



Japanese and Taiwanese Approaches to Future Climate Displaced People

Kate Hannah Martin

INTRODUCTION

Japan and Taiwan do not yet have a defined approach to climate displaced people. This can be explained by a combination of the perceived slow-onset nature of climate change and the reluctance of both nations to accept displaced populations. This situation is underpinned by both nations' current legal definitions failing to recognise such people. Whilst the discourse surrounding such migrants exists both on an international scale and within the limited domestic dialogue of Japan and Taiwan, there is no consensus as to how they should be referenced or what protections/aid they should be given (Apap & de Revel, 2021). Without a standardised approach, individual nations are left grappling with the issue of international climate displacement, a challenge which requires a whole new layer of administration, legal frameworks, and financial aid. As climate induced displacement transforms from a domestic issue into a global crisis, the Pacific Islands region, just a stone's throw from Taiwan

K. H. Martin (✉)
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
e-mail: kmartin5@uclan.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2024
L. Momesso and P. Ivanova (eds.), *Refugees and Asylum Seekers in East Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan Studies on Human Rights in Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-2867-1_13

and Japan, is set to contribute the first to the climate migrant crisis. It is for this reason that we must consider possible outcomes, including those which result in climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands seeking asylum in nations like Japan and Taiwan. As such, this chapter investigates to what extent these nations are prepared and willing to accept Pacific Islanders. Learning from positive and negative experiences of Pacific Island migrants and those international refugees who now reside in Japan and Taiwan could help inform the migratory decision-making process of future climate displaced people from the Pacific Islands.

In a recent legal case brought to the New Zealand High Court by Ioane Teitiota who attempted to gain refugee status as he argued that his human rights were being infringed upon by the impacts of climate change on Kiribati (Climate Change Litigation Database, 2015), it became clear that climate induced displacement in the Pacific Island region is leading some to search for a more stable home, most likely in a new country. If the forecasts on climate migration are accurate 1.2 billion people could be displaced globally by 2050, the UN Human Rights Council and the White House is already suggesting a need for some form of protected status for climate refugees (McAllister, 2023). Developing the kind of protections for climate displaced peoples that are reflective of both the domestic discourse and acclimation requirements of receiving nations whilst creating attainable options that will provide a balance of community, opportunity and stability would require a unique and balanced approach. Japan and Taiwan offer an interesting case in this area because, when it comes to climate migration and asylum seeking, they are relatively blank slates. Both are highly developed post-industrial nations with the financial capacity and sturdy social infrastructure to accommodate climate displaced communities. However, willingness to offer sanctuary varies within the domestic discourse, with one showing acceptance coming from the top (Taiwan) (Kironksa, 2022b) and the other seemingly more agreeable at grassroots level (Japan) (Uji et al., 2021). This chapter argues that as contributors to the global climate crisis who have the necessary financial capital, Japan and Taiwan have a moral obligation to offer refuge to climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands. This chapter also hopes to contribute to identifying new migratory pathways which reflect the changing needs and requirements of climate migrants from the Pacific Island region. In order to discover viable solutions and substantiate the given argument, this chapter will analyse secondary source materials, employing textual analysis to help explore the nature of refugee and

migrant experiences and how those experiences could influence migratory decision-making. The use of textual analysis will be focused on both the accounts and experiences of existing Pacific Island migrants as well as the discourse within Japanese and Taiwanese society and politics related to migrants and refugees, whilst framing this within a wider context of global migration to and asylum seeking in Japan and Taiwan. The patterns revealed in the experiences of existing migrants or the perspectives of the receiving countries will be translated into constructive recommendations at the end of the chapter conveying the current trends surrounding climate displacement and displaced populations.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND FUTURE CLIMATE MIGRANTS AND DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Climate change is a concern that the governments and agencies of the Pacific Islands and beyond are attempting to tackle (Bafana, 2022; Harding, 2022). Biodiversity loss and extreme weather events are just a few of the ways Pacific Islanders experience climate change and those experiences influence their decisions to remain in place or to migrate abroad (Ferris, 2023; Taylor, 2023). Sea-level rise is often the focal point of climate discussions related to the Pacific with an “average sea-level rise of between 25 and 58 centimetres [...] predicted to occur by the middle of the century along the coastlines of Pacific Island countries” (Parsons, 2022). This poses a very real existential threat to those nations that sit just a few metres above sea level (Merga & Redl, 2023), and even for those on higher ground, the displacement and migration of coastal communities and a drastic reduction in tenable land (Albert et al., 2016; Singh, 2022) would still have an effect. Even though the Pacific Islands are responsible for only 0.3% of global carbon emissions (Natano, 2022), the list of climate-related impacts that threaten island systems, in some cases rendering them unstable during the twenty-first century (Parsons, 2022), is too long to detail here. The most serious changes to note would be the permanent loss of groundwater sources within the next few decades and the sea-level rise within the next 20 to 40 years (Parsons, 2022). Running parallel to one another, these factors will present human communities with intolerable levels of risk by 2060 (Parsons, 2022). Meanwhile, marine resources will continue to be depleted through ocean warming and acidification (United Nations, 2023a) whilst agriculture is crippled by higher tides, increasing storm intensity, heatwaves, and soil

salination and erosion (Salem, 2020a), all leading residents to possibly contemplate leaving for a more stable and safer life elsewhere (UNU-EHS, 2017). In the words of Kausea Natano, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, “This (the impacts of climate change) is how a Pacific atoll dies. This is how our islands will cease to exist” (Natano, 2022), and though nations like Tuvalu are not yet in this state, they are heading towards it (Craymer, 2022).

For the people of the Pacific Islands “land and sea” are both of significant economic, political, and cultural importance. As US\$474 million in revenue has been brought into the region in the form of fishing licences in 2016 alone, the “untouched” nature of Pacific Islands continues to draw in tourism which makes up to 70% of any given island’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Salem, 2020a). Tourism is just one area of a nation’s economy which will be affected by increased extreme weather events and a reduction in natural beauty spots such as coral reefs (Salem, 2020b).

On a community level, climate change is felt acutely, which is clearly exhibited by a recent UNU-EHS report based on fieldwork in Tuvalu, Nauru, and Kiribati. Researchers found that “in Nauru, 74% of households experienced one or more impacts of environmental change in the last decade ... drought and irregular rains impacted 61% of the surveyed families”, and in Kiribati 94% of households had been impacted by natural hazards over the preceding ten years, 81% of which having been affected by sea-level rise (UNU-EHS, 2015; UNU, 2017). It is clear that without a drastic reduction in emissions and a significant shift in the behaviours of developed and developing nations, countries across the Pacific will observe a marked decline in their economy over the coming decades, thereby further reducing their resilience to climate change and its impacts (IISD, 2019). Every year the region suffers from cyclones, flooding, and heatwaves, and larger and larger proportions of GDP are spent by Pacific Island nations on recovering and rebuilding from climate-related disasters and crises (Fouad, 2021). If such conditions continue unabated, the world would have to find solutions for the Pacific Island populations displaced by or unwilling to live with the constant bombardment of climate impacts.

Climate Induced Migration and Displacement in the Pacific Islands

Migration was repeatedly mentioned in the UNU-EHS report, when discussing climate change across the three islands. In Nauru over a third

of households believed that “migration will be necessary in the future due to climate change... however, only a quarter of households believe that they would be able to afford to migrate in the future” (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017). Meanwhile, in Kiribati migration had remained internal with people moving to the capital of South Tarawa “intensifying existing overcrowding and water shortages” (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017). Tuvalu was also experiencing internal migration as “environmental conditions triggered 9% of recorded movements in 2005–2015” and the majority of households indicated that migration may become a necessary survival strategy as climate change impacts living conditions and quality of life (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017). In all nations the combined or individual factors of “sea-level rise (76% of respondents), saltwater intrusion (74%), drought (72%) and floods (71%) are the most likely environmental factors to trigger future migration” (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017). Most concerning was how 97% of the Tuvaluan households which were surveyed reported having been impacted by natural disasters between 2005 and 2015, yet just 53% believed that they could afford to migrate, if necessary, in the future (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017). For many people on the ground, migration, or displacement due to climate change, is becoming a fact of life. Even so, there is a significant gap between those who believe that migration will be necessary and those who, when the time comes, will be financially able to move. The concern over whether one is able to afford to migrate could dictate the future patterns of migration decision-making if it proves true that those with the financial capacity will move voluntarily in advance of environmental disasters whilst those who lack the resources become the forcibly displaced post event.

Unmanaged rural to urban migration in the Pacific Islands is already observed, and this trend is only set to grow as outlying atoll islands are no longer able to sustain communities (Campbell & Warrick, 2014). Unfortunately, urban centres do not necessarily offer safe harbour as both urban and non-urban atolls are considered to be vulnerable to climate change’s impacts and the impact of development pressure on the already struggling environment (Campbell & Warrick, 2014). Despite the UN reports which indicates that climate change is impacting migration trends and discourse in the Pacific Islands (UNU-EHS, 2015; United Nations University, 2017), some migration scholars remain unwilling to attribute a

significant role in migration decision-making to climate change and environmental drivers (Campbell, 2014). Climate migration as we know it today is only just beginning and though there is a growing body of literature on the topic (Ghosh, 2022), we still do not possess enough empirical evidence for this phenomenon as climate change migration continues to be interwoven with other forms of migration which are more easily identified, i.e. escaping war, violence, or persecution.

This hesitancy to accept the looming climate displacement crisis is evident in the failure of international organisations and individual governments to come to a consensus on or provide legal provisions for climate displaced people (Prange, 2022). It is perplexing, particularly in light of several sovereign Pacific Island nations becoming uninhabitable due to climate change (Natano, 2022). Nevertheless, Pacific Island governments are taking radical actions such as launching the Rising Nations Initiative to fill in gaps in legal frameworks whilst pushing for increased awareness and political commitment (Natano, 2022).

PACIFIC ISLAND CLIMATE MIGRANTS—THOUGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES ON A DISPLACED FUTURE

The Pacific Islands are already struggling with the disproportionate impacts of climate change and for people residing in nations such as Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, or Nauru, as adaptation options in situ become inadequate or too expensive in the face of “particularly severe, frequent or unrelenting” climate impacts (Campbell & Warrick, 2014) migration may become the only option. Such circumstances are being met with mixed feelings, particularly as migration for economic reasons is already so prevalent in the region (Tchounwou et al., 2022).

Today, Pacific Islanders are pushing for voluntary, dignified migration whereby migrants can actively contribute to the social and economic life of the country to which they move (ABC News, 2014). Across every level of society in Oceania, climate change is coming into focus and people, communities, and governments are taking action. These include national adaptation plans (Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2018); students campaigning and taking their message all the way to the International Court of Justice (PISFCC, 2023); and foreign ministers making impactful speeches at international conferences (Packham & Singh, 2021). The Pacific Islands are doing all they can to help stop climate change, primarily by working towards an aim of carbon neutrality for the region by

2050 (IISD, 2022). Meanwhile, the juxtaposition between the islanders' resilience and their understanding of the inevitability of migration, at least in some quarters (Doherty, 2017), exhibits a clear need for adaptation strategies which stretch across everything from food security (SPREP, 2023) to new migratory policies and opportunities (Plano, 2022).

The UNU-EHS report on Nauru, Kiribati, and Tuvalu provides one of the most significant insights into approaches to emigration, whilst telling very different stories for the three nations and identifying a common will to remain on the islands where possible. For those experiencing climate-related hazards Kiribati saw 1.3% of respondents move internationally (7.7% moved internally), Nauru saw 10% move internationally (no internal migration), and Tuvalu saw 15% move internationally (12% moved internally) (UNU-EHS, 2016). As a one-island state Nauruans have no choice but to move abroad, whereas I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans have the option to move to other islands that they perceive to be safer or more stable within the state (United Nations University, 2017). This displays their connection to their homeland and a wish to avoid external migration where possible, thereby avoiding being disconnected from their culture, a top concern in the UNU-EHS report (UNU-EHS, 2016).

It can be safely stated that Pacific Islanders prefer to have a choice to migrate, no matter their reasons, as opposed to being forcibly displaced and yet current statistics show an average of "50,000 people in the Pacific being forced to flee their homes due to the devastating impacts of disasters and climate change" each year (United Nations, 2021). Nauru have already shared their concerns that resettlement will no longer be a last resort as it is cheaper for the major polluters to move people than it is to shift to a green economy (United Nations, 2021), meaning that the receiving nations will have at least some if not all the input. It is of the utmost importance that the Pacific Island people have the strongest voice on migration that pertains to themselves; even so, questions remain as to the balance of power and decision-making when resettlement outside the region begins to occur.

For those people who are facing displacement, their thoughts, perspectives, and particularly their concerns are already being voiced. The Carteret Islands of Papua New Guinea play host to around 2500 islanders who have, until recently, lived relatively peaceful lives (Farrell, 2014). Unfortunately, the Carterets have experienced significant agricultural disruption lately as coastal erosion, destruction of sea walls, and inundation of saltwater have led to a rapidly depleting emergency food supply

and relocation possibly becoming the only option readily available to resolve the situation (Farrell, 2014). The Papua New Guinea administration has since struggled to move the islands' populations, having already made several unsuccessful attempts as "many residents say they are worried about losing their culture and traditions and are uncertain as to how they will be received by the host community" (Farrell, 2014). For the Carteret Islanders migration and resettlement are their only choice; in some ways they are lucky in being able to move to land within the same nation state where they can retain, at least in part, their sense of community and their rights as citizens, a privilege other such migrants in Oceania may not enjoy.

Though Pacific Islands have growing political, economic, and trade connections with Japan and Taiwan, this is yet to translate into consistent migration. This may be due, in part, to linguistic and cultural challenges posed by migrating to Japan and Taiwan. With the exception of Tonga, the Japanese language does not appear in the high school curriculum and to experience Japanese culture one would need to attend events ran by the Japanese embassy in Fiji (Embassy of Japan in the Republic of Fiji, 2022). Whilst Mandarin and Cantonese speakers can be found in pockets across the Pacific Islands, the opportunities to learn either of the core Chinese languages remain limited to universities in countries such as Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga (JICA, 2009). The linguistic connections between the Pacific Islands and Japan/Taiwan are tenuous at best, even when taking into account the links between Indigenous Taiwanese languages and the related languages spoken in the Pacific Islands. The perceived lack of an existing community is also a barrier to migration, particularly when compared with Pasifika communities in nations such as New Zealand and Australia where Pacific Island migrants make up 8% (381,642 people) (New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2023) and 1.3% (337,000 people) (Liu & Howes, 2023) of the population, respectively. Without this sense of community, which Pacific Islanders place so much emphasis upon (PICA-WA, 2022), it is easy to understand why previous trends in migration are linked to regions with an existing community and cultural connection to Oceania. Nevertheless, there are small grassroots Pasifika communities growing in both Taiwan and Japan, and the experiences of those migrants, as well as others from existing refugees, will be invaluable in informing the migratory decision-making process of other Pacific Islanders and in building ties between the islands and Taiwan/Japan (Schieder, 2021). With a larger community

base, future displaced people may be able to transition to Japan or Taiwan more smoothly. Pre-emptive Pacific Islander trans-border mobility within the Pacific may go a long way to opening Japan and Taiwan up to future displaced peoples and ensuring that existing policies and frameworks are amended to meet the needs of future climate migrants.

CURRENT APPROACHES TO MIGRATION AND REFUGEES IN JAPAN AND TAIWAN

Whilst Japan has a working legal framework to allow for refugees, Taiwan's policies remain complex and to an extent dictated by wider geopolitical constraints. The homogenous nature of Japan has meant that the door to migration is opened to a select few. In contrast to this, modern-day Taiwan is a product of continuous migration and colonisation. Its culture today reflects this; however, its difficulty in allowing larger-scale migration and accepting refugees in significant numbers is due to its unique political relationship with China.

Japan—Migration and Refugee Policy

Migration between the Pacific Islands and Japan is limited. Japanese immigration policy is particularly restrictive towards foreign unskilled workers, who in 2015 made up only 2.5% of the workforce (Saito, 2022) a statistic that remained the same five years later (CNBC, 2021). This practice of discriminating against so-called unskilled workers puts up a barrier to the many potential Pacific Islander migrants who are skilled in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, tourism, and business linked to natural resources (ILO, 2017). On those occasions when Japan does open its doors opportunities are often limited to specific sectors or for those willing to work the 3Ks jobs (Saito, 2022). One of the most interesting examples of such a job is that of a care worker. With a rapidly ageing population Japan has taken to recruiting migrant workers from Southeast Asia to fill caring positions. Though these migrant care workers often find themselves in a paternalistic system of control (Lan, 2022) prospective migrants from nations such as Indonesia continue looking to Japan for opportunities.

Recently, schools offering a mixture of vocational and Japanese language training have mushroomed across the region to channel more than 16,000 Indonesians into the Japanese special skilled worker scheme

in 2022 alone. This growth in migration, which has “benefited both countries” (Matarani, 2023), provides a framework for future migration which could be copied by other Pacific Island nations (Matarani, 2023). The Australian Government has already set up a similar Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme to provide training in order to increase the number of Fijian aged care workers who can make the transition (APTC, 2022), proving that there is a demand within the Pacific Island region to train for such jobs and to migrate if the right opportunities exist.

Though adding in a language learning element to such training will have an added expense, recruiting from nations such as Fiji, where multilingualism is already prominent (Kaur, 2016), should not prove any more challenging to implement than in the training schools of Indonesia. There may be great potential in introducing vocational schools to the Pacific Islands which include a Japanese language course, as in 2019 a law took effect which introduced a new category of “specified skilled workers” in 14 sectors such as agriculture, sanitation, and construction, which is aimed at attracting 345,000 such workers over a five-year period. It is hoped that this policy will help primarily Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Filipino workers to continue living and working in Japan as well as offering the opportunity to bring their families with them (Lang, 2023). There is nothing to say that this could not also benefit Pacific Islanders, even if this still leaves the scope for migration relatively limited. Nevertheless, some business leaders have clearly stated that “if the country wants to remain competitive, redrafting its immigration policies is inevitable” (Barron, 2017). There is a clear will, at least within the business community, to have Japan open its doors to asylum seekers and refugees as potential future workers (Lewis, 2017). If Japan were to redirect funds into language and vocational programmes for communities in the Pacific Islands who are most likely to be affected by climate change, such a measure could give potentially displaced peoples a skillset that would allow them to apply for work in Japan, provide a fresh start for those who feel they would otherwise be displaced by climate change, and introduce migrant communities who have a head start in acclimating to the culture, ensuring that Japan retains a level of cultural homogeneity even in a growing multicultural society.

For refugees looking to find safe harbour in Japan, the path to asylum and eventual citizenship proves difficult and, for the majority, impossible. Japan still strictly adheres to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention definition (UNHCR, 1951). This means that those who are

fleeing conflict, natural disasters, or possibly climate change do not qualify for asylum in Japan. Unfortunately, the measures which are currently in place have historically fallen short of providing for refugees who are both waiting in Japan for a visa and to be resettled in country, with reports of homelessness among refugees who are struggling to meet basic needs not uncommon (JAR, 2023). Refugees can wait anywhere up to ten years for a decision on their case and in that time the government funds they are eligible to receive can take several months to materialise and will only amount to two-thirds of the normal social welfare fund (JAR, 2023). Those who do not have the status of resident whilst seeking a refugee status could be seen as illegal (undocumented) and are at risk of being detained (Japan Association for Refugees, 2023).

Taiwan—Migration and Refugee Policy

Taiwan's migration and refugee policies are made complex by the strained relationship with China which has drawn a line in the sand blocking Taiwan from forming a comprehensive framework for migration and refugees. That is not to say, however, that Taiwan has become disinterested in or unwilling to act upon the refugee question, "Taiwan cannot ignore the refugee issue, because there are various groups of people that require protection and the government is not able to respond effectively in the absence of an asylum law" (Kironka, 2022a). The country has, in theory, a limited migration policy, and although there are a number of methods to sidestep its limitations, Taiwan's inability to effect further change to its policies even when the will might exist to do so leaves it at what initially appears to be a dead end. The three most common long-term categories of visa which are open to non-Chinese foreigners are "migrant workers, marriage immigrants and skilled workers" (Wang, 2011, p. 174). The treatment of migrants can vary depending on their category. Skilled workers receive the most favourable treatment, with an option for permanent resident status after six years, whilst less-skilled migrants have to leave Taiwan after their contracts expire (Wang, 2011, p. 174). Similar to Japanese migration policies, Taiwan places importance on retaining a relatively homogenous society by guarding "population quality" (*renkou suzhi*) with the added point of protecting "national security" (Wang, 2011, p. 182–83). However, such entrenched positions on migrants have been forced to change due to existing labour shortages.

In order to make up the shortfall in workers, Taiwan has recognised that “to maintain Taiwan’s economic growth momentum, the foreign workforce needs to be increased by a net 400,000 from 2021 to 2030” (Taiwan Economic Forum, 2022) which is just over the total populations of Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Cook Islands, Tonga, Niue, American Samoa, Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau and Easter Island (389,255). Attempts to meet the labour shortage are currently limited to “strengthening recruitment of foreign professionals, increasing the attraction and retention of foreign students and overseas compatriot students and retaining foreign technical manpower” (Taiwan Economic Forum, 2022) but is yet to extend to offering provisions for blue-collar workers to reside long term.

Unfortunately, refugees in Taiwan are often left in a legal grey area, even after Taiwan ratified and adopted sections of the international human rights convention into national law. Among the five international treaties that Taiwan has agreed to is the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which binds its signatories to respecting civil and political rights, such as the rights to life, freedom of religion or speech), which introduced the *non-refoulement* obligation in Taiwan” (Kironka, 2022a). Despite this, Taiwan has previously deported refugees including those who file an asylum application; various authorities pass refugees from one organisation to the next, leaving many reliant on support given by civil society groups to provide basic resources such as accommodation and medical treatment whilst they wait (Kironka, 2022a). The chasm in Taiwan’s immigration system has the potential to be filled as soon as the 15-year-old draft refugee law, which recognised environmentally displaced people and is slated to be passed in 2024 (TaiwanPlus News, 2023), comes into force. This could contribute to Taiwan’s already growing status as a leading regional figure in human rights (Amnesty International, 2023) and open the nation up a potential migration option for climate displaced people or environmental migrants coming from the Pacific Islands. Though this will present new challenges in providing the necessary infrastructure and aid for incoming refugees, an issue the nation already grapples with (Davidson & Lin, 2022), it does present a modicum of hope.

EXPERIENCES OF PACIFIC ISLAND MIGRANTS LIVING IN JAPAN AND TAIWAN

Though there are currently no climate displaced people living in Japan or Taiwan who originate from the Pacific Islands, we can use the experiences of those Pacific Island migrants currently living in the two nations. This chapter will focus on the community-building practices and experiences of Fijian migrants living in Japan, the highs and lows of life for Pacific Island students studying in Taiwan and Japan, the paternalistic systems and opportunities which influence the lives of Tongan sportsmen in Japan, and the transition from island life in Hawaii to the bustling metropolis of Taipei for a Hawaiian-Taiwanese family unit. Finally, this section will consider experiences of refugees from Myanmar which could inform the future policies that may affect displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands.

The literature on the experiences of Pacific migrants in Japan and Taiwan is not extensive; however, through Dominik Schieder's articles: "Fiji Islander trans-border mobility in the Pacific: The case of Fiji and Japan" (Schieder, 2021) and "Community Life and Discourses among Fiji Islanders in Kantō, Japan" (Schieder, 2015), we can gain a glimpse of the true reality of life for such migrants.

According to Schieder the number of Fijian migrants in Japan has grown steadily since the commencement of diplomatic relations in 1970 and as of 2019 there were 287 Fiji Islanders in Japan. This level of migration is significantly lower than the levels we see to New Zealand or Australia, but it does show that migration is viable, though assuredly more difficult. The age bracket of these migrants is particularly telling, with the vast majority (65%) being between 20 and 39 years of age, with education and professional rugby being the core reasons behind the decision to migrate. Between 2012 and 2019 the number of these migrants increased from 181 to 287, a sharp increase on previous migration levels, which indicates a strengthening of ties and a corresponding increase in access to student visas and engineer/specialist in humanities/international services visas. In 2021 students made up 74 of the 287 migrants to Japan and the Japanese government is actively encouraging this migration as part of a wider aid programme, which funnels Fijian students into degrees in agriculture, environmental conservation, management, pedagogy, and science education (Schieder, 2021). Fijians, among other Pacific Islanders such as Samoans, Tongans, and Rotumans, have also appeared in increasing numbers across sports in Japan such as rugby and to a lesser extent sumo.

Migration in this sector remains small and though it could grow in a similar way to sports migration in other parts of the world, it does rely on youth and possibly the willingness to give up one's citizenship if the sportsperson is hoping to compete internationally in events such as the Olympics. It also appears to be a stream of migration dominated by men, with limited prospects for female sports migration to Japan. This is due to the core recruitment coming from universities or companies looking to bolster their existing men's teams. In Schieder's view, these small migrant communities could grow and foster longer-term migration trends from Fiji to Japan. However, the trans-border mobility between the two nations remains limited and does not appear likely to expand, which calls into question Schieder's predictions of long-term migration trends between Fiji and Japan.

As part of Schieder's study on this community he took note of the trends in behaviour and social/cultural discourse that are beginning to form in diaspora communities. In particular, Schieder states that the term "community", a frequent topic of discussion even when physical social gatherings are infrequent, is playing a unique role in manifesting social bonding and creating a sense of belonging to a wider community when the regular community life which many Islanders are so familiar with is no longer open to them. What is of interest to an outsider is how Fijian Islanders have transformed their concept of community and built into their lives in Japan through their retention of the "community" term whilst disconnecting from the expectations typically associated with the term. In effect, "community discourses allow Fiji Islanders in Japan to circumvent socio-economic commitments without questioning their participation in a community as such" (Schieder, 2015). This taps into something not just of interest to researchers focusing on the changing perceptions of sociality among Indigenous Fijian migrants but also to those who are attempting to understand how a wider community of Pacific Islanders may cope if moved to a nation such as Japan. In understanding how Pacific Island migrants approach the discourse surrounding community" and all that term encompasses, the outcome of further research in this field could be of significance when contributing to any new policies linked to both migrants and displaced peoples/refugees from the wider Pacific region.

Community can be a crucial part of life for migrant and diaspora communities, particularly as they can be fed by a flow of new migrants joining already settled communities. However, that flow of migrants

either relies on consistent, healthy diplomatic relations between two nations or on one nation being willing to take in migrants, refugees or displaced peoples from the other. When relations sour, whether that be for political, economic, or other such reasons grassroots communities can suffer. This is the case we have seen with new communities and groups such as the Pacific Islands Students Association (PISA, 2023). The ill feeling which resulted from the switch in diplomatic relations by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati has cost students studying in Taiwan their scholarships (91 being I-Kiribati and 35 from the Solomon Islands) and led to either repatriation or the decision to continue their academic journey in mainland China (Quinn, 2019). The “immediate and angry” response exhibited by Taiwan in light of the diplomatic switch has had devastating results for the students who found out about the loss of their scholarships after reading it in the newspaper and were left with sleepless nights as they tried to quickly organise a new plan and leave Taiwan within one month. With little to no communication from mainland Chinese universities or from the Solomon Islands government beyond a vague commitment to eventually take in these students many have been left worrying about having to move to universities in China. Some are having to dip into limited family savings to complete their tuition in Taiwan or to simply return home having not completed their degrees (Cavanough & Nielson, 2019).

These shifts in diplomatic relations have had ramifications for small grassroots Pacific Island communities in Taiwan and unfortunately this has meant that, whether they had a good experience of Taiwan or not, those who do not have the funds to continue will probably leave dissatisfied as they are no longer able to see out their scholarships and could, through word of mouth, put off other Pacific Islanders from viewing Taiwan as a future migration option. What we can see from those students who are attempting to stay is that the overall experience of Taiwan and its education system is a positive one, particularly as individual institutions attempt to find new scholarships for their Pacific Island students, which shows a level of care and acceptance at least from the academic world (Leung, 2019). The previous scholarship funding from the Taiwanese government will however now benefit other Pacific Islanders as Taiwan redirects funding into new scholarships for its remaining diplomatic partners in the region (Leung, 2019).

As mentioned previously the paternalistic system of control over migrant workers in Japan (Lan, 2022) has also been observed by Besnier

(Besnier, 2011) whose research on Pacific Islanders in Japan leads us to the experiences of Tongan rugby players whose treatment in Japan has recently come under criticism due to the players being controlled by the team managers, who are employed by the corporation who owns the team and not looking out for Tongan players best interests. Unfortunately, these relatively well-paid positions are still considered to be blue-collar work and so the Tongan migrants are scrutinised in all their actions both on and off the pitch. If they step out of line, they are often swiftly deported.

For Tongan rugby players in Japan this has led to a high “burnout” rate and shows how sport can offer opportunities for employment and migration but that such forms of migration are a double-edged sword. What rugby opportunities in Japan do offer to Tongan players, which goes beyond a monetary or migration value, is in the reproduction of the traditional social order and the introduction of possible stardom and wealth, a hope that we see repeated in those Tongans who migrate to Japan to train as future sumo wrestlers (Besnier, 2011).

The experiences of these Tongan sportsmen speak to one of the most prominent issues linked to migration in Japan, particularly for blue-collar workers, migrants coming from low-income countries, and refugees: Japan’s innate need to control the activities and behaviour of such migrants. Though the system of paternalistic control over migrants is not necessarily unique to Japan, the simple fact that migrant numbers coming from the Pacific Islands are so low means that such control is felt most acutely when struggling with challenges linked to the workplace (Besnier, 2011). Such a feeling is compounded when a migrant does not have the resource of a community to draw on due to the geographic distance between existing Pacific Island migrants. This could be a source of concern for climate migrants or displaced peoples who do not wish to live under a microscope, having their choices questioned or risking deportation if they fail to assimilate. However, from Besnier’s research it is also clear that the opportunities offered by Japan may, for some, outweigh the disadvantages of the paternalistic system and that such a system can prove a welcome reflection of the social norms of Tongan culture with which Tongan migrants are familiar.

A possible exception to this paternalistic system is in migration for education. In a series of YouTube video’s documenting life in Japan as an international student, Philemon Maiennaka Nangu, originally from Papua New Guinea, shows his experiences in Japan whilst continuing to post

videos linked to his home country. Though his videos do not verbalise his thoughts on life in Japan, it is clear from the imagery and content that there is a small “Pasifica family” (Nangu, 2020) in Nagoya and across the wider expanse of Japan. Nangu’s choice to name another one of his videos “Pacific Island Family in Japan” (Nangu, 2020) exhibits a willingness to create a Pacific Island community as opposed to one solely based on his own nationality. This speaks to the community-building practices of Pacific Islanders living in Japan and shows that Pacific Islanders can find community connection points beyond Oceania. Even if Japan is unwilling to move on the matter of climate migrants (Kameyama & Ono, 2020), another possible option could be to filter more Pacific Islanders through the higher education system where possible, which will give them time to put down roots and learn the language before eventually transitioning into longer-term employment in Japan.

It is particularly important to remember that the Pacific Islands are home to people from a variety of mixed heritages. An interesting podcast by the Ka ‘iwakiloumoku Pacific Indigenous Institute interviewed a Hawaiian-Taiwanese family living in Taipei, showcasing the benefits and challenges of life in Taiwan (Ka‘iwakiloumoku, 2021). One of the family’s major challenges came in the form of extreme changes in weather/temperatures as well as the earthquakes which they had not experienced to such a level before. Though the family were jovial about it the mother did recognise how such events are dangerous and expressed some concern for the family’s welfare. The major positives that come through in the interview were how Taiwan is more conducive to “new things, to new hobbies, to new experiences in general” and how moving to Taiwan opened the horizons of the younger generation and gave them a new perspective which they believe has had a positive influence on their lives. For the mother her experiences were more mixed as she noted how they missed loved ones in Hawai’i and the overall environment of the islands (Ka‘iwakiloumoku, 2021). Arguably the difficulties experienced by this Hawaiian–Taiwanese family could be the same as those of any new migrant in Taiwan as they reflect the challenges of daily life linked to language, education, and acclimating to the environment and culture. Yet, it is clear from the outset that the availability of opportunities, more so for the younger generation through improved access to extra-curricular activities and a multicultural educational experience, can make the move more bearable.

Although the migratory experiences of this family do not include the trauma of forced displacement, it does offer an insight into how it is possible to make a transition to Taiwan smoother by placing children in international schools, focusing on language training for adults to give them greater access to the society and culture, and also to possibly connect incoming Pacific Islanders with Taiwan's Indigenous community, which could prove to have some positive outcomes. For the Hawaiian-Taiwanese family in this interview, beyond the jabs made at their inadequate linguistic skills, the family did not have any further unpleasant experiences, however, researchers have questioned if the numbers of Pacific Island migrants with no Taiwanese ethnic heritage were to increase and remain on a more permanent basis, whether they may experience such discrimination. Naturally, questions will arise over the humane treatment of migrants and refugees as findings shed light on such experiences (Phillimore et al., 2021). It is no secret that Japanese and Taiwanese societies and the cultures at large are not as racially or culturally sensitive as they could be which can lead to misunderstandings and negative experiences being had by those of non-Japanese/non-Taiwanese heritage or even by those with a mixed heritage (Arudō, 2015; Illmer, 2020; Park, 2017).

Moving beyond migration to Japan or Taiwan, it is also crucial to glance at the experiences of those refugees who have settled and made these nations home. Within the literature it has already been recognised that there is an urgent need to “expand the scale and scope of refugee resettlement schemes” in Japan as the current approach focused on economic self-sufficiency lacks the more holistic aspects of community collaboration and integration (Phillimore et al., 2021). However, in a recent study comparing refugee approaches and experiences in the UK and Japan conducted by Jenny Phillimore and her team, which interviewed refugees from Myanmar currently residing in Japan, the self-sufficiency policy appears to prove more successful than the UK's more informal approaches.

The approach of transitioning refugees into paid employment after an initial settling in period appears to improve self-esteem and self-respect, particularly among men who, through taking financial responsibility for their families, felt that they were fitting into Japanese society. It is not only the independence which comes from this income which helps refugees to integrate but also the opportunity to build social connections and build

new communities through a multicultural workplace, whilst also experiencing an interest in their own culture from their Japanese co-workers. These factors make integration feel more like a two-way process.

To strike a balance the study also highlighted the issues which have arisen. For example, some refugees experienced xenophobia, struggles with the language, and with social integration, particularly for women with school age children. Though Japan's model does offer early financial independence, the difficulty comes later as case workers do not help refugees access new employment if they do not like their first placement or wish for more social mobility. The dependence on a refugee's first employer and colleagues can prove challenging. They have cited the long working hours as a reason for why they have struggled to make connections within the local community (Phillimore et al., 2021).

Phillimore's study is crucial to understanding the positives and pitfalls of Japan's approach to refugees and the implications this may have for possible future climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands. The integration of refugees into any society is a complex and non-linear process. Japan's strength in its approach to refugees lies in its provision of employment opportunities. However, there is room for improvement in fostering positive community engagement. The community groups of Schieder's study, and of Philemon Maiennaka Nangu, as well as those many related groups on Facebook which can provide connections to Chamorro (Guam) dance and cultural exhibitions ran by the Guma' Famagu'on Tano' yan I Tasi (Guma' Famagu'on Tano' yan I Tasi, 2023) or other community events organised by Pacific Islanders serving in the United States military, can all provide a resolution and bridge the gap, allowing for a smoother, less traumatic transition for climate displaced peoples from the Pacific Islands.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON ACCEPTING CLIMATE DISPLACED PEOPLE IN JAPAN AND TAIWAN

Pacific Islanders may prove willing to migrate to Japan or Taiwan, and the latter countries may have the capacity to take displaced people, but do they have the willingness to do so? Literature available on the policies and public discourse surrounding climate displaced people arriving in Japan or Taiwan is difficult to attain and could offer a particularly interesting field of research for those who are looking to both understand their experiences and contribute to new and existing policies pertaining

to such peoples. The available information does not shed much light on how Taiwan will process, provision for, and assimilate future climate displaced people should the new bill pass, nor does it articulate what possible actions the Japanese government is planning to take or even if the issue is on their radar. For both nations, efforts to create policies regarding displaced people will be implemented in preparation for the displacement of their own people as climate change and sea-level rise begin to impact upon these nations. In this regard Japan and Taiwan have much in common with their Pacific Island brethren as they are all islands, with limited amounts of tenable living space. All have varying levels of risk posed by rising seas, by extreme weather events, and by a rapidly changing climate; the only difference is their capacity to withstand the impacts of these events. It would be foolish to approach Taiwan and Japan as nations which will be untouched by the climate crisis and therefore capable of spending vast quantities on relief efforts or welcoming in large numbers of refugees without keeping in mind the significant domestic challenges linked to climate change they must themselves also face. Nonetheless, we cannot discount the carbon emissions and consumption patterns in these countries which have made a substantial contribution to the current climate crisis and that both Taiwan and Japan will need to shoulder some of the responsibility and provide aid to those most affected.

Japan's Public Discourse

Though awareness and discussions surrounding migration have increased in Japan, usually the topic is discussed in relation to replacing an ageing population, not in offering safe harbour to climate displaced people. Therefore, attempting to gauge locals' reactions to having a large number of climate displaced migrants arriving on their doorstep remains somewhat difficult to ascertain. In 2021, a team of researchers released their data produced from a survey-embedded joint experiment; the results of this experiment highlighted the responses of Japanese participants to possible future climate migrants and considering what has already been observed from Japan on an international level in relation to providing aid as opposed to opening its borders, the responses are telling (Uji et al., 2021). The results of the survey suggested that Japanese public opinion is not so much swayed by previous aid or immigration levels but by the support a nation gives to Japan whether that be in international forums or in purchasing Japanese exports to improve their economy. Japanese

respondents did not see taking in migrants as an obligation, but they did show a bias towards taking Asian migrants (Uji et al., 2021). So, what does this mean for future climate migrants coming from the Pacific? It could mean for a time that if the affected countries continue to provide a block of political support to Japan at the international level, there may be some leverage through which they can open Japan's doors, however, it would also mean that when countries start to disappear from the map that leverage will dissipate, even if Pacific Island nations are able to retain some form of sovereignty without their islands. Their only saving grace may be in the latter part of the Japanese responses which showed that "sea-level rise and droughts, whose effect is gradual seem to generate more public support than dramatic events such as floods, typhoons, and wild-fires" (Uji et al., 2021); this contrasts with Western support which often occurs after significant events. Japanese public support appears to rely on something that they can see is threatening a person's safety but does not necessitate quick and decisive action, in keeping with their slow adoption of refugee policies. This could explain why Japan has shown little to no interest in climate refugees or in how climate displaced people could present both a security risk to Japan and an opportunity to secure further economic growth. There is also the matter of how they could lose face due to their lack of prior action on the subject (World Economic Forum, 2021). In a meeting of the United Nations Security Council in February of 2023, the Japanese position on climate migrants became yet clearer as Japan's delegate likened the threat posed by sea-level rise to that posed by foreign invasion (United Nations, 2023b). The delegate also mentioned the need to work beyond the council with other entities to handle these issues (United Nations, 2023) which once again allows Japan to shift responsibility away from itself in relation to physically taking in displaced people (United Nations, 2023b). Though a limited number of "general refugees" have been allowed to enter the country, this poses no real threat to national security, but it is clear that there are concerns over future threats and instability caused by climate migrants moving to Japan, even though this is not yet something the Japanese government is discussing publicly (Kameyama & Ono, 2021). Though, for the time being, Japan's public discourse, at least within the bounds of the media, does recognise climate displacement as a burgeoning issue the manner in which media outlets address this issue shows quite plainly how the Japanese discourse perceives this to be an international problem which either they can help

to relieve through finance or which needs to be resolved by the Western world (Naidoo, 2018; Uji et al., 2021).

Taiwan's Public Discourse

Surprisingly, the available information on how Taiwan is approaching international climate migration, beyond the possible changes to asylum law, appears to be thin on the ground. There are two possible reasons for this, the first of which is the difficulty in producing a comprehensive refugee framework and putting it into practice. Though human rights groups in the nation have consistently lobbied for a change to the law, this has often been in response to political turmoil in China (TaiwanPlus News, 2023). There has been no definitive discourse on doing so to aid climate migrants, which is baffling considering their recognition of such people in the new refugee law. Of course, such a move could possibly be taken as a sign to China that Taiwan is taking further steps towards sovereignty and autonomy and would possibly make an already fragile situation worse. In the knowledge of this, Taiwan may not be in the position to make policies or take in climate migrants at the time of writing (2023). However, any moves from them to do so would certainly send a message not just to China but to the world of their global standing and their ambitious human rights plans. It could also change the face of international refugee law, in being the first nation to accept environmentally displaced peoples. The second reason is that Taiwan is already beginning to handle the fallout from climate change as many of their own low-lying communities come under threat (Yuan Teng, 2022) and they recently experienced some of the worst droughts in history which has shown how easily their water supplies can be destabilised (Jensen, 2020). With discussions already arising that include Taiwan among the first nations that will produce climate refugees (Taiwan Today, 2006), Taiwan will require a modicum of understanding in any hesitance to take in climate displaced peoples from other nations. If this is the case, then any expectations one might have for Taiwan to take climate refugees simply due to its developed status and strong economy would need to be put aside whilst it directs its finances to protecting its own communities at risk and remaining strong. We cannot criticise Taiwan for not initiating further action to provide safe harbour for climate migrants but considering its past history of taking in refugees we also have little cause to believe that they would turn people away at this time.

CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to contribute to the conversations about climate displaced people from the Pacific Islands, examining the issues around possible migration routes to Japan and Taiwan. It has become clear through the development of this chapter that any decision to migrate would not be made lightly due to the existing restrictive and complex immigration systems of Japan and Taiwan, and that making and pursuing such a choice could prove strenuous and inconvenient in comparison with other more well-trodden migration routes to Australia, New Zealand, or the US. Yet, considering the unpredictable nature of climate change and its impacts on the Pacific Islands it is necessary to prepare for all possible migratory choices which result from the environmental damage anticipated.

We have seen how those nations involved retain relatively amicable ties, making it all the more puzzling as to why those relationships have not resulted in increased rates of migration. This does not necessarily need to be taken as an indication of Japan or Taiwan's unwillingness to accept Pacific Island people or of the Pacific Island people's lack of interest in migrating to these nations. Instead, we must look at what triggers migration and why Pacific Island people make the migratory choices that they do, so as to understand why Japan and Taiwan are not yet viewed as preferable choices for Pacific migrants. In this chapter, the current trends in migration from the Pacific Islands have been defined by education and potential work opportunities, largely in the sporting field. The experiences of these migrants have shown many positive aspects to life in Japan and Taiwan, whilst also recognising the drawbacks of how migrants can be impacted by changes in diplomatic relations or restricted by paternalistic systems of control placed on lower-skilled migrants. Meanwhile, the insight into refugee experiences shows how Japan's system of ensuring paid work for newly arrived refugees can provide stability and a sense of self-worth, yet there are challenges in providing refugees with a community. For Japan and Taiwan to become viable destinations for climate-displaced Pacific Islanders, they must offer language and cultural classes, educational and vocational training, and collaborate with existing Pacific Island communities to ensure community engagement and a sense of belonging. This combination would allow newly arrived people to access their receiving society, Japan or Taiwan, and provide them with a space to find common ground and community with other

Pacific Islanders. Pacific Islanders can become active, valuable members of Japanese or Taiwanese society if they so choose and in being given the ability to do so both Japan and Taiwan ensure migration with dignity for Pacific Islanders whilst also being able to resolve their own internal challenges of a reduced workforce and ageing populations. Time will show if Japan is able to transform its migratory frameworks and if Taiwan is willing to commit to its new refugee law in 2024 and set a new precedent for environmental migration.

REFERENCES

- ABC News. (2014, September 5). *Pacific Islanders reject 'climate refugee' status, want to 'migrate with dignity', SIDS conference hears*. ABC. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-05/pacific-islanders-reject-calls-for-27climate-refugee27-status/5723078>
- Albert, S., Grinham, A., Gibbes, B., Leon, J., & Church, J. (2016, May 9). *Sea level rise swallows 5 whole Pacific Islands*. Scientific American. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sea-level-rise-swallows-5-whole-pacific-islands/>
- Amnesty International. (2023, July 13). *Taiwan can play a leading regional role on human rights but sustained commitment needed, says Amnesty's Secretary General following visit*. Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/07/taiwan-can-play-a-leading-regional-role-on-human-rights-but-sustained-commitment-needed-says-amnestys-secretary-general-following-visit/>
- Apap, J., & de Revel, C. d. P. (2021, 10 18). *The concept of 'climate refugee'*. European Parliament. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)698753_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI(2021)698753_EN.pdf)
- APTC. (2022, May 30). *Fijian aged care workers to benefit from new pilot program*. APTC. <https://www.aptc.edu.au/news/news/2022/05/30/fijian-aged-care-workers-to-benefit-from-new-pilot-program>
- Arudō, D. (2015). *Embedded racism: Japan's visible minorities and racial discrimination*. Lexington Books.
- Bafana, B. (2022, November 15). *Climate change is no 'future scenario' for Pacific Island Nations; Climate change is 'real' - world*. ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/climate-change-no-future-scenario-pacific-island-nations-climate-change-real>
- Barron, L. (2017, July 6). *Japan has a labor crisis that refugees could fix, if only its government would let them*. Quartz. <https://qz.com/1014031/japan-has-a-labor-crisis-that-refugees-could-fix-if-only-its-government-would-let-them>
- Besnier, N. (2011). *On the edge of the global: Modern anxieties in a Pacific Island nation*. Stanford University Press.

- Campbell, J., & Warrick, O. (2014, 09 14). *Climate change and migration issues in the Pacific*. ILO. <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/261/Pacific.pdf>
- Campbell, J. R. (2014). *Climate-change migration in the Pacific*, 26(1). The Contemporary Pacific.
- Cavanough, E., & Nielson, J. (2019, December 7). When China came calling: Inside the Solomon Islands switch. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/08/when-china-came-calling-inside-the-solomon-islands-switch>
- Climate Change Litigation Database. (2015). *Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment - Climate Change Litigation*. Climate Change Litigation Databases. <https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/ioane-teitiota-v-the-chief-executive-of-the-ministry-of-business-innovation-and-employment/>
- CNBC. (2021, November 17). *Japan looking to allow more foreigners to stay indefinitely in a major immigration policy shift*. CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/18/japan-could-allow-more-foreigners-to-stay-indefinitely-in-major-shift.html>
- Craymer, L. (2022, November 15). *Tuvalu turns to the metaverse as rising seas threaten existence*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/tuvalu-turns-metaverse-rising-seas-threaten-existence-2022-11-15/>
- Davidson, H., & Lin, C. H. (2022, June 22). Neither citizens nor foreigners: Hongkongers struggle to adapt to life in Taiwan. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/22/neither-citizens-nor-foreigners-hongkongers-struggle-to-adapt-to-life-in-taiwan>
- Doherty, B. (2017, May 13). ‘Our country will vanish’: Pacific islanders bring desperate message to Australia. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/14/our-country-will-vanish-pacific-islanders-bring-desperate-message-to-australia>
- Embassy of Japan in the Republic of Fiji. (2022, March 15). *Culture and Education (Information on Japan & Japanese Culture)*. Embassy of Japan in the Republic of Fiji. https://www.fj.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/culture_and_education.html
- Farrell, B. (2014, December 14). *Pacific islanders face the reality of climate change... and of relocation*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2009/12/4b264c836/pacific-islanders-face-reality-climate-change-relocation.html>
- Ferris, E. (2023). *Countervailing pressures: climate change, migration and COVID-19...* Environmental Migration Portal. <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/countervailing-pressures-climate-change-migration-and-covid-19-pacific>

- Fouad, M. (2021, September 24). *Unlocking access to climate finance for Pacific Island Countries*. IMF eLibrary. <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/087/2021/020/article-A001-en.xml>
- Ghosh, R. C. (2022, April 16). A systematic review of climate migration research: gaps in existing literature. *SN Social Sciences*, 2(47). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-022-00341-8>
- Government of the Republic of Fiji. (2018). *Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan*. United Nations Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/documents/302826?gclid=CjwKCAjwm4ukBhAuEiwA0zQxkwA9LBTaXJnV5JV8bAqA8Ur9bQdEqqsBq8_WRqIRDJKb_TN-n0hrBoCDQIQAvD_BwE
- Guma' Famagu'on Tano' yan I Tasi. (2023). *Guma' Famagu'on Tano' yan I Tasi*. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/gumafamaguontanoyanitasi>
- Harding, B. (2022, July 7). *Pacific Islands Forum: Leaders want to focus on climate change, not geopolitics*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/pacific-islands-forum-leaders-want-focus-climate-change-not-geopolitics>
- Higushi, E. (2019, December). *Climate change policies and migration issues of New Zealand and Australia*. Climate Change Policies and Migration Issues of New Zealand and Australia. https://www.spf.org/en/global-data/opri/perspectives/prsp_002_2019_higuchi_en.pdf
- IISD. (2019, May 21). *Pacific Island Leaders, UN Secretary-General call for "Decisive and Transformative Action" to reduce emissions* | News | SDG Knowledge Hub | IISD. SDG Knowledge Hub. <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/pacific-island-leaders-un-secretary-general-call-for-decisive-and-transformative-action-to-reduce-emissions/>
- IISD. (2022, July 27). *Pacific Island leaders declare climate emergency* | News | SDG Knowledge Hub | IISD. SDG Knowledge Hub. <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/pacific-island-leaders-declare-climate-emergency/>
- Illmer, A. (2020, August 28). *Black lives matter pushes Japan to confront racism*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53428863>
- ILO. (2017, May 11). *A study on the future of work in the Pacific*. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-suva/documents/publication/wcms_553880.pdf
- Japan Association for Refugees. (2023). *Refugees in Japan*. Refugees in Japan | Japan Association for Refugees (JAR). <https://www.refugee.or.jp/en/refugee/>
- Jensen, S. (2020, December 21). *FEATURE-Taiwan may face fewer typhoons – but harsher drought – as planet warms*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-taiwan-typhoon-idINL8N2IP5J7>
- JICA. (2009). *We are islanders!– For the future of the Pacific*. JICA. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/jica_archive/brochures/pdf/islanders.pdf

- Ka'iwakiloumoku. (2021, March 5). *Offshoot commentaries: Living as a Hawaiian-Taiwanese in Taipei – Ka'iwakiloumoku – Hawaiian Cultural Center*. Hawaiian Cultural Center. <https://kaiwakiloumoku.ksbe.edu/article/pacific-conversations-offshoot-commentaries-living-as-a-hawaiian-taiwanese-in-taipei>
- Kameyama, Y., & Ono, K. (2020, September 25). The development of climate security discourse in Japan. *Sustainability Science*, 16, 271–281. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00863-1>
- Kameyama, Y., & Ono, K. (2021). The development of climate security discourse in Japan. *Sustainability Science*, 16, 271–281. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00863-1>
- Kaur, M. (2016, March). Multilingualism, the linguistic landscape of Fiji. *International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies*, 2(4), 625–631. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327190543_Multilingualism_the_Linguistic_Landscape_of_Fiji
- Kironska, K. (2022a, January 10). Taiwan's road to an asylum law: Who, when, how, and why not yet? *Human Rights Review*, 23, 241–264. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-021-00644-y>
- Kironska, K. (2022b, April 13). *Taiwan's asylum policy: A lack of political will to implement the law? – CEIAS*. Central European Institute of Asian Studies. <https://ceias.eu/taiwans-asylum-policy-a-lack-of-political-will-to-implement-the-law/>
- Lan, P.-C. (2022, 09 13). Contested skills and constrained mobilities: migrant carework skill regimes in Taiwan and Japan. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 10(37). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-022-00311-2>
- Lang, E. (2023, April 25). *Japan eyes long-term stays for wider range of skilled foreign workers*. Nikkei Asia. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-immigration/Japan-eyes-long-term-stays-for-wider-range-of-skilled-foreign-workers>
- Leung, M. (2019, September 25). *Pacific Islands students caught in China-Taiwan standoff*. University World News. <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190925161021413>
- Lewis, L. (2017, November 16). *Japan business group chief calls for more foreign workers*. Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/9a55f006-caab-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e>
- Liu, H., & Howes, S. (2023, March 31). *Pacific Islanders in Australia: 2021 census results*. Devpolicy Blog. <https://devpolicy.org/pacific-islanders-in-australia-census-results-20230331/>
- Matarani, Z. (2023, April 4). *As Japan ages, young Indonesians train to fill caregiver jobs*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-ages-young-indonesians-train-fill-caregiver-jobs-2023-04-04/>
- McAllister, S. (2023, June 3). *There could be 1.2 billion climate refugees by 2050. Here's what you need to know*. Zurich Insurance Group. <https://www.zurich.com/en/media/magazine/2022/there-could-be-1-2-billion-climate-refugees-by-2050-here-s-what-you-need-to-know>

- Merga, R. D., & Redl, C. (2023, July 26). *Tuvalu Needs to Build Resilience Amid Threat from Rising Seas*. International Monetary Fund. <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/07/26/cf-tuvalu-needs-to-build-resilience-amid-threat-from-rising-seas>
- Naidoo, K. (2018, May 28). *The coming wave of climate displacement*. The Japan Times. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/05/28/commentary/world-commentary/coming-wave-climate-displacement/>
- Nangu, P. M. (2020, May 13). *Park games with Pacifica family*. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0RPWH5coDN8>
- Natano, K. (2022, September 28). The climate crisis is making the Pacific Islands unlivable. *Time*. <https://time.com/6217104/climate-crisis-pacific-islands-uninhabitable/>
- New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2023). *Pasifika New Zealand*. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/pacer-plus/pasifika-new-zealand/>
- Packham, C., & Singh, K. (2021, November 9). *Tuvalu minister stands in sea to film COP26 speech to show climate change*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/tuvalu-minister-stands-sea-film-cop26-speech-show-climate-change-2021-11-08/>
- Park, S. (2017). Inventing aliens: immigration control, ‘xenophobia’ and racism in Japan. *Sage Journals*, 3(58). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396816657719?journalCode=rach>
- Parsons, C. (2022, May 23). *The Pacific Islands: The front line in the battle against climate change*. National Science Foundation. <https://beta.nsf.gov/science-matters/pacific-islands-front-line-battle-against-climate>
- Phillimore, J., Morrice, L., Kabe, K., Hashimoto, N., Hassan, S., & Reyes, M. (2021, April 28). Economic self-reliance or social relations? What works in refugee integration? Learning from resettlement programmes in Japan and the UK. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 9(17). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-021-00223-7>
- PICA-WA. (2022, November 18). *Pasifika Narratives*. <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLKESMBc5RpAo0raZrWkQX5pAQ9ZhcM95F>
- PISA. (2023, June 22). *Pacific Island students in Taiwan – Our cultures our pride*. <https://sites.google.com/site/ourculturesourpride/entertainment/pacific-island-students-in-taiwan>
- PISFCC. (2023). *Pacific Islands students fighting climate change | Seeking an advisory Opinion from the ICJ*. Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change | Seeking an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ. <https://www.pisfcc.org/>

- Plano, R. (2022, November 1). *Pacific Island states — Spotlight — Climate refugees*. Climate Refugees. <https://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/tag/Pacific+Island+States>
- Prange, M. (2022, December 19). *Climate Change Is Fueling Migration. Do Climate Migrants Have Legal Protections?* Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/climate-change-fueling-migration-do-climate-migrants-have-legal-protections>
- SPREP. (2023). *Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change (PACC) Programme | Pacific Environment*. SPREP. <https://www.sprep.org/pacc>
- Quinn, C. (2019, September 27). *Pacific Island airplane argument costs students Taiwan scholarship*. The PIE News. <https://thepienews.com/news/pacific-students-taiwan-scholarship/>
- Saito, J. (2022, June 15). *Historical background of the Japanese restrictive immigration policy*. Japan Centre for Economic Research. <https://www.jcer.or.jp/english/historical-background-of-the-japanese-restrictive-immigration-policy>
- Salem, S. (2020a, January 9). *Climate change and the sinking island states in the Pacific*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/01/09/climate-change-and-the-sinking-island-states-in-the-pacific/>
- Salem, S. (2020b, February 18). *Climate change and food security in the Pacific*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/18/climate-change-and-food-security-in-the-pacific/>
- Schieder, D. (2015). Community life and discourses among Fiji Islanders in Kantō, Japan. *Anthropological Forum*, 2(25), 167–186. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2014.995153>
- Schieder, D. (2021, August 21). *Fiji Islander trans-border mobility in the Pacific: The case of Fiji and Japan*. University of Siegen. https://pacific-geographies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/PG56_DOI10.23791_561322_DS.pdf
- Singh, V. (2022, November 28). *Blog: How Fiji is turning to nature to cope with climate change*. Commonwealth. <https://thecommonwealth.org/news/blog-how-fiji-turning-nature-cope-climate-change>
- Taiwan Economic Forum. (2022). *Launching population and immigration policy, to maintain Taiwan's economic growth momentum* (2, 20th ed.). Xiàjì hào. <https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzEwL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xNDglOS85ZTMwMGJlZS1hZmU3LTRiZTAyMjNi0wN2M0ODAwZDc0MGUucGRm&n=MjAyMue2k%2Ba%2Fn%2BirluihoV8yMC0yXzItMi7mLl%2FnrZbnhKbpu55f5Y2U6Kq%2F5o6o5YuV5Lq65Y%2Bj5Y%2BK56e75rCR5pS%2F562>
- TaiwanPlus News. (2023, June 20). *Human rights activists call for new refugee laws for Taiwan*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-DOE5yqYKE>
- Taiwan Today. (2006, July 7). *Taiwan today*. Taiwan Today. <https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=10,23,45,10&post=16154>

- Taylor, L. (2023, February 20). *Pacific islanders head to Australia for jobs as climate fears grow* | Context. Context News. <https://www.context.news/climate-risks/pacific-islanders-head-to-australia-for-jobs-as-climate-fears-grow>
- Tchounwou, P. B., McNamara, K. E., & Westoby, R. (2022, 06 01). Emotions of the Anthropocene across Oceania. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 19(11). <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19116757>
- Uji, A., Dolšak, N., Song, J., & Prakash, A. (2021). Public support for climate adaptation aid and migrants: A conjoint experiment in Japan. *Environmental Research Letters*, 16(12). <https://iopscience.iop.org/article/https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac3b7b>
- UNHCR. (1951). *Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/media/28185>
- United Nations. (2021, February 11). *Pacific regional consultation on internal displacement* | UN Secretary-General's high-level panel on internal displacement. the United Nations. <https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/events/pacific-regional-consultation-internal-displacement>
- United Nations. (2023a). *How is climate change impacting the world's ocean* | United Nations. the United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/ocean-impacts>
- United Nations. (2023b, February 14). *Climate change-induced sea-level rise direct threat to millions around world, Secretary-General Tells Security Council* | UN Press. UN Press. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15199.doc.htm>
- United Nations University. (2017, February 23). *Pacific islanders faced with climate-induced migration – Institute for Environment and Human Security*. UNU-EHS. <https://ehs.unu.edu/blog/articles/pacific-islanders-faced-with-climate-induced-migration.html>
- UNU-EHS. (2015). *Climate change and migration in the Pacific: Links, attitudes, and future scenarios in Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati*. https://i.unu.edu/media/ehs.unu.edu/news/11747/RZ_Pacific_EHS_ESCAP_151201.pdf
- UNU-EHS. (2016). *How does climate change affect migration in the Pacific?* The United Nations University. https://unfccc.int/files/science/workstreams/research/application/pdf/part2_unu-ehs_oakes_vandergeest_poster.pdf
- Wang, H. (2011). *Immigration trends and policy changes in Taiwan* (20th ed., Vol. 169–194). Asian and Pacific Migration Journal.
- World Economic Forum. (2021, June 18). *Climate refugees – the world's forgotten victims* | World Economic Forum. The World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/climate-refugees-the-world-s-forgotten-victims/>

yuan Teng, K. -. (2022, June 13). *Taiwan's first climate refugees/Politics & Society/2022-06-13/CommonWealth Magazine*. CommonWealth Magazine. <https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3243>

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

