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LG3992: DISSERTATION

**Worldviews and 'reality'
in the Palestinian-Israeli 'conflict'**

ASIF PANDOR

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Abstract

In this thesis I critically engage with the language of the Palestinian-Israeli ‘conflict’ and, drawing from Corpus Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), explore how language is used to construct different realities and perspectives. For the quantitative (CL) analysis, I use two 19,000 word corpora of articles, of which one represents pro-Israeli views, and the other pro-Palestinian views. Through these datasets I explore the views and polemic projected by each group to understand their key concerns, and unravel their mindsets and worldviews. For the more qualitative analysis, I draw from CDA to deconstruct the ‘reality’ portrayed by the group I choose to view as the ‘oppressor’ – for, characteristically, CDA “intervenes on the side of dominated and oppressed groups and against dominating groups” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:259). In doing so, I seek to make explicit some of the “linguistic devices used to code [...] beliefs and ideologies as well as the related practices” against the chosen ‘oppressed’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:266). For this qualitative analysis I primarily focus on a single article from the aforementioned (specifically-built) corpora, although other articles are used for comparing and contrasting purposes. In both types of analyses, the main focus is on worldviews and their effects on a solution to the conflict. I conclude by considering the usefulness of the findings of this paper in terms of resolving the ‘conflict’. I also reflect briefly on the strategy of partnering qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis.

Word count: 10,969

Introduction

The Palestinian-Israeli ‘conflict’ is fascinating. Its religious roots make it of immense interest to people of the three Abrahamic faiths in particular; but even those of other faiths and no faith may have been affected by the repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli ‘conflict’, with ‘terrorist’ bombings and activities in the Western world often being attributed to the unresolved status of the ‘conflict’. Then there is the inextricable involvement of the likes of Britain and America, and the history of Europe’s treatment of Jews. The ‘conflict’ appears to be a cauldron of burning views, of which many appear irreconcilable (Pandor 2008).

It was McGreal’s article in the Guardian, ‘BBC accused of bias against Israel’ (2004), which initially sparked my interest in exploring this topic further.¹ In it, McGreal speaks of the immense pressure on the BBC and other news organisations from the Israeli government and other pro-Israeli organisations “to curtail critical coverage [of Israel] or to report stories Israel believes help identify the Palestinian conflict with global Islamist terrorism”.² McGreal (2004) elucidates that the pressure includes boycotting news organisations, accusations of anti-semitism and baying for the expulsion of correspondents; its effect is that Israeli officials need, for example, “only to call a number at the network’s [CNN] headquarters in Atlanta to pull any story they do not like”.³

According to MacAskill (2006), for journalists seeking a pro-Israeli perspective “access couldn’t be easier.” Conversely, from a pro-Palestinian perspective, this resonates with Van Dijk’s (1996:85, 92) observations that the lack of access to the mediums of persuasion and manipulation such as the media – the source of power in ‘modern’ democratic societies - is instrumental to understanding profound misrepresentations of ethnic groups. The ideas of *bias* and *framing* so explicitly highlighted in the McGreal (2004) article interested me deeply.

¹ See Islamic Human Rights Commission (2004) for a case study on the pro-Israeli bias in the BBC.

² Square brackets are mine. For an extensive exploration of this theme, see Adams and Mayhew (1975).

³ Square brackets are mine.

Crucially, it corroborates perfectly with what Said discusses in *Covering Islam* (1997). The crux of his argument is that successive Israeli governments and pro-Israeli books and journals have used relentless propaganda to shape the depiction of Arabs and Muslims as sub-human terrorists “in the hope that more Americans and Europeans will see Israel as a victim of Islamic violence”, despite Israel’s staggering culpability (Said 1997: xxi). He develops this argument further in *The Question of Palestine* (1992), and illustrates how this ‘conflict’ makes for, perhaps, an unsurpassable example of power abuse through one of power’s most instrumental mediums – language (Locher 2001:321). This sentiment is also expressed in the dismay of the Jewish writer William Zuckermann, who, in 1958, wrote:

The terrifyingly gruesome power of modern propaganda to take over men’s minds and lives, to manipulate their emotions and turn them into animals, is to my mind nowhere expressed more clearly than in the Zionist propaganda about Arab refugees put out over the last ten years. This propaganda has literally succeeded in changing black into white, lies into truth and serious social injustice into an act of justice, praised by thousands. This propaganda has turned capable men with more than average understanding into dupes and fools who believe everything that they are told; it has made friendly and gentle men and women with a strong sense of compassion into harsh fanatics, without any feeling for anyone other than their own people.

(in Grollenberg 1980:65)

But the sheer irreconcilability of this kind of polemic with the rhetoric of organizations such as ‘Zionism on the Web’, for example, is astounding. They assert that:

Zionism is suffering a concerted attack by those who wish to delegitimize Israel and the Jewish right to self-determination. If you believe that Jews have the same rights as other people to self-determination in our own national home, you can help fight racism and anti-Zionism.

(Helping Zionism and Zionism on the Web n.d.)

Such discourse suggests that pro-Palestinian groups also abuse the power of language to attack Israel, in spite of the fact that their access to the world’s media (as a minority) is thought to be minimal (van Dijk 1996:92-4). Furthermore, Dugdale’s view that “the ideal of Zionism is to restore self-respect to the Jewish people, and thus

to bring back the Jewish nation into the respect of the other peoples of the world” (in Goodman 1943:9), makes opposition to Zionism appear truly unreasonable.

The language of this ‘conflict’, then, provides a fascinating platform from which to explore how groups construct their drastically opposite ‘realities’ and how, through “ideologically patterned” related texts, they ‘naturalize’ their “particular view of reality” (Cameron 2001:123-4). Considering Palestine’s personal religious significance for me, this opportunity to explore the ‘conflict’ is one I am relishing – especially since I have never sufficiently explored the topic to grasp the crux of the present conflict ‘objectively’ from an informed historical stance.

Literature Review

The Corpus Linguistics (henceforth CL) research referred to and further developed in this dissertation relates to ‘*An exploration of the Palestinian-Israeli ‘conflict’ using Wmatrix*’ (Pandor 2008). For that project, I built two 19,000 word corpora. One corpus consisted of articles portraying pro-Palestinian views, and the other pro-Israeli views. Subjectively determining a main theme for all the articles in both corpora initially produced twelve general categories, which were valid for both corpora.⁴ I used Wmatrix to compare both corpora against each other for statistically significant key concepts and domains in each corpus. I then compared these with the main themes into which I had categorised the articles. To facilitate this I mapped Wmatrix’s SEMTAGS on to my categories. This cross-comparison revealed some SEMTAGs that were consistent in both corpora and my categories, and it is a couple of these – namely ‘Government, Politics & elections’ and ‘Evaluation’ – that, following a general discussion of the overall results, I explored further (for further detail, see Pandor 2008)

Gabrielatos and Baker (forthcoming 2008:2)⁵ cite studies that show “how corpus analysis can uncover ideologies and evidence for disadvantage”, which can then be explored through Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA). By combining CL with CDA, the criticism, for example, that CDA uses an “arbitrary selection of texts” which cannot be representative, can be overcome, and the strong bias for the ‘oppressed’ group in CDA can be tempered through empirical data (Gabrielatos and Baker, forthcoming 2008:2-3). Similarly, the problem of CL not usually taking into account “the social, political, historical and cultural context of the data” can be resolved (forthcoming 2008: 30). The fusion is also quite natural since CL and CDA overlap in concordance analysis (forthcoming 2008:10). Their recommendation is that CL methodology “only forms part of the analysis, informing and being informed by a critical discourse analysis approach” (forthcoming 2008:30), which is one I am happy to adopt for this paper.

⁴ For a breakdown of all the articles used in both corpora and how I categorised them, please see APPENDIX A.

⁵ I am grateful to Dr Richard Xiao for acquiring this paper for me.

Other than their discussion on the synergy of the CL and CDA approaches, their actual study of “the discursive construction of refugees and asylum seekers [...] in a 140 million word corpus of UK press articles” is also immensely useful and parallels can be drawn with my own research to date. Their comment on the usefulness of newspapers as a source of data is particularly poignant for me:

The reciprocity of influence between readers and newspapers, and, more importantly, the power of newspapers over the selection, extent, frequency and nature of their reporting, coupled with their availability for corpus compilation, make newspapers an excellent source of data for the examination of the construction of refugees and asylum seekers.

(forthcoming 2008:5)

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) provide a superb concise synopsis of CDA, touching upon its origins, different approaches to it, and a discussion of CDA’s key themes through an extended example. A more detailed exploration which also highlights the resources necessary to practically implement CDA, is provided by Fairclough in *Analysing Discourse* (2003). As Fairclough and Wodak (1997:258) elucidate, CDA sees discourse as a dialectical social practice in which “discourse is socially *constitutive* as well as socially shaped”. Its principal aim, they state, is to “uncover opaqueness and power relationships” (1997:279), and importantly, it helps show “how ideological differences between texts in their representations of the world are coded in their vocabulary” (Fairclough 1989:112-3). Some of the very relevant questions that CDA asks, which directly concern my research, include:

how do existing societies provide people with the possibilities and resources for rich and fulfilling lives, how on the other hand do they deny people these possibilities and resources? What is it about existing societies that produces poverty, deprivation, misery and insecurity in people's lives? What possibilities are there for social change which would reduce these problems and enhance the quality of the lives of human beings?

(Fairclough 2003:202)

One of the approaches to CDA mentioned by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) was the discourse-historical method, which Reisigl and Wodak (2001) employ in *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and anti-Semitism*. Reisigl and Wodak assert that:

As it is one of our key assumptions that racism, ethnicism and antisemitism are – to a large extent – produced and reproduced discursively, the discourse-analytical approach is very rewarding [...] we believe that the theoretical and methodical approach will also be fruitfully applicable to discourse-analytical investigation of other parts of the world.⁶

(2001: preface xi)

They applied their approach to three case-studies through which they endeavoured “to illustrate how a multidisciplinary context driven approach could work” in a CDA of the problem of discursive discrimination (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:268).⁷ Fairclough and Wodak (1997:266) state that “the distinctive feature of this approach is its attempt to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of written or spoken text”. This makes it particularly useful for the type of analysis I aim to undertake.

Further studies using this method elaborated on van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach and, considering he combined quantitative and qualitative analyses of news reports to explore prevailing ethnic prejudices, and more recently, the crucial role of the elite in reproducing racism, the relevance of his work to mine is clear (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:265-6). However, Reisigl and Wodak (2001:24) comment that although “we certainly believe that ‘the elite’ plays a significant role in the production and reproduction of racism, [...] we prefer to assume a more reciprocal, less monocausal and unidirectional top-down relationship of influence between the ‘elite’ and other social groups and strata within a specific society”.

In his insightful article, ‘Towards the year 2030: can a civil society shared by Jews and Arabs evolve in Israel?’, Hareven (2002) provides a frank appraisal of Arab-

⁶ Their research looked at anti-Semitism in Vienna.

⁷ For a summary of the key questions which they sought to answer in their analyses, see the preface xiii.

Israeli relations in Israel and how they may develop. He identifies key areas that need to be addressed and asks a whole host of very pertinent questions relating to how the future should unfold to develop a civic structure in which Israeli Arabs can truly become equal citizens, and thus, peace can evolve. However, Hareven's guarded optimism is not echoed by the research of Al-Haj (2002),⁸ for example, who explored multiculturalism in Israel. After analyzing the development of curricula in Jewish and Arab schools through Israel's history, Al-Haj (2002) concludes that "there has been no attempt to foster a civic culture in which the Arab citizens are a separate but equal component". Nevertheless Ghanem's (2002) research on Palestinian Israeli's political orientation and aspirations does suggest that Hareven's vision within Israel does have the potential to be realised - if Israel can deliver on national and civic equality.⁹ Ghanem's (2002) research draws on data collected over a decade up to 2001 and thus appears to be authoritative in the views it projects.¹⁰

A drawback in the work of the researchers mentioned in the above paragraph is that, by focussing on Arab-Israeli relations in Israel proper, they largely overlook the wider regional concerns of the situation in the Occupied Territories. It is in this respect that the work of Kelman (1999:583) excels. His synopsis of the 'conflict' is objective and precise, and his ideas for a long-term solution very interesting; he suggests that it "requires a development of a transcendent identity for the two peoples that does not threaten the particularistic identity of each", and develops the notion very usefully. Moller's (2003) investigation on national, societal and human security, and their role in resolving the Palestine-Israeli conflict was broad, insightful and balanced, covering many factors and variables. He suggests that reducing the threats to the many different types of security concerns should help foster greater interaction, dismantle enemy images, and allow a wider margin for concessions in the peace process.

⁸ Also see Lewin, Stier, and Caspi-Dror (2006).

⁹ Crucially, Ghanem (2001) states that, "Palestinians in Israel see themselves as Israeli citizens who will continue to live in the country and are not willing to move to another country, not even to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip". Hence, "in their eyes the state must serve both groups, the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, equally. In practice they demand that the state be binational rather than one that favors one group (the Jews) over all others. All of these are reflected in a demand to change the character of the state".

¹⁰ Please note that the articles of the researchers in this paragraph were accessed through an online source which did not demarcate the pages to correspond with the print journals. Therefore, when quoting these articles, page numbers will not be provided. As a general rule, whenever page numbers are not provided, either this will be the reason, or that the article is from an online newspaper. Other examples include Bishara (2006), Baratz (2007), and Agha and Mally (2001 & 2007).

Grollenberg's *Palestine Comes First* (1980) is well researched, far-ranging, and concisely achieves its aim of providing a general knowledge of earlier developments to help understand present events. Johnson's *Civilizations of the Holy Land* (1979), whose historical account starts in prehistoric times and ends with a fleeting mention of the founding of Israel, also made interesting pre-Israel background reading.

A thorough critique of anti-Zionist arguments is provided by Rabinowicz (1974) in his analysis of the historian Tonybee's work on Judaism and Zionism

The essays in Goodman's (ed.) *The Jewish National Home* (1943) romanticize Zionism and depict it in noble and heroic terms. As such, they often counter Grollenberg's version of history. Slater (2001) provides a historical appraisal of the 'conflict' broadly within the paradigm of Israel's 'new history', as narrated by Israeli academicians and journalists in the past twenty years. La Guardia's (2007) *Holy Land, Unholy War* is also notable for its dispassionate manner and excellent historical account.

Methodology

For the quantitative analysis, I use the research in ‘*An exploration of the Palestinian-Israeli ‘conflict’ using Wmatrix*’ (Pandor 2008) as my starting point. As discussed in the literature review, two corpora representing pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli views were compared for key domains and concepts using Wamtrix. Wmatrix is the web interface for USAS, a semantic annotation system which automatically assigns a part-of-speech tag to every lexical item and multi-word expression. This output is then fed into SEMTAG which assigns semantic tags to all the lexical items.¹¹ Thus data can be quantitatively explored through ‘conceptual’ semantic domains (Archer 2007: week 10). In this thesis, I will re-examine and further explore the results produced by Wmatrix with a view to unravelling “differing themes, concerns, attitudes (and mindsets/ worldviews?)” (Archer 2007: weeks 1 & 10). In particular the focus will be on mindsets in relation to ‘reality’ and resolving the ‘conflict’, the latter being a suggestion I made for further study when concluding the aforementioned research (Pandor 2008). Using the empirical findings of this analysis as a guide, I will choose either a pro-Palestinian or a pro-Israeli stance, and critique, in greater depth, the discourse of the opposite group through CDA. In this latter analysis too, the focus will primarily be on ‘reality’ and solutions.

In both analyses, from the several possible strategies for unravelling worldview,¹² I will specifically be exploring the themes via an investigation of presuppositions (including presuppositional triggers) (see, e.g. Levinson 1983) and lexical choice. Considering that the worldview of socio-cultural groups can be generally contrasted with ‘reality’ (Archer 2007: weeks 11-12), attempting to decode each group’s ‘reality’ – the construction of ‘reality’ being the experiential aspect of discourse (Fairclough 1989:113)¹³ - should provide some particularly interesting results.

¹¹ See APPENDIX B for a list of the 232 semantic field tags that lexical items can broadly be assigned through USAS (UCREL Semantic Annotation System).

¹² “*Worldview* in this sense denotes a complex mix of beliefs, concepts, sense of order and social constructs, role-models and moral precepts which are unique and peculiar in comparison to those of other such socio-cultural groupings” (Archer 2007: weeks 11-12).

¹³ Fairclough (2001:113) expands that the experiential function is about “how ideological differences between texts in their representations of the world are coded in their vocabulary”.

Findings and Observations

SECTION 1: Analysis of themes generated quantitatively

In this section I explore in greater depth the corpus-based data produced in Pandor (2008). The purpose is to quantitatively determine which themes are the most statistically significant in this ‘conflict’, and briefly explore them before downsampling for a qualitative analysis. This will ensure that the themes and viewpoints discussed will be those that are recurrent throughout the discourse, rather than being specific to a few articles. Furthermore, the particular viewpoint adopted for the subsequent critical discourse analysis can then be said to be informed by more empirical and relatively objective research into differing perspectives. As such, the level of confidence in the CDA findings should be higher (Gabrielatos and Baker forthcoming 2008:3). In light of this ‘guiding’ purpose, this section will be shorter than the following one. Nevertheless, I anticipate that the quantitative research in its own right will produce insights that the qualitative analysis might not be able to grasp (Gabrielatos and Baker forthcoming 2008:4).

As mentioned previously, my qualitative readings of the pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli corpora produced twelve key themes,¹⁴ which were restructured into eleven. These eleven were then compared to the themes produced quantitatively by Wmatrix. Below, is a condensed version of a table showing only the most relevant themes and results.¹⁵ As with Pandor (2008), I refer to the results of a search in which the key categories of the pro-Palestinian corpus are compared to those of the pro-Israeli corpus as PvI, and refer to the results of a search in which the key categories of the pro-Israeli corpus are compared to those of the pro-Palestinian corpus as IvP.

¹⁴ See APPENDIX A for a full breakdown of the articles in both corpora and the themes that emerged.

¹⁵ See APPENDIX C for a full version of the table.

TABLE 1: A CONDENSED CROSS-CORPORA-CATEGORY COMPARISON OF SHARED SEMTAGS
(underlined and italicized in same colour = identical SEMTAG; only same colour = partially shared SEMTAG).

PvI (pro-Palestinian corpus compared against the pro-Israeli corpus)	IvP (pro-Israeli corpus compared against the pro-Palestinian corpus)	CONTAGS (see Note 2 below) (the words in upper case in the right-hand column represent the categories on to which the SEMTAGs were mapped)	
SEMTAGS with a Log-Likelihood of 6.63 or above (descending order)		SEMTAGs that conflate to match my CATEGORIES	
<u>A6.2+</u> (Comparing: usual)	<u>G1.1</u> (Government)	<u>G1.2</u> , <u>S5+</u> , <u>O4.3</u>	APARTHEID
<u>G1.2</u> (Politics)	<u>O4.3</u> (Colour and colour patterns)	A2.2, <u>G2.1-</u>	CAUSE (of global TERROR)
<u>H4</u> (Residence)	<u>A5.2+</u> (Evaluation: true)	<u>A5.2-</u> , <u>Z6</u> , <u>A5.3-</u> , Q2.2	culture of DENIAL
X2.2- (No knowledge)	<u>G2.1-</u> (Crime)	<u>S5+</u> S3.1	Israel-DIASPORA RELATIONS
<u>S7.4</u> (Permission)	<u>S5+</u> (Belonging to a group)	T1.1.3, S5-, <u>A9-</u> , <u>A6.2+</u> , <u>S7.1+</u> , E3+	looking to the FUTURE / PEACE?
<u>B4</u> (Cleaning and personal care)	<u>S7.1+</u> (In power)		
Note 1: By using only those SEMTAGs that have a Log-Likelihood score of 6.63 or above, we can be 99% confident of their statistical significance. Note 2: CONTAGS are project-specific categories made by conflating, subdividing or ignoring various SEMTAG categories (Archer 2007: week 10).		<u>H1</u> , <u>T1.3</u> , <u>S7.1+</u> , <u>B4</u> , T2+	FOUNDING of Israel / Since the FOUNDING
		<u>A5.2+</u> <u>A5.4+</u> , A3+	REALITY?
		M1, M7, <u>A5.3+</u> , <u>H4</u> , <u>S7.4+</u>	RIGHT of RETURN
		<u>G2.2-</u> , <u>G2.1-</u> , <u>S7.4</u>	STRANGULATING Gaza & Hamis

(Adapted from Pandor, 2008)

The above table shows that, generally, the themes I identified through a qualitative reading of the corpora for my previous research (see Pandor 2008) also cropped up in a quantitative analysis. By way of illustration, themes that occurred in both include ‘apartheid’, ‘crime’, ‘denial’, ‘diaspora-relations’, ‘residence’ (i.e. military occupation), ‘peace’, ‘politics’, and ‘reality’. For reasons of word length, I have chosen to focus in this section on the different perspectives of the pro-Palestinians and pro-Israelis in respect to ‘security/ peace’ and ‘denial/ reality’. Although ‘security’ is not in Table 1, it is inextricably entwined with ‘peace’, as the concordances reveal.

The most significant PvI category in Table 1, A6.2+,¹⁶ lists ‘convention’, ‘norm’, ‘common’, ‘normalisation’ and ‘conventions’ as its most frequent constituents. Eleven of the twelve occurrences of ‘convention’ relate to the Geneva Conventions – the exception being a reference to the Vienna Convention; all five instances of ‘norm’ collocate with ‘international law’; three of the four uses of ‘common’ are about achieving a peaceful solution; and all five instances of ‘normalisation’ are about normalising relations between Israel and the Arab world. Thus the category is primarily about the Palestinians’ desire to realize a peaceful future through the practical enforcement of international law (Various Rights Organisations 2007). Strikingly, the Conventions are not referred to even once in the pro-Israeli corpus, nor are ‘norm’ and ‘normalisation’ used.¹⁷ I cannot provide a justification for the lexical avoidance of these terms. However, it is interesting to note that historians, researchers, and journalists such as Grollenberg (1980), Slater (2001), Said (2002), McDowall (1993) and Levy (2006 & 2007) have commented that pro-Israelis groups are not interested in abiding by international law and negotiating a solution, and never have been.¹⁸ Such a view is also supported by the view of pro-Palestinian groups, who insist that “international law must at last be understood to be the essential overarching framework for negotiations” (Various Rights Organisations 2007) - ‘at last’ presupposes that pro-Palestinians feel international law has never previously been the

¹⁶ (‘Comparing: usual’)

¹⁷ Similarly, the single instance of ‘common’ in IvP relates to Israel seeking to strengthen ties with the Jewish Diapora (Lipshiz 2007), rather than with the Palestinians.

¹⁸ For reasons supporting this theory, see the comments of Uri Avnery in Hari (2007), Nahum Goldmann in Grollenberg (1980: 120), and Akiva Eldar in Macintyre (2008). The article by Stern (2007) which I later analyse using CDA also supports this notion. Also see Agha & Malley (2007). Cox (2007) suggests that neither party wants peace because of the compromises involved.

basis of negotiations. This, pro-Palestinians probably feel, entailed the failure of all previous negotiations, and it is understandable that the lack of such language ('Conventions', 'norm', 'normalisation' etc.) in pro-Israeli literature would seem marked for pro-Palestinian readers.

In the IvP dataset, the most significant category is G1.1 (Government). Its most frequent constituent, 'state', is very revealing in several respects.¹⁹ Of the 92 occurrences of 'state', 59 refer to Israel, of which 39 collocate very strongly with 'Jews' and 'Jewish' (Pandor 2008). One could argue that these definite descriptions seem to be presupposing that Israel is 'Jewish' and / or that Israel being 'Jewish' is very important to pro-Israelis (McDowell 1993:644-5). In the PvI dataset, such collocations are rare – for example, 'Jewish' is only used twice to define the state of Israel. Instead, pro-Palestinians tend to use either the 'state of Israel', or the 'Israeli state' - the latter being a colligation totally unused by pro-Israelis (Pandor 2008); presumably, they always prefer to use 'Jewish' as the preceding adjective. This suggests that pro-Palestinians tend not to view Israel as (solely) Jewish, and that, for them, the issue is purely political. As the table shows, G1.2 (politics), of which 'political' is its most frequent constituent, is highly significant in PvI (statistically speaking). G1.2's other constituents are 'apartheid', 'zionism', 'human rights', 'elected', 'labour' and 'democracy'. Pandor (2008) has used the concordance results to suggest that pro-Palestinians feel Israel is more of an apartheid state than a democratic one – a view also shared by Herman (1994), Massad (2007), Khodr (2000b), Pilger (2004), and Abdullah (2001), to cite a few.

What is particularly interesting about the pro-Israeli mindset is that, since "every fourth citizen of Israel is non-Jewish" (Silver 2007), it is easily arguable that, demographically at least, Israel is not (solely) Jewish.²⁰ Furthermore, Herzl always intended Israel to be "a secular state and not a theocracy" (Grollenberg 1980:115). Also, in response to the apartheid allegations perhaps (Pandor 2008), the data suggests

¹⁹ See APPENDIX D for the concordance lines. Other frequent words under G1.1 in IvP included 'government', 'nations', 'citizens', 'minister', 'country', 'authority', 'diplomatic' and 'states'.

²⁰ Nationally, too, according to Friedmann (1967:226), who asserts: "There is no Jewish nation. There is an Israeli nation. The state that came into existence as a result of Herzl's predictions in not a "Jewish state". See Grollenberg (1980:113-5) for an extended discussion. Moller (2003:10) also expands on the controversialness of Jewish ethnicity. Also see the comments of Azzam and Spears in Keay (2003:355-6).

that pro-Israelis consider Israel to be ‘modern’ and ‘democratic’.²¹ However, the data in PvI substantiates Grollenberg’s view that it is “completely impossible” for Israel to be both Jewish and democratic, and that, at present, it is neither (1980:115).²²

This difference in perspective is profound in terms of peace negotiations and a lasting solution. The pro-Israeli mindset that the state is strictly Jewish and also democratic could be seen by some as an explanation for their apparent unwillingness to work towards a democratic bi-national solution within Israel proper. For example, Moller (2003:10) discusses how in Israel proper “the very presence of the Arab population may constitute a threat to the Jewishness of Israel” since Arab birth rates are higher than those of Jews” and thus “the Jewish segment of the population will, at some stage, find itself outnumbered by Arabs”. Another issue that might potentially ‘block’ or ‘hinder’ pro-Israelis’ willingness to negotiate is that of the Palestinian refugees issue – for allowing them to return could also tip the demographic make up of Israel proper against Jews (Moller 2003:11-12; Hareven 2001).²³

We might also potentially link this with philosophical discussions relating to the two-state solution. For example, the above result seems to suggest that Israel regards itself as one single Jewish state. And for Zionists, this Jewish state has always conceptually “included the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights, southern Lebanon and much of Egypt’s Sinai peninsula” (Slater 2001:174). Yet in the corpus, pro-Palestinians have been writing in terms of a “two-state” solution.²⁴ The problem with this is that the very notion of such a solution would appear to go against pro-Israelis’ apparent mindset. Since conceivably they can’t think in terms of a two-state solution, they may not be able to hear and understand arguments in favour of it. Supporting this stance is Slater’s (2001:174) view that since 1948 Zionists have consistently “worked actively to prevent the creation of a[n independent] Palestinian state [alongside Israel]”,²⁵ as was proposed in the 1947 UN partition plan.

²¹ See APPENDIX D, plum coloured words.

²² Al-Haj (2002) makes the same point in milder terms.

²³ See Agha & Malley (2007)

²⁴ ‘Two-state’ does not feature in the pro-Israeli corpus at all.

²⁵ The square brackets are mine, but the content is from the same source.

Interestingly though, it is now questionable how relevant pro-Israelis “who believe in a greater Israel stretching from the Mediterranean to Jordan” (Macintyre 2008)²⁶ possibly ‘baulking’ a two-state solution is. This is because according to Akhtar (2005) a two-state solution is not even possible any more since the West Bank and East Jerusalem have been integrated into the infrastructure and legal fabric of Israel proper. As asserted in the ‘One State Declaration’ (Various Undersigned 2007) “the two-state solution ignores the physical and political realities on the ground”. Both physically and bureaucratically, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)²⁷ have been absorbed (Akhtar 2005). Hence, Akhtar (2005) argues it is now a case of recognizing the “one-state reality”. This is the ‘reality’ that “Zionist intellectuals on the left” have always feared, and have always predicted to be the eventual result of not settling “an early two-state solution” (Macintyre 2007). As an eventual minority in one-state from Jordan to the Mediterranean, the idea of a ‘Jewish democratic state’ becomes completely unsustainable – the only other option being an “Israeli apartheid regime” that “continues to repress the occupied Palestinians by force while the Palestinians continue violently to resist” (Oz, in Macintyre 2007).²⁸

This discussion may illustrate the difference between pro-Israelis’ worldview and ‘reality’. A pro-Palestinian may argue, for example, that pro-Israelis are in denial of Israel’s ‘reality’, because the ‘reality’ disproves Israel’s ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ nature. My earlier results suggest that they might also argue pro-Israelis do not want to discuss international law and a solution; the reason is that every possible solution compromises their ideals, and thus maintaining the status quo remains preferable. And even the status quo, as discussed above, would eventually favour the pro-Palestinians. However, an alternative view is that ‘reality’ matches the pro-Israeli worldview, and it is the pro-Palestinian worldview that does not fit ‘reality’.²⁹ And from a broader perspective, perhaps, neither view may match ‘reality’ completely.

²⁶ For an extended discussion see Moller (2003:10). He notes that “quite a large part of the settler population belong to this creed” which views ‘greater Israel’ as their *promised land*, rather than just a homeland for the Jews, which could just as well have had another geographical location.

²⁷ Using OPT to refer to the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem may be problematic since “Israeli propaganda has always claimed that there is no ‘occupation’ but merely “administration” (Akhtar 2005). Also see Pandor (2008) for the contrasting use of ‘occupation’ and similar terms in IvP and PvI.

²⁸ However, see Massad (2007) for an argument that Israel has a deserved right to exist as a racist state and that its neighbours should recognise and accept that ‘special need’ to bring about peace. ‘New anti-semitism’, he argues, “consists mainly of any attempt to take away and to refuse to uphold the absolute right of Israel to be a racist Jewish state”.

²⁹ For a concise synopsis of the pro-Palestinian version of ‘reality’, see Khodr (2000a; APPENDIX H)

The above discussion dealt with the societal security of Jewish Israelis (Moller 2003:10). Equally important though, in the pro-Israeli discourse, are issues of national security. Pro-Israelis concern for Israel's existence is conveyed through the blue words in the concordance lines of 'state' (see APPENDIX D; Pandor 2008). This kind of language may be taken to reflect a kind of semantic prosody (Nelson n.d.) for the Israeli state within the pro-Israeli discourse, building the image of it forever being at risk. For example, words collocating with 'the Jewish state'/'state of Israel' include 'existence', 'security', 'recognition', 'deny', 'obliterate', 'destroy', 'dismemberment', and 'its enemies'. Yet, Moller (2003:9) argues that "because Israel has long been an (undeclared) nuclear power [...] and because the conventional balance of power has changed dramatically in Israel's favour [...] Israel is perfectly capable of defending itself by defensive means". Also, according to Akhtar (2005), much of Jewish Israelis self-professed "eternal fear of being 'pushed into the sea'" may be more a result of "nurture rather than nature".³⁰ This, he asserts, is because Israeli children are taught "a version of history portraying the Arabs as the aggressors against the persecuted Jewish people". By contrast, researchers found that in Arab schools the curriculum

refers to the conflict in a balanced fashion with a dry presentation of the historical facts from the points of view of the Jewish people and of the Palestinian-Arab people

(al-Haj 2002)

Friends of al-Aqsa (2007) also suggest Israeli fears are "deliberately engineered". This raises the question, why? Quoting Nahum Goldmann in a 1970 interview, Grollenberg (1980:120) proposes it is because keeping fear and anti-Semitism alive are crucial to keeping Israel alive.³¹ Goldmann asserted that the Jewish people's "existence has never been so threatened as now, precisely because the Jews are no longer persecuted as they were in former times [...] and thus Jews...] would no longer need to show solidarity". Deutscher (1968:51) seems to confirm such a view when he

³⁰ See al-Haj (2002) and Maoz (2000) for research on the Israeli education system's role in fostering fear and presenting the conflict "in a one-way fashion that corresponds to the Jewish-Zionist narrative, with no expression of the Palestinian or pan-Arab narrative" (al-Haj 2002).

³¹ Also, see Lipshiz (2007), who suggests that, along with other factors, the absence of state-sponsored anti-Semitism has led to disinterest in Israel from the Jewish diaspora, and thus dramatically reduced donations. Brenner (1983:96) also mentions how in 1937 "anti-semitism was now conceded to be the main force of Zionism".

asserts that the only way in which he is a Jew is “by force of my unconditional solidarity with the persecuted”.

Another view which emerged in Pandor (2008) and is collaborated by Herman (1994), is that ‘security’ is a guise by which “Israel is executing a deliberate policy [...] to strip Palestinians of all security. This, in the long run, can only be achieved by ethnic cleansing of Palestinian lands or the genocide of the Palestinians” (Friends of al-Aqsa 2007). The “dominant Israeli psyche”, Friends of al-Aqsa (2007) argue, is that of the first President of Israel, Chaim Weizman, who “once said that the Palestinians must be seen like the rocks of Judea, as obstacles that have to be cleared for the creation of [a] secure Israel”. Though particularly strong as a worldview, any possible ‘solution’ - and even maintaining the status quo - are all perilous to the Jewish democratic vision. So for those who cannot relinquish the aspiration of a Jewish democratic Israel, the current situation, perhaps, leaves no other way to view the ‘conflict’.

The human security risks (Moller 2003:12) faced by Jewish Israelis is captured by G2.1- (crime) in IvP. Its constituents - ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorists’, ‘terrorist’, ‘perpetrators’, ‘crimes’, and ‘hijackings’ - all serve to demonstrate the threats Israeli citizens face.³² The situation of inhabitants of settlements, Moller (2003:12) states, “is particularly precarious – but they have deliberately chosen to live on illegally occupied territory with all accruing risks”. Of course, for those Messianic Zionists who view the territory as their *promised land*, the accruing risks are unwarranted and international law, as it stands, is unjust to their cause.

The human security problems of the Palestinians, which “are more severe” (Moller 2003:12), are projected through the aforementioned G1.2 (political) in PvI. The view that Palestinians are the victims of ‘apartheid’, ‘zionism’ and ‘human rights’ abuses is what is expounded by the concordance lines of those words. For example, Pilger (2004) discusses how “Israel has walled in the Palestinians in pursuit of the **Zionist** dream of an **apartheid** state” and Khodr (2000a) asserts that:

[...] while Israel for the last ten weeks has been killing Palestinian children daily, launching air and sea attacks on homes at night, destroying farm land and uprooting olive trees, starving

³² See Said (2002) for further analysis of the use of these terms in the pro-Israeli discourse.

them with closures, and even firing on ambulances (all of this is documented by every **human rights** organizations [sic] and the United Nations), Israel in our media and by our shameful politicians from Clinton, Albright, and Congress is portrayed as being "besieged" by stones and its very survival is in question.³³

This quote is also poignant in terms of its relevance to the wider discussion on media representation and the validity of security concerns.

Interestingly, 'human rights' does not feature once in the pro-Israeli corpus, and the 25 occurrences of 'apartheid' in IvP all seek to refute the "calumny", broadly speaking (Falkson 2007). Hence, in PvI, 'apartheid' generally carries an existential assumption and features in 'realis' statements (Fairclough 2003:55-6, 109), whereas in IvP, because of the discourse context, the presupposition³⁴ is defeasible (Levinson 1983:189). Thus pro-Israelis decry the validity of apartheid allegations by negating a comparison with South African apartheid, whereas pro-Palestinians view apartheid as inherent in Zionism, and thus do not see much need to refer to South African apartheid (see APPENDIX E).³⁵

This discussion has revealed several instances in which denial of 'reality', or another's 'perspective', can be said to be inherent to the mindset/ worldview of each group. In addition to being a key theme, denial is also a discourse strategy. In his research on power relations in Jewish-Arab teachers' encounters, Maoz (2000) notes that:

[...] the Jewish majority's opposition to airing the conflict in the encounter [...] can be seen as an attempt to preserve the status quo that it regards as illegitimate but stable. This is done by utilizing strategies of denial and repression of the conflict and its elements of asymmetry and illegitimacy.

More generally, van Dijk (1996:94) points out that in the media "'our' negative actions are de-emphasised by denials, euphemism, mitigation, or other strategies for avoiding negative self-presentation" (in Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996:84-104). Notice that both parties engage in this in their respective articles. The following

³³ The emboldening of words in the above two quotes is mine.

³⁴ Fairclough calls presuppositions 'assumptions' (2003:59).

³⁵ See La Guardia (2007:488) for a brilliant synopsis of the 'apartheid' debate.

CDA analysis will seek to further identify the use of these strategies and others.

SECTION 2: Critical Discourse Analysis of Stern's *Arab Culture of Denial* (2007; APPENDIX F)

I have chosen to analyse Stern (2007) from the pro-Israeli corpus. As such, I will be using CDA in favour of the Palestinians. That is to say, I will be viewing the Palestinians as a dominated and oppressed group and critique the discourse of the pro-Israelis, who represent the dominating group (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:259). For purposes of contrast and comparison, I will also draw on Pilger's (2004; APPENDIX G) and Khodr's (2000a; APPENDIX H) articles from the pro-Palestinian corpus. As with Stern's article, line numbers are cited in square brackets in the analyses of these articles, which can be cross-referenced with the version of the articles provided in the appendices.

As Palestinians are a minority group in Israel, van Dijk's (1997) approach to social prejudices becomes particularly relevant. His focus is on the 'rationalisation and justification of discriminatory acts against minority groups' through "the 7 D's of Discrimination [....:] dominance, differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion, depersonalisation, or destruction, and daily discrimination" (1984:13, in Reisigl and Wodak 2001:22). And I believe that some of these social practices will naturally emerge in my analysis of Stern. However, the main thrust of my approach will be to deconstruct pro-Israeli 'reality' by looking at the ideological assumptions Stern seeks to establish and maintain as commonsensical (Fairclough 1989:90). The "overwording" of 'denial' and related concepts such as 'truth' and 'reality' throughout Stern's texts clearly confirm the quantitative findings that they are a "focus of ideological struggle" (Fairclough 1989:115). Therefore, it is primarily Stern's axiom of 'Arab denial' that I will analyse and counter with pro-Palestinian formulations of 'reality'. In doing so, her worldview will also be considered. Unfortunately though, due to word count constraints, many other angles of analysis will have to remain unexplored.

Some of the most basic of Stern's linguistic choices, such as 'the Middle-East conflict' [1], 'wars' [26], and 'the Palestinian cause' [35] reflect a stance, in the same way that Pilger's use of language reflects his stance. Not once does Pilger refer to the

issue as such, but uses language such as ‘struggle against the empires of the West’ [2], the West’s ‘rapacious crusades and domination’ [3], ‘colonial terrorism’ [5], ‘this danger’ [7], the Zionist states ‘regional grievance and sheer terror’ [8], ‘enduring bloodbath’ [11], ‘Israel’s enduring colonial role in the Middle East’. The gulf between these two viewpoints is self-evident. A ‘conflict’ is generally construed as “a struggle between opposing principles or aims” (Watson 1976:228), which presumes that each party has more or less equal footing and equally valid claims; hence it is a ‘struggle between’ rather than a ‘struggle against’, which is what opposing colonial domination is. After “imperialism again fell into discredit” following the First World War (Watson 1976:538), colonial domination is generally no longer accepted as morally valid; and this, says Grollenberg (1980:22), “is the tragedy of the state of Israel [...] that it was planned and prepared for in a Europe which thought in colonial terms, but came into being in a world that had rejected colonialism”.³⁶

Interestingly, Pilger’s view is shared by the Israeli Socialist Organization, which “considers Israel to be a colonialist and racist state in which the European Jews, as representatives of American imperialism, oppress the oriental Jews and the Palestinians” (Metzger, Orth & Sterzing 1983:261). And although this party does not have parliamentary representation in Israel, it is interesting to note the existence of other political parties in Israel such as the anti-Zionist Communist Party of Israel (C.P.I), which “advocates the complete withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the founding of a Palestinian state alongside Israel” (Metzger, Orth and Sterzing 1983:259-60). These alternate views within Israel also introduce the problem of considering ‘Zionist’ and ‘Israeli’ to represent a single view.

They also serve to completely discredit Stern’s opening paratactically linked propositional assumptions (Fairclough 2003:55), which are the premise of her whole argument. It is these (i.e. 1. ‘the roots of the conflict began in denial’ [1]; 2. ‘and so long as death and denial are the tools of the Arab religious and political leaders, the conflict will remain unresolved’ [1-2]) that she seeks to make “the ‘commonsense’

³⁶ See Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 16-17) for modern and postmodern views of racism. An instrumental sentence in their discussion is: “Postmodern researchers in racism regard Western genocide against aboriginal people, slavery, imperialist and colonial domination and exploitation, and the Holocaust, in all of which Western doctrines of ‘racial’ and cultural superiority have played a constitutive role, as the other side of Western modernity.”

currency of the operating discourse” and “naturalize” (Kelly 2000). Rather than attributing the cause of the ‘conflict’ to the Zionist colonial invasion of Palestine and the establishment of a racist apartheid state (Barghouti 2006), Stern totally absolves Zionists of any blame. ‘Began’ [1] presupposes that ‘the roots of the Middle East conflict’ [1] did not even exist prior to Arab ‘denial’, and thus, implicitly, the fault is entirely the Arabs. Watkins (1980:4), however, states “that the root cause of the whole conflict was the grave and continuing injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people by the creation of the Israeli state” – ‘continuing’ presupposes that the Zionist injustice had been ongoing.³⁷ Both Stern and Watkins use the presuppositions inherent in ‘change of state verbs’ (Levinson 1983:181-2) to make opposite points.

In the second part of her opening paratactic sentence, Stern then explicitly states that the full blame for the continuing non-resolution of the ‘conflict’ is also with the Arabs. Making the Arabs the agents and cause of ‘death and denial’ is paramount to legitimizing her discourse (Fairclough 2001:51). Exploiting the existential presupposition in the conditional subordinating conjunction ‘so long as’ [1], she legitimizes, through ‘rationalization’ (Fairclough 2003:98), the idea of Israel maintaining the status quo of 100% occupation of the Palestinian home (Khodr 2000a:[82]). Her second sentence then explicitly reiterates the non-obligation of Israel and all other parties in changing the status quo, a point she also emphasises in her concluding paragraph:

You cannot make peace with those whom you deny and until the denial stops, there is really no reason for the world or Israel to even attempt to negotiate the situation [60-1].

Nothing that anyone can do, not the Israelis, not the Europeans, not even the Americans, can change this simple truth [64-5]

The concluding sentence of the final paragraph [64-5] is an exact repetition of the concluding line of the first paragraph. Thus repetition, reiteration and rewording of synonymous and interchangeable concepts seem to be part of Stern’s experiential strategy to normalise her version of ‘reality’ (Kelly 2000). The interesting thing about this sentence is that by special mention of the agents, it implicitly acknowledges that the Israelis, Europeans and especially the Americans (‘even’ presupposes they have

³⁷ Slater (2001:174) states that “the expulsion of the Palestinians began well before the Arab invasion”, which took place the year after the Israeli state was created.

greater power) are the powerful social actors that are responsible for and can resolve the conflict, and not the Palestinians. This implication, though, is negated by explicitly depicting them as powerless to resolve the ‘conflict’ in face of Arab denial. The flimsiness of this postulation, which will be further expounded on, offers further validity to the suggestion that the dominant pro-Israeli stance is of non-negotiation, as discussed in the quantitative analysis. Apportioning (full) blame to the Palestinians³⁸ and simultaneously absolving all other parties from any responsibility [2-4, 64-5] could possibly be conceived to be the forerunner of the aforementioned “dominant Israeli psyche”, as promulgated by Chaim Weizman (Friends of al-Aqsa 2007). Also interesting is Watkins (1980:4) use of a virtually parallel sentence structure to Stern’s in the above example [60-1], with the subordinating conjunction ‘until’ (but to an opposite end):

The root cause of the conflict remains the treatment of the Palestinian people, and, until they receive the justice which the international community has denied them for so long, there will be endless conflict with ever widening repercussions.

Whereas Stern absolves the ‘world’ from any responsibility, Watkins places the blame and responsibility squarely on the international community’s shoulders. *La Guardia* (2007:500) goes further and says that non-resolution, “more than half a century after the original UN partition, is a stain on the international community”. In a broader context, whilst Stern portrays the ‘world’ as a supporter of Israel [16, 61] and a victim of Palestinian ‘idiocy’ and ‘violence’ [18, 58], Pilger portrays the ‘world’ as against a defiant Israel [19-20, 23]. Through such references, both parties are employing ‘authorization’ to validate their stance (Fairclough 2003:98).

Stern’s premise for the end of the ‘conflict’ (i.e. the end of her so-called ‘Arab culture of denial’) is one that would see Palestinian refugees ‘deny’ their own lineal, historical and religious ties with Palestine and be ‘absorbed’ elsewhere; for part of Stern’s ‘solution’ is that Palestinians should voluntarily make their expulsion permanent, and by so doing, end the refugee problem that Israeli Zionists created (Slater 2001:175) and which is such a thorn in Israel’s side (see quantitative analysis

³⁸ This strategy of placing the “fate of the occupied territories firmly in the Palestinian lap” is not unique to Stern, but might be seen as an Israeli strategy (McDowall 1993:643).

above). Yet Stern fails to see that for Palestinians their own history “far outweighs the Jewish claim to Palestine, which is ultimately based on a biblical account in which God promised the land to the Jews, who subsequently conquered, inhabited, and ruled that land until they in turn were conquered and expelled by the Roman Empire two thousand years ago” (Slater 2001:173).³⁹ Also, the historical ties “of the Arabs of modern Palestine” to the region, Aamiry (1978:1) asserts, goes back to prehistoric times, and they are from the same stock who, in about the fourth or third millennium BC, founded Jerusalem. Furthermore, “recent studies strongly suggest the probability that the Israelites had an altogether different racial origin” (Aamiry 1978:6). As such, Palestinian refugees do not want to and logically can not be expected to relinquish their right to live in their homeland. And it is for this reason - that it is “contrary to the interests and expressed wishes of the refugees themselves” (Grollenberg 1980:68) – that neighbouring Arab countries haven’t ‘absorbed’ them. Thus her accusation of Arab ‘denial’ being the cause of the refugee problem still existing, fails to stand, as does her drawing parallels with the Jewish immigrants, who unlike the Palestinians, apparently, ‘were as determined’ to be absorbed as Israel was to absorb them [31].

Another alleged ‘denial’ that ‘rationally’ vindicates Stern’s stance of non-negotiation is the supposed Palestinian refusal to recognize Israel [16-17, 36-37]. However, as Slater (1991:414-5) clarifies, from the 1970s onwards the PLO position of non-recognition began to shift, and in the 1980s it moved to “public acceptance of Israel [... until...] finally, in November 1988, Arafat officially declared that the PLO accepted a two-state solution based on UN 242”. Thereafter, again, at the opening of the 1993 Oslo peace process, the PLO “recognized the Israeli state, comprising over three-quarters of the Palestinians’ historical homeland, and gave de facto recognition to Israel’s capital on more than two-thirds of Jerusalem occupied in 1967” (Bishara 2001:135). Furthermore, Agha and Malley (2007) state that:

Five years ago, the Arab League's 22 countries put forward a peace initiative offering normalisation of relations with Israel in exchange for full withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967 and a negotiated resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. Ariel Sharon, then Israel's prime minister, dismissed it.

³⁹ Indeed, the former British minister Louis Spears “ridiculed the whole idea of a people as racially mixed as contemporary Jewry laying claim to the heritage of the biblical Jews” (Keay 2003:355).

This offer, according to Hari (2007), still stands. Also, when Hamas were democratically elected in 2006, they too “said they would respect all previous agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority – a de facto concession that they would recognize Israel” (Hari 2007). In light of this, Stern tendering Palestinian non-recognition of Israel as an argument for non-negotiation in 2007 is inexplicable.⁴⁰

Though as unhelpful as Stern’s stance in terms of a solution today, a more accurate counter-narrative and argument, perhaps, to that provided by her in the fourth paragraph, from a pro-Palestinian perspective, could read as follows: were it not for the British and French lying to and betraying Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, in the first-world war, the Arabs would have been fully independent; and had it not been for the betrayal of Prince Feisal in 1919 by the Zionists, the forged ‘Frankfurter letter’, and many other unscrupulous and terrorist methods, hand in hand with terribly deep-rooted, persistent and powerful Christian-European anti-semitism (Grollenberg 1980:25-9, 37; Patel 2005:114-6, 124-6, 131-4), Israel would never have been created; then ‘the region and the world’ would not have been ‘plunged’ into ‘6 decades of violence’ (Stern 2007:[18-19]) and the issue of an indigenous population ‘recognising’ a colonial racist terrorist apartheid state (Barghouti 2006) founded on their land through the support of racist hypocritical⁴¹ nations would never have arisen.

Stern’s other accusations of ‘denial’ do not have any direct relation to resolving the ‘conflict’ today – it is simply rhetoric and a false presentation of history to support her premise (see Slater 2001). On the basis of the aforementioned ‘denials’, then, it is clear that Stern’s stance of maintaining the status quo and distancing all parties from the ‘conflict’ is unfounded and untenable. More accurately though, as the concluding paragraph confirms, it is not a status quo that Stern is advocating, and it is not in terms

⁴⁰ Also, see Grose (1973) for an argument that Palestinians, having come to know Israel first hand through the occupation, “know that Israel cannot be eliminated militarily, nor is its existence and economy all bad for them” – thus coexistence is and will remain reality.

⁴¹ The hypocrisy is that because of their racism “they [the ‘great nations’] still continued to refuse to help homeless Jews from Hitler’s concentration camps to find a place in their rich and spacious lands; at the same time they were appealing on humanitarian principles for people to go and be squeezed into tiny, restless Palestine” despite acknowledging the injustice, impracticality and immense riskiness of it (Grollenberg 1980:48). Also see Keay (2003:356-7), who citing Hourani, says that “The West, with enormous undeveloped colonial territories at its disposal had no right to impose the Jewish problem on the Arab world”.

of a 'conflict' that she views the state of affairs; rather, it is the further deterioration of the Palestinians' situation that she is sanctioning (by encouraging international disinterest and non-obligation [2-4, 64-5]), and it is in terms of a self-inflicted plight that she envisages their circumstances (by implicitly and explicitly insisting that 'they have no one to blame but themselves' [64]). Her mindset is not at all incongruous with previous findings and could easily be construed to lean towards that projected by Massad (2007), who asserts:

The only thing Israel has asked for, and continues to ask for in order to end the state of war with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours, is that all recognise its right to be a racist state that discriminates by law against Palestinians and other Arabs and grants differential legal rights and privileges to its own Jewish citizens and to all other Jews anywhere.

According to pro-Palestinians, the 'reality' is that the non-resolution is entirely due to Israel being unprepared to negotiate a solution based on peace and justice in accordance with numerous UN resolutions, and in particular resolutions 194, 242 and 338, which confirm "the right of Palestinian refugees to return" and calls for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war (Grollenberg 1980:84, 87; Patel 2005:214; Slater 2001:176; La Guardia 2007:498).

Other Arab 'denials' alluded to by Stern include that of denying 'the rights of the Jews to return to their homeland.....with violence' [14] and of denying 'the Partition Plan' [17]. In both cases, her historical understanding may be considered flawed. Responding to accusations of this type, Watkins (1980:6) confirms that for taking up arms in *defence* of *their* land, "in any fair assessment, they [the indigenous Palestinians] could not be blamed", since "the decision [to partition their country] was taken against their interests, with out consulting them and it was of questionable legality". Furthermore, "the Jewish state was to get the most fertile parts of Palestine, and the Arab state would be economically viable only through close collaboration with it" (Grollenberg 1980:48). And any violence, Slater (2001:173) expounds, "was based not only on their insistence on 100 percent of their political rights, but also on their belief – which turned out to be correct – that the Zionist leadership would not be

satisfied with or abide by a compromise”;⁴² thus, “under a general umbrella of protection and encouragement from Ben-Gurion and other political leaders” (Slater 2001:175) the Israeli army and Israeli terrorist groups took up arms with the aim of *aggressively* seizing “the whole of Palestine for the new Israeli state” (Watkins 1980:6).⁴³ Hence ‘denial’ would more justifiably be attributed to Zionists for denying, with violence, Palestinians their political rights and their homeland, rather than vice versa.

As for the supposed (Muslim) Arab denial of the ‘Temple mount’ [38] and ancient ‘Jewish settlement’ [40], like the denial of ‘recognition’ claim, it is untenable. For Islamic traditions also state that Solomon completed the building of the ‘first temple’ that was begun by David and which was destroyed in 586BC by the King of Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar (Patel 2005:10-12). The difference is that Islamic traditions view it as Solomon’s reconstruction of the Al-Aqsa masjid originally built by Adam, then rebuilt by Abraham and Isaac⁴⁴ (Patel 2005:11).

And this necessary parenthesised specification of ‘Muslim’ denial, as opposed to just ‘Arab’ denial, raises an interesting point about Stern’s representation of social actors (van Leeuwen 1996:32-70). By contrasting ‘Arabs’ with ‘Jews’ she seems to be desisting from using religion to categorise non-Jews. It could be argued that this is because she is in denial of the strong religious heritage Christians and Muslims have in Palestine. And this denial on her part is necessitated by the fact that if Stern extended her own logic to others, Palestine should then, possibly, also be considered to be the ‘homeland’ of the world’s Christians and Muslims.⁴⁵ Furthermore, George Antonius (1983:450, in Grollenberg 1980:33) explains, “with the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possible [sic] seem to either Christians or Moslems [sic]⁴⁶ proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the

⁴² See Keay (2003:350-388) and Grollenberg (1980:39-42) for a more thorough account of the underlying causes of Arab violence at the time of the partition, which “inaugurated a train of bloodshed which has lasted to the present day”.

⁴³ See Finkelstein (2003) for an in depth exploration of this chapter of history.

⁴⁴ May peace be upon them all.

⁴⁵ Illogically, she acknowledges ‘the native Arabs in Palestine’ [9] in her comparison with ‘the native Jewish population’ [10], but then calls Palestine the ‘homeland’ [14] of the world’s Jews and ‘the land that was theirs’ [5].

⁴⁶ This spelling is “outdated” and corrupts the original Arabic meaning deriving from ‘peace’ to one deriving from ‘oppress’. ‘Muslim’ is “more faithful to the original” (La Guardia 2007: preface xviii).

Holy Land as a whole, [and that the Muslims,] because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be". Also, by specifically referring to Christian Palestinians/ Arabs, Stern would be making their 'ingroup' (see, e.g., Reisigl and Wodak 2001:56-9) solidarity with the primarily Christian British and American nations explicit. And this would be counterproductive because it is the British and Americans who supported the founding and development of Israel and, in the case of the latter, continue to unreservedly support Israel, without which Israel's difficulties would increase manifold (Finkelstein 2003). So categorizing non-Jewish social actors through their faith would be very problematic for Stern. Instead, by choosing to use 'worship' [19, 34] Stern gives non-Jews/ Arabs (be they Christian, Muslim or otherwise) a 'religion' of 'death' [19], 'darkness' [20], 'denial', and 'martyrdom and hatred' [34], which they elevate 'to the level of holiness' [64].

Another related point is that her general use of 'Arab(s)' appears to inconsistently shift between the specific (Palestinians) and the generic (all the Arabs in the wider region), although in the penultimate paragraph she does clearly split the two in the same sentence [83]. For example, 'Arab' in the title and the second line is likely to be generic, whereas in lines 9 and 10, it is specific. It is possibly due to a mind-set overlapping Sackett's (2005) that Stern chooses to do this until the end of the fourth paragraph. Sackett (2005) asserts that 'Palestinians' don't exist, but only 'Arabs', and similarly 'Israelis' don't exist, but only Jews.⁴⁷ By denying the existential assumption behind 'Palestinians',⁴⁸ any 'Arab's' claim to the specific area of land that was 'Palestine' is presumably invalidated, and by using only 'Jews' it is 'Greater Israel' that becomes their exclusive 'homeland' rather than the confines of the Israeli state within its pre 1967 borders, the so-called Green Line (Yiftachel 1998:9-10).⁴⁹ Thus Stern, in line nineteen, probably feeling that a possible, even likely, generic interpretation of 'Arabs' by readers is unacceptable for that particularly vehement

⁴⁷ Friedmann (1967), on the other hand, argues that: a 'Jewish people', now, "lives only in legend"; that "there is no Jewish nation. There is an Israeli nation"; and that "orthodox religion has no chance of shaping the inhabitants of Israel to any degree into a Jewish people".

⁴⁸ See Metzger, Orth and Sterzing (1983:208) for a discussion on how the non-conventional Israeli definition of 'Palestinian' affected the understanding of the 1978 Camp David agreements.

⁴⁹ See Wheatcorft (2004:129) for a discussion on how "changes in language mark a change of status" in relation to changes in terminology used to describe Muslims in Spain, and their eventual expulsion. If Sackett's stance were to be adopted, Israeli Arabs would probably cease to be citizens and warrant (further) expulsion/ ethnic cleansing.

assertion,⁵⁰ may have been emotionally forced to resort to ‘Palestinians’ [19]. The fifth paragraph sees Stern return to her shifting use of ‘Arab’ where using Palestinian would probably have been more appropriate [21, 23]; but, from the eighth paragraph onwards, where her accusations of denial rise to their crescendo, it would appear that no less than ‘Palestinian’ would suffice as the accused. Yet, though her greater grievance is with the Palestinians, her accusations are clearly not levelled at the Palestinians alone, but also at ‘Arab nations’ [33] and the entire ‘Arab world’ [50].

Stern’s view that the Palestinian culture of denial instigated the Intifada that followed the Camp David Summit [para. 9] is also rhetoric without substance. In her remarkably shallow diagnosis Stern “ignores history, the dynamics of the negotiations, and the relationship between the three parties” and thus the fact that Barak’s supposed ‘dangerous concessions’ [44] could not even be viewed “as an offer” by the Palestinians (Agha and Malley 2001).⁵¹ Furthermore, contrary to Stern’s view that peace was Barak’s ‘flawed’ [45] goal, Patel (2005:179-184) clarifies that peace was an impossible objective under Barak; and that the breakdown of the negotiations, which was “the immediate catalyst for the violence” (Mitchell *et al* 2001), was thus inevitable.

In further ‘evidence’ of her ‘Arab denial’ axiom, she incorrectly attributes the Holocaust denial of President Ahmedinijad (McDowall 2006), first, to the whole of Iran, then, to the ‘Arab world’ [50]. For, as Bishara (2006) elucidates in his well considered article *Ways of Denial*:

the majority of educated and informed Arab opinion has never denied the Holocaust or the existence of anti-Semitism in Europe. Rather, they have argued -- correctly -- that since this horror took place in Europe the Palestinians should not have to pay the price.

The (apparently) baseless accusation allows Stern to personalise the Jewish tragedy

⁵⁰ I.e.: ‘caused the Palestinians to raise their children to worship death and darkness’ [19].

⁵¹ Simplifying the matter somewhat, La Guardia (2007:495) notes how having given up “three-quarters of the former British mandate of Palestine” and recognised Israel helps explain “the infuriating Palestinian negotiation tactic of saying ‘No’ to everything at Camp David that was not a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza strip and East Jerusalem”. Keay (2003:474) also notes how the ‘offer’ “presumed neither parity of status with Israel nor economic independence nor territorial homogeneity... [but]... brought to mind only the helpless plight of South Africa’s ‘Bantustans’.”

(e.g. ‘the piles of human hair’ and ‘the eye glasses’ [51]) and even stress its recentness (the bones that still rise to the surface during heavy rains in Chelmo [53]). In doing so, she implicitly evokes and reinforces the popular sub-discourse of the Holocaust being “a justification for Jewish nationalism and Israel” (Wolf 2004:73). However, Baratz (2007) refutes its validity:

the Holocaust doesn’t grant Israel a right to exist. Using the Holocaust as an argument doesn’t work because it is intellectually weak, historically problematic, and conditional on a post-national world view (not infrequently lacking in self-awareness).

Similarly, Bishara (2006) asserts that “the Zionist movementhad set its sights on Palestine long before the Holocaust [and] Zionists only used the Holocaust to justify their national project in hindsight”. Stern’s use of this ‘moral’ legitimization therefore appears to confirm the validity and accuracy of Wolf’s (2004:74) observation that:

Any narrative that turned to the Holocaust to justify Israel was for most Arab supporters merely a coverup for Israeli injustice; and any argument that invoked the genocide and the Middle East other than to justify Israel was unacceptable for many Jews.

Inappropriate usage of emotive language to evoke sympathy is a strategy that Stern also exploits when she uses ‘After centuries of persecution and yearning for the land that was theirs’ [5]. In this non-finite temporal clause, ‘After centuries of persecution’ sweepingly overlooks the periods in which Jews flourished. For example, before AD 70, when Vespasian besieged Jerusalem, “Jews enjoyed various privileges, like dispensation from the obligations of emperor worship, exemption from military service and so on” (Grollenberg 1980:113). Also, Johnson notes that “the change from Roman-Byzantine to Islamic rule marked the beginning of the Jewish recovery” and that under the ruling Arab Umayyads, who “showed their benevolence to the Jews” (1979:172), “for the first time in 500 years since their expulsion from the Holy Land” seventy Jewish families started living there and they “were allowed to practice their religion freely” (Patel 2005: 29). These examples discredit her accusation of Arabs having a ‘policy’ of ‘hatred’. As Armstrong (2001:18) states, “anti-semitism is a

Christian vice”;⁵² hatred of the Jews became marked in the Muslim world only after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent loss of Arab Palestine (Brenner 1983:102).⁵³ In fact, Armstrong (2001:18-19) suggests that “Muslims were compelled to import anti-Jewish myths from Europe, and translate into Arabic such virulent and anti-semitic texts as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, because they had no such traditions of their own”.⁵⁴

Similarly, ‘yearning’ for centuries for ‘their’ land [5], as history attests, is also exploitative dramatization. For when the Jews were allowed to return from Babylonian captivity to Judah in 539 BC, “the great majority of those who had been deported preferred to remain in Babylon. Furthermore, at that time Judaens had already settled outside their land, in Damascus as merchants, and also in Egypt” (Grollenberg 1980:112). Grollenberg (1980:113) further states that following the Jews expulsion around AD 70 “nowhere did the thought of a ‘return’ live on”, and it was Theodor Herzl and the conditions of the nineteenth century that revived the idea “that the Jews form a people in the sense of a ‘nation’ and that therefore they had to have a land of their own, or get back to their old fatherland”. Indeed, “at the turn of the [nineteenth] century, this ‘positively defined identity’ of the Jews was in the process of dissolution” and the macabre truth is “that the greatest ‘redefiner’ of the Jewish identity has been Hitler”; “Auschwitz was the terrible cradle of the new Jewish consciousness and of the new Jewish nation” (Deutscher 1968:50).⁵⁵ Yet, even then, support for nationalistic Zionism faced much resistance from Jews (Deutscher 1968:119) and it took much propaganda, coercion and underhanded methods such as spreading anti-Jewish rhetoric and attacks to encourage Jews to move to Palestine (Grollenberg 1980:118-20).⁵⁶ In fact, in 1917, at the time of the fundamentally unjust (Watkins 1980:7)⁵⁷ Balfour Declaration, “barely one per cent of the Jews throughout the world had any sympathy with Zionism” (Grollenberg 1980:26). ‘Yearning’, then,

⁵² See Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 12-13) for a psychoanalytic analysis of ‘Christian anti-semitism’

⁵³ And even then, “Arabs initially differentiated between Jews and Zionists” (Porath, cited in Finkelstein 2003: xiii).

⁵⁴ Brenner (1983:79) makes the interesting point that it was Zionism that fostered anti-semitism, and had it not been for Zionism, Hitler, whose “first thoughts towards Jews were all benign,” may well not have taken the eventual stance he did.

⁵⁵ Also, see Brenner (1983) who argues that Zionists closely colluded with Nazis to bring about changes conducive to their Zionist aspirations.

⁵⁶ For a romanticized pro-Zionist version of events, see Engle (1943:187-189, in Goodman 1943:187-215)

⁵⁷ Also see Finkelstein (2003: introduction xiii-xv)

clearly serves to paint a different version of history/ depict a different ‘reality’.

Other lexical choices which are particularly poignant in reflecting Stern’s worldview include her use of the neutral ‘arriving’ [6] and ‘influx’ [10] - instead of ‘mass immigration’, or ‘colonial invasion’, perhaps. She conveys the favourability of the ‘influx’ through the positive assumed values (Fairclough 2003:173) associated with ‘to join and strengthen’ [6] and ‘benefited’ [9]. Other such words serving the same purpose include ‘rich’, ‘creative’, ‘dedicated’, and ‘bloom’. They all combine to provide a rosy contrast to Arab ‘violence’, ‘death’, ‘darkness’ and ‘denial’, and thus further highlight and emphasise the supposed ‘idiocy’ [18] of Arab actions. ‘Instead’ [14] (used to commence the fourth paragraph), and ‘not so’ [33] (in the seventh paragraph), are examples of ‘contrast’, and are also part of Stern’s strategy for positive self-presentation in a discourse which is primarily constructed of negative ‘other’-presentation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001:23).

‘An exchange of population’ [26] and ‘positive planning’ [33] are two of Stern’s more delectable (to a Zionist mind) examples of euphemisms; they serve to dilute the negative expressive values (Fairclough 2001:97-8) associated with formulating the event of the Israeli army driving into exile “three-quarters of a million Palestinians” and welcoming immigrant Jews to replace the expelled Arab workers and inhabit thousands of their “modern dwellings” (Grollenberg 1980:60-1). She chooses to use ‘displaced’ [26] to describe Palestinians being terrorized out of their homeland (Slater 2001:175), but ‘forced to flee’ [28] to describe the Jews leaving Arab lands, which actually contradicts her previous assertion that Jews were ‘yearning’ to ‘return’ [Stern: 5]. Its factuality is also contestable: Khodr (2000b) elucidates that “It is not true that Arab Jews were summarily expelled in 1948 to Israel”, but that “Zionists bribed, enticed and coerced many Arab Jews to leave [Arab countries], yet many still remain”.⁵⁸

Clearly, then, Stern’s lexical choices play a significant role in projecting her (untenable) assumptions and naturalizing them throughout the text. This also helps deflect interrogation of her ideology (Kelly 2000).

⁵⁸ Grollenberg (1980: 119) speaks of the tragedy for Arab Jews that for the sake of building Israel as quickly as possible, “virtually the whole of Jewish life in the Islamic world has been sacrificed”.

We can briefly summarise Stern's article in terms of Fairclough's (1989:112) relational, experiential and expressive functions. On a relational level (which encodes and enacts social relationships in the text) she implicitly proposes isolating the Palestinians in their plight. Israel, America, and Europe, though implicitly otherwise powerful and dominant social actors, are deemed powerless to affect change in this case. On an experiential level (which represents 'reality' in the text) she asserts that the cause of the conflict and its continued non-resolution is due entirely to the Arab/Palestinian psyche and culture of death and denial. On an expressive level (which evaluates that 'reality'), Stern exonerates all social actors of any blame or responsibility - except for the Arabs, who she portrays as their own enemies. Rather than seeking a solution to the 'conflict', she implicitly proposes continuing the degeneration of the Palestinians.

Conclusion

The qualitative analysis has revealed that Stern's 'general truth' which was devised to reflect Palestinian 'reality', and its effect on the status quo⁵⁹ - 'you cannot make peace with those whom you deny' [60] - would perhaps better apply to Israelis, since denial seems to be more their trait. However, the problem with applying this 'truth' to pro-Israelis would be the underlying assumption that they want peace, which, according to the quantitative findings of this thesis, in particular, may not be the case. Essentially the research corroborates Slater's (2001:172) observation that:

The Israeli narrative significantly distorts and oversimplifies the historical reality. The unwillingness of most Israelis to reassess their mythology is the fundamental reason for the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Thus the Revisionist Israeli 'new history', as documented by Israeli academicians and journalists in the past twenty years (see Slater 2001:172; Pilger 2004), probably provides the most accurate historical version of the 'conflict'.

In terms of a solution, if the apparently dominant pro-Israeli discourse, as unravelled by this thesis, can be confuted in the eyes of pro-Israelis, there will be greater room for the cautious and stipulative optimism voiced by Hareven (2002). For, as research on Jewish-Arab encounters by the likes of Maoz (2000) and Al Haj (2002) show, despite Israelis only ever having been "educated according to a monolithic version of history that presented the Jewish side as almost exclusively in the right" (Maoz 2000), when presented to them, they "react[ed] favourably to Arab accounts and explanations regarding their position in the conflict". This was so much so that the Jewish teachers in the encounters felt that

the knowledge gained about "peace plans" — a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip with a corridor through Beersheba — the Arab Law of Return, comprehensive equality in all domains, a state governed binationally, the removal of Jewish settlers from the territories and their replacement with refugees from the Arab countries [...all reflected...] legitimate and acceptable views.

(Maoz 2000)

⁵⁹ It is unlikely that Palestinians are her intended audience and that this is an advice to instigate change.

Thus, very extensive and open discussions between Palestinians and Israelis clearly have the potential to change perceptions and foster empathy. If this spirit of understanding could be transposed to recognising Israel and the Occupied Territories as a ‘one-state reality’ (Akhtar 2005; Various undersigned 2007; Macintyre 2007), and acknowledging its implications, ‘greater Israel’ could then be developed into “an egalitarian bi-national state that has an egalitarian attitude toward citizenship and citizens” (Ghanem 2002); thus peace and justice could finally be realised for people of all faiths in the region. Such a solution is perfectly in keeping with Kelman’s (1999:582-3) view that *equal-status* contact in pursuit of common goals is absolutely fundamental in “a long-term resolution of the conflict [which] requires a development of a transcendent identity for the two peoples that does not threaten the particularistic identity of each”.

The problem, as discussed by Maoz (2000), seems to be the ‘legitimate’ and ‘coercive’ power⁶⁰ used by the Jewish authorities to stifle discussion on the ‘conflict’, because of the “sense of threat from the presentation of the Palestinian version and the fear of its impact”. Instead, they promoted less political discussion which was “consistent with the status quo of Jewish dominance” (Maoz 2002). Macintyre (2008) also discusses how very powerful Jewish lobbying groups such as AIPAC – even though they are not necessarily the most representative⁶¹ - monopolise the language of the discourse and present the ‘conflict’ in their hardline zero sum perspective, which stifles any discussion that may be critical of Israel. Macintyre (2008) elaborates how perverse this practice is for the likes of AIPAC since this stance “may imperil Israel’s very existence as a Jewish state”. This, of course, brings us full circle to (whilst corroborating) the discussion in my introduction on forces influencing media bias.

From the Israeli-Jewish population, though, less than fifty percent are ‘ideological hawks’ who remain “adamantly opposed to withdrawal under any conditions” (Slater 1991:413). Also, many Diaspora Jews “want an Israel that makes them feel good, that reflects their liberal outlook and values” (Marucs 1990:548). Thus the views which emerged in this paper probably are not fully representative. However, the analysis has,

⁶⁰ See Locher (2004) and Thornborrow (2002) for discussions on ‘power’ and its enactment.

⁶¹ For example, see Slater (1991:413) for the mixed opinions in Israel on resolving the ‘conflict’.

I feel, admirably revealed and probed into some of the critical “contradictions between Zionist ideology and growing realities” (McDowall 1993:643), of which McDowall (1993) provides a brilliant extended synopsis. In his epilogue, La Guardia’s (2007:495) harsh synopsis provides an insightful and succinct picture of the ingredients and possibilities for peace and “that ill-defined quality of ‘justice’”.

When taking the quantitative analysis into account as well, what has come through most strongly from this research is that the ‘conflict’ boils down to a matter of perspective and differing ‘realities’. Both analyses, individually and combined, show how the same actions can be expressed through “ideologically different formulations” (Fairclough (2001:97), and how, to create these ‘realities’, both parties use virtually the same techniques.

The quantitative and qualitative techniques combined very well to provide a more informed overall analysis than if either one had been employed in isolation. The CL analysis was very useful “at identifying large-scale trends as well as minority cases” and provided some unique insights into worldviews (Gabrielatos and Baker forthcoming 2008:30). However, the drawback with CL analysis tends to be that it “does not usually take into account the social, political, historical and cultural context of the data” (Gabrielatos and Baker forthcoming 2008:30); and since this is the realm of CDA, the marriage of the two disciplines was ideal. The CL analysis informed the CDA analysis from a more empirical and objective perspective, highlighting the most statistically significant themes in the discourse to explore further; as such it played an instrumental but lesser role in the overall investigation

Further study

One of the major drawbacks of the CL analysis was that the two corpora were only 19,000 words each. Furthermore, rather than being objectively collated,⁶² the two corpora were somewhat arbitrarily and subjectively compiled (see Pandor 2008). In light of these shortcomings, the findings I have reported here can only be considered to be indicative at best. Therefore, future quantitative studies on the topic should be conducted after building much larger, balanced (in terms of viewpoints captured), and objectively compiled corpora. Undertaking a broader (and potentially more objective) study such as this would be a useful way of checking the validity of my findings. What I also found interesting about the articles in the corpora was that they were all written from 1997 onwards, and more than 50% of the articles were published in 2007 (Pandor 2008). Hence they should reflect the most current views. Future studies, however, could collate articles diachronically (see, e.g., Gabrielatos and Baker forthcoming 2008) and see if the language of the discourse and worldviews have changed over time. My thesis suggests that the Israeli discourse has not changed much, whereas the Palestinian one has shifted from non-recognition of Israel to a 'two-state' solution, with voices for recognising the 'one-state' 'reality' emerging now. It would be interesting to see how true this is.

In future studies the CDA analysis should also be much broader and explore selected texts from many more angles to make for a more complete analysis.⁶³ Such an analysis could also be conducted by viewing Israelis as the 'oppressed' and seek to determine to what extent the Palestinians can justifiably be viewed as the 'oppressors'.

⁶² See, for example, Gabrielatos & Baker (forthcoming 2008) who used Lexis Nexis (an online interface of newspapers and periodicals) with a specific search query to collect their data (5).

⁶³ Admittedly though, "there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of a text" (Fairclough 2003:14)

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Appendix A

TABLE OF ARTICLES USED IN BOTH CORPORA.

<i>ARTICLE'S KEY FOCUS</i>	<i>PRO-PALESTINIAN</i>	<i>PRO-ISRAELI</i>
After the 1967 war	'40 Years of Occupation' (2007). <i>Friends of Al-Aqsa</i> , 8 June. (760) ⁶⁴	Freedland (2007). 'The six-day war is not over: Today, it brings the spectre of al-Qaida in Gaza', <i>The Guardian</i> , 23 May. (1312)
Apartheid	Ben-dor (2007). 'Israeli Apartheid is the Core of the Crisis', <i>Counterpunch</i> , 23/24 June. (875)	Falkson (2007). 'An Apartheid State or the Greatest Lie Ever Told?', <i>Emet News Service</i> , 10 March. (1361)
Culture of denial	Hanania (2006). 'History of recognizing Palestinian rights', <i>Ynet News</i> , 25 August. (702)	Stern (2007). 'Arab Culture of Denial', <i>Israeli Insider</i> , 18 February. (934)
Cause of global terror	Pilger (2004). 'The Unmentionable Source of Terrorism', <i>New Statesman</i> , 20 March. (1140)	Gordon (2004). 'The Real "Root Cause" of Global Terror', <i>The Jerusalem Post</i> , 13 September. (1059)
Founding of Israel	Patel (1997). 'The British Promise of Palestine', <i>Riyadhul Jannah</i> , vol. 2, no. 12. (748) Akhtar (2005). 'Israel was created by wiping out Palestine', <i>Friends of Al-Aqsa</i> , 15 October. (649) Khodr (2000a). 'America and Israel: You and me against the World', <i>Media Monitors</i>	Alderman (2007). 'Facts: Arabs persecuted Jews', <i>The Jewish Chronicle</i> , 23 November. (753) Farrah (2002). 'The Jews took no one's land', <i>Our Jerusalem</i> , 19 November. (778) Plaut (2006). 'Terrorism without "Occupation"', <i>Our Jerusalem</i> , 17 May.

⁶⁴ The figures in the brackets at the end show the number of words in each article.

	<i>Network</i> , 07 December. (2241)	(1102) ⁶⁵
Looking to the future	White (2007). ‘The one-state reality’, <i>The Electronic Intifada</i> , 13 November. (861) Various Undersigned (2007). ‘The One State Declaration’, <i>Friends of Al-Aqsa</i> , 1 December. (105) ⁶⁶	Pfeffer (2007). ‘Debate rages on World Jewry’s role in peace concessions’, <i>Haaretz</i> , 29 November. (514) Uni (2007). ‘UK radical left sees one-state solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, <i>Haaretz</i> , 21 November. (689)
Miscellaneous (Pro-Palestinian: Strangling Gaza and Hamas. Pro-Israeli: Israel-Diaspora relations)	Hari (2007b). ‘Stop this strategy of strangulation’, <i>The Independent</i> , 8 November. (1159)	Lipshiz (2007). ‘Report: Israel-Diaspora relations sink to a new low’, <i>Haaretz</i> , 30 November. (975)
Peace?	Agha & Malley (2007). ‘The chance of a deal is now the object of futile bartering’, <i>The Guardian</i> , 18 May. (1065) Hari (2007a). ‘Israel must negotiate with	Gaffrey, Jr. (2007). ‘Gang rape in Annapolis’, <i>Israeli Insider</i> , 28 November. (891) Bar’el (2007). ‘One PA – with Hamas’, <i>Haaretz</i> , 2 December. (666)

⁶⁵ Minus 79 words elided to fit the 1900 corpus word count. The 79 words were from the last line of the ninth paragraph and the full tenth paragraph. The elided words are as follows: “And the story of what became of one of them can help us understand the entire Middle East conflict.

A few days ago, a fascinating story related to that era was published for the first time by the dovish Israeli journalist (and film-maker) Yehuda Litani, in *Yediot Ahronot*, Israel’s leading daily, on May 4, 2006. Litani is well known for his film about the conflict in Ireland, as well as films sympathetic to the mundane problems of “Palestinian” Arabs.”

⁶⁶ The first 105 words of ‘The One State Declaration’ has been taken to complete the 19,000 word corpus size. These 105 lines form the final two paragraphs of the corpus. The full final sentence which is cut off at ‘denying’ is as follows: “It is predicated on the unjust premise that peace can be achieved by granting limited national rights to Palestinians living in the areas occupied in 1967, while denying [the rights of Palestinians inside the 1948 borders and in the Diaspora].”

	<p>Hamas', <i>The Independent</i>, 18 June. (1146)</p> <p>Various Rights Organizations (2007). 'Uphold International Law at Annapolis', <i>The Electronic Intifada</i>, 26 November. (1431)</p>	<p>Heifetz (2007). ' Hamas has not delivered', <i>The Guardian</i>, 20 February. (632)</p>
Reality?	<p>Akhtar (2004). 'The Impact of Zionism on Jewish, Christian and Muslim Relations', <i>Palestine Times</i>, 15 March. (1337)</p> <p>Khodr (2000b). 'Response to Rabbi Joel M. Finkelstein', <i>Media Monitors Network</i>, 12 December. (1255)</p>	<p>Weiss (2007). 'Facts in the air', <i>Haaretz</i>, 02 December. (889)</p> <p>Ettinger (2004). 'Israeli Occupied Territory or Land of Israel', <i>Our Jerusalem</i>, 12 November. (395)</p>
Religion's role	<p>Abdullah (2001).⁶⁷ 'The right of return in the [sic] Zionist political discourse', <i>Al Aqsa Journal</i>, vol. 4, no. 1. (2898)</p>	<p>Eidelberg (2005). 'Beyond Politics', <i>Emet News Service</i>, 3 June. (710)</p> <p>Sackett (2005). "'Palestinians Don't Exist...but neither do "Israelis"', <i>Israeli Insider</i>, 15 May. (859)</p>
Right of Return	<p>Abdullah (2001). 'The right of return in the [sic] Zionist political discourse', <i>Al Aqsa Journal</i>, vol. 4, no. 1. (2898)</p>	<p>Auster (2004). 'How Strong is the Arab Claim to Palestine', <i>Emet News Service</i>, 30 August. (1881)</p>
Since the founding...	<p>Jassat (2007). '60 years later the world remains a bystander', <i>The Palestinian Times</i>, 5 October. (628)</p>	<p>'The Sequel to Palestinian Nakba Day' (2001). <i>Debkafile</i>, 16 May. (1043)</p> <p>Glick (2007). 'Is November 29 a day to remember?', <i>The Jerusalem Post</i>, 26 November. (1557)</p>

⁶⁷ I have used the same article under the 'Right of Return category'. However, it only occurs once in the corpus.

Appendix B

UCREL Semantic Annotation System (USAS) Semantic Tagset

A GENERAL & ABSTRACT TERMS		I MONEY & COMMERCE		S1.1.1 General	
A1	General	I1	Money generally	S1.1.2	Reciprocity
A1.1.1	General actions, making etc.	I1.1	Money: Affluence	S1.1.3	Participation
A1.1.2	Damaging and destroying	I1.2	Money: Debts	S1.1.4	Deserve etc.
A1.2	Suitability	I1.3	Money: Price	S1.2	Personality traits
A1.3	Caution	I2	Business	S1.2.1	Approachability and Friendliness
A1.4	Chance, luck	I2.1	Business: Generally	S1.2.2	Avarice
A1.5	Use	I2.2	Business: Selling	S1.2.3	Egoism
A1.5.1	Using	I3	Work and employment	S1.2.4	Politeness
A1.5.2	Usefulness	I3.1	Work and employment Generally	S1.2.5	Toughness; strong/ weak
A1.6	Physical/ mental	I3.2	Work and employment Professionalism	S1.2.6	Sensible
A1.7	Constraint	I4	Industry	S2	People
A1.8	Inclusion/Exclusion	K ENTERTAINMENT, SPORTS & GAMES		S2.1	People: Female
A1.9	Avoiding	K1	Entertainment generally	S2.2	People: Male
A2	Affect	K2	Music and related activities	S3	Relationship
A2.1	Affect: Modify, change	K3	Recorded sound etc.	S3.1	Relationship: General
A2.2	Affect Cause/Connected	K4	Drama, the theatre & show business	S3.2	Relationship: Intimate/sexual
A3	Being	K5	Sports and games generally	S4	Kin
A4	Classification	K5.1	Sports	S5	Groups and affiliation
A4.1	Generally kinds, groups, examples	K5.2	Games	S6	Obligation and necessity
A4.2	Particular/general; detail	K6	Children's games and toys	S7	Power relationship
A5	Evaluation	L LIFE & LIVING THINGS		S7.1	Power, organizing
A5.1	Evaluation: Good/bad	L1	Life and living things	S7.2	Respect
A5.2	Evaluation: True/ false	L2	Living creatures generally	S7.3	Competition
A5.3	Evaluation: Accuracy	L3	Plants	S7.4	Permission
A5.4	Evaluation: Authenticity	M MOVEMENT, LOCATION, TRAVEL & TRANSPORT		S8	Helping/ hindering
A6	Comparing	M1	Moving, coming and going	S9	Religion and the supernatural
A6.1	Comparing: Similar/different	M2	Putting, taking, pulling, pushing, transporting &c.	T TIME	
A6.2	Comparing: Usual/unusual	M3	Movement/transportation: land	T1	Time
A6.3	Comparing: Variety	M4	Movement/transportation: water	TU	Time: General
A7	Definite (+ modals)	M5	Movement/transportation: air	T1.1.1	Time: General: Past
A8	Seem	M6	Location and direction	T1.1.2	Time: General: Present; simultaneous
A9	Getting and giving; possession	M7	Places	T1.1.3	Time: General: Future
A10	Open/closed; Hidden/ Hidden:	M8	Remaining/stationary	T1.2	Time: Momentary
A11	Importance	N NUMBERS & MEASUREMENT		T1.3	Time: Period
		N1	Numbers	T2	Time: Beginning and ending
A11.1	Importance: Important	N2	Mathematics	T3	Time: Old, new and young; age
A11.2	Importance: Noticeability	N3	Measurement	T4	Time: Early/late
A12	Easy/difficult	N3.1	Measurement: General	W THE WORLD & OUR ENVIRONMENT	
A13	Degree	N3.2	Measurement: Size	W1	The universe
A13.1	Degree: Non-specific	N3.3	Measurement Distance	W2	Light
A13.2	Degree: Maximizers	N3.4	Measurement Volume	W3	Geographical terms
A13.3	Degree: Boosters	N3.5	Measurement Weight	W4	Weather
A13.4	Degree: Approximators	N3.6	Measurement: Area	W5	Green issues

A13.5	Degree: Compromisers	N3.7	Measurement: Length & height	X PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS, STATES & PROCESSES
A13.6	Degree: Diminishers	N3.8	Measurement: Speed	X1 General
A13.7	Degree: Minimizers	N4	Linear order	X2 Mental actions and processes
A14	Exclusivizers/ particularizers	N5	Quantities	X2.1 Thought, belief
A15	Safety/Danger	N5.1	Entirety; maximum	X2.2 Knowledge
B THE BODY & THE INDIVIDUAL		N5.2	Exceeding; waste	X2.3 Learn
B1	Anatomy and physiology	N6	Frequency etc.	X2.4 Investigate, examine, test search
B2	Health and disease	O SUBSTANCES, MATERIALS, OBJECTS & EQUIPMENT		X2.5 Understand
B3	Medicines and medical treatment	O1	Substances and materials generally	X2.6 Expect
B4	Cleaning and personal care	O1.1	Substances and materials generally: Solid	X3 Sensory
B5	Clothes and personal belongings	O1.2	Substances and materials generally: Liquid	X3.1 Sensory: Taste
CARTS & CRAFTS		O1.3	Substances and materials generally: Gas	X3.2 Sensory: Sound
C1	Arts and crafts	O2	Objects generally	X3.3 Sensory: Touch
E EMOTIONAL ACTIONS, STATES & PROCESSES		O3	Electricity and electrical equipment	X3.4 Sensory: Sight
E1	General	O4	Physical attributes	X3.5 Sensory: Smell
E2	Liking	O4.1	General appearance and physical properties	X4 Mental object
E3	Calm/ Violent/ Angry	O4.2	Judgement of appearance (pretty etc.)	X4.1 Mental object: Conceptual object
E4	Happy/sad	O4.3	Colour and colour patterns	X4.2 Mental object Means, method
E4.1	Happy/sad: Happy	O4.4	Shape	X5 Attention
E4.2	Happy/sad: Contentment	O4.5	Texture	X5.1 Attention
E5	Fear/bravery/shock	O4.6	Temperature	X5.2 Interest/ boredom/ excited/ energetic
E6	Worry, concern, confident	P EDUCATION		X6 Deciding
F FOOD & FARMING		P1	Education in general	X7 Wanting; planning; choosing
F1	Food	Q LINGUISTIC ACTIONS, STATES & PROCESSES		X8 Trying
F2	Drinks	Q1	Communication	X9 Ability
F3	Cigarettes and drugs	Q1.1	Communication in general	X9.1 Ability: Ability, intelligence
F4	Farming & Horticulture	Q1.2	Paper documents and writing	X9.2 Ability: Success and failure
G GOVT. & THE PUBLIC DOMAIN		Q1.3	Telecommunications	Y SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
G1	Government, Politics & elections	Q2	Speech acts	Y1 Science and technology in general
G1.1	Government etc.	Q2.1	Speech etc: Communicative	Y2 Information technology and computing
G1.2	Politics	Q2.2	Speech acts	Z NAMES & GRAMMATICAL WORDS
G2	Crime, law and order	Q3	Language, speech and grammar	Z0 Unmatched proper noun
G2.1	Crime, law and order: Law & order	Q4	The Media	Z1 Personal names
G2.2	General ethics	Q4.1	The Media: Books	Z2 Geographical names
G3	Warfare, defence and the army; Weapons	Q4.2	The Media: Newspapers etc.	Z3 Other proper names
H ARCHITECTURE, BUILDINGS, HOUSES & THE HOME		Q4.3	The Media: TV, Radio & Cinema	Z4 Discourse Bin
H1	Architecture, kinds of houses & buildings	S SOCIAL ACTIONS, STATES & PROCESSES		Z5 Grammatical bin
H2	Parts of buildings	S1	Social actions, states & processes	Z6 Negative
H3	Areas around or near houses	S1.1	Social actions, states & processes	Z7 If
H4	Residence			Z8 Pronouns etc.
H5	Furniture and household fittings			Z9 Trash can
				Z99 Unmatched

Appendix C

COMPLETE TABLE COMPARING CROSS-CORPORA-CATEGORIES SHARED SEMTAGS (Pandor 2008)
(underlined and italicized = identical SEMTAG; same colour = partially shared SEMTAG).

PvI	IvP	CONTAGs	
SEMTAGS with LL 6.63 or above (descending order)		probable SEMTAGs that conflate to match my CATEGORIES	
<u>A6.2+</u> (Comparing: usual)	<u>G1.1</u> (Government)	<u>G1.2</u> , <u>S5+</u> , <u>O4.3</u>	APARTHEID
N5.1 + (Entire: maximum)	Z99 (Unmatched)	A2.2, <u>G2.1-</u>	CAUSE (of global terror)
<u>G1.2</u> (Politics)	Y1 (Science and technology in general)	<u>A5.2-</u> , <u>Z6</u> , <u>A5.3-</u> , Q2.2	culture of DENIAL
<u>H4</u> (Residence)	<u>O4.3</u> (Colour and colour patterns)	<u>S5+</u> S3.1	Israel-DIASPORA REALTIONS
X2.2- (No knowledge)	<u>A5.2+</u> (Evaluation: true)	T1.1.3, S5-, <u>A9-</u> , <u>A6.2+</u> , <u>S7.1+</u> , E3+	looking to the FUTURE: PEACE?
N5 + (Quantities: many/ much)	T3 ++ (Time: Old; grown-up)		
Q1.3 (Telecommunications)	<u>G2.1-</u> (Crime)		
<u>S7.4</u> (Permission)	N3.7 Measurement: length and height)	<u>H1</u> , <u>T1.3</u> , <u>S7.1+</u> , <u>B4</u> , T2+	FOUNDING of Israel Since the FOUNDING
<u>B4</u> (Cleaning and personal care)	<u>S5+</u> (Belonging to a group)	<u>A5.2+</u> <u>A5.4+</u> , A3+ S9	REALITY? RELIGION's role
O1.2 (Substances and materials: liquid)	<u>S7.1+</u> (In power)	M1, M7, <u>A5.3+</u> , <u>H4</u> , <u>S7.4+</u>	RIGHT of RETURN
		<u>G3</u> T1.1.1, T1.1.2	after the 1967 WAR
	X3 (Sensory)	<u>G2.2-</u> , <u>G2.1-</u> , <u>S7.4</u>	STRANGULATING Gaza &

	X9.2 + (Success)		Hamas
SEMTAGS with LL between 3.84 and 6.63		NOTE: I have merged the categories of ‘looking to the future’ and ‘peace?’ since conceptually they deal with similar ideas. For a similar reason ‘founding of Israel’ and ‘since the founding’ have been merged. Because trying to map ‘miscellaneous’ as a category would have been utterly futile, I have entered the individual themes of the articles.	
O4.1 (General appearance and physical activities)	A1.3.1 (Degree: non-specific)		
K2 (Music and related activities)	N1 (Numbers)		
W1 (The Universe)	A13.3 (Degree: boosters)		
A3 (Being)	Z3 (Other proper names)		
F1 (Food)	X5.2- (Uninterested/ bored/ unenergetic)		
I3.1 (Work and employment: generally)	<u>Z6</u> (Negative)		
X5.1- (Inattentive)	<u>T1.3</u> (Time: period)		
E6+ (Confident)	P1 (Education in general)		
A5.4- (Evaluation: unauthentic)	I1.1 (Money and pay)		
A7- (Unlikely)	N3.2 (Measurement: size)		
<u>H1</u> (Architecture, houses and buildings)	S9- (Non-religious)		
	N6+ (Frequent)		
<u>A9-</u> (Giving)			
A1.8+ (Inclusion)			
X4.1 (Conceptual object)			
S8+ (Helping)			
G3- (Anti-war)			
S7.2+ (Respected)			
I4 (Industry)			
G2.1 (Law and order)			

Y2	(Information technology		
	and computing)		
I1.3-	(Cheap)		

Appendix D

CONCORDANCE OF 'STATE' (in G1.1, IvP: **bold** = references to the state of Israel, and *italics* to the Palestinian 'state')
Plum: positive words; **Blue**: threat to Israel/ security; **Green**: apartheid; **Pink**: one-state/ two-state solution

1	Day and everything about the modern	state	of Israel	are important because they
2	Plan which would have given them a	state		in 1947 , that idiocy plunged the re
3	f thousands of Jews came to the new	state		and were absorbed . It was a painful
4	not only deny the existence of the	state	of Israel	by refusing to give it " recognition"
5	nk of the territory which the young	state	of Israel	- then just 19 years old -
6	political and moral disaster for the	state		he had founded and loved . The morta
7	tion of being a Jewish , democratic	state		, it could not rule over a Palestini
8	and Gaza or you remain a democratic	state		with a Jewish majority : you ca n't
9	eady resembles : a lawless , failed	state	, a Somalia on Israel 's southern bo	(Gaza)
10	r that prior to the founding of the	state	of Israel	in 1948 , the name " Pales
11	Arabs were unable to coexist in one	state		, there had to be two states . At th
12	ntrated near the coast , the Jewish	state		had to start at the coast and go som
13	d have stopped , and where the Arab	state		should have begun , was a practical
14	partition plan , which gave them a	state		with squiggly , indefensible borders
15	out the Jews and destroy the Jewish	state		, they accepted the verdict of arms
16	ntic ; who in 1947 rejected an Arab	state		in Palestine alongside a Jewish stat
17	ate in Palestine alongside a Jewish	state		and sought to obliterate the nascent
18	ht to obliterate the nascent Jewish	state		; who never called for a distinct Pa
19	led for a distinct Palestinian Arab	state		until the creation of the terrorist PLO
20	een years after the founding of the	state	of Israel	; and who to this moment c
21	dvanced by the creation of the Arab	state		they demand . The Arab claim to sove
22	do not include a recognition of the	state	of Israel	Yesterday 's meeting betwe
23	ement that called for a Palestinian	state		within the 1967 borders . I replied
24	itly to accept the existence ⁶⁸ of the	state	of Israel	, let alone to mention the
25	lar Zionists who founded the modern	State	of Israel	thought they could dispens
26	lar , i.e. , flawed founding of the	State		. Occurring in the midst of this dec
27	, incidentally , of a 'Palestinian'	state		instead of Israel , which did not ye
28	ies no one was talking about such a	state		. Even after Israel captured the Wes
29	, nobody advocated a 'Palestinian'	state		in those territories ; the world exp

⁶⁸ 'Mish'al was still not able to bring himself explicitly to accept the existence of the state of Israel.'

30	Forty years later , a 'Palestinian'	state	in every inch of the West Bank and G	
31	matic recognition and backing for a	state	instead of declaring them beyond the	
32	' responded to Israel 's offer of a	state	in more than 90% of the territories	
33	e the winning tactic . An Apartheid	State	or the Greatest Lie Ever Told ? It t	
34	apartheid label to the democratic Jewish State	of Israel	. For the boot is truly on	
35	udge whether Israel is an apartheid	state	as alleged by Palestinians in partic	
36	d non-Jewish citizens of the Jewish	State	, have equal rights . While no Black	
37	sted in Israel 's Jewish democratic	State	. * 4 . There was free education for	
38	t in all Magen David Ambulances and	State	hospitals . * 9 . Non-Europeans " co	
39	th Africans received about half the	State	pension allocated to whites . They w	(South Africa)
40	apartheid label to the democratic Jewish State	of Israel	. For the boot is truly on ⁶⁹	
41	ies of the Middle East , the Jewish	State	neither believes in nor does it prac ⁷⁰	
42	nnapolis It is fitting Secretary of	State	Condoleezza Rice chose the U.S. Nava	(America)
43	tendees have in mind for the Jewish	State	-- namely , its dismemberment and ul	
44	defense and security of the Jewish	State	. Hard experience in southern Lebano	
45	ow the capital of a new Palestinian	state	to be established in the section of	
46	phically into the end of the Jewish	State	. By virtue of its sponsorship of th	
47	orge Bush 's policies on the Jewish	State	and its enemies . Today , Palestinia	
48	security and integrity as a Jewish	state	in the hope of rescuing his failed p	
49	n Mandate Palestine) into a Jewish	state	and an Arab state , with Greater Jer	
50	e) into a Jewish state and an Arab	state	, with Greater Jerusalem under inter	
51	c decision to re-establish a Jewish	state	in Palestine was taken on November 2	
52	ntries to the re-established Jewish	state	. These are indeed the forgotten ref	
53	d as members of the Jewish minority	state	of Palestine ; their bank accounts w	
54	the war launched against the Jewish	state	by five Arab nations - drove home th	
55	the creation in 1948 of the Jewish	state	was a Day of Nakba (catastrophe) .	
56	had never been an Arab Palestinian	state	, and had not even been under any fo	
57	Jewish mini-state and a large Arab	state	, both to be carved out of Western P	
58	,000 or so square □ubstitute of the	state	he seeks to receive from Israel , wh	
59	Gaza , an inseparable part of this	state	, is currently ruled by a rival - in	
60	is our moral justification for the	State	[of Israel] , and there	
61	involvement from the Diaspora , the	state	should pass a law - possibly a basic	

⁶⁹ This line is not an accidental repetition of concordance line 35, but line 35 begins the article, and this line is towards the end. Both concordance lines are followed by different subsequent sentences.

⁷⁰ 'Unlike the Judenrein Arab countries of the Middle East , the Jewish State neither believes in nor does it practice major nor minor racial apartheid.'

62	migration , advocates forming a new	state	authority headed by six Israeli repr	
63	y , which would be sponsored by the	state	, would completely replace the Jewish	
64	s on Israel 's identity as a Jewish	state	, first and foremost , would likely	
65	odels for the formation of a single	state	ranging from the Mediterranean to th	(combined, future)
66	emnations of Israel as an apartheid	state	by churches , and the recent academi	
67	ed establishing either a binational	state	or a " state of all its citizens " ,	(combined, future)
68	ng either a binational state or a "	state	of all its citizens " , or a secular	(combined, future)
69	nd Israelis in the would-be unified	state	, relying on historic precedents lik	(combined, future)
70	nce was organized by the London One	State	Group an association of about a doze	(combined, future)
71	onialist power " and " an apartheid	state	. " In the small conference hall , Z	
72	stinian Authority in his proposed "	state	of all its citizens , " Eshpar said	(combined, future)
73	ion and the existence of the Jewish	state	, " said Lorna Fitzsimons , CEO of t	
74	rtitioned between a Jewish and Arab	state	. What the confluence of events serv	(both, past)
75	national legal basis for the Jewish	state	was the 1922 League of Nations Manda	
77	area earmarked as the future Jewish	state	. Indeed , if anything , resolution	
78	oster the establishment of a Jewish	state	which would eventually replace the B	
79	y of the land slated for the Jewish	state	. Moreover , they took all possible	
80	prevent the Jews from establishing a	state	on the remainder of the land . They	
81	be too small to sustain a sovereign	state	. It was due to the British failure	
82	Jewish people from establishing their	state	that the UN partition plan was broug	
83	is , far from establishing a Jewish	state	, 181 simply accepted an already exi	
84	Jews had already established their	state	in 1947 . It would have existed even	
85	olitical warfare against the Jewish	state	. Since the Iranian nuclear weapons	
86	as Israelis and condemn the Jewish	state	to their faces , and who view a lega	
87	hments in building and securing the	state	, Israels supporters will continue t	
88	sengaging the Negev from the Jewish	State	. Fact : Kfar Darom was established	
89	far Darom be uprooted by the Jewish	State	? Fact : Gaza and Tiberias □ubstitute	
90	o refugees by the Israelis . Let me	state	this plainly and clearly : The Jews	(verb: express)
91	that is the ongoing battle over the	state	of Middle Eastern studies at univers	(i.e.: condition)

(Pandor 2008)

Appendix E

CONCORDANCE OF 'APARTHEID' (in G1.2, Pvl)

1	nians in pursuit of the Zionist dream of an	apartheid	state . The author David Hirst describes the
2	s only to Jews . Thus is by a definition an	Apartheid	state that discriminates against non-Jews in
3	hat Israel 's policy included elements of "	apartheid	" and that this was bad for the future of a
4	nians , secluded behind the American funded	apartheid	wall and cut up into portions revealing Isra
5	no mercy . " (Deuteronomy 7:1-3) Israeli	Apartheid	is the Core of the Crisis It is unethical to
6	ers refer to the post-1967 occupation as an	apartheid	regime . There are good reasons for such com
7	gader hafrada " . Like the Afrikaans word "	apartheid	" , the Hebrew word " hafrada " means " sepa
8	hose villages from their farmland . But the	apartheid	label should not be restricted to the post-1
10	ation . There is a more fundamental form of	apartheid	, of which the occupation is but a manifesta
11	ich the occupation is but a manifestation .	Apartheid	in historic Palestine originated , and has p
12	take in the political community . It was an	apartheid	mentality that nourished the desire of estab
13	, in 1948 , of 750000 indigenous people was	apartheid	practice par excellence . It is apartheid wh
14	s apartheid practice par excellence . It is	apartheid	which prevents the expelled and their descen
15	and their descendants from returning : this	apartheid	denies residence to expellees from my former
16	me , but to Jews all over the world . It is	apartheid	law that creates a wall of discrimination be
17	ab citizens of the Israeli state . It is an	Apartheid	mentality that prompts some Israeli Jews to
18	, the subtext is that it is reasonable for	apartheid	practices which are at the core of the state
19	his mantra , and those who try to limit the	apartheid	label to " the occupation " , are complicit
20	" the occupation " , are complicit with the	apartheid	inside pre-1967 Israel . Tough questions nee
21	ed against the post-1967 occupation and its	apartheid	practices both conceal , and thus entrench ,
22	ices both conceal , and thus entrench , the	apartheid	mentality that lies at the core of the Israe
23	y about the boundaries of the area in which	apartheid	can have free play , or should criticism be
24	-wingers agitate against the continuance of	apartheid	inside those borders ? If not , what makes a
25	inside those borders ? If not , what makes	apartheid	inside the pre-1967 borders acceptable ? If
26	the notion of Jewish statehood necessitates	apartheid	, why is this not subject to the same challe
27	ject to the same challenge as South African	apartheid	? These are questions that ought to be canva
28	he occupation " , it serves to entrench the	apartheid	ideology which is central to the essence of
29	was intended to force it to accept Israeli	apartheid	. Only when the world is ready to call by it
30	iticism of Israel . The denial of this core	apartheid	, of which the Gaza violence is a symptom ,
31	top . We should say it loud and clear . The	apartheid	system which lies at the core of Israeli sta
32	antled . It is unethical to rationalize the	apartheid	notion of a Jewish state . It is not consist
33	eid-based statehood , while criticising its	apartheid	practices in the Occupied Territories . Apar

34	eid practices in the Occupied Territories .	Apartheid	should have no sanctuary in any future visio
35	aels work in maintaining its occupation and	apartheid	policies is becoming easier with loose words
36	eir ethnicity ? Will it be an exclusivist ,	apartheid	state -- or a democracy where Jews are no mo
37	n become a " Palestinian state " which isnt	apartheid	in name only . Rights orgs : Uphold internat

CONCORDANCE OF 'APARTHEID' (in G1.2, IvP)

1	at has proven to be the winning tactic . An	Apartheid	State or the Greatest Lie Ever Told ? It tak
2	s real chutzpah to attach the South African	apartheid	label to the democratic Jewish State of Isra
3	. For the boot is truly on the other foot .	Apartheid	in South Africa was based on race and color
4	one valid way to judge whether Israel is an	apartheid	state as alleged by Palestinians in particul
5	ashamed and apologetic . The philosophy of	apartheid	was encapsulated in the slogan of the ruling
6	derogatory appellations . Israel 's Reverse	Apartheid	It must be manifestly clear to anyone except
7	we plan to absorb some 10,000 more . Unlike	apartheid	South Africa which wanted to expell its Indi
8	semblance to the practices of South African	apartheid	here in democratic Israel . If ever a lie ha
10	than a big lie , incessantly repeated . The	apartheid	lie is one of several concocted by Palestini
11	ng their policies . However the practice of	apartheid	is totally inapplicable to Israel as the fol
12	refutations make abundantly clear : Fifteen	Apartheid	Refutations * 1 . Blacks , Coloreds , Indian
13	on-Europeans " and did not have the vote in	apartheid	South Africa . Neither in Municipal , Provin
14	parties in flagrante delicto . * Legal sex	apartheid	in democratic Israel ? You have to be joking
15	men 's " entrance at back . * An unheard of	apartheid	stricture in democratic Israel . * 14 . Blac
16	in Ideology The way the Arabs use " Israeli	apartheid	" one might think they were protesting becau
17	rab 's pure Judenrein nazi ideology . The "	Apartheid	Wall A No Brainer Last but by no means least
18	s least , we must not overlook the use of "	apartheid	wall/fence " the most often repeated and del
19	often repeated and deliberate misuse of the	apartheid	calumny . South African apartheid never need
20	se of the apartheid calumny . South African	apartheid	never needed security walls , fences or barr
21	s real chutzpah to attach the South African	apartheid	label to the democratic Jewish State of Isra
22	nor does it practice major nor minor racial	apartheid	. Inclined to be practical , Israelis will n
23	th African Jews emigrated after the fall of	apartheid	, most preferred Australia or Canada to Isra
24	rade unions , condemnations of Israel as an	apartheid	state by churches , and the recent academic
25	scribed as " a colonialist power " and " an	apartheid	state . " In the small conference hall , Zio

Appendix F

	Arab culture of denial
P1	
1	The roots of the Middle East conflict began in denial and so long as death and denial are the
2	tools of the Arab religious and political leaders, the conflict will remain unresolved. Nothing
3	that anyone can do, not the Israelis, not the Europeans, not even the Americans, can change
4	this simple truth.
P2	
5	After centuries of persecution and yearning for the land that was theirs, Jews in large numbers
6	began arriving in Ottoman and then British-mandated Palestine to join and strengthen the
7	existing Jewish community. The land then, as now, was rich enough and the people creative
8	and dedicated enough, to have supported this influx.
P3	
9	Even more, the native Arabs in Palestine during this time could have benefited from this influx
10	just as the native Jewish population did. The Arab population could have joined in draining the
11	swamps in the north and making the desert bloom. They could have joined in building a country
12	that truly would have been the crossroads of the world, the center of commerce and travel and
13	tourism and research and development.
P4	
14	Instead, they denied the rights of the Jews to return to their homeland and did it with
15	violence. Then, as now, the Arabs chose the path of denial. It is a mistake they continue to
16	repeat year after year. And then, as now, the world rejected their violence and recognized the
17	right of Israel to again take its place among the nations. When the Arabs denied the Partition
18	Plan which would have given them a state in 1947, that idiocy plunged the region and the world
19	into 6 decades of violence and caused the Palestinians to raise their children to worship death
20	and darkness.
P5	
21	The Arab countries denied their Arab brothers by refusing to absorb 600-700,000 refugees,
22	leaving them for decades in squalor and poverty. There were no language, religious, economic,
23	or cultural barriers that should have prevented the Arab refugees of 1948 from easily being
24	absorbed in the Arab countries to which they emigrated. It was the culture of denial that
25	brought about generations of suffering.
P6	
26	Wars often result in an exchange of population, but rarely are those displaced so despised as
27	to remain seemingly homeless and poor through generations. A similar number, estimated between

28	600-900,000 Jews were forced to flee their homes in Arab lands. From Libya, Yemen, Lebanon,
29	Syria, Egypt, Iraq and so many other places, hundreds of thousands of Jews came to the new
30	state and were absorbed. It was a painful and slow process, but the Jews of Israel were as
31	determined to absorb as the new immigrants were to be absorbed.
P7	
32	There is no refugee problem in Israel among the Jews who came from Arab lands, because with
33	positive planning, they were given homes. Not so among the Arab nations who worshiped this
34	policy of denial and crowned it with martyrdom and hatred.
P8	
35	A refusal to accept the truth that was obvious to all, continues to plague the Palestinian
36	cause today. Today, the Palestinians not only deny the existence of the state of Israel by
37	refusing to give it "recognition," but are attempting to deny long-accepted archeological
38	evidence that under the mosques they built on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, lies the buried
39	remains of our two Holy Temples. The amazing part of their denial is not that they seek to
40	convince the world that there was no Jewish settlement here thousands of years ago, no Jewish
41	Temple, no organized religion. No, the amazing part of their denial is that they actually
42	believe their own lies.
P9	
43	When Ehud Barak met Yasir Arafat and Bill Clinton at Camp David, he made unprecedented and
44	dangerous concessions that would have seriously damaged Israel's security. To Barak's flawed
45	way of thinking, the goal of any agreement should have been peace so he was willing to
46	compromise Israel's security. We should be forever grateful that the culture of denial among
47	the Palestinians manifested itself once again, even if it did plunge us into yet another
48	Intifada.
P10	
49	And finally, we arrive at Iran's repeated denials of the Holocaust, yet another example of the
50	Arab world attempting to deny what is obvious to all. One need only visit Auschwitz and see the
51	piles of human hair, the eyeglasses, the abandoned suitcases and worst of all, the gas chambers
52	and barracks to know this was a place of great evil and death. The ashes still remain in
53	Maidanek and the bones still rise to the surface during heavy rains in Chelmno.
P11	
54	To deny the Holocaust despite massive physical evidence and the eyewitness testimonies of
55	hundreds of thousands, to deny that the Temple Mount is holy to the Jewish religion because our
56	great Temples once stood there, and to deny Israel's right to exist, are all failed attempts at
57	denying reality. Of all the concepts prevalent in the Palestinian and Arab psyche, this culture
58	of denial is perhaps the most damaging not only to the world and the quest for Middle East

59	peace, but especially to the Arabs themselves.
P12	
60	You cannot make peace with those whom you deny and until the denial stops, there is really no
61	reason for the world or Israel to even attempt to negotiate the situation. The roots of the
62	Middle East conflict began in denial so long ago and so it continues today. If things are bad
63	for the Palestinians now, amidst this culture of denial they have elevated to the level of
64	holiness, than they have no one to blame but themselves. Nothing that anyone can do, not the
65	Israelis, not the Europeans, not even the Americans, can change this simple truth.

Appendix G

	The Unmentionable Source of Terrorism
P1	
1	The current threat of attacks in countries whose governments have close alliances with
2	Washington is the latest stage in a long struggle against the empires of the west, their
3	rapacious crusades and domination. The motivation of those who plant bombs in railway
4	carriages derives directly from this truth. What is different today is that the weak have
5	learned how to attack the strong, and the western crusaders' most recent colonial terrorism
6	exposes "us" to retaliation.
P2	
7	The source of much of this danger is Israel. A creation, then guardian of the west's empire in
8	the Middle East, the Zionist state remains the cause of more regional grievance and sheer
9	terror than all the Muslim states combined. Read the melancholy Palestinian Monitor on the
10	Internet; it chronicles the equivalent of Madrid's horror week after week, month after month,
11	in occupied Palestine. No front pages in the West acknowledge this enduring bloodbath, let
12	alone mourn its victims. Moreover, the Israeli army, a terrorist organisation by any reasonable
13	measure, is protected and rewarded in the west.
P3	
14	In its current human rights report, the Foreign Office criticises Israel for its "worrying
15	disregard for human rights" and "the impact that the continuing Israeli occupation and the
16	associated military occupations have had on the lives of ordinary Palestinians."
17	Yet the Blair government has secretly authorised the sale of vast quantities of arms and terror
18	equipment to Israel. These include leg-irons, electric shock belts and chemical and biological
19	agents. No matter that Israel has defied more United Nations resolutions than any other state
20	since the founding of the world body. Last October, the UN General Assembly voted by 144 to
21	four to condemn the wall that Israel has cut through the heart of the West Bank, annexing the
22	best agricultural land, including the aquifer system that provides most of the Palestinians'
23	water. Israel, as usual, ignored the world.
P4	
24	Israel is the guard dog of America's plans for the Middle East. The former CIA analysts
25	Kathleen and Bill Christison have described how "two strains of Jewish and Christian
26	fundamentalism have dovetailed into an agenda for a vast imperial project to restructure the
27	Middle East, all further reinforced by the happy coincidence of great oil resources up for
28	grabs and a president and vice-president heavily invested in oil."
P5	

29	The "neoconservatives" who run the Bush regime all have close ties with the Likud government in
30	Tel Aviv and the Zionist lobby groups in Washington. In 1997, the Jewish Institute for National
31	Security Affairs (Jinsa) declared: "Jinsa has been working closely with Iraqi National Council
32	leader Dr Ahmad Chalabi to promote Saddam Hussein's removal from office..." Chalabi is the CIA-
33	backed stooge and convicted embezzler at present organising the next "democratic" government in
34	Baghdad.
P6	
35	Until recently, a group of Zionists ran their own intelligence service inside the Pentagon.
36	This was known as the Office of Special Plans, and was overseen by Douglas Feith, an under-
37	secretary of defence, extreme Zionist and opponent of any negotiated peace with the
38	Palestinians. It was the Office of Special Plans that supplied Downing Street with much of its
39	scuttlebutt about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; more often than not, the original source
40	was Israel.
P7	
41	Israel can also claim responsibility for the law passed by Congress that imposes sanctions on
42	Syria and in effect threatens it with the same fate as Iraq unless it agrees to the demands of
43	Tel Aviv. Israel is the guiding hand behind Bush's bellicose campaign against the "nuclear
44	threat" posed by Iran. Today, in occupied Iraq, Israeli special forces are teaching the
45	Americans how to "wall in" a hostile population, in the same way that Israel has walled in the
46	Palestinians in pursuit of the Zionist dream of an apartheid state. The author David Hirst
47	describes the "Israelisation of US foreign policy" as being "now operational as well as
48	ideological."
P8	
49	In understanding Israel's enduring colonial role in the Middle East, it is too simple to see
50	the outrages of Ariel Sharon as an aberrant version of a democracy that lost its way. The myths
51	that abound in middle-class Jewish homes in Britain about Israel's heroic, noble birth have
52	long been reinforced by a "liberal" or "left-wing" Zionism as virulent and essentially
53	destructive as the Likud strain.
P9	
54	In recent years, the truth has come from Israel's own "new historians," who have revealed that
55	the Zionist "idealists" of 1948 had no intention of treating justly or even humanely the
56	Palestinians, who instead were systematically and often murderously driven from their homes.
57	The most courageous of these historians is Ilan Pappé, an Israeli-born professor at Haifa
58	University, who, with the publication of each of his ground-breaking books, has been both
59	acclaimed and smeared. The latest is A History of Modern Palestine, in which he documents the
60	expulsion of Palestinians as an orchestrated crime of ethnic cleansing that tore apart Jews and

61	Arabs coexisting peacefully. As for the modern "peace process," he describes the Oslo
62	Accords of 1993 as a plan by liberal Zionists in the Israeli Labour Party to corral
63	Palestinians in South African-style bantustans. That they were aided by a desperate Palestinian
64	leadership made the "peace" and its "failure" (blamed on the Palestinians) no less counterfeit.
65	During the years of negotiation and raised hopes, governments in Tel Aviv secretly doubled the
66	number of illegal Jewish settlements on Palestinian land, intensified the military occupation
67	and completed the fragmentation of the 22 per cent of historic Palestine that the Palestine
68	Liberation Organisation had agreed to accept in return for recognising the state of Israel.
10	
69	Along with the late Edward Said, Ilan Pappé is the most eloquent writer of Palestinian history.
70	He is also one of the most scholarly. This combination has brought him many admirers, but
71	also enemies among Israel's academic liberal mythologists in Britain, one of whom, Stephen
72	Howe, was given the Pappé book to review in the New Statesman of 8 March. Howe often
73	appears in these pages; his style is to damn with faint praise and to set carefully the limits
74	of debate about empire, be it Irish history, the Middle East or the "war on terror." In Pappé's
75	case, what the reader doesn't know is Howe's personal link to the Israeli establishment; and
76	what Howe does not say in his review is that here for the first time is a textbook on Palestine
77	that narrates the real story as it happened: a non-Zionist version of Zionism.
11	
78	He accuses Pappé of "factual mistakes," but gives no evidence, then denigrates the book by
79	dismissing it as a footnote to another book by the Israeli historian Benny Morris, who has
80	long atoned for his own revisionist work. To its credit, Cambridge University Press has
81	published Pappé's pioneering and highly accessible work as an authoritative history. This
82	means that the "debate" over Israel's origins is ending, regardless of what the empire's
83	apologists say.

Appendix H

	America and Israel: You and Me against the World
P1	
1	"You and Me Against the World" is the title of a wonderful romantic song by
2	Gladys Knight and the Pips that I enjoyed immensely. It's a song of a love so
3	strong that it can withstand all the world's pressures and disapprovals.
4	America, my country 'tis of thee, and Israel's faux faux love affair have ruined
5	the song for me.
P2	
6	Tragically, now when I hear this song it only conjures up images of hate,
7	oppression, lies, weapons, hypocrisy, double standards, political intimidation,
8	cowardice, the buying and selling of values, morals, and principles; a corrupt
9	media, a naïve people being taken advantage of, and worst of all, the "ethnic
10	cleansing" of a people from their land and homes by an "ethnic race" cleansed
11	of all responsibility for the deliberate murder of Christian and Muslim children
12	in the Holy Land, the land of Palestine.
P3	
13	The history of the "special" relationship between Israel and America has been
14	extensively documented by many historians and scholars, including Israeli
15	and American Jewish scholars. Unfortunately, for the west and especially for us,
16	Americans, these books are deliberately kept out of our bookstores and libraries
17	for politically kosher reasons. It's the same old story of the powerful American
18	Jewish lobby ensuring that very little if any truth or criticism of Israel
19	is ever publicized. Hell hath no fury like "Israel" scorned.
P4	
20	Given America's downsized attention span and its lack of desire to be
21	enlightened beyond what's easily spoon fed by our media, I'll try to simplify
22	how this detrimental "special" relationship between a country of 4 million Jews,
23	Israel, and America began and how this binary relationship defies the rest of
24	the world's sense of peace and justice. You see, for centuries Christian
25	Europe had a problem. A problem prejudicially called "The Jewish Problem".
26	Christians didn't like the exclusivity of Jews, their lack of assimilation and
27	withdrawal into their religious and social world, their strange language and
28	customs, and of course there's that "Christ Killers" charge. So they
29	persecuted and killed the Jews over time culminating in the horrors of the

30 Holocaust. Escaping Jews found peace, freedom, respect, and sanctuary in
31 the--ready for this America--"Islamic" world. There they prospered like never
32 before in all fields to the point that the famous Jewish physician theologian
33 philosopher Moses Maimonides was the personal physician to Saladin.
34 Europe had only one way to deal with its people "problems"--kill them or
35 export them. Thus Europeans formulated the idea of "Zionism" later adopted and
36 developed by Theodore Herzl as a political ideology to export the Jews to
37 Palestine. Although Zionism was adopted by European secular Jews, the
38 majority of the world's Jewry especially Orthodox Jews rejected Zionism on
39 political and religious grounds.

P5

40 Thus after World I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, England and
41 France divided "their" Middle East into crude countries and borders. Palestine
42 was taken by England to counter French influence. Under Jewish pressure and
43 England's desire to curry favor with American Jews to draw America into
44 the war, Lord Balfour, England's Foreign Minister, wrote a letter of 68 words to
45 a rich Jew, Lord Rothschild, supporting the establishment of "a" Jewish
46 homeland in Palestine as long as the Non-Jews were taken care of. After
47 WWII, America became the dominant western power. In addition, the
48 Holocaust cemented into the psyche of every westerner the horrors of Jews
49 being murdered. The world was motivated to finally settle these Jews in
50 Palestine. Harry Truman, to curry favor with New York's Jews in his election
51 (a pattern followed since then, lately by the newest Islamophobe Hilary
52 Clinton) pressured the U.N. to adopt a resolution approving the Balfour
53 Declaration and a plan to partition Palestine into two states for the Jews and
54 Palestinians. The Jews to this day are shocked at why the Palestinians didn't
55 simply agree to the idea of partition which could have settled the matter
56 peacefully forever. Here's JEWISH logic for you---Palestinians should have
57 accepted that foreign powers thousands of miles away because of two pieces
58 of paper and their own domestic politics give Jews the right to take 56% of
59 your home (actually the best part of the house) for a small population while
60 Palestinians who own the house get to keep 44% of the home (the worst part)
61 for a larger population. Obviously, if Palestinians only accepted that
62 agreement we wouldn't be fighting today. But no, they refused. So the Jews
63 take advantage of their stronger military and take more land, another 22
64 percent of the house. So now the Palestinians only live in 22% of their original

65	land. Of course the world is angry at this injustice just after they gave Jews a
66	land they never had. So the U.N. starts protesting and passing resolution after
67	resolution saying you can't do that. But, you see Jews have an ace in the
68	Security Council. It's Uncle Sam-uel. American Jews make sure that no
69	President, no Congressman, no media, no Hollywood, no publishing
70	company, in short no words ever leaks to the American people about the truth
71	of how the Zionist Jews massacred the poor Palestinians, wiped 500 villages
72	from the map, destroyed every mosque and church (yes, church, there are
73	Palestinian Christians), and expelled 800,000 Palestinians on foot out of their
74	homes into refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring Arab
75	countries. Instead let's make romantic movies about Jews, let's publish
76	Exodus, let's begin the "Greatest Story Never Told' Campaign to ensure Israel
77	is right and good, Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims are bad. You see, we
78	Americans like things simple and direct. Just tell me what to believe. From
79	then on, the power of American Jews only grew and grew and they became
80	bolder about their lies. Wait, the Jews are still greedy for the rest of the
81	house. Thus, in 1967, they launch a preemptive war against the Palestinians (and
82	Arabs) and now occupy the whole house-100% of the Palestinian home.
83	That ended any freedom, justice, peace, dignity, livelihood, freedom of
84	movement, education, jobs, as well as any sense of a home or homeland for the
85	Palestinians. Now all of Palestine is under Israel's military control and
86	occupation. The historical, geographic, and demographic hijacking, erasure and
87	eradication of Palestine was complete.
P6	
88	No other historical precedent exists for a people and a land to be physically
89	eradicated as a home for one race, to be totally transformed as a home for an
90	invading race, except for Palestine. A total transformation accomplished with
91	remarkable blitzkrieg under the sponsorship and support of "my country-land of
92	liberty of thee I sing". The United Nations Security Council drew a "line in the
93	sand" adopting UN Resolutions 242, 338 demanding Israel withdraw its occupation
94	from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Of course this is Israel not Iraq.
95	UN Resolutions are meaningless even it was introduced by the U.S.
P7	
96	Hence, dear America, you became the "sucker" for anything Jewish and Israeli.
97	What began for America as an emotionally sympathetic adoption of Israel after
98	the Holocaust has now become an overwhelming intimidating force that doesn't

99 even allow our government, our media, nor we Americans the opportunity to think
100 or question our policy toward Israel. Now no one dares say Israel is bad for
101 killing babies with our weapons and taxes. Yes, our taxes. Every American has
102 sent every Israeli over \$22,000 since 1949 to the tune of \$150 Billion. Can you
103 use that money for your kid's college tuition? In fact, we're sending a very
104 rich country, richer than most European countries and richer than most U.S.
105 states about one third of all our foreign aid to the world. That's like me
106 sending Bill Gates welfare check every month. But do you think our cowardly
107 Congress will ever stop this aid? Not in your life if they know what's good for
108 them. Anyone who's dared question Israel's aid only drives rich Jewish
109 organizations to work to defeat them in the next election--Like Senators
110 Fulbright and Percy. A lesson not lost on any of our politicians. What this
111 means is that 5 million Jews in our country, less than two percent of our
112 population, actually dictate and formulate our foreign policy and protect Israel
113 at every turn. Forget the bunk that this is ANTI-SEMITISM (I am a Semite). This
114 is American PATRIOTISM and standing up for our values of freedom, self-
115 determination, justice and human rights for all people; in this case the
116 Palestinian people. While Israel for the last ten weeks has been killing
117 Palestinian children daily, launching air and sea attacks on homes at night,
118 destroying farm land and uprooting olive trees, starving them with closures, and
119 even firing on ambulances (all of this is documented by every human rights
120 organizations and the United Nations), Israel in our media and by our
121 shameful politicians from Clinton, Albright, and Congress is portrayed as being
122 "besieged" by stones and its very survival is in question. That's also the usual
123 BUNK. Israel is the fourth largest powerful army with nuclear weapons all of
124 which they received or stole from us as well as sell to our enemies. Israeli
125 LOGIC: we are the victims because their stones hurt our feelings while we've
126 killed over 300 of them and wounded 13,000 while only 25 of us are dead. Please
127 somebody, help them with a massive Prozac shower.

P8

128 It never fails that whenever the United Nations General Assembly that includes
129 almost all of the world's nations takes up the Palestinian issue, the entire
130 world votes to condemn Israel while the only two countries voting against these
131 resolutions are you guessed---AMERICA AND ISRAEL. According to Israeli logic---
132 the entire world is ANTISEMITIC and hates Israel. I wonder why the entire world
133 hates Israel and by extension hates us?

P9	
134	Does that explain why the world is up in arms against us, killing our military
135	and diplomatic personnel, committing terrorist acts, burn our flag, want to
136	boycott our products, even want to go to war against us—all because we're
137	DUMB enough and cowardly enough to succumb to America's powerful
138	Jewish lobby? Is this our country or what? American Jews enjoy unparalleled
139	success in this country in all fields. You can't turn on a TV news program
140	without seeing an American Jew "expert" speaking on Islam or on any
141	subject. Are there no Muslims in this country, no Catholics, no Protestants, no
142	African Americans, no Native Americans, no Cubans etc. to speak on topics
143	impacting them? Our own Senate has 11 Jewish Senators without a single
144	Black, Hispanic, or Muslim Senator. Maybe that's why our Congress is considered
145	a rubber stamp body for Israel's Knesset (parliament) by the world.
146	Our newspapers should be renamed from the New York Times and
147	Washington Post to the Tel Aviv Times and Post.
P10	
148	To be fair, there are many American Jews, European Jews, and Israeli Jews who
149	understand the paradox of a country founded on the Holocaust and
150	Judaism that has become a military killing machine of Palestinians civilians.
151	Unfortunately, they are like you and me, intimidated or relegated to the
152	sidelines unable to reach our media or politicians. Israel does NOT represent
153	ALL Jews nor does it represent Judaism. It's simply an extension of European
154	imperialism and expansionism selling itself as a "strategic friend and ally" to
155	the west serving as the western "colony" in a hostile world first against
156	Communism and now against the greater evil of "Islamic Fundamentalism".
P11	
157	Whether we like it or not, my American friends, Israel's song of "YOU AND
158	ME AGAINST THE WORLD" lacks political, economic, or military sense.
159	Israel is a liability to us in the Middle East and to the Islamic world. It
160	truly is America's Achilles Heel. It makes no sense that our priority should be
161	with one nation of four million in lieu of relationships with 60 Islamic nations
162	with 1.3 Billion people. We send Israel money while all those countries send us
163	their money to purchase our products. Europe, Russia, China, and Japan are
164	supportive of the Palestinians and doing good business with the Islamic world
165	while we can't even ask Israel why it bombed and killed our sailors on the
166	USS Liberty in 1967. Our Congress funds the Holocaust Museum in

167	Washington DC while denying funds to our WWII Veteran Memorial. That is
168	outrageous.
P12	
169	Israel is detrimental to our values, economy, sense of justice and national
170	interest. We maybe drawn into a war we don't want nor need because of
171	Israel's military aggressions that we end up paying for and its unmatched
172	influence on our government and institutions. Our sons and daughters are
173	already dying in the Middle East because of Israel but many more will die if
174	we don't act firmly with Israel and end this conflict based on peace for Israel
175	and justice for the Palestinians as outlined by the UN Resolution 242 that
176	America introduced in 1967 and that Israel has thumbed its nose at. If we
177	don't, America won't have peace and security and our children will die and our
178	economy will suffer. Clinton and his Jewish foreign policy team want to send
179	Israel \$480 Million in military emergency aid to replenish the bullets and
180	rockets that tore Palestinians flesh.
P13	
181	Don't just sit there my friend, tell Congress what Rabin said in the White House
182	in 1993-'ENOUGH IS ENOUGH". For me, I'm mad as hell and I can't take this
183	anymore. Can You?

