Access network synthesis game in next generation networks

Abstract

In next generation communication networks, multiple access networks will coexist on a common service platform. In cases where network resource planning indicates that individual access network resources are insufficient to meet service demands, these networks can cooperate and combine their resources to form a unified network that satisfies these demands. We introduce and study the Network Synthesis game, in which individual access networks with insufficient resources form coalitions in order to satisfy service demands. The formation of stable coalitions in the core of the game is investigated, in both cases where payoffs are transferable or are attributed in proportion to the contribution of each member of the coalition. We also consider an alternative payoff allocation approach, according to the value of the well-known Shapley–Shubik, Banzhaf and Holler–Packel power indices, which represent the relative power each player has in the formation of coalitions. Using the knowledge attained from the coalition game analysis, we propose a new power index, called Popularity Power Index, which is based on the number of stable coalitions an access network would participate in if payoffs were assigned in a fair manner.