An agency-based perspective on the performance consequences of COO adoption

Vafeas, Nikos and Vlittis, Adamos (2012) An agency-based perspective on the performance consequences of COO adoption. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 39 (3). pp. 361-382. ISSN 0924-865X

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-011-0255-y

Abstract

The aim of this study is to explain the performance consequences of the adoption of a Chief Operating Officer (COO) position by drawing from agency theory. Although, prior research has documented a performance penalty associated with the use of this position, we currently have an incomplete understanding of the factors explaining this penalty. This study suggests that the delegation of CEO decision rights to the COO is explained by information transfer and agency considerations. Largely consistent with agency theory, our empirical analysis suggests information transfer considerations are related to the likelihood of COO adoption, while CEO ownership and board characteristics mitigate the related performance penalty.


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