The routine arming of the police in Britain, the right to life and the security theory of John Locke and Benedict de Spinoza

Abstract

Unlike the police in Northern Ireland, officers in mainland Britain are not routinely armed. But the greater weaponisation of the police in the UK is on the increase. As more officers are trained in – and are more comfortable in carrying – a weapon, the opposition to the routine arming of the police, at least from rank-and-file officers, weakens. Natural opposition to the idea of all UK officers being armed comes from rights groups, concerned about the right to life implications for victims: not only in the greater risk of arbitrary killing by the state, but also the impunity for offending officers.

This reticence to the routine arming of the police reflects the classic liberal approach that citizens must be protected from the actions of the state, especially where fundamental human rights such as the right to life are threatened. But does this traditional approach unduly monopolise the human rights debate? Perhaps there is an argument to say that, rather than the right to life being in outright opposition to the routine arming of the police, it can in fact support it? In many human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights individuals have a right to life, liberty and security, as per Article 3. One inference to be drawn is that these three elements of Article 3 are mutually dependent and the preservation of life cannot be maintained without security. Thus, a routine arming of the police in the UK, in hastening security, should have the effect of providing greater protection for life rather than undermining it. The purpose of this piece is to explore conceptual arguments relating to the right to life to see if the traditional approach to the right, which has largely concentrated on the arbitrary killing of individuals, has unfairly dominated the rights discourse, ignoring an equally justifiable argument for the routine arming of the police in the UK.