the assessment and treatment planning for radicalised individuals in forensic units. Therefore, scholars and practitioners familiar with the field will be surveyed to establish consensus regarding terminology, factors relevant to radicalisation, and considerations about assessments.

Study one: Establishing consensus regarding central issues pertaining to radicalisation in forensic populations

Aims:

1. To reach an expert definition regarding terrorism that informs the ongoing debate.

2. To establish agreement on factors relevant to radicalisation.

3. To understand challenges unique to the forensic population in mental health settings.

Predictions

It is expected that

1. The terrorism definition will feature aspects such as ideological motivation, civilian targets, and the intent to change behaviour (Schmid, 2012), while struggling to agree on state agents as terrorists (Horgan, 2005).

2. Radicalisation will be characterised by individual factors and the individual's social environment (e.g., Schmid, 2013; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018).

3. Protective factors will be limited in exploration (e.g., Lösel et al., 2018), with experts likely reiterating influences known to mitigate general violence.

Both the systematic literature review and the Delphi survey will allow the determination of the most substantiated factors influencing radicalisation, particularly for complex forensic patient populations. Additional factors will then be collected in the ensuing steps, which are not represented yet in the empirical base. Hence, an open exploration of the lived experiences of forensic psychiatric patients involved in extremism will be conducted.

Study two: Lived experiences of radicalised forensic psychiatric patients
Aims:

1. To capture the lived experiences regarding membership to an extremist group and/or movement.

2. To capture additional factors relevant to the radicalisation process that are not part of the current literature.

Predictions
It is expected that

1. Radicalised patients will disclose factors relevant to general violence instead of extremist violence (e.g., Hart & Logan, 2011).

2. Conflicting findings will be observed regarding the role of mental illness in the radicalisation process (Gill & Corner, 2017; Al-Attar, 2020).

3. Patients will emphasise social radicalisation factors like pronounced in- vs. out-group thinking (e.g., Borum, 2012) when reflecting on the group and/or movement membership.

4. Radicalised patients will offer justifications when recounting extremist violence (Dhumaed et al., 2020).

Not all discussed risk factors are uniquely relevant to radicalisation but overlap considerably with risk factors accounting for general violence (Smith, 2018; Dhumad et al., 2020). It appears that radicalised individuals often meet several criteria of general violence assessment tools (Hart et al., 2017). However, not all individuals convicted of general violence would get highlighted as radicalised. This led Hart et al. (2017) to conclude that summarising extremist violence under group-based violence (Cook et al., 2013) had added benefits. At the time of writing, this has not been explored with a forensic mental health population.

Study three: Comparison between forensic patients who engaged in group-based violence and patients convicted of general violence

Aims:

1. To replicate the overlap of risk factors relating to group-based violence and general violence.

2. To locate clusters of group-based violence that point towards underlying mechanisms of radicalisation.

Predictions

It is expected that

1. The findings by Dhumad et al. (2020) will be replicated, demonstrating only minor differences between the groups based on justifications (Dhumad et al., 2020) and social themes (Hart et al, 2017). However, mental health issues will yield further inconclusive findings (e.g., Al-Attar, 2020).

2. Due to the complexity of forensic populations (e.g., Völlm et al., 2018), no significant differences between incident types will be expected. Hence, new clusters for group-based violence will be explored that aid formulation independently from incident types. These are expected to be different from general violence (e.g., Hart et al., 2017).

Overall, it is expected that the thesis will result in a conceptual model that will aid clinicians to assess, formulate, and subsequently understand the radicalisation of forensic patients with complex mental health issues. Furthermore, the model is expected to support the care pathway planning for these patients, subsequently preventing future incidents of extremist violence.

CHAPTER SIX
SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE RADICALISATION OF COMPLEX FORENSIC POPULATION

6.1   Structure of the chapter

After presenting the central issues in the counterterrorism literature, the current systematic literature review is aiming to establish an overview of psychologically relevant factors influencing the radicalisation of complex forensic populations. The rationale for this study is outlined in more detail below. The methodology is presented next, followed by the results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings.

6.2   Case for a systematic literature review

Empirical evidence of factors that influence the radicalisation of forensic populations appears limited. This is surprising since some scholars frame prisons as "breeding grounds for terrorists" (Mulcahy et al., 2013, p. 4), with the two dominant questions in the field being where and how to house detained terrorists. Others view prisons as an opportunity for reintegration (Silke et al., 2021). In their systematic literature review of 29 publications from 2017 onwards, Silke et al. (2021) found empirical evidence that prisons provide time and space for reflection, as well as physical safety from extremist group members. However, it appears that there is nothing specifically capturing forensic mental health settings.

Methodological issues and limited generalisability impact the systematic reviews currently available, as noted in earlier chapters. Out of the eight overviews currently available (Christmann, 2012; Schmid, 2013; Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Scarcella et al.,

2016; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018; Lösel et al., 2018; Vergani et al., 2020; Silke et al., 2021), only the reviews by Scarcella et al. (2016), **Lösel et al. (2018)**, Vergani et al. (2020), and Silke et al. (2021) followed the guidelines of the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA; Moher et al., 2009). The four publications are the only ones reporting the search process in detail, for example, Scarcella et al. (2016) explicitly present a detailed quality appraisal of the reviewed studies. Meanwhile, the others presented findings in an untransparent and/or unstructured manner (Christmann, 2012; Schmid, 2013; Feddes & Gallucci, 2015; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018).

All reviews present some differences in the included studies, likely due to the reviews' varying theoretical outlooks. Hence, some overviews include research that is not directly related to radicalisation. **Young and Findley (2011)** suggest that the lack of access to primary data (e.g., due to security concerns) is causing this focus on broader concepts. For example, Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) lists studies by Becker et al. (2011), Hogg and Adelman (2013), and Thomas et al. (2014), amongst others, all of which tackle issues like protest culture, moderate political engagement, or collective identity, but not radicalisation factors. Similarly, Vergani et al. (2020) include literature that reflected on the wider society and the cultural upbringing of offenders. Again, this highlights the same lack of conceptual consensus that is criticised by the reviewers themselves.

The goal of the present review is to summarise the factors deemed relevant for an individual's psychological development towards extremist violence. The literature search focused on understudied areas, like the radicalisation of forensic patients, the role of mental health issues in the process, protective factors, and factors discussed to be relevant for more than one ideology. In line with best practice, the systematic literature review adapted the methodology of the previously outlined examples. This meant outlining a

clear research question, only summarising empirical evidence, and reflecting on study quality.

6.2   Methodology

A systematic literature review was conducted, following PRISMA standards (Moher et al., 2009). The following sections outline the data search, including the guiding rationale for inclusion and exclusion criteria, the search strings and databases, and the quality appraisal.

Data search. A study was included in the final overview when it met all the following criteria: (1) The paper had to present factors that influence the radicalisation process; (2) the presented factors had to be distinct; (3) the presented factors had to be individual, not social or organisational factors[8]; and (4) the publication had to provide measurable and verifiable evidence for the presented factors. Papers were excluded if they only presented general guidelines, or commentaries, were reviews themselves, or only included organisational or socio-political considerations, which did not relate to the dynamics relevant for an individual, and/or addressed factors that were not closely related to the radicalisation process itself (e.g., target choice, joining the militia in areas of civil war). However, studies that outlined the effects of de-radicalisation programs were included. While not directly outlining radicalisation factors, they indirectly describe psychological aspects that the intervention focuses on. Thus, relevant factors could be deduced.

The following search string was used in three different iterations, considering only English language papers published up to March 2019: Radicali*ation OR terrorism OR

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[8] As only factors relating directly to the individual's decision-making process are deemed beneficial for formulation efforts (e.g., Taylor & Horgan, 2006).

extremis*. These keywords were combined separately with the following three search strings:

- AND (vulnerability OR victim)

- AND (prison OR criminal OR offender*)

- AND (assessment OR risk assessment OR screening)

Furthermore, all search string combinations included an additional search string, in the end, representing the exclusion criteria: NOT legislation OR law* OR regulation OR policy OR eco* OR history OR cancer OR injury OR metaboli* OR chem*. The search was conducted using the following databases: PsycInfo, PsycArticles, MEDLine, Criminal Justice Abstracts, SocINDEX, and International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center.

Quality appraisal. Each included study was evaluated utilising an amended 15-item merged version of the Quality Assessment Tool for Observational Cohort and Cross-Sectional Studies checklist and the Quality Assessment of Case-Control Studies checklist; both developed by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI, n.d.). The conjoined use of both checklists captured the predominant methodology of this research area the most appropriately. However, changes on the content level had to be made to represent facets of the radicalisation conceptualisations accurately. Questions included the presence of clear and explicit definitions, whether the studies focused on several ideologies, and whether the authors utilised advanced statistical analyses, amongst other aspects (see Appendix A). The quality of each paper was summarised as 'good', 'fair', or 'poor'.

Grounded Theory Approach (Martin & Turner, 1986). This analysis sorts data in an inductive manner (i.e., the synthesis of general principles based on specific observations),

as opposed to a hypothetico-deductive approach (i.e., proposing a falsifiable hypothesis by using observable data). The reason for its utilisation lies in the recency of the academic enquiry into counterterrorism. It can be divided into four stages; all of which were applied to the current analysis. Firstly, the data were assigned codes. This was achieved in conjunction with the second step, in which some codes were summarised with the concepts to that they were all related. Next, all concepts derived from the data set were summarised in categories. Finally, these categories were related to each other to propose new insights.

6.3   Results

Entering the search strings in the databases resulted in a total of 5,514 articles, of which 1,573 were duplicates. Further 2,552 articles were removed because the titles were deemed to be irrelevant to the aims of the current study. An additional 897 articles were removed based on their abstracts. For the remaining 492 articles full-text copies were obtained and screened regarding the inclusion criteria in more detail. As a result, 440 articles were removed, with 28 of those being case studies and not reporting any statistically relevant empirical data. Eleven articles were added due to a hand search of the full-text references. The final set of 63 articles was subjected to a quality appraisal. 31 were labelled as 'Good', 22 were labelled as 'Fair', and ten were labelled as 'Poor' (Figure 6.1).

10% of articles were then extracted randomly from the abstract and text stage and reviewed by a second independent assessor. This resulted in an interrater agreement of 92.5%. Furthermore, another assessor independently appraised the quality of all 63 included articles. The interrater agreement was 87.7%; minor discrepancies on item level were resolved via discussion.

Figure 6.1

Flowchart Depicting the Search Process for the Systematic Literature Review

Identification of new studies via databases and registers

Identification of new studies via other methods

Identification

Records identified from databases (n = 5,514)

Records removed before screening:
Duplicate records removed (n= 1,573)
Records marked as ineligible by automation tools (n= 0)
Records removed for other reasons (n= 0)

Records identified from:
Citation searching (n= 11)

Screening

Records screened (n= 3,941)

Records excluded (n= 2,552)

Reports sought for retrieval (n= 492)

Reports sought for retrieval (n= 11)

Reports assessed for eligibility (n= 80)

Reports excluded because they were case studies(n= 28)

Reports assessed for eligibility (n= 11)

Included

New studies included in review (n= 52)

Total studies included in review (n= 63)
Quality appraisal break down: 31 'Good', 22 'Fair', and 10 'Poor' studies

Characteristics of included studies (see Table 6.1). In seven instances a purely unspecified Western focus was employed, in six other articles, this also included participants from Asian or Middle Eastern countries. Most were US publications ($N = 18$), followed by the United Kingdom with six publications. Articles from non-Western countries (including Palestine, Israel, Russia, Thailand, Kenya, Indonesia, & Iran) made up 13 out of the 63 included studies.[9]

Forty-nine articles reported quantitative methodology, eight qualitative methodology, and six used a mixed-method approach. The most common study format was surveys ($N = 19$), followed by interviews ($N = 13$), case files ($N = 13$), and publicly available information ($N = 8$). However, six articles reported several of those data collection methods, meaning that presented numbers do not total of 63. Case files and public information were most often used when studying terrorist samples ($N = 14$) and lone actors ($N = 11$). Other types of participants and/or data sources were students and adolescents ($N = 13$) and members of Muslim communities ($N = 7$). Again, it should be noted that some studies utilised several different sample types, resulting in an overlap between articles. Only two studies explored practitioners working in the field to deduce relevant factors of radicalisation.

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[9] In the literature, it is often discussed that research increased after 9/11 (e.g., Schmid, 2013). However, it appears that publications presenting empirical data, which is the focus of this systematic literature review, only notably increased from 2009 onwards, with 50 out of 63 articles being published since then; only two articles published before the 2000s met the inclusion criteria.

Table 6.1

Study Characteristics of all Reviewed English-Language Publications

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
Arndt, et al., 2002	Good	United States	mortality salience, psychological distancing, group identification	QNT; randomised experimental trial in two studies	N_1 = 47 students N_2 = 91 students
Askew & Helbardt, 2012	Poor	Thailand	motivation	QUL; analysis of interviews, case files, & propaganda	N = 3 Patani warriors
Baele, 2017	Good	International	emotions, cognitive flexibility	QNT; linguistic analysis of written texts	N_1 = 11 lone actors N_2 = 3 peaceful political figures N_3 = thousands of texts as baseline
Baez et al., 2017	Good	United States	intellectual & executive functioning aggression emotion recognition moral judgement	QNT; comparison of surveys & experiment with matched control group	N_1 = 66 right-wing terrorists N_2 = 66 community-based participants
Bartlett et al., 2010	Good	International	social & personal characteristics religion & ideology	QNT, QUL; interviews & case files	N_1 = 58 Islamist terrorists N_2 = 28 radical Muslims (no conviction) N_3 = 71 young Muslims
Berko & Erez, 2006	Fair	Palestine	gender, recruitment, prison experience	QUL; interviews	N = 14 women detained for security offences
Bhui, Everitt, & Jones, 2014a	Good	United Kingdom	psychosocial adversity, social capital, mental health	QNT; cross-sectional survey	N = 608 of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin (18-45 years old)
Bhui et al., 2016	Good	United Kingdom	life events, political engagement, depression	QNT; cross-sectional survey	N = 608 of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin (18-45 years old)

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
Bhui et al., 2014b	Good	United Kingdom	health, anxiety, depression	QNT; cross-sectional survey	$N = 608$ of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin (18-45 years old)
Blazak, 2001	Poor	United States	General Strain Theory	QUL; interviews	$N = 65$ skinheads
Brym & Araj, 2012	Poor	Palestine	sociodemographic details, depression	QUL; interviews	$N_1 = $ NR; relatives of suicide bombers
Capellan, 2015	Fair	United States	sociodemographic details, role of ideology	QNT; comparison of case files & public information with control group	$N_1 = 40$ incidents of ideologically motivated shooters $N_2 = 242$ incidents of non-ideologically motivated shooters
Challacombe & Lucas, 2019	Good	United States	TRAP-18: personal pathway, fixation, identification, novel aggression, energy burst, leakage, last resort, threat, grievance & moral outrage, ideology, failure to affiliate with extremist group, dependence to virtual community, thwarting occupational goals, emotional & cognitive changes, failure of intimate bonding, psychopathology, creativity, violence,	QNT; comparison of case files & public information with control group	$N_1 = 30$ violent individuals $N_2 = 28$ non-violent individuals both associated with sovereign citizen movement
Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015	Good	United States	sociodemographic details, criminogenic	QNT; comparison of case files & public information	$N_1^A = 637$ right-wing extremists $N_2^A = 182$ left-wing extremists $N_3^A = 155$ Al-Quaida members

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
			conditions, offender type & timing		
Cohen, 2012	Fair	United States	cognitive rigidity	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of text analyses	$N = 483$ students
Cohen, 2016	Fair	Palestine	reasoning, motivation	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of thematic text analyses	$N = 211$ suicide bombers
Coid et al., 2016	Good	United Kingdom	attitude, psychiatric morbidity, ethnicity, religion	QNT; cross-sectional survey	$N = 3,679$ men, 18–34 years old
Corner et al., 2019	Fair	International	psychopathology, religion	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of sequential analyses	$N^B = 125$ lone actors
Dechesne, 2009	Fair	United States	violence, struggle, narcissism	QNT; randomised experimental comparison	$N = 128$ students
Dhumad et al., 2019	Good	Iraq	childhood, family, personality (Significance Quest Theory)	QNT; survey & interviews for comparison with control-groups	$N_1 = 160$ convicted terrorists $N_2 = 65$ convicted murders $N_3 = 88$ community members without criminal history
Doosje et al., 2013	Fair	The Netherlands	perceived procedural justice, emotional uncertainty, perceived group threat, ideology	QNT; cross-sectional online questionnaire	$N = 131$ Muslims (12-21 years)
Egan et al., 2016	Good	United Kingdom	Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) guidance Religious/cultural/social isolation, risk taking behaviour, sudden changes in religious practice, violent	QNT; cross-sectional analysis of public available data	$N = 157$ convicted terrorists

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
			rhetoric, deviant peers (view reference for all 16 items)		
Gill et al., 2017	Fair	United States	sociodemographic details, development, antecedent attack, attack preparation, commission properties	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of case files with codebook	$N_1 = 115$ lone actors
González et al., 2014	Fair	United States	gender	QNT; comparison of case files with control-group	$N_1^A = 49$ far-right female lone actors $N_2^A = 36$ eco female lone actors $N_3^A = 244$ far-right male lone actors $N_4^A = 135$ eco male lone actors
Groppi, 2017	Fair	Italy	sociodemographic details, attitudes, grievance, ideology, identity crisis	QNT, QUL; survey, interviews, focus groups with cross-sectional comparison	$N = 440$ Muslims
Gruenewald et al., 2013	Fair	United States	sociodemographic details, psychopathology, victim characteristics, relationship	QNT; cross-sectional analysis of case files	$N^A = 96$ far-right lone actors
Hirschberger et al., 2009	Good	Iran	mortality salience, perceived adversary intent, personal vulnerability	QNT; randomised & comparison with control-group experiment	Study 1 $N = 80$ students Study 2 $N = 308$ students Study 3 $N_1 = 114$ students with exposure to war $N_2 = 116$ students without exposure to war

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
Holt & Bolden, 2014	Poor	International	technological skills	QUL; thematic analysis of written communication	$N = 60$ online threads of white supremacists (a total of 117 users)
Horgan et al., 2018	Good	United States	behavioural mapping of recruiters, supporters, actors	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of case files & public information	$N = 183$ convicted terrorists
Jacques & Taylor, 2008	Good	International	gender, motivation, recruitment, attack outcome	QNT; comparison of public information with control group	$N_1 = 30$ female suicide bombers $N_2 = 30$ male suicide bombers
Jasko et al., 2017	Good	United States	economic & social loss of significance, presence of radicalised others	QNT; cross-sectional profile comparison	$N = 1,496$ terrorists (varying ideologies)
Joosse et al., 2015	Poor	Canada	counter-narratives regarding recruitment	QUL; cross-sectional comparison with interviews	$N = 118$ individuals with Somalian background
Kamans et al., 2009	Good	The Netherlands	negative meta-stereotypes	QNT, QUL; cross-sectional interviews & surveys	$N = 88$ teenagers with Moroccan background
Kemmelmeier, 2008	Fair	United States	cognitive abilities, political attitudes	QNT; cross-sectional survey	$N_1 = 7,279$ students $N_2 = $ NR; participants from all states
Kerodal et al., 2016	Fair	United States	offence types, commitment to ideology	QNT; comparison of case files with control groups	$N_1^A = 142$ far-right homicides $N_2^A = 103$ far-right financial schemes $N_3 = 27$ homicide $N_4 = 33$ financial schemes
King et al., 2011	Fair	Indonesia	attitudes, family support	QNT, QUL; cross-sectional interviews & surveys	$N = 20$ immediate relatives of 16 Jema'ah Islamiyah members
Klausen et al., 2016	Poor	United States	age-crime curve	QNT; cross-sectional case file comparison	$N = 600$ Islamist terrorists
Krout & Stagner, 1939	Fair	United States	early childhood memories	QNT; survey comparison with control group	$N_1 = 153$ members of extremist movement (Young People's socialist league & Young Communist league)

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
					N_2 = 97 individuals from the community
Laor et al., 2006	Good	Israel	ideology, resilience, family, trauma responses	QNT; cross-sectional surveys	N = 1,105 adolescents exposed to terrorism
Liem et al., 2018	Good	Europe	event characteristics, sociodemographic details, psychological background, violence	QNT; matched comparison of case files	N_1 = 98 lone actors N_2 = 300 homicides; 3 matched to each in N_1
Loza, 2010	Poor	Canada	political views. Attitudes towards women, attitudes towards Western culture, religiosity, condoning fighting	QNT; cross-sectional assessment	N = 89 incarcerated offenders
McCauley et al., 2013	Poor	United States	grievance, unfreezing, status-and-risk-seeking, history of weapons use, violence	QNT; comparison of governmental reports with control group	N_1 = 83 lone actors N_2 = 41 school shooters
Meloy & Gill, 2016	Fair	International	TRAP-18	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of case files	N^B = 111 lone actors
Meloy et al., 2015	Good	Europe	TRAP-18	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of public information	N = 22 lone actors
Merari et al., 2010	Fair	Palestine	ego strength, psychopathic deviation, personality style	QNT; assessment comparison with control group	N_1 = 15 thwarted suicide bombers N_2 = 12 prisoners due to political violence N_3 = 14 prisoners due to ordering suicide bombings

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
Nivette et al., 2017	Good	Switzerland	collective strain, moral/legal constraints	QNT; cross-sectional & longitudinal comparison with interviews	N = 1,214 students age 15-17
Pauwels & De Waele, 2014	Good	Belgium	social integration, discrimination, procedural justice, beliefs/attitudes, peer delinquency	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with surveys	N = 2,879 adolescents
Peddell et al., 2016	Poor	United Kingdom	vulnerabilities, motivation, mechanisms	QUL; thematic analysis of focus group	N = 5 counterterrorism practitioners
Pitcavage, 2015	Poor	International	ideological composition, lethality	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with data bases	N = 35 lone actors
Pretus et al., 2018	Good	Spain	social exclusion	QNT; comparison with randomised experimental allocation to fMRTs	N = 38 Sunni Muslim Moroccan men vulnerable to radicalisation
Savage et al., 2014	Fair	Kenya	integrative complexity of ideology	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of verbal data	N = 24 Kenyan & Somali men vulnerable to radicalisation
Schils & Pauwels, 2016	Good	Belgium	extremist propensity, exposure to violent extremism, perceived injustice, social integration, perceived alienation, perceived procedural justice, religious authoritarianism	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with surveys	N = 6,020 adolescents
Schils & Verhage, 2017	Good	Belgium	injustice, identity, ideology, social environment, active	QUL; cross-sectional comparison with interviews	N = 12 adolescents

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
			involvement, online vs. offline		
Schuurman et al., 2018	Fair	International	personal background, social context, attack planning, attack preparation, operational security, leakage, postoperation activities, other activities	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of public information (supplemented with primary data where possible)	N^B = 55 lone actors
Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006	Fair	Russia	organisational motivation, community support for suicide attacks, individual motivation, political aspects, religious aspects, foreign influences, ideology, martyrdom, seeking answers, fraternity	QNT, QUL; cross-sectional comparison with interviews	N = 32 relatives of 51 suicide terrorists
Stankov et al., 2010a	Fair	International	justification of violence, religious reasoning, blaming Western legislations	QNT, QUL; cross-sectional comparison with linguistic analyses & thematic analyses	Study 1 N = 132 extremists' statements Study 2 N = 452 students
Stankov et al., 2010b	Fair	International	Pro-violence, Vile World, Divine Power	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with survey	N = 2,424
Taubman-Ben-Ari, & Noy, 2010	Good	Israel	death-related thoughts, rumination about self-consciousness, cultural worldviews	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with survey	Study 1 N = 56 students Study 2 N = 212 students

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
Trujillo et al., 2009	Good	Spain	group hierarchy, group identity, legitimisation of violence, religion	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with survey	N = 192 prison officials
Victoroff et al., 2012	Fair	International	justification of suicide bombings, discrimination, difficulties being Muslim, group identity	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with survey	N_1 = 1,627 European Muslims N_2 = 1,050 US Muslims
Webber et al., 2018	Good	International	loss of significance, cognitive closure	QNT; cross-sectional comparison with survey	Study 1 N = 74 incarcerated members of a Philippine terrorist organisation Study 2 N = 237 incarcerated members of Sri Lankan terrorist organisation Study 3 N = 196 US participants from general public Study 4 N = 344 US participants from general public
Webber et al., 2017	Good	International	loss of significance, threat of significance, opportunity for significance gain, ideology, group processes, sociodemographic details	QNT; cross-sectional comparison of public information	N = 219 suicide bombers
Weinberg & Eubank, 1987	Fair	Italy	role in organisation, gender, family	QNT; comparison of case files with control group	N_1 = 451 incarcerated female terrorists N_2 = 2,512 incarcerated male terrorists

Reference	Quality	Country	Central constructs	Study design	Participants demographic
			relationships, relationships with other terrorists		

Themes based on the Grounded Theory Approach. Based on the previously described analysis, 27 sub-ordinate themes were found in the 63 included articles (Table 6.2). These were summarised in eight themes: (1) Extremism enhancing attitudes; (2) Criminogenic indicators impacting on offence risk; (3) Social influences exposing individuals to extremism; (4) Conflicting findings of the contribution of mental health issues to radicalisation; (5) Aversive events/circumstances obstructing individuals' pro-social goal obtainment; (6) Impaired functioning facilitating extremist attitudes and/or violence; (7) Conflicting findings regarding the utility of sociodemographic characteristics in the prediction of radicalisation; and (8) Content of radicalisation cognitions. Each theme and its related sub-ordinate themes are presented next, commencing with the concepts that appear studied most often.

Extremism enhancing attitudes: The first emerging theme researched the most often (N = 30) relates to *ideological* (N = 17), *religious* (N = 9), or *political attitudes* (N = 2). Both *political engagement* and *world view* were researched once each. These concepts do not appear distinct (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2010), and are debated as not being equally important. For example, Schils and Verhage (2017) doubt that ideology is the main driver. The attitudes entail mostly good quality studies (*N* = 14) and fair quality studies (*N* = 13). Ideology appears to have been studied the most frequently utilising mostly fair quality methodology (*N* = 9). Religion (*N* = 5) and political beliefs (*N* = 3) have been less frequently studied, but with good quality methodology. Political engagement presented with one good study and general worldview's inclusion has been rated as fair. These attitudes often appear to serve as pro-social legitimisation for violence (Cohen, 2016; Stankov, Higgins et al., 2010; Trujillo et al., 2009). They likely inform pre-offence

Table 6.2

Overview of Factors Derived from the Thematic Analysis, Listed from Most to Least Empirical Support

Factor	Number of Studies covering the Factor out of 63 Studies	Good	Fair	Poor
Extremism enhancing attitudes	**30**	**14**	**13**	**3**
Ideology	17	7	9	1
Religion	9	5	2	2
Political attitude	2	1	1	0
Political engagement	1	1	0	0
World view	1	0	1	0
Criminogenic indicators impacting on offence risk	**27**	**14**	**8**	**5**
History of violence	10	6	2	2
Past offence characteristics indicating preparedness	9	4	4	1
Protective factors countering extremism	5	3	1	1
Factors motivating engagement with extremism	3	1	1	1
Social influences exposing individuals to extremism	**24**	**13**	**8**	**3**
Group processes	13	6	4	3
Presence of delinquent peers	10	6	4	0
Prison experience	1	1	0	0
Conflicting findings of the contribution of mental health issues to radicalisation	**23**	**13**	**9**	**1**
Depression	8	5	2	1
Non-specified mental health difficulties	8	5	3	0
Personality disorder	3	1	2	0
Anxiety	2	1	1	0
Early childhood memories	2	1	1	0
Aversive events/circumstances obstructing individuals' pro-social goal obtainment	**18**	**10**	**5**	**3**
Strain	10	4	3	3

Factor	Number of Studies covering the Factor out of 63 Studies	Good	Fair	Poor
Discrimination	8	6	2	0
Impaired functioning facilitating extremist attitudes and/or violence	**18**	**12**	**5**	**1**
Cognitive impairment	9	5	4	0
Emotional impairment	5	4	1	0
Impulsiveness	4	3	0	1
Conflicting findings regarding the utility of sociodemographic characteristics in the prediction of radicalisation	**15**	**6**	**7**	**2**
Sociodemographic characteristics	10	4	4	2
Gender	5	2	3	0
Content of radicalisation cognitions	**10**	**10**	**0**	**0**
Loss of significance	4	4	0	0
Mortality salience	4	4	0	0
Moral considerations	2	2	0	0

Notes. The headings in bold are not discussed by the respective authors and represent themes derived from the current author's analysis. Some included studies covered more than one factor in their design; hence, the columns exceed the total of 63 studies.

behaviour (Capellan, 2015), such as target selection (Coid et al., 2016; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006). As such, they appear to hold predictive power (Challacombe & Lucas, 2019; Kerodal et al., 2016; Bhui et al., 2014a; Schils & Pauwels, 2016; Pauwels & De Waele, 2014) and, hence, are studied in the context of threat assessments (Doosje et al., 2013; Groppi, 2017; Laor et al., 2006; Loza, 2010; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy et al., 2015).

On a content level, religion appeared to facilitate radicalisation, especially when extremists used spirituality to subscribe meaning to their crisis (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006; Askew & Helbardt, 2012). Hence, religion is hypothesised to be a recruitment tool (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006). Linked to this, extremist leadership is deriving authority from their perceived closeness to divine power (Stankov et al., 2010). However, generalisability is limited, as most studies focused on Islamist terrorism (Loza, 2010).

Bhui et al. (2016) found that *political engagement* appears to reduce the likelihood to sympathise with political violence in their sample of South Asian immigrants living in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, political activism can be an effective predictor of extremist violence in screening instruments (Egan et al., 2016). This is discussed in conjunction with social influences in the sections below. Furthermore, a *worldview* presenting general disgust with society can contribute to radicalisation (Stankov et al., 2010).

Criminogenic indicators impacting on offence risk: The second most researched theme (*N* = 27) represents factors directly linked to the risk of an offence, including recidivism (i.e., the risk of reoffending). This included *history of violence* (N = 10)*, past offence*

characteristics indicating preparedness (N = 9), *protective factors countering extremism* (N = 5), and *factors motivating engagement with extremism (*N = 3). The studies present mostly good quality studies (*N* = 14), followed by fair quality studies (*N* = 8), and five poor studies. Violence appears to be studied using mostly good quality research (*N* = 6), while past offence characteristics and other motivations exhibit equal amounts of good and fair studies. Lastly, protective factors seemed to show mostly good empirical evidence (*N* = 3).

A history of general violence was consistently found to increase the risk for radicalisation (e.g., Liem et al., 2018) likely because it indicates psychological capability for violence (Gill et al., 2017). Violence was also operationalised as violent rhetoric (Egan et al., 2016). The readiness can express itself as self-defence (Bartlett et al., 2010) or as a need for excitement (e.g., Askew & Helbardt, 2012). Certain forms of violence, such as previous use of weapons, seem to be predominantly used by lone actors (McCauley et al., 2013). Those offenders might be better captured with psychological dynamics related to school shooters (McCauley et al., 2013).

A general history of criminal activity also appeared to increase the risk of radicalisation (Gill et al., 2017). This is captured in offence characteristics, including the pre-offence phase. Factors such as leakage (i.e., disclosing plans to others) and attack location familiarity (Gill et al., 2017). Others included familiarity with past victims, use of weapons, number of victims, the presence of additional offenders (Gruenewald et al., 2013; Liem et al., 2018; Schuurman et al., 2018), as well as lethality and level of planning (Pitcavage, 2015). Most factors are used in threat assessment as they have been found as feasible predictors of extremist violence (e.g., Challacombe & Lucas, 2019; Egan et al. 2016; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy et al., 2015). On the content level, offence motivation

is often found relevant (e.g., Cohen, 2016). Some offenders offered pro-social motivations for joining an extremist organisation (Cohen, 2016) or popularity (Peddell et al., 2016). However, female offenders especially provided antisocial reasoning such as revenge or personal vendetta (Jacques & Taylor, 2008).

Variables mitigating radicalisation are summarised under protective factors. Symptoms of depression were indirectly negatively associated with violence, as they impacted on general psychopathology (Coid et al., 2016). Similarly, community-based narratives countering recruitment (Joosse et al., 2015), a combination of resilience and self-control (Merari et al., 2010), pro-social political engagement, and critical negative life events (Bhui et al., 2016) decreased the risk for extremism. These life events are discussed as surprising (Bhui et al., 2016), given that grievance is usually framed as a contributing factor to radicalisation (see further below). However, in combination with political engagement, it appeared to foster social connectedness, protecting individuals from radicalisation (Bhui et al., 2014a; Bhui et al., 2016).

Social influences exposing individual to extremism: 24 studies explored the social environment of radicalised individuals, namely *group processes* (*N* = 13), *presence of delinquent peers* (*N* = 10), and *prison experience* (*N* = 1). Most studies exhibited good quality (*N* = 13), followed by fair quality studies (*N* = 8), and three poor studies. Group processes and the presence of delinquent peers seem to display comparable qualities of empirical evidence, entailing six good and four fair studies. A single study addressing prisons (Trujillo et al., 2009) was noted to be of good quality.

On a collective level, strong group identity (Arndt et al., 2002; Victorof et al., 2012), conformity to group norms (Askew & Helbardt, 2012), fraternity, participating in a

hierarchy (Horgan et al., 2018; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006; Trujillo et al., 2009), and active involvement in an extremist group online and/or offline (Berko & Erez, 2006; Blazak, 2001; Holt & Bolden, 2014; Schils & Verhage, 2017; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987) were considered linked to radicalisation. The latter was also shown to improve the use of predictive instruments, amongst other factors (Egan et al., 2016). On a content level, peer pressure and exploitation within extremist groups were utilised to recruit suicide bombers, especially female extremists (Jacques & Taylor, 2008).

Generally, the presence of delinquent peers contributed to radicalisation (Egan et al., 2016; Gruenewald et al., 2013; Pauwels & De Waele, 2014; Jask et al., 2017; Schuurman et al., 2018). Especially, when they are viewed as worthy to be imitated (Bartlett et al., 2010) or when they share pro-violent attitudes, for example, in families (Dhumad et al., 2019; King et al., 2011; Schils & Verhage, 2017; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). This is also applicable to peer influences in prison settings (Trujillo et al., 2009).

Conflicting findings of the contribution of mental health issues to radicalisation: This theme encapsulated *depression* ($N = 8$), *personality disorder* ($N = 3$), *anxiety* ($N = 2$), *early childhood memories* ($N = 2$), and *non-specified mental health difficulties* ($N = 8$). Most studies exhibited good ($N = 13$) or fair quality ($N = 9$). Meanwhile, depression and non-specified mental health difficulties exclusively entailed five good studies each. Personality disorders, in turn, exhibited a fair evidence basis ($N = 2$), as did early childhood memories ($N = 1$).

Several studies have linked general psychiatric symptomatology to an increased risk of radicalisation (Challacombe & Lucas, 2019; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Coid et al., 2016; Corner et al., 2019; Gruenewald et al., 2013; Liem et al., 2018; Meloy & Gill, 2016;

Meloy et al., 2015). However, they do not explicitly name them in their design. More specifically, depression- and anxiety-related symptomatology appeared to make an individual more vulnerable to radicalisation (Bhui et al., 2016), like rumination (Bhui et al., 2014a). This was considered likely related to death-related thoughts (Taubman-Ben-Ari, & Noy, 2010). These aspects appeared to be most often researched in the context of suicide bombings (Brym & Araj, 2012; Merari et al., 2010; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006). However, the extent to which suicidality contributes to radicalisation in those cases is unclear. Bhui et al. (2014b) found no association between depression or anxiety with extremist violence and Coid et al. (2016) found a negative relationship between depression and extremism.

Additionally, some personality disorder symptoms were found to contribute to radicalisation, including self-concept instability, like narcissism (Dechesne, 2009), Antisocial Personality Disorder (Dhumad et al., 2019), or any diagnosis relating to cluster C personality styles of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; Merari et al., 2010).

Krout and Stagner (1939) explored early positive and negative childhood memories in the context of psychodynamic theories. They found that abandonment led to antagonism and subsequently extremism. These findings were not replicated by Dhumad et al. (2019) who compared 160 terrorists with 65 murderers and a non-criminal control group ($N = 88$). Their findings suggest that both criminal groups were less likely to be subjected to harsh treatments in their childhood. However, terrorists exhibited higher levels of disobedience, when younger.

<u>Aversive events/circumstances obstructing individuals' pro-social obtainment of goals</u>:
Eighteen studies explored this theme, including *strain* ($N = 10$) and *discrimination* ($N = 8$). The former was divided into individual and collective strains. Both strain ($N = 4$) and discrimination ($N = 4$) seemed equally well supported by good-quality research. However, the latter exhibited no poor-quality studies, while the former counted three poor-quality studies.

On an individual level, violence may emerge because of struggle (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014), especially in the combination with other personal variables. These included a lack of resilience (Dechesne, 2009) and when an individual was faced with a situation threatening their control or predictability (McCauley et al., 2013). Again, these factors were proven useful for threat assessment (Challacombe & Lucas, 2019; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy et al., 2015). Collectively, relative deprivation[10] (Peddel et al., 2016), nationalistic struggles (Jacques & Taylor, 2008), and generational divisions (Blazak, 2001) appeared relevant to radicalisation. However, this seemed likely only for individuals already holding pro-violent ideas (Nivette et al., 2017). Meanwhile, Groppi (2017) found no significant link between economic disparity and those of Muslim faith supporting violence.

Linked to strain was discrimination, which is often framed as a separate concept (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014). This is operationalised as perceived injustice and group threat (Doosje et al., 2013; Schils & Verhage, 2017; Victoroff et al., 2012), individuals' reactions to stereotypes (Kamans et al., 2009), and social exclusion or poor social inclusion (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014: Pretus et al., 2018; Schils & Pauwels, 2016).

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[10] The individual's perception of the level of deprivation their group faces in comparison to other groups in a given society (Peddel et al., 2016).

However, discrimination only appears to support radicalisation in conjunction with other factors (e.g., distorted worldview, presence of delinquent peers) and did not distinguish terrorists from others (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2010).

Impaired functioning facilitating development of extremist attitudes and/or violence: This comprised 18 articles addressing *cognitive impairment* (*N* = 9), *emotional impairment* (*N* = 5), and *impulsiveness* (*N* = 4). Cognitive impairment was nearly equally displaying good (*N* = 5) and fair evidence (*N* = 4), while emotional impairment was mainly supported by good studies (*N* = 4). Impulsiveness had been explored by mostly good quality studies (*N* = 3) and one poor study.

Cognitive impairment related to impacted intellectual functioning, including reduced cognitive flexibility (Baele, 2017) or increased cognitive rigidity (Cohen, 2012). However, higher cognitive abilities were also related to conservatism if the relationship was influenced by low political involvement (Kemmelmeier, 2008). It appears extremists cannot integrate complex cognitions into their political ideas, often expressed as pronounced black-and-white thinking (Savage et al., 2014). Other functions related to radicalisation were the increased need for cognitive closure (Webber et al., 2018) and impaired social cognitions and/or failure to affiliate with others (Challacombe & Lucas, 2019). The latter appeared to have predictive utility in threat assessment (Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy et al., 2015), but only in combination with other impaired functions (Baez et al., 2017).

This could include the second sub-ordinate theme, emotional impairment. It appeared that difficulty in emotion recognition distinguished between terrorists and other non-criminal combatants (Baez et al., 2017). Additionally, terrorists exhibited higher levels of

proactive aggression (Baez et al., 2017). Baele (2017) found that extremists, especially lone actors, appeared to have generally higher levels of negative emotions. Emotion dysregulation and the expression of aggression, grievance, and general negative emotions were successfully utilised in threat assessment (Challacombe & Lucas, 2019; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy et al., 2015).

Radicalisation was also linked to impulsiveness, specifically failures in impulse regulation (Egan et al., 2016) and participation in general risk-seeking behaviour (McCauley et al., 2013; Pauwels & De Waele, 2014). Pauwels and De Waele (2014) concluded that thrill drove the radicalisation process more than impulsivity. However, in a more complex analysis of the same data set, a lack of self-control appeared directly linked to extremist violence (Schils & Pauwels, 2016).

Conflicting findings regarding the utility of sociodemographic characteristics in the prediction of radicalisation: Fifteen studies explored several *sociodemographic characteristics* (e.g., ethnicity, education, income; $N = 10$) and specifically *gender* ($N = 5$) about radicalisation or extremist violence. Studies relating to inconsistencies reported equally good and fair quality in methodology (each $N = 4$) and two poor studies. Gender was studied in three fair quality studies, followed by two good-quality studies.

Overall, sociodemographic features resulted in inconsistent findings (Coid et al., 2016). Groppi (2017) found no significant links between economic disparity and other common sociological variables. Similarly, Klausen et al. (2016) did not find any significant links between early school dropouts and radicalisation. Comparing suicide bombers with the Palestinian public also yielded no significant differences (Brym & Araj, 2012). They noted that most offenders were unmarried, with 40% being students and 5% being

unemployed (Brym & Araj, 2012). Lone actors also do not seem different to non-ideological active shooters (Capellan, 2015). But Gruenewald et al. (2013) found in their review of the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) that lone actors were more likely to be younger when following a right-wing ideology. These findings were partially replicated by Chermak and Gruenewald (2015) who found that terrorists following either white supremacists, Islamists or left-wing ideology exhibited significantly different profiles regarding age and relationship status. For example, Islamists tended to be older and Islamists and white supremacists were less often in a committed relationship (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). Similarly, Liem et al. (2018) showed that 60% of investigated lone actors were single, which made them comparable to homicidal offenders, amongst other factors (e.g., employment status and level of education).

However, only two studies significantly distinguished radicalised individuals from the general public. Sociodemographic stress indicators, such as unemployment or loss of a relationship, linked a sample of mass murderers to extremism (Gill et al., 2017). Similarly, distressing events and the responses of various age groups, genders, and education levels were linked to radicalisation (Webber et al., 2017). Some studies focused exclusively on gender. For example, Berko and Erez (2007) interviewed 14 female Palestinian terrorists and found most women did not join extremist movements to experience empowerment. Instead, Jacques and Taylor's (2008) findings suggest female suicide bombers were motivated by personal vendettas. When exploring ideologies, González et al. (2014) reviewed the ECDB and showed that women seem more likely to join left-wing causes or causes linked to eco-activism. However, they were less likely to actively participate in a terrorist offence or become a lone actor (González et al., 2014).

<u>Content of radicalisation cognitions</u>: Ten studies investigated thoughts and perceptions linked to radicalisation, summarised as *loss of significance* ($N = 4$), *mortality salience* ($N = 4$), and *moral considerations* ($N = 2$). Here, all included studies were rated as presenting with good quality.

Losing significance (e.g., employment loss) or needing more significance (e.g., due to narcissism), increased vulnerability to radicalisation (Jasko et al., 2017; Webber et al., 2017; Webber et al., 2018). Dhumad et al. (2019) did not directly study the loss of significance, but in their interpretation, they contextualised deprivation and other justifications brought forward by the investigated offenders ($N = 160$) with the task to reinstate an individual's significance.

Similarly, thoughts regarding an individual's mortality could lead to extremist views (Arndt et al., 2002). Underlying mechanisms could be a combination of escalating political conditions and low perceived personal vulnerability (i.e., how political conditions would affect their personal lives or that of their loved ones; Hirschberger et al., 2009). However, individuals with war experience only endorsed political violence when considering additional adversary rhetoric (Hirschberger et al., 2009). Ruminations about the self also increased the accessibility of mortality-related thoughts, which in turn triggered the individual's focus on perceived social transgressions to their group (Taubman-Ben-Ari & Noy, 2010). This resulted in unfavourable opinions regarding other groups, likely contributing to radicalisation.

Lastly, moral considerations were shown to increase the likelihood of extremism. For example, individuals supporting violence focused merely on the outcome (Baez et al., 2017). Furthermore, Nivette et al. (2017) showed in their sample of 1,675 Swiss pupils

that individuals who experienced strain were more likely to support extremist violence, when also exhibiting a high level of moral and legal neutralisation techniques (i.e., morally disengaging from an argument or idea to justify violence, e.g., by reframing own harmful behaviour as honourable or heroic).

6.4   Discussion

The systematic literature review offered an overview of relevant factors influencing the risk of radicalisation, while also reflecting on the quality of the empirical evidence. Eight themes emerged: Extremism enhancing attitudes; criminogenic indicators impacting on offence risk; social influences exposing individuals to extremism; conflicting findings of the contribution of mental health issues to radicalisation; aversive events/circumstances obstructing individuals' pro-social goal obtainment; impaired functioning facilitating extremist attitudes and/or violence; conflicting findings regarding the utility of sociodemographic characteristics in the prediction of radicalisation; and content of radicalisation cognitions. These themes confirmed the first prediction that radicalisation is determined by a multitude of factors. However, only limited insight was gathered about radicalisation in forensic populations, with only Trujillo et al. (2009) researching the prison context. Thus, confirming the second prediction that only limited insight into the radicalisation of forensic mental health populations would be yielded, replicating findings from Mulcahy et al. (2013) who criticised the lack of research in this area.

Instead, most research related to attitudes and justifications, as well as aversive events. These represent central constructs of risk assessments, such as the ERG-22+ (Lloyd & Dean, 2015) and the VERA-2R (e.g., Pressman & Flockton, 2012). The themes' popularity might be linked to their apparent face validity. For example, it can be reasonably concluded that strains like discrimination push individuals away from

mainstream culture towards fringe movements. Another reason for the themes' frequent study coverage is its accessibility. For example, exploration of factors like ideology and religion are predominantly comprised of publications that utilised publicly available information about extremist offenders (e.g., Capellan, 2015; Challacombe & Lucas, 2019). In such instances, the factors' presence was arguably more easily deduced than complex features, which would require access to secure data.

Ideology was especially repeatedly explored as a radicalisation influence. However, the review yielded mixed results on the factor's impact. This reflects the debate in the literature and is in line with predictions. Recent developments suggest ideology is no longer understood as a prerequisite for radicalisation. For example, the UK Home Office no longer includes ideology in its definition (Patel & Hussain, 2019), and scholars such as Borum (2015) and Vergani et al. (2020) argue that not every radicalised individual must present with an understanding of ideological agendas. This links to the more recent distinction between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013; Vidino, 2010), with only the former being associated with ideological preoccupation.

Furthermore, the review highlighted sociodemographic characteristics as equally contested. No consistent findings could be found, which would constitute a terrorist profile. This reflects conclusions by Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) who refuted the search for sociodemographic root causes. The inconsistent findings are likely due to two reasons. Firstly, the theme subsumed the most fair and poor quality studies of this review. The predominant use of correlational designs was likely unable to detect underlying mechanisms not represented in an individual's sociodemographic characteristics. Secondly, the reviewed studies found an overlap between terrorists and other violent offenders, for example, murderers (e.g., Gill et al., 2017).

This and the overlap of criminogenic indicators for radicalisation with factors for general violence affirm the prediction that neither sociodemographic profiles nor risk factors for radicalisation will yield conclusive findings. That these indicators are the second most researched aspect in this review is likely due to scholars exploring factors well-established for other risk assessments (e.g., HCR-20 by Douglas et al., 2013). Like the general violence literature (de Ruiter & Nicholls, 2011), protective factors also appeared understudied in this review. Some mitigating influences seemed to represent inverted risk factors, for example, violence-triggering critical life events were found to aid pro-social reorientation (Bhui et al., 2016).

However, this review yielded distinct factors separating radicalisation research from general violence discourse. In line the predictions that most research will emphasise group processes, factors like group identity were found as well substantiated. The fact that the presence of delinquent peers was linked to an increased risk of radicalisation confirms the notion of this process as inherently social (e.g., Borum, 2012). The tentative findings are promising, especially as in comparison to other themes these influences presented consistently good-quality studies. Similarly, the review found that the content of cognitions appeared to distinguish radicalised individuals from general violence. The studies utilised the most experimental designs of the included publications, for example, utilising written scenarios to elicit emotional or moral responses (e.g., Baez et al., 2017; Hirschberger, 2009). Further research needs to explore whether those cognitions can be naturally observed.

Lastly, the prediction was confirmed that mental health issues will yield inconclusive findings. While the review found a multitude of publications, no single diagnosis could

be empirically linked to radicalisation. This was likely due to the consistently poor-quality study designs, for example, not specifying the explored psychopathology. Similarly, the review yielded no consistent findings for impaired functioning. Again, aspects like impulse control deficits, antisocial personality style, or emotional dysregulation are also discussed as relevant for some offenders of general violence (e.g., Douglas et al., 2013). The lack of specificity arguably impacted the understanding of its influence on radicalisation. Overall, this reflects scholars' concerns about the empirical evidence in the field (e.g., Gill & Corner, 2017; Al-Attar, 2020), urging for further exploration of these facets.

6.4.1   Limitations

The review is limited in several ways. The study only considered English language articles. Hence, alternative empirically substantiated influences in other countries are not included. As such, it is unclear what additional relevant factors for radicalisation might be well established in other cultural settings, limiting the generalisability of the summarised findings. The review only focused on research directly investigating radicalisation and extremism, discarding findings of similar dynamics based on other schools of thought. Some mechanisms, for example, the violence-strain link, have been well-researched for other offence types. Hence, a broader perspective might elicit more empirical support for the factors listed here. Lastly, only a qualitative synthesis of the findings was conducted utilising thematic analysis. This approach restricts insight about the extent of empirically well-established evidence as opposed to more elaborate methods like meta-analyses that, for example, weigh effect sizes against the study qualities.

6.4.2   Concluding comments

In summary, several factors were identified as crucial and empirically well-supported in the radicalisation process. However, some influences present considerable overlap with the general violence literature (i.e., history of violence, preparedness, sociodemographic features like income, education, or gender). Additionally, the review yielded little insight into the radicalisation of forensic populations, especially when they present with complex needs, as mental health issues appear understudied. As the literature appears limited, the next step must gather insight from professionals familiar with the care of radicalised forensic patients. This is the focus of the ensuing study.

CHAPTER SEVEN
STUDY ONE: THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR RADICALISATION IN FORENSIC POPULATIONS: THE VIEWS OF EXPERTS

7.1   Structure of the chapter

This chapter addresses the unanswered question raised in the systematic literature review, namely whether the radicalisation process in forensic populations is characterised by unique factors. Hence, factors influencing radicalisation beyond the community setting were explored. First, the rationale for utilising the Delphi methodology is presented, followed by the three consecutive survey rounds to reach a consensus. Lastly, the general discussion and further theoretical considerations are presented.

7.2   Rationale for utilising the Delphi methodology

As established in the previous chapter, the available empirical evidence concerning radicalisation factors appears to vary in its quality. Especially forensic populations are extremely understudied, with only one study included (Trujillo et al., 2009). Furthermore, Trujillo et al. (2009) and Peddell et al. (2016) represent the only studies exploring consensus amongst practitioners regarding radicalisation factors, at the time of writing. Furthermore, Schmid (2011, 2012) surveyed 90 counterterrorism colleagues to reach a consensus on a terrorism definition, since Eason and Schmid's (2011) found 250 conceptualisations of terrorism. The agreement settled on terrorism as an illegal, politically motivated violent tactic aiming to elicit fearful responses by targeting civilians to address other conflict parties (Schmid, 2011, 2012), but has not been more recently considered.

Further research is also required regarding mental health issues, protective factors, and best practice for assessments exploring radicalisation (Horgan, 2017). Hence, the goal of study one is to employ Schmid's (2011) methodology to find consensus amongst experts on all those aspects specific to forensic populations. Because the insight of the participants is such a central characteristic of this research, the next section presents the recruited experts in more detail.

7.3   Participants

A purposive sampling technique was used to identify and recruit participants based on their fit with one of the following inclusion criteria: (a) Academics that had been published in two scientific journals on the topic of radicalisation. The minimum threshold of two independent journals is considered common practice in Delphi studies (e.g., Vosmer et al., 2009) and is aimed at guaranteeing an appropriate level of expertise. (b) Practitioners who worked with extremist offenders or worked with populations considered vulnerable to radicalisation, and/or consulted on cases of radicalisation.

Required years of experience were not specified, as the potential pool of professionals working in counterterrorism appeared small and was not the intention to be limited further. Instead, participants had to indicate their confidence regarding their knowledge about radicalisation, before continuing with the online survey. Furthermore, participants were encouraged to forward the survey link to their colleagues.

Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology, University of Central Lancashire. Before participating, all identified individuals received an invitation email with all relevant details about the study (including research aims, issues about confidentiality and anonymity, consent and withdrawal, and the previously mentioned

inclusion criteria; see Appendix B). This also included the researchers' information. Participants could consent via a box at the beginning of the online survey. They had more than two months to complete the survey and received up to two reminder emails during this period. Lastly, all participants received a debrief, either when completing each round or when withdrawing. The study process is detailed in Figure 7.1.

80 individuals were approached, of which 27 responded (33.8% initial response rate). Nineteen continued to participate after the initial confidence question to establish whether they view themselves as knowledgeable in the topic. Twelve were scholars (including lecturers, professors, and academic leads) with an average of 14.5 years of experience in counterterrorism. Three were forensic psychologists with an average of nine years of experience, and two were police officers with an average of four years of experience.

7.4 Methodology

Participants were asked to rate items indicating their level of agreement. In each subsequent round they received feedback about the items that reached consensus. The strictest cut-off of 80% or more was chosen for the level of (dis)agreement (Vosmer et al., 2009). Overall, three rounds were employed.

Round one provided the participants with a list of items exploring influences on the risk of radicalisation in forensic populations. A further goal was to establish consensus regarding the contested terrorism definition and agreement relating to best practices for assessments. Therefore, participants were presented with items and had to indicate their relevance. They could also mention additional items.

Figure 7.1

Flowchart visualising the Process of Study One

Employing the Delphi methodology to establish the most important factor for radicalisation in forensic mental health populations

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┌──────────────────────────────┐        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ Rationale for using the      │        │     Item development        │
│ Delphi methodology           │───────▶├─────────────────────────────┤
└──────────────────────────────┘        │     Administration          │
                                        ├─────────────────────────────┤
                                        │       Analysis              │
┌──────────────────────────────┐        ├─────────────────────────────┤
│ Recruitment, details of      │        │  Results - Thematic Analysis│
│ participants, and ethical    │        ├─────────────────────────────┤
│ approval                     │        │    Items for next round     │
└──────────────────────────────┘        └─────────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────────────────┐        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ Round one of the Delphi      │        │       Participants          │
│ survey (N = 27)              │───────▶├─────────────────────────────┤
└──────────────────────────────┘        │        Material             │
                                        ├─────────────────────────────┤
                                        │        Analysis             │
┌──────────────────────────────┐        ├─────────────────────────────┤
│ Round two of the Delphi      │        │  Results - Thematic Analysis│
│ survey (N = 11)              │        └─────────────────────────────┘
└──────────────────────────────┘
                                        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
┌──────────────────────────────┐        │       Participants          │
│ Round three of the Delphi    │───────▶├─────────────────────────────┤
│ survey (N = 11)              │        │        Material             │
└──────────────────────────────┘        ├─────────────────────────────┤
                                        │        Analysis             │
                                        ├─────────────────────────────┤
┌──────────────────────────────┐        │        Results              │
│ Review and discussion        │        └─────────────────────────────┘
└──────────────────────────────┘        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                                        │      Overall results        │
                                        └─────────────────────────────┘
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7.5   Round one of the Delphi

Item development. The items were based on the findings of the systematic literature review. The development utilised thematic analysis (see Chapter 6 for a description of thematic analysis; Braun & Clark, 2006). Review findings were included in the survey

when they presented with good-quality empirical evidence, for example, grievance. Factors with fair or poor quality evidence were explored with open-ended questions and guided the item development in subsequent rounds. Questions were explored in three categories (see Appendix C): terrorism definition; factors influencing radicalisation in forensic populations; and assessment guidance. Additional open questions explored participant rationale for their ratings.

Administration. All three rounds of this survey were administered using the online questionnaire service eSurvey. Participants were asked to rate the relevance of the presented items on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 'strongly agree' (coded '1') to 'strongly disagree' (coded '5').

Analysis. A quantitative analysis summarised the average percentage of (dis)agreement. For example, calculating the mean for all ratings indicating 'agree' or 'strongly agree' represented consensus on one item and vice versa. Items meeting the 80% threshold (Vosmer et al., 2009) were fed back in the second round but were not required to be rated again. Furthermore, another thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006) of the participants' comments and suggestions was conducted to generate more items for round two.

Consensus results. Six out of 25 items reached consensus (Table 7.1). Furthermore, the thematic analysis yielded additional categories for each section. The first part exploring the terrorism definition was restructured with the five new categories *perpetrator*, *target*, *goals*, *motivation*, and *nature of violence*, including twelve new items. When reviewing the items, suggestibility achieved agreement, while low intelligence did not (Table 7.1).[11]

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[11] However, because the literature exhibits a well-established link between intelligence and suggestibility (e.g., Gudjonsson, 1991; Søndenaa et al., 2010), it was decided that intelligence would not be rated again as a separate item in the next round.

The second part relating to radicalisation factors was structured into *environmental/contextual factors*, *criminal needs,* and *individual factors,* with 18 new items. Lastly, the third section exploration risk assessments included nine new items. Three participants suggested in their responses that low intelligence was linked to suggestibility.

7.6   Round two of the Delphi surveys

In the second round, participants had to rate 58 items. Additionally, they had to provide further qualitative feedback regarding protective factors, as the previous round had not elicited enough responses to create new items.

Participants. All participants from round one received an email invitation for the second round and had approximately six weeks to participate. Eleven participants returned for round two, resulting in a response rate of 57.9%. The other eight participants received a debrief.

Consensus results. Twenty items met the 80% threshold for consensus (Table 7.1). Furthermore, the thematic analysis regarding protective factors yielded twelve new items based on the feedback of six participants (Table 7.1).

7.7   Round three of the Delphi

Round three was the final round of this study. Overall, participants were asked to rate 41 items but did not have to provide any more qualitative feedback.

Participants. All approached individuals participated again, resulting in a response rate of 100%.

Material. To facilitate a consensus, the scale was changed to a 4-point Likert-scale, ranging from 'strongly agree' (coded '1') to 'strongly disagree' (coded '4'). Excluding the neutral option required participants to decide the items' relevance. The choice was made given the data from previous rounds, with several items only barely not making the cut-off of 80% or more.

Consensus results. In the last round, 18 items reached consensus, including one item that participants agreed upon as non-relevant (Table 7.1).

7.8   Results

After three rounds, with a total of 41 participant responses, 44 out of 67 items reached consensus (Table 7.1). It appears that experts mainly agreed on items that related to environmental and/or contextual factors linked to radicalisation, protective factors, and considerations for assessments and formulations. However, participants also indicated in their qualitative responses that protective factors were not thoroughly substantiated.

Table 7.1

The Average Percentage of Agreement and Disagreement for All Items

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %	Round item reached consensus
Section 1: Environmental/ contextual factors			
1. Exposure to extremist content.	**90.9**	0.0	Round 2
2. Exposure to extremists or other pro-criminal peers.	**90.9**	0.0	Round 2
3. No pro-social networks.	**81.8**	9.1	Round 2
4. Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in social divides.	72.8	27.3	
5. Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in discrimination.	**100**	0.0	Round 3
6. Preoccupation with current political events resulting in sense for imminent need for action.	**90.9**	0.0	Round 2
7. Preoccupation with current political events resulting in feeling of threat to own group.	**100**	0.0	Round 2
8. Moving between different institutions (e.g., from prison to hospital).	18.2	**81.8**	Round 3
Section 1: Criminal needs			
9. Previous problems with violence.	**90.9**	0.0	Round 2
10. Opportunistic motivation to gain financial resources.	54.5	45.5	
11. Opportunistic motivation to gain protection.	72.8	27.3	
12. Previous criminal record	72.8	27.3	
13. Affordance/capacity.	63.6	36.4	
Section 1: Individual factors			
14. Symptoms of depression (e.g., hopelessness)	63.6	36.4	
15. Suggestibility	**88.9**	0.0	Round 1
16. Experienced grievance	**88.9**	5.6	Round 1
17. Perceived discrimination	**94.4**	0.0	Round 1
18. Previous victimisation	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
19. Grandiose sense of self	**100**	0.0	Round 3
20. Distorted cognitive style/worldview (e.g., conspiracies)	**81.8**	9.1	Round 2
21. High levels of impulsivity	72.7	27.3	

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %	Round item reached consensus
22. Boredom or tendency for sensation seeking	72.7	27.3	
23. Feelings of guilt and/or need for redemption	63.6	36.4	
24. Substance misuse	45.4	54.5	
Section 1: Protective factors			
25. Pro-social role models in secure forensic settings (e.g., officers)	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
26. Pro-social role models outside of secure forensic settings(e.g., peers)	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
27. Needing to take care for others outside of secure forensic settings (e.g., sick family members, children)	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
28. Meaningful pro-social engagement with system (e.g., school engagement)	**100**	0.0	Round 3
29. Peers present with diverse backgrounds	**100**	0.0	Round 3
30. Content with own life	**81.8**	18.2	Round 3
31. Mindfulness	72.8	27.3	
32. Respecting others	72.8	27.3	
33. Cognitive flexibility	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
34. Not externalising blame	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
35. Hope for meaningful pro-social life outside of secure forensic settings	**100**	0.0	Round 3
36. Aware of hypermasculinity	63.6	36.4	
Section 2: Considerations for assessment			
37. Consideration of alternative hypotheses to engage in extremism.	**80.0**	0.0	Round 2
38. Continuous assessment to evaluate development.	**90.0**	0.0	Round 2
39. Assessments must include formulations to account for functions of factors specific to each individual.	**90.0**	0.0	Round 2
40. Assessment of needs, instead of prediction of risk.	**80.0**	10.0	Round 2
41. Un-targeted, general assessment runs the risk of contributing to radicalisation dynamics (e.g., making individual feeling even more oppressed, hence, seeking out other extremists).	**80.0**	0.0	Round 2
42. Verification and access to collateral information.	**90.0**	0.0	Round 2
43. Establishing trust.	**90.0**	0.0	Round 2
44. Awareness that warning signs for grooming are often lacking.	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3
45. Awareness that some crucial concepts have no established measurements.	**90.9**	9.1	Round 3

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %	Round item reached consensus
Section 3: Perpetrator			
46. Terrorism can be used by individuals.	**94.7**	5.3	Round 1
47. Terrorism can be used by groups.	**100**	0.0	Round 1
48. Terrorism can be used by state agents.	54.5	45.5	
49. Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.	45.4	54.5	
Section 3: Target			
50. Immediate targets are mostly civilians.	**80.0**	20.0	Round 2
51. Immediate targets are mostly representations of targeted state/government.	45.4	54.5	
Section 3: Goals			
52. A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.	**90.9**	9.1	
53. An attack has the purpose to elicit support in like-minded individuals/groups.	**80.0**	0.0	Round 2
54. An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.	72.8	27.3	
55. An attack is intended to inflict helplessness in the target.	72.8	27.3	
56. An attack has the purpose of expressing grief or supremacy.	54.5	45.5	
57. Terrorists attacks are indiscriminate.	36.4	63.6	
Section 3: Motivation			
58. A terrorist attack is motivated by political reasons.	**90.0**	10.0	Round 1
59. A terrorist attack is motivated by ideological reasons.	**90.0**	10.0	Round 2
60. A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.	30.0	70.0	
61. Terrorists' motivation is considered to be heterogeneous.	**100**	0.0	Round 3
Section 3: Nature of violence			
62. Extreme forms of activism can be considered terrorism, if violence is a key aspect of activism.	**90.0**	0.0	Round 2
63. Terrorist attacks are predominantly premeditated.	**90.0**	10.0	Round 2
64. Violence by terrorists is not static (like a trait), but dynamic (like behaviour).	**90.0**	10.0	Round 2
65. Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.	50.0	50.0	
66. Hate crimes can be considered terrorism.	**80.0**	20.0	Round 3
67. Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.	**90.0**	10.0	Round 3

Note. Values presented in bold reached the cut-off ≥80% for consensus.

7.9   Discussion

This study aimed to generate a consensus amongst experts regarding a definition for terrorism, as well as understanding radicalisation influences for forensic populations. It was predicted that the terrorism definition would feature aspects such as ideological motivation, civilian targets, and the intent to change behaviour. The exploration replicated these central aspects previously found by Schmid (2011, 2012). In addition, participants in both studies also agreed that terrorists commit attacks both as individuals and groups. However, only the previous research extended the latter to international networks (Schmid, 2011, 2012). Meanwhile, participants of the current study included extreme forms of activism and hate crimes in the definition, while viewing terrorism as clearly different to other forms of organised violence. None of these aspects can be found in Schmid's (2011, 2012) results.

This arguably expands the terrorism definition to include forms of violence that Cook et al. (2013) summarised under 'group-based violence' in their Multi-Level Guidance (MLG). That risk assessment encapsulates terrorism with other forms of violence that position the individual in a perceived or real group context. In the current study, participants illustrated the inherently social nature of terrorism, for example, via terrorists' motivation to elicit support from like-minded people or achieve personal vendettas.

The social emphasis is also reflected in the consensus of radicalisation influences, summarised under environmental/contextual factors. This section elicited the most consensus amongst participants. This is in line with the systematic literature review, which highlighted external influences as some of the most well-established links to radicalisation in empiricism. Furthermore, it replicates notions centring relationships and

group dynamics in the hypothetical conceptualisation of the radicalisation process (e.g., Borum, 2012, Victoroff, 2005; Horgan et al., 2018). Both, this, and the vast array of individual factors obtained from participants' feedback confirms the second prediction that both social environment and individual factors are relevant to the radicalisation process.

Overall, consensus on individual factors, including criminal needs, is also in line with the findings of the systematic literature review. Participants presented with a contemporary knowledge of factors of importance, such as trauma-informed findings, which appreciates that terrorists can also experience victimisation (Aarten et al., 2018). Additionally, they refuted the utility of sociodemographic features for assessment purposes, reflecting considerations also noted by Kruglanski and Fishmann (2006). However, participants did not view items related to offence planning as relevant. This likely reflects a lack of familiarity with threat assessment approaches like the TRAP-18 (Meloy & Gill, 2016), as they are not used in secure forensic settings.

Another surprising finding that partially opposed the third prediction (i.e., experts will likely reiterate factors known to mitigate general violence) was the lack of consensus on items relevant to general violence. While aspects like substance use are commonly explored in care pathways addressing violent behaviour (e.g., HCR-20; Douglas et al., 2013), these items consistently did not reach a consensus in the current expert Delphi. Participants likely understood the instructions as exploring factors *exclusively* relevant to radicalisation. As such, their ratings could confirm the notion that several criminal needs derived from the review are not reliably differentiating extremist violence from other forms of aggression. Nevertheless, most recommendations regarding the assessment of radicalisation reiterated common practices found for general violence (e.g., Völlm et al.,

2018). Deviating suggestions, for example, how assessors can contribute to radicalisation dynamics, evidenced participants' familiarity with the subject.

The Delphi's findings also partially confirm the third prediction, namely the limited consensus of protective factors. Initially, participants appeared hesitant to generate suitable items, requiring additional prompts in subsequent rounds. However, a wide breadth of suggestions was developed that emphasised social themes again. This is in line with the findings by Silke et al. (2021) who found similar factors to be beneficial for the successful disruption of the radicalisation pathway. Especially the pro-social influence of peers, family and parenthood was highlighted in both studies. Additionally, participants acknowledged rehabilitation opportunities forensic services might provide; a finding that is described as a considerable environmental catalyst in Silke et al.'s (2021) review. They suggest that prisons provide a space for reflection, physical safety from extremist peers the individual previously engaged with, and opportunities for pro-social engagement (Silke et al., 2021). Thus, both studies are in contrast with previous conclusions by McCauley et al. (2013) and Trujillo et al. (2009), who framed prisons as settings likely increasing the risk of radicalisation.

Overall, the experts' feedback overlaps with two different strains of psychological theories. The items relating to discrimination and grievances echo *relative deprivation* (Gurr, 1970), which describes how a sense of injustice or frustration results from comparison with others, as opposed to absolute deprivation. The *Staircase to Terrorism* (Moghaddam, 2005, 2006) and *Federal Bureau of Investigation Model* (Borum, 2003) link this explicitly to radicalisation, while the *Four Prongs Model* (Sageman, 2008) frames deprivation more broadly. Sageman (2008) defines as *personal resonance*, meaning the individual views their subjective deprivation as political struggle, and

includes perceived threat to own group, need of imminent action, and preoccupation with political events. All these experts' ratings describe moments of crisis, dissatisfaction, and frustration. The consensus echoes the *frustration-aggression* (FA) hypothesis (i.e., preventing goal obtainment results in frustration that can cause aggression; e.g., Friedland, 1992). It appears experts suggest that dissatisfaction is facilitating radicalisation, especially when the individual views it as unjust as a result of social comparison.

Wiktorowicz's (2004) *cognitive opening* might explain the underlying mechanism, as they describe in their *Theory of Joining Extremist Groups* that moments of crisis result in mistrust of established ways of living. Individuals are instead receptive to new ideas. This readiness is likely represented in the current study as the need for imminent action, while the relevance of new ideas is arguably emphasised by items including the exposure to new ideas through extremist content or extremist peers. Thus, the Delphi's findings align with the *Rational Choice Theory* (Crenshaw, 1992), meaning that radicalisation is speculated to be a result of the individual concluding that the costs of their goal obtainment outweigh their benefits. They reorientate themselves towards new, in this case, extremist ideas that allow the relief of the accompanied frustration through aggression.

However, other items of the current study align with an alternative explanation. Experts viewed grandiose sense of self as relevant to radicalisation. In accordance with the *Significance Quest Theory* (Kruglankapi et al., 2014), extremism is understood as a way to fulfil the individual's need to (re)gain their sense of significance. In this context, aspects like relative deprivation do not facilitate radicalisation due to a rational weighing of options, but because they are judging their situation influenced by their needs and

personality tendencies. This aligns with the *Cognitive Appraisal Theory* (e.g., Lazerus & Folkman, 1984; Scherer, 2009), which states that events are subjectively interpreted based on the individual's cognitions. The appraisal is hypothesised to determine stress responses, depending on whether the individual renders situations as threatening and manageable (Lazerus & Folkman, 1984) and influenced by the individual's values (Scherer, 2009). Besides the grandiose sense of self yielded from the current study, other items that could render the appraisal outcome include a distorted worldview and preoccupation with current political events.

It appears that in comparison with the Rational Choice Theory, the Cognitive Appraisal Theory aligns more closely with the goals of this study (i.e., developing a conceptual model aiding the assessment, formulation, and care of radicalised individuals), as it accounts for individual differences. However, the experts did not agree on other opportunistic motivations. While motivating factors for extremist engagement must be more closely investigated in the next study, the lack of consensus on these items also presents as an inconsistency. The statements would have aligned with the *crime-terror-nexus*, meaning that criminally motivated individuals are speculated to join extremist groups and vice versa (e.g., Basra & Neumann, 2016). But despite experts broadening the terrorism definition to include other forms of violence on the spectrum (i.e., hate crime, extreme forms of activism) that can be summarised under Cook et al.'s (2013) *group-based violence*, they viewed organised crime as distinct from terrorism. The limits for the fluctuation between those two forms of offending behaviour must be explored in the next study. As such, the thesis will carry forward the group-based violence definition, which encapsulates any form of violence which is committed in reference to a group (Cook et al., 2013). The definition does not require group membership but merely the affiliation of an individual with a group and/or movement, meaning that lone actors are also

summarised under this term, as their offences are in reference to a wider ideological movement.

7.9.1 Limitations

The Delphi findings are limited in several ways. The population's characteristics from which participants were recruited restrict the study's insight. The topic requires high levels of specialisation. This was reflected in the high drop-out rate after initial positive responses ($N = 8$), with participants reporting a lack of confidence despite meeting the inclusion criteria. Additionally, most participants were researchers and scholars ($N = 12$). Therefore, the expressed opinions and consensus are predominantly academic. The restricted scope is likely due to practitioners being more difficult to engage via restrictions on their practice permissions. For example, practitioners working in British prisons could have only been recruited with additional ethic clearance. Experts could only participate when they could read and write in the English language. While the recruitment was explicitly international, this restricted the generalisability of the findings. Lastly, the Delphi methodology has no clear guidance, as for example noted previously when discussing cut-off values. This limits the replicability of the study design, meaning that future studies might yield different findings.

7.9.2 Concluding comments

The participants' emphasis on social influences warrants a deeper exploration of radicalised individuals and their membership in extremist groups and/or movements. The Delphi findings explicitly broadened the extremist offender category, now encapsulating individuals who participated in group-based violence. However, no consensus was achieved regarding the motivation of such offenders. The understanding of driving factors and especially the radicalisation of forensic patient populations appear completely

neglected. Thus, the next study seeks to explore these facets by investigating the lived experiences of forensic mental health patients who have become radicalised.

CHAPTER EIGHT
STUDY TWO: LIVED EXPERIENCES OF RADICALISED FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS

8.1   Structure of the chapter

The previous chapters focused on the conceptualisation of radicalisation in the literature and by experts. This raised the question of whether radicalisation factors can be observed in the lived experiences of forensic populations with complex mental health issues. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were conducted exploring group membership and ideology among forensic patients classed as vulnerable to radicalisation. This chapter will first outline the rationale for the employed methodology. The contents and construction of the semi-structured interview are presented, including the recruitment of participants, as well as the subsequent analytical steps, before the results are presented.

8.2   Rationale for current study approach

In the previous studies, it was highlighted that little is known about the radicalisation of forensic populations, with the systematic literature review yielding only one relevant study that had been conducted in prison (Trujillo et al., 2009). Regarding mental health issues in general, Gill et al.'s (2021) review yielded a limited amount of research ($N =$ 19) linking them to radicalisation. While they concluded that the evidence base had improved, they also criticise the predominant focus on diagnoses instead of psychopathology. Instead, Gill et al. (2021) suggested an idiosyncratic approach to substantiate the current understanding of the lived experiences of the investigated populations. An avenue to explore these perspectives is a network approach (e.g., suggested by Borsboom, 2008), conceptualising pathways along social relationships

while accounting for the interconnection and variability of the considered influences (Gill et al., 2021).

Advancements of this kind have been made, for example, by Abdalla et al. (2021) who explored interaction-related concepts regarding online radicalisation. Focusing on three convicted terrorists, Abdalla et al. (2021) reviewed their online communication on Twitter and Facebook and found high levels of dehumanising language. However, the authenticity of the communication was limited due to the online platforms' policies around acceptable content. It becomes apparent that a more explorative stance must be employed to tackle the understudied areas while incorporating suggestions from recent research. The following section provides an overview of this study's methodology.

8.3   Methodology

8.3.1   Construction of the semi-structured interview

A semi-structured interview approach was chosen to allow the exploration of topics that would not be captured elsewhere (e.g., in case files). The semi-structured format was chosen to allow for the individualised exploration of new aspects that have not been covered in previous research or lack sound empirical evidence. The interview followed the established 5P approach (e.g., Weerasekera, 1996), an information-gathering method, which helps formulate hypotheses about a present problem and the interacting influences of predisposing, perpetuating, precipitating, and protective factors in risk assessments and therapy planning (e.g., Weerasekera, 1996; Dudley & Kuyken, 2006; Logan, 2014).[12] Thus, lending a logical and empirically founded structure to the understanding and

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[12] The 5P approach (e.g., Weerasekera, 1996) was chosen as it captures motivation more than other behavioural analytical approaches, such as the SORC (S-timuli [triggers], O-rganism [historical factors], R-esponse [resulting behaviour], C-onsequences [reinforcing mechanisms]; Lee-Evans, 1994).

subsequent communication of psychologically relevant dynamics. The following overview presents each section of the 5P approach (Logan, 2014) and includes an excerpt of variables that were included in the interview based on the findings of the previous two studies (for a full overview of the interview guidance see Appendix D).

Present issues. A description of the currently observable problematic behaviour operationalised as current political and/or religious views for this study. Questions centred on the participants' views, the views of others and how they react to this, and the subscribed importance of those views. Additionally, the role of violence was investigated. The general use of violence was also explored independently in the latter interview sections, to not conflate the focus of this section, the political and/or religious opinions.

Perpetuating factors. Influences generally increase the likelihood of the present issues. As the previous studies emphasised the social environment as crucial, this section focused on the socialisation process during radicalisation (e.g., Borum, 2012, Victoroff, 2005). For example, the impact of relatives, peers inside and outside of forensic units, and the wider community (including media content) were discussed here. Furthermore, the need for belonging was explored, as adherence to group processes was highlighted in the previous systematic literature review as important (e.g., Askew & Helbardt, 2012).

Predisposing factors. Origin of the presenting problem in childhood. The previous studies did not link any developmental factors to radicalisation, making an open exploration necessary. However, survey findings and literature suggested 'moments of crisis' as predisposing factors (e.g., moments that result in the need for revenge; Jacques & Taylor, 2008), resulting in an additional targeted search of significant life moments.

Precipitating factors. Influences that occur right before the present issue and can reasonably be linked to such occurrence (i.e., triggers). The previous two studies did not highlight any triggers, making an open exploration necessary.

Protective factors. Influences mitigating the occurrence of the present problem. Preliminary evidence was found in study one, making an open exploration necessary. The experts' feedback focused on social relationships (e.g., pro-social peer support, taking care of others, peers with diverse backgrounds, etc.) and hence, was covered in the discussion of the individual's social environment earlier. Additionally, the Delphi study highlighted adaptive coping strategies and future prosocial outlooks, making it clearly important to include here.

The guidance included an overview of the general areas expressed in language that was more accessible for patients (Appendix D). These and a list of all questions could be handed out to participants, if required, and served as support during the interview. The sessions lasted up to 60 minutes, depending on the participant's needs.

8.3.2   Procedure

Recruitment was conducted in a secure forensic hospital. Ethical approval was received from the Research Ethics Committee of the NHS. Included were individuals when meeting one of the following inclusion criteria: (1) they had committed an extremist offence (i.e., one or more offences in the past that can be linked to ideological beliefs and/or were motivated through extremist peers); or (2) they exhibited extremist tendencies within forensic care. Care teams decided on suitable patients. Following the experts' responses in study one, the criteria were kept deliberately broad to encapsulate Cook et al.'s (2013) understanding of group-based violence. However, the community-

centred Vulnerability Assessment Framework by Lloyd and Dean (2015) was supplied with the information sheet to guide practitioners' discussion during the meetings (Figure 8.1). The guidance is recommended by the British government to identify individuals in the community who are likely vulnerable to radicalisation (HM Government, 2012) and includes the three dimensions engagement (e.g., motivations or contextual factors that lead to extremist involvement), intent (i.e., a pro-violent mindset), and capability (i.e., skills and resources that enable extremist violence).

Once suitable participants were identified by the care team, the responsible clinician (RC) was asked to consent for the researcher to approach patients (Appendix D). Only then could patients be approached on the wards and informed about the study via the information sheet (Appendix D). Before the patient's decision, potential participants were given one week to decide whether to participate. Those that confirmed their participation were then approached to set a date for the interview session.

Figure 8.1

Vulnerability Assessment Framework by Lloyd and Dean (2015)

Dimensions	Factors
Engagement	1. Need to address injustice and express grievance
	2. Need to defend against threat
	3. Need for identity, meaning, belonging
	4. Need for status
	5. Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
	6. Need for dominance
	7. Susceptibility to indoctrination
	8. Political/moral motivation
	9. Opportunistic involvement
	10. Family or friends support extremist offending
	11. Transitional periods
	12. Group influence and control
	13. Mental health
Intent	1. Over-identification with a group or cause
	2. 'Us and Them' thinking
	3. Dehumanisation of the enemy
	4. Attitudes that justify offending
	5. Harmful means to an end
	6. Harmful end objectives
Capability	1. Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies
	2. Access to networks, funding, and equipment
	3. Criminal history

8.3.3   Participants

After meeting with all care teams on all wards, out of 197 patients on-site, 18 were identified by practitioners as suitable for this study (circa nine percent of the forensic patient population at the hospital). For three patients, the RCs could not give consent, as they were deemed too unwell. Of the resulting 15, nine refused to participate. The reasons for refusal were lack of interest and suspicion regarding the project and/or researcher. Six consented to be interviewed. This is a response rate of 40% of all eligible patients. However, one patient refused engagement on the day of the session due to declining mental health, resulting in a final set of five interviews. All participants were men. No other sociodemographic features were recorded.[13]

8.3.4   Material and transcription

The interviews were conducted between August and December 2021. All sessions were conducted on the wards in assigned interview rooms, allowing for privacy and safety as ward staff monitored the rooms. All interviews were recorded with a Dictaphone after the participants had consented to its usage. The interviews were transcribed and anonymised on-site using the Windscribe software.

The transcription was comprehensive, as a reduction of content before analysis (e.g., summarising interviews in bullet points) could limit the potential insight and obstruct analysis (e.g., Gill, 2000; Wood & Kroger, 2000). However, the amount of detail clearly had to be kept manageable. For that purpose, the notation system by Jefferson (2004) was used to indicate paralinguistic characteristics in a coherent and concise manner (e.g., interview partners talking over each other, etc.; see Figure 8.2). Indicators detailing the

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[13] As the sample was smaller than expected, the inclusion of such details would have resulted in the possible identification of the participants.

exact extent of pauses (Jefferson, 2004) were not included, because the sound quality prevented such nuanced transcription. Instead, the analysis unit of interest was the way that participants assign meaning to their group memberships. Hence, a simplified adaptation by Benneworth (2009) was utilised.

Figure 8.2

Transcriptions Conventions by Jefferson (2004)

Symbol	Meaning
[ ]	Onset and end of overlapping talk between conversation partners.
=	Direct response to an utterance without break.
(.)	Unspecified long break between utterance and response.
.	Indication of a falling intonation.
,	Indication of a continuing intonation.
!	Indication of a louder intonation (e.g., because conversation partner is animated, agitated, etc.)
?	Indication of a questioning intonation.

Note. This overview utilises the convention system by Jefferson (2004) but shortened the system to fit the study goals. For that purpose, adaptations by Benneworth (2009) were used as guidance.

In the transcripts, 'Int.' refers to the interviewer, 'P' refers to the participant. Numbers behind 'P' ranging from one to five indicate the respective participants. Additional conventions had to be introduced to capture other details:

- Descriptors indicating the context of the conversation (e.g., non-verbal behaviour, audio issues) were marked in asterisk (e.g., *shaking head*)

- Unspecified long pauses within a speaker's presentation were marked with '...'

- Direct quotes presented by a speaker were marked with '

- Interruptions of one speaker by the other conversation partner were marked with '//'

- Censored content was marked with 'X' or summarised using the descriptors, in instances where anonymisation impacted on the understanding.

These modifications were necessary due to the common occurrence of such instances over large sections of some interviews. Furthermore, the presentation of regional accents was excluded due to the sensitive nature of the data. Instead, transcripts resorted to generic informal language (e.g., 'gonna' instead of 'going to' or 'wanna' instead of 'wanting to'). Thus, adhering to standards by Gill (2000) to present interviews verbatim where possible. All transcripts are included in Appendix E.

A clinician reviewed the sufficient anonymisation of all interviews. Furthermore, they also listened to all recordings to identify potential risks. However, no concerns were noted.

8.4   Analysis and discussion

After the transcription, each interview was analysed following the overarching research question of how forensic patients view their membership in extremist groups and/or movements. As data was limited but rich in detail, a discourse analysis (DA) was conducted (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The approach is utilised in a range of disciplines (e.g., sociology and psychology; Willig, 2000) and explores how language is used to convey meaning (e.g., Gee & Handford, 2013), either in written text or conversation.

In the extremism context, it has been utilised to explore terrorists' online communication, although limited due to the platforms' censorship of such content (Abdalla et al., 2021).

However, Gough et al. (2019) demonstrated that DA can also be successfully utilised in non-naturally occurring conversations like research interviews. Hence, their analysis units (i.e., discourse strategies and narratives) are employed for the current study even though their application context was independent of the radicalisation research (Gough et al., 2019). *Discourse strategies* relate to the communication methods with which interviewees convey their *narratives*, which represent the communication content.

While there is no universal way to approach those or other units in DA (e.g., Burr, 1998), Gill (2000) suggested general steps. Firstly, the researcher must familiarise themselves with the data. In the current study, this is achieved via the verbatim transcription and the subsequent re-reading of all interviews. Secondly, each transcript must be coded (Gill, 2000). One way to structure the coding is the sequencing of the interview into small sections that can be prescribed to a distinct topic or function (e.g., taking control of the discourse; Sacks et al., 1979). Lastly, Gill (200) recommends the search for patterns, including the developing of hypotheses. These steps can be repeated several times, for example, to reflect on deviant cases (Potter, 1969) until a consistent and coherent pattern emerges. While it is recommended to include participants' understanding of the analysis (e.g., Potter, 1969), this step is skipped in the current study. This is due to their mental health, as well as the potential risk of violence upon confrontation with insights gathered about their extremist affiliation.

While most interview sections elicited detailed accounts from the five interviewees, questions about triggers and coping strategies yielded little to no responses. It is hypothesised that these required a level of insight not common in the considered patient sample. All other areas were characterised by the interviewees rationalising their group/movement membership and inadvertently presenting themselves in a positive light.

These discourse strategies are characterised as normalising their past behaviour and/or current opinions, to save face and not implicating themselves in offence behaviour.

These instances were commonly raised without being prompted by the interviewer. A potential explanation is the implied power imbalance in such sessions, where the interviewer has the authority to control the content of the interview. As forensic patients are arguably dependent on the professional's judgement in these settings, these neutralisation techniques could be an attempt at impression management. This is explored in more detail below.

Independently from the discourse strategies, interviewees exhibited a wide range of narratives. Most often, they framed their membership as pragmatic to secure their safety in the face of imagined or real enemies ('membership to guarantee survival'); they described their entry to a group/movement as an automatic result of their upbringing or living circumstances ('membership being naturally determined'), and they presented themselves as unique and important in their cause ('membership to support their own importance'), yet they were careful not to implicate themselves as an active agent in past offence behaviour ('members as innocent'). Notably, these observed narratives did not appear independent of each other. However, to explore each narrative appropriately, they are presented separately in the following sections.

8.4.1 Membership to guarantee survival

All participants reported some form of prevalent threat they experienced or are experiencing when discussing their views; most often in the context of their previous detentions in prison. For example, when the interviewer asked to clarify P1's

apprehension towards Muslims, the interviewee framed this in the context of previous violent experiences he had in prison (P1, l. 33-57):

P1[14]: Yeah, well, for instance this morning, well X who I sort of disliked, sitting having me dinner and there is an extremist on here and he was *mumbling* understood to booked into the Arabic channel and was singing 'Humdala humdala' and all that stuff and I thought I dislike that. And I think that is instilled in me from prison to dislike that that gang member… not just the religion in general, it's a gang… And ehm, I *inaudible* for a split second but then I kind of was eating me dinner and forgot about it. But for a split second it did irritate me, you know?

Int.: Yeah, and, so, it's not so much – just to get this right, clarifying things—it seems it's not so much about the religion itself as it's more the experience you had in prison with other gangs?

P1: Yeah, the gang culture and what it became. Some of them were praying and doing stuff, they were just, they were just form a gang and that clique would then go on to on a Friday after prayers—we called them 'Friday fanatics'—after Friday prayer they would attack someone.

Int.: Oh, ok, and, ehm, how, when you say for a second you got back into this mind set of being in prison how did that make you feel? Like how was that relationship back then with those gangs? Was that really hostile or//?

P1: Very hostile. It was, we were training on the yards, and the 20 extremist and 20 other lads, all training, on the same yard, for one purpose, for the up and coming fight that be coming. And ehm it was it was scary times, you know? It was weapons and stuff.

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[14] In the transcripts, 'P' refers to the Participant, numbers behind 'P' ranging from one to five indicate the respective participants. 'Int.' refers to the interviewer.

Int.: So, had it ever come to physical fights?

P1: Yeah, loads of time, yeah. I'm been involved in three myself, three altercations myself. One was documented by the staff, someone and that. And ehm I then find myself being the enemy of the state, sort of thing, for the extremists. Put money on me to get me and stuff like that. And I had to live with that, you know?

The severity of the threat is emphasised by mentioning high frequency ('… after Friday prayer they would attack…'; '… [physical fights] loads of time, yeah.') and high intensity, for example, framing the enemy is 'very hostile' and that it was 'very scary times'. This is a common discourse strategy across most participants, with interviewees portraying their detention as a continuously 'dangerous', requiring them to 'fight all the gangs' (P2, l. 353-357), often 'loads of times' (P3, l. 305-308). These descriptions can become graphic, for example, when P1 explicitly outlines how the constant occurrence of violence led him to pre-emptively be violent (P1, l. 191-195):

P1: Well, I've seen lads out there trampled, seen lads being slashed, lads being boiled with boiling water, boiling oil. Seen people ears drip off from the fucking head where they've been boiled and strained in kitchens. And ehm I thought to myself I did not want this happen to me. So I come on and I thought I killed in full force before this can happen I attack… I'll attack any possible enemies.

The 'enemy' was usually referred to in derogatory language, especially questioning their sanity. In the first example, the interviewee refers to the Muslims he encountered in prison as 'Friday fanatics'. P2 characterises them as being of 'weak mind' suggesting that they are all 'coached' (P2, l. 331-332). And P4 describes the enemy was believing 'nonsense' to the degree that no retribution was possible anymore ('fucking far gone'; P3, l. 224-

226). It appears that the devaluing of the enemy was limited to participants who perceived Muslims to be a threat to their safety. However, P3, who describes he was the target of racist violence, did not utilise such language. Instead, he portrayed the fights with other groups as initially 'exciting', when prompted to elaborate (Part 3., l. 131-134).

Participants seemed to commonly attempt rationalising these derogatory views by utilising professional lingo, such as 'extremist' (P1, l. 34), 'terrorists' (Part 2., l. 411; P5, l. 58), 'radicalised people' (P3 l. 326), or 'converted' (P4, l. 241). Although the interviewer did not prompt them and specifically did not use that terminology in his sessions, it is likely that participants were motivated by the context of the interviews. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the interviewees had been exposed to such language by other professionals before (e.g., P2 is mentioning at the end of his interview that prison staff had labelled him as radicalised in their reports). Hence, it is hypothesised that participants introduced those terms to associate themselves more closely with authority figures on a linguistic level, thus, lending more assumed legitimateness to their denunciation of the enemy.

This can be further observed in accounts by P1 and P4, who seemingly attempt to persuade the interviewer to acknowledge their fight as understandable. Both present a recent local catastrophe as justification for their cause. For example, P1 justifies his disdain of a fellow patient as follows (P1., l. 162-169):

> P1: Yeah, so what I do is, I just don't let him… He's from Manchester. He's from Manchester. He's become an extremist after the Ariana Grande [thing.
>
> Int.: Gottcha.
>
> P1: and] that's when I turned a bit radical myself. I became a little hitman. Because after the Ariana Grande thing, my little nieces went there. They were in

the front row and they were ok, and all that, they were in the forum. But the explosion happened. And ehm when I see a Manchester extremist you'd become radicalised after that I think 'Is he taking the piss? Has he seen what happened to all those kids? And still he want to jump on that [cause?'

This describes a geographically close event that a considerable number of staff members were affected by either directly or indirectly. It appears that he expected the interviewer to react with sympathy, as he was siding with the victims and subscribing his cause against Muslims in their name. Similarly, P4 introduces the idea of the Manchester bombing to justify violence against Muslims. To appear even more reasonable and less extreme, the interviewee claimed that he was not motivated by racism, as he had 'lot of Muslim friends' (P4, l. 231-232).

In line with these normalisation attempts of their behaviour and in the context of the previously introduced perceived intense threat, all interviewees arrive at the idea that joining a group/movement was a practical decision to secure their survival. Most stated this explicitly, without being prompted. For example, P1 reflected after his initial statement that his friends kept him safe in prison as follows (P1, l. 59-74):

Int.: Did they shared kind of the similar believes as you did?

P1: = No, no, it was lads, all lads being in trouble with these kinds. All sorts have come together in this one jail, and even the staff… prison staff would get us all together and tell us 'This male just got out, phone call today, somebody gets attacked." So, we all stick together. And you sort of fall down into a little clique.

Int.: = Gottcha. Yeah.

P1: = And, ehm, I got out of one gang living on the streets on to jumping onto another gang in prison.

Int.: Ok, ehm, when you were with that gang in prison for example, ehm, was there... it kind of sounds a bit like you were looking out for each other.

P1: It was a survival thing.

Int.: It was a survival thing.

P1: To get into the shower, you needed 4 of you to get in the shower together. To get to one of the yards *inaudible* you needed to go out together. To... to certain things or going to your room at night you wouldn't walk the hallway at night and eh it was in prison. It was hectic.

As the excerpt shows, the participant explicitly labelled the group membership as serving his 'survival', followed by a concrete example highlighting how trivial daily tasks could only be achieved in prison through the presence of peers. Similarly, P4 emphasised during an exploration of his social ties in the community that 'loyalty' was the most important trait for his friends, as it would be beneficial during violent encounters ('Violence happened, people get hurt, it's nice to know you got someone's help, in case something does go on.', P4, l. 69-80). It becomes apparent that group membership serves a pragmatic purpose. On a more abstract level, this also includes the safety and/or prosperity of the entire community. For example, P3 described how his membership was inspired by the group's efforts to fund youth centres through criminal activity ('Fund… like funding. Because there used to be like a community centre where we used to have… like a youth… a youth centre thing… where you go there, play games or they took us on trips. Some of the gangs used to help fund that.', P3, l. 108-110). He continued (P3, l.167):

P4: I just like that we were all together, really. All look after each other. All friendly.

The last two examples also highlight the fraternity aspect appearing to be of importance in multiple of those narratives. In contrast to the narrative that was utilised to describe the enemy in the beginning, participants used warm and positive language indicating friendship. Ideological content appears to be overridden by more pragmatic concerns like belonging and safety. This becomes even more apparent in the statements by P1 and P5. Both interviewees disclosed that they were raised Christian, but converted to Islam, before converting back again to Christianity. For example, P5's outline of his past conviction demonstrated how interchangeably ideology appears to be (P5, l. 52-60):

> Int.: Nice. Ok… ehm. Was there ever the option for another religion? What do you think of other religions?
>
> P4: I did ehm… I was a Muslim once. I was an Christian, then Muslim, then I converted back to Christian. Which is a bad thing to do but…
>
> Int.: Why is this a bad thing to do?
>
> P4: Cause I turned my back on God and… threw my believes out the window… *mumbling* Muslim, cause they're terrorist and that…
>
> Int.: Ah, ok. When was that then?
>
> P4: (.) I can't remember.

While the participant remained vague through the entirety of the interview what had motivated him, he clearly and strongly rejected his past affiliation during the session and the violent acts he had committed in their name ('I hurt a lot of people', P5, l. 178). Meanwhile P1 was more forthcoming in details, describing how he converted to Islam due to an Iman he met in prison and how his father reacted (P1, l. 90-97):

> P1: = No, no one has taught me religion, no one taught me. Me mum and dad did. I, I was gonna turn Muslim when I was a kid, when I first was gone send to

jail. Because he was a nice… a Iman, he was a nice fella. I must have started the rise of the Muslim in prison. And ehm I got out on a visit with my dad and I had the beads on—those Muslim beads—and my dad said to me 'What the fuck you doing? You lost your mind! You're not religious. Don't… don't be falling on to religion, please. We're your family. We're your strong, we're your threshold. We're… we're gonna… ehm, hand…*mumbling* You're protestant.' So, I just stuck to being a protestant from that day forward.

Later, the interviewee clarified that he sought to relief his guilt of his index offence with the priest in prison. However, the Iman was reportedly more forthcoming and introduced P1 to the idea of self-defence instead of self-sacrifice ('But the Iman would open the door come in and speak to you and showed… intrigued about your life. And would tell you that as a Muslim you can defend yourself.', P1, l. 110-112). Both his excerpts reiterate the themes of safety and belonging. Furthermore, they show the implicit divide in the interviewee's perception: While P5 seemingly views the past Muslim group as deeply religious, he sees his ties to Protestantism as less religious, seemingly more culturally embedded in his upbringing. This aspect also links to the next narrative, in which participants framed their affiliation to a certain group and/or movement as nearly automatic.

8.4.2   Membership being naturally determined

Most interviewees refuted the idea of organised recruitment or structured initiation when becoming a group member (e.g., '[…] it's not an initiation or anything like that.', P4., l. 47-48). Instead, the common narrative appeared to be that the participants became affiliated with groups automatically. For example, P3 describes how a family member already had ties to a local gang, making his membership inevitable (P3, l. 122-129):

Int.: Do you still remember how you got into gangs?

P3: Yeah, from my… area that I was in and my brother… One of my brothers was a gang member from the area anyway. So, I basically fell into it. Me and my friends.

Int.: Ok. And, ehm… What did you do, when you were 11? Because that's kind of young, isn't it?

P3: Cause then… *mumbling* When I was like 11 used to go to city centre, just wait for the other gang and fight them. I was… I was with a lot of older one. Used to ehm… wait for the other gang in city centre and fight them.

The interviewee was pausing frequently during his description, either because he was reluctant to disclose information or because he had not previously reflected on his group entry. Similar issues were observed in other statements (e.g., Part.2: 'Just… it was just gangs again gangs. That was young offender times juvenile times. Was like gangs *mumbling*. From the outside it follows you inside.', P2, l. 257-258). Only P4 seemed able to offer additional insight, proposing that previous negative experiences in his childhood had facilitated his negative views on professionals subsequently shutting him off from their support in adulthood and enabling easier recruitment (P4, l. 134-136):

P4: Not went to them for nothing. Cause they *mumbling*… had I… had I been treated better as a child in secure units I probably would've had a different opinion on… screws, or prison officers as you say. Ehm… but what was I saying? *mumbling*

However, even this unprompted reflection by the participant appears unfocused and not fully formulated, indicating a lack of awareness regarding his development before becoming involved in group-based violence.

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Most interviewees portrayed the transition between everyday life and group-based violence as seamless. For example, when the interviewer posed the question of what caused P4 to grow close with members of a criminal organisation, he replied (P4, l. 87-91):

> P4: No, just that… we enjoyed each other company. Everything we did was together. The kids grew up together. The… we all went out together. All our families, all together. It was very close knit. [Ehm…
>
> Int.: Yeah, you became a proper *inaudible*
>
> P4: They're like my brothers.]

The interviewee described an intimate entanglement with other group members, blurring the lines between family and a group that readily employs violence. His account also highlights a discursive strategy employed by other participants as well: Not distinguishing between family-like ties and violent group members results in normalising membership to those groups. Statements that centre the role of the family in the entry of such groups can also be found in other interview sessions. P3 indicated that he joined the 'gang' because his brother was already part of such criminal structures, again allowing for a seamless transition by sheer proximity; or as he nonchalantly expressed, 'fell into it', as if joining a gang was not a significant life event (P3, l. 123-124). P1 also highlighted the importance of family members, namely how his father and brother asserted their beliefs on him after he had converted to Islam (P1, l. 130-131):

> P1: Yeah. Cause, I, he schooled me that we're protestant in our family, but we're not really religious so don't get stuck into a religion, you know?

He contrasted between the religion that he was part of at the time (i.e., Islam) and the religion his family was part of. The latter was linguistically framed as something they are, instead of something they believe in. This sentiment is reiterated by P1 throughout the session, equating his way of living not only to his belief system, but also to what football clubs he must support ('He support [local football club], so I've got to support [local football club].', P1, l. 101). Throughout his narrative, two aspects became apparent: (1) He viewed his family as significant influences despite their own violent past ('Yeah, very good role models. They were not like criminals.', P1, 373); (2) He deeply identified with his group, viewing it not just as a belief system but as something he is. In all those statements, it appears that the most interviewees judged their engagement as unavoidable in hindsight. None of the participants were able to identify opportunities in their history that could have prevented them from joining those groups/movements.

This perceived inevitability is so central to some reports that one interviewee even voiced pessimism for his own son, as he concluded that the pathway towards a violent group is just a normal development for a child (P4, l. 297-302):

> P4: [...] But you can't listen, when you're a kid, cause I didn't. I've got a son who is doing exactly the sort of same stuff that I was doing when I was a kid. He's gonna get locked up if he carries on. And… I tell him *mumbling* 'I've done it', I've done exactly the same thing I don't want him to do. And I speak to him and he goes 'Pff' *shrugging*. It seems to me that when you're a kid you think you're right anyways. So, whatever you feel as a kid you carrying forward.

The interviewee appeared during these moments disillusioned, as indicated by his non-verbal behaviour such as shrugging his shoulders. His conviction that children will always choose to be revolting against the authority of their parents, and that this inevitably means

violence, follows the interviewer's probing about what P1 could have done differently in the past to avoid his group membership.

For others, this idea of automatic affiliation also extended to their group exit. Instead of reporting agency in this process, several participants disclosed that they were labelled as a member of a certain group, making a safe exit impossible to them. This is, for example, described by P2 elaborating further on his initial recruitment (P2, l. 259-265):

> Int.: Do you still remember how you got into those gangs?
>
> Part.2: We were just hanging around with those people older lads that were in the gangs and then you're just becoming… I was only a gang member for a couple of years. And then I got locked up. And then, must've been 2003 or 2004 and then 2005 I got locked up. So, I was only a gang member for 2 1/2 years, 3 years. Even in jail, I was out of it. *mumbling* But people from other gangs still labelled me a gang member. And that didn't apply to me, that hit me. And I thought, you know, 'Fuck it, I was fighting them as well'.

Again, issues around safety were raised in this excerpt, highlighting how P2 perceived this situation as unsolvable, with only violence being left as a viable option. Another interviewee summarised similar events in prison as being stuck in his group even when he did not want to be affiliated with them anymore, describing a lack of alternatives or agency ('P3: So, it's like: I'm involved in shit anyway. Even when I'm trying not to be involved in it, you're getting caught in *inaudible*…', P3, l. 318-319).

One interviewee also reported having been attacked when asked whether cutting ties with other group members in prison had been dangerous (,= Dangerous, I got stabbed in the neck. Twice, once in me neck, stabbed in the arm. That was while I'm in prison as well.',

P2, l. 353-355). How interviewees potentially utilised counter-narratives to combat the perceived or real victimisation is explored in the next section.

8.4.3   Membership to support their own importance

It appears that their membership and status within a group/movement served to combat the perceived or feared powerlessness. For that purpose, interviewees utilised a host of different discursive strategies. For example, some participants appeared to downplay the effects that the experienced violence had on them. This can be observed in P2's description of his exit (P2, l. 343-344):

> P2: = No, no, they wouldn't have been angry at me. Some of them might fell out with me, but ehm… yeah. He got shot. People were trying to shoot us. Things like that.

The interviewee appeared conflicted about the violence he encountered when he attempted to leave. He concludes by trivialising the severe aggressions against him ('Things like that', l. 344). Similar phrasing was used by P3. describing how he was stabbed when attempting to leave ('Yeah, that was about it, really.', l. 193) and P2 when listing attacks, he had survived in prison ('It was hectic.', l. 73-74). The excerpts also included references to other members and appeared at times rehearsed, as the affect of those descriptions was consistently flat. Likely these narratives are common within their groups, negating the display of weakness. In all those instances, the interview shifted to other topics after these statements. It can be hypothesised that interviewees were uncomfortable discussing their past victimisations further.

Other strategies the interviewees employed to make themselves appear more powerful were direct and indirect references to their status within the group or movement. P1 gave himself a title when discussing past violent altercations (l. 54-57):

> P1: Yeah, loads of time, yeah. I'm been involved in three myself, three altercations myself. One was documented by the staff, someone and that. And ehm I then find myself being the enemy of the state, sort of thing, for the extremists. Put money on me to get me and stuff like that. And I had to live with that, you know?

His own importance was directly suggested using the term 'enemy of the state', a unique and outstanding role in his white supremacist movement. The interviewee repeated that narrative throughout the entire session, referencing himself as 'enemy of Muslim' (l. 238 & 260), 'little hitman' (l. 154), 'peacemaker between the Muslims and the Non-Muslims' (l. 402-403), or that his exceptional status had been even recognised by the 'king of all Muslims' in prison (l. 233). Other participants used similar methods to self-prescribed importance. For example, P4 made several references to his muscular physique, highlighting not only that he could defend himself, but that his appearance was the reason he was so frequently challenged in prison ('P4: But] I mean I'm a big lad, so, I had a few scrapes with different people over the years.' P4, l. 118). Again, violent attacks leaving him scarred were described as 'scrapes', reiterating the downplaying strategy found in other statements.

Interviewees also employed more subtle strategies to convey their power to the interviewer. P2 portrayed himself as reckless and fearless (l. 253-265):

P2: […] But people from other gangs still labelled me a gang member. And that didn't apply to me, that hit me. And I thought, you know, 'Fuck it, I was fighting them as well'.

Prior to this claim, that he had wanted to fight the entire prison population (i.e., an overwhelming and unrealistic amount of enemies), he had appeared reserved. While the interviewer had tried to shift to other topics, such as recruitment, the participant circled back and emphasised his willingness to put himself in danger. P2 used direct quotes and curse words, both in stark contrast to the session up to that point.

The notion of overcoming great enemies was also shared by P1 (l. 308-316):

P1: […] But I ehm… I read these books about these Vikings. And it was… it was all bout their Gods wanted them to entertain them *inaudible* they didn't want nothing else, no pray, they didn't want to pray or give money to that place. It was just the entertainment side of them. So I took that and thought 'I'll be entertaining'. I'll attack this guy. He's this, he's *inaudible* these people. The last big fight I had, was… was a lad with 22 stone. And- 66 fight in a *mumbling* champ boxing. And little 10-stoner ol' me and I had to fight this guy, in the middle of the landing. And… you know what I mean? I don't… And I thought to myself 'I think I was entertaining there, to the Gods'.

The interviewee portrayed himself as an underdog using linguistic markers like 'ol' me', likely as a form of impression management to make the defeat of the larger enemy even more impressive. However, the fact that he viewed himself as important and outstanding can also be noted in the way he described his religious views. P1 noted in addition to his previously described Christian faith he was inspired by Nordic beliefs. This mixing

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of belief systems is a common narrative in right-wing circles (Ebner, 2021). He appeared to specifically have enjoyed the idea that Gods were focusing on him. Furthermore, he used descriptors commonly associated with being an actor ('entertaining'). Overall, the impression arose, that P1 viewed himself as extraordinary, settling himself into a wider cause. This was also observed, when discussing Muslim prisoners, whom he had viewed as radicalised (l. 352-359):

> P1: Cus, I… I know if I let that slide, getting inside me, I think 'I stood by and watched that'. And that's all good that is not entertainment, that's not good karma. It's really not. I've seen lads… I've seen people getting battered, getting chocked being put asleep [mimicking a choke hold], and the lads going like that [spreading out]. Or somebody will go 'Da, smoke that'. A lad will smoke the spice and goes like that *mimicking falling unconscious* and pulling on him taking the piss.
>
> Int.: = Yeah.
>
> P1: = And I just thought 'I can't let that happen', so I intervene.

While P1 reiterated themes of entertainment and the focus of Gods on him, he also introduced the idea of him as a saviour. By doing so, he reframed the violent attacks against Muslims in prison settings as an honourable cause where he had stood up for weaker peers. In these moments during the interview, he became more emotive, using non-verbal indicators more frequently (e.g., mimicking actions), and seemingly taking control of the interview. In this context, it seemed important to him to emphasise his offences in a more positive light that the interviewer was expected to better relate to.

Similar efforts were made by P4, who tried to prescribe a higher meaning to his acts of aggression, even when it was lacking the sophistication and elaboration of P1 (l. 99-101):

> P4: […] Went to another jail, this was… it was the psyche wards, getting kicked out of jail, fighting the system, fighting the screws, fighting inmates… […].

Besides presenting themselves as dangerous, P4 reiterated several times his 'fight against the system'. Again, it appeared as a method to contrast himself against the common prisoner, associating himself more with an overarching cause than with the daily struggle. While those narratives highlighted the outstanding status of the interviewees and their perceived significance, everyone was extremely conscientious to not implicate themselves with compromising details, as described in the last section.

8.4.4   Members as innocent

The language that interviewees were using to describe their own group was in stark contrast to the previously outlined description of the enemies. While the enemy was demonised and blamed, participants were conscious to further this divide by presenting their own membership as normal and innocent. As the interviewer explored their engagement with the groups and/or movements, interviewees introduced topics such as friendship, neighbourhood, family, or community. They humanised the in-group and presented them in relatable terms. For example, P2 interrupted the interview and shifted the focus away from the violent retaliation of his own group against alleged racist prison officers (l. 241-245):

> P2: while] in jails, where I've been, there's a big Muslim population. White, Black, Asian, everyone just… a big Muslim population. They're all friends. And they think people that are not religious or not a Muslim… we're all friends as

well. You only get the certain individuals that come to the prison and they're racist and they don't like the way we living and then they get into fights and then…

The interviewee used sweeping statements to tackle the notion of conflict, framing prison life as harmonious and violent incidents as rare and isolated incidents. P1 was more extreme in his employment of the same discourse strategy, suggesting that 'even staff' had come together to form a 'little clique' (l. 60-63). Utilising terms like clique to describe prison gangs is a form of downplaying. In conjunction with self-deprecating strategies ('little hitman', l. 154) he was likely refusing to acknowledge his participation in group-based violence. Similar rejection was witnessed in P4's account of prison peers (l. 248-251):

P4: […] Not I ever was part of a gang, but in prison… half the lads were good lads, they would probably get on together. They've got *mumbling* no one talks to… So, I've… I suppose you could say it was a gang, but it's not really a gang. Cause that… no… you know what I mean?

He first appeared to refuse the idea of being a member of such groups, only to then agree with the interviewer tentatively. However, the excerpt seems to lack structure, with the interviewee seemingly losing his line of thought. In the description, P4 appears to remove himself from the narrative, instead, he focused on other 'lads' and how they had appeared to be socially isolated.

While P4 implied psychological distance from his peers linguistically, other interviewees explicitly presented themselves as innocent. This discourse strategy was most notably observed in P5's session. The participant has not been featured heavily in the previous

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section of this study, as he appeared reclusive and non-collaborative during the interview. Only in moments where he could demonstrate prosocial attitudes did he engage with the interviewer (P5, l. 178-183):

> P5: I hurt a lot of people.
>
> Int.: Was that verbally aggressive or physical?
>
> P5: = Both.
>
> Int.: Both. And ehm… how do you… what do you think about it now that you're looking back to those things?
>
> P5: That's all in the past, you know. *mumbling* Living my best… *mumbling*

He was shutting down any further exploration, through a combination of superficial statements and mumbling. It is unclear, whether the latter was due to the interviewee being reserved, experiencing problems with speech, or being passively hostile. At other times, he appeared to confirm his changed outlook in the context of religion, implying that through Christianity he had become better as 'you had to do good acts' (l. 83-89). Other interviewees linked their change in attitude to the treatment they had received in the setting that the interview was conducted in. However, those accounts lacked detail.

For instance, P4 redirects the interview away from the interviewer's prompt to explore coping in prison, instead emphasising the progress he supposedly made. Throughout his account (l. 280-283), he used direct language ('[…] and I thought 'Maybe a lot of what I've done was wrong and maybe I should do it in a different way.'') seemingly to provide insight into his improvement, while also downplaying the actual extent of his treatment needs ('a bit of therapy'). Instead of providing concrete examples, he appealed to the interviewer's sympathy by calling him 'mate'.

Meanwhile, P2 followed a similar strategy. When asked at the end of the interview, whether he wanted to clarify any points, he disclosed that prison staff members had claimed in his reports that he had been radicalised. To refute this notion, the interviewee stated that in fact, he was 'the most unradicalised person' (l. 405). However, prior to this, he implied that he was not part of the group anymore, merely because the 'all the gang things has played out now' (l. 267-277). This placed his disengagement with the group and membership in the context of practicality and availability, reiterating themes around what resources and support a group can offer to its members like the notion of survival in the beginning.

8.4.5   Discussion

The study aimed to explore the lived experiences of a forensic population that had been radicalised and had participated in extremist violence. In contrast with the first prediction (i.e., participants would only disclose factors connected to general violence instead of extremism), the interviews yielded influences both relevant to general violence and extremist violence. For example, the narrative relating to participants' perceived grandiosity replicates survey findings from the UK, US, and Poland that highlighted narcissistic tendencies as a driving influence in right-wing radicalisation (Cichocka et al., 2017). Similarly, Kruglanski et al. (2014) concluded that the individual's quest to obtain and/or increase their personal significance was central to the pathway towards terrorism. The current accounts imply that participation in extremist violence directly fulfilled this need, as the findings linked sequences discussing violence with narrations relating to the participants' status within the group.

Interviewees expressed their status often concerning their group's perception of themselves. Cichocka et al. (2017) view this perpetuation by group members to shift

blame towards the enemy. The current study replicated these findings, demonstrating how participants viewed their group-based violence as a necessity caused by the enemy. Like Moghaddam's (2005) hypothesis, this often appeared to be attempts at rationalising, framed as self-defence (Bartlett et al., 2010) or even redemption (Askew & Helbardt, 2012). The need for own importance appeared amplified through the experience of discrimination (Jasko et al., 2017; Webber et al., 2017; Webber et al., 2018), another narrative observed in the current study. Throughout the interviews, participants expressed this as the pragmatic motivation for survival.

It appears that the obtainment of such concrete goals was more important than following a more abstract ideology. Study two becomes part of a growing number of research questioning the role of ideology in the radicalisation process (e.g., Borum, 2012). Interviewees presented neither with a clear understanding nor with considerable conviction of ideology. Instead, ideological mentions appeared to justify violence in hindsight, like findings by Gøtzsche-Astrup's (2018) systematic literature review, which suggested ideology as a post-hoc explanation. Duhmad et al. (2020) demonstrated that these justifications are a distinguishing facet of extremists when compared to offenders of general violence and the public. Alternatively, ideological narratives in the interviews did not serve as justification but represented a mirroring of professional language. Other instances included the unprompted use of terms like 'radicalisation' in a likely attempt of impression management. Thus, ideological mentions used in such a manner would not represent genuine beliefs. The role of ideology and its potential to differentiate varying forensic populations must be explored in the next study. Furthermore, the unprompted employment of professional language must be viewed critically. As described previously (see Chapter Three), terms like 'radicalised' or 'extremists' are part of an emotive debate. When these labels are increasingly used by individuals to differentiate themselves from

others, it could result in stereotyping and stigmatisation, as shown in the past with terms such as 'prisoners' or 'criminals' (e.g., Tran et al., 2018). In the future, this might potentially lead professionals to hesitate reporting concerns related to radicalised individuals.

Another aspect of radicalisation that remains unclear is the influence of mental health issues. In line with the second prediction, the interviews yielded no clear insight. However, this was not due to conflicting presentations across interviews, as the literature would suggest (e.g., Gill & Corner, 2017; Al-Attar, 2020; Gill et al., 2021). Instead, none of the interviewees appeared to possess sufficient insight to reflect on the impacts of their symptomatology on their group membership. This likely also impacted the limited discussion of protective factors. In instances where mental health issues were mentioned, the impact was trivialised. It is speculated that these discussions were not important to the participants. That would imply an emphasis on psychoeducation with radicalised individuals for care pathway planning. Alternatively, following the previously discussed narcissistic tendencies, it is hypothesised that the trivialisation was serving to save face in the presence of the interviewer.

Similarly, other strategies aimed to present the own group as favourable while discounting the perceived enemy. This confirms the prediction that socialisation factors would be emphasised by the participants, as the interviewees demonstrated, for example, group identity as important to the radicalisation process. The interviews showcased how radicalised individuals view organised crime and their group membership as a family identity. This is a novel finding not reflected in the current literature, elevating group identity in extremist organisations beyond the fulfilment of the need for belonging or fraternity (e.g., Lloyd & Dean, 2015). The family notion implies that participants view

themselves as being born into those structures, which are seemingly naturally incorporated into their identities. Thus, prevention and rehabilitation will have to expect resistance to changes, as individuals will likely view any intervention as a change to integral parts of their identity. Furthermore, it appears reasonable that framing extremist affiliation as family identity facilitated the observable disparity in the discourse strategies between in- vs. out-group, echoing high prevalence of this thinking style in radicalised populations (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Jost et al. (2009) summarised this as the *Motivated Social Cognition Model of Ideology*. It postulates that instant automatic intergroup categorisation is facilitated by ideology. This leads to favouring members of the in-group while discriminating against others (Jost et al., 2009). In the interviews, this is observed as participants utilising demonising language when discussing the enemy. Findings by Abdalla et al. (2021) suggest the use of dehumanising language common in terrorists' communication. They concluded that discrimination is a driving force along the pathway to extremist violence. Obaidi et al. (2018) previously explored the mechanism experimentally and showed that viewing opposing groups and movements in an extremely negative manner allowed Danish participants to label Muslim minorities as less human, instead increasing attitudes endorsing violence against those groups. Obaidi et al. (2018) hypothesised that this lowers inhibition for violent offences. It can be speculated that the occurrence of dehumanising language, for example, during risk assessments, would indicate the individual's progression on the radicalisation pathway.

Jost et al.'s (2009) Motivated Social Cognition Model of Ideology is part of wider *Social Cognition Models* which explain the interaction between the individual's experiences, their thought processes, and the resulting behaviour. However, Jost et al.'s (2009)

extremism-related model does not reflect central aspects of general violence explanations, such as *aggressive scripts* (i.e., habitual aggressive behaviour learned through practicing own behaviour and observing other's behaviour), for example, included in the *Information Processing Model for the Development of Aggression* (Huesmann, 1988). In the interviews, the network of learned cognitions, which readies aggressive responses (Huesmann, 1988), can be observed as normative beliefs, meaning beliefs that indicate the appropriateness of aggressive responses (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). For example, P4 expresses a deterministic perspective when mentioning the aggressive behaviour of his son, framing aggressive responses as automatic and inevitable. Or in other words, he is expressing his normative beliefs, thus, emphasising the importance that conceptual models seeking to explain extremist violence account for include aggressive scripts.

All findings from this study can be visualised in a graph (Figure 8.3). The two diametral spectrums represent the discourse strategies and the four areas between the axes represent the narratives. The x-axis contains the locus of the interviewees' agency with the endpoints *active* and *passive*. The y-axis presents the intention with which language is used, namely *humanising* and *demonising*. In this space, the 'membership as survival'-narrative is a combination of demonising the enemy and portraying themselves as active in securing the survival of themselves/their group. Directly opposed to this is the 'members as innocent'-narrative, in which the interviewees viewed themselves in a passive, innocent role within the conflict to not implicate themselves. They utilised language that was aimed at providing a positive and differentiated perspective on themselves and other members. Likewise, the narratives of natural determinism and own importance can be positioned at opposite ends of the graph. The former presents members of the own group as merely reactive to the violence inflicted on them by the enemy and their resulting membership as reasonable causes. Themes around causes were also part of

the latter narrative, however, portraying interviewees as active in their fate and combatting the powerlessness implied in the aforementioned narrative.

Figure 8.3

Graph Mapping Discourse Strategies Against Narratives

The graph visualises the DA's underlying assumptions, namely how reality, such as group membership, is shaped by the utilised language (so-called *Constructivism*; e.g., Gee & Handford, 2013). The application of the DA to in-person interviews with radicalised individuals and the resulting graph present a novel approach in counterterrorism, as linguistic analyses are currently restricted to online communication (e.g., Abdalla et al., 2021). Categorising narratives and discourse strategies in this manner is expected to contextualise statements by forensic mental health patients. In other words, it supports the deduction of the aggression's function by settling it within wider radicalisation dynamics.

8.4.6   Limitations

The generalisability of the findings is restricted. As only a small sample ($N = 5$) participated, it is unlikely that the narratives and discourse strategies can be observed in all interviews with radicalised forensic patients. The majority of eligible participants refused to be part of this research for several reasons (e.g., boredom, suspicion, or declining mental health). Thus, the gathered insight instead is limited to individuals that were motivated to attend an interview. However, the motivation for participation was not recorded; any sampling bias (i.e., the higher or lower likelihood for certain populations to be recruited; e.g., Barton, 1990) can only be speculated about. Further limitations relate to the research methodology itself. While the DA is suitable for conversations, the reports presented here were not generated independently by the participants. Instead, the interviewees were prompted to discuss certain content. However, participants were aware that they were talking to an individual in a power position, further impacting what they would and would not disclose (e.g., Hawthorne, 2006). Impression management, or in some cases the (un)intentional deception of self and others, is common in forensic mental health populations (e.g., Gudjonsson, 1990). For example, individuals can be motivated to present themselves as well-adjusted to progress quicker through forensic services (Lanyon, 2001). Given the emotive nature of terms such as 'radicalisation' or 'extremism' (as discussed in Chapter 3), it can be hypothesised that impression management was even more important for the participants, as it would have been for non-radicalised forensic patients. Lastly, the study retrospectively reviewed the interviewees' involvement in extremist groups and/or movements. Hence, it can only be assumed that ideological narratives were present at the time and or not just presented as post-hoc justifications.

8.4.7 Concluding comments

The current study broadened the radicalisation category to recruit individuals who had participated in group-based violence (Cook et al., 2013). The findings suggest that several influences on radicalisation discussed in the literature also apply to a forensic population with complex mental health issues. However, it is currently not addressed whether the observed dynamics are unique to individuals who participated in group-based violence or whether they are representative of the entire forensic population. The notion that a considerable number of radicalisation influences overlap with factors relevant to general violence (e.g., Duhmad et al., 2020) could be usefully explored in a comparison between those two populations. This will be the focus of the final study.

CHAPTER NINE
STUDY THREE: COMPARISON BETWEEN RADICALISED AND NON-RADICALISED FORENSIC PATIENTS

9.1   Structure of the chapter

Throughout the previous studies, radicalisation in forensic populations has been explored exclusively with individuals who participated in group-based violence (e.g., including extremist violence, hate crimes, organised crime, and lone actors; Cook et al., 2013). They have yet to be compared to forensic patients that committed individually violent offences to establish influences distinct to extremist violence. Hence, data collection and employed methodology will be outlined. The chapter will close with the result and conclusion section, discussing theoretical implications and avenues for future research.

9.2   Rationale for current study approach

In line with expert feedback from study one (Delphi), extremist violence is now captured under group-based violence (Cook et al., 2013). While study two yielded comparable narratives from forensic patients that had been part of extremist groups and/or extreme movements, research has not explored their distinctness from other forensic populations. However, empirical findings on radicalisation in community samples suggest a considerable overlap of influences, both accounting for radicalisation and general violence (e.g., Gill, 2015; Gill et al., 2021). It appears that only justifications differentiate between extremist offenders and other violent offender groups (Duhmad et al., 2020).

Individuals captured under the group-based violence term appear to present with qualitative differences from individual actors without radicalisation indicators (Cook et al., 2013). For example, Hart et al. (2017) compared five case files using violence

assessments, such as the group-based the Multi-Level Guidance[15] (MLG; Cook et al., 2013) and the Historical Clinical and Risk Management-20 (HCR-20; Douglas et al., 2013). A positive correlation was found between both tools but limited to factors relating to individual (historical-static) factors, such as mental health, while MLG factors representing group processes were not significantly linked to HCR-20 ratings (Hart et al., 2017). It was thus concluded that group-based violence offers additional insight when assessing extremist violence as opposed to general aggression risk assessment guides (Hart et al., 2017).

This arguably highlights the need for formulating group-based violence, including radicalisation, differently to capture the risk for extremist violence fully. In forensic populations, formulations not only aid the assessment of risk but also the care pathway planning for offenders (e.g., Borum, 2011). However, no guidance is yet available because the MLG has not been explored with forensic populations and findings on the influence of mental health issues are inconclusive (e.g., Al-Attar, 2020; Gill et al., 2021; Trimbur et al., 2021). Hence, the current study compares a group-based violence sample with a non-group-based violence sample in a forensic population detained in a forensic mental health hospital to explore overlaps and differences. It is predicted that most factors relevant to radicalisation are not unique to this form of violence and that only justifications (Dhumad et al., 2020) and social themes (Hart et al, 2017) aid the distinction of the samples. Furthermore, the exploration of mental health issues will likely yield inconclusive findings (e.g., Al-Attar, 2020). The study's aim is to find new clusters for group-based violence that will aid clinical and risk formulation in the future.

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[15] The Multi-Level Guidance (Cook et al., 2013; Cook 2014) is a risk assessment instrument exploring group-based violence across four areas: (1) individual factors such as individual's cognitions or mental health problems; (2) individual-group factors, such as in- vs. out-group thinking); (3) group factors including organisational structure and leadership; and (4) group-societal factors, for example, how the group is positioning itself against mainstream culture.

9.3 Procedure

9.3.1 Data

The data comprised all crisis profiles collected in a secure forensic hospital ($N = 74$ out of approximately 190 patients). Crisis profiles are clinical documents developed for the management of patients posing a high risk of being involved in security incidents (e.g., hostage taking, barricading, rooftop protest) that may require structured negotiation efforts. The security documents, which are completed pre-emptively by a care team during the pre-admission process, aid the resolution of such incidents. Only those deemed to be at a raised risk for such incidents receive such profiles (e.g., due to their offending history including previous examples of incidents). The document itself is classed as a security measurement, with patients not receiving access to their crisis profiles.

9.3.2 Ethical approval

Hospital approval and university ethics were obtained to gain access and a clinical team member anonymised all available documents, assigning them a study ID.

9.3.3 Data capture sheet

All profile information was collated in a data capture sheet (see Appendix F) and the development is summarised in Figure 9.1. This included incident details (e.g., incident type, threats), mental health issues (e.g., diagnosis, triggers, relapse indicators), relationships (e.g., peer conflicts, staff contacts), and background information. The latter was rich in detail. Hence, the development[16] for the following items (Figure 9.1) was

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[16] The inclusion of items of the aforementioned risk assessment instruments was guided by the availability of information in the profiles. An initial familiarisation with the data yielded an understanding of what items would

informed by the VERA-2R (Pressman & Flockton, 2012), TRAP-18 (Meloy & Gill, 2016;), ERG-22+ (Lloyd & Dean, 2015), and MLG (Cook et al., 2018), as well as the findings of the previous two studies. This included pre-offence behaviour including level of planning, state of mind, and *leaking* (i.e., disclosing plans to disapproving third parties; Dudenhöfer et al., 2021)[17]. Furthermore, political and/or religious views were captured, as well as specifications for patients' risk, including the type of violent behaviour, victim type, and potential self-harming behaviour. The previous studies of this thesis also noted a lack of identified triggers and motivators. For example, study one only found suggestibility as an antecedent to violence. Hence, this, alongside factors like violent attitudes, need for dominance, need for excitement, personal grievance, need for belonging, and need for defending were also captured.

9.3.4   Sample partitioning

The study compared those with radicalisation indicators, extreme views and/or organised crime involvement with a comparison group of individually violent offenders. Thus, the profiles were divided into five groups: The 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation' sample included *terrorist cell*, *lone actor*, *hate crime*, and *organised crime*. The 'individual actor without radicalisation indicators' sample committed their offences individually and presented with none of the indicators. The groups are summarised in Table 9.1.

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likely be observable. This approach allowed a complete data capture sheet that would not omit any profile information.

[17] The latter represents a novel exploration, as leaking has not yet been explored in radicalised forensic mental health populations.

Figure 9.1

Overview of Crisis Profile Items

Item	Description
Incident type	(Potential) escapee, terrorist activity/affiliation, barricades, (potential) hostage taker, involved in disturbance, roof top incidents, assaults on staff, assaults on others, risk to staff
Mental health diagnosis[ACD]	Mood disorder (e.g., depression), anxiety disorders, personality disorder, psychotic disorder, trauma-related disorder, substance abuse disorder, neurodivergent disorder
Level of planning[D]	Incident premeditated or unplanned/impulsive
Threats[D]	Utterance of verbal threats or physically threatening behaviour prior to incidents
Leaking[D]	Presence of disclosed plans to disapproving third parties indicative of future violent behaviour
Risk rating for future violence	Prediction of future violent behaviour, including sexual violence, physical violence against people and/or objects, verbal violence, or undermining services
Risk rating for future victim(s)	Prediction of future victims, including male and female adults, male and female children, members of BAME or LGBTQ+ communities, victims of White ethnicity, or unspecified victim types
Self-harm	Presence of self-harming behaviour with or without suicidal intentions
Relapse indicators[B]	Emergence of positive symptoms (e.g., hallucinations); increased irritability, anger, impulsivity; increased thought or speech disorganisation; deterioration of personal or social functioning; sudden decline in self-care; sudden cognitive preoccupation; changes in sleeping pattern; withdrawal; self-harming
Triggers of violent behaviour	Threat to status, threat to safety, related to trauma, overstimulation, embarrassment, needs not met
Offences[ABC]	Homicide/manslaughter, battery/assault, child abuse, rape/sexual violence, domestic abuse, kidnapping/hostage taking, terrorism, arson, crimes against property, statutory crimes
Co-offenders[B]	Presence of other individuals who committed offence together with patient
Substance use	Substance use linked to the reported incident

Item	Description
Relationships (with family, peers, intimate partners)[ABCD]	No contact/deceased, isolated, contact not further specified, prosocial support, deviant support, extremist endorsement, conflict
Protective factors[A]	Secure attachment in childhood, empathy, adaptive coping, self-control, leisure activities, motivation for treatment, positive attitudes towards authority, life goals, compliance with medication
Religion[ADC]	Mentions of different religions, including extremist tendencies
Politics[ADC]	Mentions of different political ideologies, including extremist tendencies
Stress responses	Withdrawal, paranoia, verbal confrontation, physical confrontation, self-harm, understanding/acceptance, somatic responses, adaptive coping
Attitudes about violence[BC]	Presence of attitudes endorsing the use of violence
Personal grievance[ABCD]	Experience of personal grievance that is reportedly linked to patient's aggression
Need for excitement[AC]	Boredom, lack of excitement, or impulsivity reportedly linked to patient's aggression
Need for dominance[AC]	Dominating behaviour or need for status reportedly linked to patient's aggression
Individual's group affiliation[BC]	Patient reportedly part of group (e.g., gang)
Traumatic events	Presence of traumatic events reported in patient's past
Suggestibility[AC]	Patient reportedly vulnerable to exploitation by others
Capability[ACD]	Patient reportedly prepared for his violent behaviour (e.g., due to weapon crafting skills, martial arts training)
Pronounced need to defend against threat[AC]	Patient's aggression reportedly motivated by increased threat perception
Pronounced need for belonging, identity[AC]	Patient's aggression reportedly motivated by increased sense of fraternity or need for affiliation

Notes. Basis for item development is indicated from 'A' to 'D: *A* = VERA-2R (Pressman et al., 2012); *B* = MLG (Cook et al., 2013); *C* = ERG-22+ (Loyd & Dean, 2016); *D* = TRAP-18 (Meloy & Gill, 2016). Items with no indication were informed by the crisis profile sections themselves. 'BAME' describes Black, Asian, and ethnic minorities. 'LGBTQ+' describes sexualities and gender identities, including Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Queer, amongst other identities.

The indicators included past terrorist offences or affiliation with a terrorist organisation, staff viewing past incidents as motivated by extremism, or staff reporting patients endorsing extreme religious and/or political views. Indicators for terrorist cell were radicalisation indicators and past co-offenders or group affiliation, while lone actors lacked the latter. Patients classed as part of organised crime must have had co-offenders or group affiliation but could not display any radicalisation indicators. Hate crime was indicated by radicalisation indicators and a victim preference against minorities.

Table 9.1

Frequencies of Various Groups and their Indicators

Group	Variable Indicators	Frequency (*N* = 74/%)
Terrorist Cell	- 'Group Affiliation' and/or 'Co-Offenders' - Radicalisation indicators[a]	4 / 5.4%
Lone Actor	- No 'Group Affiliation' and/or no 'Co-Offenders' - Radicalisation indicators[a]	15 / 20.3%
Hate Crime	- Victim type 'BAME', 'Adult Female' and/or 'LGBTQIA+', unless in-group violence or predominantly sexualised violence	10 / 13.5%
Organised Crime	- 'Group Affiliation' and/or 'Co-Offenders' - No radicalisation indicators[a]	12 / 16.2%
Comparison group	- All remaining patients	42 / 56.6%

Note. a = Any type of terrorist offence or affiliation in the past, staff reporting concerns, and/or recorded extreme religious or political views. The groups are not cumulative, as 'Hate Crime' has conceptual overlap with 'Terrorist Cell' and 'Lone Actor'.

All other patients were summarised in the comparison group, comprised of individual actors with no radicalisation indication, such as patients who committed sex offences or homicides unrelated to groups. Hate crime had considerable conceptual overlap with terrorist cell and lone actor (e.g., Sullaway, 2016). Hence, the group was excluded in the initial research steps, where the independence of groups was a prerequisite.

9.3.5   Statistical analysis

Most variables were categorical. Thus, group comparisons were achieved via Pearson's correlation or the Chi-square tests for the independence of the proposed groups. Thus, no estimation of outliers or distribution could be performed. Furthermore, the calculation of missing values was not deemed appropriate, as not every variable was represented in each clinical case.

Smallest Space Analysis[18] (SSA; Lingoes, 1973) was performed to further explore radicalisation dynamics. The explorative method visualises correlations in a scatterplot, with the distance between depicted variables representing the strength of their correlational link. Clusters of correlations can be identified through partitioning. These clusters are expected to inform the formulation of group-based violence.

9.4   Results

9.4.1   Descriptive statistics

Out of approximately 190 patients considered, 74 were deemed at a higher risk for being part of a critical incident, thus, their crisis profiles were part of this study. Table 9.1 summarises the frequency of each group and Table 9.2 summarises the frequency

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[18] SSA is often utilised in similar studies (e.g., Spruin & Siesmaa, 2017) and can be applied to small data sets.

of reported features across all profiles (i.e., for how many patients certain features were reported). The most common critical incidents included risk to staff and others ($N = 58$; 78.4%), while the most common offence was assault ($N = 36$; 48.7%). The least reported offence was terrorism ($N = 1$; 1.4%). Patients appeared commonly motivated by violent attitudes ($N = 56$; 75.7%), as well as personal grievance ($N = 45$; 60.8%). The most reported protective factor was leisure activity ($N = 71$; 95.9%). Psychotic disorders ($N = 63$; 85.1%) were most often diagnosed, including prominent triggers like threat to safety ($N = 29$; 39.1%), needs not met ($N = 24$; 32.4%) and relapse indicators, such as anger ($N = 56$; 75.7%) and withdrawal ($N = 41$; 55.4%).

Table 9.2

Frequencies of Main Features across All Profiles

Reported feature	Frequency of $N =74$ n (%)	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Involved in critical incidents	64 (86.5%)	4	11	8.41
Past offences	62 (83.8%)	2	131	29.5
Motivational influences	74 (100%)	1	9	4.54
Protective factors	71 (96%)	1	4	1.55
Relationship with family*	72 (97.3%)			
Relationship with peers*	50 (67.6%)			
Relationship with intimate partners*	45 (60.8%)			
Diagnoses	70 (94.3%)	1	6	2.01
Triggers	46 (62.2%)	1	6	2.28
Relapse indicators	74 (100%)	1	7	3.49

Note. 'Frequency' refers to the percentage of patients for which features were reported in the profiles. Variables marked with * are categorical, hence, no descriptive indexes could be calculated.

9.4.2 Group Comparison

To compare between the five groups, Pearson's correlation was calculated for each association. These are as presented in Table 9.3. Within the 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation' sample only hate crime correlated positively with terrorist cell, $r(74) = .430$, $p < .001$, and lone actor, $r(74) = .391$, $p < .001$, depicting the conceptual overlap of those groups.

Table 9.3

Pearson's Correlations Between Groups

Variable		1	2	3	4	5
1. Comparison Group	Pearson's r	—				
	p-value	—				
2. Terrorist Cell	Pearson's r	-0.27*	—			
	p-value	0.018	—			
3. Lone Actor	Pearson's r	-0.58***	-0.12	—		
	p-value	< .001	0.306	—		
4. Organised Crime	Pearson's r	-0.50***	-0.11	-0.22	—	
	p-value	< .001	0.373	0.058	—	
5. Hate Crime	Pearson's r	-0.45***	0.43***	0.39***	-0.17	—
	p-value	< .001	< .001	< .001	0.138	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Two forms of group comparison were next conducted, fist, all patients who committed group-based violence were compared to the comparison group (see Table G1, Appendix G), and second, all sub-groups within the group-based violence sample were compared to each other (Table 9.4).

The first comparison yielded areas of significance when exploring relationships with intimate partners. Members of the 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation' sample were more likely to have prosocial relationships with their partners, $X^2(1, N = 74) = 6.008$, $p = .014$ than the 'individual actor – no radicalisation indicator' sample. When comparing the groups on variables reflecting motivators for violence, the need for belonging was more likely to occur in the group-based violence sample, $X^2(1, N = 63) = 8.110$, $p = .004$. The link between capability and group membership was also significant, $X^2(1, N = 67) = 4.509$, $p = .034$, but the review of the expected values did not elicit a clear direction of the relationship. Subsequent calculations of Pearson's correlations revealed a significant negative link between capability and comparison group, $r(67) = -.259$, $p = .034$, while all other correlations remained non-significant.

The second type of comparison focused on the sub-categories within the group-based violence sample. Table 9.4 depicts the Chi-square test of independence for these comparisons, together with the frequency across all four samples. Again, most comparisons did not yield significant results. For example, the four groups exhibited similar high rates regarding personality disorders ($M = 11.92\%$) and psychotic disorders ($M = 16.13\%$), while having comparably low percentages of formally diagnosed trauma-related, substance-related, or neurodivergent psychopathology (($M = 0.81\%$ - 1.62%). Common mental health indicators were anger ($M = 23.39\%$) and cognitive preoccupation ($M = 13.71\%$), with the same trigger across all groups, namely threat to safety ($M = 17.5\%$). Similarly, the most common motivators were evenly observable across all groups namely attitudes endorsing violence ($M = 25\%$) and grievance ($M = 23.24\%$). Need for excitement was equally low across all groups ($M = 5.21\%$).

Table 9.4

Differences Among All Group-Based Violence Groups

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Terrorist Cell in %	Lone Actor in %	Hate Crime in %	Organised Crime in %
Diagnoses	31		2					
Mood Disorder		2.28		.320	0.00	6.45	0.00	0.00
Anxiety Disorder		1.64		.441	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.23
Personality Disorder		2.87		.238	6.45	12.90	12.90	12.90
Psychotic Disorder		4.83		.089	12.90	32.26	16.13	3.23
Trauma-related Disorder		1.10		.576	0.00	3.23	0.00	0.00
Substance-related Disorder		2.67		.263	0.00	3.23	0.00	3.23
Neurodiverse Disorder		1.49		.475	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.23
Relapse Indicators	31		2					
Occurrence of positive symptoms		1.78		.411	6.45	12.90	16.13	9.68
Increased anger/impulsivity		1.53		.465	12.90	35.48	29.03	16.13
Speech/cognitive impairment								
Less social functioning		2.80		.247	3.23	3.23	9.68	6.45
Decreased self-care		0.61		.737	6.45	22.58	9.68	12.90
Cognitive preoccupation		3.97		.137	3.23	29.03	16.13	6.45

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Terrorist Cell in %	Lone Actor in %	Hate Crime in %	Organised Crime in %
Changed sleep patterns		0.68		.714	3.23	6.45	6.45	3.23
Social withdrawal		6.24		.044*	6.45	9.68	9.68	12.90
Evidence of self-harm		0.44		.802	6.45	12.90	9.68	9.68
Triggers	20		2					
Threat to status		0.76		.683	5.00	15.00	15.00	0.00
Threat to safety		0.66		.720	15.00	10.00	30.00	15.00
Trauma-related		0.09		.959	5.00	5.00	10.00	5.00
Overstimulation		1.63		.442	10.00	10.00	10.00	5.00
Embarrassment		1.71		.424	0.00	10.00	0.00	5.00
Needs not met		1.21		.546	10.00	20.00	30.00	0.00
Protective Factors	30		2					
Secure attachment style		0.34		.842	0.00	3.33	0.00	3.33
Empathy								
Adaptive coping		4.11		.128	0.00	3.33	3.33	6.67
Self-control		1.55		.460	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Leisure								
Motivation for treatment		3.15		.207	3.33	0.00	3.33	6.67
Positive attitudes towards authority								

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Terrorist Cell in %	Lone Actor in %	Hate Crime in %	Organised Crime in %
Life goals		4.04		.133	3.33	0.00	3.33	3.33
Adherence to medication		0.34		.842	0.00	3.33	3.33	0.00
Relationships with Family	30		2					
No relationship as contact deceased		2.05		.359	0.00	16.67	3.33	6.67
Isolated		4.29		.117	3.33	3.33	3.33	0.00
Relationship present but not specified in report		2.28		.320	3.33	3.33	3.33	6.67
Prosocial Deviant		1.61		.448	6.67	23.33	23.33	3.33
Conflictual		4.81		.090	0.00	13.33	3.33	13.33
Relationships with Peers	19		2					
No relationship as contact deceased								
Isolated		9.92		.007**	5.26	31.58	21.0	5.26
Relationship present but not specified in report		1.17		.556	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.26
Prosocial		1.62		.445	5.26	10.53	10.53	0.00
Deviant		3.96		.318	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.53

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Terrorist Cell in %	Lone Actor in %	Hate Crime in %	Organised Crime in %
Conflictual		5.63		.060	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.53
Relationships with Intimate Partners	18		2					
No relationship as contact deceased		0.32		.852	5.56	11.11	16.67	5.56
Isolated		2.34		.311	5.56	22.22	27.78	0.00
Relationship present but not specified in report		5.29		.071	5.56	0.00	5.56	0.00
Prosocial Deviant		1.61		.448	0.00	16.67	11.11	5.56
Conflictual		6.92		.031*	0.00	5.56	0.00	11.11
Influences on Violence								
Attitudes about violence	30	0.34	2	.842	13.33	40.00	30.00	16.67
Personal grievance	30	1.21	2	.547	13.33	36.67	26.67	16.67
Need for excitement	24	1.32	2	.517	0.00	12.50	8.33	0.00
Need for dominance	29	0.93	2	.0627	6.90	27.59	17.24	6.90
Violence related to traumatic events	26	4.50	2	.105	15.38	23.08	23.08	15.38
Suggestibility	27	5.79	2	.055	7.41	0.00	3.70	11.11

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Terrorist Cell in %	Lone Actor in %	Hate Crime in %	Organised Crime in %
Capability	29	0.63	2	.730	10.34	37.93	24.14	17.24
Need to defend	30	1.03	2	.598	10.00	33.33	16.67	16.67
Need for belonging	27	7.36	2	.025*	7.41	7.41	11.11	22.22

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

However, members of organised crime appeared significantly more likely to exhibit withdrawal from social interactions as a relapse indicator, $X^2(2, N = 31) = 6.241, p = .044$, as opposed to the other groups. When reviewing relationships with peers, lone actors were much more likely to be isolated, while members of organised crime were much less likely, $X^2(2, N = 19) = 9.919, p = .007$. The latter were also more likely to have conflictual relationships with their intimate partners, $X^2(2, N = 18) = 6.923, p = .031$.[19] When reviewing motivators for violence, the need for belonging was more likely found with lone actors, $X^2(2, N = 27) = 7.364, p = .025$.

9.4.3   Smallest Space Analysis

Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) was employed to explore alternative data-informed categories for the group-based violence sample. Although all the variables' correlations were ranked, the SSA had to be conducted stepwise, because the number of variables exceeded the maximum limit of the software. This was due to the data being mostly nominal, requiring a dummy coding of each variable's sub-category. As a result, in each step, variables were excluded when their sub-categories did not spread across the resulting scatter plots, making no distinction possible. For example, all different incident victim types (i.e., stranger, known to offender, professional, patients/inmates, children, no victim) clustered together, making a reasonable interpretation impossible. The scatter plots for each SSA can be viewed in Appendix G. The final one is presented in Figure 9.1. These variables cover 87.1% of the entire variances.

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[19] An observed trend was members of organised crime were also more likely to have conflictual relationships with their peers, when compared to the other groups, $X^2(2, N = 19) = 5.630, p = .060$. Another trend was the lower occurrence between suggestibility and lone actors, $X^2(2, N = 27) = 5.786, p = .055$.

Figure 9.2

Finale SSA Scatterplot with Partitioning

No universal guidance is available on how to divide the SSA results. However, Brown and Barnett (2006) suggest several structures (e.g., concentric circles) that can be overlayed to split the data into separate regions. Hence, two raters independently categorised all variables based on their distance towards each other, the previous analyses' findings, and considerations on a content level (93.2%). Figure 9.1 depicts three emerging types of patients as described in the available profiles: (1) *Injustice collector*; (2) *Social offender*; and (3) *Dominance seeker*. Each region is described briefly below.

(1) Injustice Collector: Central to this cluster is the extreme closeness of personal grievance and attitudes that support violence. Both variables are in the vicinity of capability, suggesting that injustice collectors are more likely to prepare themselves (e.g., practising with weapons). Fittingly, threats with weapons are in the same region. Generally, individuals in this cluster appear to utilise more threats and follow through on those threats, seemingly motivated by instances of crisis and conflicts in equal parts. The victim types that are part of this region are members of the LGBTQIA+ community and White individuals. This also falls in the spatial vicinity of the variable capturing religious ideology. Regarding mental health issues, the prevalent diagnoses here are either mood- or trauma-related, seemingly also associated with the relapse indicator of declining self-care.

(2) Social Offender: This region of the plot includes more variables related to social constructs, as opposed to the other clusters. Here, individuals appear more likely to offend with others, and affiliate with a criminal organisation, but also being viewed as more suggestible. However, the same cluster also includes withdrawal and the decline of social relationships, as relapse indicators. Other indicators are disorganised speech and thought, and changes in sleep patterns. This is likely related to the high prevalence of diagnoses as part of this cluster, including psychotic disorders, personality disorders, anxiety-related disorders, substance-related disorders, and neurodivergent disorders. Some of these presentations might also explain the occurrence of the unspecified victim type in this region. The violence of individuals fitting this category appears characterised by increased anger and the pronounced need to defend themselves against perceived threats. Lastly, leakage (i.e., the disclosure of offence plans to independent third parties) also falls in this cluster.

(3) Dominance Seeker: Central to this cluster is the need for dominance. Closely related to this are several victims: male and female victims that are either adults or children and members of the BAME community. In turn, they display a closeness to cognitive preoccupation as a relapse indicator and political ideology. Furthermore, the cluster entails the need for excitement and the need for belonging and identity. It appears that these variables are related to the occurrence of self-harm, which is in the vicinity of traumatic events in the individual's past and the experience of positive symptomatology (e.g., hallucinations). Lastly, the incidents of this region appear to be more premeditated and planned than in the other categories.

Lastly, the partitioning was compared to the scatter plot of the 'individual actor – no radicalisation'-sample (Figure 9.3). The variables account for 87.5% of the variance. The same type of partitioning was overlayed. While this does not represent a structured comparison, it does highlight qualitative differences between the two samples. This is due to the different distribution of variables across three partitions, when compared to the previous SSA plot. For example, while the top partition encapsulated grievances, attitudes supporting violence, capability, threats with weapons, LGBTQIA+ victims, and religious ideology, amongst other facets in the injustice collector category, here the focus appears more on mental health issues. The differences suggest that the same variables impact on the occurrence of violent behaviour, but that their interplay is presumably different. Thus, the two different SSA plots highlight the importance of formulation.

Figure 9.3

Scatterplot of Finale SSA Pertaining to the 'Individual Actor – No Radicalisation'

Sample

9.5   Discussion

The comparison between forensic mental health patients either being part of the 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation' sample or the 'individual actor – no radicalisation' sample explored the potential overlap of risk factors. In accordance with the first prediction, namely expecting a considerable overlap between risk factors, the

lack of distinction between group-based and individual violence was mostly confirmed. No significant differences were observed on any psychologically relevant factors, replicating findings from the community setting (Gill, 2015; Gill et al., 2021). Only variables representing social themes found marginal differences, with radicalised patients and patients who were members of organised crime appearing more likely to engage in prosocial intimate partner relationships. This further confirms the prediction that social themes would aid the distinction between extremist violence and individual actors who are not radicalised (Hart et al., 2017). It implies that risk assessments and subsequent care plans have to account for the role extremist group affiliations play, instead of their mere presence.

The comparison of the four groups terrorist cell, lone actor, hate crime, and organised crime yielded few significant differences relating to social themes. This was in line with the second prediction, which stated that the differentiation of incident types does not aid formulations. Again, only social processes appeared central to these varying forms of violence, reiterating findings from the radicalisation literature (e.g., Borum, 2012). For example, lone actors appeared socially isolated and displayed closer links to the need for belonging and identity, replicating De Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker's (2016) findings that lone actors were had fewer social relationships, especially when presenting with mental health issues. However, in the current study, indicators for mental health issues elicited no significant differences, likewise, confirming predictions that the investigation of such features would yield inconclusive findings. The overall descriptive statistics indicated high rates of diagnoses, such as psychotic disorders or personality disorders, with prevalence comparable to previous research on forensic psychiatric populations (Taylor et al., 1998). It can be speculated that the current population represents extreme psychopathology overall, so discrimination between the groups is unlikely. This does not

imply that mental health issues are not important to the radicalisation process but that their contribution to extremist violence has not yet been understood.

However, in line with the second prediction, namely expecting new clusters to be formed that would aid formulation, the application of SSA to the 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation'-sample yielded three new categories of group-based violence in a forensic population: Injustice Collector, Social Offender, and Dominance Seeker. The same partitioning yielded different variable clusters in the comparison group. While the same variables appear relevant for understanding violence, the composition of those influences appears to vary. This reiterates the conclusions by Hart et al. (2017), emphasising the added value of assessing group-based violence separately. The marked differences between SSA plots means that the same variables interlink differently, thus, emphasising the need for violence-specific

The pattern found in the group-based violence sample appears reminiscent of certain personality tendencies and cognitions, increasingly utilised to conceptualise extremist violence (e.g., Tetreault & Sarma, 2021). This echoes conclusions from the previous studies, which emphaisied cognitive appraisal (Study 1) and the underlying normative beliefs (Study 2) as important influences shaping the radicalisation process. These facets appear to be facilitated by maladaptive personality tendencies (Tetreault & Sarma, 2021), the so-called *Dark Tetrad* (e.g., Međedović & Petrović, 2015). This constellation of four sub-clinical personality presentations that have been connected empirically to a wide array of criminal and antisocial behaviour (e.g., Buckels et al., 2013), as survey responses by 573 college students suggest that they influence the decision-making process[20]

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[20] Harrison et al.'s (2018) research appears to be one of the only studies clarifying the underlying mechanism of the Dark Triad on the decision-making process. The study explored the Dark Triad's impact on fraud but is used to contextualise the findings of this study and develop hypotheses for future research.

(Harrison et al., 2018). The four traits are the original *Dark Triad* including Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2002), and later sadism (e.g., Međedović & Petrović, 2015). The here proposed categories appear to fit the original three traits discussed in the Dark Triad, meaning that sadism (i.e., the enjoyment of other people suffering) is not part of the following presentation, including Injustice Collector, Social Offender, and Dominance Seeker.

The Dominance Seeker category centres dominance operationalised as asserting influence over others. Thus, it fits Machiavellianism, as individuals with that personality style are likely to be manipulative, con and lie to achieve their goals, but would be reluctant to engage in direct violence that would put themselves at risk (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2002). It also appears to fit with suggestions by McGregor et al. (2015), based on their review of the extremism literature, that found that individuals in the Machiavellianism category display a higher drive for power and authority, which could lead to radicalisation when co-occurring with low morality. Furthermore, individuals fitting the Dominance Seeker cluster appear to carefully plan their violent offences, seemingly fitting the careful approach that individuals of the Machiavellianism category take. However, need for excitement is uncommon for this Dark Triad personality style (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2002) and requires further exploration.

The survey findings by Harrison et al. (2018) suggest that this personality facet causes individuals to identify opportunities for manipulation more readily. Harrison et al. (2018) apply *Routine Activity Theory* (Cohen & Felson, 1979) to describe this, framing criminal behaviour as a result of opportunity defined as comprising an attractive target and lack of surveillance. When applied to radicalisation, it can be speculated that forensic mental health patients with raised levels Machiavellianism actively seek out other individuals

that they perceive as vulnerable to exploitation (i.e., presenting as an attainable opportunity). They might decide to utilise extremist ideology motivating others to participate in violence, thus, not requiring to directly engage in aggressive behaviour themselves. Furthermore, for forensic services it implies the need for continued monitoring of such individuals to prevent those radicalisation dynamics, thus, reiterating experts' recommendations from Study 2 (Delphi) and capturing the importance of the process being dynamic.

The second category yielded by the SSA is the Injustice Collector, representing individuals who are prone to focus on grievances, including perceived conflicts or slights against them that can cause personal vendettas. It resembles the entitlement, self-importance, and superiority commonly observed in narcissistic individuals (Paulhus et al., 2002). McGregor et al. (2015) found similar motivations for extremist offenders in their review. They concluded that superiority allowed individuals to distance themselves from their enemy, instead aligning themselves with other radicalised individuals. Furthermore, Chichocka et al. (2017) found that social dominance alleviates uncertainty experienced by right-wing extremists in their American, British, and Polish samples. This bears similarities to the so-called *ego threat* that narcissistic individuals experience (e.g., Jones & Neria, 2015). It describes their tendency to perceive criticism of their identity as a form of aggression, often resulting in them reacting violently. The current study appears to replicate these findings, as the grievance variable also exhibited a close association with individuals endorsing pro-violent attitudes. The resulting extremist violence is speculated to be pre-emptive (Harrison et al., 2018).

The last SSA category describes Social Offenders, a cluster characterised by affiliation to deviant peers and organised crime; both variables are linked to antisocial behaviour.

This category is reminiscent of psychopathy, which arguably focuses on the use of instrumental violence (Buckles et al., 2013) and displays of antisocial behaviour with low levels of anxiety or empathy (Paulhus et al., 2002). Other aspects of psychopathy were equally replicated by the current study, including the decline of social relationships, which is reminiscent of the lack of social skills in individuals fitting the psychopathy style (e.g., Rauthmann, 2012). Some argue that individuals high on psychopathy traits might also experience more self-reported aggressions (Paulhus et al., 2021), a variable included as anger in the Social Offender category here, while others suggest a lack of emotion. The latter would contradict some aspects observed in the current study, as the Social Offender also features mood and anxiety-related diagnoses. Thus, it becomes clear that future research must explore personality in more detail across these three clusters to identify individual differences.

The three new clusters of group-based violence arguably present with some overlap because the partitions are merely explorative. However, this is in line with Cook et al.'s (2013) conceptualisation of group-based violence, as varying forms of aggression are on a spectrum. Similarly, the dark personality styles are not viewed as distinct (e.g., Buckles et al., 2013) and have been shown to contribute together to extremism (Charbol et al., 2020). Similarly, both the Dominance Seeker and the Injustice Collector cluster include variables featuring ideology and/or cognitive preoccupation.

It seems no literature exists that explores the potential link between the dark personality traits and mental health issues. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn about the observed mental health indicators in each of the three clusters. However, it can be speculated that personality influences the relationship between mental health issues and extremist

violence indirectly by informing the individual's (mal)adaptive coping mechanisms. Future research must explore this link more closely.

While the included variables appear to explain a high level of variance, the scatter plots group in a cloud formation around the centre. As a result, the remote corners of the diagram remain empty. Blank spaces in SSA are an indication of other variables that have not yet been considered. However, they will likely explain the marked differences between the group-based violence categories and the general violence group, as observed in the initial correlation matrix (e.g., 'lone actor' correlated negatively with the comparison group, $r(74) = -.58, p < .001$). Suggested avenues for this exploration can be identified when reflecting on the following limitations.

9.5.1 Limitations

While the study presents a novel comparison between radicalised individuals and individually violent patients without radicalisation indication, the insight is limited due to the scope of the available data. For example, protective factors and social relationships had been included in insufficient detail in the clinical documents. The reported factors often related to critical incidents within secure forensic services. Thus, their presence during the radicalisation process and their role as antecedent to violence unrelated to the incidents could only be assumed. Furthermore, the reports included unstructured clinical judgements instead of in-depth measures, such as personality. The limitations likely impacted the lack of differences observed between and within the group-based violence category and the comparison group. Furthermore, generalisability is expected to be limited as a result of the small sample size ($N = 74$), especially in some groups (e.g., terrorist cell, $N = 4$), which in conjunction with mostly categorical variables restricted the use of complex statistical analyses. Finally, the forensic sample was exclusively male and

predominantly British, thus, limiting the application of the current findings beyond this profile.

9.5.2 Concluding comments

The comparison between 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation'-sample and the 'individual actor – no radicalisation'-sample within a forensic mental health population yielded no differences. However, the former sample could be divided into four groups (i.e., terrorist cell, lone actor, hate crime, and organised crime), highlighting the heterogenous nature of this sample. The tentative importance of social factors and the overlap between forms of group-based violence and the Dark Triad traits are particularly worthy of future investigations. In addition, the research offered empirical support for the notion to summarise extremist violence under group-based violence. Based on the yielded understanding, the next chapter will outline a conceptual model, which could be useful in directing future research and considerations for practice.

CHAPTER TEN
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Collectively, the studies indicated an interplay of social cognitions and maladaptive personality traits as crucial radicalisation influences across a heterogeneous group of forensic mental health patients who engaged in violence motivated by their group membership. One of the thesis' goals was to explicitly define this heterogeneous group, as scholars had identified the lack of transparent definitions in the counterterrorism literature (e.g., Schmid, 2011; Horgan, 2017). Across the three studies, it became apparent that terrorism had to be conceptualised beyond individuals who commit violence in the name of extremist ideology to impact political change (Schmid, 2011). Instead, the findings implied that radicalised individuals can be encapsulated under a broader concept, namely *group-based violence*, first introduced by Cook et al. (2013). Both expert feedback and comparisons of this wider group with individually violent patients who showed no signs of radicalisation highlighted the utility of this concept. Several categories were identified within the forensic mental health population, including terrorist cells, lone actors, hate crimes, and organised crime.

The unifying characteristic of the diverse range of individuals appears to be their intent; all committed violence that was motivated by or in reference to a real and/or perceived group membership. In accordance with this definition, extremist violence is viewed as independent from ideology, an aspect that appears to have become obsolete over the course of the three studies. In study two, interviewees demonstrated a shallow ideological understanding, with pragmatic incentives, such as survival, taking a higher precedent. Similarly, study three could not find a conclusive role for ideology in the radicalisation process. The thesis becomes part of a growing number of publications questioning the

relevance for radicalisation in the escalation towards extremist violence (e.g., Borum, 2012; Patel & Hussain, 2019). The findings suggest that, at least for forensic mental health populations, the mere presence of extremist views does not constitute a cause for concern by itself but must be viewed in context of the individual's group membership.

The advantage of broadening the definition to group-based violence, instead of referring to 'radicalised' individuals or 'terrorists', is two-fold. Firstly, the literature chapters presented in this thesis demonstrated how the counterterrorism discourse and the associated terminology has become emotive, with the use of aforementioned words often being divisively used. Considerations regarding general rehabilitation (e.g., Tran et al., 2018) suggested that 'othering' language that objectifies the individual, such as 'criminal' or 'prisoner' can lead to stereotyping and stigmatisation. This could arguably lead to professionals avoiding discussing issues surrounding this topic, subsequently underreporting individuals of concern.

Secondly, the new definition allows for a broader comparison with individuals who committed violent offences on their own, without the indication of radicalisation. The initial systematic literature review identified the comparison as important for forensic mental health populations, as no research was available directly exploring those samples. However, scholars had previously highlighted that most risk factors for extremist violence were not unique to this form of aggression, instead presenting a considerable overlap with general violence, antisocial, and/or criminal behaviour (e.g., Dhumad et al., 2020). This was partially confirmed by study three, highlighting that the same variables accounted for violence. However, the lack of differences can also be impacted by the lack of comprehensive documentation in the case files, as well as the lack of appropriate

measurements. This perhaps points to a revised approach to what is included in case files, namely information of particular value in this area of work.

Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the groups within the sample of individuals who had participated in group-based violence demonstrated a heterogenous composition of motivations linked to varying personality traits. Thus, the thesis presents with a strong argument for individualised, in-depth formulation and care pathway planning regarding this violence form. The risk and protective factors that stood out across the three studies and appeared distinct in the last study all related to social themes (e.g., presence of extremist peers, group identity, individual positioning themselves in relation to 'enemy'). In other words, the influences relevant to the radicalisation process linked to social processes, reiterating the dominant view in the literature that radicalisation is an iterative socialisation process (e.g., Borum, 2012, Victoroff, 2005; Horgan et al., 2018). A novel finding was the notion that radicalised individuals viewed their group identity closely related to concepts of family, in study two. This included a humanising perspective that presented as nuanced, diverse, and rich in positive features. Family implied that the interviewees had grown into the violent groups, framing it as a natural and automatic *progression*. This demonstrates how closely self-identity and group-identity are associated in this population. Similar tendencies were observed in study three, with the Social Offender group showing a heightened need for belonging and identity.

This close interconnection also appeared to foster the divide with other groups, such as the 'enemy', in so-called in- vs. out-group thinking. In fact, interviewees in study two utilised dehumanising language, demonstrating a pronounced inflexible thinking, as also described by Savage et al. (2014). Consequently, radicalised individuals appear unlikely to tolerate competing world views or counternarratives, which can result in violence

(Obaidi et al., 2018). Interviewees appeared instead to externalise blame, replicating findings by Cichocka et al. (2017), that found the refusal of taking personal responsibility was a crucial step in the radicalisation process. The reverse was fittingly summarised by experts as a protective factor in study one. Participants rated cognitive flexibility, diverse peer group, and not externalising blame as relevant mitigating influences.

However, interviewees appeared flexible in their cognitions regarding their own group or justifying their own actions. Here, various degrees of justifications were provided, echoing findings by Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) and Dhumaed et al. (2020) who viewed rationalising attempts as a unique facet of radicalised populations. Furthermore, the interviews included themes of redemption and self-defence, previously both observed by Askew and Helbardt (2012) Bartlett et al (2010), respectively. The paradoxical co-existence of the conflicting conclusions (i.e., radicalised individuals being cognitively rigid and flexible at the same time) becomes resolved when reflecting on the function these cognitions serve. In both instances, it can be reasonably speculated that the individuals attempt to protect their self-identity and self-worth. Indeed, both study two and three highlight the importance of status and self-preservation; both incentives are arguably impacting on each other. For example, interviewees consistently mentioned survival as the single most important incentive to join and/or participate in extremist groups.

In accordance with the importance of the self in interpreting the thesis' results, study three found three clusters in the 'group-based and/or indicators of radicalisation' sample that link to maladaptive personality traits. They are summarised under the *Dark Triad* including Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2002). While their link with criminal behaviour is well established (e.g., Buckels et al., 2013), their

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introduction to extremist violence is novel. In study three, their application resulted in three clusters of individuals, namely, the *Injustice Collector*, the *Dominance Seeker*, and the *Social Offender*. It is speculated that they present with distinctive motivations, which, in turn, are informed by their personality. These are suggestions how the exploration of the self-identity can explain radicalisation influences in the section relating to future research.

A facet of the radicalisation process that remains inconclusive is the role of mental health issues. As described the introduction chapters, the literature presents with conflicting findings (e.g., Gill & Corner, 2017; Al-Attar; 2020) on this topic. Across all studies in this thesis, this could not be clarified. In study one, experts appeared reluctant to suggest concrete mental health factors as influences, likely based on the existing literature. In the subsequent studies, the exploration yielded no results because interviewees either did not have the capacity to reflect on their mental health or did not view it as important, while the case files did not present mental health issues in sufficient detail. It is also likely that mental health issues will be better understood in the context of maladaptive personality styles.

10.1 Theoretical context of findings

The available risk assessment guidance lacks theoretical underpinning, especially for the forensic mental health population, as previously outlined. While the introduction chapters discussed several radicalisation theories, the overview could not yield one superior explanation. Extremist violence appears complex, as indicated by the multitude of identified influences in this thesis. No individual conceptualisation appeared sufficient to capture radicalisation in its full scope. Nevertheless, throughout the studies, five criminological theories emerged with utility to the radicalisation context: Relative

Deprivation Theory (Gurr, 1970), Rational Choice Theory (Crenshaw, 1992), Dark Triad (Paulhus et al., 2002), Cognitive Appraisal Theory (e.g., Lazerus & Folkman, 1984; Scherer, 2009), and Information Processing Model for the Development of Aggression (Huesmann, 1988). These theories might explain how the interconnection of social process and maladaptive responses informed by the individual's identity can result in extremist violence. In addition, it was argued that the Significant Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014) might explain the mechanisms that govern the relationship between self-identity and group-identity. Lastly, the Phoenix model (Silke et al., 2021) is included to reflect on the found protective factors; the model is currently the only empirically substantiated conceptualisation of rehabilitating radicalised individuals. Thus, the following sections will critically reflect the thesis' findings in the context of these theories and consider the extent to which the empirical evidence supports the existing explanations.

Deprivation and its impact on extremists' goal obtainment

Relative deprivation is defined as dissatisfaction that results from social comparison with others (e.g., Gurr, 1970). Even if they are objectively in a stable financial and/or societal position, the individual perceives their status as relatively less than members of a comparison group. In the counterterrorism literature, this is often framed as grievances or injustice, which in turn result in extremist violence (e.g., Groppi, 2017; Challacombe & Lucas, 2019). Across the three current studies, this was observed as experiences of discrimination and perceived political threat to own group in the experts' feedback, and as threat to own physical safety and threat to status within forensic settings in the interviewees' responses. Consequently, these observations guided the operationalisation in study three. The findings are two-fold: (a) the three studies highlight the wide variety of instances that can be summarised as deprivation; and (b) deprivation appears relevant

across all forms of group-based violence (i.e., Injustice Collector, Social Offender, Dominance Seeker).

However, only the individual's resulting dissatisfaction was observed in the three studies, with the social comparison prior to feelings of relative deprivation only being assumed. Only study two found mentions of social comparison, with participants, for example, describing how the financial strain on their community led them to join organised crime. Thus, the thesis can only partially support the Relative Deprivation Theory's relevance for the radicalisation context. Furthermore, the current studies did not clarify the proposed mechanism, namely frustration (e.g., Friedland, 1992), that would cause the individual to elevate the dissatisfaction caused by the social comparison through aggression (see Chapter Two). Rather, it is argued that in accordance with the Rational Choice Theory (Crenshaw, 1992), individuals will evaluate their chances for goal obtainment (i.e., relieving the experienced dissatisfaction) by minimising the cost and/or maximising their benefits. In this proposed calculation of maximising self-interest, extremist violence is suggested to become a viable option.

However, the current studies found inconclusive support for the Rational Choice Theory. Experts appeared to refute the relevance of opportunistic motivation or personal vendettas in study one but emphasised the importance of individuals feeling the need for imminent action. The latter echoes the readiness for new, in this case extremist, ideas described by Wiktorowicz (2004) as *cognitive opening*. This term describes the readiness for new ideas beyond mainstream culture. These new ideas could arguably include alternative, violent ways for the individual to achieve their goal, thus, aligning with the Rational Choice Theory. Meanwhile, study two offers direct support for that theory, as interviewees consistently reported pragmatic reasonings, namely survival, to participate in extremist

violence. Their group membership ensured that the aforementioned grievances related to perceived deprivation would be addressed. The participants presented this as an unconscious, automatic process. While this appears not to align with the cost-benefit calculation of the Rational Choice Theory, the conceptualisation never proposes a conscious processing of the behaviour alternatives for goal obtainment. Overall, the thesis appears to therefore partially support both Relative Deprivation and Rational Choice Theory when explaining the radicalisation process. However, they do not account for the decision-making process that results in an individual engaging in extremist violence.

Cognitive appraisal and social cognitions supporting extremism

Cognitive Appraisal Theory (e.g., Lazerus & Folkman, 1984; Scherer, 2009) defines aggressive responses as the result of the individual's subjective interpretation of events, for example, as threatening, based on their cognitions and their values (Scherer, 2009), which states that events are subjectively interpreted based on the individual's cognitions. In the Information Processing Model for the Development of Aggression (Huesmann, 1988) the central social cognitions are aggressive scripts, so-called as they the prompt the individual to follow automated behavioural steps due to previous learning experiences. These can include *normative beliefs*, as they represent norms or expectations about appropriate behaviour (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). In the context of this thesis, it means the appropriateness of extremist violence. The relevance of those extremist cognitions was observed in two of the three current studies. In study two, the interviewees' responses indicated the endorsement of pro-violent attitudes, for example, via justifications or normalisations of violence. Radicalised individuals appeared to view violence as an efficient mean to ensure their survival and status. In addition, they refuted responsibility and framed violence as an automatic result, in one instance explicitly stating that this is a progression they can also observe in their own child. In study three, it appeared that

different value systems were relevant for different categories of violence. This was deduced from different victim types (e.g., the Injustice Collector was more likely to attack LGBTQIA+ individuals, the Dominance Seeker was more likely to have BAME victims), as they implied what groups the individuals viewed as appropriate 'enemies'. Furthermore, it was found that especially individuals focusing on perceived injustice were also more likely to exhibit pro-violent attitudes.

In study one, the experts' feedback only indirectly alluded towards a value system that would influence the appraisal process, such as distorted worldview and preoccupation with political events. However, none of the current studies was able to explore the learning experiences prior to developing those aggressive scripts. Data was either inaccessible, as it would have required a level of trust between interviewer and interviewees that was unrealistic to achieve in the context of time restricted research interviews, or data was insufficient in reporting on such experiences, because they were not relevant to the goals of the crisis profiles (i.e., they did not support the resolution of critical incidents). In sum, the empirical evidence supports the relevance of social cognitions for the radicalisation process but is insufficient to replicate all aspects connected to aggressive scripts. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that examples of learning experiences that support extremist scripts can be found in radicalised forensic patients' biographies, as outlined later in the section pertaining to future research.

The self-identity of radicalised individuals

An aspect that is unaddressed in the aforementioned appraisal process is what informs the underlying value system. As scripts are based on the individual's learning experiences (Huesmann, 1988), it is reasonable to assume that the individual's self-identity is a crucial aspect in this process. The Significance Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014) centres

on the self, as they understand radicalisation as an attempt to (re)gain a personal sense of importance. The thesis found empirical evidence across all studies for the relevance of this need. Experts' feedback connected a grandiose sense of self with radicalisation; interviewees' responses emphasised how their extremist group membership ensured their status; and self-importance was a central feature of the violence category Injustice Collector. Thus, it appears a common thread in this thesis that radicalised forensic mental health patients exhibit extremist behaviour in an attempt to feel significant. The fulfilment of this need likely overlaps with safety concerns, as interviewees' mentioned high levels of threat perception, especially when detained in forensic settings. The notion of grandiose sense of self is also the only instance in this thesis where psychopathology (i.e., the pathological inflated self-worth) appears theoretically underpinned.

Other aspects of the Significance Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014), or later further developed into the *3N approach* (Webber & Kruglanski, 2017; see Chapter Two) are equally well substantiated in this thesis. In study three, the experts' feedback indicated the presence of extremist peers or as co-offenders and group affiliation as central to radicalisation, thus, replicating *Network* (i.e., the presence of extremist peers) as an important influence on the *Need for Significance*. Identified mechanisms for radicalisation include the pronounced in- vs. out-group thinking facilitated by the network, as well as the integration and maintenance of the group identity within the individual. As previously outlined in the overall findings, the novel finding of this thesis is the framing of organised criminal groups as family. The experts' feedback, which emphasises the relevance of extremist and/or delinquent peers, in conjunction with the identified narratives of the interviews suggest: (a) social exclusion of other groups to make the portrayal of out-groups as the 'enemy' easier; and (b) the limiting of behavioural

alternatives of pro-social goal obtainment, thus, priming the individual to utilise extremist violence instead. This is in line with the conceptualisation by Kruglanski et al. (2014).

Webber and Kruglanski (2017) suggest that the alternative explanations presented by the network constitute ideological content. While the ideology's function includes target choice for violence and strategies for goal obtainment (Webber & Kruglanski, 2017), this could not be explored in the thesis. This was due to a lack of available ideological content to analyse. As described earlier, the interviewees' accounts and case files were ideologically limited for several reasons, with experts not elaborating on the presumed function. In summary, the current findings appear to support the Significance Quest Theory, with two out of three key features being observed across all studies. However, the proposed integration of the three components—need, network, and narrative—have not been part of the research focus and are thus only assumed in the thesis.

Furthermore, the Significant Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014) makes no presumptions about the individual's personality and how the underlying traits might impact the radicalisation process. It can be argued that self-worth is closely linked to the individual's understanding of themselves. In an attempt to explore the underpinning personality found by Tetreault and Sarma (2021) in connection with extremist tendencies, the findings of study three informed the categorisation along the maladaptive personality styles of Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, summarised as the Dark Triad (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2002). The link between the Dark Triad and different forms of group-based violence likely presents an important extension to the existing radicalisation theories. The findings tentatively align with conclusions by findings by Harrison et al. (2018), for example, how insecurity caused by narcissism could be an explanation for certain types of forensic patients to show a higher vulnerability to perceived injustices.

However, the lack of in-depth measurements in the current thesis warrants caution when linking those findings; a fact that is discussed in more detail in the limitation section.

Mitigating influences for extremist reoffending

The previous sections critically reflected on the literature pertaining to the development towards extremist violence. In an attempt to capture all relevant aspects, the thesis also investigated protective factors. At the current time, the only empirically substantiated conceptualisation relating to those factors is the Phoenix model by Silke et al. (2021), based on findings of a systematic literature review (Morrison et al., 2021). The model is strictly addressing de-radicalisation and desistance (i.e., rehabilitation) but appears relevant to the discussion of mitigating influences in the forensic mental health population as well. The current experts' feedback featured pro-social influences by a diverse peer group and family, the presence of pro-social role models inside and outside of forensic settings, and the pro-social meaningful engagement with the system; all influences represented by the *actor catalyst* (i.e., influences on the individual) and *environmental catalyst* (i.e., prison influences on the rehabilitation process) in the Phoenix model (Silke et al., 2021). Furthermore, the need to take care of somebody outside of the forensic setting was an unprompted expert response that matches closely with the findings by Morrison et al. (2021) who identified parenthood as a key influence in the actor catalyst category. Study two yielded further insight into the *psychological catalysts* (i.e., internal influences of the individual; Silke et al., 2021), such as disillusionment, which was explicitly mentioned by one interviewee as an exit reason. A host of other individual factors were also found that are not part of the Phoenix model[21]. However, mental health

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[21] In study one, the following protective factors were identified by experts: Pro-social role models in and outside of secure forensic settings, needing to take care for others outside of secure forensic settings, meaningful pro-social engagement with system, diverse peer group, content with own life, cognitive flexibility, not externalising blame, and hope for meaningful pro-social life outside secure forensic settings.

issues, such as burnout or stress, that are found to aid the rehabilitation process (Silke et al., 2021) were not shown as protective against radicalisation in the current thesis.

Beyond the catalysts, it is reasonable to assume that securing physical safety to disengage from an extremist group (Silke et al., 2021) can be deduced from the patient accounts, as they emphasised that the risk of retaliation from other members had prevented them in the past from exiting in the past.

However, the proposed mechanisms of the Phoenix model that drive the identity transformation (Silke et al, 2021) could not be clarified via the current studies. The overlap between protective factors and rehabilitation factors is a finding in itself, as the factors assumed to prevent radicalisation can also be utilised in care pathway planning to prevent reoffending. While the current findings support aspects of the Phoenix model, they can only be viewed as tentative. Nevertheless, the integration of the summarised theories results in a newly proposed conceptual model, as outlined next.

10.2   The proposed conceptual model

This preliminary conceptual model draws on the findings of the systematic literature review and the three studies to formulate group-based violence (Cook et al., 2013). Thus, it features risk and protective factors that influence the radicalisation process in forensic mental health populations. It is informed by the previously discussed theories and the supporting empirical evidence of the current studies It positions the radicalised individual in the *context* of the real or perceived extremist group. Hence, the proposed conceptual model is named the *Eco-System of Extremist Violence* (ES-EV). It is presented in Figure 10.1. The model aims to substantiate existing assessment approaches by offering guidance for formulating radicalisation dynamics.

Figure 10.1

The Proposed Eco-System of Extremist Violence Model (ES-EV)

Optional

Contributing Factors

- Preparedness/Capability:
  - History of violence & criminality
  - Use of weapons
  - Other offenders
  - Lethality
  - Level of planning
- Psychopathology (rumination & death-related cognitions)
- Strain, grievances, & discrimination
- Narcissism
- Distorted worldview
- Moving institutions
- Impairment (cognitive & emotional)
- Anger

Protective Factors

- Depression
- Resilience & self-control
- Democratic values & prosocial engagement with institutions
- Positive role models
- Political engagement
- Cognitive flexibility
- Content with own life
- Positive life goals
- Diverse peer group
- Disillusionment

Leakage

Precipitating & Perpetuating

In-Group/Movement (Perceived or Real)

- Humanising (prosocial, innocent, nuanced)
- Group identity and cohesion
- Active involvement
- Members worth imitating
- Imminent need for action
- Membership naturally determined

Present Risk for extremist violence

Self in Social Context

- Own importance
- Externalising blame
- Need for belonging
- Adhering to hierarchy
- Suggestibility
- Focus on threat
- Dominance

Dominance Seeker/ Machiavellianism

Injustice Collector/ Narcissism

Social Offender/ Psychopathy

Dark Triad

Survival

Predisposing

Extremist Culture

Ideology
- Extremist enhancing attitudes
- Political/religious

Out-Group
- Demonising
- Target choice/ target of blame

Justification of Violence
- Violent rhetoric
- Need for excitement

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Central to the ES-EV preliminary model is the relationship between the radicalised individual and the extremist in-group that they are part of. Together they constitute a social eco-system that fosters the occurrence of extremist violence. Or, in other words, *both* individual and group are proposed to be necessary for the radicalisation process. Thus, the emphasis of the ES-EV is solely on the self-identity in the social context. Individual's characteristics not directly related to social interaction are captured elsewhere. In line with Cognitive Appraisal Theories (e.g., Lazerus & Folkman, 1984; Scherer, 2009), this section of the ES-EV model includes social cognitions or factors that can be reasonably assumed to impact on the appraisal process, such as suggestibility. Most importantly, this includes own importance as a central motivating factor, echoing the Significance Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014). While fulfilling the goal to (re)gain self-importance, the ES-EV proposes that all other social cognitions serve that function. The presumed maladaptive personality traits represented by the Dark Triad (Paulhus et al., 2002; Harrison et al., 2018; Tetreault & Sarma, 2021) underpin this dynamic, likely making extremist violence an attractive and viable behavioural option.

Opposite of the self is the perceived or real extremist in-group the individual is part of. This explicitly includes lone actors who might only position themselves on the fringes of an extremist movement, yet still relate their offence intention to the group (Cook et al., 2013). In line with the 3N approach (Webber & Kruglanski, 2017), the network of other extremists facilitates social processes that are meant to eliminate other avenues of goal obtainment, besides extremist violence. Thus, this section of the ES-EV model includes group cohesion and group identity, such as viewing the in-group in a humanising manner as 'family'. The preliminary model presumes that the in-group also provides learning opportunities to acquire aggressive scripts, which is a tenant of the Information Processing Model for the Development of Aggression (Huesmann, 1988). This includes

members worth imitating. Lastly, this section includes a call to imminent action, which is assumed to translate the cognitive preparedness for violence into observable behaviour. This follows considerations of the Rational Choice Theory (Crenshaw, 1992), proposing that the need for cognitive closure as a driving factor in the cost-benefit calculation of an individual's attempt to maximise their self-interest.

The ES-EV identified several other factors that are merely optional. They are listed in such manner as their contribution to the radicalisation process is assumed to be (a) not strictly necessary; or (b) not directly associated to an increased risk. The former represents individual factors, such as anger or impulsivity. While they might impact on the appraisal process like suggestibility, they are not inherently social constructs. Thus, they are included in this section. Furthermore, forms of deprivation are viewed as optional factors. As outlined previously in this chapter, social comparison with others appears a crucial facet of the radicalisation process, in accordance with the Relative Deprivation Theory (Gurr, 1970). However, the relativity of these experiences was only assumed in the current studies. Nevertheless, this factor could move to more central structures of the ES-EV, if future validation studies can clarify its role for the forensic population.

Factors that are presumed to not directly contribute to the risk of extremist violence include capability and its various operationalisations (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). They are assumed to be predictive of the risk because they indicate the severity of future offences and they allow conclusions about the individual's progression towards future offences (e.g., Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Meloy & Gill, 2016). Assessors can observe these dynamics via the disclosure of those plans to third parties, operationalised as leakage by Dudenhoefer et al. (2021). Other optional influences are protective factors. These align with the Phoenix model (Silke et al., 2021) and are likely counternarratives or alternative

behavioural options for goal obtainment. However, they are not represented in the catalyst structure suggested by Silke et al. (2021), with this neither replicated in the current studies, nor the focus of the proposed model.

Ideology was not found as a necessary risk factor for the occurrence of extremist violence in the current studies. Nevertheless, it is recognised that in accordance with the 3N approach (Webber & Kruglanski, 2017) that extremist narratives likely provide a template for violence. As such, they frame violent behaviour as a means for survival; a narrative that then enters the dynamic of self-identity and group processes (e.g., heightening threat perception). Furthermore, ideology furthers the divide between in- and out-group (Webber & Kruglanski, 2017), which lowers the inhibition for violence (e.g., Basra & Neumann, 2016). All these aspects are arguably located in the wider extremist culture and hence are included in such manner.

10.3   Practical implications

The introduction chapter outlined several practical challenges that are critically reflected upon below, resulting in practical suggestions.

Assessment and care pathway planning

The findings of the three studies present an argument for the combination of static/historical factors of risk assessments for general violence and individual factors specific for extremist violence. While the lack of differences between radicalised individuals and individuals who committed violent offences alone without radicalisation indication in study three constitutes a considerable overlap, the discovery of new categories of violence aligning with the Dark Triad (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2002) suggest that the same risk factors are differently composed in cases of extremist violence. This

echoes findings by Hart et al. (2017) who yielded additional insight when using general tools like the HCR-20 (Douglas et al., 2013) together with instruments pertaining group-based violence (MLG; Cook et al., 2013). Consequently, the ES-EV is not replacing any assessment procedures, but aids to formulate the obtained ratings. The conceptual model represents a novel focus, as none of the assessment instruments emphasise the intersection between self-identity and group identity.

A factor that was initially assumed to reliably distinguish extremist violence from general violence was ideology. However, the thesis suggest that the emphasis of ideology is not justified. In fact, it is assumed that this focus within the literature likely contributed to discrimination, overemphasising certain communities, such as individuals of Muslim faith (e.g., Corbin, 2017). This aligns with experts' feedback who suggested that the untargeted assessment of entire communities can contribute to the risk of radicalisation, as the individuals will perceive the practice as unjust. Instead, the in-depth understanding of the radicalised individual's goals, such as survival, can allow clinicians to identify alternative pro-social scripts that can support goal obtainment. Again, this aligns with findings from study one, where experts suggested the assessment focus should not be on risk, identifying instead needs for intervention. The focus on needs that is a tenant of the ES-EV will likely also combat the focus on 'worst-case scenarios'[22] inherent in de-radicalisation interventions (Pettinger, 2020). Addressing those needs can become part of tailored multi-modal treatment plan that focuses on information processing and decision-making. Such programmes based on an integration of theory and typology do exist (Ireland & Ireland, 2018).

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[22] This refers to the tendency of policy makers and other counterterrorism professionals to anticipate the worst possible outcome in an effort to thwart security risks (Pettinger, 2020). However, Pettinger (2020) argues that this perspective does not translate into preparedness when countering terrorist attacks.

Guidance for clinicians in defining and language use

Study one yielded an explicit working definition, based on transparent quality criteria. It is expected that a shared understanding will allow clinicians to compare and standardise approaches (e.g., Schmid, 2011; Sageman, 2014), with the aim to improve the care for radicalised forensic mental health patients. By expanding the definition to group-based violence, it can be related to professionals that (a) offences summarised under this term are heterogeneous; and that (b) the immediate presence of other extremist group members in the vicinity of an individual is not a prerequisite for radicalisation. Instead, the perception of the individual, for example, in the form of their group identity appears to be important.

In this context, the findings reframe the secure environment into an opportunity for pro-social change. For example, whilst prisons were previously viewed as "breeding grounds for radicalisation" (Mulcahy et al., 2013, p. 4) due to the presumed negative impact of other extremist peers, the view of the social group working in such manner is not supported by the thesis. However, the studies failed to replicate the positive outlook of Silke et al. (2021) who present secure environments (i.e., prisons) as a chance for reorientation. Nevertheless, a multitude of protective factors were suggested in study one. It is argued that communicating the wide variety of strengths to clinicians can combat the pessimistic perspective domineering in the field that radicalised individuals cannot be rehabilitated (Weeks, 2021).

Linked to this is the recommendation to rethink the use of language. One finding of the thesis is that professional language has entered the daily rhetoric of radicalised forensic patients. The interviews demonstrated how words like 'radicalised' or 'extremist' were used by participants, without prompt. When viewed together with the fact that the

counterterrorism debate has become emotive in the public and amongst professionals (e.g., Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004; Weinberger et al., 2004), it becomes apparent how the use of those words in daily clinical practice might potentially inhibit professionals to report individuals of concern. In line with the broader definition utilised in this thesis, a descriptive label for radicalised individuals is suggested, for example, 'individuals who participated in group-based violence'. This matches considerations by Tran et al. (2018) regarding the general rehabilitation literature.

Policy changes for forensic settings

Due to the observed overlap of risk factors relevant to radicalisation with general violence the call for increased monitoring of radicalised individuals (Mulcahy et al., 2013) appears insufficient. It is assumed that superficial screening would be unable to distinguish radicalised individuals from individuals without radicalisation. Similarly, it could be argued that the call for segregating radicalised individuals from each other (Mulcahy et al., 2013) is difficult to enforce and may be counterproductive by serving only to reinforce a 'them and us' culture. Based on the current studies' findings, it is further presumed that this practice may also amplify perceived deprivation, which could foster progression along a radicalisation pathway. Prevention efforts should instead emphasise policies that support anti-discrimination initiatives on a staff and patient level.

Another novel aspect introduced in this thesis is the utilisation of threat assessment principles to the formulation of radicalised forensic mental health populations[23]. The inclusion of capability and leakage is common in community settings (e.g., Meloy & Gill,

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[23] Threat assessment is the assessment of individuals or groups to establish the level of threat for future violence that they might pose (e.g., Meloy & Gill, 2018). In the clinical context, the practice assess the likelihood of future offences committed within the service, as opposed to establishing the likelihood for reoffending after discharge as common with risk assessments.

2016; Dudenhoefer et al., 2021), but is not considered standard within forensic services. Consequently, the use of more contemporary inclusions should form part of developing policies.

10.4 Limitations

Limitations must be considered. The generalisability of the current thesis is restricted by the sample characteristics of the recruited population. Only neurotypical British male adults were included in the current research, as the service site was not specialised for female forensic patients, children, and/or neurodivergent patients. Consequently, the findings cannot be readily applied to other service types. Another aspect impacting the generalisability is the small sample sizes employed, even accounting for the specialised nature of the sample.

Another limiting sample characteristic is the severe nature of the observable mental health issues. Mental health indicators, such as social withdrawal or self-harming, were often reported. This likely presents a sampling bias inherent in high-secure settings, as they admit only individuals with complex mental health issues. It is assumed that the admission criteria also limited the scope of observed diagnoses to mostly psychotic disorders and personality disorders. Other measurements, such as wellbeing scales and collateral information, were instead required to capture the mental health in-depth of the studied patients. Similarly, personality traits (e.g., narcissism) and factors related to threat assessments (e.g., leaking, capability) required comprehensible data. Data detailing those aspects exhaustively was unavailable. As the focus was on the individual's psychological influences, a wider perspective was excluded. Thus, other aspects impacting the radicalisation process on a societal level are not represented in the current thesis.

In addition, the thesis study designs further limited the insight. The thesis exclusively utilised retrospective study designs, where radicalisation pathways were essentially investigated post-hoc, instead of tracking the possible development of extremist violence across multiple time points. Hence, the order in which those influences occurred can only be assumed. For example, ideology could have been a belief system that fostered extremist violence and/or it could have served as a justification of past radicalisation. Furthermore, the retrospective approach did not allow the researcher to trace an individual across different settings, not beyond the high-secure context. Thus, the discussed influences are limited to how they present themselves in forensic services and do not account for potential changes. For example, the access to different influences, such as family, arguably change once individuals become discharged.

Continuing from the previous point, the study designs were explorative. As such, they remained on a descriptive level, for example, summarising similarities and differences between groups but not exploring the causality of the observed links. In other words, the underlying mechanisms could not be determined. Consequently, all discussed explanations, such as the impact of normative beliefs on the radicalisation process, are speculative. The explorative design likely also restricts replicability of the findings. All studies and the systematic literature review featured qualitative methodology, such as thematic analyses (Braun & Clarke, 2006) or setting a cut-off value for the experts' feedback (Vosmer et al., 2009). Even the statistical analysis in study three included qualitative steps, namely the partitioning of the scatterplots to identify new clusters. As described throughout all limitation sections, the literature only provides general guidance (e.g., Gill, 2000). Consequently, future research might yield deviating influenced by a variation in the employed qualitative methodology.

Finally, the proposed ES-GBV model is preliminary at most. The scope of the current research did not allow for validation of the model or testing of its application in a clinical setting. Hence, it is expected that future evaluations will result in adjustments to the model. Avenues for such research are elaborated on next.

10.5   Future research

The systematic literature review together with the three studies identified several underlying mechanisms of radicalisation in forensic populations. As summarised by the ES-EV, especially the role of social cognitions was postulated as important to the radicalisation process. This includes aggressive scripts and their underlying normative views, such as violence ensuring survival, which echo the conclusion by Dhumaed et al. (2020) that justifications distinguish extremist individuals from other types of violent offenders. As Huesmann and Guerra (1997) locate the origin of general aggressive scripts in childhood, future research will have to focus on biographical accounts of radicalised individuals. In particular, the social comparison assumed to drive relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) should be included to foster the understanding what types of events contribute to the risk of radicalisation. All of these facets should aid the validation of the newly proposed conceptual ES-EV model.

For the mechanisms to be explored, first the observed heterogeneity of group-based violence must be replicated in other samples. This entails the investigation of other populations beyond the British cultural context. Only then can universal mechanisms be investigated by incorporating in-depth measures of personality. A criticism in study three was that the case files were sufficient for a first exploration but did not offer a detailed insight into the maladaptive personality styles. The wider spread of measurements must also address mental health issues to clarify their role in the radicalisation process.

In context of the current studies' findings and their alignment with the Information Processing Model for the Development of Aggression (Huesmann, 1988), it is hypothesised that the role of mental health issues might be best understood in the way that they impact on the information processing and decision-making process. It is expected that this will yield a more varied insight into different psychopathology, as compared to the undifferentiated views criticised in the systematic literature review. This also applies to the exploration of protective factors, a novel contribution of this thesis to the discourse of radicalised forensic mental health populations. Future research should trace the catalytic mechanisms suggested by Silke et al. (2021) to support rehabilitation endeavours. To explore the underlying mechanisms of radicalisation in more depth, all the aforementioned avenues must be settled in statistical analyses that allow for causal conclusions.

10.6   Concluding comments

The current research aimed to further the understanding of radicalisation in forensic mental health populations. For this purpose, methodology novel to the counterterrorism research, such as discourse analysis or Smallest Space Analysis, were applied to an understudied sample. The three studies, in conjunction with the systematic review, revealed a complex interplay of multiple factors influencing the risk of extremist violence. While some findings replicated previous studies that had been conducted in community settings, other results yielded new factors not before considered in counterterrorism. The motivation to participate in group-based violence and linking these forms of aggression to the Dark Triad represent new insights, along with the observed interplay of self-identity and group identity at the centre of the pathway towards extremist violence. Additionally, several protective factors unique to secure forensic settings were

identified. As such, the current research is one of the few studies offering empirical evidence regarding the radicalisation process within forensic populations. It offers a contribution to the ongoing debate in form of a conceptual model developed to aid clinicians in their understanding and subsequent prevention of extremist violence.

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APPENDIX A: AMENDED MATERIALS FOR THE SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

A combination of (a) Quality Assessment Tool for Observational Cohort and Cross-Sectional Studies and (b) Quality Assessment of Case-Control Studies

(merged) Criteria	Yes	No	Other (CD, NR, NA)*
1. Was there a clear and explicit definition of 'terrorism' and/or 'radicalisation' (e.g., differentiated from 'hate crime' or 'activism')?			
2. Was the research question or objective in this paper clearly stated?			
3. Did the research question focus on several extremist ideologies? If 'No', did the research question give reasons to only focus on a specific one?			
4. Were already established psychological and/or social theories utilized to guide the study (as opposed to proposing new theories)?			
5. Was the study population clearly specified and defined?			
Was there a control group (as opposed to a cross-sectional design)? If 'Yes', were the cases clearly differentiated from each other?			
6. Was the participation rate of eligible persons at least 50%? If less than 100 percent of eligible cases and/or controls were selected for the study, were the cases and/or controls randomly selected from those eligible?			
7. Were participants/cases from recruited the actual population (as opposed to a substitute sample that was assumed to be similar)? If 'No', does it appear reasonable that the presented findings can be extrapolated to the terrorist context?			
8. Were all the subjects selected or recruited from the same or similar populations (including the same time period)?			
9. Were inclusion and exclusion criteria for being in the study prespecified and applied uniformly to all participants?			
10. Was a sample size justification, power description, or variance and effect estimates provided?			
11. Were the investigators able to confirm that the exposure/risk occurred prior to the development of			

(merged) Criteria	Yes	No	Other (CD, NR, NA)*
the condition or event that defined a participant as a case?			
12. Were the measures of exposure/risk clearly defined, valid, reliable, and implemented consistently (including the same time period) across all study participants?			
13. Were the assessors of exposure/risk blinded to the case or control status of participants?			
14. Were appropriate statistical analyses employed that go beyond the level of descriptive analyses?			
15. Were key potential confounding variables measured and adjusted statistically in the analyses? If matching was used, did the investigators account for matching during study analysis?			

Quality Rating (Good, Fair, or Poor)
Rater #1 initials:
Rater #2 initials:
Additional Comments (If POOR, please state why):

*CD, cannot determine; NA, not applicable; NR, not reported

APPENDIX B: MATERIALS USED FOR STUDY ONE

Vulnerability factors putting individuals at risk of radicalisation

I would like to invite you to take part in a research study exploring psychological factors that make individuals vulnerable to radicalisation in secure forensic settings (SFS, e.g. prisons or forensic hospitals). While there is an increasing understanding of radicalisation in general, it remains unclear which factors and dynamics are relevant in SFS. This study aims to obtain your view on such potential drivers of radicalisation. It is part of a PhD that I am completing at the University of Central Lancashire.

What is the purpose of the study? Who should take part?

I want to explore the views of those with experience in either working with extremist offenders or who consult on such cases. I also want to obtain the view of academics who have published in this area. Please note that I am not requesting identifiable details about cases, I am only interested in your insights.

What does taking part in the study involve?

There are multiple concepts, factors, and dynamics discussed in the current literature regarding radicalisation. However, it remains unclear which of those factors are relevant in SFS and how they could impact. I would like to ask your opinion about this. I will suggest different factors that could be related to radicalisation and ask you to rate how useful they are. The survey should take about 10 to 15 minutes each time, with up to four rounds. Each round summarises the prior round and will ask you to comment on whether or not you agree with the factors being outlined. The aim it to reach a consensus view. You can stop taking part any time you like.

After reading this information sheet, you will be asked to provide your consent to participate. You will then be asked to provide a contact e-mail so that we can contact you about your participation in the next round. These will not be accessible to other participants. These details will be stored on a password protected document once responses have been collected, whilst other data will be entered separately into statistical software. When you have completed the entire study, any identifying information will be removed. We will then add your responses to the large pool of responses from the rest of our expert panel and look for patterns and trends in the opinions of the panel as a whole.

Please do not provide any identifiable details in your responses.

Why am I being asked to take part?

We have chosen you to take part in this study because you have experience in all of some of the following areas, (1) working with extremist offenders, (2) working with populations considered vulnerable to radicalisation, (3) conducting research in the field of radicalisation

(and published about this topic in two independent journals), and/or in (4) working as a consultant in cases of radicalisation.

Do I have to take part?

You should only take part if you want to. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to consent prior to joining the study. You can decide to withdraw after you have consented to taking part. If you decide to withdraw after starting the study, you can simply stop answering the questions. However, once you have submitted your answers, they cannot be withdrawn anymore. This is due to the fact that we merge your anonymised response with the rest of the group data, making the identification of individual responses impossible.

Who do I contact if I have any questions?

If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact me (SHenrich@uclan.ac.uk). If you have any concerns or complaints about the study you may contact the University Officer for Ethics at the University of Central Lancashire (OfficerForEthics@uclan.ac.uk). Please provide them with the name of the study (vulnerability to radicalisation) and researcher's name (Sören Henrich).

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. My supervisors details are below:

Supervisors

Prof. Jane L. Ireland
University of Central Lancashire, Fylde Road, Preston, PR1 2HE
Email: jireland1@uclan.ac.uk

Dr Michael Lewis
University of Central Lancashire, Fylde Road, Preston, PR1 2HE
Email: mlewis9@uclan.ac.uk

☐ I have read and understood this information sheet, and I consent to participate in this study.

Delphi questionnaire for round 1:

Demographic questions

Note that name and e-mail address are only collected to be used simply to contact you for the later research rounds – your name and email will not be retained once the data for this study has been collected.

1: Name:

2: E-mail address:

3: What is your job role?

_____

4: To what extent do you consider yourself knowledgeable about counter-terrorism (where '1' indicates 'not at all' and '5' 'extremely'):

Academically   1   2   3   4   5

In practice   1   2   3   4   5

5: Please read the following inclusion criteria to check whether you are eligible to participate in this study. Only tick the box below, if you meet at least on criterion.

You either are (1) working with extremist offenders, (2) working with populations considered vulnerable to radicalisation, (3) conducting research in the field of radicalisation (and published about this topic in two independent journals), and/or (4) working as a consultant in cases of radicalisation.

O I confirm that I meet at least one inclusion criteria.

Relevant aspects of the definition of 'terrorism'

As you are aware from your work, there are multiple definitions regarding 'terrorism'. In this section, we are interested in what you deem the most relevant to be considered in a definition.

What do you consider important aspects of terrorism that needs to be captured in a definition?:

_____

What do you consider are the most common misconceptions about terrorism?:

_____

Please indicate how strongly you agree with the aspects suggested below.*

Aspects	Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Unsure 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5
• A terrorist attack is politically motivated.					
• A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.					
• A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.					
• An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.					
• An attack must inflict helplessness in the target.					
• Terrorism can be used by individuals.					
• Terrorism can be used by groups.					
• Terrorism can be used by state agents.					
• Extreme forms of activism can be considered terrorism.					
• Hate crime can be considered terrorism.					
• Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.					
• Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.					
• Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.					

*Note to the ethical reviewer: After every rating the participants will have the opportunity to state their reasoning to include or exclude certain aspects in a text box stating 'If possible, please provide a reason for your rating.'.

If possible, please write down any other aspects you deem important for the definition of terrorism that have not been captured: _____

Factors associated with radicalisation in secure forensic settings

Please rate how much you think each of the statements will increase the likelihood of those detained in secure settings (prisons, hospitals, custody settings) becoming radicalised. Please use the following scale to rate your responses.*

Aspects	Strongly agree 1	Agree 2	Unsure 3	Disagree 4	Strongly disagree 5
• suggestibility					
• symptoms of depression (e.g. hopelessness)					
• below average IQ					
• experienced grievance					
• perceived discrimination					
• emotional coldness					
• lack of empathy					
• previous criminal record					
• access to religious services					
• grandiose sense of self					
• no social network					
• previous victimisation					
• Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.					

*Note to the ethical reviewer: After every rating the participants will have the opportunity to state their reasoning to include or exclude certain aspects in a text box stating 'If possible, please provide a reason for your rating.'.

If possible, please write down any other aspects you deem important for an individual becoming radicalised that have not been captured: _____

What factors would you include in a risk assessment specific to a secure forensic context?: _____

What are challenges of the radicalisation assessment that could be unique to a secure forensic context?: _____

What are the problems with current risk assessment instruments dealing with radicalisation?: _____

<u>Debrief sheet:</u>

Thank you for taking part in this Delphi study; your time is very much appreciated. This study aimed to explore the factors that could make someone detained in secure services vulnerable to radicalisation.

The findings of this Delphi study aim to contribute to the evidence base and to subsequent research that will try to identify individuals at risk of radicalisation. These findings will also contribute to the development of a holistic model explaining various trajectories to different types of radicalisation either in secure forensic settings, or after discharge.

If you have any questions regarding this research or your participation, or if you would like a copy of the overall findings, please do not hesitate to contact myself or my supervisors.

PhD Student
Sören Henrich
University of Central Lancashire, Fylde Road, Preston, PR1 2HE
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Supervisors:
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<u>Initial e-mail contact:</u>

Hello,

My name is Sören Henrich and I am a PhD student at the University of Central Lancashire. I am currently conducting my research in the area of radicalisation in secure forensic settings (SFS; e.g. prisons or forensic hospitals). This involves looking at factors making individuals in SFS vulnerable to different types of radicalisation. As part of this research, I will be conducting a Delphi study, in which I aim to recruit a panel of experts to give their opinions of this area.

In order to be eligible to take part in the research, you must have expertise in dealing with radicalised individuals. This may be in the capacity as a charge nurse, ward manager, psychologist (qualified, trainee or assistant), researcher or as a member of staff who feels they are particularly experienced in this area.

Ethical approval has been obtained from the ethics committee at the University of Central Lancashire. Please feel free to pass this email on to any colleagues working in Secure Services who may meet the criteria and may wish to participate.

This study will commence on DD/MM/YYYY. If you feel that you meet the eligibility criteria and would like to join this panel of experts, please contact me directly on shenrich@uclan.ac.uk.

If you would like to ask any questions before you decide to participate, please contact me on the e-mail provided below and I will respond to you directly regarding your participation.

Kind regards,

Sören Henrich

shenrich@uclan.ac.uk

Director of Studies: Prof. Jane Ireland jireland1@uclan.ac.uk

Second supervisor: Dr Michael Lewis mlewis9@uclan.ac.uk

<u>Initial contact e-mail for participants:</u>

Hello,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study, which is looking at factors making individuals vulnerable to radicalisation in secure forensic settings (SFS; e.g. prisons or forensic hospitals).

For the first round, I will provide you with statements, based on the findings from a systematic review of the literature that are considered significant to how and why individuals might become radicalised in secure services. As a member of the panel, you will be asked to indicate the extent to which you agree with these factors, based on your own experience. You will also be given the opportunity to provide your own factors that you deem to be relevant.

If you still wish to participate, please follow the link below which will direct you to an online survey.

<center><Insert link></center>

The deadline for the completion of the questionnaire is XXXXXX.

Kind regards,

Sören Henrich

Hello,

Thank you for agreeing to take part in the second round of this Delphi study. For this round, the factors that reached high consensus have been included for validation of consensus. This round will also include any additional factors that were suggested by any member of the panel to explore the degree to which the rest of the panel is in agreement with these. As with the first round, you will be provided with a list of statements regarding each factor and asked to rate the extent to which you agree with them, based on your own professional experience. You will also be given the opportunity to add further insights that you feel are relevant to staff responses.

If you still wish to participate, please follow the link below which will direct you to an online survey.

<Insert link>

The deadline for the completion of the questionnaire is XXXXXX.

Kind regards,

Sören Henrich

<u>Third round email:</u>

Thank you for agreeing to take part in the third round of this Delphi study. For this round, the factors that reached high consensus in the previous rounds have been included to explore whether in your view, remain to be significant factors. You will be provided with statements and asked to rate the extent that you agree with them as factors relevant to how staff respond to exposure to extreme stress.

If you still wish to participate, please follow the link below which will direct you to an online survey.

<center><Insert link></center>

The deadline for the completion of the questionnaire is XXXXXX.

Kind regards,

Sören Henrich

<u>Fourth round email:</u>

Thank you for agreeing to take part in the fourth round of this Delphi study. For this round, the factors that reached high consensus in the previous rounds have been included to explore whether in your view, remain to be significant factors. You will be provided with statements and asked to rate the extent that you agree with them as factors relevant to how staff respond to exposure to extreme stress.

If you still wish to participate, please follow the link below which will direct you to an online survey.

<p style="text-align:center"><Insert link></p>

The deadline for the completion of the questionnaire is XXXXXX.

Kind regards,

Sören Henrich

APPENDIX C: STEPWISE BREAKDOWN OF THE RESULTS OF STUDY ONE

Table C.1

Items Included in Round One

Items
Terrorism definition
1. A terrorist attack is politically motivated.
2. A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.
3. A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.
4. An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.
5. An attack must inflict helplessness in the target.
6. Terrorism can be used by individuals.
7. Terrorism can be used by groups.
8. Terrorism can be used by state agents.
9. Extreme forms of activism can be considered terrorism.
10. Hate crime can be considered terrorism.
11. Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.
12. Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.
13. Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.
Factors associated with radicalisation in SFS
14. suggestibility
15. symptoms of depression (e.g. hopelessness)
16. below average IQ
17. experienced grievance
18. perceived discrimination
19. emotional coldness
20. lack of empathy
21. previous criminal record
22. access to religious services
23. grandiose sense of self
24. no social network
25. previous victimisation

Note. Qualitative open-ended questions are not included here, but presented further below.

Table C2

The Average Percentage of Agreement and Disagreement for All Items in Rround One (N =

19)

	Percentage %	
Items	**Agreement**	**Disagreement**
<u>Terrorism definition</u>		
1. A terrorist attack is politically motivated.	**84.2**	10.5
2. A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.	36.8	36.8
3. A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.	78.9	15.8
4. An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.	73.7	26.3
5. An attack must inflict helplessness in the target.	36.8	42.1
6. Terrorism can be used by individuals.	**94.7**	5.3
7. Terrorism can be used by groups.	**100**	0.0
8. Terrorism can be used by state agents.	78.9	15.8
9. Extreme forms of activism can be considered terrorism.	42.1	26.3
10. Hate crime can be considered terrorism.	52.6	21.1
11. Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.	26.3	47.4
12. Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.	52.6	42.1
13. Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.	47.4	26.3
<u>Factors associated with radicalisation in SFS</u>		
14. suggestibility	**88.9**	0.0
15. symptoms of depression (e.g. hopelessness)	61.1	11.1
16. below average IQ	44.4	27.8
17. experienced grievance	**88.9**	5.6
18. perceived discrimination	**94.4**	0.0
19. emotional coldness	33.3	38.9
20. lack of empathy	33.3	33.3
21. previous criminal record	44.4	22.2
22. access to religious services	22.2	44.4
23. grandiose sense of self	44.4	22.2
24. no social network	44.4	33.3
25. previous victimisation	61.1	11.1

Note. Values presented in bold reached the cut-off ≥80% for consensus.

Table C3

Items for the Next Round Derived from the Participants' Responses, Including their Exemplary Comments, Structured Following Section One 'Terrorism Definition', Section Two 'Radicalisation Factors', and Section Three 'Considerations for Assessment'

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
Section 1: Perpetrator	Terrorism can be used by state agents.*	/
	Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.*	/
Section 1: Target	Immediate targets are mostly civilians. (22.2)	"indiscriminate use of violence against civilians"
	Immediate targets are mostly representations of targeted state/ government. (16.7)	"[...] who perpetrate acts of violence against targets that represent the state to express [...]."
Section 1: Goals	A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.* (16.7)	"[...] 3) Violence that is intended to affect the behaviour of an audience other or in addition to the actual victims of physical violence (e.g. government, corporation) [...]"
	An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.* (11.1)	"[...]fear-inducing [...]"

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
	An attack is intended to inflict helplessness in the target.*	/
	An attack has the purpose of expressing grief or supremacy. (11.1)	"[...]to express grievance and assert their supremacy."
	An attack has the purpose to elicit support in like-minded individuals/groups. (16.7)	"That violence is not the endgoal, but the means through which terrorist grab the attention of diverse target audiences; those they wish to intimidate and those they wish to win over. Terrorism as violent theatre."
	Terrorists attacks are indiscriminate. (11.1)	"indiscriminate use of violence against civilians"
Section 1: Motivation	A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.*	/
	A terrorist attack is motivated by political reasons.* (22.2)	"political purpose"
	A terrorist attack is motivated by ideological reasons.* (27.8)	"Radicalised ideology, extreme views, and evil intentions"

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
	Terrorists' motivation is considered to be heterogeneous. (5.6)	"[misconceptions about terrorism are...] 2) Motives are considered homogenous [...]"
Section 1: Nature of Violence	Hate crimes can be considered terrorism.*	/
	Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.*	/
	Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.*	/
	Extreme forms of activism can be considered terrorism, if violence is a key aspect of activism.*	/
	Terrorist attacks are predominantly premeditated. (25.0)	"it is planned; [...]"
	Violence by terrorists is not static (like a trait), but dynamic (like behaviour). (33.3)	"recognition of 'process' rather than 'state'"

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
Section 2: Environmental/ contextual factors	Exposure to extremist content. (21.4)	"Contacts; [...]; Ideological exposure"
	Exposure to extremists or other pro-criminal peers. (37.5)	"[...] Meaningful contact with other individuals who are interested, involved or identified with violent extremist groups, causes or ideologies [...]"
	No pro-social networks. (14.3)	"[...] social exclusion and when protective influences fail, or investment in extreme over-valued idiosyncratic beliefs when accompanied by social isolation that is independent of mental illness [...]"
	Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in social divides. (11.1)	"prison officials (officers, wardens etc,) who promote certain types of racial/ethnic segregation, [...] encouraging conflicts between groups or otherwise coordinate with certain inmate-based groups in terms of drug distribution and other criminal activity [...]"
	Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in discrimination. (18.8)	"[...]Contextual conditions that support, facilitate or reinforce discrimination, injustice, dehumanisation and demonisation of other

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
		groups, us and them thinking etc (including the policies, processes and practices of establishments and staff members) [...]"
	Preoccupation with current political events resulting in sense for imminent need for action. (14.3)	"[...]External events accessed through news, media or other contacts."
	Preoccupation with current political events resulting in feeling of threat to own group. (12.5)	"[...] The opportunity provided by the political/ social context is also important, alongside failures of protection."
	Moving between different institutions (e.g., from prison to hospital). (6.3)	"[...]Changes in environment (especially entering secure units from the community or switching secure environments) [...]"
Section 2: Criminal needs	Opportunistic motivation to gain financial resources. (25.0)	"[...] criminal intent - the opportunist seeking tangential benefits of the extremist cause. [...]"
	Opportunistic motivation to gain protection. (25.0)	"promise of some form of gain: protection, belonging, material rewards"
	Previous criminal record.*	/
	Previous problems with violence. (12.5)	"[...]previous experience of committing violent crimes, [...]"

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
	Affordance/capacity. (7.1)	"Financial examination - means, opportunity, motivations, access.; [...] Tendency to engage in futile ideas and fads - likelihood of engagement."
Section 2: Individual factors	symptoms of depression (e.g. hopelessness) (12.5)	"[...]Loneliness. Alienation suicidality"
	previous victimisation*	/
	grandiose sense of self* (6.3)	"[...] Terrorism involves restoring impugned narcissism in those who feel power poor. ; The role of supremacy is important here. All terrorist ideologies promise supremacy (not equal respect), [...]"
	high levels of impulsivity (12.5)	"[...]low self-control [...]"
	boredom or tendency for sensation seeking (6.3)	"[...]; Boredom or lack of excitement - the thrill seeker. [...]"
	distorted cognitive style/worldview (e.g., conspiracies) (28.6)	"[...]Manichean worldview.; - Conspiratorial worldview [...]"
	feelings of guilt and/or need for redemption (31.2)	"In my experince the aspect of redemption is important. I often see individuals with criminal records who seek forgiveness for their past in strict religious ideas and beliefs"

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
	substance misuse (7.1)	"[...] mental health, substance misuse, [...]"
Section 3: Considerations for assessment	Consideration of alternative hypotheses to engage in extremism. (20.0)	"[...]Individuals may want to appear radicalised in secure settings - when this may not actually be the case - for reasons that may not be present or apparent in community settings e.g. to 'survive' in secure settings, to establish group membership, to access resources.[...]"
	Continuous assessment to evaluate development. (20.0)	"[...]forensic context [...] provides time for people to actually delve into their ideologies which might make them more radicalised."
	Assessments must include formulations to account for functions of factors specific to each individual. (6.7)	"Individuals are subject to restrictions across multiple lifestyle factors which are important to the process of radicalisation (social and environmental factors)."
	Assessment of needs, instead of prediction of risk. (23.1)	"[...]we should focus more on needs assessment and providing wrap around services to all inmates/patients [...]
	Un-targeted, general assessment runs the risk of contributing to radicalisation dynamics (e.g.,	"Those being assessed are likely to be suspicious of those assessing (resulting in limited disclosure) - fear of "mind games", extra restrictions of liberty... [...]"

Sub-ordinate theme	Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
	making individual feeling even more oppressed, hence, seeking out other extremists). (13.3)	
	Verification and access to collateral information. (26.7)	"Verification lying punishments by other prisoners"
	Establishing trust. (6.7)	"The nature of the relationship - trust and confidentiality; [...]"
	Awareness that warning signs for grooming are often lacking. (6.7)	"As with any person being groomed there may be little to no warning signs."
	Awareness that some crucial concepts have no established measurements. (38.5)	"Lack of testing and evidence"

Note. The depicted percentages indicate the number of participants who contributed to a theme/item. Themes/items marked with * were first derived from the systematic literature review, but could also mentioned again in the participants' responses. Where a comment to a * is missing, the item is purely based on the systematic literature review and is mentioned here for the participants' convenience in the next round.

Table C4

The Average Percentage of Agreement and Disagreement for All Items in Round Two (N = 11)

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %
<u>Section 1: Environmental/ contextual factors</u>		
1. Exposure to extremist content.	**90.9**	0.0
2. Exposure to extremists or other pro-criminal peers.	**90.9**	0.0
3. No pro-social networks.	**81.8**	9.1
4. Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in social divides.	36.4	9.1
5. Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in discrimination.	27.3	9.1
6. Preoccupation with current political events resulting in sense for imminent need for action.	**90.9**	0.0
7. Preoccupation with current political events resulting in feeling of threat to own group.	**100**	0.0
8. Moving between different institutions (e.g., from prison to hospital).	9.1	27.3
<u>Section 1: Criminal needs</u>		
9. Opportunistic motivation to gain financial resources.	27.3	54.5
10. Opportunistic motivation to gain protection.	45.5	45.5
11. Previous criminal record	54.5	18.2
12. Previous problems with violence.	**90.9**	0.0
13. Affordance/capacity.	54.5	0.0
<u>Section 1: Individual factors</u>		
14. symptoms of depression (e.g. hopelessness)	54.5	18.2
15. previous victimisation	54.5	18.2
16. grandiose sense of self	72.7	9.1
17. high levels of impulsivity	45.5	36.4
18. boredom or tendency for sensation seeking	72.7	9.1
19. distorted cognitive style/worldview (e.g., conspiracies)	**81.8**	9.1
20. feelings of guilt and/or need for redemption	45.5	9.1
21. substance misuse	18.2	45.5
<u>Section 2: Considerations for assessment</u>		
22. Consideration of alternative hypotheses to engage in extremism.	**80.0**	0.0
23. Continuous assessment to evaluate development.	**90.0**	0.0
24. Assessments must include formulations to account for functions of factors specific to each individual.	**90.0**	0.0
25. Assessment of needs, instead of prediction of risk.	**80.0**	10.0
26. Un-targeted, general assessment runs the risk of contributing to radicalisation dynamics (e.g., making individual feeling even more oppressed, hence, seeking out other extremists).	**80.0**	0.0
27. Verification and access to collateral information.	**90.0**	0.0
28. Establishing trust.	**90.0**	0.0
29. Awareness that warning signs for grooming are often lacking.	50.0	10.0
30. Awareness that some crucial concepts have no established measurements.	70.0	00

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %
Section 3: Perpetrator		
31. Terrorism can be used by state agents.	70.0	20.0
32. Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.	30.0	60.0
Section 3: Target		
33. Immediate targets are mostly civilians.	**80.0**	20.0
34. Immediate targets are mostly representations of targeted state/government.	50.0	50.0
Section 3: Goals		
35. A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.	70.0	10.0
36. An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.	40.0	40.0
37. An attack is intended to inflict helplessness in the target.	40.0	30.0
38. An attack has the purpose of expressing grief or supremacy.	30.0	40.0
39. An attack has the purpose to elicit support in like-minded individuals/groups.	**80.0**	0.0
40. Terrorists attacks are indiscriminate.	20.0	50.0
Section 3: Motivation		
41. A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.	30.0	50.0
42. A terrorist attack is motivated by political reasons.	**90.0**	10.0
43. A terrorist attack is motivated by ideological reasons.	**90.0**	10.0
44. Terrorists' motivation is considered to be heterogeneous.	70.0	20.0
Section 3: Nature of violence		
45. Hate crimes can be considered terrorism.	60.0	30.0
46. Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.	40.0	30.0
47. Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.	60.0	20.0
48. Extreme forms of activism can be considered terrorism, if violence is a key aspect of activism.	**90.0**	0.0
49. Terrorist attacks are predominantly premeditated.	**90.0**	10.0
50. Violence by terrorists is not static (like a trait), but dynamic (like behaviour).	**90.0**	10.0

Note. Values presented in bold reached the cut-off ≥80% for consensus.

Table C5

Items for the Next Round Derived from the Participants' Responses Regarding Protective Factors,

Including their Exemplary Comments

Theme/Item (%)	Suggestion/Comment
pro-social role models in SFS (e.g., officers) (33.3)	"positive pro social mentor or role model among staff"
pro-social role models outside of SFS (e.g., peers) (16.7)	"[...]Authentic and positive personal relationships.[...]"
needing to take care for others outside of SFS (e.g., sick family members, children) (16.7)	"duty of care for others outside of prison setting; [...]"
meaningful pro-social engagement with system (e.g., school engagement)* (16.7)	"[...]ability to engage with pro-social systems of meaning (e.g. schooling, family etc)"
peers present with diverse backgrounds (16.7)	"postive relationships with individuals from diverse backgrounds; [...]"
mindfulness (16.7)	"[...]mindfulness [...]"
respecting others (16.7)	"[...] d. Generally respects others and do not blame other groups for his/her difficulties. [...]"
content with own life (16.7)	"[...]c. . Generally content with his-/herself and his/her life [...]"
cognitive flexibility (16.7)	"[...]b. Flexible in his/her attitudes and willing to question his/her beliefs [...]"
not externalising blame (16.7)	"[...] d. Generally respects others and do not blame other groups for his/her difficulties. [...]"
aware of hypermasculinity (16.7)	"[...]understanding social arrangements in terms of how hypermasculinity encourages certain types of behavior"
hope for meaningful pro-social life outside of SFS (16.7)	"[...]A belief or hope in a meaningful life within or beyond the SFC."

Note. N = 6 participants. The item marked with * was already mentioned in previous rounds,

clarifying that access to religious services should not be classed as a risk factor, but a protective

factor.

Table C6

The Average Percentage of Agreement and Disagreement for All Items in Round Three (N = 11)

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %
Section 1: Environmental/ contextual factors		
1. Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in social divides.	72.8	27.3
2. Institutionally enforced segregation resulting in discrimination.	**100**	0.0

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %
3. Moving between different institutions (e.g., from prison to hospital).	18.2	**81.8**
Section 1: Criminal needs		
4. Opportunistic motivation to gain financial resources.	54.5	45.5
5. Opportunistic motivation to gain protection.	72.8	27.3
6. Previous criminal record	72.8	27.3
7. Affordance/capacity.	63.6	36.4
Section 1: Individual factors		
8. symptoms of depression (e.g. hopelessness)	63.6	36.4
9. previous victimisation	**90.9**	9.1
10. grandiose sense of self	**100**	0.0
11. high levels of impulsivity	72.7	27.3
12. boredom or tendency for sensation seeking	72.7	27.3
13. feelings of guilt and/or need for redemption	63.6	36.4
14. substance misuse	45.4	54.5
Section 1: Protective factors		
15. pro-social role models in SFS (e.g., officers)	**90.9**	9.1
16. pro-social role models outside of SFS (e.g., peers)	**90.9**	9.1
17. needing to take care for others outside of SFS (e.g., sick family members, children)	**90.9**	9.1
18. meaningful pro-social engagement with system (e.g., school engagement)	**100**	0.0
19. peers present with diverse backgrounds	**100**	0.0
20. mindfulness	72.8	27.3
21. respecting others	72.8	27.3
22. content with own life	**81.8**	18.2
23. cognitive flexibility	**90.9**	9.1
24. not externalising blame	**90.9**	9.1
25. aware of hypermasculinity	63.6	36.4
26. hope for meaningful pro-social life outside of SFS	**100**	0.0
Section 2: Considerations for assessment		
27. Awareness that warning signs for grooming are often lacking.	**90.9**	9.1
28. Awareness that some crucial concepts have no established measurements.	**90.9**	9.1
Section 3: Perpetrator		
30. Terrorism can be used by state agents.	54.5	45.5
31. Terrorism should be defined by a specific cluster of psychological traits.	45.4	54.5
Section 3: Target		
32. Immediate targets are mostly representations of targeted state/government.	45.4	54.5
Section 3: Goals		
33. A terrorist attack aims to change behaviour.	**90.9**	9.1
34. An attack must inflict fear or panic in the target.	72.8	27.3
35. An attack is intended to inflict helplessness in the target.	72.8	27.3
36. An attack has the purpose of expressing grief or supremacy.	54.5	45.5
37. Terrorists attacks are indiscriminate.	36.4	63.6

Items	Agreement in %	Disagreement in %
Section 3: Motivation		
38. A terrorist attack is motivated by a personal vendetta.	30.0	70.0
39. Terrorists' motivation is considered to be heterogeneous.	**100**	0.0
Section 3: Nature of violence		
40. Hate crimes can be considered terrorism.	**80.0**	20.0
41. Terrorism should be defined as a warfare strategy.	50.0	50.0
42. Terrorism is clearly different to other form of organised crime.	**90.0**	10.0

Note. Values presented in bold reached the cut-off ≥80% for consensus.

Interview Guidance following 5P-Approach

(Logan, C. (2014). The HCR-20 Version 3: A case study in risk formulation. *International Journal of Forensic Mental Health*, *13*(2), 172-180.

Weerasekera, P. (1996). Multiperspective case formulation: A step toward treatment integration. Malabar, FL: Krieger.)

An interview will be completed in relation to your views of politics and/or religion using the 5P-Approach to guide the information gathering.

5P interview prompts for patients.
INTERVIEWER TO READ OUT TYPE NOT IN BOLD

Introduction

This interview will explore with you attitudes related to political and/or religious views and how these relate to your behaviour. We will be asking you about the following areas:

- Your views around politics and/or religion;
- Whether your friends and family support your views;
- Your mental health and how you generally cope with difficulties;
- Your current care and how it relates to political and/or religious views

We hope that this will provide some useful information on <u>how</u> different factors can impact views about politics and/or religion and how this can inform behaviour.

If you feel that you do not want to discuss something, please just say. You do not have to give a reason. You can also end this interview at any time, again you do not have to give a reason. Also, you do not have to answer all questions put to you, you can choose not to answer some questions.

INTERVIEWER TO SHOW PATIENTS WHAT A BRIEF INTERVIEW GUIDANCE LOOKS LIKE AND TO BRIEFLY TALK THROUGH EACH SECTION

This interview will go through each section to gather information about your political and/or religious views. We first would like to get a good understanding of your current opinions.

Completing the Interview Guidance following 5P-Approach

INTERVIEWER TO COMMENCE WITH 'PRESENT VIEWS' SECTION

We will now explore what you think about politics and/or religion.

INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **What is your opinion on politics and/or religion?**
- **How important are those views to you? How often do you think about those views?**
- **What do you think about others who have different opinions?**
- **When thinking about people with different opinions, what is your view on violence?**

INTERVIEWER TO EXAMINE 'PERPETUATING' SECTION

We will now explore what supports your attitudes and opinions.

INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **How can you talk to the following people about your views?**
  - **Family?**
  - **Friends?**
  - **Inside the hospital?**
- **What are your views on media regarding politics/religion and why?**
- **How does it feel being part of a group of people who have the same opinions, and why do you feel that way?**
- **Who is your biggest influence on your political/religious views? What are characteristics you like about them?**

INTERVIEWER TO EXAMINE 'PREDISPOSING' SECTION

We will now explore how you started having those opinions and/or beliefs.

INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **When you first started having those opinions, what was happening in your life? Can you describe one event that was personally important to your political/religious views?**
- **How did you learn about this specific political opinion/religious attitude?**
- **How did the political opinion/religious attitude make your life better?**
- **In your opinion, is there a certain type of person holding views similar to yours? Please describe them.**
-

INTERVIEWER TO EXAMINE 'PRECIPITATING' SECTION

We will now explore moments when your political and/or religious beliefs are really important.

INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **When do you tend to think about politics and/or religion? What kind of situations, how do you tend to feel?**
-

INTERVIEWER TO EXAMINE 'PROTECTIVE' SECTION

We will now explore what makes you doubt your political and/or religious beliefs.

INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **When do you doubt your beliefs? What is going on in your head during those moments?**
- **What do you think about other political and/or religious beliefs?**
- **Do you think that you will always have the same views? Why?/ Why not?**
- **What would it take to convince you of other political and/or religious beliefs?**
-

INTERVIEWER TO EXAMINE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR

I would like to ask you a few questions to briefly explore your aggressive behaviour.
INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **Would you describe yourself as a verbally aggressive person? i.e. do you insult others verbally, shout at others, threaten others?**
- **Would you describe yourself as physically aggressive to objects? i.e. breaking objects, kicking objects**
- **Would you describe yourself as a physically aggressive person? i.e. do you hit, slap, punch, kick others?**
- **Have you ever deliberately hurt yourself? i.e. cut, severely scratched, burned, swallowed dangerous substances or objects, on purpose?**

INTERVIEWER TO EXAMINE CONSEQUENCES & COPING

I would like to ask you a few questions to briefly explore your coping.
INTERVIEWER TO COVER THESE AREAS:
- **What helps you cope with stressful situations?**
- **What is your favourite way to relax?**

Ending the interview
Thank you for taking the time to discuss this with me. Is there anything that you would like to add?

INTERVIEWER TO CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW BY ASKING THE PATIENT ABOUT GENERAL ISSUES TO DISTRACT FROM THE CONTENT OF THE INTERVIEW E.G. WHAT ARE THEIR PLANS FOR THE REST OF THE DAY, WHAT WORKSHOPS ARE THEY ATTENDING AT THE MOMENT ETC.

ORIGIN OF YOUR VIEWS
How did you learn about those political/religious views?

PRESENT VIEWS
What is your current opinion on politics and/or religion?

DOUBTING YOUR VIEWS
When do you doubt your views?

SITUATIONAL
In what situations do you actively think about your political and/or religious views?

SUPPORT FOR YOUR VIEWS
Who else in your life has the same views?

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PRESENT VIEWS

- What is your opinion on politics and/or religion?
- How important are those views to you? How often do you think about those views?
- What do you think about others who have different opinions?
- When thinking about people with different opinions, what is your view on violence?

ORIGIN OF YOUR VIEWS

- When you first started having those opinions, what was happening in your life? Can you describe one event that was personally important to your political/religious views?
- How did you learn about this specific political opinion/religious attitude?
- How did the political opinion/religious attitude make your life better?
- In your opinion, is there a certain type of person holding views similar to yours? Please describe them.

SUPPORT OF YOUR VIEWS

- How can you talk to the following people about your views? Family? Friends? Inside the hospital?
- What are your views on media regarding politics/religion and why?
- How does it feel being part of a group of people who have the same opinions, and why do you feel that way?
- Who is your biggest influence on your political/religious views? What are characteristics you like about them?

SITUATIONAL

- When do you tend to think about politics and/or religion? What kind of situations, how do you tend to feel?

DOUBTING YOUR VIEWS

- When do you doubt your beliefs? What is going on in your head during those moments?
- What do you think about other political and/or religious beliefs?
- Do you think that you will always have the same views? Why?/ Why not?
- What would it take to convince you of other political and/or religious beliefs?

QUESTIONS ABOUT AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR

- Would you describe yourself as a verbally aggressive person? i.e. do you insult others verbally, shout at others, threaten others?
- Would you describe yourself as physically aggressive to objects? i.e. breaking objects, kicking objects
- Would you describe yourself as a physically aggressive person? i.e. do you hit, slap, punch, kick others?
- Have you ever deliberately hurt yourself? i.e. cut, severely scratched, burned, swallowed dangerous substances or objects, on purpose?

QUESTIONS ABOUT COPING

- What helps you cope with stressful situations?
- What is your favourite way to relax?

APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS OF STUDY TWO

Interview 1:

1 Int.: Yeah, so, ehm, we have a little interview *inaudible* of things and how they affect

2 behaviour. As I say, whatever you wanna mention or not mention, it's like super chill, I'm not

3 going into like a lot of difficult things so to speak. So generally, I'm wondering like are you…

4 do you think you're political or religious or any of those things?

5 P1: No, I'm neither of those things. I'm a little bit religious, but I don't believe in the bible or

6 something like that. I sort of believe in Karma, if I conduct myself in a good way, I will maybe

7 go to heaven.

8 Int.: Ok.

9 P1: And stuff like that. I *mumbling* I sometimes contradict myself.

10 Int.: Ok, but that is kind a religion that you practice as well or is that something//?

11 P1: I say my prayers every [night

12 Int.: Ok.

13 P1: and] direct that to the lad that lost his life on me case. So, I'm trying not to forget about it

14 before *mumbling* I think it erases his memory, you know what I mean?

15 Int.: Yeah, ok, interesting. And this prayer, as you saying, you're doing every evening, right?

16 P1: = Yeah.

17 Int.: Is that something that you can also share with people here, for example, or do you keep

18 that to yourself?

19 P1: I don't tell anyone about my thoughts and beliefs. I sit sometimes I talk about it, but I don't

20 know why I believe it. I don't know whether it is true or false.

21 Int.: = Yeah.

22   P1: So, I sort of talk about it with any *mumbling* he's a good lad, and he will tell me, he will

23   tell me 'why you reading the bible?' and that, and I tell him 'I don't believe in the bible, I just

24   believe in Jesus.'

25   Int.: Gottcha.

26   P1: Cause he seems to be into the Koran. The the the Jewish books. And the bible. So, he's

27   the biggest celebrity that ever lived, you know what I mean?

28   Int.: Seems to know a lot about all those things then, yeah?

29   P1: Yeah.

30   Int.: So, ehm, so, do you, is that… how do I phrase that? When you talking to the lads here, on

31   the ward, ehm, do you find difficult when they have different opinions. Because it sounds from

32   what you're describing, it sounds really ehm relaxed.

33   P1: Yeah, well, for instance this morning, well **X** who I sort of disliked, sitting having me

34   dinner and there is an extremist on here and he was *mumbling* understood to booked into the

35   Arabic channel and was singing 'Humdala humdala' and all that stuff and I thought I dislike

36   that. And I think that is instilled in me from prison to dislike that that gang member… not just

37   the religion in general, it's a gang… And ehm, I *inaudible* for a split second but then I kind

38   of was eating me dinner and forgot about it. But for a split second it did irritate me, you know?

39   Int.: Yeah, and, so, it's not so much – just to get this right, clarifying things—it seems it's not

40   so much about the religion itself as it's more the experience you had in prison with other gangs?

41   P1: Yeah, the gang culture and what it became. Some of them were praying and doing stuff,

42   they were just, they were just form a gang and that clique would then go on to on a Friday after

43   prayers—we called them 'Friday fanatics'—after Friday prayer they would attack someone.

44   Int.: Oh, ok, and, ehm, how, when you say for a second you got back into this mind set of being

45   in prison how did that make you feel? Like how was that relationship back then with those

46   gangs? Was that really hostile or//?

47   P1: Very hostile. It was, we were training on the yards, and the 20 extremist and 20 other lads,

48   all training, on the same yard, for one purpose, for the up and coming fight that be coming.

49   And ehm it was it was scary times, you know? It was weapons and stuff.

50   Int.: So, had it ever come to physical fights?

51   P1: Yeah, loads of time, yeah. I'm been involved in three myself, three altercations myself.

52   One was documented by the staff, someone and that. And ehm I then find myself being the

53   enemy of the state, sort of thing, for the extremists. Put money on me to get me and stuff like

54   that. And I had to live with that, you know?

55   Int.: I mean that does sound very dangerous the way you describe that. But it also seems you

56   had then in your corner your gang. Did they shared kind of the similar believes as you did?

57   P1: = No, no, it was lads, all lads being in trouble with these kinds. All sorts have come together

58   in this one jail, and even the staff… prison staff would get us all together and tell us 'This male

59   just got out, phone call today, somebody gets attacked." So, we all stick together. And you sort

60   of fall down into a little clique.

61   Int.: = Gottcha. Yeah.

62   P1: = And, ehm, I got out of one gang living on the streets on to jumping onto another gang in

63   prison.

64   Int.: Ok, ehm, when you were with that gang in prison for example, ehm, was there... it kind of

65   sounds a bit like you were looking out for each other.

66   P1: It was a survival thing.

67   Int.: It was a survival thing.

68   P1: To get into the shower, you needed 4 of you to get in the shower together. To get to one

69   of the yards *inaudible* you needed to go out together. To... to certain things or going to your

70   room at night you wouldn't walk the hallway at night and eh it was in prison. It was hectic.

71 Int.: It sounds like it. Ehm. Would you say—as I say it was survival, you were looking out for

72 each other—ehm it was all necessary because you're having the same believes to a small

73 amount ehm yeah as I say it's a survival thing. With for example what we mentioned before—

74 Jesus, Karma, having your prayers at night—would you wish you would have more people that

75 you can share this with? Was that something important to you now *inaudible*?

76 P1: Well, for instance, the Friday Fanatics attacked us on the wing. There were 15, 15 of them

77 and everyone on the ward wing just stood there and let it happen. And I was the only person

78 who jumped in there and helped. And I thought to myself 'I'm alone in this'. So, then I started

79 picturing everyone as the enemies. I thought 'Surely they would stick it to me'. I was paranoid

80 then, I was hypervigilant, and I was using really excessive force.

81 Int.: (.) So, from the sounds of it, it feels then really alone, because there wasn't anyone else

82 who had the courage to step in. You were kind of the only one *inaudible* in those moments.

83 Ehm, going back to the religion part, because I am really interested in that, because you

84 mentioned some *inaudible* With the religious aspects, like thinking about karma etc, you said

85 beforehand that you're not quite sure where that comes from or whether it is true or not.

86 P1: = No, no one has taught me religion, no one taught me. Me mum and dad did. I, I was

87 gonna turn Muslim when I was a kid, when I first was gone send to jail. Because he was a

88 nice… a Iman, he was a nice fella. I must have started the rise of the Muslim in prison. And

89 ehm I got out on a visit with my dad and I had the beads on—those Muslim beads—and my

90 dad said to me 'What the fuck you doing? You lost your mind! You're not religious. Don't…

91 don't be falling on to religion, please. We're your family. We're your strong, we're your

92 threshold. We're… we're gonna… ehm, hand…*mumbling* You're protestant.' So, I just

93 stuck to being a protestant from that day forward.

94 Int.: Ok, it seems your dad had a real big influence on you that day.

95 P1: Yeah.

96   Int.: You're [that…

97   P1: He support] [local football club], so I've got to support [local football club].

98   Int.: What would've happened that day if you said 'No, I wanna be Muslim', for example?

99   P1: (.) He would've stuck by me, but he would've looked at me in a different way.

100   Int.: Hm, ok, and you said beforehand that the Iman was a 'nice fella'. What made him…

101   what made him nice, like [did he…?

102   P1: Well, I] just stabbed a lad in the throat. And I nearly killed them. And I thought to

103   myself 'I'm just getting evil and this jail is making me worse, making me more vicious.' And

104   ehm the priest would come to your window and asking 'You're ok?'—there's a flap in—and

105   shut the flap on you and walk away. He'd come around and *inaudible*, but he wouldn't

106   open the door and come and speak to you. But the Iman would open the door come in and

107   speak to you and showed… intrigued about your life. And would tell you that as a Muslim

108   you can defend yourself. If anyone touches you, you can defend yourself. None of this 'Turn

109   the other cheek'P1: shit, like the Christians are into. And I thought I didn't like that.

110   Int.: (.) I mean, that… I can see why that is better obviously. Because if the priest comes

111   along, that is not really ehm… not really talking to you and seem not really interested in you.

112   Just close the flap again. Ehm, so, the *inaudible* the Iman had to… ehm, it seems it was just

113   more in you interest, maybe? Because it was like… it's more about [self-defence

114   P1: Yeah!]

115   Int.: actually talking to you//

116   P1: And it was all evidence books and all that. Which the bible never had evidence book and

117   stuff like that it was just taken on face value… faith you know what I mean? With this faith,

118   you know?

119   Int.: Yeah, ehm. How often—this is just an estimate, it don't need to be exact—but I was just

120   wondering how often and for how long did you seen that Iman then?

121   P1: (.) He would come and see me… definitely every Friday and occasionally twice, three

122   times through the week.

123   Int.: Ok. … And then, was that for a long time generally?

124   P1: No, I was in the block for 6 months. So, he was 6 months.

125   Int.: And afterwards your dad saw the prayer beads and was like 'What's happening'?

126   P1: Yeah. Cause, I, he schooled me that we're protestant in our family, but we're not really

127   religious so don't get stuck into a religion, you know?

128   Int.: Gottcha. And how… how did that make you feel? Was that ok for you? Were you

129   shocked what you dad said?

130   P1: I was shocked, cause, ehm, I thought he'd be happy that I found [religion

131   Int.: Yeah.

132   P1: but] instead he was the opposite. He was like… he turned to me 'These things happened

133   2,000 years ago. You're… these were laws of the land, these religious books. And ehm…

134   they were for the church to get money or somebody to get like *mumbling*.' But he said to

135   me: 'That … that was 2,000 years ago, right? These books are *mumbling* books. They

136   don't apply to us today, you know?'

137   Int.: So… why was that… so why was that important to 'Ok, I'm sticking to my family'. Like

138   why was that more important to you than//?

139   P1: Because I didn't want to change. I was an evil guy when I was outside. I made… I've

140   done certain things, vicious things. But they were only to criminals, to defend myself. I don't

141   wanted defend myself. And ehm when I come to jail I took it upon myself to stab people. To

142   took some people. My Karma… my Karma was nowhere to be seen. It was only until I

143   started conducting myself in a better way, I was getting more results out of… away in the

144   block. I had a telly, I had family come to see me always made up with me. But when I was

145   stabbing people and that, everyone was all negative. The food was spat in, pissed in. I was

146   standing in there and all that looked out the block, had no telly, had no relationship with no

147   one and I was becoming a vicious guy, an animal. I properly needed community, you know

148   what I mean?

149   Int.: So, did you feel that your religion helped you to turn towards a better//?

150   P1: Yeah, not just the religion. It was… it was my inner thought I wanted to be a better

151   person. I was wishing, I was wishing to be a good person. And whether that wish come to

152   well, I don't know but I was wishing to be a good person.

153   Int.: (.) Have you then… I think it's very honourable to have that kind of outlook on life

154   saying I want to be a better person. Ehm… so I was kind of wondering, because you also said

155   before it's not about religion but it's about people attacking you and you defending yourself.

156   So, I was just kind of wondering ehm how do you feel about different religions now? Where

157   do you draw the line, for example with, the guy who is an extremist//?

158   P1: Yeah, so what I do is, I just don't let him… He's from Manchester. He's from

159   Manchester. He's become an extremist after the Ariana Grande [thing.

160   Int.: Gottcha.

161   P1: and] that's when I turned a bit radical myself. I became a little hitman. Because after the

162   Ariana Grande thing, my little nieces went there. They were in the front row and they were

163   ok, and all that, they were in the forum. But the explosion happened. And ehm when I see a

164   Manchester extremist you'd become radicalised after that I think 'Is he taking the piss? Has

165   he seen what happened to all those kids? And still he want to jump on that [cause?'

166   Int.: Yeah.

167   P1: This] is what the outcome will be, you know what I mean? And I just got out of control in

168   jail. It was too many enemies for me to handle. I don't know what happened, but I was

169   warped. I radicalised myself.

170   Int.: Yeah, ehm, and that was linked to the guy in here or was that already in prison?

171   P1: = No the guy in here, I just don't speak to him.

172   Int.: Gottcha.

173   P1: I get in trouble, when I'm with him alone, I just don't want to acknowledge him. He's

174   dead to me. But, I see his charisma and his good qualities and I think to myself… I shook his

175   hand the other day in football… in football shook his hand and I was proud of myself for

176   doing [that

177   Int.: Yeah.

178   P1: because] normally I hated him for a while. And now ehm I taught myself he got good

179   qualities you know what I mean? He might have been a sick man. So, ehm, I just suck it

180   down, but I haven't spoken to him since.

181   Int.: I mean I think that's really impressive, like you can gap those differences and be like 'I

182   hate you but also you have good [qualities.'

183   P1: Yeah.

184   Int.: that] is really good. Ehm, when you say… ehm, so before that, back in prison when you

185   were saying 'I radicalised myself', like what you define that as? Like what do you mean

186   when you say that?

187   P1: Well, I've seen lads out there trampled, seen lads being slashed, lads being boiled with

188   boiling water, boiling oil. Seen people ears drip off from the fucking head where they've

189   been boiled and strained in kitchens. And ehm I thought to myself I did not want this happen

190   to me. So I come on and I thought I killed in full force before this can happen I attack… I'll

191   attack any possible enemies. So, I anticipated like before… I anticipated I do this I do that

192   like… I would get no sleep. All I'd be doing is anticipating for the next day's drama. And the

193   next day I would come through with that anticipation with them… I don't know how to

194   explain it… but I would come through with it and me head would tell me what to do and

195 attacking stuff.. with… with metal things and doing *mumbling* stuff and fuck *mumbling*

196 up…

197 Int.: Gottcha. So, it was again kind of this feeling of 'I need to be out ehm I need to look out

198 for myself, I need to help myself before things are happening'.

199 P1: Yeah.

200 Int.: But that was also kind of before your religion? Or was that in the same time?

201 P1: (.) I, I never really had any religion. It's been based on Karma, really. It was like… I

202 believe a little bit in Jesus, I was praying to Jesus about the lad who… who I'm in for. I

203 would say 'God bless him and I hope he's ok and hope he's going to a better place'. Whether

204 that is in heaven, Valhalla, paradise, I just wanted him to go to one of those places. And I

205 needed to know *inaudible*. But, it's not as strong religious *mumbling* I don't know what

206 heaven is or what God is. I just… I sort of look at Jesus and he's the one that everyone's

207 talking about.

208 Int.: Yeah, ok. Ehm, when you're here on the ward, for example, in [censored] are there…

209 you said before that you're praying in the evening. Are there particular moments where you

210 think 'Oh, praying would really help me right now'?

211 P1: Yeah, sometimes I have do things like this or therapy and all that. I've come back and

212 say… I have to write to the victim's family. I wrote to the victim's family and I thought to

213 myself: It was sort of selfish use. I was writing about 'I'm sorry, I'm done this.. and I, I, I…'

214 and I'm thought to myself 'I pray cus I'm sorry for this lad'. I just hope that… I just hope…

215 that I come across as genuinely sorry. Like the lad was 18, 19 when he died. And I'm

216 genuinely sorry that I took him so young. But I don't want to make it about I, me, I want to

217 make it about [censored], you know what I mean?

218 Int.: = Gottcha. Yeah. So, that is, for example, a moment when you pray except you're kind

219 of trying to//

220   P1: Yeah, I wasn't praying like that *folds hands*, I was just talking to [myself

221   Int.: Yeah.

222   P1: 'Jesus] could you please put across to me that ehm I'm sorry and I wish I could be

223   friends with him and so on and so forth.' And ehm wishes to him like a djinni or something.

224   Basically it's not prayers it's wishes, you know?

225   Int.: = Yeah, but that's how you think about your religion and that helps a bit, if you're

226   saying 'Oh it's not… It's more talk to Jesus' so to say. But that seems helpful to you, that's

227   good.

228   P1: One I had before, it's… I was 18 years of age in prison and Muslim fella stabbed a

229   NonP1: Muslim fella who I was arguing with. And this fella was the king of all Muslims in

230   prison, he was like the main guy. And he said to me 'I see you in 10 years time and you'll be

231   a brother, you'll be a Muslim, and your name will be Issac.' And ehm what I going back to

232   jail, there's the big guy, you know, he's dangerous, he stabbed all the people and all that. And

233   I have to come across him again, and his little minions and stuff like that. And ehm, I'm not

234   going to be Muslim. I'll be an enemy of the Muslim. So it's going to be… it's gonna be a

235   very sticky situation.

236   Int.: Gottcha, yeah.

237   P1: = Cause these lads are the extreme of all extremes.

238   Int.: Ehm, how does it make you feel then//?

239   P1: It makes me feel… They were telling me that I'm doing 'Life Minus Violence', which is

240   life without the violence. Now, I'm saying I can do that *mumbling* all day, but I've gotta

241   go back to violence and violence, where I gotta get a table leg… I'm a magician, I can make

242   knives. I gotta get myself a weapon and defend myself properly. And ehm… I'm devastated I

243   gotta do that. I don't wanna hurt anyone again for the rest of my life.

244   Int.: = Yeah.

245   P1: = I said to myself for being here. I loved this little time here, 3 years without hurting

246   someone. With no blood on my hands, no blood on my face. And, I'm thinking 'I just killed

247   that guy.' Behind your door, when you look behind the door you can hear all the staff. But

248   keys going, I'm thinking 'I just left him for [dead'.

249   Int.: Yeah.

250   P1: And] ehm… I haven't had that for 3 years and I sort of come to be a better person, you

251   know?

252   Int.: But you're… you also seem to worry about what happens when you go back to an

253   environment that is violent especially with guys like [that…

254   P1: Yeah.

255   Int.: … ehm], ok, so it still sounds that—because you were saying that 'I will probably gonna

256   be the enemy of the Muslims because they're so extreme'. Is there any point where you

257   consider going back to being Muslim because it might safe you in prison or are you set on…?

258   P1: (.) I'm… I'm… I could, I think I'm in atheist and Muslims even took at all…. and ehm

259   they need that religion to build.. to build something within them.

260   Int.: Yeah.

261   P1: Some needed faith to think that. And I just think to myself 'I just need, I just need good

262   Karma, I don't need faith. I just need good Karma not to attack no one'.

263   Int.: Yeah.

264   P1: And I don't think the faith… I think the faith would sort of turn me into a ten times more

265   worse person. If I believed in 'I do these acts of God', then I'd… I'd put my all into that. And

266   ehm… I'd be a worser person for it, I think.

267   Int.: So, it is all about doing good things, building up that Karma, but where you don't

268   necessarily—like you said before with that guy, he gets something out of God, gets

269   something out of religion. But that's not… that's not you, you said.

270   P1: No, I… I don't know. I don't know who I am, or where I am or what I'm like… I just

271   know that I don't wanna turn weird, or Muslim, you know what I mean? I've seen… I've

272   seen lads getting lashes, because they've been caught smoking or they've been caught with a

273   porn magazine. I've seen them getting 20, 40 lashes in a cell with a homeP1: made weapon.

274   And… and these lads… these lads were Scousers and like… we were raised… we weren't

275   raised being Muslim where I'm from. Now they're Muslim, turned the way they talk,

276   changed what teams they support, and I didn't like that. I thought that was living your life on

277   your knees.

278   Int.: And how did that make you feel when you saw those Scousers//?

279   P1: I just disowned them.

280   Int.: Ok.

281   P1: Cause I thought I did… when they turn on their family values they gonna definitely turn

282   on me.

283   Int.: Ah, ok, ok. So, because they… the kind of//

284   P1: They had no loyalties.

285   Int.: That's the word I was looking for, yeah.

286   P1: *mumbling*

287   Int.: And, ehm, so. It's more about sticking to your family, sticking to like your group, stuff

288   like that than it is really about religion? Is that//?

289   P1: I think it is yeah. It's more… I… I have… I have little prayer beads that I just use, when

290   I pray. And, as I say, just teases. It's not the bible or *inaudible* not bits about our studies.

291   I've been to Islam prayers, I've done all these things, and I did not like it. I thought it was all

292   too controlling and too much of a… what's the thing when they all mass… when they all

293   mass kill themselves?

294   Int.: I know what you mean, yeah.

295   P1: Like a mass killing. All these… it was all like being zombie brain.

296   Int.: = Yeah.

297   P1: But, ehm, what I had was my personal… me and my personal little.. my little sympathy

298   in for what I've done. I told that had all to do with about myself.

299   Int.: (.) Ok, ehm. I was just really wondering, because you said before and I wanted to know

300   more about this because I find it really interesting that ehm… It's not necessarily praying

301   when you, for example, wrote that letter, but it's like talking to yourself, talking to Jesus and

302   have this wishing that things be better… ehm. Are there any other moments where you think

303   for yourself religion helps you or the way that you pray helps you?

304   P1: I don't know if religion helps me so far, I'm not that religious. But I ehm… I read these

305   books about these Vikings. And it was… it was all bout their Gods wanted them to entertain

306   them *inaudible* they didn't want nothing else, no pray, they didn't want to pray or give

307   money to that place. It was just the entertainment side of them. So I took that and thought 'I'll

308   be entertaining'. I'll attack this guy. He's this, he's *inaudible* these people. The last big

309   fight I had, was… was a lad with 22 stone. And 4P1: 66 fight in a *mumbling* champ

310   boxing. And little 10P1: stoner ol' me and I had to fight this guy, in the middle of the landing.

311   And… you know what I mean? I don't… And I thought to myself 'I think I was entertaining

312   there, to the Gods'. And ehm I thought another little thing which *inaudible* I speak to all

313   the *inaudible* and I let on to everyone, speak to everyone. And… I sort of be nice and kind

314   when I need to be, and I'll be vicious when… with excessive force when I need to be. So, I

315   don't know… I might be two different people.

316   Int.: Yeah. Ok, recognising that in yourself and saying that's is how it is, I think that's

317   probably a very important step. Ehm. What other things are you doing, when there's stress

318   coming up on the ward? Is there anything that helps you?

319   P1: = Yeah, I eat a little bit of chocolate, I look out the window, I go for a walk, I go in the

320   garden for 2 hours, I'll train. And ehm… I sort a… people talk all the time of going home, I

321   don't think I'll ever go home. So I sort of think to myself, I give 'em some positive feedback,

322   positive take is what he needs, and I say: 'I'm glad you're going home, so young, look after

323   your family when you're getting out.' Because some of them get ideas when they get out. But

324   in the same sense I'm gutted thinking 'You're just another person I met on my travels and

325   now you go home. I never see you or hear from you again'. But I will give you all my

326   emotions, all my goodness, I will teach you how I lived and hopefully you take something

327   from it.

328   Int.: Ok. I think that's a really positive outlook on life that you're giving so much positive

329   emotion to other people. Ehm. *inaudible* I think that's really great and I'm really thankful

330   that you did all of that. Ehm. Is there generally anything you feel what we're talking about…

331   did the prison and with the different groups, religion, that I have missed, that I didn't ask

332   you? Anything you want to explain a bit more?

333   P1: Yeah, spoke to me dad the other day with FaceTime, but… with the laptop, with Teams

334   or whatever it is [called

335   Int.: Yeah.

336   P1: and] he said to me there is now 47-ranking Al-Quaida members in the prison where I'll

337   be going back to when I go back in… ehm… And I said 'Dad, I'll be alright and all that. I

338   navigate my way through the system.' But me first thought was 'I'll kill one of them to go on

339   CSC'. CSC is five years of solitary confinement. 5 years I'm in. And I'm here… here… in 12

340   months there and 6 months here, but 5 strong years in the *inaudible* in segregation. But I

341   thought to myself 'The only way for my life to live in isolation in prison'. Cause I don't want

342   a life where I see someone getting radicalised. I will interfere. If I see someone bullied, I will

343   interfere. And if I see… I will entertaining Gods, and stuff like that. I want them to laugh,

344   you know what I mean?

345   Int.: Yeah. I wonder why you have… besides obviously needing to survive in prison, I

346   totally get that… but you were also saying 'seeing bullying, seeing radicalisation, I will

347   interfere'//?

348   P1: Cus, I… I know if I let that slide, getting inside me, I think 'I stood by and watched that'.

349   And that's all good that is not entertainment, that's not good karma. It's really not. I've seen

350   lads… I've seen people getting battered, getting chocked being put asleep [mimicking a

351   choke hold], and the lads going like that [spreading out]. Or somebody will go 'Da, smoke

352   that'. A lad will smoke the spice and goes like that *mimicking falling unconscious* and

353   pulling on him taking the piss.

354   Int.: = Yeah.

355   P1: = And I just thought 'I can't let that happen', so I intervene.

356   Int.: (.) Ok, so it sounds like there is a strong sense of justice that you're having, of 'that can't

357   be, at least not on my watch'.

358   P1: Yeah, I… I was in the dispersal system where it wouldn't… if it went off, fightingP1:

359   wise, everyone brought out their weapons and fought with weapons. And, I sort of, I strongly

360   with the people around me instilled their believes in... what they believed in… into me. From

361   my dad, from my brother, to these gangsters. And then instilled in myself. I sort of took

362   everything what I've learned and everything what I've learned as I say was a sense of justice

363   and… and me own good karma and me own good entertainment, for whoever is watching.

364   Int.: But it sounds like your brothers… ehm do you have one or several brothers?

365   P1: = I just got one brother.

366   Int.: Ok. So your dad and your brother, are they… would you consider them good role

367   models? Because we talked about loyalty and//?

368   P1: Yeah, very good role models. They were not like criminals.

369   Int.: Ok.

370   P1: They were always working. Always *mumbling* with all the lads. And, they've been

371   fights when they were younger—I heard all the stories—and I just always looked up to them

372   and thought 'How can I make them proud?'. And I've never been able…. I never heard it

373   saying 'I'm proud of you' or anything like that. I never… I've never been able to make them

374   proud. But, I hope one day I get out of jail and buy my dad a pint and to say 'I'm proud of

375   you lad'. Cause… cause I did get through. I hope. I don't get killed in the system.

376   Int.: Yeah.

377   P1: If I make it through, I think he should be proud of me. I did 13 years of jail.

378   Int.: = Yeah, definitely. Great. Ehm, Let me just check… You mentioned some really great

379   things that really helpful. And I'm thankful that you shared that with me. Let me just check

380   that I have everything…. How do you think that went? Was that ok for you?

381   P1: Yeah, good. I… I just ehm… answered the best way that I [could

382   Int.: Yeah, perfect.

383   P1: and I] don't know whether that was right or wrong or how that came across.

384   Int.: There is literally no right or wrong, so whatever you said was really good…. I think we

385   talked about everything. I'm just making sure that I not forgot everything. Yeah, we talked…

386   so, just as one last thing, because I'm also mindful of the time and I don't want to keep you

387   too long. Ehm. When we talked about going back to prison and I asked about how likely it

388   would be for you to change and it was a hard no for you, like this is not being loyal. People

389   living their lives on their kness, etc. Ehm. Do you think there would be anything ever that

390   would make you change your mind in regards of Jesus or turning away from Jesus or not pray

391   anymore?

392 P1: I mean, I want to go…. Radicalised and turned to Muslim and a lot of Scousers that

393 fought against their people. So I did turn Muslim and became an enemy of the city—of

394 Scousers—and ehm, in turn *inaudible* Muslims. So either way, I'm stuck, I'm put in this

395 [predicament

396 Int.: Yeah.

397 P1: I'm] put in this predicament. For five years I was a peacemaker between the Muslims and

398 the Non-Muslims. And then, once I attacked a Muslim, or fucked up their Friday

399 assassination, I became an enemy of them. And then all the Scousers loved me. Even outside.

400 *inaudible* Doing great in jail, helping the lads all out and that. And *mumbling* look out

401 for the lads. And I'm fucking *mumbling* can't even look out for myself, you know what I

402 mean?

403 Int.: Yeah, ok. So//?

404 P1: So either way, both sides, either way…

405 Int.: (.) Ok, I think we covered everything. Again, I'm just really thankful that you had time

406 today. Ehm, yeah, do you have any questions at the end of this?

407 P1: What happens? Do you speak to…? Does that get told to anyone else?

408 Int.: = No, there's potentially somebody else listening to this just to help transcribe all these

409 things.

410 P1: = Yeah.

411 Int.: But nothing else is happening. Ehm, this is… this is the end of the interview. I'm going

412 to turn this off in a sec. That's about it. That's all the like that I ask of you… *inaudible*

413 P1: I was just happy to explain what I was explaining to [you

414 Int.: Yeah.

415 P1: you] seemed intrigued. So… *recording stops*

Interview 2:

1   Int.: I put this here and then we can ignore that *referring to the recording device*.Well, first

2   off, how have you been since//?

3   Part.2: Yeah, pretty good, yeah.

4   Int.: Yeah? Did anything exciting happen? Did you go to the gym or anything like that?

5   Part.2: No, I've just been to my therapies.

6   Int.: Ok, that's good. Ehm, yeah, as I said before, this chat is essentially about opinions, how

7   they impact our behaviour. As I said, if you have any questions, literally feel free to stop me.

8   Ehm, generally I am wondering with people here: Are you political? Are you religious? Any

9   of those things?

10   Part.2: = No.

11   Int.: = No?

12   Part.2: No.

13   Int.: Ehm, do you… do you practice any… prayers or something like that?

14   Part.2: = No.

15   Int.: Have you never done anything like that?

16   Part.2: I have. I'm Muslim. But I'm.. I'm not really practicing right now.

17   Int.: Ah, ok. So, ehm//

18   Part.2: I used to go to private prayers.

19   Int.: Ok. Was that something you just did or was something you really liked?

20   Part.2: No… something… everyone was doing it. So, I thought, might as well go along…

21   Int.: Yeah? And how was that?

22   Part.2: (.) It was ok… yeah.

23   Int.: Yeah?

24   Part.2: (.) It was… normal prison life. You meet all… you meet all your mates there. Cause

25   everyone coming from the different wings, is gonna go there. So, it was just meet until we got

26   out.

27   Int.: Oh, I did not know that. Ok. So, did it feel quite social then?

28   Part.2: Yeah.

29   Int.: Ok. And ehm did you make friends there? Or was that more//?

30   Part.2: Oh, depends on who was there. You'd meet up on the gym, meet up in the chapel,

31   praying your prayers, meet up in education or a workshop. Everyone was meeting up there.

32   Int.: Ah, ok. And how… how was that feeling for you? Like, can you describe that a bit?

33   When you were going there.

34   Part.2: Ehm… it was ok, yeah. I'm going there having a chat and, you know, it was good,

35   yeah.

36   Int.: Yeah? Why is… I mean… You did this in prison. Why are you not doing this here? Is

37   there a particular reason for that?

38   Part.2: No, no… *inaudible* few weeks ago… it's no.. it's not really interesting.

39   Int.: Ok. Is that because of the Iman here?

40   Part.2: = No, no, no, no. Not because of the Iman.

41   Int.: Ok. Or is that a little bit less social in Ashworth?

42   Part.2: Yes, it is less social.

43   Int.: Gottcha. Yeah, figured. Ehm, so, I assume probably your family was also [Muslim

44   Part.2: Yeah, yeah.

45   Int.: and are] they practicing?

46   Part.2: My sister. *mumbling*

47   Int.: Yeah. And… but… she would know that you are not that religious right now, how

48   would she feel about that?

49   Part.2: Oh, she'd be alright. She knows. She never seen me being religious.

50   Int.: Ok. So it's not a big thing for… your family. Ehm, I was wondering, back in prison,

51   when you were going and it was quite sociable, ehm… how… there are obviously also other

52   *inaudible* my questions, etc. … ehm… how was the relationship between those groups?

53   Part.2: Alright.

54   Int.: Yeah?

55   Part.2: (.) Well, in prison you get a big Muslim population. *inaudible* big Muslim

56   population, like, everyone's being Muslim.

57   Int.: Andh ehm… what would've happened, in prison, if you wouldn't have gone?

58   Part.2: Nothing, nothing.

59   Int.: Ok. Would've you not//?

60   Part.2: *inaudible*

61   Int.: = No, no, I was just wondering, ehm… because it's obviously quite social, and you said

62   there are other opportunities like going to the gym, etc. Ehm… would've had the same

63   connections if you wouldn't have gone to the Friday prayer?

64   Part.2: No.

65   Int.: Why do you think that is?

66   Part.2: What do you mean? Would I've not had *stammering*?

67   Int.: Yeah, ok sorry//

68   Part.2: We've been to education, we've been in gym, we've been workshop… *stammering*

69   Int.: Ok. Ehm… How do f… Did you witness anyone not going to kind of//?

70   Part.2: Yeah, religious… all the time. At times, I didn't use to go.

71   Int.: Ok.

72   Part.2: So, sometimes. In jails that I've been into for the longest… *stammering* I was in

73   there for like 7-8 years. And used to go cook our foods or sometimes… sometimes being

74   slow. But most times we'd be cooking, cooking your own food…

75   Int.: So, it sounds quite relaxed, how people handled it. That's really good. Ehm… were there

76   any people… that… ehm.. you really liked? Like people that were kind of your friends?

77   Good connections there yeah?

78   Part.2: *nodding* There were people I associated to. Yeah. They were everywhere man…

79   Int.: Yeah? Yeah I can imagine. And… what… like why did like them more than other

80   people? Can you describe that a bit? Like why were they your friends?

81   Part.2: Because they… any reason. As I told you, we were going to the gym and train with

82   them. And speak to them or… cook with them. Sort of… sort of the things that you like, you

83   know? You connected to them.

84   Int.: Ok. So it has common ground//

85   Part.2: Yeah, yeah!

86   Int.: What were the things you were liking? Like things that you had in common? Could you

87   describe that a bit?

88   Part.2: (.) We liked the same music, same artist, the same TV programme, talked about that.

89   Int.: Nice.

90   Part.2: (.) So, *mumbling* got the, you know? Understanding…

91   Int.: Yeah, I like those. Really good. Do remember what kind of TV programmes that were

92   and stuff like that?

93   Part.2: No can't remember now *smiles*, you know?

94   Int.: That's fair enough, I was just wondering//

95   Part.2: It's been… last time I was in prison was like 4 years ago.

96   Int.: So, it has been a while now.

97   Part.2: Yeah.

98   Int.: = Gottcha. Ehm. There is sometimes—I don't know whether you're aware of this—but

99   do you watch the news?

100   Part.2: = Yeah, yeah.

101   Int.: So, ehm, obviously in the UK, there is a lot of bad news about Muslims, where people

102   are saying false things, things that are not true… Ehm, how do you feel about that, when you

103   see that?

104   Part.2: I don't know. I'm not… I'm not really seeing that.

105   Int.: Ok.

106   Part.2: But I don't believe in sort of thing like that. Because they got a lot of… ehm… bad,

107   you know, reputation. There are bad things and then everyone gets labelled.

108   Int.: Yeah, so it like doesn't bother you or is it something that is so far away right now//?

109   Part.2: So far away.

110   Int.: Yeah. How would that be if you'd be let's say back in prison or back in the community?

111   How would that make you feel then?

112   Part.2: *mumbling and shrugging shoulders* sort of don't know…

113   Int.: No, it's ok, like it's absolutely fine, there are not right or wrong answers. I'm just

114   curious ehm about those things. Ehm, let me just check here… ehm. So, you said before that

115   your family is not super religious. It's mostly your sister, did I get this right? Ehm//

116   Part.2: *nodding* She's not religious.

117   Int.: Ok.

118   Part.2: She's just… I don't know just born into it.

119   Int.: She's… she's just Muslim.

120   Part.2: = Yeah.

121   Int.: Ehm. So, in your family, was that often discussed? The religion?

122 Part.2: We don't… yeah, we did… used to go the Mosque and things like that. But… ehm…

123 we're not religious.

124 Int.: Ok. What do you think is the difference then between you and your family and really

125 religious people? Like how do you see…?

126 Part.2: Like really religious people, they wear the… *mimics headscarf around his head*…

127 ehm.. veils and things like that. Veils and beards… and… ehm… yeah… and… I don't know.

128 Pray all the time!

129 Int.: = Yeah.

130 Part.2: Ehm, things like that.

131 Int.: And, how do you feel about that?

132 Part.2: You can do what you want.

133 Int.: If somebody would say 'Oh, you need to pray more', would that be something you'd

134 then do or would you say 'No'?

135 Part.2: I'd say *laughs* just… I don't know what I'd say…

136 Int.: No, that's ok, I'm just… I'm just asking. You're doing… you're doing really well. So no

137 worries. It's just different things that I'm curious about.

138 Part.2: It' just different isn't it?

139 Int.: Yeah, absolutely, I//

140 Part.2: more expecting int *mumbling*…

141 Int.: … yeah, that's a good perspective to have. Has there any time been—in prison or in the

142 community—where Non-Muslims like, for example, Christians said anything to you because

143 you are Muslim. Like, I don't know, hate talk towards you or your family? Did that happen in

144 the past?

145 Part.2: No. Not to me. But… ehm… in here—I'm not gonna say no [names

146 Int.: No, that's good.

147   Part.2: But] staff said to me once—I was on a Halal meal—and I said… No, I wasn't on a

148   Halal meal, said 'Can I have a Halal meal?'. And she… I don't think she knew I was Muslim.

149   That's when I first came in. And she said 'Don't… don't *mumbling*. They're not good

150   people.' And I… and I thought to myself 'Oh, not everyone is the same', you know? And

151   I've said that to her. I just spoke to her and said: 'Not everyone is the [same'.

152   Int.: Yeah.

153   Part.2: said that.]

154   Int.: Ok. How did that make you feel in that moment?

155   Part.2: = Made me feel a little bit sad.

156   Int.: Yeah.

157   Part.2: Cause to think that everyone is the same and all that. Cause there's a lot of bombings

158   have happened and being Muslim… if some been by certain individuals and then everyone

159   gets labelled…

160   Int.: Yeah.

161   Part.2: It's sad, really.

162   Part.2: Yeah. I mean, that sounds really unfair to me that people are saying things like that to

163   you. Ehm… has that also happened to friends outside in the community? That you [heard

164   Part.2: No.

165   Int.: of] some?

166   Part.2: No.

167   Int.: Ok.

168   Part.2: No one's ever been racist to me outside. It's only when I've been in jail; there're a lot

169   of racist people…

170   Int.: Ok. Why do you think that is?

171   Part.2: = Don't know.

172   Int.: Is there//

173   Part.2: Outside—I'm from Manchester—I'm from a.. like a background that is really diverse.

174   And people from all communities. Black, white, Asian, all communities. I've gone with them

175   all *inaudible* to school, home, everywhere.

176   Int.: Oh wow.

177   Part.2: It's been all mixed. And then when you've come to jail and I've met people from like

178   all the cities, Newcastle, Liverpool, there are not really coming from a background, a mixed

179   background, where they've been a bit racist. And you know things like that.

180   Int.: = Gottcha. So, do you think that has something to do with it that you had so many

181   different people around you and they don't?

182   Part.2: Yeah.

183   Int.: Ok. Did that ever also—problems with racist people—result in violence? Not against

184   you, maybe, but against other people?

185   Part.2: No, but other people, yeah. They did a lot of violence back in X prisons, dispersals,

186   there's a big Muslim population and there you get individuals that are racist. And they don't

187   like that. So, they… they fight certain people and that causes [problems

188   Int.: Yeah, I can imagine.

189   Part.2: but I never] got involved in that.

190   Int.: That's good. Did you… like how … how do people defend themselves against racists?

191   Like what can they do?

192   Part.2: (.) Ehm… They just start fights and stab each other and… and me… you know, all

193   sorts of things.

194   Int.: Was there an option to talk to staff or were they also racist?

195   Part.2: = No, not all of staff were racist.

196   Int.: Not all of that. Did you feel like people of that group could talk to them and say 'Hey,

197   there is somebody racist is hurting us'?

198   Part.2: You… you come to realise what staff you gotta talk to and which one you can't.

199   There's… like I was there for so long. There were staff that I could go to and staff that I

200   couldn't. Sometime… if I had problems with… cause at the time, at one point, a lot of staff

201   were going out of their way to make life difficult for me.

202   Int.: How did that look like? How did they make life difficult?

203   Part.2: Yeah, it was horrible. I was drinking *inaudible*, bullying people, and I was there

204   from 21 to… 21 to 27. It was grownPart.2:ups *inaudible* it was a bit sad.

205   Int.: How did that look like when they made your life difficult? Like what did they do? Can

206   you tell me that?

207   Part.2: They would put me on basic parolees, take my telly. Certain times, I was in

208   segregation unit and the SO—senior officer—that I had a problem with, had come over and

209   said 'He gets no phone calls today' and all the staff were saying 'Yeah, no problem'. Things

210   like that. They… all the staff under him were listening to him. So, things like that. But it

211   weren't all of them. It's just a certain group of them, 4 or 5 of them.

212   Int.: Yeah, but that is really difficult to even have…

213   Part.2: Yeah, because I was there for so long. And I had to put up with them for so long as

214   well. So, it… it was… it was…

215   Int.: It sounds horrible.

216   Part.2: = Yeah.

217   Int.: Yeah. Ehm, was there any help? Did any of the other prisoners… could help you in any

218   way? With those guys?

219   Part.2: No, but sometimes my friend would say to me 'Listen, if they call you in a… tell you

220   to go into a room on your own, call us'.

221   Int.: Ok. Because what did they think would happen?

222   Part.2: Because sometimes staff would let… let's say you… say you did… they say that you

223   you're trying to do something. Say you're in a room with no cameras on. And they say

224   *mumbling* 'He tried to attack one of them' and restrained you and used force on you, and

225   all you know, hit you everything… anything they want.

226   Int.: Ok, so, was there ever a situation where you had to call one of your friends to be with

227   you in the room because it was happening?

228   Part.2: No, but a lot of times… a lot of times. No, there weren't no. They were saying to me

229   like 'Come into the room, we're doing an interview' while basically I was like 'Leave it, I

230   don't wanna do it'.

231   Int.: = Gottcha, ok. Ehm, why do you think they were... the staff members… why were they

232   like this? Do you have any idea?

233   Part.2: Cause they were angry in the past and things like that.

234   Int.: Hm, ok. Ehm… was there ever a time that you thought 'I might better not be Muslim in

235   prison. I'm trying to distance myself from this so I'm not getting targeted'?

236   Part.2: = Nooo, no.

237   Int.: No? That's perfectly fine, I'm just wondering, because ehm… they way that you

238   describe things with those racist people it sounds like you were having a target//

239   Part.2: They was only a very few racist [people

240   Int.: Sure.

241   Part.2: while] in jails, where I've been, there's a big Muslim population. White, Black, Asian,

242   everyone just… a big Muslim population. They're all friends. And they think people that are

243   not religious or not a Muslim… we're all friends as well. You only get the certain individuals

244   that come to the prison and they're racist and they don't like the way we living and then they

245   get into fights and then…

246 Int.: Gottcha. Was it also ever the other way around that your group didn't like one who was

247 coming to prison and then was trying to do something?

248 Part.2: No.

249 Int.: Ok. Ehm//

250 Part.2: They weren't my group. It was like… just… everyone was all good friends.

251 Int.: = Gottcha. So it was very loose connections?

252 Part.2: They weren't groups… weren't groups like 'Oh, yeah, he's in our group' But when I

253 was younger I used to be in gangs. That was the only time people were saying he's in a

254 group.

255 Int.: OK so that felt different then? That was… how was… How were the rules for a gang, for

256 example? Could you then meet other people or//?

257 Part.2: Just… it was just gangs again gangs. That was young offender times juvenile times.

258 Was like gangs *mumbling*. From the outside it follows you inside.

259 Int.: Do you still remember how you got into those gangs?

260 Part.2: We were just hanging around with those people older lads that were in the gangs and

261 then you're just becoming… I was only a gang member for a couple of years. And then I got

262 locked up. And then, must've been 2003 or 2004 and then 2005 I got locked up. So, I was

263 only a gang member for 2 1/2 years, 3 years. Even in jail, I was out of it. *mumbling* But

264 people from other gangs still labelled me a gang member. And that didn't apply to me, that

265 hit me. And I thought, you know, 'Fuck it, I was fighting them as well'.

266 Int.: Okay, sounds very dangerous.

267 Part.2: It was. Since then I've done a lot of work, I'm on therapies, Life Minus Violence,

268 [CBT

269 Int.: Yeah, I've heard.

270   Part.2: work] with X, I'm not a gang member, I won't go back to X again. No, I changed a

271   lot.

272   Int.: That's good, that's good to hear. Why do you, why do you think you will not go back?

273   Part.2: Cause I won't. I realised… I realised it's not worth it. I… it… it took me… it took

274   me… a life sentence to realise it's not worth it. You know? I just wanna live life, live a

275   normal life. And where I'm from, it's not all…all the gang things has played out now. All the

276   gang's been stopped. Everyone is working, attempting caring for their families and all. It's…

277   you know, settling down.

278   Int.: Is that something//

279   Part.2: That's what I want.

280   Int.: = Ah, ok!

281   Part.2: That's what I wana do.

282   Int.: That's good, yeah. Why do you think it stopped?

283   Part.2: Because police, back in the day, back in 2008-times, 9-times, they did an operation

284   and all the gangs. And they locked up everyone doing all the shootings and then, you know,

285   crimes and that… they locked everyone up. And then… there was nothing going on. And

286   then I think everybody just got older and wiser and grown up, you know, really.

287   Int.: Yeah, that makes sense. Ok. Ehm… that is very hypothetical question, so if you don't

288   have an answer that's fine. But I was just wondering, if you could talk to yourself younger,

289   just about to join a gang, what would you say?

290   Part.2: I would change everything really. I would talk to myself and say 'It's not worth it,

291   man. You will regret it'. *mumbling* So, if I knew what was coming, I would have gotten a

292   job at McDonalds, or something. Because… it's not worth it, man. And probably the most…

293   the most important person to me was my mum—now my sister, my entire family—but,

294   because first person was my mum and I hurt her the most.

295   Int.: Ok. In what way?

296   Part.2: Cause… cause she lost her son. She lost me. She lost me. I turned just 18, when she

297   lost me. *mumbling* only 10 year… She died, when I was in here.

298   Int.: Oh, I am sorry.

299   Part.2: So, she could never have me back, you know what I mean? But when I have kids, I

300   don't want my son or my daughter to go through things like I went through. To… you

301   know… do bad things *mumbling* I wanna make my mum proud still. Still wanna make her

302   proud even though she's dead. I want a good life, you know.

303   Int.: Ok. So, your dream is also for her, kind of?

304   Part.2: = Yeah. For myself, everyone, my family, my friends, my mum. *inaudible*

305   Int.: Are you still in contact with your sister, for example?

306   Part.2: = Yeah. *mumbling*

307   Int.: Nice. That's good to hear. What helped you the most in getting better? We talked about

308   therapy sessions, like what… what support do you have? What helps you?

309   Part.2: I got loads support, psychologists, *name of psychologist*, who else? Oh, *other

310   psychologist's name*, I forgot probably some, I always follow [psychologist] and say 'I got

311   this problem, my problem'… and talk to Dr *responsible clinician name* and talk to Dr

312   *name of other responsible clinician* and ward psychologist staff as well. You know *names

313   3rd psychologist*? I see him most through… *mimics window*. And the doctors, my doctor

314   especially, very good doctor. Since I've had him… everything's been good.

315   Int.: Ehm, that's really good to hear. I'm happy that you have all that kind of support. I'm just

316   going through because… ehm. You're giving me a lot of good things and the answers are

317   great and I'm so thankful that you help me with this. I just wanna make sure that I'm not…

318   ehm… missing anything. Just because… we talked about prison and we talked obviously

319   being part of them… ehm Muslim group. I think we can put a pin in it for now. I was just

320   wondering a bit more about… ehm… the gang experiences that you had, if you don't mind.

321   Ehm… did you have… you said you were hanging out with lads and then kind of just getting

322   sucked into it//

323   Part.2: Yeah, so ehm… where I am from. The estate that I am from… it's the *estate name*.

324   That's the estate where… when I was in. That's where they came from. So, we group up

325   around them. Grew up around… automatically we were fighting people from the *other

326   estate name*. Come to school, fighting with them, things like that. It was just automatic.

327   Int.: Because everyone else was doing it?

328   Part.2: = It was just natural. And then in 2003, my… the older lads were saying to me

329   'You're *gang name*' and I think to myself 'This is…' it was just natural, really.

330   Int.: Yeah?

331   Part.2: 2004 one of my mates got shot… in the back and nearly died. He was in hospital for

332   months. And at that time, we fell out. So, I was saying 'I'm not [gang name] anymore' and

333   things like that. And then went to jail, got back out in 2005, started hanging around with the

334   same people. He was alright after he had been shot… and then started hanging around with

335   him again. Doing all sorts. He was always carrying guns and things like that. And then I got

336   locked up again in 2006 *mumbling* and yeah…

337   Int.: Ok. Do you still remember why you were falling out? Was that related to the gang or

338   because he got shot?

339   Part.2: (.) No, he got shot and then in the hospital we had an argument. But… yeah… don't

340   remember what the argument was about…

341   Int.: Yeah, that's ok. I don't mind, I was just wondering. Ehm… was that an option to say

342   'No' or would people be angry at you if you would have said 'No, I don't want to do this?

343   Part.2: = No, no, they wouldn't have been angry at me. Some of them might fell out with me,

344   but ehm… yeah. He got shot. People were trying to shoot us. Things like that.

345   Int.: You also—I remember now—you were also saying beforehand, in prison, that even

346   though you weren't in a gang anymore, others were putting that label on you?

347   Part.2: = Yeah.

348   Int.: So, it sounds like//

349   Part.2: Upholding gangs. They were still labelling me *gang name*, so I thought 'Fuck it'.

350   Int.: Yeah.

351   Part.2: Cause I was still hanging around with them and that. But I wouldn't claim *gang

352   name*. So… yeah… *stammering*

353   Int.: (.) Was that dangerous? Was that a dangerous time?

354   Part.2: = Dangerous, I got stabbed in the neck. Twice, once in me neck, stabbed in the arm.

355   That was while I'm in prison as well.

356   Int.: = Wow.

357   Part.2: = Fighting the other gang members. You know, fighting all the gangs.

358   Int.: Did anyone, like was anyone able to help you in those moments?

359   Part.2: Only if they were gang members.

360   Int.: Yeah? Ok. And you were saying beforehand about carrying weapons and stuff like that.

361   Ehm… so… can you describe, if you want to—if you don't want to you don't have to—but

362   can you describe to me what ehm… what kind of things you were up to on a daily basis with

363   the lads like… you were carrying around guns, I suppose?

364   Part.2: = Oh yeah, no.

365   Int.: And did you ever… ehm… get to fight with guns, were the fights with fists, with other

366   weapons? Like how did that look like?

367   Part.2: *hesitant stammering*

368   Int.: I mean if you don't want to go there that is total fine. I'm just asking. So… ehm…

369   Part.2: I talked about this in therapies and that, you know, with psychologists and that.

370   *psychologist's name* and people like that. Talked about what I survived, you know? I

371   never… I never… I've been locked up for everything that I've done. So… you know?

372   Int.: I mean//

373   Part.2: I shot everybody… the people that I shot I've been locked up for.

374   Int.: = Gottcha. Ok. Ehm… As I say, you're doing really well. And I'm thankful for

375   everything that you answer.

376   Part.2: Yeah, that's alright.

377   Int.: I don't want you… I don't want to push you anywhere, where you don't want to talk

378   about things… ehm. Ok, looking again. Ehm… I think I have one… one last question about

379   ehm… the religion, even if you're saying you're not really religious. Do you think there's

380   ever gonna be a time that you're going to be more religious? Literally doing more things like

381   more prayers or going back into ehm… the… the prayer service?

382   Part.2: Ehm. Don't know. No, don't think so.

383   Int.: Ok. Is there ehm… anything else in here that you like to do that helps you with stress?

384   Part.2: Ehm…

385   Int.: Do you have hobbies?

386   Part.2: I listen to music, go to the gym—when the gym is on! *mumbling* due to COVID.

387   Int.: Yeah, I know//

388   Part.2: Yeah, going to the gym, writing letters, ehm… Yeah, going out for walks. Things like

389   that.

390   Int.: Sounds good. Ehm… Ok. I think we… I think we covered most of the things. Ehm. Do

391   you have any questions about…? How do you feel that was going?

392   Part.2: You know, about the Muslim things you… ehm asking about?

393   Int.: = Yeah.

394   Part.2: When I was in prison, certain ward staff were saying 'Listen', hence my assault and

395   certain staff that had problems with me, writing things about me, that weren't true. I got

396   transcripts *inaudible* And I was watching… I was looking at the files and they were saying

397   things that are not true, saying 'carries weapons'… ehm… 'radicalised'… you know, things

398   that are not true.

399   Int.: Yeah.

400   Part.2: I am not radicalised. Things like that. Not true.

401   Int.: Why do you think they were saying that then?

402   Part.2: Cause… there was X who was radicalised. If you speak to them they'd say 'Oh yeah

403   he's radicalised' and things like that. But it's not true.

404   Int.: Ok.

405   Part.2: I'm the most unradicalised person you could meet, really.

406   Int.: So was… How were those ties then, when you were not radicalised but with those who

407   were radicalised? Like how were those guys? What did you notice with them?

408   Part.2: I noticed that they were… they were *mumbling* proper religious.. they… they…

409   they were like… ehm… a bit extreme?

410   Int.: Extreme in what way?

411   Part.2: Some of them were terrorists, they were locked up for terrorism. Things like that. So,

412   just keep a distance, you know. Cause I didn't want anyone think that I'm a terrorist, things

413   like that.

414   Int.: How ehm//?

415   Part.2: We were still speak to them. I speak to everyone. There's people in there, sex offences

416   and things like that, but everyone speak to everybody. You know?

417   Int.: So, there was something about like still having respect for each other? That's good.

418   Part.2: Yeah. It's a bit like in here, a little bit. Cause you get people that sex offenders in here

419   and you get people that have racists. You got people that are terrorists. Like on this ward.

420   There's a mixture of people. And I speak to everyone, really. If someone speaks to me, I

421   speak back to them, I'll be respectful to everybody.

422   Int.: That's good, yeah.

423   Part.2: It's like in here, really.

424   Int.: How were others reacting to those radicalised lads? Were others having stronger

425   reactions like 'Oh, I'm not gonna talk to them'? Or was everyone kind of respectful?

426   Part.2: Everyone was respectful.

427   Int.: Ok. But you also said you were still keeping your distance because of staff members so

428   you're not getting labelled as well.

429   Part.2: Ehm, yeah, we still spoke to them, but never like… I was with them 24/7. I still spoke

430   to them.

431   Int.: Ok. When those documents came that were false, how did that make you feel? That

432   some people are like//

433   Part.2: I… I was thinking about respect *mumbling* That it was false. Seen… seen some

434   documents and that was in 2016 and they were false.

435   Int.: Were you ever able in here to clarify things? Did anyone ever bring that up with you?

436   Part.2: No, I don't think anyone ever did.

437   Int.: Ok, so it's kind of now… passed.

438   Part.2: = Yeah.

439   Int.: Ok, ehm… yeah, think we covered everything. I'm very thankful. Yeah, as I say…

440   ehm… the recording will only be listened to by me and another researcher and will not be

441   shared with anyone else. And yeah… I can shut this off now… How do you think *recording

442   end*

443

Interview 3:

1   Int.: *recording starts* there. Ok, so, what I do in the beginning ask everyone ehm: Are you

2   political? Do you consider yourself being political or interested in politics?

3   P3: *frowns* Not really…. Not really.

4   Int.: Ok. Is there a particular reason for that? That you're not that interested?

5   P3: Most of them liars… politicians and stuff.

6   Int.: Yeah. Ehm… what do they tend to lie about, you think?

7   P3: Just about… say they wanna help, but they don't help anything.

8   Int.: Yeah. Ehm//

9   P3: Like areas that are low… that ehm… poverty areas, things like that. I… I used to watch a

10   little bit. It used to say 'We're getting funding'… build like community centres, things like

11   that but they don't let that happen.

12   Int.: = Gottcha. So, they say they do things and then it never really happens. How does it

13   make you feel?

14   P3: (.) Just not interested really.

15   Int.: Yeah.

16   P3: Stop being interested in it.

17   Int.: Yeah, fair enough. Ehm… And is there any particular party that you think is promising a

18   lot and then not doing it or is it all politicians generally?

19   P3: I can't remember what it was when I was watching… can't remember which party it was,

20   but probably most of them really…

21   Int.: Yeah. Fair enough. Ehm… And the other thing that I always ask people as well is: Are

22   you religious?

23   P3: = No.

24   Int.: No? And again, same question: Why are you not following any kind of religion?

25 P3: Just… I just believe in God. I don't really believe in religion, to be honest.

26 Int.: Oh, ok. So you still believe in God is that//?

27 P3: Yeah, yeah.

28 Int.: Ah, ok, ok. So, ehm… You say, if you believe in God you don't need religion. Is that…

29 What do you think, for example, about the church or Catholics? Like why is that something

30 that is not important to you?

31 P3: Don't know. Don't know really. Cause… *shrugs shoulders*

32 Int.: Yeah, that's ok.

33 P3: That's what I remember, go to church, and I have family members who are Muslim,

34 Christian, Rastafarian… but me… I don't know.

35 Int.: Ok. Never really interested you?

36 P3: = No.

37 Int.: Was there family members who tried getting you interested in that?

38 P3: = No, not really.

39 Int.: = Ok.

40 P3: My mum… my mum is Rastafarian. But she never… tried to put it on me.

41 Int.: Ok, so it was all really relaxed?

42 P3: *nodding*

43 Int.: That's good. Ehm//

44 P3: Creates a divide, really.

45 Int.: Sorry?

46 P3: *inaudible* religion creates a divide, really. That's what I think.

47 Int.: = Yeah, I think that is a good point. Why do you think… did you… Let me rephrase

48 that: Did you witness divide happening in your community, for example?

49   P3: All over the world, really. I mean, everything you see, documentaries, soaps, anything

50   really.

51   Int.: Yeah, ehm, how does it make you feel when you see things like that on the news or

52   documentaries?

53   P3: It is how it is. It is just how it is, yeah.

54   Int.: Fair enough. Do you think there can be change in any way?

55   P3: Way too late.

56   Int.: = Way too late.

57   P3: = It's too far gone.

58   Int.: Yeah. So, there is nothing really that we can do anymore about [it

59   P3: *laughs*

60   Int.: with this kind] of divide. Fair enough. So, what do you think ehm… how society can

61   work then? Like is there any way… to improve or is it just absolutely hopeless at this point?

62   P3: Ehm, I wouldn't know really. Ehm. … I don't know.

63   Int.: Yeah, it's fine. I'm just asking.

64   P3: = Yeah… it's too far gone, really. *inaudible* It won't change anything. There are people

65   that are trying change thing were obviously… that's not enough. We need more people.

66   Int.: It needs more people, you say//

67   P3: Yeah, more people, to back whatever it is *inaudible*

68   Int.: Yeah. Ehm that wouldn't then be politicians, right?

69   P3: That wouldn't what, sorry?

70   Int.: = Wouldn't be politicians, right? That would be the general people? Because you said

71   before that you don't really trust politicians anymore.

72   P3: *mumbling* Yeah, you got people ehm… that are like on Facebook, wanting change,

73   things like that. But nothing really happens.

74 Int.: Yeah. Fair enough. Ehm… what do you think of people who are on Instagram or

75 Facebook and try to get all the people together to go against politicians? Do you think that

76 would be helpful?

77 P3: (.) Depends, depends what they're doing then. Depends what you mean by 'going against

78 them'.

79 Int.: Ehm… like for example trying to get rid of politicians instead of like… having people

80 running the country, for example.

81 P3: (.)

82 Int.: I mean it depends. What would… what would you think would be good and what would

83 you think would be bad?

84 P3: (.) Ehm… I don't know, maybe different politicians? *mumbling* Yeah, different

85 politicians.

86 Int.: Ok. Was there… was there ever a time when you were more interested in politics?

87 P3: Yeah… Yeah, used to be.

88 Int.: What did you do back then?

89 P3: Just… just watched a lot of the news, really. Just follow it, basically, yeah.

90 Int.: Yeah. And when do you think that changed for you? When was that not important

91 anymore?

92 P3: When ehm… ages ago.. ehm… about… 10 years ago. Maybe a bit more.

93 Int.: Do you know why you stopped being interested in that?

94 P3: I thought anything they were saying was lies. That's what… that's what got me out of it.

95 Int.: Yeah.

96 P3: *stammering* Cause I come from an area, poverty area. So, when they were saying

97 things like 'Going to help the area' things like that. And ehm… and the *inaudible*

98 Int.: Ok. Were there groups within that area that helped instead?

99   P3: Kind of. Yeah, there is like local residents who do things like opening things like

100   community centres for the youth and things like that. Yeah *mumbling*

101   Int.: Ok. Was there… I am only asking because there are people saying 'Oh, I had similar

102   experiences as you' ehm… and they had gangs helping them where they were living. Was

103   that ever something that happened in your neighbourhood?

104   P3: = Yeah, when I was younger, yeah. Some gangs used to like do things and help out…

105   Int.: What did the do to help, for example?

106   P3: (.) Fund… like funding. Because there used to be like a community centre where we used

107   to have… like a youth… a youth centre thing… where you go there, play games or they took

108   us on trips. Some of the gangs used to help fund that.

109   Int.: Oh wow. Ok. Didn't know that. Did you ever… were you ever involved in things like

110   helping, for example, funding the community centre or get funds?

111   P3: = No, no I would be going to the community centre, because I was only [young

112   Int.: Yeah.

113   P3: So,] used to kind go to the community centre.

114   Int.: Ok. Were you ever interested in, for example, being part of like gang?

115   P3: = I was, I was.

116   Int.: = Oh, you were. Ok.

117   P3: = Yeah, yeah. I was there for a long time.

118   Int.: Ok. When did that start? Approximately?

119   P3: When I was about… 11. 11, 12.

120   Int.: Do you still remember how you got into gangs?

121   P3: Yeah, from my… area that I was in and my brother… One of my brothers was a gang

122   member from the area anyway. So, I basically fell into it. Me and my friends.

123   Int.: Ok. And, ehm… What did you do, when you were 11? Because that's kind of young,

124   isn't it?

125   P3: Cause then… *mumbling* When I was like 11 used to go to city centre, just wait for the

126   other gang and fight them. I was… I was with a lot of older one. Used to ehm… wait for the

127   other gang in city centre and fight them. And when I was older, I was selling drugs and using

128   guns and carrying guns and all that…

129   Int.: Ok. Was that… difficult in the beginning? I'm just thinking of… If it would've been me

130   being 11, I would've been a bit scared. Maybe a bit excited? So, how was that for you in the

131   beginning?

132   P3: = In the beginning, it was just like excited, really. Yeah, yeah.

133   Int.: Ok. Ehm… would've been that an option to say 'No, I don't want to do this?

134   P3: Ehm… probably can yeah.

135   Int.: Yeah? What would've happened like because… you said your brother was already part

136   of the gang. Would your brother be disappointed if you wouldn't have joined? Or angry?

137   P3: Ehm, I don't know. To be honest, he wouldn't… he wouldn't have minded. Like… if I

138   didn't join, he wouldn't have been disappointed or anything like that. He probably would've

139   … happy?

140   Int.: Ok. Yeah. How about the rest of your family? What were they thinking about it?

141   P3: = They were disappointed.

142   Int.: Really?

143   P3: = Yeah, yeah.

144   Int.: Ok. Why? Why were they disappointed?

145   P3: Just cause I was on the street… running on the street, I don't know, doing things and stuff

146   like that.

147   Int.: Ok. You were saying, in the beginning, was mostly fights and then also selling drugs

148   later. Were those fights… were those… *inaudible* were those big groups clashing or just a

149   few people?

150   P3: = Yeah, like big groups, big groups.

151   Int.: Is that with fists, is that with weapons, is that with guns?

152   P3: = Both… eh not guns, at the start. Just fists. Fists and like… a bit of weapon. I mean, it

153   got to like guns and stuff like that.

154   Int.: But that was later on then…

155   P3: = Yeah, yeah.

156   Int.: Ok. And ehm… did you make a lot of friends in the gang?

157   P3: = Yeah.

158   Int.: How did those friendships look like? What were you doing? If not going to fights or

159   selling drugs. What were you doing to chill?

160   P3: Just… just chilling… just chilling really. Doing kids stuff, playing like ehm… hide and

161   seek. And things like that. In school, being kids.

162   Int.: Yeah? Ok. And, what did you like about your friends back in the gang? Like, who were

163   cool people to hang out with? … I don't mean names by the way. I just mean what did you

164   like about those people?

165   P3: I just like that we were all together, really. All look after each other. All friendly.

166   Int.: Ok. You had each other's back//

167   P3: Yeah, we would.

168   Int.: Yeah, it sounds overall like how you're describing it like you had a good time. In a sense

169   that there was fun to be had. It was exciting, you said.

170   P3: = Yeah.

171 Int.: Did that ever change at any point that you were like 'this not exciting anymore'? This is

172 not for me//

173 P3: Yeah, when I got older. Same stuff really, drugs selling, shooting guns… same stuff. It

174 got… not boring, but like… I just got tired of it.

175 Int.: Ok, tired in what sense?

176 P3: (.) Ehm… not… not ehm… progressing in life. Being stuck in the same place, doing the

177 same things.

178 Int.: What did you want to do instead then?

179 P3: = I wanted to do plumbing and IT.

180 Int.: Ok, but that wasn't an option while you were in a gang?

181 P3: (.) it was, but I didn't… I didn't want to be plumbing and IT until… plumbing first…

182 until I was about… 18? I think I was 18. Before that I didn't know what I wanted to be. And

183 then ehm… yeah, so, I didn't know what to become until I was about 18.

184 Int.: Ok. Did you then leave the gang at that point? Or when did you leave?

185 P3: Yeah, I left when I was about 20.

186 Int.: Ok, so then you were like nearly 9 years in the gang.

187 P3: Yeah, yeah.

188 Int.: Was that difficult to leave? Like how do I have to imagine that when… at that point

189 when you're leaving? Like how does it look like?

190 P3: Yeah, was difficult. They didn't want me to leave. I ended up getting stabbed for

191 leaving… by one of my old… by one of my old friends. Yeah, that was about it, really.

192 Int.: So, did you have contact with that friend afterwards? I assume [not.

193 P3: No.]

194 Int.: Were they angry that you were leaving or why were they stabbing you?

195 P3: Yeah, cause… cause I was leaving… angry.

196   Int.: Ok, so sounds then dangerous. In the beginning, it's seemed quite exciting and that

197   sounds quite dangerous that you got stabbed then.

198   P3: Yeah.

199   Int.: Would you… would you do the same thing again if you had the chance? Like would you

200   join a gang again? If you would be that age, not now, I mean. But if you would go… If you

201   would think 'Oh, I can talk to myself when I was 11', what would you say to your younger

202   self?

203   P3: I'd probably say 'It's not worth it', really. 'Waste of time'.

204   Int.: Waste of time, ok. Was there at any point… because we started this whole conversation

205   saying 'oh the gangs also helped out with, for example, the community centres'… and it

206   seems from the way that you're describing things that there was a real sense of community in

207   the beginning—sticking together, helping each other out—can you… how do I describe that?

208   Was there ever a point where that changed where you felt like this was not feeling like a nice

209   community anymore?

210   P3: Ehm, no, the area, the area has always been like…. It's been an alright community, it's

211   just the gangs, really, that's the only… that's part of the area, like… poverty and like gangs

212   and stuff like that… Other than that.. other than that it's an alright area.

213   Int.: Ok, ehm… let me just check that I'm covering everything. You're doing really well, by

214   the way. I'm really appreciative that… ehm… you're trying to do this interview that way.

215   Ehm… I was also wondering, just because I just see here… What are your… now that you're

216   here, what are things that you do to kind of ehm… relax, unwind? You've been to the gym

217   this morning?

218   P3: Yeah, I was going gym, listen to music, whatever, take walks in the garden.

219   Int.: Do you still have contact with your family?

220   P3: = Yeah, yeah.

221   Int.: That's good. How do you getting along with the rest in here?

222   P3: = Alright. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

223   Int.: Yeah? That's good. Is there anything—maybe on the wards—that annoys you? Or that

224   you find difficult?

225   P3: (.) Not on the ward. Just that… there is nothing to do off the ward. There used to be

226   education courses and things like that. And now there is nothing. Just stuck at the ward.

227   Int.: I can imagine. What would you would… what would you like to do, if that would be an

228   option?

229   P3: = English, Math, IT. Probably a few other things, whatever is available.

230   Int.: Yeah. I mean, I agree with you, there was much more in the past. Now it's all kind of

231   scratched, especially after COVID. Ehm… Just check as well that I got everything. Ah yeah,

232   what I wanted to ask about the gangs as well: So, how does it look like as a group? Is there a

233   leader or several leaders?

234   P3: *smiling* There is… are like older heads that are like leading and stuff like that, yeah.

235   You could say… yeah, yeah, yeah. *mumbling*

236   Int.: You see *laughing* when I was saying leaders you seemed hesitant. Is that not the right

237   way to describe that?

238   P3: *laughing* Ehm//

239   Int.: I'm just asking because I obviously have no ideas how gangs work or how they look

240   like. So, I'm just wondering//

241   P3: Yeah, yeah, I mean you could describe them as leaders yeah. Yeah, yeah *mumbling*

242   Int.: Was there a lot of, ehm… ehm questioning the authority or was there… were they

243   definite saying what the gang was doing?

244   P3: = Nah, it wasn't much that they were ordering what the gang was doing. It's like a team,

245   innit? It is… For example, this is got like older head that have been in the gang for a while.

246   They've done a lot of shooting, for example, so everybody would respect him. Then you got

247   his friend who is another older head that's done a lot of shooting so everyone respects him.

248   So it's not like point… leader… it's like a team.

249   Int.: = Gottcha. I understand now. Did you ever see any those people that were maybe a little

250   bit older leave the gang at any point? Like you did?

251   P3: (.) Only recently! It's been on TV, about the X gangs and one of them… couple of gangs

252   had said to leave it behind… meeting of the other gangs and… it was on the TV it was

253   literally on the news…

254   Int.: Oh, I didn't know that. How did that make you feel when you saw that on news, the old

255   gang being on TV?

256   P3: I just thought… I don't know! I don't know! To be honest, the… the person that was

257   doing it… he… he was always preaching about being in the gang for life and *laughing* he

258   used to make music as well. He was putting it in his music. So, when I was seeing him I was

259   kind of shocked because I thought 'he is the one who was always preaching the gang stuff'…

260   I just thought it is what it is…

261   Int.: Yeah, yeah true. I would've probably also been quite [surprised

262   P3: Yeah!

263   Int.: *inaudible*] 'Wait a second, I know you'.

264   P3: = Yeah, preaching, always. Music, anything. And then, it all changed. But he's like 40

265   now.

266   Int.: Ah, ok, so probably kind of aged out of the whole thing. You were also saying that at

267   times it was probably stressful the way you were describing [things

268   P3: Yeah!

269   Int.: because] in the beginning we obviously talked about politics and religion and stuff like

270   that. Was that at any point important for people in the gang?

271   P3: (.) Probably… ehm some of the smarter ones would be… ehm follow the politics and

272   things like that. Get what I mean, yeah? Definitely. Was important to some people.

273   Int.: Yeah. Were there… were there… because you were saying before 'preaching'… ehm

274   were they trying to get people interested in politics or in a certain religion or was it just them

275   doing it on the side, so to speak?

276   P3: No, I don't know about getting people interested in it, but like for example one of the

277   olders I was talking about he was into music and stuff… saying certain things into music

278   about politicians… not politi—Politics! And ehm… that's about it, really.

279   Int.: Ok.

280   P3: Called… like called certain lines that they said *inaudible* …

281   Int.: Ok, sound also really frustrated, which I think I can understand, if they say 'Oh, we

282   gonna help and then nothing is happening'.

283   P3: Yeah.

284   Int.: Another thing that just came to my mind, because I talked to a few other people in

285   here—not on this ward but elsewhere—ehm… and when they were in prison they had a lot of

286   issues with other gangs even though they weren't in a gang anymore. Did you experience

287   similar things?

288   P3: Yeah, yeah… When I was in a gang or when I was out again?

289   Int.: Ehm… both. Like when were you in prison? Were you then still in a gang when you

290   were in prison?

291   P3: Not… not this time. Not recently. But before, yeah.

292   Int.: Ok, so, when you were not in a gang anymore and in prison, people still treated you as if

293   you were in a gang?

294   P3: = Yeah.

295   Int.: Ehm… was there any way to stop this?

296   P3: = Not really. Only way to go onto ehm… called the VP wing. It's like a 'Vulnerable

297   Person'… *mumbling* but I wouldn't go on it.

298   Int.: Ok, why? Was that not an option for you or was that not… way was that not an option?

299   P3: Cause that is only for people that are like… people that are getting decked and then gone

300   off or people that are… that are in for like funny stuff.

301   Int.: Ok.

302   P3: So…

303   Int.: So, that wasn't for you then. Ehm… That also, I mean I'm not gonna lie, that also

304   sounds dangerous, again! So, was there ever times where you felt 'Things are getting risky in

305   prison'?

306   P3: Loads of times, yeah, loads of times. With knives and stuff like that in prison.

307   Int.: Yeah, and were you reconsidering then joining the gang to have more protection or was

308   that also not an option?

309   P3: Nah, not really. Not really.

310   Int.: = Why?

311   P3: Because… just, couldn't be bothered with it, mate. Like, I was…I don't know how to

312   explain it. When I was there…. Some of my friends, all my… most of my friends were… all

313   friends were in the gang anyway. So, like, they my friends anyway. So, like, I'm in jail, there,

314   in jail chilling with them anyways, cause they're my friends.

315   Int.: Ah, ok.

316   P3: So, it's like: I'm involved in shit anyway. Even when I'm trying not to be involved in it,

317   you're getting caught in *inaudible*…

318   Int.: (.) I understand now. So, you were still in contact with all your friends and stuff like that.

319   P3: Before, yeah.

320   Int.: Ok. Ehm… I heard from other people that there are also groups in prison that are really

321   extreme, that are either religious extreme or political extreme and they're giving… it sounds

322   like they're giving gangs a hard time. Was that at any time something that you also

323   experience or was that never the case?

324   P3: Yeah, I've seen people like… what's it called? Some radicalised people and stuff like

325   that. Yeah, yeah, I've seen that. I've seen that in here.

326   Int.: = Really?

327   P3: = Yeah, I've seen that in here.

328   Int.: And, like what is your reaction when you see that?

329   P3: (.) I find it… not funny, but funny. I just like… they tryna…you got to have a weak mind

330   to kind of be coached into that. I don't know. I don't know.

331   Int.: Why… why do you say… I'm not disagreeing with you but I'm just wondering why do

332   you think it's funny?

333   P3: = No… *laughing* I don't know.

334   Int.: Or… weird or…

335   P3: (.) I don't know to explain it. From they way I've seen it… I'm seeing it happen to me

336   it's funny cause… it's like, I'm looking… I'm looking and I'm like 'Don't they know what

337   they doing'… that's what I feel like saying to people that they radicalising... 'Don't they

338   know what they doing?' like…

339   Int.: How does that look from the outside, when you, for example//?

340   P3: It just looks…

341   Int.: (.) How did you notice that it was happening in prison?

342   P3: The way that they speaking to you. What they're saying to you *laughing*

343   Int.: Ok.

344   P3: It's funny, yeah.

345   Int.: (.) Like what are they saying? I have no idea about this.

346   P3: I don't know how to explain it. I don't know. It seem like… to someone who don't know

347   it probably seem like they just having a normal conversation about… about their religion. It's

348   not… it's not. It's not a normal conversation, when they keep like bringing it up and things

349   like that.

350   Int.: Interesting, ok. Yeah, that's interesting. Just because I would not know probably how to

351   tell the difference. So, I find it interesting… like, that you're noticing something. I'm

352   wondering what that is//

353   P3: You probably would. I don't know… to me it's easy to notice. For example, if somebody

354   comes up to me and is talking about… I don't know, is talking about Islam. And is saying…

355   ehm... our prophet said this our prophet said that… But it's every few days, he says that every

356   few days. He's trying to coach you into it.

357   Int.: = Gottcha. I know what you mean now. So, it feels like constantly brought up, again and

358   again.

359   P3: Yeah, but subtlety. They do it subtlety. Like yeah.

360   Int.: And, why do you think some people in prison fell for it? You said something before

361   about 'weak minds'//

362   P3: Yeah, I don't know. I don't know. That's what it seems to me.

363   Int.: = Yeah, yeah.

364   P3: Weak-minded. *mumbling* I don't know. Obviously, ehm… you can do your own

365   research, and learn… learn things yourself. Lot of people let say certain things to them and

366   few things to them. And they all read one book and after that they're changed.

367   Int.: = Gottcha. Did you friends in prison also noticed when people were talking like that?

368   P3: Some of them, some of them.

369   Int.: What was their opinion about that?

370   P3: I'm not too sure, really. Like, I know someone who went to jail and became Muslim. But

371   he's not on these terrorist thing, you get me? But then they are people that are not my friends

372   *stammering* that are on these terrorist things.

373   Int.: = Gottcha. So, it's… yeah ok. Let's just check I didn't miss anything. But that is really

374   interesting, because obviously I have no idea how it is being in a gang and things like that. So

375   that's really… ehm really helpful. I think we covered most of it to be honest. One thing

376   generally… you were saying beforehand I used to… ehm…. I used to want to be a plumber

377   or things like that… ehm… what is your plan now? Do you have a plan? Is there something

378   you want to do in the future?

379   P3: = Personal trainer.

380   Int.: Like personal trainer workout?

381   P3: Yeah.

382   Int.: Nice. Ehm… so often are you going to the gym then here?

383   P3: Once a week. It's supposed to be twice a week but because it's low staffed we're getting

384   it once a week.

385   Int.: Ok. Yeah, ok, is there anything that I didn't ask that you wanted to mention? Anything

386   you feel like I didn't ask properly?

387   P3: *shaking head*

388   Int.: How did you feel that went?

389   P3: = Alright.

390   Int.: Yeah, I agree. I think that was really good, really helpful. Sometimes people find my

391   questions a bit weird but that is because I am curious. So, if you have nothing else to add to

392   this, I can turn this off now.

Interview 4:

325

1   Int.: So, thank you for meeting me today. As I say, if at any point you don't want to answer

2   something or say that this is enough now *inaudible* very relaxed session, I think. Generally,

3   I ask in the beginning, because we're talking about *interrupted by nurse fixing the light*

4   Usually, in the beginning, because we're talking about opinions and how that affects

5   behaviour, I ask everyone: Do you think of yourself as political?

6   P4: = No, not at all.

7   Int.: = No? Do you have any opinion about politics... what is happening right now?

8   P4: *mumbling* No.

9   Int.: Is that//?

10   P4: Reading the papers, but I just… I don't really trust the papers what they say. So, I do read

11   the papers but I am not really interested in politics.

12   Int.: Yeah, *inaudible* papers, is that like//?

13   P4: I think, I feel that sometimes papers want what they think will sell stories. So, you can't

14   really trust the papers. You know what I mean?

15   Int.: = Yeah, I understand. And, if that would be different would you then be more interested

16   in politics or is that//?

17   P4: Yeah, probably.

18   Int.: Ok.

19   P4: Not really an interesting subject to me to be fair, I'm not really into politics. Even as I got

20   older, I really didn't get into it.

21   Int.: Ok, why was that? What was more interesting?

22   P4: Ehm… Going out and doing things, not sitting in, watching things on the telly. We were

23   out, doing stuff.

24   Int.: Yeah, what were you doing, for example?

25   P4: Going out clubbing ehm… going out on the nights *inaudible*… you know, different

26   sort of life to sitting reading papers, you know?

27   Int.: Yeah, ok. Ehm… and the other question I always ask in the beginning as well just to

28   kind of to cover the basis—we're talking about politics—I also often ask: Are you religious

29   in any way?

30   P4: = I am Roman-Catholic, but I am not very… religious.

31   Int.: Ok. What does 'not very religious' mean?

32   P4: Mean, I probably go to church once or twice, but I do believe in God. I believe… ehm…

33   Roman-Catholic is my religion. But I wouldn't say I'm very religious.

34   Int.: = Gottcha. So, when you say 'I'm not really going to church' and things like that do

35   you//?

36   P4: I do! I'm not saying I have never or have [been

37   Int.: Yeah.

38   P4: but] I should go a bit more than what I actually do. You know what I mean?

39   Int.: = Gottcha. Yeah, yeah. Ehm… Do you pray or is that//?

40   P4: Sometimes. Ehm, when my kid was ill—my daughter was ill—I prayed, but not really.

41   Int.: Yeah.

42   P4: I don't really think that the life that I led that praying is going to help with what I did

43   *smiles*

44   Int.: *laughs* Ehm… was your, or is your family religious in any way?

45   P4: No, not really.

46   Int.: Ok, ok. Those are the two questions I cover in the beginning. And then, what I was

47   wondering is… ehm… you can decide what we're going to talk about—either when you were

48   in the community or when you were in prison—about like the people that you hung out with.

49   Friends, ehm… or were you ever part of a gang, for example?

50   P4: Ehm… no not really.

51   Int.: Ok, so, if you want, for example, we can talk about generally the people you hung out

52   with, your family, like ehm… you said before you were going out partying and things like

53   that… ehm… How did you meet those friends? Where would you know them from? Was that

54   back from when you were children, was that in your neighbourhood//?

55   P4: Both, both! *mumbling* when I wanted used to go out partying with the people I've

56   knew before. Cause I went to town *jail* and got put up on a sentence and when I come out I

57   was 21. Went in like… ehm I think I was 16, come out when I was 21. So, ehm… I'm started

58   quite a lot of going out and doing things with your mates and that… so I started going out

59   from that age—21—and I met up with people I knew from before, new people… and ehm…

60   I… I was out pretty much every day… enjoying [myself

61   Int.: Ok.

62   P4: But ehm]… yeah, I wouldn't say that I was part of a gang.

63   Int.: Ok.

64   P4: = Ever!

65   Int.: And… were there particular people that you—how do I ask this?—who is likely to be

66   your mate? Like what are you looking for when you're having friends?

67   P4: = Loyalty!

68   Int.: = Loyalty.

69   P4: = Trusting. Caring. Ehm… loyalty is a big thing to me, to be fair.

70   Int.: Yeah.

71   P4: Yeah… and I've… I can probably fit my closest friends in a car. So…

72   Int.: And how… what does this loyalty mean for you? Can you give an example, when people

73   behaved loyal to you?

74   P4: (.) what do you mean by that?

75   Int.: Like, ehm… How do you know that someone is loyal? How do you notice?

76   P4: = Oh, ok! Ehm… By being there. Through things that happen. Day to day things or

77   things that aren't happen often—don't happen often, sorry! Ehm… obviously, when you're a

78   criminal things happen. Violence happened, people get hurt, it's nice to know you got

79   someone's help, in case something does go on. As I said, I've got good… I've got a lot lot

80   people, but I can fit my friends in a care… with me in a car *mumbling* that's not a lot of

81   people, really. I tend to keep my circle very small… and ehm… the fact that I've a lot… there

82   have been a moment all my life… have always been friends with them all my life, they've

83   just around… but we've gone to be very close over the years that we've known each other…

84   Int.: Ok. And was that because of things that you were experiencing—criminal things—or

85   was that because//?

86   P4: No, just that… we enjoyed each other company. Everything we did was together. The

87   kids grew up together. The… we all went out together. All our families, all together. It was

88   very close knit. [Ehm…

89   Int.: Yeah, you became a proper *inaudible*

90   P4: They're like my brothers.]

91   Int.: Ok, and you said before you were 16 to 21 in prison. Was it easy to get to know people

92   there? Because, for example, I obviously never been to//

93   P4: I went to the jail in X called X. I was there for… till I was 18. I was 16 when I was

94   coming. I… I left there when I was 18. And… I… wasn't a great jail. I mean, not on the

95   wing, I was the only white guy on the whole wing. So, that was a bit of a problem. But I got

96   through it. Ehm, I… went to another jail at 18 to X on juveniles. And I end up going to X in

97   X, straight away I was fighting, every day, for about 3 weeks, got moved up there. Went to

98   another jail… I think it was X… same thing happened, fighting every day. Went to another

99   jail, this was… it was the psyche wards, getting kicked out of jail, fighting the system,

100 fighting the screws, fighting inmates… ehm… and ehm, end up get send to jail which I really

101 didn't think the psyche ward is *mumbling* there are no replacements in a psyche ward.

102 They literally keep you here whatever you've done, you're not gonna get kicked out, they

103 gonna keep you in this place. And eh… I was there for a couple of years, kept fighting

104 them… obviously, as you do, I was only 18. So, I just fought on everything I thought wasn't

105 right and ehm… I tried my luck, tried fighting the system, it didn't work. All happened was I

106 ended up in the segregation or in basic and they… they said to me—one of the guards said to

107 me 'Look, if you do whatever I ask you to do, I will… I get you back closer to home'. And…

108 *mumbling* it took me a while, before I took on board what he said. I did it. And he actually

109 did get me down South, so…. I was happy that. And why I was coming down here I was back

110 in… back in X, which is X prison, which was good for me because it was close to my family.

111 And… and I stayed in there until I got released and I was fine in there.

112 Int.: I mean, that sounds like… already like when you were saying in the beginning 'Oh I was

113 in jail, I was the only white guy' I was already thinking 'Uh that sounds dangerous'. Was that

114 dangerous?

115 P4: = It was! Obviously in X there is a lot of gangs [locked up.

116 Int.: Yeah.

117 P4: But] I mean I'm a big lad, so, I had a few scrapes with different people over the years.

118 But I knew a lot of people who've… from out there who's brought to that jail… black lads,

119 white lads, and like ehm… it was fine. It was a lot of people from my area, was in that jail,

120 just go on different wings.

121 Int.: Ok. Ehm, so, this is me assuming and you can obviously correct me, but you said, the

122 two things that strike me, is the way you kept yourself safe. Cause what you're saying 'I'm a

123 big lad, so I had to defend myself obviously' and they had respect when they obviously see

124   someone this big… but you also said you were well connected. Do you think those were the

125   two things//?

126   P4: Probably.

127   Int.: = Hm?

128   P4: = Probably yeah.

129   Int.: Ok. And, was there any kind of… ehm… support system beyond the people that you

130   knew, like staff members that could help you//?

131   P4: Not went to them.

132   Int.: = Why?

133   P4: Not went to them for nothing. Cause they *mumbling*… had I… had I been treated

134   better as a child in secure units I probably would've had a different opinion on… screws, or

135   prison officers as you say. Ehm… but what was I saying? *mumbling*

136   Int.: Ehm, and then, you got out, you… we talked about the friends that you made outside in

137   the community… as you say, the brothers so to speak…. And your families got together. And

138   then, did you say that afterwards you came here? I assume not.

139   P4: = Nah, ehm… I've been in X, I lived in… moved to X when I came out prison. I was

140   there until… let me work that out.

141   Int.: (.)

142   P4: (.) I was 23, when I moved to X with my… partner at the time and my 4-month-old

143   daughter. So, we went to X, ehm… we got... we got a house. Obviously, nothing really

144   changed from what I was doing in X. I just carried on what I was doing in X in X. And… and

145   yeah… end up getting locked up a couple of times. And then obviously, I come here

146   eventually. *inaudible* a lot of years, a lot of stuff happened in X, a lot of things. Ehm… end

147   up going to jail. And I've done… being in jail and… jail at the time…

148   Int.: Ok, was the… was that time in *inaudible* when you went to jail kind of a different

149   experience or was that kind of feeling the same again?

150   P4: *inaudible* When I went to jail… type where I am in now, for this time, which is X.

151   When I went to X prison, it was…. It was an absolute joke of a place *inaudible*… I mean

152   like you got people that were self-harming—cutting fingers off, cutting toes off—dying in

153   front of me, I saw loads of different things in that jail. It was… it was appalling, the way they

154   treated people. They… there was not staff, got screws, staff, whatever. No staff there to….

155   To stop these things from happening. In a lot… in a sense it was a good thing for me cause I

156   could do whatever I wanted. But, if you needed help—which I think I did at that time, I

157   needed help—they wouldn't help a bit. You know what I mean?

158   Int.: = Ok. I mean not ok//

159   P4: I was like, *inaudible* I at least speak to doctors, tell them how I'm feeling, what I'm

160   thinking about, what is going on in my head. And it just… it was like banging your head

161   against a brick wall… Obviously, the things that happened at jail were of course how the way

162   the jails were run. That was… they weren't down to *mumbling*… because I… I like…

163   head *mumbling*… I mean I had some illness problems, but it still laid the basis of the

164   problem was the prison.

165   Int.: = Yeah, yeah I understand that. Ehm, how did you… because that sounds even more

166   extreme than what you described beforehand and it is like such a poor prison where you're

167   not safe because staff not help you or whatever… ehm how did keep yourself safe?

168   P4: I had a lot of friends.

169   Int.: Is that from outside [*inaudible*?

170   P4: Outside and the inside.]

171   Int.: Ok. And was that anyway… I mean do I have to imagine that? Like 'we meet everyday'

172   ehm//

173   P4: It's not like that. In jail, you're on a wing.

174   Int.: Yeah.

175   P4: Majority of your time you spend in that one wing. You're either in your cell or you're out

176   on the wing. Or you out exercise. If you have a job, you go to work. If you go to the gym,

177   you go to the gym. But your hold live revolves around that jail. So, you eat there, you sleep

178   there, you shit there, you're there all the time that's what you do. You know what I mean?

179   Ehm… In that… in that jail, there was no staff around… at all. At any time, when… There

180   was the geezer died in front of us… everyone was saying *mumbling* 'He's not breathing'.

181   And, he died on the… on the fucking pool table. And I think… *mumbling* last minute

182   reanimation turned on, but it was too late, he was fucking gone, was dead.

183   Int.: How did that make you feel in that situation?

184   P4: I couldn't believe it. I thought it was an absolute *inaudible*…

185   Int.: Yeah, I mean, it sounds horrendous.

186   P4: = It was horrendous.

187   Int.: I agree with you there. Ehm… You said before, ehm… because I'm still thinking about

188   how you keep yourself safe in such situations and stuff like that//

189   P4: I carried a weapon everywhere I went! Everywhere I went I had a knife on me.

190   Int.: Did you get that from outside?

191   P4: I did!

192   Int.: Ok. And ehm… did you ever have to use it or was that more to feel like you have

193   something in emergencies?

194   P4: Nah, just in case I needed it.

195   Int.: = Gottcha. And ehm… Did you witness other people also having weapons?

196   P4: Yeah, daily.

197   Int.: It was a standard thing?

198   P4: Was a standard thing.

199   Int.: = Gottcha. Talking about standard thing, because I talk to other people obviously as well

200   about this. And you weren't part of a gang, but I heard in prison there are a lot of gangs.

201   P4: Yeah.

202   Int.: Did you ever witness gangs trying to [*inaudible*?

203   P4: *inaudible*] X, I've been to quite a few different jails, and I say X has a really big gang

204   culture. X got very… got all different gangs in X. But in X there is only really two main

205   gangs. There's a few little ones that nobody really talks about but ehm… there's are two main

206   gangs and in jail they tend to split them off into different… gangs. So, one gang would be on

207   one wing, one gang would be on another.

208   Int.: = Gottcha. What happens to people that are in-between? If you're not part of a gang

209   what happens to you then?

210   P4: (.) Is… it is not really that they're recruiting people, mate. To be fair, if… if you wanna

211   talk about people trying recruit, have gangs… is like… you got Muslim lads trying to convert

212   other lads into being Muslim. That's like a gang in jail, like that's a big thing a lot of people

213   are doing that right now. Trying to be Muslim, to be part of the bigger picture. Pfff… but

214   that's up to them. If they wanna do that, that's fine. But they… ehm… that's probably the

215   biggest gang in jail, which is the Muslim gang.

216   Int.: Did they ever approach you?

217   P4: They always find you.

218   Int.: And how did you stay clear of that//?

219   P4: It's not… it's not… it's not for me.

220   Int.: And you… like *inaudible* just say 'No' and then they leave you alone or//?

221   P4: Yeah… *mumbling* … I just… I just didn't do *mumbling, shrugging*

222   Int.: Fair enough… I mean I could imagine//

223 P4: I'm not talking about like people that have come from the street. I'm talking about people

224 that are fucking far gone. These people like, the shit they believe… it's all well and good

225 having a religion, but the shit they believe in is just nonsense. It's not normal.

226 Int.: Ok. What was that, for example?

227 P4: The… the terrorist and all that. I'm not… I'm not even entertaining shit like that. I'm…

228 it's not for me. That religion is not for me, cause… whenever they dress it up, that's what

229 they do. They killing all kids and women and children… in fucking Manchester—that

230 arena—I'm… I'm not into that. And it's not religion that I look to… I'm not racist towards

231 Muslim people, I've got a lot of Muslim friends. And that's alright. And they're normal

232 people. They're not going to fucking blowing people up. But in prison a lot of them are in for

233 that. So… yeah… it's... they're the people that are trying to convert people for their reasons.

234 Not to be a Muslim, it's for being a terrorist.

235 Int.: Yeah. Did you see ehm… other people… ehm that were successfully converted?

236 P4: Yeah, loads of them.

237 Int.: What do you think is the difference with them? Because//

238 P4: A lot of my mates that are said that a Muslim have talked to them in jail… a lot of my

239 mates that… who are Muslim—I've got a few mates that are actually born Muslim—a lot of

240 my mates are converted… have been converted in jail. But they weren't converted to go and

241 blow people up or to kill people. They were converted because they got religion. It's a diff…

242 it's a completely different thing.

243 Int.: Yeah. Of course, of course. Ehm… so getting away from that ehm… did anyone ever

244 approach you or… to become a member of a gang? Just because of mentioning you're a big

245 guy, people have respect to you… like did they ever try to get you on either side//?

246 P4: No… it's not… it's not really… *mumbling* it's not an initiation or anything like that.

247 Not I ever was part of a gang, but in prison… half the lads were good lads, they would

248   probably get on together. They've got *mumbling* no one talks to… So, I've… I suppose

249   you could say it was a gang, but it's not really a gang. Cause that… no… you know what I

250   mean?

251   Int.: Ok, yeah. I know what you mean. Ehm//

252   P4: They're not people in our side. Once I got bored of them, you gotta go outside.

253   *inaudible* But then the rest of the lads are on there that are actually alright. They're…

254   they're good lads. They make mistakes, they end up in prison, but in the end of the day, they

255   are actually alright. So, we speak to them.

256   Int.: Yeah, ok. Makes sense to me. Ehm… Just see if we cover everything. Ehm… Covered a

257   lot of things. We talked about ehm… different groups, and as you say… ehm… we talked

258   about—and I thought this was important—that you said ehm… there are different groups in

259   prison, for example, the… the… Muslim quote on quote 'gangs' that are trying to recruit

260   people ehm… they are different than the fact that *inaudible* outside… and that you

261   [*inaudible*

262   P4: *inaudible*

263   Int.: they] are two completely separate things//

264   P4: Yeah, yeah.

265   Int.: I think that is ehm… that's quite important, that's good… Ehm, yeah, I think we covered

266   most of it. Just also wondering ehm… we obviously talked a lot about negative things, what

267   had happened in prison and the mismanagement of the jail and stuff like that. Were there any

268   things that you could do that were positive? Like, I don't know//

269   P4: What, in prison?

270   Int.: = Yeah, I don't know. I'm asking because [*inaudible*

271   P4: *inaudible*] There is nothing positive about prison, mate.

272   Int.: Yeah.

273 P4: I'm never… I never learned my lesson once any time I been to prison. Come in here is

274 changed my way of thinking completely. Is… is… not worked for me in prison, at all! I've

275 been locked up, in and out, since I was ten years old. And I never ever once thought to myself

276 'I'm gonna get a job'… 'I'm gonna do this, I'm gonna do that, I'm not gonna do…'—every

277 time I get out of jail I think 'What am I doing next? What… How am I working money the

278 next week?' Being caught for it is *inaudible*. I've never even had the idea in my head to

279 even think about getting a job. Only since I've come to this place that I've got medication,

280 done a bit of therapy, talked over my issues and I thought 'Maybe a lot of what I've done was

281 wrong and maybe I should do it in a different way.' That's… that's the choice, mate, I

282 promise you. The only time I've… I've ever changed my thought process is that I'm here.

283 Int.: Yeah. I mean I hear that from a lot of people, that because prison is so horrible//

284 P4: Yeah, exactly.

285 Int.: Not really changes people, does it?

286 P4: No, not at all. Not at all. It's not helping, it's… it's just keeping people away, in… in the

287 prison. They do… they're not helping, they're not giving therapy, they do a few courses… in

288 X I did about three courses and all I did was fucking too far gone anyway. So, you probably

289 never really get out. Very rarely you see anyone getting out for life sentence, cause they…

290 they change not… they so used to routine, it's… They not on a continuous sort of way life.

291 It's horrible.

292 Int.: Yeah. So, saying you that ehm… the first time you changed perspective was here… if

293 you could talk to yourself when you were younger//

294 P4: Of course. I'd say: 'Go to school'… 'Got to school, get a job, and work! And have legal

295 money'. Cause anything you earn as a criminal is not even your money, you can't buy

296 anything with it, it's taken off you. So… is… is… it's all needless. But you can't listen, when

297 you're a kid, cause I didn't. I've got a son who is doing exactly the sort of same stuff that I

298   was doing when I was a kid. He's gonna get locked up, if he carries on. And… I tell him

299   *mumbling* 'I've done it', I've done exactly the same thing I don't want him to do. And I

300   speak to him and he goes 'Pff' *shrugging*. It seems to me that when you're a kid you think

301   you're right anyways. So, whatever you feel as a kid you carrying forward.

302   Int.: Yeah. Very right. As a kid you probably think you're… know everything [*inaudible*

303   Part.4: *inaudible*

304   Int.: nothing] bad can happen to you in that sense. Yeah… no, I agree. So, what are you

305   doing in here that's positive? You said already//

306   P4: I've talked… cause to be fair, I've talked about any problems I've had, I had a lot of

307   issues, before coming here and I kept it all hidden away. I was wrapped up in a lot of criminal

308   life day to day, every day. I wake up angry every day… so, that's been angry, it's gonna be

309   violent, it's gonna… it's gonna be problems all the time and ehm… I was always angry. I...

310   *mumbling* I get angry every now and then over things that are relevant, that are… that are

311   actually meaningful. But before, I just get angry cause I… oh, I fucking I put the wrong

312   shows on to match my jeans. Everything would piss me off. And now, I feel a lot better, a lot

313   better… for… cause I'm calm, my… my thought process is a lot slower than it was. I was

314   erratic, when I was outside. So, being like it… it causes a lot of problems, a lot of problems.

315   Day to day, I was a nightmare. So, I've been told by a lot of people with things I was doing…

316   I was… lucky really to be here, things I was doing, cause… someone… that *inaudible*

317   could've fucking kill me. But I'm lucky, I'm still here.

318   Int.: Yeah. Ok. Well, ehm… I'm really thankful that you did this interview. Ehm… and

319   answered some of the questions. Do you feel like there's anything that I didn't asked

320   properly//

321   P4: You did a good job, mate.

322   Int.: Anything that you want to add that we didn't touch upon?

323   P4: = No.

324   Int.: Ok. Perfect. Ehm… yeah, that's… that's about it then. I turn this off, we talked for 25

325   minutes.

Interview 5:

1   Int.: Here you go, I put it *the recorder* here. Ehm, yeah so this is going to be very relaxed

2   interview, however much you wanna share, there is no pressure whatsoever. If at any point,

3   you're like 'Nah, that is not for me anymore' we can stop and yeah there is no impact on the

4   care that you're receiving. Generally, when I start those interviews, I ask everyone: Do you

5   consider yourself being political?

6   P4: *shaking head*

7   Int.: No?

8   P4: *shaking head again*

9   Int.: No. Ehm, why not?

10   P4: *mumbling*

11   Int.: Sorry?

12   P4: *mumbling*

13   Int.: Why should you?

14   P4: Yeah.

15   Int.: Hm, I'm just wondering, I'm just curious, I'm just going through those questions.

16   P4: I don't know nothing about politics at all. I don't interest me, I don't really care what

17   they're doing.

18   Int.: Yeah, ok. Ehm… And the other question that I usually ask people as well is whether you

19   are religious?

20   P4: Yeah, I'm a Christian.

21   Int.: Is that Catholic or Protestant or//?

22   P4: Christian, Church of England.

23   Int.: Church of England, ok. Are you regularly going to church?

24   P4: Nah, she comes over to see me. Gives me the communion. Every week. So, I'm still

25   waiting on her this week.

26   Int.: (.) So, I assume—you can correct me, if I'm wrong—if that's every week that's

27   something that is important to you?

28   P4: = Yeah. Very important.

29   Int.: Ok. Why is that important to you?

30   P4: Cause ehm… Jesus *mumbling* and Jesus died on the cross for us for our sins, so that's

31   why *mumbling* he looks after me.

32   Int.: Ok. That's good to hear. And do you… you also pray then?

33   P4: I do, yeah.

34   Int.: Ok.

35   P4: *shows two necklaces with two different sized crosses*

36   Int.: Ah, yes, I see, the crosses around your neck. Ehm… Is that something that your family

37   also does? Or is that something that only you do?

38   P4: No, I… I do only.

39   Int.: Ok. When did you start believing in Jesus? Was that always there or…?

40   P4: About 14, 15.

41   Int.: Ok, that's quite young to find Jesus. What… Was there anyone who helped you find

42   Jesus or…? How did you come about it?

43   P4: (.) Just went to church and listened to stories and stuff like that.

44   Int.: And what did you like about the stories?

45   P4: I liked the church and that I believed that God was real and prayed for forgiveness and

46   *sigh* that's it.

47   Int.: Ok. Ehm… How do you usually feel, when—is that a lady that comes over?

48   P4: *nodding*

49   Int.: When she comes over and you pray, like what are the feelings that you're getting when

50   you… ehm… when you're doing that?

51   P4: Comfortable *mumbling*. Makes me feel better.

52   Int.: Nice. Ok… ehm. Was there ever the option for another religion? What do you think of

53   other religions?

54   P4: I did ehm… I was a Muslim once. I was an Christian, then Muslim, then I converted back

55   to Christian. Which is a bad thing to do but…

56   Int.: Why is this a bad thing to do?

57   P4: Cause I turned my back on God and… threw my believes out the window… *mumbling*

58   Muslim, cause they're terrorist and that…

59   Int.: Ah, ok. When was that then?

60   P4: (.) I can't remember.

61   Int.: Ok, that's fine *inaudible* that's totally ok. Ehm… so, I asked you before whether your

62   family is Christian and you said, 'They're not really'. Do you have anyone besides the lady

63   that's been visiting you in here that you can share that with? Or is that is something that is

64   just for you?

65   P4: Yeah, my main nurse.

66   Int.: Ok, is she religious as well.

67   P4: (.) I don't... but I can talk to her about it.

68   Int.: Ok. And ehm… beforehand, when you were not in here… ehm you said you were going

69   to the church. Was that a big community, was that a small community, like how do I have to

70   imagine that?

71   P4: Normal.

72   Int.: Normal?

73   P4: = Yeah.

74   Int.: Did you have a lot of people there that you can share that with?

75   P4: Only me *mumbling*.

76   Int.: Ah, ok…. Ok. Ehm… So, what did you find initially attractive about going… going

77   there and praying?

78   P4: I never went.

79   Int.: Oh, you never went?

80   P4: *shaking head*

81   Int.: So, where did you listen to those stories then? Sorry, I didn't get that.

82   P4: When I was locked in… juvenile.

83   Int.: Ok, I got that. Ehm… ok, let me just check here. Ehm… Was there anything—and again,

84   if you don't want to share that is totally within reason—ehm… anything when you were in

85   juvenile ehm… that was going in your life that's difficult to deal with right now? How was

86   that back then when you were//?

87   P4: Good, yeah, yeah. When I first gotta *mumbling* Christians… you had to do really good

88   acts, innit? I was so happy and just relieved almost *flat in affect*. *mumbling for long time*

89   guidance and things. Guidance and faith, and things.

90   Int.: (.) Ok that sounds really positive, giving believes and giving… like you have someone

91   who can forgive you for those things. That's really nice. Ehm… do you feel like that also

92   really made your life a bit better then, having a *inaudible* that you can talk to?

93   P4: Yeah, yeah.

94   Int.: Ehm… I know that is not really option in here, but would you like to go to church in the

95   future? Like having a bigger community *inaudible*?

96   P4: *mumbling*

97   Int.: Hm?

98   P4: Not in here, no.

99   Int.: Why?

100   P4: *sigh* Cause it's bad people in here. And I don't mix with them.

101   Int.: = Ok. You mean here in X?

102   P4: *nodding*

103   Int.: Ehm, if that wouldn't be here, like would that be something that would be nice?

104   P4: Yeah.

105   Int.: Ok. So, it's just about the people here that you… Ok that's fair enough. Is there—I'm

106   thinking about how to try and ask this—are there particular days or situations that you pray

107   more [often

108   P4: No.

109   Int.: Or] is that something very regular? How does it look like to you?

110   P4: Every day, hm.

111   Int.: How does it look like then? Is that something that helps or are you skipping it then?

112   P4: A bit, yeah.

113   Int.: Ehm… Is there anyone—and again you don't have to say anything if you don't want

114   to—but is anyone ehm given you grief for being Christian?

115   P4: No.

116   Int.: No? Oh, that's good to hear. Ehm, but do you think about people that don't believe in

117   Jesus?

118   P4: I only believe in one God and *mumbling* they just believe in a different way.

119   Int.: Yeah.

120   P4: So, yeah, sort of…

121   Int.: Ok. Did anyone ever tried to convince you of the opposite, like 'Nah you're doing it the

122   wrong way' or…?

123   P4: (.) *mumbling* yeah.

124   Int.: And how did you react to that?

125   P4: I did a mistake and *mumbling* and now I'm a 100% Christian.

126   Int.: Yeah. How did you find your way back then?

127   P4: (.) Ehm… I can't remember.

128   Int.: Was that… that was before X, I assume.

129   P4: No, that was in X.

130   Int.: Ah, ok. So, it's quite recent?

131   P4: = No.

132   Int.: Ok, ehm… is there, you said before, you made a mistake and things like that. Do you

133   feel ehm… you said before you're a Christian and you're never leaving, ehm… Do you think

134   that will stay like this your entire life now?

135   P4: Yeah, I'd imagine so.

136   Int.: What… what caused it beforehand to change? Why… or do you not want to talk about

137   that?

138   P4: *mumbling* I… I don't know why I did it. I haven't got a clue.

139   Int.: Ok.

140   P4: Can I open this quickly? *pointing towards letter he got before the session from nurse*

141   Int.: = Yeah, of course! Go ahead.

142   P4: *next 2 mins reading letter*

143 Int.: All good?

144 P4: = Yeah.

145 Int.: Ok. Ehm… Do you find it—generally when we're having this conversation right now—

146 do you find that weird talking to me about this? Or is that ok?

147 P4: It's alright. *avoiding eye contact*

148 Int.: (.) Yeah? I just don't want to make you in any way ehm… uncomfortable. So, please let

149 me know, if ehm… yeah, anything bothers you. Ehm… So, we just talked about that you

150 think that likely you will stay Christian your entire life. Ehm, I'm just wondering—you said

151 you can't really remember what made you change beforehand—but it seems a bit like ehm…

152 you didn't have the best opinion about the people [Muslims] back then. Did I get that right?

153 P4: = Yeah.

154 Int.: Why was that?

155 P4: = Don't know.

156 Int.: Don't know?

157 P4: *shrugging*

158 Int.: Was that something particular that they did that rubbed you the wrong way or were they

159 aggressive maybe?

160 P4: = No.

161 Int.: Ok. Was that in prison?

162 P4: = Yeah.

163 Int.: = Gottcha. Ehm… do you… How… Are there Muslims here on the ward?

164 P4: No.

165 Int.: Would that be a problem for you, if there would be Muslims here on the ward?

166 P4: No.

167 Int.: Ok. Ehm… you don't feel like there is any kind of conflict anymore?

168   P4: *shaking head*

169   Int.: That's good to hear. Ehm… Just going through my questions here…

170   P4: (.)

171   Int.: Just to get a bit away from the religion and X: In the past, did you consider yourself

172   being aggressive or peaceful? How were you?

173   P4: = Aggressive.

174   Int.: What did you do that made you aggressive?

175   P4: I did a lot of bad things.

176   Int.: Ok.

177   P4: I hurt a lot of people.

178   Int.: Was that verbally aggressive or physical?

179   P4: = Both.

180   Int.: Both. And ehm… how do you… what do you think about it now that you're looking

181   back to those things?

182   P4: That's all in the past, you know. *mumbling* Living my best… *mumbling*

183   Int.: That's good to hear. What made you change?

184   P4: = My mum… I had to look after my mum.

185   Int.: Ok. Ehm… so, what does that mean 'look after your mum'? How did that help you

186   change?

187   P4: Cause I love my mum and don't want her to be distressed all the time.

188   Int.: Ok, so you changed for her? Did I get that correctly?

189   P4: (.) Yeah.

190   Int.: That is nice to hear. And then ehm… What helps you in here, if you're sad or having a

191   bad day? What would you like to do in here?

192   P4: Play on the Xbox, *mumbling*.

193   Int.: Ok, what you're playing on the Xbox?

194   P4: (.) Ehm, Discourse.

195   Int.: (.) Discourse… I don't think I know that.

196   P4: It's an imersionary *immersive? Imaginative/* game.

197   Int.: (.) Ok, I need to look that up. And you said Xbox and what did you say afterwards?

198   P4: (.)

199   Int.: Or what else are you doing?

200   P4: (.)

201   Int.: I think you said something else. Maybe chat with people or something like that, is that

202   what you said?

203   P4: I didn't say that.

204   Int.: Ah, ok, sorry. Then I did get that wrong. Ehm… are you also… you said before that you

205   have a main nurse that you can talk quite well, is that right?

206   P4: = Yeah.

207   Int.: Anyone else that you're getting along with in here?

208   P4: Yeah, talk to all… all the staff, most of the patients…

209   Int.: Ok, that is really good. That sounds really good. So, how do you find it in [location

210   here]?

211   P4: Good, yeah. It's a good place to be and all that.

212   Int.: Ok. Ehm… Did you have other good place in the past that you could go to or was that

213   mainly prisons? How was that for you?

214   P4: Prisons *mumbling* and yeah.

215   Int.: Ok. Ehm… Let's see… *checking notes* We covered most of it. Ehm… How… how

216   did you find those questions?

217   P4: It's alright, yeah.

218 Int.: Is there anything that I asked where you were like 'Uh, I wanna explain that a bit

219 more'…?

220 P4: *shaking head*

221 Int.: No? Ok. Ehm… yeah, I think that that's about it then. That was a very brief one. I hope

222 that was ok for you.

223 P4: = Yeah.

224 Int.: Ehm.

APPENDIX F: MATERIALS FOR STUDY THREE

Profile Rating Form
based on the sections addressed in the clinic document 'Crisis Profile'

Study ID:

Item	Brief Item Prompt	Rating
Type	*Check all types ticked in the profile.*	o Escapee o Potential Escapee o Terrorist Activity/Affiliation o Barricades o Hostage Taker o Potential Hostage Taker o Involved in Disturbance o Roof Top Incidents o Assaults on Staff o Assaults on Others o Risk to Staff
Mental Health Diagnosis	*Write down all diagnoses.*	
PI1: Incident	*Brief description.*	
PI2: Location	*Brief description, <u>no ward descriptions, etc.!</u> (instead: shower, therapy room, etc.)*	
PI3: Victim(s)	*Brief description.*	
PI4: Number of victim(s)	*Full number.*	
PI5: Threats	*Check box.*	o Yes. o No.
PI6: Frequency of Threats	*Brief description of time scale, inc. estimates (e.g., per month, per year, etc.).*	
PI7: Time scale	*Brief description of the time scale regarding incident.*	
PI8: Nature of Threats	*Brief description.*	
PI9: Prevention	*Brief description of potential aspects preventing the carrying out of threats.*	
PI10: Threats carried out	*Check box.*	o Yes. o No.

Item	Brief Item Prompt	Rating
PI11: Demands	*Check box.*	o Yes. o No.
P12: Nature of Demands	*Brief description.*	
PI13: Demands met vs. not met	*Check box.*	o Yes. o No.
PI14: Patient's reaction	*Brief description.*	
PI15: Reasons (staff)	*Brief description of reasons for incident as described by staff.*	
PI16: Reasons (patient)	*Brief description of reasons for incident as described by patient.*	
PI17: Incident Time	*Approx. time indication of how long incident lasted.*	
PI18: Resolving	*Brief description how incident was resolved (voluntarily, with police force, etc.).*	
F1: Further incidents	*Brief description.*	
F2: Risk rating	*Brief description of risk when unwell.*	
MH1: Relapse indicators	*Brief description.*	
MH2: Strategies	*Brief description managing mental health symptoms.*	
MH3: Triggers	*Brief description.*	
MH4: Substance Use	*Brief description.*	
OF1: Index Offence	*Brief description.*	
OF2: Alone vs. group	*Check box.*	o Violence predominantly committed alone. o Violence predominantly committed in group.
OF3: Offence History	*Brief description listing all noted offences.*	
B1: Relationships	*Brief description of positive and negative relationships.*	
B2: Likes	*Brief description.*	
B3: Dislikes	*Brief description.*	
B4: Religious	*Brief description of possible religious beliefs.*	

Item	Brief Item Prompt	Rating
B5: Political	*Brief description of possible political attitudes.*	
B6: Stress Responses	*Brief description of typical patient response to stress.*	
B7: Response when needs not met	*Brief description of typical patient response when needs not met.*	
A1: Attitudes about Violence	*Brief description.*	
A2: Personal Grievance	*Brief description about the patient's motivation in relation to personal vendettas/revenge.*	
A3: Need for Excitement	*Brief description.*	
A4: Dominance	*Brief description.*	
A5: Group Affiliation	*Brief description about potential co-perpetrators present on site.*	
A6: Upbringing	*Brief description.*	
A7: Traumatic Events	*Brief description.*	

APPENDIX G: FULL OVERVIEW OF ALL RESULTS OF STUDY THREE

Table G1

Difference Between Comparison Group and Group-Based Violence Sample

Variable	*N*	X²	df	*p*	Frequency in %
Diagnoses	74		1		
Mood Disorder		0.26		.609	8.11
Anxiety Disorder		1.33		.249	1.35
Personality Disorder		0.11		.741	45.95
Psychotic Disorder		2.19		.139	85.14
Trauma-related Disorder		1.33		.249	1.35
Substance-related Disorder		0.01		.938	12.16
Neurodiverse Disorder		0.01		.938	12.16
Relapse Indicators	74		1		
Occurrence of positive symptoms		0.64		.423	45.95
Increased anger/impulsivity		0.95		.329	75.68
Speech/cognitive impairment		3.22		.073	5.41
Less social functioning		0.00		.966	28.38
Decreased self-care		1.81		.178	47.30
Cognitive preoccupation		0.30		.582	43.24
Changed sleep patterns		3.69		.055	10.81
Social withdrawal		0.67		.414	55.41
Evidence of self-harm		0.14		.710	35.14
Triggers	46		1		
Threat to status		0.38		.539	28.26
Threat to safety		0.22		.641	63.04
Trauma-related		1.81		.179	39.13
Overstimulation		0.12		.725	26.09
Embarrassment		0.44		.506	19.57
Needs not met		1.34		.246	52.17
Protective Factors	71		1		

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Frequency in %
Secure attachment style		0.67		.412	4.23
Adaptive coping		0.02		.878	16.90
Self-control		0.14		.712	4.23
Motivation for treatment		0.11		.744	8.45
Positive attitudes towards authority		0.79		.375	1.41
Life goals		0.06		.801	14.08
Adherence to medication		0.07		.792	5.63
Relationships with Family	72		1		
No relationship as contact deceased		0.73		.392	27.78
Isolated		0.25		.615	8.33
Relationship present but not specified in report		0.25		.615	20.83
Prosocial		0.90		.342	38.89
Deviant		0.04		.841	2.78
Conflictual		1.61		.204	27.78
Relationships with Peers	50		1		
No relationship as contact deceased		1.96		.162	6.00
Isolated		0.02		.879	46.00
Relationship present but not specified in report		0.76		.382	10.00
Prosocial		0.02		.884	20.00
Deviant		0.42		.519	12.00
Conflictual		0.58		.445	16.00
Relationships with Intimate Partners	45		1		
No relationship as contact deceased		0.53		.467	26.67
Isolated		2.80		.094	28.89
Relationship present but not specified in report		0.10		.747	6.67
Prosocial		6.01		.014*	8.89
Deviant		0.75		.387	2.22

Variable	N	X²	df	p	Frequency in %
Conflictual		2.57		.109	40.00
Influences on Violence					
Attitudes about violence	67	1.91	1	.167	83.58
Personal grievance	66	2.30	1	.129	68.18
Need for excitement	56	1.95	1	.162	25.00
Need for dominance	65	0.10	1	.758	55.38
Violence related to traumatic events	64	0.00	1	.954	78.13
Suggestibility	61	0.96	1	.328	16.39
Capability	67	4.51	1	.034*	70.36
Need to defend	69	0.85	1	.358	75.36
Need for belonging	63	8.11	1	.004**	25.40

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Figure G1

First Iteration of SSA: Dispersion Accounted For = .91239


354

Figure G2

Second Iteration of SSA: Dispersion Accounted For = .89761


Note. Excluding: PI15 (Staff Reason).

Figure G3

*Third Iteration of SSA: Dispersion Accounted For = .90475*

Note. Excluding: Relationships.

Figure G4

Fourth Iteration of SSA: Dispersion Accounted For = .95119

Note. Excluding: PI3 (Victims known etc.).

Figure G5

Fifth Iteration of SSA: Dispersion Accounted For = .90469

Note. Excluding: Outliers FI2_Phy, PI1_Mixed.

Figure G6

Sixth Iteration of SSA: Dispersion Accounted For = .87765

Object Points

Common Space

Note. Replace Political and religious views just with yes and no. Excluding next: Exc. MH3, FI2.